S-400 battery deployed near Elektrostal, Russia

Editor’s Comments Table of Contents

This month, I&A returns for 2012 with Air Defense
a selection of features primarily focused on The DPRK’s SAM Network (Sean O’Connor) 1
worldwide missile systems. Facility Analysis
The new regime in the DPRK HQ-9 Pads (Sean O’Connor) 9
Imagery Highlight
provides an incentive to examine the air
Russia’s S-400 Batteries (Sean O’Connor) 13
defense network of the nation, highlighting Facility Analysis
its strengths and weaknesses stemming Chinese DF-31 Garrisons (Sean O’Connor) 15
from layered architecture and overreliance Source List
on aging Soviet-era technology. Source List 19
Continuing with air defense, the What Is It?
PRC’s HQ-9 complexes are re-investigated January 2012 Rear cover
to determine the functional purpose of
unidentified features. Russia’s first two
operational S-400 batteries are also
detailed.
Finally, the PRC’s mobile ICBM
garrisons are identified to highlight similar
features, aiding in the future identification of
deployed units.
I&A returns in March 2012 to its
monthly schedule, and hopes to bring a
wealth of new and interesting features
during the new year.

Sean O’Connor

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Publishing Information
I&A Volume 2, Number 1 (January/February 2012)
Self-published by Sean O’Connor (Editor)
Cover image courtesy of Google Earth.

Disclaimer
I&A is an open-source publication. As such, I&A only references publicly available material when
researching and authoring the features contained herein. All sources referenced appear in a list at
the end of each issue, organized by the articles that they were used to create. Refer any
questions regarding the source material or the content presented herein to the editor.
Air Defense with early warning radar coverage, used for
SAM system target acquisition and track
The DPRK’s Strategic handoff, and GCI control of fighter units.
SAM Network Primarily consolidated in the southern half of
the nation, these EW sites provide substantial
Sean O’Connor
coverage of the capital and the DMZ.
The Democratic People's Republic of
Identified EW radars operating in the
Korea fields one of the most capable third-
DPRK are predominately Soviet-era systems,
world strategic SAM networks on paper.
although Chinese hardware is also in use.
However, despite the high concentration of
How well the Chinese system integrates with
strategic SAM batteries and EW sites, there
the rest of the FSU-era equipment remains
are significant issues in the network that need
unknown, but it is potentially not a problem
attention in the near future. Ignoring these
given that China operates a number of Soviet
issues places the DPRK at risk from overflight.
and Russian systems.
EW Coverage
The following EW assets serve in the
DPRK, as evidenced by their presence in
Fifty-one EW sites provide the DPRK

1
imagery: Interestingly, the only strategic SAM
system possessing a visible organic EW
• P-12/18 (SPOON REST) system is the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), with
• P-14 (TALL KING) each site containing a P-14 radar. S-75 (SA-2
• P-35/37 (BAR LOCK) GUIDELINE) and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries
• P-80 (BACK NET) do not appear to field any organic EW
• 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) elements, in which case they must rely on
• JY-8 (WALL RUST) either the external network or the limited
• JLP-40 functionality of their engagement radars to
provide target acquisition and track generation.
The US DoD reports that the following Alternatively, the lack of identification of
radars are also in service: organic EW assets at S-75 and S-125 sites
may result from either insufficient imagery
resolution or large amounts of vegetation found
• 5N69 (BIG BACK)
at S-75 sites.
• P-8/10 (KNIFE REST)
• P-15 (FLAT FACE) A further EW system available to the
• P-15M (SQUAT EYE) DPRK is the Ramona passive detection
• PRV-11 (SIDE NET) system. The advantage to the Ramona is that
• PRV-13 (ODD PAIR) it does not radiate, allowing it to be relocated to
complicate targeting with considerably more
Most DPRK EW sites appear to be host ease than a strategic SAM battery. The
to a single example of one radar type. Other Ramona system has not been located in
radars, especially smaller units such as those available imagery, but is believed to be a
of the P-12/18 series, may be present but not leftover Soviet system, emplaced and operated
visible in available imagery. Alternatively, they by the USSR.
may remain in reserve to expand the network
when required, or may reside at locations not Strategic SAM Force
yet located. AAA sites are common at both
EW and SAM sites to provide additional The DPRK's strategic SAM assets are
defense. subordinate to the Air Force. The Air Force
operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment,
including strategic SAM systems and
supporting EW assets. The following strategic
SAM systems are currently in service: S-75, S-
125, and S-200. The overwhelming majority of
the deployed strategic SAM assets are located
along the DMZ and the coasts.

