General Theory of Law and Development: Yong-Shik Lee

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General Theory of Law and

Development
Yong-Shik Lee†
Although scholarship in law and development that explores the rela-
tionship between law and social and economic progress has evolved over
the last four decades, this area of inquiry remains unfamiliar to many legal
scholars, lawyers, and policy makers. Scholars have not yet been able to
develop a theory that systematically explains the interrelationship between
law and development, which would establish law and development as a
robust and coherent academic field. This Article attempts to fill this gap by
presenting a general theory that defines the disciplinary parameters of law
and development, and explains the mechanisms by which law impacts
development. This Article also demonstrates the validity of this general
theory by applying it to an empirical case and also by explaining the devel-
opment process of South Korea (1962– 1996) under its analytical frame-
work. The concept of development, which has traditionally been
associated with developing countries, may also be extended to address eco-
nomic problems in developed countries today.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 R
I. Law and Development: History and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 R
A. Law and Development “Movements” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 R
B. “Law” in the Context of Law and Development . . . . . . . . . 423 R
1. Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 R
2. Legal Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424 R
† Director and Professorial Fellow, The Law and Development Institute and
Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Emory University School of Law (2015– 2016). The
author is grateful to leading scholars who read earlier versions of this manuscript and
gave helpful comments, including Professors Frank Upham (New York University),
Simon Deakin (University of Cambridge), Tom Ginsburg (University of Chicago),
Reuven Avi-Yonah (University of Michigan), Alvaro Santos (Georgetown University), Paul
J. Zwier (Emory University), Francis Snyder (Peking University), Moshe Hirsch (Hebrew
University of Jerusalem), Klaus Ziegert (University of Sydney), William H.J. Hubbard
(University of Chicago), Jide Okechuku Nzelibe (Northwestern University), Tim Murphy
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Diogo R. Coutinho (University of São Paulo),
Wouter Vandenhole (University of Antwerp), Markus Kaltenborn (Ruhr University
Bochum), Alexander Volokh (Emory University), Salim Farrar (University of Sydney),
Pedro Rivas Palá (Universidad de La Coruña), Stephanie de Moerloose (Universidad
Austral), T.K. Pooe (North West University), Alessandro Romano (China-EU School of
Law), Won-Mog Choi (Ewha Womans University), Dae In Kim (Ewha Womans
University), Junji Nakagawa (University of Tokyo), Jon Mark Truby (Qatar University),
and Dr. Johan Rochel (University of Tokyo). The author also thanks Ms. Kari Bloom, Mr.
Ryan Layton, Mr. Brian McKeegan, Mr. Clinton Odel Hall, Mr. Robert Sroka, Ms. Qi Bao,
Dr. Hye Seong Mun, and the editorial staff of Cornell International Law Journal for their
editorial and research assistance.
50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415 (2017)
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416 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50
3. Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426 R
II. The Question of Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428 R
A. What Constitutes Development? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428 R
B. Economic and Social Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430 R
C. Extension of the Concept of Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 R
III. Regulatory Impact Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 R
A. Regulatory Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436 R
1. Anticipated Policy Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436 R
2. Organization of Law, Legal Frameworks, and
Institutions (LFIs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 R
3. Adaptability to Socioeconomic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . 444 R
B. Regulatory Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446 R
1. General Regulatory Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 R
2. Specific Regulatory Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 R
C. Quality of Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 R
1. Definition and Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 R
2. State Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 R
3. Political Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454 R
IV. Application of the General Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 R
A. Development of South Korea (1962– 1996): An
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 R
B. Applying the General Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 R
1. Applying the Disciplinary Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 R
2. Regulatory Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 R
3. Regulatory Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463 R
4. State Capacity and Political Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 R
Conclusion: Does Law Matter for Development? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 R
Introduction
Law has become the framework and vocabulary for constructing and
debating development policies,1 but law and development, an area of schol-
arship that explores the relationship between law and economic and social
progress,2 is relatively unknown and underdeveloped as an academic field
1. Development policies since the 1990s have been conceived and constructed in
the notion of legal rights. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and
Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 95, 167 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discussing the chang-
ing roles of law, economics, and politics in the context of development policies).
2. Law and development, as an area of scholarship, is indeterminate and heteroge-
neous. Reflecting on these characteristics, Scott Newton commented, “It [law and devel-
opment] does not appear to possess a particular normative armature or notable
thematic consistency or much of a unifying logic or set of organizing principles. The
most one can say is that the disciplinary range of L&D is constituted by the aggregate of
studies pursued by its self-identifying adherents.” Scott Kennedy, The Dialectics of Law
and Development, in NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 177. The R
noted indeterminacy, lack of disciplinary clarity, and absence of an underpinning the-
ory that systematically explains the interrelations between law and development have
retarded its development as a coherent academic field.
2017 General Theory of Law and Development 417
despite decades of research.3 Leading scholars, such as Trubek and

Galanter (1974),4 Merryman (1977),5 Snyder (1982),6 North (1991),7
Tamanaha (1995),8 Chibundu (1997),9 Posner (1998),10 Chua (1999),11
Cross (2001),12 Davis and Trebilcock (2001),13 Barr and Avi-Yonah,
(2005),14 McInerney (2005),15 Chodosh (2006),16 Dam (2006),17
Chukwumerije (2009),18 and Prado (2009)19 have addressed a range of
issues in law and development. These scholars have called for, inter alia,
new approaches, including comparative ones, with references to the local
context and conditions, as well as theoretical underpinnings that better
explain the dynamics among law, institutions, and the existing political,
social, and economic conditions.
In response to these calls, particularly the one requiring the theoretical
underpinnings, this Article presents a general theory of law and develop-
3. For a review of law and development scholarship, see Kevin E. Davis & Michael
Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists versus Skeptics, 56
AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008); and David M. Trubek, Law and Development 50 Years On
(University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1212, 2012), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2161899 [https://perma.cc/ZVK2-3HPP]; see also Yong-Shik Lee,
Call for a New Analytical Model for Law and Development, 8 LAW & DEV. REV. 1, 10– 27
(2015).
4. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflec-
tions on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, WIS. L. REV. 1062
(1974).
5. See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins,
Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457
(1977).
6. See Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of “Law and Development,” WIS. L. REV. 373
(1982); see also Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency The-
ory, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 723 (1980).
7. See Douglas C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991).
8. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 470 (1995).
9. See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and Serv-
ing Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 167 (1997).
10. See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13
WORLD BANK OBSERVER 1 (1998).
11. See Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward A New Paradigm for
Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998).
12. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2001).
13. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and Development, 22
THIRD WORLD Q. 21 (2001).
14. See Michael S. Barr & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Law and Development,
26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
15. See Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic Practice, 38
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (2005).
16. See HIRAM CHODOSH, GLOBAL JUSTICE REFORM: A COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY
(2005).
17. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2006).
18. See Okezie Chukwumerije, Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Link Between the Rule of
Law and Economic Development, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2009).
19. See Mariana Prado, Should We Adopt a “What Works” Approach in Law and Devel-
opment?, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 174 (2009).
ment (“the general theory”).20 The general theory is comprised of two

parts: the first part of the general theory sets the disciplinary parameters of
law and development by clarifying the constituent concepts of “law” and
“development”; the second part explains the causal relationship between
law and development through “the regulatory impact mechanisms,” i.e.,
the mechanisms by which law impacts development, with references made
to institutional frameworks and socioeconomic conditions.21
The clarification of the regulatory impact mechanisms is not only an
academic exercise to establish law and development as a coherent and via-
ble academic field, but it also raises important practical implications.
International financial institutions and aid agencies have sponsored many
law reform projects with development objectives,22 such as economic
growth through the privatization and deregulation of the economy. How-
ever, these projects were developed and implemented without a solid
understanding of how law impacts development in different institutional,
economic, social, and political contexts.23 As a result, many of the laws
and legal practices that were transplanted or adopted through law reform
projects did not operate successfully in host countries or deliver their antic-
ipated outcomes.24 The clarification of these causal mechanisms between
law and development in the context of local socioeconomic conditions will
assist reformers in improving the effectiveness of law reform projects
through better regulatory design and implementation.25
These regulatory impact mechanisms are comprised of three categori-
cal elements: “regulatory design,” “regulatory compliance,” and “quality of
implementation,” as well as additional sub-elements as summarized below.
These elements are conceptually distinct but interrelated and influence
one another.
20. It is described as a “general” theory as it sets the general parameters of the disci-
pline by defining the constituent concepts of “law” and “development” and explains the
general mechanisms by which law impacts development.
21. Socioeconomic conditions refer to a range of social, political, economic, and cul-
tural conditions that are essential to the successful operation of law.
22. The World Bank is known to have embarked on over 600 such projects by 2004.
See Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at R
221.
23. See e.g., LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey ed.,
2006).
24. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 916; and Alvaro Santos, The World R
Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 254. Alan Watson also discussed the problem R
associated with the legal transplant. See Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and
Legal Change, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1146– 47 (1983).
25. In this respect, the general theory would be necessary to solve “the problem of
knowledge” as indicated by Thomas Carothers. See Thomas Carothers, The Problem of
Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 15, 16
(Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). The regulatory impact mechanisms may be also applied
beyond law and development to assess the impact of law (“regulatory impact”) generally.
Examples of such general application are also provided. See infra notes 173 and 203 R
(discussing the importance of state capacity concerning crime control).
The first element of the regulatory impact mechanisms, “regulatory

