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Attitude Formation and Change

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DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24004-X

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From Crano, W.D., Gardikiotis, A., 2015. Attitude Formation and Change. In: James D.
Wright (editor-in-chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol 2. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 169–174.
ISBN: 9780080970868
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.
Elsevier
 Author's personal copy

Attitude Formation and Change

William D Crano, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA, USA
Antonis Gardikiotis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
This article is a revision of the previous edition article by S. Chaiken, volume 2, pp. 899–905, Ó 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

This article presents a summary of developments in the study of attitude formation and attitude change, two defining features
of social psychology from its inception as an empirical science. Research on conceptualizations of change is discussed, as are
variables implicated as attitude change agents. The interconnection of implicitly and explicitly measured attitudes is dis-
cussed, along with models devised to account for their mutual interplay.

Study of attitude formation and change is a central preoccu- Attitude Formation and Change
pation of social psychology, and has been so from the begin-
ning days of the discipline (Prislin and Crano, 2012). Research Partly in response to Johnson and Eagly’s (1990) stout critique
on attitudes provides an aperture into the conceptual system, of the field’s failure to differentiate attitude formation from
supplies insights on complexities of human social behavior, change, investigators have attended more closely to the
and suggests how actions are affected by beliefs, and how distinction between these two cognitive processes. The best
beliefs affect actions. Advances in measurement, necessary for research on attitude change focuses on beliefs that are relevant
the scientific study of any phenomenon, were driven in the to the individuals under study, whereas investigations of atti-
early days of attitude research by Louis Thurstone (1931), tude formation are concerned with how attitudes develop in
whose pioneering efforts conveyed the concept of attitude from the first place.
speculation to operation. His insights were advanced and
refined by Likert (1932) and Osgood et al. (1957), among
Attitude Formation
others. Thurstone’s view of attitudes as fundamentally evalua-
tive was carried forward by his intellectual successors, and the Early research on attitude formation, initiated when learning-
field has largely followed this lead, though current views also based models were in vogue, tested the possibility that atti-
include cognition and affect in definitions of the construct (e.g., tudes could be established via classical or operant conditioning
“An attitude represents an evaluative integration of cognitions procedures. Both approaches were consistent with Thurstone’s
and affects experienced in relation to an object” (Crano and assumption that attitudes were fundamentally affective. Using
Prislin, 2006: p. 347). classical conditioning processes, Staats and Staats (1958)
Beyond measurement, programmatic experimentation on found that consistent association of positively valenced
attitudes and attitude change grew largely from the efforts of words (e.g., gift, sacred, happy) with a national name (e.g.,
Carl Hovland and his research group at Yale, where much of the Dutch, Swedish) resulted in significantly more positive ratings
foundational research on persuasion was undertaken (Hovland of the national name than when the same name was associated
et al., 1953). Hovland’s work affirmed Allport’s (1935: p. 395) with negatively valenced words (e.g., bitter, ugly, failure). This
earlier appraisal that identified attitudes as social psychology’s result held after subjects who claimed awareness of the study’s
‘most distinctive and indispensable concept.’ Although other purpose were removed from the analysis, though this proce-
actors have made their entrance on social psychology’s stage dure’s utility has been challenged (Kattner et al., 2012; Stahl
since that time, attitude formation and change maintains the et al., 2009). Operant conditioning, too, can affect expres-
lead role. sions of attitude. Insko (1965) verbally reinforced (good)
Two fundamentally divergent views of the construct university students for agreeing with positive or negative
currently vie for adherents: the traditional position follows statements about a campus issue. This operant procedure
from and extends Thurstone’s original evaluative emphasis, in clearly influenced responses. Furthermore, the effects persisted
which attitudes are conceptualized as enduring and stable when students’ attitudes were assessed 1 week later in
structures that are stored in memory and vary in strength, a different context, by different researchers with the critical
which determines the attitude’s stability and likelihood of attitude items buried in a longer ‘Local issues questionnaire.’
affecting behavior (Fazio, 2007; Petty and Brinõl, 2009). The Awareness of reinforcement contingencies is not a strong rival
alternative (constructionist) position also hews to the evalua- explanation of the persistent effects Insko reported.
tive nature of attitudes, but holds that attitudes are not stored More recent research on evaluative conditioning (EC) mirrors
in memory, but rather are constructed judgments influenced by the findings of the classical conditioning school, but its
the context in which they are assessed (Schwarz, 2007). Inter- proponents point to different underlying processes to explain
mediate positions (e.g., Crano and Prislin, 2006) can accom- conditioning effects. In the usual EC study, a picture of
modate either the traditional or constructivist views, and may a neutral, unknown human face is presented repeatedly with
provide a means of integrating both camps. a liked or disliked face, resulting in the originally neutral face