General Characteristics
System Range Altitude Guidance
S-75 7-43 km 400-30,000 m Command
S-125M 4-25 km 20-18,000 m Command
S-200VE 7-250 km 300-29,000 m SARH

The S-75

There are currently forty-seven active S-

P-14 EW site located north of Paegyokpyong 75 sites inside of the DPRK, constituting the
(Google Earth) bulk of the strategic SAM force. According to
SIPRI, the DPRK sourced forty-five S-75 Dvina

2
systems from the USSR. Fifteen batteries
arrived between 1962 and 1964, with the
remaining thirty batteries arriving between
1966 and 1971. The DPRK procured 1,950
missiles to arm the batteries. The DoD credits
the DPRK with possession of numerous S-75
variants. S-75 batteries deploy to provide
barrier air defense of the DPRK's coastlines
and the DMZ, as well as coverage of the bulk
of the DPRK's interior.

Reports indicate that the DPRK

acquired the Chinese HQ-2 (CSA-1
GUIDELINE). HQ-2 presence would account
for the discrepancy between deployed and
delivered batteries. Imagery resolution is
insufficient to differentiate between S-75 and
HQ-2 batteries. Representative DPRK S-75 site with nearby AAA
position (Google Earth)

3
The S-125 cover, which splits in half and slides open to
expose the radar.
There are currently seven active S-125
sites inside of the DPRK. Six batteries serve in
defense of the capital of Pyongyang, with the
remaining site situated to defend the nuclear
research center at Yongbyon. The DPRK
operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with
SIPRI reporting the delivery of eight batteries
between 1985 and 1986.

S-125 batteries deploy at sophisticated

hardened facilities. These sites contain three
launch revetments for 5P73 four-rail launchers
and a position for the RSN-125 (LOW BLOW)
engagement radar. The launchers retract into
bunkers when not in use, while the radar
Yongbyon S-125 complex showing deployed system
lowers into a bunker protected by a retractable components (Google Earth)

4
The S-200

There are currently two active S-200

sites inside of the DPRK, the longest-range
strategic SAM system in the DPRK's arsenal.
These sites reside near the east and west
coasts and range both offshore and deep into
the ROK. SIPRI reports the delivery of four S-
200 batteries to the DPRK between 1987 and
1988; two batteries are co-located at each site.

As with the S-125, the DPRK employs

hardened facilities for the S-200. Elevators
provided for the two 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR)
engagement radars at each location facilitate
underground storage when not in use, and Wonsan S-200 launch area showing deployed and
hardened bunkers protect the 5P72 launch loaded launch rails (Google Earth)
rails when retracted.
5
 in the SAM network. This suggests that
classification of the site as inactive when last
imaged potentially stems from temporary asset
relocation for training or maintenance
purposes.

Support Facilities

Interestingly, there are no identified

support facilities related to the strategic SAM
force in the DPRK. Given that the DPRK
employs a great deal of hardened and
underground facilities, this is not necessarily
surprising. Many of these facilities are
identifiable in other nations due to the
presence of SAM components in imagery. If
Wonsan S-200 site showing deployed 5N62 radars these facilities remain hidden in the DPRK,
(Google Earth)
then their identification would be extremely
difficult. However, it is a logical assumption
Inactive Sites
that such facilities do exist, even if they have
not yet been located or conclusively identified.
There are currently thirty-two identified
These facilities would provide maintenance,
inactive strategic SAM sites located in the
store missile reloads, and garrison surplus
DPRK. There are twenty-eight S-75 sites and
equipment for future deployment.
four S-125 sites. The bulk of these sites reside
near Pyongyang. As such, they may represent
Strategic SAM Force Capability
facilities available for bolstering capital-area air
defenses during a time of conflict. They may
The DPRK appears to possess an
also serve as relocation facilities, complicating
intelligently designed, layered air defense
targeting of active batteries.
network at first glance. S-75 site locations
provide barrier air defense of the coastal and
southern border regions, with the remaining S-
75 and S-125 batteries bolstering inland
defenses and protecting critical locations.

