Global Merger Control: OECD Competition Trends, Volume II

GLOBAL MERGER CONTROL
OECD Competition Trends, Volume II

2021
OECD Competition Trends 2021
Volume II: Global Merger Control
PUBE
2
Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2021), OECD Competition Trends 2021, Volume II, Global Merger Control,
http://www.oecd.org/competition/oecd-competition-trends.htm
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and
arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over
any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of
such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements
in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
© OECD 2021
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

3
Foreword
Starting in 2018, the OECD, under the guidance of the Bureau of the Competition Committee, has launched
an initiative to develop a database of general statistics relating to competition agencies, including data on
enforcement and information on advocacy initiatives. The database currently covers the period 2015-2019
and will be collected on an annual basis in the future.
OECD Competition Trends presents unique insights into global competition trends based on analysis of
data from more than 50 OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. First launched in 2020, this second edition is
presented in two volumes. Volume II provides an overview of trends in global merger control. It describes
a selection of the different choices made by jurisdictions when designing legal regimes, global merger
control activity, and trends in merger control enforcement. This is complemented by Volume I which
provides an update on the competition enforcement trends between 2015-19 for the competition authorities
of the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database.
This publication supports informed policymaking and contributes to improving competition law and policy
around the world by providing multi-year data on a large number of economic and legal indicators. The
OECD Competition Committee, which includes representatives of the world’s major competition
authorities, is the premier source of policy analysis and advice to governments on how best to harness
market forces in the interests of greater global economic efficiency and prosperity. For almost 60 years the
OECD and its Competition Committee have taken a leading role in shaping the framework for international
co-operation among competition agencies. The resulting recommendations, best practices and policy
roundtables serve both as models and inspiration for national initiatives and as tools for sharing global best
practices on competition law and policy. Competition officials from developed and emerging economies
are offered a unique platform from which to monitor developments in competition policy and enforcement,
and to discuss new solutions for increasing effectiveness.
Data in OECD Competition Trends 2021 is mainly presented on an aggregate level, combining the data of
a certain number of individual jurisdictions. The aggregate-level data includes an analysis (i) for all
participating jurisdictions (“All jurisdictions”), (ii) comparing OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions, and (iii) per
geographical region (Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Other (i.e. countries that do not qualify for the
first three regions, but for whom not enough countries in their region participate to remain anonymous)).
This work benefits from the support of the OECD Secretariat, in particular the Competition Division, and
from the organisation’s whole-of-government approach, taking advantage of expertise in other OECD
committees and experience in international co-operation. As the role and scope of competition law and
policy continue to evolve, the tools of competition authorities must constantly develop and incorporate
lessons learned from others. This publication contributes to helping policy makers and competition
enforcers to stay up to date with the different ways in which competition law and policy is applied throughout
the world.
The publication was prepared under the supervision of Antonio Capobianco, Acting Head of Division; by
Wouter Meester, project leader; Carlotta Moiso; Menna Mahmoud; Niyati Asthana; and Pedro Caro de
Sousa; all of the OECD Competition Division. Cristina Volpin, Federica Maiorano, Isolde Lueckenhausen,

4
James Mancini, Paulo Burnier, Ruben Maximiano and Sabine Zigelski, all of the OECD Competition
Division, provided comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The report was edited for publication by
Tom Ridgway and prepared for publication by Edward Smiley and Erica Agostinho.
We want to thank the individual competition authorities in the participating jurisdictions who generously
provided the information on which much of this publication is based.

5
Table of contents
Foreword 3
Executive summary 7
1 Introduction 8
1.1. Importance of merger control 8
1.2. Report structure 8
2 Merger regimes around the world 9

2.1. Introduction of merger regimes in selected regions 9
2.1.1. Competition Programme OECD/Korea Policy Centre (KPC), Seoul, Korea 9
2.1.2. OECD Regional Centre for Competition in Latin America (RCC), Lima, Peru 9
2.1.3. OECD-GVH Regional Centre for Competition, Budapest, Hungary 10
2.2. Characteristics of merger control regimes in CompStats 11
2.2.1. Mandatory and voluntary merger notification regimes 11
2.2.2. One-phase or two-phase approaches 14
3 Global merger control activity 16

3.1. Total number of notifications and merger decisions 16
3.2. Trends in merger control enforcement 19
3.2.1. Blocked and withdrawn transactions 19
3.2.2. Use of remedies 22
4 Policy trends in merger control 25

4.1. Are mergers more likely to be problematic than previously thought? 25
4.2. Notification thresholds – how to effectively review potentially anticompetitive mergers 26
4.3. Substantive developments 26
4.3.1. A renaissance for vertical and conglomerate theories of harm 27
4.3.2. Increased focus on dynamic competition and protecting potential competition 27
4.3.3. Greater interest in non-price concerns 28
4.4. Monitoring the effects of mergers on suppliers and labour markets 30
4.5. Interaction with public-interest considerations 31

6
Annex A. OECD Merger Roundtables 32

Annex B. Explanatory notes for the graphs 34
Annex C. Competition Authorities in the CompStats Database 35
References 39
Notes 43
Tables
Table A A.1. List of OECD Best Practice Policy Roundtables on merger issues, 1995-2020 32
Figures
Figure 2.1. Development of competition law and merger regimes in selected regions 10
Figure 2.2. Overview of mandatory and voluntary merger-notification regimes in CompStats jurisdictions 12
Figure 2.3. Filing-fee requirements, 2020 12
Figure 2.4. Selected criteria for establishing merger-notification thresholds 13
Figure 2.5. Use of simplified merger regime, 2020 14
Figure 2.6. CompStats jurisdictions with one-phase or two-phase approaches 15
Figure 3.1. Merger decisions and notifications in selected regions, 2015-2019 16
Figure 3.2. Distribution of merger decisions, by jurisdiction, 2019 18
Figure 3.3. Overview of types of merger decisions, 2019 18
Figure 3.4. Types of merger decisions, 2015-2019 19
Figure 3.5. Prohibition decisions and withdrawn notifications, 2015-2019 20
Figure 3.6. Prohibitions and withdrawn notifications, by jurisdiction, 2018 vs. 2019 20
Figure 3.7. Number of prohibition decisions, by region, 2015-2019 21
Figure 3.8. Number of withdrawn notifications, by region, 2015-2019 21
Figure 3.9. Top-ten sectors with highest number of blocked mergers, 2015-2019 22
Figure 3.10. Absolute number of decisions with remedy and percentage of total merger decisions with remedy,
2015-2019 23
Figure 3.11. Reliance of competition authorities on remedies, 2019 24
Figure 3.12. Change in use of remedy decisions, by jurisdiction, 2018 vs. 2019 24
Boxes
Box 2.1. OECD Recommendation on Merger Review 11
Box 3.1. International enforcement co-operation on merger cases 17

7
Executive summary
Effective merger review is a key component of almost all competition regimes. As of 2019, 135 jurisdictions
around the world have merger laws or regulations in place. However, implementation can differ
substantially across jurisdictions. The vast majority of the jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database
adopt a mandatory pre-merger notification system and in most of them the adopted notification thresholds
pertain to turnover. A two-phase merger assessment process is the most common approach, with only a
limited number of regimes using a one-phase approach.
The total number of merger notifications received by the jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database
increased in 2019, compared to 2018, continuing a trend seen in previous years. The total number of
decisions taken by the authorities, however, slightly decreased for the first time after continuous growth
since 2015.
The vast majority of mergers, approximately 95%, assessed between 2015 and 2019 were deemed not to
have anti-competitive effects and were cleared without a remedy after the first phase of investigation. The
total number of blocked transactions grew by 12.5% in 2019, while the number of withdrawn notifications
remained stable.
While the absolute number of merger cases cleared with remedies slightly decreased in 2019, after steady
growth since 2016, the average proportion of remedy decisions actually increased by almost two
percentage points compared to 2018.
Merger control and enforcement have recently been the subject of lively debates and policy developments,
mostly related to the criticism that merger control has not been particularly effective in limiting increased
market concentration and market power. Notification thresholds for instance have been at the centre of
recent policy debates as some argue that potentially harmful transactions below notification thresholds
have escaped merger review.
The debate around vertical and conglomerate theories of harm has also been lively due to renewed interest
in the potential anti-competitive effect of these mergers. Moreover, dynamic competition and protecting
potential competition are increasingly in focus as the dynamism that characterises important emerging
markets makes it more difficult for competition authorities to predict how markets will evolve when
assessing mergers.
Experts are are debating the practical challenges authorities face when assessing the non-price effect of
mergers and the possible effects of mergers on suppliers and labour markets. The latter discussion can
be traced to yet another recent topic of interest: calls for the inclusion of various dimensions of public
interest into competition assessments.