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24004-X 169

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 169–174
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170 Attitude Formation and Change

taking on the evaluative tone of the valenced one. The mere considerations of implicit and explicit attitudes, though his
association of evaluative cues is sufficient for attitude forma- theory of communication and persuasion implies strong inter-
tion. This position has many adherents (e.g., Forgas, 2008; relatedness between them; that is, that explicit opinions and
Walther and Langer, 2010), but it is not without critics who implicit attitudes were strongly associated, and that large
maintain that cognitions (beliefs) and their associated evalu- discrepancies, resulting in unpleasant cognitive disequilibrium
ations, not mere affect, are the foundation of attitudes or imbalance, would create the conditions for change.
(Fishbein and Middlestadt, 1995). The weight of evidence
favors the ‘mere affective association’ position, but whether EC
Message Design, Elaboration, and Counterargumentation
can affect strong and highly vested attitudes remains at issue.
Contrary to results in classical conditioning, some have Hovland et al. (1953) assumed that if a persuasive message were
found that EC effects are strongest when respondents are noticed and relevant to the individual, it would be considered
unaware of the contingency between conditioned and uncon- carefully (i.e., elaborated). This elaboration process, which
ditioned stimuli (De Houwer et al., 2001). However, contro- involved careful consideration of the persuader’s arguments,
versy surrounding this position remains (Gawronski and also was accompanied by a defensive response called counter-
Walther, 2012; Kattner et al., 2012). This issue is important argumentation, which protected established beliefs. Thus,
as it bears on the effects of implicit attitudes on actions and developing methods to overcome counterargumentation was
explicit beliefs (Greenwald et al., 1998), the focus of consid- the central goal of persuasion in Hovland’s scheme. To realize
erable interest today. What appear noncontroversial are the this objective, it was necessary that a persuasive message raises
distinctions between classical and evaluative conditioning. The a question in the receiver’s mind about the legitimacy or validity
latter, for example, apparently is not dependent on temporal of an established attitude. Furthermore, to succeed, the
contiguity between the unconditioned and conditioned communication had to provide an answer to the question that
stimuli. Furthermore, linkages formed by evaluative condi- suggested the appropriate response. Hovland’s model was
tioning seem considerably more resistant to extinction than developed when social psychology was strongly influenced by
classically conditioned associations (Walther and Langer, learning theory. Consistent with this then-popular approach, it
2008). These differences suggest the more widespread use of was assumed that opinions were learned and that new learning
evaluative conditioning in field settings, especially in applica- was needed to overlay old knowledge in producing change.
tions involving attitude formation, that is, on issues on which Attitude change was viewed as a function of message learning,
no firmly established belief exists. and so factors thought to reinforce learning and acceptance of
the persuader’s position, thus resulting in ‘attitude change,’ were
the fundamental variables of study. Many variables have been
Attitude Change
shown to influence the attitude change process in ways pre-
Study of attitude change logically presupposes preexisting dicted by Hovland and associates, even though the underlying
attitudes, which may vary in terms of strength and centrality. link between message learning and attitude change often was
An essential task of the attitude change researcher is to under- not evident, even in research that succeeded in changing atti-
stand the factors that render an individual more or less tudes. An abbreviated sampling of some of the most established
susceptible to persuasion. A standard assumption in almost all persuasion variables is presented on the following pages.
of the foundational theories is that people strive to attain and
maintain valid beliefs. Consistent with this assumption is the
Source
expectation that the more self-relevant the attitude, the more
difficult it will be to change. These assumptions have formed Features of the source of a persuasive communication have
the basis of considerable research in traditional studies of proven important to the success or failure of an attempt at
attitude change. influence. In Hovland’s learning-based model, being in agree-
ment (and identified) with a respected message source was
reinforcing, thus prompting acceptance of the position
Hovland’s Base Model advanced. Source credibility, as this variable is commonly
termed, was defined as a function of the source’s expertise –
The formative model of attitude change was developed by its capacity to provide valid information – and the source’s
Hovland et al. (1953), who made a critical but often overlooked trustworthiness – its willingness to provide honest information
distinction between attitudes and opinions. Attitudes were independent of self-interest. Sources of high levels of expertise
thought to involve nonverbalizable, often unconscious implicit and trustworthiness induce considerably more change than
approach–avoidance tendencies; opinions, on the other hand, those that do not possess these features. It should be noted,
were the verbal answers that one produced overtly or covertly to however, that source credibility effects often prove ephemeral,
questions regarding the evaluation of a person or object. The an aspect of the persuasion equation noted even in the earliest
technology of Hovland’s time precluded study of implicit studies of this variable (Hovland and Weiss, 1951).
cognitive–behavioral responses (attitudes), and so by his defi-
nition, ‘attitude change’ research actually focused on opinions
Minority versus Majority Sources of Influence
(explicit evaluative judgments), expressed and assessed on stan-
dard attitude measures. (To maintain consistency with contem- An exciting extension of research on source credibility devel-
porary usage, we will use the terms interchangeably.) Hovland’s oped from Moscovici’s (1980) seminal work on the influence
stress on the implicit nature of attitudes foreshadowed current of minority groups on the majority. After Moscovici,