National S-200 Coverage

The DPRK’s S-200 batteries provide

long-range air defense. The S-200 is a
significant threat to ISR and support aircraft
operating in the theater, such as the USAF's U-
2R based out of Osan AB in the ROK. The
location and range of the S-200 would hold any
such cooperative target at risk shortly following
takeoff from most of the airfields in the ROK.
Ergo, while the S-200 is not a serious threat to
Inactive S-75 site northeast of Pyongyang near Aha- non-cooperative, maneuverable targets such
ri (Google Earth) as fighter aircraft, it represents a significant
problem for any potential aggressor.
A site located near Kuum-ni on the
northeastern coast resides in a coverage gap
6
 Border Coverage

Many of the DPRK's S-75 batteries

reside along the coastline and along the DMZ.
These systems provide barrier air defense to
deter any foreign intrusion into the DPRK's
airspace. The locations of the majority of these
systems provide overlapping fields of fire to
strengthen air defenses in many areas. The
northern border with China and the
northeastern border with Russia represent the
only border regions lacking significant strategic
SAM coverage.

Inland Coverage

DPRK S-200 coverage zones (Sean O’Connor) The wide-ranging deployment of military
facilities in the central part of the nation has

7
precipitated the deployment of S-75 and S-125 vans renders this site unusable even if it were
batteries to protect much of the DPRK's fitted with operational launchers. Furthermore,
interior. S-125 batteries protect two areas, a lack of visible evidence of cable connections
Pyongyang and Yongbyon. between system components identifies each
location as a decoy site.
Interestingly, one location left
undefended is the underground nuclear test
facility in the northeast. This may stem from
the fact that if air defenses are present,
analysts will assume that there is something
there worth protecting. Similarly, the DPRK's
rocket test sites at Musudan-ri and Changya-
dong are also currently unprotected.

Denial and Deception Efforts

With a number of camouflaged and

underground facilities, the DPRK is clearly
aware of the concept of denial and deception.
Evidence is present of such practices in the
strategic SAM network.

The simplest method available to prove Mock S-125 site near Yongbyon (Google Earth)
if a site is active or a decoy, outside of having
access to an ELINT system, is to examine the
imagery to locate the associated cable
connections and other typical equipment found
at active batteries. While vegetation often
precludes examining many sites in this fashion,
some examples of denial and deception are
discernable.