design,” concerns how optimally a law is designed to achieve its regulatory
objectives.26 This assessment can be a complex task, and regulatory
design is analyzed in the following three categories (sub-elements): antici-
pated policy outcome; organization of law, legal frameworks, and institu-
tions (“LFIs”); and adaptation to socioeconomic conditions as further
explained in Part III.27 The second element of the mechanisms, “regula-
tory compliance,” refers to the conduct of the general public in complying
with law.28 Law would not be effective without compliance by the general
public. The analysis of regulatory compliance entails the assessment of
two sub-elements: general regulatory compliance, which refers to the over-
all level of compliance with law in any given jurisdiction, and specific regu-
latory compliance, which pertains to the strength of public compliance
with a particular law.29 The third and final element of the mechanisms is
“quality of implementation.”30 It assesses the degree to which a state31
meets the requirements of law and undertakes the mandates under the lat-
ter to fulfill its objectives.32 A state implements law through legislation,
judicial decisions, and administrative actions. This implementation, when
it poses political challenges, also requires a degree of political will. Thus,
two outstanding factors, state capacity and political will, determine the
quality of implementation.
There is also room for in-depth social analysis pertaining to each of
these three elements and sub-elements (e.g., why certain societies produce
laws with better regulatory design, secure stronger regulatory compliance,
and have governments implementing them more effectively, leading to eco-
nomic and social development) and also to the concepts of “law” and
“development.”33 This Article discusses some of the key factors, such as
state capacity and political will, but does not address all relevant social,
political, cultural, and economic issues in sufficient depth. In-depth dis-
cussion of these issues is outside the scope of the general theory, but
26. Law is designed in the process of legislation or, in the cases of customary law
and case law, by evolvement and adaptation (and in the process of its identification).
For further discussion, see Part III A.
27. For further discussion of the three sub-elements, see discussion infra Part III A.
28. See discussion infra Part III B.
29. Id.
30. See discussion infra Part III C.
31. A state refers to an organized political community directed by a sovereign gov-
ernment with control over a defined territory. For the purpose of this Article, the con-
cept of “state” includes both formal state, which is recognized by other states under
international law, and de facto state, which may not be formally recognized but func-
tions as one by the recognition and support of its constituent members. For further
discussion of the recognition of states in international law, see Hersch Lauterpacht, Rec-
ognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385 (1944).
32. See discussion infra Part III C.
33. The terms, “economic and/or social development” and “economic and/or social
progress,” are treated as synonymous and used without distinction throughout this
Article.
should be explored in future research.34

This Article is structured as follows. Parts I and II review the historical
context of law and development shown by its previous “movements” and
examine the first part of the theory, the disciplinary parameters of law and
development. For the latter, Part I discusses the concepts of “law” and the
associated concepts of “legal frameworks” and “institutions.” Part II exam-
ines the concept of “development” and addresses issues associated with the
identification of “social progress,” as well as the approach adopted to incor-
porate both economic and social progress in the general theory. Part III
examines the second part of the theory, the regulatory impact mechanisms
in depth. This part analyzes the general mechanisms by which law impacts
development, examining the three categorical elements and sub-elements,
with an assessment of how they operate to determine regulatory impact on
development. Part IV applies the general theory to an empirical case and
adopts its analytical framework to explain one of the most successful devel-
opment cases in history, the development process of South Korea (“Korea”).
Korea is chosen for its unique reference value, as demonstrated by the suc-
cessful achievement of both economic and social development over a
period of three decades from the 1960s to the 1990s.35
I. Law and Development: History and Context

A. Law and Development “Movements”
The idea that law is relevant to economic and social progress is not
new. Adam Smith stated in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that “the imper-
fection of the law and the uncertainty in its application” was a factor that
retarded commerce.36 Max Weber, a lauded sociologist and philosopher of
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, explained the impor-
tance of “rational” law in economy and society.37 Friedrich Hayek,
another prominent philosopher and economist of the twentieth century,
also discussed relevant legal concepts to support liberty as the cornerstone
of wealth and growth.38 The term “law and development” emerged and
gained significance after the Second World War, when a group of scholars,
practitioners, private foundations, and aid agencies in developed countries
made efforts to adopt laws and legal practices from developed countries,
34. I am offering a further discussion in my forthcoming book, LAW AND DEVELOP-

MENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Routledge, on file with the author).
35. From 1962 to 1996, the Korean economy grew at an average of 8.75 percent per
annum, which was unprecedented economic growth sustained for over three decades,
and as a result, the country transformed itself from one in absolute poverty under an
authoritarian regime to another with an advanced economy based on the rule of law and
elective democracy by the 1990s. See infra notes 75 and 215 and discussion infra Part R
IV A.
36. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 528 (1978).
37. See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils
& Max Rheinstein trans., 1967).
38. For more on Hayek’s discussion on law, liberty, and economic growth, see gener-
ally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) and LAW, LEGISLATION, AND
LIBERTY, vols. 1– 3 (1979).
particularly the United States, in order to assist in the economic and social
progress of developing countries in the Third World.39
These initial efforts, referred to as the first “law and development
movement,”40 were influenced by modernization theory advanced in the
1950s and the 60s by scholars such as Walt Rostow who argued that the
modernization (development) of the Third World would be accomplished
by the diffusion of capital, institutions, and values from the First World.41
“Modern law” was believed to be the “functional prerequisite of an indus-
trial economy,”42 and law was seen as “a force which can be molded and
manipulated to alter human behavior and achieve development.”43 The
first law and development movement was largely unsuccessful due to diffi-
culty implementing laws and legal practices, including reform of legal edu-
cation, in developing countries where key socioeconomic conditions,44
which were essential to their successful implementation, did not exist and
their absence had been overlooked or ignored.45
Law and development was resuscitated in the 1980s and the 90s after
the fall of the Soviet bloc, with the proliferation of neoliberal46 law reform
projects that sought to reduce state intervention in the economy by promot-
ing the privatization and deregulation of the economy.47 This second law
and development movement was substantially larger in scale and impact
than the first, with significant effects on development projects and policies
around the world.48 The outcome of the second law and development
movement was mixed at best, failing to result in successful development for
most of the developing world.49 Moreover, some of these reforms caused
serious economic difficulties for large populations, as demonstrated by the
39. See David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present,
and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 74– 75. R
40. Id. at 74– 81.
41. Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 900. R
42. David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1972).
43. Elliot M. Berg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of
“Scholar in Self-Estrangement,” 25 AM J. COMP. L. 492, 505– 06 (1977).
44. A series of presumptions or “pillars” on which the first law and development
movement proceeded, such as a cultural reform and transplantation strategy, an ad hoc
approach to reform based on simplistic theoretical assumptions, faith in spillovers from
the economy to democracy and human rights, and a development strategy that stressed
state-led import substitution, collapsed by the 1970s. See Trubek, supra note 39, at R
78– 81.
45. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 4. R
46. The neoliberal approach is based on neoclassical economics, which emerged in
the late nineteenth century and reaffirmed, against Marxism, that the market promotes
economic efficiency and fair social distribution. Neoliberalism, which became a domi-
nant political-economic ideology in the 1980s, discouraged positive government inter-
ventions in the economy and promoted free market approaches, including privatization
and trade liberalization.
47. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law
and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 3. R
48. See id.
49. See id. at 6– 7.
devastating economic outcome of the market-shock therapy in Russia, the