8
1 Introduction
1.1. Importance of merger control
Effective merger review is a key component of almost all competition regimes intended to prevent
consumer harm resulting from transactions that significantly reduce competition. While most mergers do
not cause harm to competition and will often generate efficiencies, certain may create competition
problems that require competition authority intervention. Competition authorities can address this problem
through the imposition of a remedy (structural or behavioural), or the prohibition of the transaction.
In recent decades, the number of merger control regimes has increased significantly. As of 2019, almost
all jurisdictions in the world have some form of merger control regime, assessing mergers’ competitive
impact in their relevant markets.
1.2. Report structure
This first part of the report aims to provide an overview of the merger control regimes in OECD CompStats
jurisdictions. The report’s second part focuses on the main characteristics of the regimes in force in OECD
CompStats jurisdictions. The third part explores the merger control activity in OECD CompStats
jurisdictions and identifies overall trends in merger control enforcement, as well as regional trends. The
fourth and final part of the report is dedicated to a discussion of the most recent policy trends in merger
control.

9
2 Merger regimes around the world

As of 2019, 135 jurisdictions around the world have merger laws or regulations in place that mandate
competition authorities to examine certain types of transactions.1 In some countries, even though a full and
comprehensive regime is not in place, sector-specific laws regulate competition aspects of mergers in
certain sectors of the economy.
Fifty-four jurisdictions have yet to adopt a merger regime. However, seven of these jurisdictions are in the
process of developing one and a further 22 are covered by supranational merger regimes through a
regional competition agreement (OECD, 2018[1]).2
Three jurisdictions have already developed and adopted a regime, but do not have yet an operational
competition authority.
Of the 56 jurisdictions included in the OECD CompStats database, only two have no regulatory framework
for merger control in place.3
2.1. Introduction of merger regimes in selected regions
The introduction of merger regimes has differed across different regions. This section briefly explores the
introduction of competition law and merger regimes in the regions where the OECD has established
regional centres. The OECD operates three regional centres that support local jurisdictions in the
development and implementation of competition law and policy.
2.1.1. Competition Programme OECD/Korea Policy Centre (KPC), Seoul, Korea
Established in 2004 as a joint venture between the Korean government and the OECD, the Korea Policy
Centre (KPC) works with jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, 26 jurisdictions in the region
frequently participate in KPC activities, 4 of which only two are still to introduce competition legislation.
Asia-Pacific includes a large number of recently established competition regimes and authorities. While
ten jurisdictions have enforced competition laws for more than three decades, ten jurisdictions in Asia-
Pacific enforced their first competition law in the past two decades. Five jurisdictions introduced their law
after 2010.
Of the 24 jurisdictions with a competition law in this region, 23 have successfully implemented a merger
control regime and one uses sectoral assessment.
2.1.2. OECD Regional Centre for Competition in Latin America (RCC), Lima, Peru
The OECD Regional Centre in Latin America (RCC) is a joint venture between the Peruvian Competition
Authority (INDECOPI) and the OECD. The RCC was established in 2019 and provides competition support
to 23 jurisdictions and two regional communities.5 Out of all RCC jurisdictions, only one is yet to introduce
competition legislation.

10 
The Latin America region consists of many relatively recently established authorities. In many jurisdictions
merger control regimes were not put in place until sometime after a competition law was introduced; as a
result, half of the jurisdictions have only adopted a merger regime in the past 15 years (Burnier da Silveira,
2020[2]).
Figure 2.1. Development of competition law and merger regimes in selected regions
Panel A. Asia-Pacific Panel B. Latin-America Panel C. Eastern Europe

and Central Asia
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20
1990 1990 1990
1992 1992 1992
1994 1994 1994
1996 1996 1996
1998 1998 1998
2000 2000 2000
2002 2002 2002
2004 2004 2004
2006 2006 2006
2008 2008 2008
2010 2010 2010
2012 2012 2012
2014 2014 2014
2016 2016 2016
2018 2018 2018
Competition Law Merger Regime
Panel a) Data for the 23 jurisdictions with a competition law that frequently participate in KPC activities.
Panel b) Data from the 22 jurisdictions with a competition law that frequently participate in RCC activities.
Panel c) Data from the 19 jurisdictions that frequently participate in OECD-GVH activities.
2.1.3. OECD-GVH Regional Centre for Competition, Budapest, Hungary
The OECD-GVH Centre was established in 2005 to provide capacity-building assistance and policy advice
for 19 jurisdictions in Eastern and Southeast Europe and Central Asia. 6
Despite all jurisdictions in OECD-GVH having a competition legislation, merger control mechanisms and
functioning competition authorities, competition enforcement often remains limited. Many of these agencies
are small, both in terms of budget and staff numbers; this leads to an often- low number of enforcement
cases.7

 11
2.2. Characteristics of merger control regimes in CompStats
While almost all competition law regimes provide for merger control, implementation can differ considerably
between jurisdictions.
2.2.1. Mandatory and voluntary merger notification regimes
Some important features of merger control regimes that can differ across jurisdictions are whether an
authority undertakes ex ante or ex post assessments and whether the notification of an intended or
consumed transaction is mandatory or voluntary. Only a limited number of jurisdictions (eight) employs a
voluntary merger notification or post-merger notification and assessment regime. The large majority of
merger control regimes requires mandatory pre-merger notification for transactions that meet certain
thresholds defined using criteria, such as turnover, asset, market share, or transaction value.
Whether a given transaction needs to be notified to the reviewing authority depends on: 1) the definition of
a notifiable transaction, and 2) whether certain notification thresholds are met (OECD, 2013, p. 13[3]).
Notification thresholds seek to prevent the notification of transactions that most probably have no material
impact in a given jurisdiction. According to the Recommendation of the OECD Council on Merger Review
(the Recommendation), clear and objective criteria should be used as notification thresholds (OECD, 2005,
p. 2[4]). The Recommendation also states that adherents should assert jurisdiction only over those mergers
that have an appropriate nexus with their jurisdiction, and review only those mergers that could raise
competition concerns in their territory. 8
Box 2.1. OECD Recommendation on Merger Review

The Recommendation of the OECD Council on Merger Review was adopted on 23 March 2005 (OECD,
2005[4]). Building on extensive prior work conducted by the OECD Competition Committee, the
Recommendation contributes to greater convergence of merger-review procedures. It covers four main
areas: 1) notification and review procedures; 2) co-ordination and co-operation for transnational mergers;
3) competition authorities’ resources and powers; and 4) the periodic review of merger laws and practices.
The Recommendation instructs the OECD Competition Committee to review periodically the experiences
of OECD members and non-members, and to report to the OECD Council as appropriate on any further
action needed to improve merger laws, achieve greater convergence towards recognised best practices,
and strengthen co-operation and co-ordination in the review of transnational mergers.
In 2013, the OECD published Report on Country Experiences with the 2005 OECD Recommendation on
Merger Review (OECD, 2013[5]) which reviews key developments in the four main areas covered by the
Recommendation, as well as certain areas that fall outside its scope. The report found that significant
convergence had occurred in all the areas covered by the Recommendation and most OECD merger
control regimes appeared to be in line with it. The report confirmed that the Recommendation remained
important and relevant, and that it complemented work on merger policy being done at international level
by other organisations and networks, such as the International Competition Network (ICN).
Source: OECD (2020), OECD Competition Trends 2020, www.oecd.org/competition/oecd-competition-trends.htm
Figures Figure 2.2 2.3 and 2.4 provide an overview of the 54 CompStats jurisdictions’ decisions 9 when
designing their merger control regimes, from their notification procedures to the criteria selected to
determine whether a transaction meets the notification thresholds.
The vast majority of these 54 regimes adopts a mandatory pre-merger notification system (46 jurisdictions).
Three regimes have adopted a voluntary regime, while the remaining five jurisdictions have adopted a

12 
mandatory “post-merger” or “pre- or post-merger” regime. “Pre- or post-merger” refers to the fact that they
can voluntarily notify the authority before the transaction is consummated, but are obliged to notify within
a certain period after it (see Figure 2.2).10 In numerous regimes, parties uncertain of their position have
the possibility of voluntarily notifying the reviewing authority of a transaction even if it does not meet the
threshold.
Figure 2.2. Overview of mandatory and voluntary merger-notification regimes in CompStats

jurisdictions
2 1
4
1 Mandatory and pre-merger
Mandatory and post-merger
Mandatory and pre- or post-merger
Voluntary and pre-merger
Voluntary and pre- or post-merger
46
Note: Based on data from the 54 jurisdictions in OECD CompStats database with a merger control regime in place.
Source: OECD CompStats database and OECD analysis based on publicly available information.
A substantial number of competition authorities around the world charge a fee for merger filings: of the 56
jurisdictions in the CompStats database, 34 now charge one. The practice has become more common
since 2005 when the International Competition Network (ICN) published the results of a review of filing
fees: 6 of the 54 introduced this requirement in the past 15 years (International Competition Network,
2005[6]).
Figure 2.3. Filing-fee requirements, 2020
19
No
35
Yes
Source: OECD analysis based on publicly available information.