Two identified mock SAM sites both

feature apparent S-125 components, most
notably imitation 5P71 two-rail launchers.
Each site features a different configuration. A
site located near Yongbyon represents an
inactive S-125 field deployment position, while
a site located near Chunghwa south of
Pyongyang occupies an inactive S-75
Mock S-125 site near Chunghwa (Google Earth)
emplacement.
Air Defense Issues
Each site features three apparent 5P71
launchers, and an object placed to simulate the
The primary issue facing the DPRK's air
S-125’s RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) engagement
defense network is one of age. While the
radar. The 5P71 decoys feature differing
equipment may still be serviceable, none of it is
dimensions, indicating that some or all of them
a major threat to a modern and capable air
are not operational system components. The
arm. The DPRK desperately needs an infusion
most compelling evidence of the true nature of
of modern air defense systems if it is to remain
these locations is the lack of any support
viable in the 21st Century.
equipment. A lack of command and control
8
 Modern air arms faced the S-75 and S- in the placement of these systems, as it denies
125 multiple times since 1990 and consistently them the ability to function to their maximum
defeated the systems using current tactics and degree of effectiveness. The hardened S-125
electronic warfare concepts. Afghanistan, Iraq, and S-200 batteries reside more logically at
Libya, and Yugoslavia all possessed these higher elevations than surrounding terrain,
systems and they represented no significant allowing them greater freedom of operation.
threat to air operations. The main victory
claimed by these systems was the downing of One further issue to address is the
an F-117A by a Yugoslavian S-125 battery in overreliance on AAA and MANPADS' in the
1999, but this was due to excellent intelligence DPRK. The DPRK possesses some of the
support, outstanding site discipline, and native highest AAA concentrations in the world. The
system modifications rather than the actual general concept is that combat aircraft will fly
effectiveness of the baseline system itself. at lower altitudes to evade SAM batteries,
Furthermore, each of the DPRK’s strategic making them susceptible to AAA or
SAM systems possess single-target MANPADS'. What the DPRK has overlooked
engagement capability, reducing their is the fact that its SAM defenses are
effectiveness and allowing significant gaps to inadequate in light of current ECM and SEAD
be carved out of the network by defeating a systems, allowing combat aircraft to fly at
small number of installations. higher altitudes to avoid the bulk of the AAA
and MANPADS threat. AAA is comparatively
In a conceivable conflict, the DPRK cheap and can be very effective in the right
would be facing American and ROK aircraft, environment, but the DPRK seems to have
and the USAF has exploited the S-75 and S- seriously erred in its judgment.
125 for decades. The S-200 may be
marginally more credible as a threat, but as Conclusion
mentioned before it is only a significant threat
to a cooperative (i.e. non-maneuverable and The DPRK is the new Iraq. During the
large RCS) target. It has also been physically lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM, the
exploited based on the presence of equipment Western media often credited Iraq with the
at the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range, possession of one of the world’s most capable
but it is not known when this was acquired, air defense networks. This turned out to be an
meaning that the DPRK may have a more erroneous description, based in part due to
recent iteration of the system with a few tricks Iraq's overreliance on dated technology and
up its sleeve that remain undocumented. weapon systems. The same problems that
Given American reliance on ISR and IFR plagued Iraq’s air defense network in 1991 are
platforms during wartime air operations, it is evident in North Korea's current network, and
likely that S-200 batteries would represent require rectification if the DPRK intends to field
priority targets during the opening salvo of any any degree of credible air defense in the 21st
conflict, as ISR and IFR platforms represent Century.
cooperative targets.
Facility Analysis
Another obstacle to the DPRK's
strategic SAM force is terrain. Much of the Unidentified Pads at PRC
terrain in the DPRK is very varied, including
that near the DMZ. Even a height difference of
HQ-9 SAM Sites
Sean O’Connor
a few hundred feet can produce an exploitable
blind zone in a SAM battery's coverage. More
A feature found on or adjacent to
critically, many of the S-75 batteries along the
Chinese HQ-9 strategic SAM complexes raises
DMZ exist in positions of lower altitude than the
questions about the capability or survivability of
surrounding terrain, restricting the fields of view
the system. Identification of the true purpose
of the SAM batteries. This is a significant error
9
of the feature is necessary to gauge the true
threat presented by the HQ-9. A re-examination of Chinese HQ-9
complexes to monitor activity levels highlighted
The Feature a feature not given attention previously. HQ-9
complexes field a series of three concrete
Each purpose-built HQ-9 complex pads, with the location and size of the pads
possesses a number of features common to varying among individual complexes. The
every site. A centrally located berm serves as presence of these three pads at each location
the location for the HT-233 (TIGER PAW) indicates a potential relationship with the HQ-9
engagement radar, the berm providing an SAM system. Many HQ-9 batteries reside on
expanded field of view. Similarly, a berm converted HQ-2 complexes. In all cases,
adjacent to the launch complex serves as the construction of the pads coincides with site
location for any co-located battery-level EW or conversion to the HQ-9, further reinforcing the
target acquisition asset. The launch complex potential relationship with the system.
contains four pads arrayed around the
engagement radar position, with each pad The pads exist in one of two
mounting two TELs and their associated configurations. In the first iteration, the pads
support van. reside on the grounds of the HQ-9 complex, in

10
close proximity to one another. In the second
iteration, the pads reside off-site and feature
greater separation, likely due to not being
constrained by a requirement to reside on the
HQ-9 complex itself.

Sub-scale HQ-2 battery fielded at the Nanjing NW

HQ-9 complex in 2007 (Google Earth)

The problem with this explanation is that

it only logically applies to the closely separated
pads located within the grounds of HQ-9
Dispersed pads 1.2 km west of the Baoji HQ-9 complexes. Furthermore, sub-scale HQ-2
complex; pad separation is 300 meters (Google batteries often deploy to unprepared locations,
Earth) negating the requirement for special
deployment pads.
Possible Explanations
FT-2000 Targeting Sensors
Three possible explanations for the
unidentified pads represent logical A second possible explanation is that
explanations for their presence at HQ-9 the pads represent deployment sites for FT-
complexes. Two of these explanations confer 2000 targeting sensors. The FT-2000 is a
additional capability to individual HQ-9 passive homing SAM system derived from the
batteries, highlighting the need for further HQ-9. The FT-2000 reportedly employs four
investigation of this feature. ESM targeting sensors arrayed in a triangular
pattern, with the missile launchers deployed
HQ-2 Deployment near the central targeting sensor.