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 169–174
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Attitude Formation and Change 171

considerable research was conducted to study the different unimportant to the receiver. This is one of many reasons why it
effects of majority and minority message sources on persua- is easier to persuade receivers to accept a message on topics on
sion. The literature indicates that both the minority and the which they are not vested. Contexts that occupy cognitive
majority can induce influence, but the cognitive processes resources also are expected to disrupt counterargumentation,
underlying change in response to one the other of these groups and thus, increase the likelihood of successful persuasion. Petty
are different and produce differences in the longevity of the et al. (1976) showed that distraction inhibited the dominant
altered beliefs (Crano, 2012; Crano and Alvaro, 1998). Attitude cognitive response to a persuasive communication. Thus,
change usually occurs rapidly in response to a majority-sourced distraction enhanced attitude change when the dominant
communication, but such change typically does not persist response was negative, as often is found with illogical and
because it is based, theoretically, on threat and social pressure, poorly argued communications. However, distraction inter-
and not on careful message elaboration. fered with the positive cognitive responses that typically follow
Conversely, minorities rarely evoke immediate change; from elaboration of logical and strongly argued communica-
rather, if the minority is a part of the majority (i.e., if it is an tions. In this case, distraction inhibited attitude change.
in-group minority), and it is active – that is, willing to take the This research laid the groundwork for Petty and Cacioppo’s
risk involved in confronting majority group members – then the (1986) elaboration likelihood model of attitude change
majority may change attitudes on issues related, but not iden- (see Persuasion Theories).
tical to the focus of the minority’s communication. Further-
more, if this indirect change of majority members’ attitudes is
Overload
sufficiently large, a delayed change may occur on the attitude
that was the original focus of the minority’s persuasive Research on ‘cognitive busyness’ suggests that individuals
communication. Crano and Alvaro (1998) and Martin and working under cognitive load are less able to counterargue, and
Hewstone (2008) have suggested theoretical models that thus, are more susceptible to persuasive communications
account for this unusual but often observed pattern of results. (Gilbert et al., 1988). This hypothesis can be augmented by
considering message quality. As in research on distraction and
persuasion, it is likely that cognitive overload enhances the
Fear Arousal
relative persuasive power of weak messages by attenuating
If positive reinforcement of a behavior results in a higher negative cognitive responses, but weakens the persuasiveness of
likelihood of the behavior’s being repeated, then the rein- strong and logical messages by moderating positive responses,
forcement experienced by avoiding a negative behavioral which lead to message acceptance. If nothing else, research on
outcome should induce avoidance of the behavior. This logic is distraction and cognitive load counsel against simple univar-
the basis of considerable research on emotional or fear- iate explanations of complex human behavior, a theme that is
arousing communications, which have an enormous appeal replicated throughout the literature on persuasion.
in applied research contexts (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, or drug
prevention, lifestyle changes). Unfortunately, many such
Mood
applications have been mounted by change agents who appear
to misunderstand the principles involved in their use. It is Early research on the effects of mood on susceptibility to atti-
critical to understand the way reinforcement operates when tude change suggested that positive moods rendered receivers
using fear arousing communications to promote attitude unlikely to elaborate persuasive communications carefully.
change. Thus, to threaten an individual with dire consequences Those in a positive mood state seemed susceptible to attitude
for, say, using methamphetamines would not be expected to change regardless of the quality of the persuasive communi-
succeed if the target of the message is already concerned about cation. Message quality was thought to be a more important
the practice (e.g., is a user of the substance). Avoiding a nega- factor for those in neutral or negative mood states (Mackie and
tive outcome is reinforcing, but if the targeted behavior is Worth, 1989). Findings based on Wegener et al. (1995)
ongoing, the fear-arousing message, not the proscribed hedonic contingency hypothesis, however, suggests a some-
behavior, is the likely candidate for avoidance (Witte, 1992). what different interpretation. In Wegener and associates’ view,
This type of communication can be effective if it is not over- a happy mood state enhances message processing if the
done with threats the target finds unrealistic (Skenderian et al., communication does not threaten to ruin the happy mood, or
2008) or punishing (i.e., threatens negative outcomes for if the message is uplifting. However, if the message is
ongoing behavior), and the message is presented by a credible depressing, happy people are less likely to process it. Happy
source who offers a way of effectively avoiding the threatened people, it seems, are intent on remaining so, and thus are likely
consequences of the behavior. Without satisfying these to seek out information that supports this goal. Unhappy
requirements, fear-arousing messages are likely to produce no people, on the other hand, seem motivated to alleviate their
change or, in the worst case scenarios, iatrogenic effects as negative state, and thus will process information that might
a result of message rejection, possibly brought about by source result in a happy ending. This possibility was supported in
derogation or psychological reactance (Brehm, 2000). Hullett’s (2005: p. 423) meta-analysis of research on the
mood–persuasion association, which found that “participants’
processing of messages seemed to be motivated toward
Distraction
attaining or maintaining positive moods.”
Counterarguing draws upon scarce cognitive resources. Thus, it This emphasis on the hedonic consequences of a persuasive
is not likely to be engaged in contexts involving issues that are communication anticipated research that indicated that

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 169–174
 Author's personal copy
172 Attitude Formation and Change