 13
Focusing on a reduced sample of CompStats jurisdictions with a similar fee regime,11 it is interesting to
note significant variations in the total amount collected for merger filings across jurisdictions. On average
in these 12 jurisdictions, filing fees represent approximately 17% of an authority’s budget. However, this
varies significantly between jurisdictions, with filing fees making up less than 1% of the budget for some
and representing almost the entire budget for others.12
In the large majority of jurisdictions (51 of 54 in the CompStats database), turnover is used as (one of) the
determining factor(s) for a notifiable merger.13 Other types of thresholds include the total value of the assets
involved in a merger (15), market share (12) and transaction value (5). Several jurisdictions (24) use a
combination of these criteria (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4. Selected criteria for establishing merger-notification thresholds
Turnover # 51/54
Assets # 15/54
Market share # 12/54
Transaction value # 5/54
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Other
Recent developments in merger control, most notably the debate on ‘killer acquisitions’ and subsequent
suggestions to change merger thresholds, may be increasing the diversity of the types of merger
notification thresholds that will be used in the near future (see section 4.2).
Simplified merger regimes
In the attempt to reduce the legal costs and burden on both the merging parties and the reviewing
authorities, many jurisdictions employ simplified merger regimes for cases that meet specific criteria.
Simplified regimes may involve a simplified notification and/or a simplified assessment process by
reviewing authorities. In some jurisdictions the streamlined process can only be undertaken if the parties
specifically apply for it when submitting the notification, but it is generally automatically implemented when
the criteria are met and/or a simplified notification is filed.

14 
Figure 2.5. Use of simplified merger regime, 2020
No
13
41
Yes
About 75% of the jurisdictions in OECD Compstats have some form of simplified merger regime in place.
The most common benchmark criteria used to determine if a concentration is unlikely to create a
competition problem relate to the absence of horizontal overlaps or vertical relationships between the
merging parties, combined market shares and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The simplified
procedure is usually also available to undertakings acquiring exclusive control over joint ventures in which
they exercised joint control previously.
Gun jumping
As noted previously, the majority of jurisdictions have adopted a pre-merger notification system. As a result,
when a merger meets the relevant notification thresholds, it is frozen and barred from taking place until it
has received clearance; this is known as a standstill obligation. Gun jumping occurs when the parties
proceed to implement all or parts of a transaction before a competition authority has issued a decision.
“Procedural gun jumping” is when merging parties fail to file a notification, while “substantive gun jumping”
sees merging parties exchange information and co-ordinate prior to a deal being closed. Gun jumping has
long been part of competition agencies’ enforcement agendas, and currently seems to be subject to higher
fines (OECD, 2018[7]).
All jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database with a pre-merger notification regime have adopted
stringent gun-jumping rules.14
2.2.2. One-phase or two-phase approaches
The majority of the 56 OECD CompStats jurisdictions adopts a two-phase approach (see Figure 2.6),
according to which mergers that do not raise competition concerns are cleared in what is usually a relatively
short first phase, with a more in-depth investigation carried out during a longer second phase, if deemed
necessary. Only a limited number of regimes uses a one-phase approach.

 15
Figure 2.6. CompStats jurisdictions with one-phase or two-phase approaches
One-phase No regime
approach
2
7
Two-phase
approach
47
Source: Data from the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database and OECD analysis based on publicly available information.

16 
3 Global merger control activity

3.1. Total number of notifications and merger decisions
Jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database received more merger notifications in 2019 than in 2018,
even if the number increased more slowly than in previous years: 3% in 2019 against 7% in 2018.
The total number of decisions15 slightly decreased in almost all regions, with the exception of Asia-Pacific
(see Figure 3.1). The distribution of decisions across global regions remained mostly stable over the whole
period considered.
Figure 3.1. Merger decisions and notifications in selected regions, 2015-2019
10 000 9 155 9 272

9 000 8 566
8 049 8 284
429 412
8 000 449
400
317
7 000
3 828 3 682
6 000 3 605
3 282 3 499
5 000
4 000 1 461 1 503
1 360
1 467 1 396
3 000
2 000
2 671 2 759 3 069 3 174 3 039
1 000
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Other Total Notifications
Notes: Data from the 48 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database with a merger regime. Decisions include cases in which the waiting
period had expired.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
The increased activity by competition authorities matched an increased international enforcement co-
operation between competition authorities, which continued to rise (see Box 3.1) (OECD, 2020[8]).

 17
Box 3.1. International enforcement co-operation on merger cases

Results from the OECD/ICN Report on International Co-operation in Competition Enforcement
Improving enforcement co-operation between competition authorities has been a long-term priority for
both the OECD and ICN. Their joint report, OECD/ICN Report on International Co-operation in
Competition Enforcement, outlines key aspects of the current state of international enforcement co-
operation between competition authorities. It investigates the drivers of international enforcement co-
operation and undertakes a high-level review of key OECD and ICN initiatives to support international
enforcement co-operation. It analyses the results of a survey conducted by OECD and ICN members
in 2019, and compares it to the 2012 survey results.
The report’s key finding is that international enforcement co-operation is increasing. This trend has been
observable in all enforcement areas, and appears particularly true for co-operation on merger matters.
In fact, merger co-operation involves a significantly higher number of inter-authority contacts than co-
operation around cartels or unilateral conduct. This is related to the cross-border nature of certain
mergers and to the fact that in most jurisdictions a merger requires the involved parties to notify the
authorities of their own jurisdictions, as opposed to other enforcement areas in which cases depend on
possible infringements and authorities’ ability to detect them.
The most frequent types of co-operation in merger cases are the sharing of:
 information regarding investigation status
 substantive theories of harm
 public information
 business information, and obtaining appropriate waivers.
Respondents noted that merger enforcement co-operation is useful as it results in a valuable
exchange of ideas on how to approach mergers, improves understanding of other jurisdictions’
procedural phases, assists with co-ordinating the timing of any review, and helps authorities clarify
and define analytical criteria or technical points. Some respondents noted that these discussions are
particularly useful at the pre-notification stage.
Other highlighted benefits included consistent remedies and improved enforcement. It was noted that
where authorities agree on the definition and the application of remedies, they are more likely to be
properly enforced.
Source: OECD/ICN (2021), OECD/ICN Report on International Co-operation in Competition Enforcement,
http://www.oecd.org/competition/oecd-icn-report-on-international-cooperation-in-competitionenforcement-2021.htm.
In 2019, a small number of authorities drove a large number of decisions, as was the case in 2018. In fact,
the top-5 jurisdictions for decisions issued were responsible for almost 60% of all decisions. The high
concentration of the decisions can be clearly seen in Figure 3.2.
The vast majority of mergers assessed in 2019 by jurisdictions included in the OECD CompStats database
were deemed not to have anticompetitive effects, as shown in the high percentage of transactions cleared
without a remedy (Figure 3.3). In these jurisdictions in 2019, almost 96% of all merger decisions were
cleared without an in-depth investigation, and only 0.4% (or 27) of the over 8 500 merger decisions resulted
in a prohibition.

18 
Figure 3.2. Distribution of merger decisions, by jurisdiction, 2019
100%
2 000 90%
80%
Total number of decisions
1 500 70%
Cumulative percentage
59%
60%
50%
1 000
40%
30%
500
20%
10%
0 0%
OECD CompStats jurisdictions
Total number of decisions (left axis) Cumulative percentage (right axis)
Note: Data from the 48 jurisdictions with a merger regime included in the OECD CompStats database for which comparable data are available
for all years.
Figure 3.3. Overview of types of merger decisions, 2019

Phase II clearances with
Phase I clearances Remedies
without remedy 1.0% Prohibitions
95.7% 0.4%
Other
4.3%
Phase II clearances
without remedy
2.2% Phase I clearances with
Remedies
0.7%
for all years. Phase I clearances, Phase I clearances with remedies, and Phase II prohibitions include single-phase decisions. Phase I and
Phase II clearances include cases of expiration of waiting period.

 19
Although the total number of decisions slightly decreased in 2019 after a steady increase since 2015, the
proportion of the different types of decisions has remained generally stable; with Phase II clearances slowly
decreasing in favour of Phase I clearances (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4. Types of merger decisions, 2015-2019
100%
99%
98%
97%
96%
95%
94%
93%
92%
91%
90%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Phase I clearances Phase I clearances with remedies Phase II clearances
Phase II clearances with remedies Phase II prohibitions
for all years. Phase I clearances, Phase I clearances with remedies, and Phase II prohibitions include Single Phase decisions. Phase I and
Phase II clearances include cases of expiration of waiting period.
Given the large majority of mergers cleared in phase I without a remedy, the vertical axis starts at 90% to increase visibility of the different
categories.
3.2. Trends in merger control enforcement
3.2.1. Blocked and withdrawn transactions
The total number of blocked transactions in jurisdictions in the CompStat database grew by 12.5% in 2019;
the number of withdrawn notifications remained stable. However, when considering the general trend of
the five-year period 2015-2019, both have shown a tendency to increase (see Figure 3.5).