economic emergency experienced by many Latin American countries
adopting neoliberal policy prescriptions in the 80s, and the serious eco-
nomic recession in Asian countries resulted from the neoliberal measures
imposed by international financial institutions to address their financial
crisis in the 90s.50 Reformers in the second movement failed to adopt les-
sons from the earlier law and development movement.51
The reformers’ ideological drive, which predominated the funding
selection, implementation, and evaluation of development and law reform
projects was another cause for their failure.52 The neoliberal position, as
expressed by the Washington Consensus,53 significantly affected develop-
ment project funding from the aid agencies of major developed countries,
as well as international financial institutions. While some of the most suc-
cessful development experiences after the Second World War exhibited a
policy path that was substantially different from this neoliberal stance,
development projects did not incorporate lessons of such successes,54 even
after a substantial number of the projects that followed the neoliberal logic
did not deliver their promised outcomes.
Law and development has been undergoing a period of reflection and
new approaches, sometimes referred to as the “third movement,” since the
late 1990s.55 Although their views are more diverse compared to the pre-
ceding two movements, advocates in the third movement have supported a
more holistic view of development,56 chastened the neoliberal approach in
the preceding period, and incorporated a range of non-market values as the
objectives of development. For example, law (or the rule of law) has
50. These failures indicated that “markets do not create the conditions for their own
success.” See id. For further discussion of the Asian financial crisis, see also HAIDER A.
KHAN, GLOBAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN ASIA (2004).
51. See Wade Channel, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 137 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
52. See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 296– 97. R
53. “Washington Consensus” refers to a set of policies that represents the lowest
common denominator of policy advice that Washington-based institutions advances,
such as fiscal discipline, a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward areas offer-
ing both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution (such
as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure), tax reform to lower mar-
ginal rates and broaden the tax base, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange
rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatiza-
tion, deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit), and protection of property
rights. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERI-
CAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED 5, 7– 20 (John Williamson ed., 1989).
54. Certain East Asian countries, such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and more
recently China, have achieved remarkable economic development, rising from a state of
poverty to that of developed economies, by adopting strong state-driven industrial poli-
cies and through state involvement in the economy; however, these lessons were not
incorporated in the development projects by international development agencies, such
as the World Bank. For an account of the success of East Asian economies and the role
of the state, see YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
14– 32, 301– 33 (2016).
55. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 47, at 7– 9. R
56. For an explanation of the holistic view, see discussion infra Part II A.
become a development objective and not just a means to achieve develop-

ment, which was how it was perceived in the two preceding movements.57
Another notable development is that intergovernmental organizations like
the United Nations initiated global efforts to eradicate poverty in this
period, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs: 2000– 2015)58
and the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs: 2015– 2030).59
The SDGs include the rule of law among its targets within seventeen eco-
nomic and social development goals that they have set to achieve by
2030.60
B. “Law” in the Context of Law and Development

This section discusses the disciplinary parameters of law and develop-
ment, beginning with the concept of “law” in the context of law and devel-
opment, and two other key concepts associated with law, “legal
frameworks” and “institutions.”
1. Law
“Law” generally is defined as a “body of rules of action or conduct
prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force”61 or “a
specific rule or a set of rules binding on the members of a society.”62
Examples of law include provisions of statutes adopted by legislatures,
including constitutions, regulations adopted by administrative agencies,
and ordinances adopted by municipalities. In the law and development
context, “law” may be broader than what the term is perceived as based on
these formalistic characteristics. For example, binding judicial precedents
are referred to as “law” (case law) in common law countries, such as the
United States and Britain, even if such precedents are not formally consid-
ered “law” in civil law jurisdictions, such as France and Germany.63 Still,
if judicial precedents are followed with de facto binding force, then they are
57. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 156– 57. R

58. For further details of the achievement of the MDGs, see United Nations, The
Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (2015), http://www.un.org/millenni-
umgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf [https://
perma.cc/B54M-TY53].
59. For further information on the SDGs, see United Nations, Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-
goals/ [https://perma.cc/FZ2B-JG2V].
60. See United Nations, Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies, Sustain-
able Development Goals, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/
[https://perma.cc/4FNJ-TYMT].
61. Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1997).
62. Lee, supra note 3, at 2 n.3. R
63. “Common law” refers to the legal system that originated in England based on
binding judicial precedents. Common law was adopted in many former British colonies
and territories, such as the United States, Canada, India, Australia, and New Zealand.
“Civil law” is the legal system that originated in Roman law, which is based on formally
legislated “codes.” Civil law is now prevalent in Continental Europe, Latin America, and
East and Southeast Asia. See U.C. Berkeley, The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html
[https://perma.cc/73RA-JU8A].
considered “law” for law and development studies in both common law
and civil law countries. Scholars have recognized the existence and force
of norms other than legislation and case law.64 For the purpose of law and
development studies, “law” also includes some of these norms or informal
rules, referred to as “customary law,” that are consistently observed with
an opinio juris.65
There is a question as to whether informal norms that practically bind
the members of a society, but are not necessarily observed with an opinio
juris, should be considered “law” in the context of law and development. A
good example of such an informal norm is the “administrative guidance”66
that the Korean and Japanese governments have adopted for businesses
and industries during periods of economic development. The people of
these countries consistently followed administrative guidance, even though
it was not formally a “law” or recognized as such by the public (i.e., no
opinio juris), because their local and political cultures regarded giving such
guidance as a legitimate role of the government.67 Some suggest that “law”
should be understood very broadly, including the basic form of communal
normative ordering regardless of the presence of opinio juris.68 Per this
more expansive definition, practices such as administrative guidance as
well as all fundamental social norms, are understood to be forms of “law.”
This expansive definition blurs the distinction between law and non-legal
orders.69
2. Legal Frameworks
Another concept that is closely relevant to the discussion of law in the

context of law and development is “legal frameworks.” “Legal frameworks”
refers to frameworks in which law is organized, such as regulatory struc-
tures and legal systems. Legal frameworks are a determinant of regulatory
64. For further discussion of informal norms regulating private transactions, see
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55 (1963); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); and Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contrac-
tual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
65. The existence of a customary law may be confirmed by a judicial decision. For
further discussion of customary law, see AMANDA PERREAU-SAUSSINE & JAMES BERNARD
MURPHY, THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (2009). Customary law includes religious codes, such as Sharia law (Islamic Law)
that most Muslim-majority countries have adopted and enforced. See, e.g., SALIM FARRAR
& GHENA KRAYEM, ACCOMMODATING MUSLIMS UNDER COMMON LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANAL-
YSIS (2016).
66. “Haeng-Jung Ji-Do” (in Korean) or “Gyô-Sei Shi-Dô” (Japan).
67. For a related account of minimum judicial oversight, see Tom Ginsburg, Disman-
tling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 594– 97 (2001).
68. See, e.g., GARRETT BARDEN & TIM MURPHY, LAW AND JUSTICE IN COMMUNITY (2010).
69. In any case, the dividing line between law and non-legal orders is by no means
clear. For instance, whether a particular informal norm is observed with an opinio juris
could be a matter of debate. See also Tim Murphy, Living Law, Normative Pluralism, and
Analytic Jurisprudence, 3 JURIS. 177 (2012).
impact.70 For example, the impact of a law may vary depending on

whether it is implemented as a stand-alone statute with its own monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms or as a part of a regulation subject to the
control of a higher-level statute.71 Legal frameworks may also present chal-
lenges for the adoption of laws that originated in another jurisdiction; an
adopted law’s operative terms may reference legal norms and concepts
existing in the originating legal system, but not in the receiving jurisdic-
tion.72 For example, the adoption of a new statute referencing “fiduciary
duty” or “constructive trust,” which are legal concepts developed through
cases in common law jurisdictions, could pose considerable difficulty in
its interpretation and application in a civil law jurisdiction without similar
legal development.73
Scholars have identified legal systems with different underlying ideolo-
gies and cultural traits. According to Paul Mahoney, the ideologies under-
lying English common law promote individual liberty and freedom from
government intervention, and those underlying French civil law promote
collective rights and greater government activism, leading to different
development outcomes (i.e., common law countries show on average
higher economic growth rates over time).74 This finding, however, does
not seem to explain the most successful development cases since the Sec-
ond World War, including Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore (the
Newly Industrialized Countries or “NICs”),75 Spain, Chile,76 and, more
70. See id.

71. The importance of legal frameworks has also been emphasized by the works of
La Porta and others. See Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
& Robert Vishny (La Porta et al.), Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
They argued that legal origin, such as common law or civil law legal origins, explains
cross-country differences in financial development, and tried to demonstrate that a
country’s development in the financial market and its laws on property rights, share-
holder rights, and creditor rights are affected by its legal origin. See also La Porta et al.,
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); and La Porta et
al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002). Their conclusion
that common law is superior to civil law in financial development shows certain gaps
and has been subjected to the criticism that the cited differences in economic perform-
ance among those countries may not be attributed to differences in legal origin, but to
other factors, such as differences in macroeconomic policies. See DAM, supra note 17, at R
31– 49; and Cross, supra note 12. R
72. See Katherina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002).
73. Hedeki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Direc-
tor’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law 1, 15– 16 (Colum. L. & Econ. Working
Paper No. 219, 2003).
74. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
75. Hong Kong became a territory of China in 1997. The NICs have achieved
unprecedented sustained economic development for over three decades. Between 1961
and 1996, Korea increased its gross domestic product (GDP) by an average of 8.75 per-
cent per annum, Hong Kong by 7.61 percent, Taiwan by 8.64 percent, and Singapore by
8.61 percent, while the world’s average annual GDP increase for the corresponding
period was 3.85 percent (the GDP growth figures are calculated with real GDP figures at
constant 2005 national prices). See Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, & Marcel P.
Timmer, Penn World Table Version 8.1, U. Groningen, http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/produc-
recently, China. Among this list, only Hong Kong and Singapore are classi-
fied as common law systems. Mahoney’s research also disregarded vari-
ances among common law countries and exaggerated the claimed
differences between common law and civil law countries. For example,
Singapore, a common law country, showed strong government initiatives
and activism in its economic development process.77 When the authorita-
rian rule of Pinochet ended in 1990, Chile, which maintained a civil law
system, promoted liberal policies that emphasized individual liberty and
freedom in both political and economic areas. If there is any relevance
between the legal system and its development, it is that a civil law system,
based on state-sponsored codes, appears more adoptable than a common
law system. Except for countries that were formerly under British rule,
most countries have adopted a civil law system.
3. Institutions
Lastly, the concept of “institution” is also relevant to law and develop-
ment discourse. “Institutions,” in the context of law and development,
refers to organizations, norms, and practices related to the adoption, imple-
mentation, and enforcement of law.78 The impact of law cannot be
assessed separately from relevant institutions. For example, the adoption
of a statute that imposes a criminal penalty on corruption would lack effec-
tiveness if the essential institutions that enforce it, such as an effective
prosecutorial service or an independent judiciary, were absent.79 Also,
laws that attempt to establish formal private property rights (“FPPRs”),
with the objective of enhancing economic efficiency by securing citizens’
legal rights to their property, may not be effective without the implementa-
tivity/pwt/pwt-releases/pwt8.1 [https://perma.cc/YA5R-A3PK]; see also World Bank,