positively framed communications were more persuasive for cognitive system, however, appears to press for consistency
participants in positive than negative mood states, especially among beliefs.
when the communication was strong and logical. For those in
negative mood states, the hedonistic consequences of message
Implicit and Explicit Attitude Measurement and Change
framing and quality were less important, as most messages
would be likely to improve mood, and hence were not elabo- Feather’s (2004) description of ambivalent attitudes as
rated carefully (Wegener et al., 1995). reflecting the simultaneous possession of positive and negative
attitudes toward the same object of judgment provides the
basis for a deeper understanding of implicitly and explicitly
Misdirection
measured attitudes. Implicit, often nonverbalizable attitudes
One would not expect an individual to counterargue are thought to develop slowly, the result of a consistent pairing
a persuasive communication if it was addressed to another of an unconditioned with a conditioned stimulus. They are
person. This expectation was confirmed by Walster and slower to change than explicit attitudes, which are formed more
Festinger (1962), who found that an ‘overheard’ communi- rapidly as a function of “evaluative judgments that are based on
cation induced considerably more attitude change than an syllogistic inferences” (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006:
identical message targeted to the receiver. This misdirection p. 694). Research by Rydell et al. (2006) anticipated this view
effect, as it has come to be called, is based on the logic of by showing that implicitly and explicitly measured attitudes
counterargumentation Hovland et al. (1953) advanced, and were formed in different ways, and, importantly, were suscep-
represents an interesting technique used to circumvent resis- tible to different persuasive processes.
tance. It has been used successfully in many persuasion The standard models of attitude change (e.g., Petty and
contexts. For instance, apparently misdirected messages were Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1980) were developed before the
shown to be strongly persuasive in antidrug research technology to assess attitudes implicitly was commonly avail-
involving young adolescents, a group that usually is resistant able, and hence were focused on change of explicit attitudes. In
to such communications. The results of an experiment by the meantime, with technological advances, new models of
Crano et al. (2007), for example, indicated that youth who attitude structure and change were developed to account for the
had received a communication apparently directed toward interaction of implicit and explicit beliefs. Gawronski and
their parents were significantly more affected by it than were Bodenhausen’s (2006: p. 693) associative–propositional eval-
adolescents to whom the communication was addressed uation (APE) model, for example, “specifies causes of implicit
directly. The communications themselves differed by only and explicit attitude change and how changes in one kind of
a few words in the introduction, which specified the apparent evaluation may or may not be associated with changes in the
audience of the message, parents or their children. other.” This is not to suggest that the ‘standard’ models cannot
also account for the newly available – if not newly theorized –
features of attitudes; the possible conflict of implicit and
Ambivalence