One possible explanation for the pads is While seemingly a credible theory, the
for deploying a sub-scale HQ-2 battery. Sub- configuration of the HQ-9 pads does not
scale HQ-2 batteries consisting of an support it. According to the manufacturer, the
engagement radar and two single-rail outlying FT-2000 ESM sensors deploy at
launchers often deploy at various strategic distances of thirty kilometers from the central
SAM complexes. position. This implies a significantly increased
degree of separation than that found at the
Typically, these sub-scale batteries HQ-9 complexes. Furthermore, since the
deploy when the primary site occupant is out of unveiling of the FT-2000 in 1998, there is no
garrison, or while awaiting the delivery of more evidence that the system ever entered
modern system components, thereby allowing production for the PLAAF or an export user.
the site to retain a role in the overall air
defense network.

11
 However, if the FT-2000 did in fact enter rather than relying on decoy emitters to protect
limited production for the domestic market, the SAM batteries.
pads may yet serve to support the system.
Each pad could represent the position for
either the central ESM sensor or a launcher.
This implies that the positions for the remaining
three ESM sensors are unlocated. Given that
they individually deploy at large distances from
the central point, a lack of identification is not
out of the question.

Decoy Radar Emitters

The third and potentially most intriguing

explanation for the pads is that they represent
deployment sites for decoy radar emitters. Beijing HQ-9 complex with occupied pads; Beijing is
Theoretical incorporation of decoy emitters home to the only HQ-9 complex employing berms
within the HQ-9 system represents a counter to rather than simple concrete pads, likely intended to
anti-radar missiles targeting the HT-233 maximize field of view (Google Earth)
engagement radar.
HQ-9 vs. Hybrid Sites
China’s RWE-1 Missile Approach
Warning System is a UHF-band sensor Apart from the identification of the
designed to detect incoming anti-radar equipment intended to occupy the pads, an
missiles. Upon detecting an inbound missile, additional question remains. The only sites
the RWE-1 can shut down co-located SAM noted to possess the pads to date are
emitters and trigger decoy systems, dedicated HQ-9 complexes. However, the HQ-
theoretically protecting the SAM battery by 9 often deploys to hybrid SAM sites. Three
defeating the missile. The three pads noted at HQ-9 batteries deployed east of Nanjing, for
the HQ-9 complexes could house the decoy example, occupy hybrid SAM sites.
systems controlled by the RWE-1.
The lack of pads at hybrid sites is logical
Given the attention China is focusing on if the intended equipment is solely associated
active and passive defenses for various with the HQ-9 system. In this case, an HQ-9
systems, categorizing the HQ-9 pads as deployed to a hybrid site could rely on existing
deployment posts for decoy emitters is logical. positions to deploy the equipment, or field-
However, questions remain. The most deploy it off-site. This lends credibility to the
important question regards pad location. Four FT-2000 targeting sensor concept, and allows
of the seven identified HQ-9 complexes feature for the existence of a dedicated HQ-9 decoy
pads located on the grounds of the SAM site. system.
The close proximity to the system components
indicates that a miss or near miss could still Should this be the case, the presence of
damage SAM system components. dedicated pads at HQ-9 complexes is curious.
Furthermore, the latest models of the AGM-88 If the intended equipment can field-deploy or
HARM feature GPS capability designed to rely on existing infrastructure for deployment at
defeat such tactics, allowing the missile to a hybrid site, then the existence of dedicated
remain on-course to the initially targeted pads at HQ-9 complexes only serves to draw
emitter even if it shuts down. This may attention to the system. Given the potentially
represent the rationale behind the RWE-1’s significant nature of the capability provided by
capability to direct point-defense weapons the equipment, drawing attention to the system
capable of intercepting anti-radar missiles in this fashion is illogical.
12
Conclusion Elektrostal in the eastern suburbs of Moscow.
The Elektrostal units represented the first
The presence of unidentified pads at operational S-400 batteries in Russia.
dedicated HQ-9 complexes highlights the lack
of information on the detailed working of the Identification of S-400 batteries relies on
HQ-9 strategic SAM system. Further examination of assigned TELs. The S-400’s
investigation is clearly necessary to quantify 5P85TM TEL is approximately 49 meters in
the threat posed by the HQ-9 with accuracy. length. The 5P85T TEL employed by the S-
300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) is approximately
Imagery Highlight 44 meters in length. The primary source of the
increased length of the 5P85TM is the new
Russia’s S-400 Batteries BAZ-64022 tractor, replacing the 5P85T’s
Sean O’Connor KrAZ-260.