20 
Figure 3.5. Prohibition decisions and withdrawn notifications, 2015-2019
Notes: Data from the 48 jurisdictions with a merger regime included in the OECD CompStats database for which comparable data are available
for all years. The figures slightly overestimate the number of blocked or withdrawn transactions as they include prohibitions decisions and
withdrawals of the same transaction by different agencies.
While the trend of blocked and withdrawn transactions shows a clear increase in the period 2015-2019,
much of this increase can be explained with the activities of a relatively small number of jurisdictions.
Figure 3.6. Prohibitions and withdrawn notifications, by jurisdiction, 2018 vs. 2019
2018 2019
12
11
10
Withdrawn notifications
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Prohibitions
4
3
2
1
0
for all years. The figures slightly overestimate the number of blocked or withdrawn transactions as they include prohibitions decisions and
withdrawals of the same transaction by different agencies.
The large majority of the jurisdictions maintained the same number of prohibition decisions (30
jurisdictions) and withdrawn notifications (27 jurisdictions) in 2019 (Figure 3.6). Only ten jurisdictions
increased their number of blocked or withdrawn mergers.

 21
Decisions and actions vary across the different regions (Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8). Blocked mergers
declined in all regions except Europe, where their number rose from 7 in 2018 to 18 in 2019. Withdrawn
notifications have been steadily increasing since 2015 in the Americas, a trend that continued in 2019.
Figure 3.7. Number of prohibition decisions, by region, 2015-2019
30
25
20
15
10
0
All jurisdictions Non-OECD OECD Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Other
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
for all years.
Figure 3.8. Number of withdrawn notifications, by region, 2015-2019
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
All jurisdictions Non-OECD OECD Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Other
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
for all years.

22 
Figure 3.9 provides an overview of sectors particularly affected by the increased scrutiny of competition
authorities and which have seen the highest number of prohibited mergers.
A more in-depth analysis of a subset of 80 decisions that blocked mergers over the period 2015-2019
reveals that 16% (13) were in the technology, media, and telecom (TMT) sector (2 of which were vertical
mergers).16 Fourteen – the highest number – were in retail and wholesale and were in 11 instances
intended vertical mergers. Finally, 9 of the 80 decisions blocking mergers involved conglomerate mergers.
Vertical and conglomerate mergers are increasingly attracting greater scrutiny from competition authorities
(see section 4.3.2 on policy trends).
Figure 3.9. Top-ten sectors with highest number of blocked mergers, 2015-2019
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Retail and wholesale

TMT
Transportation
Industrial
Metal and mining
Energy
Aviation
Food and beverage
Healthcare
Banking
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Source: OECD analysis based on publicly available information.
3.2.2. Use of remedies
Remedies are a key aspect of merger review as they enable jurisdictions to address specific competition
problems, while maintaining the benefits that the mergers can potentially bring to consumers (OECD,
2018[9]).17
Long term, the use of remedies has fluctuated over time, but has generally been increasing in certain
jurisdictions. In 2019, the total number of merger cases cleared with remedies slightly decreased, after a
steady growth since 2016, yet the average proportion of remedy decisions for each jurisdiction actually
increased by more than 1.6 percentage points with respect to 2018 (Figure 3.10).

 23
Figure 3.10. Absolute number of decisions with remedy and percentage of total merger
decisions with remedy, 2015-2019
180 9%
160 8%
140 7%
6.4% 6.6%
120 5.9% 6%
100 5.2% 5%
5.0%
80 4%
60 3%
40 2%
20 1%
0 0%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number of decisions with remedies (left axis)

Percentage of decisions with remedies over total number of decisions (right axis)
Note: Percentages of decisions with remedies are calculated by averaging the percentages of decisions with remedies for each jurisdiction.
Data from the 48 jurisdictions with a merger regime included in the OECD CompStats database for which comparable data are available for all
years.
As with blocked transactions, a small number of jurisdictions are responsible for a large share of the
remedy decisions and this is clearly reflected in Figure 3.11. Two jurisdictions are responsible for 26% of
the decisions with remedies, and seven for 52%,18 while over half issued either no remedy decisions or
only one or two.
Figure 3.12 provides an overview of the change in the number of remedy decisions between 2018 and
2019. It shows that in most jurisdictions the number of decisions with remedies remained unchanged. The
number of Phase I decisions with remedies taken decreased in 15 jurisdictions and in 13 for Phase II.
Finally, only nine jurisdictions increased their number of decisions with remedies for both Phase I and
Phase II decisions.

24 
Figure 3.11. Reliance of competition authorities on remedies, 2019
25 100%
90%
Total number of decisions with remedies
20 80%
70%
15 52% 60%
50%
\
10 40%
26% 30%
5 20%
10%
0 0%
OECD CompStats jurisdictions
Total number of decisions with remedies (left axis) Cumulative percentage (right axis)
Notes: In 2019, 13 authorities issued no decisions with remedies, while one authority issued 21. Data from the 48 jurisdictions with a merger
regime included in the OECD CompStats database for which comparable data are available for all years.
Figure 3.12. Change in use of remedy decisions, by jurisdiction, 2018 vs. 2019
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20% Phase I
remedies
10%
Phase II
0% remedies
Phase I remedies Phase II remedies
Increase Stable For this jurisdiction, phase I remedy-decisions

increased and phase II remedy-decisions
Decrease Single-phase regimes
decreased in 2019.
Note: Data from all 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database.


 25
4 Policy trends in merger

control
Merger control and enforcement have recently been the subject of lively debate and policy developments.
These trends merit attention and are particularly interesting when coupled with the evolution of merger
control practices around the world.
4.1. Are mergers more likely to be problematic than previously thought?
Underlying the majority of policy developments and debates in this area is the criticism that competition
law – and merger control, in particular – has not been particularly effective in limiting increased market
concentration and market power. While it has been claimed that authorities’ enforcement efforts have
recently become more stringent, the data in this report do not support this conclusion, at least as a
generalised trend across the world. Instead, and as noted in Section 3.2.1, the number of prohibited or
withdrawn mergers remains a small proportion of the total, and broadly in line with previous years.
In 2018, the OECD Competition Committee held a hearing on increased market concentration, which had
been observed in a number of countries (OECD, 2018[10]). This rise had led to questions about whether
competition was becoming less intense, and whether a policy response was required. Increased industry
concentration does not necessarily equate with increased concentration in relevant product markets or
increased market power. Other indicators of market power are easier to calculate and often more
meaningful than industry concentration; these include estimates of price mark-ups, profitability measures,
output, and rates of market entry and exit. Recent changes in these indicators have been broadly aligned
with increased industry concentration, suggesting that market power has increased in many countries.
While the role played by mergers in these developments is not evident, ex-post assessments of the effects
of approved mergers have suggested that competition authorities were sometimes too cautious in
challenging potentially problematic mergers, overly generous to merging parties about the prospects of
future entry, and ultimately allowed mergers that in some cases led to price rises. It has been suggested
that a proportionate policy response would be to increase the rigour of merger control and antitrust
enforcement (OECD, 2018[11]).
This approach is reflected in debates in many jurisdictions around the world about the implications of
increased market concentration for merger control. For example, it has been argued that current screens
for market concentration are too lenient, leading to approval of too many mergers with likely anticompetitive
effects (Nocke, 2020[12]). Also, as mergers in concentrated markets are more likely to prove
anticompetitive, they should be subject to stricter scrutiny (Valletti, 2019[13]).
At the root of many policy debates and developments in this area of competition enforcement is a
perception that merger control has become too lenient and that this has led to problematic levels of
increased market concentration and market power.

26 
A number of these debates and how the OECD has helped to shape them are reviewed in this section.
4.2. Notification thresholds – how to effectively review potentially anticompetitive

mergers
While today there is growing concern with the supposed leniency of merger control, only a few years ago,
the focus was in ensuring that merger control did not impose excessive burdens on companies and
competition agencies alike. As recently as 2016, the OECD wrote a paper on ensuring that notification
thresholds had an appropriate local nexus, and were clear and objective, easy to use and to comply with.19
Since then, two complementary trends have emerged. First, simplified regimes for notified mergers have
been increasingly adopted to minimise burdens on companies and competition authorities in cases when
mergers caught by notification thresholds are unlikely to pose competitive risks (Figure 2.5).
Second, concern has been increasing about the effects of transactions that escape merger review, but
may still pose competition issues. This has been particularly felt in the context of killer acquisitions in the
pharmaceutical and tech sector (see Section 4.3.2). Some jurisdictions, such as Germany and Austria,
have amended their thresholds to catch potentially problematic transactions and adopted methods such
as value-based thresholds. Other methods have also been studied, such as granting residual jurisdiction
to competition agencies to review mergers falling below notification thresholds, the adoption of ex post
merger control mechanisms, and proposals to impose a duty on certain dominant firms (Autorité de la
Concurrence, 2020[14]).20
4.3. Substantive developments
The growing concern with merger control’s perceived leniency and failure to reflect economic
developments has led to significant work devoted to better understanding the competitive effects of
corporate transactions, contestability and market evolution.
Economic analysis is increasingly recognised as central to effective merger review. Unique in competition
law as it is largely a forward-looking exercise concerned with prevention of expected competitive harm,
merger review presents unique challenges to economic and legal analysis. This includes the marshalling
of relevant evidence to predict likely future effects.
Economic analysis, which provides the framework underpinning competition analysis and the likely effects
of mergers, is being increasingly adopted and replacing more formalistic approaches. This move has been
recognised by the OECD, which in December 2020 devoted a Global Forum on Competition session to
the use of economic analysis in merger investigations. 21
At the same time, a number of core concepts of merger control analysis have come under increased
scrutiny as a result of market developments. For example, debates about the usefulness of market
definition have resurfaced. It has been argued that market definition, with its focus on how a merger might
detrimentally affect welfare and competition, can confuse and obscure the nature of merger analysis in the
context of multisided markets, digital platforms or digital ecosystems. (OECD, 2020[15]) Reflecting the
challenges that recent market developments pose to economic analysis for merger control, debates about
the appropriateness of adopting presumptions of harm or relaxing evidentiary standards in certain contexts
– such as when overlapping innovation markets are at stake (Kokkoris, 2020[16]) 22 or a digital incumbent
acquires another firm (McCreary, M.A. and Lemley A., 2019[17]) (Peitz, M. and Motta M., 2020[18]) (US
Congressional Research Service, 2019[19]) 23 – have also emerged.