explicit attitudes can be seen as compatible with attitude
To this point, attitudes have been discussed as unidimen- models developed before implicit attitudes even could be
sional like–dislike, evaluative constructs. Research on attitude assessed. Petty and Briñol (2009), for example, described one
ambivalence suggests that this conceptualization may be such integration in their metacognitive model (MCM) of atti-
incomplete. Attitudes may possess positive and negative tude structure. In the MCM, evaluative associations can be
evaluations simultaneously, thus generating the experience of formed in many ways, and to the extent that they are implicit or
ambivalence (Newby-Clark et al., 2002). Distinguishing below awareness, are treated as valid. If the holder of an
ambivalent from neutral attitudes has attracted considerable implicit attitude is unaware of its existence, it is not subject to
research attention (Conner and Armitage, 2008), suggesting dispute or direct falsification. Incongruity between attitudes
the importance of the distinction. High levels of ambivalence measured with implicit or explicit measures can induce evalu-
are associated with weaker attitude–behavior relations, and ative change on either the implicit or the explicit belief. These
less resistance to counterattitudinal communications (Conner changes are predictable, and in part a function of the circum-
and Armitage, 2008). The development of ambivalent atti- stances under which the incongruity was induced. A strong
tudes, as distinct from neutral attitudes, is viewed by some as persuasive attack on an explicit attitude, for example, would be
the result of contradictory values (Feather, 2004), which expected to affect the explicit attitude; if successful (i.e., if the
suggests why contradictory evaluations of the same object explicit measure indicated attitude change in the advocated
may be expressed by the same individual at different times, direction), movement on the implicit attitude might result as
depending on the social context in which the evaluation is well, likely as a function of the preference for cognitive
elicited. This is not to suggest that attitudinal ambivalence is consistency noted earlier. An intriguing prediction from the
a positive or sought-after state. It should be understood that MCM is that the more extreme the discrepancy between explicit
the motivation to maintain consistency among cognitions is and implicit attitudes, the greater will be the accommodation
strong (Gawronski and Strack, 2012), and research has high- of one or the other when pressure for congruity motivates
lighted the ways in which explicit attitudes affect implicit attitude change. Supportive evidence for this expectation is
ones, and vice versa, to establish the preferred and probably found in the literature on minority-induced indirect attitude
normative state of cognitive balance (Peters and Gawronski, change, where minorities often induce the majority to change
2011). As will be discussed, both poles of an ambivalent on issues related, but not identical to the thrust of the
attitude may affect the other; the general dynamic of the persuasive attack (Moscovici, 1980). Research has shown that

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 169–174
 Author's personal copy
Attitude Formation and Change 173

extremity of indirect change is associated with likelihood of Crano, W.D., Alvaro, E.M., 1998. The context/comparison model of social influence:
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