GDP Growth (annual %), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
(noting that the annual GDP increase for low and middle-income countries for the corre-
sponding period was 4.39 percent) [https://perma.cc/MZ8R-QZ9X].
76. Both Spain and Chile were in a state of poverty by the time the Second World
War had ended. Spain achieved rapid economic development under General Franco
since the 1960s (“the Spanish Miracle”) and Chile since the mid-1980s under the rule of
Pinochet who, despite the atrocities that he committed, paved a way for the country’s
economic prosperity by enacting economic reforms during his regime. As a result of
successful economic development, both countries achieved the high-income country sta-
tus as classified by the World Bank (see infra note 146) and became elective democracies R
under the rule of law after the authoritarian regimes of Franco and Pinochet ended in
1975 and 1990, respectively.
77. For an evolution of the industrial policies of Singapore and other successful East
Asian developing countries, see Mari Pangestu, Industrial Policy and Developing Coun-
tries, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 149, 153 (Bernard Hoekman,
Aaditya Mattoo, & Philip English eds., 2002).
78. Douglas North defined “institutions” more broadly, to mean “the humanly
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” which
“consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes
of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” North, supra note
7, at 97. R
79. See Gerald A. Sumida, Conditions for Effective Reform, reprinted in TAKING ACTION
AGAINST CORRUPTION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD REGIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION CONFERENCE 131– 32 (2001).
tion of key institutional elements that support FPPRs, such as an affordable

and reliable land registration system operated by non-corrupt and capable
government officials.80
Institutions have gained a great deal of attention for their role in devel-
opment. In the 1970s, scholars criticized that ethnocentric assumptions
made about the role of institutions, such as the judiciary, ignored local
realities and denied the field a functional theory.81 Douglas North, a
Nobel laureate, emphasized the importance of institutions in the context of
economic development.82 Other scholars have argued that the quality of
the institutions that administer law, rather than the law per se, is more
relevant to development.83 Institutions, particularly those sanctioned by
the state, have always been at the center of law and development studies,
and there is a rising consensus that getting the right institutions is the key
to success.84 The difficulty, however, is that there is little guidance as to
which institutions are important85 and how to develop such institutions
80. For further discussion of FPPRs, see Guangdong Xu, Property Rights, Law, and
Economic Development, 6 LAW & DEV. REV. 117 (2013).
81. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 4, at 1078– 79. R
82. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE (1990). Comparing the United States’ success with its constitution with the
lack of success Latin American countries have had with their constitutions that were
inspired by the United States, North also argued that the institutions that were previ-
ously in place affect the path that an economy takes in the future (“path dependency”).
North, supra note 7, at 110– 11. According to North, institutions provide the incentive R
structure that directs economic and political growth. See Douglass North, Big-Bang
Transformations of Economic Systems: An Introductory Note, 156 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEO-
RETICAL ECON. 3, 5 (2000). The evolution of that structure determines whether econo-
mies grow, stagnate, or decline. See North, supra note 7, at 97. R
83. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 13. R
84. Several studies discuss the role of institutions in economic development. Based
on empirical evidence, Frank Cross concluded that the necessity of legal institutions for
economic growth is unquestionable. See Cross, supra note 12, at 1738– 39. Kenneth R
Dam also considered legal institutions to be important for economic development. See
DAM, supra note 17, at 230– 31. Additional empirical cross-country research acknowl- R
edges the importance of institutions for development. See Daniel Kaufmann et al., Gov-
ernance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Papers No. 2196, 1999); see also
Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH
131 (2004).
85. Some scholars have advocated for a “cluster of institutions” that are important to
encourage investment and growth, such as constraints on government expropriation,
independent judiciary, property rights enforcement, and institutions providing equal
access to education and civil liberties. See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, & James A.
Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,
91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1371– 72 (2001). By contrast, others have observed that insti-
tutions, such as the independent judiciary and formal property rights, are not essential
to successful economic growth. See Posner, supra note 10, at 2; see also Frank Upham, R
The Paradoxical Roles of Property Rights in Growth and Development, 8 LAW & DEV. REV.
253 (2015). Dani Rodrik has enumerated five market-supporting institutions, including
property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization,
institutions for social insurance, and institutions of conflict management. See Dani
Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them, 35
STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 3, 6– 10 (2000).
under varying socioeconomic conditions affecting them.86
II. The Question of Development
This part continues to examine the disciplinary parameters of law and

development, with the concept of “development,” which is another key con-
stituent concept in law and development.87 In the context of law and
development, development is defined as “a progressive transformation of
the economy and society”88 or simply as “economic or social progress,” but
there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes such economic and
social progress. Section A addresses this inquiry. Following this discus-
sion, Section B examines how both economic and social progress can be
incorporated into a coherent theory of law and development. Finally, Sec-
tion C discusses the changing economic conditions in developed countries
which render the concept of “development” and the law and development
approach applicable to economic issues in developed countries as well as
developing ones.
A. What Constitutes Development?
The substance of “development” and its focus have changed over time.
In the 50s and 60s, development primarily meant economic growth or
improvement in national income, reflecting efforts to relieve populations in
developing countries89 of prevalent poverty and to reduce economic gaps
between developed and developing countries.90 The concept of develop-
ment has become more holistic since then, emphasizing non-economic val-
ues believed to enhance human life, such as political participation, right to
property, gender equality, access to a clean and safe environment, and the
86. See Rodrik et al., supra note 84, at 157– 58. R

87. There is no universally accepted definition for “development.” Noting this
uncertainty, the U.S. representative to United Nations Human Rights Council, Michael
Novak, said in 1981, “[t]he concept of ‘development’ is itself in need of development . . .
” (quoted in Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Real-
ity, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 148 (2004)).
88. Trubek & Galanter considered development to mean “progressive social, politi-
cal, and economic changes in developing countries.” Trubek & Galanter, supra note 4, R
at 1062. The term “social development” used in this Article includes the notion of pro-
gressive political change.
89. The dichotomy between developed and developing countries is not always clear,
but the former are normally understood as high-income countries with advanced eco-
nomic, technological, and industrial capacities. For the income classifications of coun-
tries, see World Bank, infra note 146. Developed countries are also the members of the R
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), although not all of
the OECD countries may fit the cited description of developed countries. Many also
view that the practice of elective democracy and the rule of law are essential qualifica-
tions for “developed countries.”
90. See Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 1, 9– 10 (2004); see also David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development
Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 1, at 75. R
rule of law,91 as the key elements of development.92