Digital Globe imagery captured in July of Analysis of the imagery provides insight
2011 presents the first public imagery depicting into battery-level unit composition for
operational S-400 (SA-21 GROWLER) SAM operational S-400 units. Each battery contains
complexes in Russia. The imagery, acquired both a 92N6 (GRAVE STONE) engagement
on 28 July, depicts two S-400 batteries near

13
radar and a 96L6 acquisition/EW radar. capability be degraded or eliminated through
hostile action or during periods of
96L6 presence is significant as it maintenance, permitting the network to remain
represents a deviation from typical Russian S- functionally complete.
300P series battery composition. Formerly, S-
300P series batteries lacked organic EW Each battery continues to rely on 40V6
assets, relying solely on external assets such series mast assemblies to provide assigned
as the 64N6 (BIG BIRD) battle management radar systems with adequate fields of view.
radar and battery-level 5N66 and 76N6 (CLAM Basic TEL complement appears to consist of
SHELL) series radars for additional low-altitude eight 5P85TM towed TELs. This matches the
detection. The incorporation of a 96L6 with typically observed TEL complement of existing
each S-400 battery provides additional S-300PM batteries.
dedicated EW support at all altitudes, and
potentially reduces the workload of supporting The southern S-400 battery differs from
91N6 (BIG BIRD E) battle management assets the northern example in terms of TEL
resulting in improved network effectiveness as deployment, possibly indicating a new strategy.
a whole. Additionally, the 96L6 provides The northern battery features eight TELs
standalone EW capability should 91N6 parked in two groups of four on either side of

14
the central engagement radar position. The weapon systems. These facilities include
southern battery only appears to deploy four missile garrisons housing TELs and personnel.
TELs, with the remaining four parked near the These facilities often contain identifiable
two radar positions. The southern battery’s features denoting the type of missile assigned
deployed TELs reside underneath to the resident unit, permitting accurate force
camouflaged netting. While this deployment analysis.
strategy does not preclude the identification of
the battery at a prepared site complex, it General Characteristics
represents a useful option for concealing field
deployed system components. 2nd Artillery Corps missile garrisons
serve as home to personnel and equipment
Facility Analysis assigned to given units. Mobile ICBM facilities
typically contain a large garage for storing
Chinese DF-31 Garrisons garrisoned TELs. Additionally, two high-bay
Sean O’Connor garages provide enclosed environments for
performing maintenance and checkout tasks
As the PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps prior to field deployment, including TEL
undergoes modernization and expansion, new erection. The garrison complex also houses
facilities often appear to support more modern

15
administrative and support functions, and network until required. Following dispersal to
provides garages for the support equipment loading points, units deploy to field garrison
required to service deployed TELs. complexes. Field garrison complexes are
smaller facilities designed to perform final
The high-bay garages are approximately checkout of loaded TELs prior to dispersal to
33 x 63 meters, capable of housing the 20 launch sites.
meter DF-31 or DF-31A TEL. High-bay
garages of this size do not appear at garrison Nanyang
complexes affiliated with any other missile
type. As such, they remain a potential The 813th Brigade is a DF-31 unit
indicator of DF-31 or DF-31A unit affiliation. operating from Nanyang within the 54th Base.
The Nanyang complex consists of both
The lack of hardened storage bunkers garrison and field garrison facilities, as well as
at garrison complexes, coupled with the six identified launch sites.
proximity to population centers in many cases,
indicates that in-garrison TELs remain The Nanyang garrison facility contains a
unarmed. Missiles and warheads remain single TEL garage, with numerous garages for
stored in the 2nd Artillery Corps’ extensive UGF support vehicles. Unusually, this is a high-bay