 27
4.3.1. A renaissance for vertical and conglomerate theories of harm
Another development in merger analysis relates to the greater attention being devoted to vertical and
conglomerate mergers, and related theories of harm, including work undertaken by the OECD during
2020.24
Vertical and conglomerate mergers are generally accepted to be much less likely to prove anticompetitive
than horizontal mergers. This operating assumption has long seen vertical and conglomerate mergers as
unlikely to pose competition issues, and so led to merger control authorities treating them more leniently.
Intervention was presumed to be necessary only in limited circumstances.
Renewed interest in the potential anticompetitive effect of these mergers has been triggered by recent
developments, however.
For vertical mergers, a number of high-profile cases in the technology, media and telecoms (TMT) sector
have been reviewed by different competition authorities, and subjected to merger remedies. The OECD
dedicated a session in its Competition Committee to vertical mergers in TMT and their potential to harm
competition in June 2019 (OECD, 2019[20]).
Conglomerate mergers have also taken on a new prominence in the digital era, as acquisitions have
become a key part of the largest technology companies’ product development, expansion and recruitment
strategies.25 New theories suggest that digital markets may be especially prone to harm from these
practices, which is leading to the development of a significant number of conglomerate theories of harm.
As with vertical mergers, the OECD held a roundtable on “Conglomerate Effects of Mergers” in June 2020,
which reviewed the scenarios in which conglomerate theories of harm may be deployed (OECD, 2020[21]).
In December 2020, the OECD organised another roundtable, looking at digital companies’ business
models of large ecosystems of complementary products and services built around a core service, and the
implications of such practices for competition law and policy (OECD, 2020[22]).
There have also been calls to use merger control for conglomerate practices for broader public-interest
reasons, which are not necessarily connected to a merger’s anticompetitive effects. The extent to which
merger control can or should be relied upon to address such concerns is yet to be determined (OECD,
2020[21]).
4.3.2. Increased focus on dynamic competition and protecting potential competition

Merger control decisions require effects-based analysis of a merger’s likely future effects. Market dynamics
in rapidly evolving sectors, such as technology and digital sectors, can therefore pose a challenge to
competition authorities’ related merger control efforts.
Technology and digital markets are often characterised by high entry and exit rates, as well as innovations
that continuously disrupt existing business models and create entirely new markets. This dynamism makes
it more difficult for competition authorities to predict how markets will evolve when assessing mergers. This
is further aggravated by many of the currently available merger tools tending to focus on static measures
of competition.
This situation – coupled with concerns about whether competition law in general, and merger control in
particular, can address entrenched market power and reduced market entry – has triggered discussions
about how to protect dynamic competition and potential competition.
The OECD has followed this debate closely and organised a series of roundtables on the subject. A 2019
roundtable on merger control in dynamic markets, for example, looked at how assessing the dynamic
effects of mergers could potentially increase merger control’s economic relevance, by enabling authorities
to preserve long-term competition and innovation (OECD, 2020[24]). However, an over-focus on dynamic
effects creates risks for enforcement errors, and challenges for agencies in meeting requisite evidentiary
burdens and standards.

28 
These difficulties can be better understood by looking at two key issues: killer acquisitions and the
protection of potential competition.
Killer acquisitions are a type of a wider theory of harm, concerning the ‘loss of potential competition through
acquisition of a nascent firm’. The challenges posed by killer acquisitions to merger control were discussed
by the OECD Competition Committee in June 2020. Despite playing a vital role in competitive markets, the
relevance of start-up or nascent firms to merger control has traditionally been limited to providing evidence
that a relevant market was likely to become increasingly competitive. Recent empirical work has shown,
however, that in some cases the acquisition of a nascent firm has triggered the loss of not only a
competitive constraint, but also a product. Such cases have been labelled “killer acquisitions”. 26 In addition,
there are “reverse killer acquisitions” in which a company’s innovation is foregone because of the
acquisition of a business that it could have built organically instead, leading to a reduction in overall levels
of innovation. Killer acquisitions are most common in areas where firms are acquiring start-ups, particularly
in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and technology (OECD, 2020[25]).
The risk of a loss of potential competition harming consumers is well established, and research, ex post
assessment and case-law continue to identify new examples of such cases involving nascent firms.
(OECD, 2020[25]).
Debates about dynamic markets and killer acquisitions are often seen as being ultimately concerned with
the loss of future competition. “Potential competition” theories focus on how parties engaged in
complementary activities would have expanded and competed in absence of the merger, and how this
merger could remove the potential for future competition and dampen overall innovation.
Concerns about potential competition particularly arise when technology platforms purchase or build
stakes in younger, innovative companies that specialise in areas in which the larger company is not
involved, but into which it wishes to expand. Concerns about potential competition also abound in other
economic sectors, as demonstrated by the literature on killer acquisitions in the pharmaceutical sector
(Caffarra, C., G. Crawford and T. Valletti, 2020[26]).
Potential competition also poses another challenge to merger control in dynamic markets. Taking it into
account requires an in-depth counterfactual analysis, yet given the uncertain nature of potential
competition, authorities and courts cannot know with any degree of certainty whether it will lead to
competing products or services.
Given existing merger control frameworks and evidentiary standards, some suggest that a shift in merger
policy may be required to avoid under-enforcement. Proposed reforms include:
 the explicit adoption of an “expected harm test” to remove any systematic bias against challenging
mergers
 changes to evaluation processes
 the clarification and placing of greater weight on the value of potential competition
 tinkering with rules on the burden of proof in certain circumstances, such as acquisitions of nascent
companies by dominant incumbents. (OECD, 2020[25]) (Peitz, M. and Motta M., 2020[27]) (Pike C.
and P. Caro de Sousa, 2020[28]) (Hemphill and T. Wu, 2020[29])
Other researchers have warned against such changes, however. 27
4.3.3. Greater interest in non-price concerns
Non-price competition encompasses a wide range of product characteristics and business decisions that
can be as determinative of consumer welfare as price; these include innovation, quality, and consumer
preferences regarding privacy. However, the number of merger cases in which non-price effects play a
central role are limited, as are structured analytical tools to assess such non-price effects.

 29
Over the past few years, however, greater attention has been increasingly devoted to non-price factors,
and the OECD organised a roundtable entitled “Considering non-price effects in merger control” in 2018
(OECD, 2018[30]).
Innovation
Nowhere is this trend more apparent than in the ongoing academic debate about mergers that impact
innovation. Issues being investigated include the likely effects of horizontal mergers on innovation; the
nature of cognisable harms to innovation; the suitability of different analytical approaches to assess the
impact of mergers on innovation; and the nature and period of innovation and R&D initiatives with which
merger control should be concerned (OECD, 2018[30]).
This increased interest in innovation is a natural outgrowth of both the increasing economic importance of
technology-based, intellectual-property-intensive economic sectors, and concomitant market
developments, which have led to the proliferation of zero-price markets and triggered increased merger
enforcement. Also, the debate on innovation in merger control is usually framed in terms of particular
concerns about increased market power and reduced market entry.
This concern with protecting dynamic and potential competition has led to specific work and concerns.
Data protection and privacy
The rapid growth of online platforms and the advent of big-data technology have elicited wide-ranging
concerns about consumer privacy. These concerns have made their way into the competition-policy
sphere, and led to calls for competition authorities to take privacy into account when examining mergers.
It remains far from straightforward to incorporate privacy as a dimension of competition, however. On the
one hand, consumer data’s growing importance in the business model of digital firms could mean that data
protection becomes a more widely recognised dimension of quality in future merger decisions. On the
other, a certain scepticism has arisen about incorporating privacy into merger control based upon the view
that it risks injecting subjectivity and unrelated policy objectives into competition analysis (OECD, 2018[30]).
Data protection has nevertheless been considered a dimension of quality in a limited number of recent
merger decisions. In certain markets, data protection is seen as a current differentiator among firms, and
so considered a dimension of quality in standard analytical frameworks. Further, a current lack of
differentiation among firms in terms of data protection does not necessarily mean that privacy is not a
valued dimension of quality for consumers; indeed, it may instead suggest a lack of competition in the
market. That being said, until now, competition authorities have expressed caution about injecting data-
protection criteria into merger assessments, and have instead rooted their analysis in actual consumer
preferences, and on the use of data as a tool to exclude competitors and entrench market power (OECD,
2018[31]).28
Sustainable development
Sustainability has been on the competition agenda for a number of years. While competition law is not a
solution to sustainability issues, there is increasing awareness that it can play a role, as was discussed at
an OECD hearing in December 2020 (OECD, 2020[32]). This roundtable showed how sustainability can be
framed within the scope of competition law, including merger control. In particular, sustainability can clearly
fit within competition frameworks as a parameter relevant to the evaluation of quality or innovation.
Examples of merger decisions that touch on sustainability matters, if only indirectly, can be found. These
include decisions that protected competition in sectors crucial for energy transition 29 or safeguarded
sustainable innovations.30 At the same time, no merger decisions seem to have been made up to this point