This holistic view of development became triumphant and won popu-
lar support when the 1998 Nobel laureate Amartya Sen advocated “devel-
opment as freedom,” meaning that “development” should comprise of
political freedom, economic choice, and protection from abject poverty.93
Before Sen’s work, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
had introduced the concept of “human development,”94 which was in line
with the holistic view of development. The UNDP clarified that “human
development” consists of elements that directly “enhance human abilities,”
such as a “long and healthy life, knowledge, decent standard of living,” and
those that create “conditions for human development,” such as participa-
tion in “political and community life, environmental sustainability, human
security and rights, and gender equality.”95 The World Bank’s Compre-
hensive Development Framework (CDF)96 and the SDGs97 promoted by
the United Nations also encompass this holistic view of development.
The holistic view, although noble in its aspirations, presents some dif-
ficulties, as reflected in the criticism raised by Bhupinder Chimni that Sen
fails to adequately address the social constraints that inhibit the realization
of the holistic goals of development (“development as freedom”).98 There
are also economic constraints: in order to promote non-economic values,
such as the rule of law, a society needs trained legal professionals, an effi-
cient court system, and a reliable enforcement mechanism, all of which
require considerable economic and technical resources. Access to a clean
and safe environment and to education also requires economic resources.
Thus, without economic development, which enables a developing country
to secure necessary economic resources to promote non-economic values,
the effective promotion of these values as constituent elements of develop-
ment may not be realistic. This explains why many places in poverty that
fail to achieve economic development also have not met social development
goals.
To achieve development goals effectively, one may have to set priorities
among the constituent elements of development. It would be particularly
91. See Santos, supra note 24, at 256– 66 (discussing the rule of law); see also BRIAN R
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004).
92. See Gordon, supra note 90, at 13 (stating that the holistic view of development R
includes some of the social rights that are also relevant to enhance the economic and
technological capacity of society, such as access to education, in the ambit of
development).
93. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); see also Rittich, supra note
22, at 208. R
94. UNDP, What is Human Development?, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/what-
human-development [https://perma.cc/Y6EK-JR4J].
95. Id.
96. See World Bank, Comprehensive Development Framework, http://www.world
bank.org/en/webarchives/archive?url=httpzzxxweb.worldbank.org/archive/website
01013/WEB/0__PAGEP.HTM&mdk=22201409 [https://perma.cc/K89F-33RS].
97. See United Nations, supra note 59. R
98. Bhupinder Chimni, The Sen Conception of Development and Contemporary Inter-
national Law Discourse: Some Parallels, 1 LAW & DEV. REV. 3 (2008).
necessary for developing countries without sufficient resources to promote

all of the economic and social development goals simultaneously with
equal focus and strength. The successful East Asian countries (NICs)99
have prioritized economic development. One may characterize this path as
“development without freedom,”100 but the people of these countries
secured political freedom by the 1990s, including more equitable and dem-
ocratic political participation based on the rule of law, after they achieved
economic development and secured sufficient resources to meet social
development goals.101
This does not mean that one should exclude or deemphasize non-eco-
nomic values from the notion of development. Instead, it means that one
should, as a practical matter, give consideration to the resource constraints
that developing countries face. Developing countries need to have the
opportunity to focus on what they need most so that they may secure nec-
essary resources to promote non-economic values. The holistic view of
development creates multiple development goals and necessitates their
sequencing to account for resource constraints.102
B. Economic and Social Development

The preceding discussion demonstrates the importance of economic
development, but economic development and social development are not
completely separate and influence each other. The varied distributive
effect of economic development among different groups of populations
may raise social issues. For instance, economic development based on
industrial promotion and exports would benefit those in the manufactur-
ing and export sectors more than subsistence farmers in rural areas, creat-
ing economic gaps between urban and rural areas, and raising social
issues, such as the youth deserting rural communities and migrating to
cities.103 Social progress may also influence economic development. For
example, improved gender equality in work places, which is considered
social progress in many places, can motivate increased female participation
in productive economic activities, which, in turn, can contribute to overall
economic growth.104
99. For a discussion of the successful development of the NICs, see supra note 75. R
100. SONGOK HAN THORNTON & WILLIAM H. THORNTON, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FREE-
DOM: THE POLITICS OF ASIAN GLOBALIZATION (2008).
101. Kerry Rittich also observed that the most outstanding examples of both eco-
nomic growth and social progress can be found in the NICs. See Rittich, supra note 22, R
at 239.
102. Prioritizing and sequencing would also be consistent with the objectives of sus-
tainable development, because the advocated approach actually allows developing coun-
tries to secure the resources to achieve SDGs.
103. See, e.g., Matleena Kniivilä, Industrial Development and Economic Growth: Impli-
cations for Poverty Reduction and Income Inequality, in INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES 295, 312 (David O’Connor &
Mónica Kjöllerström eds., 2007) (accounting the rural-urban gap in Indonesia).
104. See Rittich, supra note 22, at 207, 216. See also World Bank, Engendering Devel- R
opment: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice 88– 92 (World Bank Pol-
icy Research Report No. 21776, 2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
Given this interrelatedness between economic and social development,

is the priority for economic development justified? One justification is the
compelling contemporary need to overcome the prevalent poverty around
the world affecting a majority of the world’s population. According to a
World Bank report, as of 2012, 14.9 percent of the people in the developing
world lived on less than $1.90 a day.105 The only permanent solution to
the widespread poverty issue is successful economic development, which
creates an economy that provides economic resources that can bring a
majority of a population out of poverty.106 As discussed in the preceding
section, prioritization and sequencing will also enable developing coun-
tries to resolve resource constraints in order to pursue non-economic devel-
opment goals effectively.107 The need for prioritization and sequencing,
however, does not mean that the social agenda should always be set aside
for economic development. The agenda can be included where it is rele-
vant to promote economic development, as discussed above, or where it can
be co-promoted without critical resource implications, regardless of
whether or not it enhances economic development.
The proposed general theory incorporates both economic and social
development. The non-economic values comprising the latter, however,
raise complex and multifaceted issues with divergent and often irreconcila-
ble views as to their substance, characterization, constituent elements, and
enforceability. Despite the existence of values and priorities claimed as
“universal,” such as fundamental human rights of a political and civil
nature, what is viewed as political and social progress is a much broader
question that lacks a cross-cultural consensus.108 For example, some cul-
tures do not agree that the legalization of same-sex marriages represents
social progress.109 One’s subjective value system and preferences of a cul-
tural and ideological nature would be a determinant of this question.
As a result, the development of objective analytical criteria for social
progress is extremely complex and controversial. There could also be a
question as to what constitutes economic development. Nonetheless, the
512911468327401785/Engendering-development-through-gender-equality-in-rights-
resources-and-voice https://perma.cc/H587-JUQ2].
105. World Bank, Poverty Forecasts, http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/
global-monitoring-report/poverty-forecasts-2015 [https://perma.cc/34RT-J336]. (The
amount in dollars ($) is in U.S. dollars throughout this Article unless indicated other-
wise.) Two seminal books in law and development also focus on economic develop-
ment. See THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006), supra note 1; and DAM, supra note 17. R
106. See World Bank, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank 8
(1998), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820031468767358922/Develop-
ment-and-human-rights-the-role-of-the-World-Bank (discussing the importance of eco-
nomic development for the enhancement of human rights) [https://perma.cc/MDJ7-
CKYH].
107. See discussion supra Part II A.
108. See Lee, supra note 3, at 4. R
109. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015) (legalizing marriages
between individuals of the same sex (“same-sex marriage”) by requiring all States to
issue a marriage license to same-sex couples.) However, as of December 2017, the
majority of countries have not legally recognized same-sex marriage.
general concept of economic development, which denotes the process of

the structural transformation of an economy from one based primarily on
the production of primary products (i.e., a product consumed in its
unprocessed state), generating low levels of income, to another based on
modern industries, generating higher levels of income for the majority of
the populations, is more widely accepted than any criteria to identify social
development.110 As to social development,111 most of the controversy cen-
ters on the question of its identification— what should be determined as
social progress as demonstrated by the example cited above. This question
is not prone to an objective assessment based on a set of criteria agreeable
across different cultures and ideologies.
Despite this complexity, it would still be feasible to address the rela-
tionship between law and social progress in the proposed general theory
once there is an agreement, perhaps among those sharing common cultural
and ideological backgrounds, that a certain type of social change is to be
considered social progress. In other words, the proposed theory may iden-
tify whatever has been agreed upon as social progress, which may well vary
from one place to another, and examine regulatory impact on social devel-
opment identified as such. The general theory does not presume or
attempt to prescribe what has to be considered “social progress” every-
where.112 As observed by a commentator, the adopted approach is essen-
tially descriptive and analytical, rather than normative and prescriptive.113
C. Extension of the Concept of Development