16
garage, permitting the servicing of TELs. Two Identified facilities in the 812th Brigade include
smaller 17 x 30 meter drive-through high-bay garrison and field garrison complexes, and two
garages appear unsuitable for supporting DF- identified launch sites.
31 TEL operations. The postulated turning
radius of the DF-31 TEL appears to preclude The Tianshui garrison complex contains
the use of at least one of the garages. a single TEL garage surrounded by garages for
support vehicles. Unlike Nanyang, this does
The Nanyang field garrison primarily not appear to be a high-bay garage and as
consists of a drive-through high-bay garage. such likely serves as a storage complex only.
Two of the six identified launch positions in the A 33 x 63 meter high-bay garage supports TEL
area reside directly adjacent to the garage, servicing and checkout functions, along with a
with a possible UGF complex located 200 smaller 25 x 54 meter garage.
meters west of the primary facility.
The Tianshui field garrison represents a
Tianshui more substantial complex compared to the
Nanyang field garrison. While a similar drive-
The 812th Brigade is a DF-31A unit through high-bay garage exists to service
operating from Tianshui in the 56th Base. deployed TELs, the Tianshui field garrison

17
possesses more substantial support facilities The Shaoyang garrison complex
for servicing field deployed components and contains a single TEL garage and numerous
personnel. The high-bay garage is garages for support vehicles. Two 33 x 68
dimensionally identical to the smaller garage meter high-bay garages support TEL checkout.
found in the main garrison complex. The TEL garage remains under construction in
Southwest of the field garrison are two launch the most recently available imagery.
sites.
Yuxi
Shaoyang
Yuxi is a garrison complex of
th
The 805 Brigade is a DF-31A unit unidentified Brigade affiliation within the 53rd
operating from Shaoyang in the 55th Base. Base. The garrison complex, under
The 805th Brigade represents a recently construction between 2007 and 2010,
converted DF-4 unit, relocating from Tongdao possesses two drive-through high-bay garages
to take advantage of newly constructed DF- similar to those found at identified DF-31 series
31A facilities. The sole identified 805th Brigade garrisons. While dimensionally smaller at 31 x
complex at this time is the primary garrison 54 meters, they retain the ability to support DF-
facility. 31 or DF-31A TEL checkout and maintenance

18
functions.
Source List
January 2012
Overhead imagery courtesy of Google
Earth; exceptions are explicitly noted in image
captions or as image annotations. All
annotations and overlays depicted on such
imagery are the work of the respective article’s
author unless explicitly noted below.

The DPRK’s Strategic SAM Network

This feature represents an expanded and

updated version of a prior IMINT & Analysis
article.
Yuxi high-bay garages imaged in 2010 (Google
Earth)
19
SAM site locations sourced from the Worldwide
SAM Site Overview KML file available at IMINT
& Analysis.

North Korea Country Handbook. Quantico:

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, 1997.

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. SIPRI.

Online source.

Soldatov, Andrei. “The Empire’s Last Secret:

The Existence of a Russian Radio-espionage
Base in North Korea was hidden for 10 Years.”
Old War Dogs. Online source.

Unidentified Pads at PRC HQ-9 SAM Sites

SAM site locations sourced from the Worldwide

SAM Site Overview KML file available at IMINT
& Analysis.

“HongQi 9 Surface-to-Air Missile System.”

Sino Defence. Online source.

Kopp, Carlo. “Air Defence System Defensive

Aids.” Tech. no. APA-TR-2009-0604. Air
Power Australia, 2009. Online source.

Russia’s S-400 Batteries

O’Connor, Sean. “The S-300P/S-400.” I&A.

1.3 (April 2011).

Chinese DF-31 Garrisons

O’Connor, Sean. “PLA Second Artillery

Corps.” Tech. no. APA-TR-2009-1204. Air
Power Australia, 2009. Online source.

O’Connor, Sean. “The PLA’s Second Artillery

Corps.” I&A. 1.11 (December 2011).

20
What Is It? – January 2012
The ability to identify objects, locations, and activity in overhead imagery is an acquired skill, and
like many acquired skills, it can degrade with time. Readers are encouraged to apply their
analytical abilities and attempt to determine the answer to the question “what is it?”

The answer to the current “What Is It” will appear in this space next month, along with a detailed
explanation of the analysis used to arrive at the proper answer.

What Is It? – December 2011

Last month’s What Is It? featured the Republic of Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD)
headquarters complex located northwest of Daejon. The ADD performs many significant functions
for the ROK, including research and development of indigenous weapon systems such as the KM-
SAM and support work related to imported weapon systems. The ADD encompasses numerous
facilities throughout the ROK, to be detailed in a future I&A feature. The Y-shaped building in the
northern portion of the complex is the site’s distinguishing feature, often appearing in materials
released by or produced with the assistance of the ADD.