30 
in which sustainable development was expressly acknowledged as a relevant criterion to the competitive
evaluation.
This is perhaps unsurprising, since the competition community is only now beginning to explore the issues
raised by competition law and sustainability concerns. Such issues include how far sustainability concerns
can fit within competitive theories of harm; how far the dynamic nature of sustainability can be pushed, in
particular by taking into account sustainability benefits in the future or in other markets; and how
sustainability-related efficiencies can be taken into account in competition assessments in general. 31 Such
considerations can be relevant for mergers, particularly when evaluating efficiencies.
On the other hand, dimensions of sustainability such as the protection of the environment can be invoked
as public-policy exceptions when deciding whether to approve or prohibit a merger in a number of
countries, including Australia, Germany, Korea, New Zealand or Spain. A good example comes from
Germany, where in 2019 the Federal Minister of Economy and Energy overruled an earlier prohibition
decision by the competition authority by invoking the proposed merger’s innovative potential in renewable
energy technology. The minister noted how “know-how and potential for innovation for the energy
turnaround and sustainability” were in the public interest, as they would be crucial for the reduction in CO2
emissions and environmental protection.32
4.4. Monitoring the effects of mergers on suppliers and labour markets
A natural counterpoint to increased concentration and rising mark-ups is the fall in labour’s share of income.
Coupled with research providing evidence of high levels of concentration in labour-input markets in certain
jurisdictions, this has attracted attention to the effect of mergers on labour markets (Abel, W., S. Tenreyro
and G. Thwaites, 2019[33]) (Azar J., I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum and B. Taska, 2018[34]) (Azar J., I.
Marinescu and M. I. Steinbaum, 2017[35]). The typical concern here is the effects of transactions involving
employers that already have buyer power over labour (understood as an input), which allows them to
reduce salaries (or non-salary benefits) below those that would emerge in a truly competitive market.
No competition authority appears to have conducted in-depth analysis of monopsony power in labour
markets as part of its merger control activity. Despite this, there seems to be increasing agreement that
authorities should do more to address monopsony power concerns on the demand side of the labour
market. The issue was discussed at an OECD roundtable, “Competition Issues in Labour Markets”, in
February 2020.33
As in any monopsony situation, it is erroneous to think that reducing salaries through the exercise of
monopsony power will necessarily benefit downstream consumers. While buyers with market power will
benefit from lower prices, it does not follow that final product prices will be lower: if this translates into lower
downstream supply or into supply coming from less efficient sources, prices are instead likely to rise.
Furthermore, those who lose out are also consumers in other markets and their lost income translates into
lower demand, resulting in an overall loss of allocative efficiency (OECD, 2020[36]). In summary, depending
on the market power of the monopolist in downstream markets, reductions in the cost of inputs (such as
salaries) can either lead to benefits, detriment or no change for final consumers. 34
In cases where monopsony has a detrimental impact on final customers, competitive harm can be
established. More controversial is potential action when a merger that creates a monopsony either has no
effect on final consumers or is actually beneficial. The question arises because the consumer-welfare
standard, in its literal interpretation as a consumer surplus, could be seen as an obstacle to the application
of competition law to monopsony employer power in cases where the transaction’s effects are minimal at
the product-market level. Some have argued that in such scenarios of harm to upstream markets, merger
control authorities can still intervene. Others would prefer restricting enforcement to situations where harm
is also felt – as will usually be the case – in downstream markets.35

 31
To date, merger enforcement on labour markets has generally been limited to non-existent.36 Moreover,
merger enforcement in this area faces significant challenges, including how to define markets, how to
identify market power, and how to distinguish between the acquisition of illegitimate monopsony power
and cost-reducing efficiencies (Marinescu, I. and H. Hovenkamp, 219[37]) (Hovenkamp, 2019[38]). Some of
these challenges are common to the application of competition law to supply markets and monopsony in
general.
4.5. Interaction with public-interest considerations
Discussions about the protection of workers under merger control can be traced to yet another recent topic
of interest: calls for the inclusion of various dimensions of public interest into competition assessments.
This trend is not limited to merger control, but can also be easily observed in it.
While it is commonly accepted that the traditional goals of competition are the protection of consumer
welfare and an effective competitive process, many jurisdictions also promote public-interest objectives
that go beyond economic outcomes. These public-interest considerations are often contained in
competition or other laws to ensure that concerns beyond the traditional goals of competition law are
accommodated in merger analysis. In OECD countries, these clauses are usually interpreted narrowly and
carefully adopted, even if crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can lead to an increased reliance on
them.
In order to ensure the objective neutrality and technical character of competition authority decisions, the
power to apply public-policy exceptions is often in the hands of government bodies other than the
competition agency. Examples of this can be found in countries such as Germany, France, the United
Kingdom and United States. In some cases, however, the competition authority has this power itself, as in
South Africa (OECD, 2016[39]).
Notable examples of relying on such public-interest considerations for the protection of employment in
merger control are South Africa, where the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal must
take employment into account when considering the effects of a merger;37 Germany, where the Minister of
Economy allowed a merger that had been prohibited by the competition authority on the grounds of
safeguarding jobs and the protection of workers’ rights;38 and France, where the Minister of Economy
removed divestment conditions imposed upon a merger because they were incompatible with the objective
of creating and preserving stable employment. 39
At the same time, a number of public-interest considerations can be framed within traditional competition
prisms. Concerns about protecting labour from increasing market power, as discussed above, provide a
good example. Other examples concern privacy or data protection and promoting sustainability.

32 
Annex A. OECD Merger Roundtables
Table A A.1. List of OECD Best Practice Policy Roundtables on merger issues,
1995-2020
Year Title roundtable Link
1995 Failing Firm Defence www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/1920253.pdf
1995 Competition Policy and Efficiency Claims in Horizontal www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/2379526.pdf
Agreements
1999 Airline Mergers and Alliances www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/2379233.pdf
2000 Mergers in Financial Services www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/1920060.pdf
2001 Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/1818237.pdf
2002 Merger Review in Emerging High Innovation Markets www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/2492253.pdf
2002 Substantive Criteria used for Merger Assessment www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/2500227.pdf
2003 Media Mergers www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/17372985.pdf
2003 Merger Remedies www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/34305995.pdf
2007 Private Remedies www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/34305995.pdf
2007 Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Analysis www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/40623561.pdf
2007 Managing Complex Mergers www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/41651401.pdf
2007 Vertical Mergers www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/39891031.pdf
2009 The Failing Firm Defence www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/45810821.pdf
2009 Standard for Merger Review www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/45247537.pdf
2011 Cross-Border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing and www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50114086.pdf
Emerging Economies
2011 Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis www.oecd.org/daf/competition/EconomicEvidenceInMergerAn
alysis2011.pdf
2011 Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Impactevaluationofmergerdecis
ions2011.pdf
2011 Remedies in Merger Cases www.oecd.org/daf/competition/RemediesinMergerCases2011.
pdf
2012 Market Definition www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition2012.pdf
2013 Remedies in Cross-Border Merger Cases www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Remedies_Merger_Cases_201
3.pdf
2013 Definition of Transaction for the Purpose of Merger Control www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Merger-control-review-2013.pdf
Review
2014 Enhanced Enforcement Co-operation www.oecd.org/daf/competition/enhanced-enforcement-
cooperation.htm
2016 Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control www.oecd.org/daf/competition/public-interest-considerations-
in-merger-control.htm
2016 Agency Decision-Making in Merger Cases: Prohibition and www.oecd.org/daf/competition/agency-decision-making-in-
Conditional Clearances merger-cases.htm
2016 Jurisdictional Nexus in Merger Control Regimes www.oecd.org/daf/competition/jurisdictional-nexus-in-merger-
control-regimes.htm
2016 Geographic Market Definition Across National Borders www.oecd.org/daf/competition/geographic-market-
definition.htm
2017 Common Ownership by Institutional Investors and Its Impact www.oecd.org/daf/competition/common-ownership-and-its-
on Competition impact-on-competition.htm
2018 Consumer-Facing Remedies www.oecd.org/daf/competition/consumer-facing-remedies.htm