The concept of “development,” which is defined as a progressive trans-
formation of the economy and society, has been associated with develop-
ing countries.114 In reality, the transformative nature of the concept may
110. There is, however, no consensus on the measurement of economic development,

and no measure captures all the elements of economic development. Subject to this
limitation, a possible measure of economic development in a given time period is the
rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the corresponding period.
111. “Social development” or “social progress” could be defined as a transformation
of the society that fulfills a particular value or a set of them shared by the majority of the
society; however, as discussed above, these values are not identical across societies with
varied cultural and ideological orientations. See also Manohar S. Pawar & David R. Cox,
Social Development, in SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: CRITICAL THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 13,
15– 18, 31 (Manohar S. Pawar & David R. Cox eds., 2010).
112. The existence of diverse positions and viewpoints, however, does not preclude
an observation or criticism that what is advocated as social progress in one place is not
consistent with what is considered a universal human right, as determined by relevant
international conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). However, the consideration
of human rights does not automatically inform what should be considered “social pro-
gress” everywhere. The determination of social progress is essentially a value judgment,
which is not a majority rule.
113. William H.J. Hubbard, Yong-Shik Lee, “Call for a New Analytical Model for Law
and Development”: A Comment, 8 LAW & DEV. REV. 271, 273– 74 (2015).
114. See supra note 89 (explaining the distinction between “developing” and “devel- R
oped” countries).
render it applicable to economic problems in developed countries to the

extent that economic and social transformation and the accompanying
changes in law are required to address them. Such application may not be
an orthodox approach, but the economic environment faced by many
developed countries today may justify this extension of the concept for the
following reason. The neoliberal economic shifts,115 which have taken
place since the 1980s in many developed countries, such as the United
States and Britain, have created substantial income gaps among citizens
and regions within developed countries,116 leading to significant political
consequences.117 Thus the concept of “development” may be relevant to
citizens with lower incomes, as well as economically less developed regions
within developed countries.118
In addition, the structural issues in the economies of developed coun-
tries today, including the increasing financial volatility, as demonstrated by
the 2008 financial crisis, a persistent low economic growth accompanying
significant unemployment, and the institutional incapacity to deal with
these issues, are not only cyclical economic issues that were once consid-
ered a normality in developed economies but also resemble the chronic
problems of the developing world.119 As such, there is rising necessity for
115. For a discussion of the neoliberal approach, see supra note 46. R
116. The OECD observed increasing wage gaps and household income inequality in a
large majority of OECD countries. See OECD, DIVIDED WE STAND: WHY INEQUALITY KEEPS
RISING 22 (2011). For example, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, New Orleans and
Detroit are among the most impoverished major cities in the United States, with 27.8
percent and 39.3 percent of their populations living below the poverty line ($24,008 for
a family of four), respectively, as of 2014. See Karen Bouffard, Census Bureau: Detroit Is
the Biggest Poor City in the U.S., DET. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.
com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/09/16/census-us-uninsured-drops-income-stag
nates/32499231 [https://perma.cc/E3BP-MY2U]. Both cities also suffer from high
crime rates and low public-school rating. See Peter Harkness, Detroit and New Orleans
Have More in Common Than Most Think, GOVERNING (Jan. 2016), http://www.govern-
ing.com/columns/potomac-chronicle/gov-detroit-new-orleans-resilience.html) [https://
perma.cc/7J7R-X5JE].
117. Analysts have cited widening income gaps and the resulting poverty as reasons
for the result of Britain’s 2016 referendum to exit the European Union and for the out-
come of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. See John Harris, If You Have Got money, You
Vote in . . . If You Haven’t, You Vote out, THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), https://www.the
guardian.com/politics/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/divided-britain-brexit-money-class-
inequality-westminster [https://perma.cc/4K3T-KZLA]; and Trip Gabriel, How Erie Went
Red: The Economy Sank, and Trump Rose, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/us/politics/pennsylvania-trump-votes.html [https://
perma.cc/NH5H-GS6H].
118. Reflecting this reality, national, regional, and local governments in developed
countries have set up offices to foster “economic development.” Examples include Eco-
nomic Development Administration (EDA) established under the U.S. Department of
Commerce, the Georgia Department of Economic Development in the State of Georgia,
USA, and the Office of Economic Development in the City of New Orleans. See EDA,
U.S. ECON. DEV. AGENCY, https://www.eda.gov/ [https://perma.cc/WC7C-CSJT]; About
Us, GA. DEP’T ECON. DEV., http://www.georgia.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/FM2G-
UCT6]; and Office of Economic Development, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, https://
www.nola.gov/economic-development/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
119. See Mohamed A. El-Erian, Why Advanced Economies Need to Learn from Develop-
ing Nations, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 11, 2016),https://www.bloomberg.com/view/arti
new analytical approaches, such as legal and institutional approaches (i.e.,

the law and development approach), that are adopted to deal with eco-
nomic problems in developing countries and facilitate economic
development.120
The question also turns on political will, i.e., whether the national
leaderships of developed countries will have the sufficient political will to
reduce the economic gaps which exist in their countries and use their polit-
ical capital for this purpose, at the risk of causing resistance and losing
support from the economic establishment and more prosperous regions
that would have to fund this effort. This represents a potential tension
between those pushing for more economic equality across the nation and
the establishment within society, who may not stand to benefit from assist-
ing the economically-depressed regions. The latter’s financial resources
and political influence can put considerable pressure on governments pro-
moting a development agenda, although the recent political outcomes in
developed countries, such as the 2016 U.S. presidential election outcome
and Britain’s referendum result to exit the European Union in the same
year, may have an effect of weakening such pressure.121
The potential applicability of the law and development approach to
developed countries will substantially expand the scope of law and devel-
opment and increase its utility beyond addressing development issues in
developing countries. In other words, the general theory advanced in this
Article offers an analytical framework through which to examine the effec-
tiveness of relevant laws in developed countries (as well as developing
ones) in dealing with the cited economic issues facing developed countries
today, with references to their legal frameworks, institutional arrange-
ments, and socioeconomic conditions. For example, developed countries
could adopt the general theory to examine the effectiveness of “jobs growth
acts” in creating jobs for low-income groups and reducing income gaps
within these countries.122
With regard to expanding the law and development approach to devel-
oped countries, there is also a question as to whether the political and legal
traditions of individual developed countries would allow their leadership to
promote a development agenda. For example, in the United States, the fed-
eral government has not engaged with local economic issues, except those
cles/2016-07-11/why-advanced-economies-need-to-learn-from-developing-nations
[https://perma.cc/J686-DRYE].
120. See id. Applied to developed countries, the definition of economic development,
introduced in the previous section, could be adjusted to “the process of the structural
transformation of an economy to one generating higher productivity and increases in
income for the majority of populations” (without the reference to “one based primarily
on the production of primary products,” because developed countries are not such econ-
omies). I also offer a discussion on the possible legal and institutional approaches to
address economic problems in the United States in my forthcoming article, Law and
Economic Development in the United States: Toward a New Paradigm (on file with the
author).
121. For a further observation on this point, see supra note 117. R
122. See, e.g., Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3101– 52; and Jobs and Growth Act, S.C. 2012, c 31 (Can.).
caused by natural catastrophes and other types of emergencies,123 and has

not traditionally provided economic support targeting economically-
depressed regions, as regional economic issues are left to be handled by
regional and local governments.124 The problem with this approach is that
regional and local governments often lack the resources to implement
development-facilitating laws through the provision of sufficient incentives
for investment and employment generation.125 Also, a substantial portion
of the general public advocating “small government” in developed coun-
tries may not support the idea of the government taking up an active role in
economic development by spending public resources. Thus, this also
involves the question of the appropriate role of the state in the economy,
which is the subject of an on-going debate.126
III. Regulatory Impact Mechanisms

Following the preceding discussions on the constituent concepts of
law and development, the next three sections discuss the second part of the
general theory, the regulatory impact mechanisms, which denote the
causal mechanisms by which law impacts development. These mecha-
nisms comprise three categorical elements: “regulatory design,” “regulatory
compliance,” and “quality of implementation.” Section A discusses the
first element, “regulatory design” and its three sub-elements: the outcome
of a policy that law is anticipated to deliver; the structural organization and
dynamics among law, legal frameworks, and institutions; and the adapta-
bility of law to the socioeconomic conditions on the ground. These three
sub-elements collectively determine the effectiveness of regulatory design.
Section B examines the second element, regulatory compliance, categorized
123. For example, the U.S. federal government supported $110.6 billion in aid for
relief, recovery and rebuilding efforts in the Gulf Coast of Louisiana following the Hurri-
cane Katrina. See DEP’T ST., Hurricane Katrina: What Government Is Doing, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/150082.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC68-TNGE].
By contrast, a relatively modest amount, $350 million of the federal aid, has been spent
on the bankrupt city of Detroit. See Harkness, supra note 116. R
124. This is generally the case except small-scaled support for “economically
depressed areas” provided by the EDA under the authority of Public Works and Eco-
nomic Development Act (PWEDA). 42 U.S.C. § 3161. In 2016, the EDA supported 649
development projects for the total grant of 261 million, averaging around 400,000 per
project. EDA, 2016 Annual Report (2016), https://www.eda.gov/annual-reports/fy2016/
[https://perma.cc/GY9G-YWWZ].
125. The local and regional governments may provide incentives in the form of tax
reduction or exemptions, but the finances of many regional and local governments may
not be strong enough to afford meaningful tax relief and other concessions in lieu of
direct subsidy payments. For a relevant discussion on the insufficient state budget, see
Lucy Dadayan & Donald J. Boyd, By The Numbers: 2016: Another Lackluster Year for State
Tax Revenue, ROCKEFELLER INST. GOV’T (May 2017), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/gov-
ernment_finance/2017-05-08-By-numbers-brief-no9.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BUZ-
QSVF].
126. See discussion infra Part III C. See generally PETER J. BOETTKE & PETER T. LEESON,
THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE (2015); Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and the Economic
Role of the State in the New Millennium, 12 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 3 (2003); and George
J. Stigler & Paul A. Samuelson, A Dialogue on the Proper Role of the State (Grad. Sch. Bus.,
U. Chicago Selected Papers No. 7, 1968).
as general and specific regulatory compliances. Section C addresses the

third and final element, quality of implementation, determined by two
other factors, “state capacity” and “political will.” This section also dis-
cusses the relationship between political will and democracy in the context
of law and development. The discussion of each element and sub-element
inevitably entails a degree of abstract discourse. I will attempt to clarify
relevant points with examples. The empirical application of the general
theory in Part IV will also assist in clarifying the conceptual aspects of the
theoretical elements.
A. Regulatory Design
The first analytical step in assessing regulatory impact is the analysis
of law’s design (regulatory design) with respect to a particular development
objective, such as economic growth.127 The analysis of regulatory design
begins with the assessment of anticipated policy outcomes, the first of the
three sub-elements as introduced above.
1. Anticipated Policy Outcome

