VOL.

157, JANUARY 29, 1988 455

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

*
No. L-44546. January 29, 1988.

RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO,
DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO, and SANTIAGO ASEJO,
respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Co-ownership; Redemption; Redemption of the

whole property by a co-owner will not make him of all of it.—The right of
repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone.
While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its
entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner
of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-
ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of all co-owners to redeem
the property entitles the vendee a retro to retain it and consolidate title
thereto in his name; Redemption not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
—The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, “may
not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,” the redemption by one
co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto
in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the
right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Registration of property not a means
of acquiring ownership.—Neither does the fact that the petitioner had
succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing
co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to
him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he
cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common. Registration
of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere
notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is a trustee of the property on
behalf of private respondents.—The petitioner must then be said to be a
trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. We agree with
the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registra-

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

456

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

tion of the property. The petitioner’s pretension that he was the sole heir to
the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary
to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his
brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. It is the
view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property,
did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted
himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his
exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as
trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article
1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative, the
petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property
and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to
have assumed the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-
heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as
the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the same whether it
is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the private
respondents, his co-heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription must be preceded by
repudiation to terminate co-ownership; Requisites.—Prescription, as a
mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded
by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.
Same; Same; Land registration; Torrens Title cannot cover up fraud;
Registration not equivalent to notice of repudiation.—It is true that
registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for
fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is
equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.
Civil Procedure; Prescription; While actions to enforce a constructive
trust prescribe in ten years from registration of the property, private
respondents’ right commenced from actual discovery of petitioner’s act of
defraudation.—For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private
respondents’ claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955.
While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we, as

457

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 457

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case.
We note the petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property
exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in
his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is ‘‘the only heir
and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to
secure title in his name also.” Accordingly, we hold that the right of the
private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the
petitioner’s act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court of
Appeals, they “came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of
the litigation.” Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Same; Same; Prescriptive as an affirmative defense must be pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived.
—Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is
deemed waived, and here, the petitioner never raised that defense. There are
recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why they
apply.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of

controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that has led not
only to protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter
consequences, like strained relationships and even the forfeiture of
lives. It is a question that likewise reflects a tragic commentary on
prevailing social and cultural values and institutions, where, as one
observer notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self-
fulfillment and where property is held as sacred as life itself. “It is in
the defense of his property,” says this modern thinker, that one “will
mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody that threatens
1
his possessions will arouse his most passionate enmity.”
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of
values; the burden of reconstructing the social order is shouldered by
the political leadership—and the people themselves.

_______________

1 GREENE, FELK, THE ENEMY 234 (1971).

458

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our
responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the decree of
law.
2
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision appealed
from:

x x x      x x x      x x x
x x x [Th]e land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay
located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally
belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property; she married twice
in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an
only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in her second marriage with one
Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs,—now, sometime in
1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons,
period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able
to redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption, herein
defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed
of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child
of his mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in
his name alone also, so that OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was
transferred to his name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of
compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed
present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a
trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,—and this is the evidence, but
as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a
portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that,—
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant in
his position that he was and became absolute owner, he was not a trustee,
and therefore, dismissed case and also condemned plaintiff occupant,
Emeteria to vacate; it is because of this that plaintiffs have come here and
contend that trial court erred in:

“I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;

II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion
of the property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant’s brief.

which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis

________________

2 Gatmaitan, Magno, Acting Pres. J.; Domondon, Sixto and Reyes, Samuel, JJ., Concurring.

459

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 459

Adille vs. Court of Appeals
3
of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should be maintained. x x x
     x x x      x x x
4
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and ruled
for the plaintiffs-appellants, the private respondents herein. The
petitioner now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Appellate
Court’s decision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment and
thereafter, having given due course to the petition, directed the
parties to file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief,
and the private respondents having failed to file one, we declared the
case submitted for decision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire
exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner’s contention that the property
subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs
to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He
relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code,
Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right
to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
5
respect to his share alone. While the records show that the petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words,
it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to6
his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners.
There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary
expense. Under the Civil Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners
to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from
this obligation by renouncing so much of his

________________

3 Rollo, 14-15.
4 Solidum, Arsenio, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Albay, Civil Case no. 5029.
5 CIVIL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.
6 Supra, art. 489.

460

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and

taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-

ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
“may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption,” the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro 7
to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision
does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing
title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership.
While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for
reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he
cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It
operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on
behalf of the private respondents. The Civil Code states:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person

obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended

the registration of the property. The petitioner’s pretension that he
was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays
a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to
exercise sole dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision
therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking
over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which
event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor

_______________

7 Supra, art. 1607.

461

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 461

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in
which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private
respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The
evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner
having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and
having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to
have assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his
co-heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any
case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the
same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain
liable to the private respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that
prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held
by another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In
that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and
8
the state of co-ownership is ended. In the case at bar, the property
was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while
the claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has
prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation
(of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-owner-ship; (2)
such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he
has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and
9
notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with
these requisites. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-
ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private
respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate
under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have
________________

8 The modes of terminating a co-ownership other than by prescription are partition

(CIVIL CODE, arts. 494; 1079,1082), merger or consolidation, and loss of the thing
(3 Manresa 486).
9 Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v. Camumot, 40
Phil. 857 (1920).

462

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

“made known” his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one

of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of
the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to
eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover
possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a
counterclaim, and only after the private respondents had first sought
judicial relief.
It is true that
10
registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens
11
title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument
to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents’
claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While
12
actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
13
reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we, as
we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this
case. We note the petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to get hold of the
property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement that he is “the only heir and child of his mother Feliza
with the
14
consequence that he was able to secure title in his name
also.” Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private
respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the
15
petitioner’s act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court
of Appeals, they “came to know [of it] apparently only during the
16
progress of the litigation.” Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense

________________

10 Pres. Decree No. 1529, sec. 31.

11 Amerol v. Bagumbaran, G.R. No. 33261, September 30, 1987.
12 Supra.
 13 Gerona v. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153 (1964).
14 Rollo,id., 14.
15 Gerona v. De Guzman, supra.
16 Rollo, id., 18.

463

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 463

Adille vs. Court of Apppeals

that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer

17
otherwise it is deemed waived, and here, the petitioner never raised
18
that defense. There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but the
petitioner has not shown why they apply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the
respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

Notes.—After the lapse of redemption period without any

redemption made, a writ of possession can be issued in favor of a
purchaser. (Banco Filipino vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 44.)
Policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat right of redemption.
(Tioseco vs. CA, 143 SCRA 705.)

——o0o——

________________

17 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 2. A party need not plead the statute of
limitations in a responsive pleading (or motion to dismiss) where the complaint itself
shows that the claims have prescribed [Ferrer v. Ericta, No. L-41767, August 23,
1978, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)]. Likewise, it has been held that where the defendant had
no way of knowing that the claim advanced by the plaintiff had prescribed, his failure
to invoke the statute (in his answer or motion to dismiss) does not constitute a waiver
of such a defense [Guanzo v. Ramirez, 32 Phil. 492 (1914)]. In another case, we said
that prescription need not be pleaded specifically in an answer where the evidence
itself shows that prescription bars the plaintiffs claims [Philippine National Bank v.
Perez, No. L- 20412, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 270 (1966); see also Chua Lanko
v. Dioso, 97 [Phil. 821 (1955); Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commission
House, No. L-22675, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 766 (1969)].
18 Rollo,id., 18.
 464

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