 33
Year Title roundtable Link

2018 Gun Jumping and Suspensory Effects of Merger Notifications www.oecd.org/daf/competition/gun-jumping-and-suspensory-
effects-of-merger-notifications.htm
2018 Market Concentration www.oecd.org/daf/competition/market-concentration.htm
2018 Non-Price Effects of Mergers www.oecd.org/daf/competition/non-price-effects-of-
mergers.htm
2019 Vertical Mergers in the Technology, Media and Telecom www.oecd.org/daf/competition/vertical-mergers-in-the-
Sector technology-media-and-telecom-sector.htm
2020 Merger Control in Dynamic Markets www.oecd.org/daf/competition/merger-control-in-dynamic-
markets-2020.pdf
2020 Conglomerate Effects of Mergers www.oecd.org/daf/competition/conglomerate-effects-of-
mergers.htm
2020 Start-Ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control www.oecd.org/daf/competition/start-ups-killer-acquisitions-
and-merger-control-2020.pdf
2020 Economic Analysis in Merger Investigations www.oecd.org/daf/competition/economic-analysis-in-merger-
investigations.htm
2020 Competition Economics of Digital Ecosystems www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-economics-of-
digital-ecosystems.htm

34 
Annex B. Explanatory notes for the graphs
 For the purpose of the report, merger decisions include both formal decisions and other outcomes,
such as the expiration of the waiting period or no-objection letters.
 As cross-border transactions may be notified to different agencies, merger decisions in different
jurisdictions may pertain to the same transaction. As a result, the data on merger decisions does
not necessarily reflect the number of mergers.
 Statistics presented in the chapter, unless specified, refer to the 48 jurisdictions included in the
OECD CompStats database with a merger regime and for which comparable data is available for
all years.
 When percentages are reported, these are calculated first for each jurisdiction, and then averaged
across jurisdictions.
 For the purpose of this report, merger prohibitions include trials.

 35
Annex C. Competition Authorities in the

CompStats Database
Jurisdiction Competition authority
Argentina Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia

National Commission for the Defence of Competition
Australia Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
Austria Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde
Austrian Federal Competition Authority (AFCA)
Belgium Belgische Mededingingsautoriteit / Autorité belge de la Concurrence
Belgian Competition Authority
Brazil Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
Administrative Council for Economic Defence
Bulgaria Commission on Protection of Competition
Canada The Competition Bureau
Chile Fiscalía Nacional Económica/ National Economic Prosecutor
The Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre. Competencia/ The Chilean Competition Tribunal
Colombia Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio
Superintendency of Industry and Commerce
Costa Rica Comisión para Promover la Competencia/Commission for the Promotion of Competition
Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones / Superintendency of Telecommunications
Croatia Agencija za zaštitu tržišnog natjecanja
Croatian Competition Agency
Czech Republic Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže
Office for the Protection of Competition
Denmark Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen
Danish Competition and Consumer Authority
Ecuador Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado
Superintendency for Control of Market Power
Egypt ‫جهاز حماية المنافسة ومنع الممارسات اإلحتكارية‬
Egyptian Competition Authority
El Salvador Superintendencia de competencia
Superintendency of Competition

36 
Estonia Konkurentsiamet
Estonian Competition Authority
European Commission European Commission Directorate-General for Competition
Finland Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto
Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority
France Autorité de la concurrence
French Competition Authority
Germany Bundeskartellamt
Federal Cartel Office
Greece Ελληνική Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού
Hellenic Competition Commission
Hungary Gazdasági Versenyhivatal
Office of Economic Competition
Iceland Samkeppniseftirlitið
Icelandic Competition Authority
India Competition Commission of India
Indonesia Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha
Indonesia Competition Commission
Ireland Competition and Consumer Protection Commission
Israel Israel Competition Authority
Italy Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato
Italian Competition Authority
Japan 公正取引委員会
Japan Fair Trade Commission
Kazakhstan Табиғи монополияларды реттеу комитеті
Committee on Regulation of Natural Monopolies and Protection of Competition
Korea 공정거래위원회
Korea Fair Trade Commission
Latvia Konkurences padome
Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia
Lithuania Konkurencijos taryba

Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania
Luxembourg Conseil de la Concurrence Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
Competition Council
Malta Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority
Mexico Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica / Federal Economic Competition Commission
Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones / Federal Telecommunications Institute

 37
Netherlands Autoriteit Consument en Markt

Authority for Consumers and Markets
New Zealand Commerce Commission
Norway Konkurransetilsynet
Norwegian Competition Authority
Peru Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad
Intelectual
National Institute for the Defence of Free Competition and the Protection of Intellectual
Property
Poland Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
Portugal Autoridade da Concorrência
Portuguese Competition Authority
Romania Consiliul Concurenței
Romanian Competition Council
Russian Federation Федеральная Антимонопольная Служба
Federal Antimonopoly Service
Slovak Republic Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej Republiky
Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic
Slovenia Javna agencija Republike Slovenije za varstvo konkurence
Public Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for the Protection of Competition
South Africa Competition Commission of South Africa
Spain Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia
National Commission on Markets and Competition
Sweden Konkurrensverket
Swedish Competition Commission
Switzerland Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft / Confédération suisse/Confederazione
Svizzera/Confederaziun svizra
Federal Competition Commission
Chinese Taipei 公平交易委員會
Taipei Fair Trade Commission
Turkey Rekabet Kurumu
Turkish Competition Authority
Ukraine Антимонопольний комітет України
Antimonopoly Committee
United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority
United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division /
Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition

38 

 39
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 41
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42 
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 43
Notes
1 The analysis excludes territories.
2For a more detailed description of the benefits and challenges of Regional Competition Agreements, see
OECD (2018), “Regional Competition Agreements – Inventory of Provisions in Regional Competition
Agreements – Annex to the Background note by the Secretariat”, DAF/COMP/GF(2018)12,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2018)12/en/pdf and OECD (2018), “Regional Competition
Agreements: Benefits and Challenges – Background note by the Secretariat”, DAF/COMP/GF(2018)5,
3 The two jurisdictions with no regulatory framework for merger control are Luxembourg and Egypt. The
Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) does not, in principle, investigate the transactions, but has put in
place a mandatory post-closing notification regime. A comprehensive merger control regime is currently
under development.
4 The jurisdictions are: Australia; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Fiji; Hong Kong
(China), China (People’s Republic of China); India; Indonesia; Japan; Lao People’s Democratic Republic;
Malaysia; Mongolia; Myanmar; Nepal; New Zealand; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; People’s Republic of
China; Philippines; Singapore; Korea; Sri Lanka; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; and Viet Nam.
5The jurisdictions and communities are: Argentina; Barbados; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica;
Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua;
Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; Venezuela; Andean Community; and the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
6The jurisdictions are: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Kyrgyzstan; Moldova; Montenegro; Republic of North Macedonia;
Romania; Russian Federation, Serbia; and Ukraine.
7 For more details on the work on competition of the OECD in South East Europe, see for instance OECD
(2018), Competitiveness in South East Europe: A Policy Outlook 2018, Competitiveness and Private
Sector Development, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264298576-en, and OECD
et al. (2019), SME Policy Index: Western Balkans and Turkey 2019: Assessing the Implementation of the
Small Business Act for Europe, SME Policy Index, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9fa9a-en.
8 For a review of the local nexus criteria of a number of OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions, see, OECD
(2016), “Local Nexus and Jurisdictional Thresholds in Merger Control – Background Paper by the
Secretariat”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)4/REV1,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)4/REV1/en/pdf.
9For the purpose of the report, decisions include both formal decisions and other outcomes, such as the
expiration of the waiting period or no-objection letters.
10 The three with a voluntary regime are Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