Law, whether it is designed by legislation (e.g., statute) or has evolved
gradually over a period of time (e.g., customary law and case law), exhibits
a policy or policies, which form regulatory objectives.128 For example, a
statute that requires the removal of customs tariffs on products imported
from other countries, as a result of a free trade agreement (FTA) between
the importing and exporting countries, advances the policies of increasing
trade between them and contributing to the economic growth of the partici-
pating countries.129 Additional examples include the policy of improving
gender equality in society through the enactment of a statute that prohibits
gender-based discrimination in workplaces.130 In the case of customary
law and case law, a regulatory objective is also “found” in the process of
identifying relevant rules. A judicial court in the United States identified a
127. An effective impact analysis would require a clarification and predetermination

of a specific development objective. A reviewer may consider an analysis to be inappro-
priate if the latter focuses on an objective that the reviewer does not consider essentially
important for development. For example, for those who value income distribution more
than economic growth as a development objective, an analysis focusing on economic
growth may not be appropriate. Thus, the controversy surrounding the appropriateness
of the analysis will reduce if an analytical task clarifies at the outset a development
objective to be focused on.
128. Legislation may have multiple objectives, all of which may not necessarily be
agreed by all legislators or be consistent with one another. Even so, most legislators, if
not all, could agree on the main purpose of legislation. Customary law and common
law are also evolved over a period of time to deliver a policy outcome to meet the chang-
ing needs of a society. See, e.g., C.R.M. Dlamini, The Role of Customary Law in Meeting
Social Needs, ACTA JURIDICA 71 (1991).
129. See, e.g., U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N (USITC), Investigation No. TA-2104-24, USITC
Publication 3949, U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-Wide and
Selected Sectoral Effects (2007), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/pub3949.pdf
(assessing the economic impact of the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement)
[https://perma.cc/8UKT-9RZZ].
130. World Bank, supra note 104. R
common law rule that denies damages for ameliorative waste (an improve-
ment to an estate that changes its character) advancing the policy of
encouraging improvements on land and economic development.131
Anticipated policy outcomes are the specific outcomes that are antici-
pated as a result of the implementation of such policies. In the first exam-
ple, the increase in trade and economic growth would be the anticipated
policy outcome,132 and, in the subsequent examples, the improvement of
gender equality and the increased improvements on land would be the
anticipated policy outcomes. The explicit regulatory objectives stated in
laws do not always identify anticipated policy outcomes nor does the legis-
lature otherwise make them clear.133 Regardless of pronounced regulatory
objectives, objective assessment identifies policy outcomes, often aided by
the methods of social sciences as further discussed below. A study has
indicated that laws may cause a variety of transformations (anticipated
policy outcomes) beyond their explicit purposes (regulatory objectives).134
The anticipated policy outcome is analyzed with references made to
the theories and analytics of relevant social sciences, which, depending on
the type of development objective pursued, may include economics, sociol-
ogy, political science, anthropology, and development studies. Reference is
also made to their methodologies,135 including those adopted in the Regu-
latory Impact Analysis (RIA).136 In adopting a social science analysis, con-
sideration should be given to its imprecise nature; since social sciences
131. Id. For further discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co.
and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055 (2011).
132. Following the implementation of the United States– Korea Free Trade Agreement,
trade between the United States and Korea increased by $23.5 billion between 2011 and
2015. See United States Trade Representative (USTR), Fact Sheet: Four Year Snapshot:
The U.S. Korea Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2016/March/Four-Year-Snapshot-KORUS [https://
perma.cc/CS7L-XEZF].
133. See Rittich, supra note 22, at 212– 13. R
134. Id. at 216.
135. Those methodologies include statistical and econometrical methods. The latter
often adopts a regression analysis, which is a statistical process for estimating the rela-
tionships among independent and dependent variables. For further discussion, see gen-
erally Angus Deaton, Data and Econometric Tools for Development Analysis, in 3
HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1785 (J. Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan eds.,
1995); and David A. Freedman, STATISTICAL MODELS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2009).
136. An RIA is a process for identifying and assessing the expected effects of regula-
tory proposals. It adopts relevant analytical methods such as benefit/cost analysis. For
further discussion, see generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment [OECD], INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK FOR UNDERTAKING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
(RIA), VERSION 1.0 (Oct. 2008), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/
44789472.pdf [https://perma.cc/MBZ3-EPTW]. For further discussion of RIAs, see
generally Robert W. Hahn, Jason K. Burnett, Yee-Ho I. Chan, Elizabeth A. Mader, &
Petrea R. Moyle, Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply
with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000); Thomas O.
McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243 (1987); Clau-
dio M. Radaelli, The Diffusion of Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practice or Lesson-Draw-
ing?, 43 EUR. J. POL. RES. 723 (2004); and Jacopo Torriti & Ragnar E. Löfstedt, The First
Five Years of the EU Impact Assessment System: A Risk Economics Perspective on Gaps
between Rationale and Practice, 15 J. RISK RES. 169 (2012).
address human behavior, which involves a degree of uncertainty and

unpredictability, an analysis of a possible policy outcome aided by social
sciences is inexact, and one needs to interpret its outcome broadly.137
This imprecise nature is also compounded by multiple layers of causation.
This means that a law may affect development, which in turn, may also
affect the law, as discussed later in this section, creating an additional layer
of causation, and so on. Thus, the impact is not linear but circular, which
is another reason for the inexact nature of such an analysis.
In the case of economic development, an assessment will analyze
whether the outcome of the anticipated policy is likely to increase eco-
nomic productivity and, thus, to achieve economic growth objectives or
other economic development objectives, or, conversely, whether it would
have an adverse effect or no effect at all. Economics is the most relevant
social science discipline, subject to its inherent limitations as discussed
above. The assessment will adopt economic theories and analytics to eval-
uate the outcome. Additionally, the assessment will reference other social
science research if such research is relevant to the particular economic
development objective. For example, if improved income distribution is a
key development objective, the assessment will reference relevant sociology
and political science research and theories to the extent that they inform
how the suggested law would or would not produce a policy outcome that
achieves a better income distribution in society.
There is no clear consensus as to what policy leads to successful eco-
nomic development and no agreement as to what the appropriate role of
the state in the economy should be. Economists emphasized the role of the
state in economic development in the 1950s and the 60s,138 but this
137. For example, using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, the USITC
estimated that trade between the United States and Korea would increase after the imple-
mentation of the U.S.-Korea FTA. Specifically, the USITC estimated that merchandise
exports to Korea would increase by $9.7 to 10.9 billion once the FTA is fully imple-
mented, merchandise imports from Korea would increase by $6.4 to 6.9 billion, reduc-
ing the U.S. trade deficit against Korea by $2.8 billion to 4.5 billion. See USITC, supra
note 129, at xvii. With the implementation of the FTA in March, 2012, U.S.-Korea trade R
indeed increased by $12 billion between 2011 and 2015, but the U.S. trade deficit with
Korea did not decrease as estimated, but actually increased by $14.4 billion between
2011 and 2016, showing the inexact nature of the earlier assessment. See USTR, 2017
Trade Policy Agenda and 2016 Annual Report, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/
reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20III%20-%20Bilat-
eral%20Trade%20Agreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/E986-QQDZ].
138. Development economists, such as Rosenstein-Rodan, Mandelbaum, Lewis, Ros-
tow, Kuznets, Gerschenkron, Hirschman, and Kindleberger, advocated the state-led
development strategy as the key to development, although they did not exactly agree on
how the state should lead economic growth. For example, Rosenstein-Rodan supported
the “big push,” which is a coordinated investment program across the board (“balanced
growth theory”). By contrast, Hirschman advocated a policy of promoting a few key
sectors with strong linkages to other sectors (“unbalanced growth theory”). See Paul
Krugman, The Rise and Fall of Development Economics, http://web.mit.edu/krugman/
www/dishpan.html [https://perma.cc/ZD5Y-89CQ]; see also Pranab Bardhan, Econom-
ics of Development and the Development of Economics, 7 J. ECON. PERS. 129 (1993) (dis-
cussing the contribution made by development economists). This period of
emphasis on the state receded in the 70s.139 The neoliberal approach,140