44 
11The reduced sample includes the 12 jurisdictions that impose a one-time flat fee only upon filing,
regardless of the phase of the investigation.
12Importantly, fee-collection systems also vary across jurisdictions. In some, they are collected by the
authority itself and feed directly into the authority’s budget, while in others, they are collected by other
public authorities.
13Note that 27 jurisdictions use turnover as the sole threshold, meaning they are not notified of acquisitions
of firms with low or zero turnover, even if potential competition implications arise. See Section 4.3.2.
14There remains a difference in practice, however, over whether the sanctionable offence is the failure of
parties to notify a transaction (whether or not it actually takes place) or the fact that it takes place before
or without clearance.
15For the purpose of the report, decisions include both formal decisions and other outcomes, such as the
expiration of the waiting period or no-objection letters.
16For a more detailed discussion on vertical mergers in the TMT sector, see, OECD (2019), “Vertical
Mergers in the Technology, Media and Telecom Sector – Background Note by the Secretariat”,
DAF/COMP(2019)5, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2019)5/en/pdf.
17For a more detailed discussion on remedies, see, OECD (2016), Remedies in Cross-Border Merger
Cases, DAF/COMP(2013)28, www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Remedies_Merger_Cases_2013.pdf; OECD
(2017), “Roundtable on the Extraterritorial Reach of Competition Remedies – Issue Paper by the
Secretariat”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2017)4, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3(2017)4/en/pdf;
and OECD (2018), “Designing and Testing Effective Consumer-facing Remedies – Background Note by
the Secretariat”, DAF/COMP/WP3(2018)2, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3(2018)2/en/pdf.
18It is unclear to what extent authorities rely on remedies imposed for the same merger by other authorities;
this can influence the number of decisions with remedies.
19 See, www.oecd.org/daf/competition/jurisdictional-nexus-in-merger-control-regimes.htm. In effect, it is

technically against both ICN and OECD recommendations to rely on non-objective criteria such as market
shares.
20
See, for example, HM Treasury (2019), Unlocking digital competition: Report of the Digital Competition
Expert Panel, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf; and Autorité de la Concurrence
(2020), “Contribution de l’Autorité de la concurrence au débat sur la politique de concurrence et les
enjeux numériques”, www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2020-
02/2020.02.28_contribution_adlc_enjeux_num.pdf.
21 See, www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/economic-analysis-in-merger-investigations.htm.
22See, Federico, G., F.S. Morton and C. Shapiro (2019), “Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and
Protecting Disruption”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 26005,
www.dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26005; Kokkoris, I. and T. Valletti (2020), “Innovation Considerations in
Horizontal Merger Control” Journal of Competition Law & Economics 16:2,
www.dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa008, pp. 220-261.

 45
23 Suggestions to the effect that such transactions should be presumed anticompetitive, and digital
incumbents should provide evidence of countervailing efficiencies, have been made; see, M.A. Lemley
and A. McCreary (2019), “Exit Strategy”, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper #542,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506919; M. Motta and M. Peitz (2020), “Big Tech Mergers”, CEPR Discussion
Paper No. DP14353, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526079; and US Congressional Research Service
(2019), Antitrust and “Big Tech”, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45910.
See, “Vertical mergers in the technology, media and telecom sector”,

24
www.oecd.org/daf/competition/vertical-mergers-in-the-technology-media-and-telecom-sector.htm;
Conglomerate effects of mergers, www.oecd.org/daf/competition/conglomerate-effects-of-mergers.htm.
See, for example, Gautier, A. and J. Lamesch (2020), “Mergers in the Digital Economy” CESifo Working
25
Paper No 8056, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529012.
26
See, for example, C. Cunningham, F. Ederer and S. Ma (2020), “Killer Acquisitions”, Journal of Political
Economy, www.dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3241707.
27See, Lécuyer, T. (2020), “Digital Conglomerates and Killer Acquisitions: A Discussion of the Competitive
Effects of Start-up Acquisitions by Digital Platforms”, Concurrences, No 1-2020, Art. No. 92964,
www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2020/law-economics/digital-conglomerates-and-killer-
acquisitions-a-discussion-of-the-competitive-92964-en, pp. 42-50; R. Nazzini and G. Carovano (2020),
“Addressing the ‘Kill Zone’ of Antitrust Enforcement Without Killing Legal Certainty” Competition Law and
Policy Debate, 6:2.
28 Good examples of competition authorities’ reactions can be found in the ongoing review of Google’s
acquisition of Fitbit; see, for example, Centre for Economic Policy and Research (30 September 2020),
“New CEPR Policy Insight – Google/Fitbit will monetise health data and harm consumers”,
https://cepr.org/content/new-cepr-policy-insight-googlefitbit-will-monetise-health-data-and-harm-
consumers (accessed 8 January 2020); and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (18
June 2020), “Statement of Issues: Google LLC – proposed acquisition of Fitbit Inc”,
www.accc.gov.au/system/files/public-registers/documents/Google%20Fitbit%20-
%20Statement%20of%20Issues%20-%2018%20June%202020.pdf.
29US FTC (2015), Panasonic Corporation and Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd, 091 0050/C-4274. In 2009, the Federal
Trade Commission required the divestment of certain Sanyo assets – notably battery-production facilities –
before Panasonic was able to buy the company; the sale was made and the deal finalised in 2015.
30 See criticisms of the Bayer/Monsanto merger.
31See, for example, discussions within agencies, such as Hellenic Competition Commission (2020),
“Draft Staff Discussion Paper on Sustainability Issues and Competition Law”,
www.epant.gr/en/enimerosi/competition-law-
sustainability/item/download/1896_9b05dc293adbae88a7bb6cce37d1ea60.html; and Dutch ACM (2020),
“Draft guidelines ‘Sustainability Agreements’”, www.acm.nl/en/publications/draft-guidelines-sustainability-
agreements.
32Federal Minister of Economy and Energy (2019), Miba/Zollern, I B 2 – 20302/14–02. The decision came
with certain binding commitments such as operating the joint venture for at least five years and investing
at least EUR 50 million in Germany over the same period. See, Linklaters (2019), “German Federal Minister
of Economics and Energy overrides the prohibition of a slide-bearing business joint venture for
environmental policy reasons”, www.linklaters.com/en/insights/publications/2019/august/german-federal-
minister-overrides-the-prohibition-of-a-slide-bearing-business-joint-venture (accessed 18 January 2020).

46 
33See, the roundtable’s background paper, OECD (2020), Competition in Labour Markets,
www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-in-labour-markets-2020.pdf, pp. 10-11.
34“An important negative implication of monopsony is that, absent real efficiencies such as economies of
scale or scope, it can be expected to result in inefficient losses in production and employment. If the
monopsonist cannot wage discriminate, the quantity (or quality) reduction in the downstream product
market might be offset by the reduced cost of wages. If the monopsonist has market power in the
downstream market, the reduced quantity of output may increase the price for consumers. If, however, the
monopsonist faces a competitive downstream market, the price for consumers will not change, and the
only impact of merger to monopsony would be the reduction in wages.” OECD (2020), Competition in
Labour Markets, p. 15.
35 For a discussion, see, OECD (2020) Competition in Labour Markets, pp. 15-19.
36
The OECD has noted that it is unaware of any merger review into labour markets in the EU or the US;
see, OECD (2020), Competition in Labour Markets, p. 33.
37See, for example, the Wal-Mart’s 2010 merger with Massmart; Competition Tribunal of South Africa
(2011), Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Massmart Holdings Limited, Case No: 73/LM/Dec10),
www.saflii.mobi/za/cases/ZACT/2011/42.pdf.
38For example, the merger of supermarket chains Edeka and Kaiser’s Tengelmann, which was initially
blocked in 2015 by the competition authority (FCO), but cleared in 2016 by the minister, a decision then
appealed by a rival supermarket. The merger was finally approved after divestments in December 2016.
See, www.vbb.com/insights/competition/merger-control/edekakaisers-tengelmann-german-merger-
review-saga-comes-to-an-end.
39See, for example, Financière Cofigeo’s 2018 purchase of certain assets of the Agripole Group;
www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/communiques-de-presse/14-june-2018-acquisition-william-saurin.

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Global Merger Control: OECD Competition Trends, Volume II

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GLOBAL MERGER CONTROL

OECD Competition Trends, Volume II

Volume II: Global Merger Control

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OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

2 Merger regimes around the world 9

3 Global merger control activity 16

4 Policy trends in merger control 25

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

Annex A. OECD Merger Roundtables 32

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

1.2. Report structure

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

2 Merger regimes around the world

2.1. Introduction of merger regimes in selected regions

2.1.1. Competition Programme OECD/Korea Policy Centre (KPC), Seoul, Korea

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Panel A. Asia-Pacific Panel B. Latin-America Panel C. Eastern Europe

Competition Law Merger Regime

2.1.3. OECD-GVH Regional Centre for Competition, Budapest, Hungary

OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021 © OECD 2021

2.2. Characteristics of merger control regimes in CompStats

2.2.1. Mandatory and voluntary merger notification regimes

Box 2.1. OECD Recommendation on Merger Review

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Figure 2.2. Overview of mandatory and voluntary merger-notification regimes in CompStats

Mandatory and post-merger

Mandatory and pre- or post-merger

Voluntary and pre-merger

Voluntary and pre- or post-merger

Figure 2.3. Filing-fee requirements, 2020

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Figure 2.4. Selected criteria for establishing merger-notification thresholds

Market share # 12/54

Transaction value # 5/54

Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Other

Simplified merger regimes

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Figure 2.5. Use of simplified merger regime, 2020

2.2.2. One-phase or two-phase approaches

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Figure 2.6. CompStats jurisdictions with one-phase or two-phase approaches

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3 Global merger control activity

Figure 3.1. Merger decisions and notifications in selected regions, 2015-2019

10 000 9 155 9 272

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Americas Asia-Pacific Europe Other Total Notifications

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Box 3.1. International enforcement co-operation on merger cases

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Figure 3.2. Distribution of merger decisions, by jurisdiction, 2019

Total number of decisions (left axis) Cumulative percentage (right axis)

Figure 3.3. Overview of types of merger decisions, 2019

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Figure 3.4. Types of merger decisions, 2015-2019