which favors economic policies that reduce state involvement in the econ-
omy and enhance the market (the private sector), such as the policies of
privatization and trade liberalization, became prevalent in the 80s.141
Chile’s successful economic development in recent decades,142 founded on
its liberal economic policies, could support the neoliberal argument.143 By
contrast, the countries that achieved the most successful economic devel-
opment, such as the NICs, adopted extensive state-led development poli-
cies,144 which were at odds with the neoliberal prescriptions.145
This divergence of views and outcomes of these dissimilar develop-
ment policies may render the analysis of the anticipated policy outcome on
economic development complex and challenging. For example, a question
may arise as to the anticipated policy outcome of a law that mandates gov-
ernment support of particular industries and their exports through sub-
sidy grants and tax breaks. Those who subscribe to a neoliberal policy
stance are likely to oppose this law due to the potential economic ineffi-
ciency associated with government distributing resources. Conversely,
those who advocate for the state-led industrial development policies are
likely to support the law as necessary to stimulate industrial development
and economic growth.
The NICs’ successful adoption of state-led policies suggests that active
government involvement in industrial promotion, accompanied by export
promotion to overcome the constraints of small domestic markets, could be
“development economics” coincides with the first law and development movement. For
a discussion of the first law and development movement, see supra Part I A.
139. See Newton, supra note 2, at 182. R
140. For an explanation of the neoliberal approach, see supra note 46. R
141. See Williamson, supra note 53 for an explanation of the “Washington Consen- R
sus,” which forms the basis of the neoliberal approach.
142. For a discussion of Chile’s economic development, see supra note 76. R
143. This observation, however, is subject to the criticism that nearly all major sectors
of the Chilean economy owe their existence to state intervention under the Pinochet
regime. See James M. Cypher, Is Chile a Neoliberal Success?, DOLLARS & SENSE: REAL
WORLD ECONOMICS (Sept.– Oct. 2004), [https://perma.cc/D4Q6-GMUB]. See also Ron-
ald J. Gibson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Devel-
oping Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011).
144. State-led development refers to the development approach adopted by a “develop-
mental state” that assumes the key role for economic development and “creates [eco-
nomic development] plans, relocate[s] surplus, combat[s] resistance, invest[s] and
manage[s] key sectors, and control[s] foreign capital.” Trubek and Santos, supra note
47, at 5. Perhaps an exception among the NICs is Hong Kong, which is known to have R
adopted a laissez-faire economic policy with minimal government involvement. In con-
trast, Catherine Schenk suggested that this perception was a myth. She argued that the
government subsidized industry indirectly through public housing, which restrained
rise in the cost of living that would have threatened Hong Kong’s labor-cost advantage in
manufacturing. See Catherine Schenk, Economic History of Hong Kong, EH.NET ENCYCLO-
PEDIA (Mar. 16, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/economic-history-of-hong-kong/
[https://perma.cc/2Q93-J5KM].
145. For a discussion of the successful economic development of the NICs, see supra
note 75. R
effective in the early stages of economic development146 if the government

devoted to development has political leadership and institutional strength.
From a neoliberal point of view, a government “selecting” industries to
receive support by way of public funding may appear to invite economic
inefficiency and corruption.147 Still, however, in a developing country
where the underdeveloped private sector may only have limited capacity to
acquire information and capital, absent a working financial market, the
role of government is essential. Supporting this point, a leading scholar
has observed that industrial restructuring rarely takes place without signif-
icant government assistance.148
As the NICs’ economies successfully developed and became more
complex and divergent in the 1980s and onwards, with their private sectors
acquiring institutional capacity to undertake much of the role previously
assumed by the state more efficiently, they shifted policies, reducing gov-
ernment control of the economy and increasing private sector auton-
omy.149 One could describe this type of economic development process as
the “marriage between state and market”150 in which the state assumes the
role of a “developmental state”151 in the early stages of economic develop-
ment, manages the economy, develops economic development plans, and
directs investments for key sectors. In this policy, despite the key role of
the state, market performance of the promoted industries, particularly in
export markets, was the benchmark of success, and private sector auton-
omy increased over time.
In sum, socioeconomic conditions, such as the stage of economic
development and the institutional strength of the government relative to
146. The early stages of economic development, which should be distinguished from
Rostow’s five stages of economic growth, refers to the initial state of economic develop-
ment with the characteristics of over-dependency on primary industries (non-manufac-
turing industries), low-level industrialization, and low per-capita income, as compared
to the later stages of economic development referring to the more advanced economic
state with sustained economic growth, industrialization, and higher (mid-level) per cap-
ita income. Per capita income is used to classify economies into different groups; as of
November 2017, the World Bank defined low-income economies as those with a gross
national income (GNI) per capita of $1005 or less; lower middle-income economies, a
GNI per capita between $1006 and $3955; upper middle-income economies, a GNI per
capita between $3956 and $12,235; and high-income economies, a GNI per capita of
$12,236 or more. World Bank, Data: Country and Lending Groups, http://data.world
bank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups [https://perma.cc/DTD7-VSQ6].
147. The public choice theory and the rent-seeking idea associated with government
failures, adopted by the neoliberal policy analytic, would lead to this conclusion.
148. See Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century 15 (JOHN F. KEN-
NEDY SCH. GOV’T, Harv. U. Faculty Research Working Papers Series, RWP04-047, 2004),
https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/industrial-policy-twenty-first-cen
tury.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU5K-6M49].
149. See id. at 6; see also KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1960– 1995 (1999).
150. See LEE, supra note 54, at 305– 09. Several scholars, including Dani Rodrik, R
Charles Sabel, Sanjay Reddy, and Ricardo Hausmann, also emphasized the importance
of public-private partnership to develop strategies and make investment choices for eco-
nomic development. See also Trubek, supra note 3, at 6. R
151. See supra note 144 (for an explanation of the developmental state). R
that of the contemporary private sector, influence policy outcome that law
is anticipated to deliver in the context of development. As noted above, a
law focusing on the state’s facilitation of development can be more effective
in the early stages of economic development, when the relative capability
and institutional strength of the government is superior to those of the
underdeveloped private sector.152 By contrast, a law focusing on privatiza-
tion and deregulation could be more effective in the later stages of eco-
nomic development when the private sector has acquired institutional
strength and experiences, as demonstrated by the successful policy transi-
tion in the NICs.153 Economics also began to recognize the complimentary
roles of the state and the market, providing support for this type of
policy.154
2. Organization of Law, Legal Frameworks, and Institutions (LFIs)

The organization and dynamics among law, legal frameworks, and
institutions (LFIs) is the second sub-element determining the effectiveness
of regulatory design. Law may not be effective absent a suitable legal
framework and an effective institutional arrangement. For example, a stat-
ute that aims to promote economic activities by protecting formal private
property rights (FPPRs) with a criminal sanction for a violation may not be
very effective without an effective institutional arrangement enforcing
them, such as a working police force and an efficient and fair prosecution
system. As to legal frameworks, one that imposes stringent requirements
for the amendment of statutes, thereby making timely regulatory modifica-
tions difficult, may reduce their overall regulatory effectiveness on develop-
152. It may not be the case that the state is more capable than the private sector in all
of the countries at the early stages of economic development. Multinational enterprises
running businesses in these countries could also be effective, but their contributions to
the economic development of the host countries could be limited due to potential incon-
sistencies between their (global) corporate interests and the long-term development
interests of the host countries.
153. See PISTOR & WELLONS, supra note 149, at 110– 11. R
154. Michael Trebilcock observed a changing trend in development economics. He
stated,
[b]y the late 1990s, the consensus in development economics had shifted dra-
matically. The Washington Consensus was agreed to have often been a fail-
ure . . . . A more promising approach is represented by the New Development
Economics (NDE) which eschews truisms such as “getting institutions right”
and represents a break with big-picture paradigms that advance one-size-fits-all
solutions . . . . Drawing on the neoclassical paradigm, it recognizes that markets
are not nearly as inefficient as the early structuralists believed; rather the funda-
mental principle of rational responses to incentives continues to organize eco-
nomic behavior. Further, with the rise of the New Institutional Economics,
[which emphasizes legal institutions as a major factor for economic development
(see North, supra note 7)], the distinction between government and markets has R
become blurred— each operating via similar fundamental mechanisms. As such,
NDE advocates a complementary role for governments and markets, finding
both to be susceptible to failures in coordination, imperfect information, and
agency problems.
Michael Trebilcock, Between Theories of Trade and Development: The Future of the World
Trading System 8– 9 (University of Toronto Law Working Paper Series No. 2014– 10,
2014).
ment under changing socioeconomic conditions.155 In fact, the impact of

law cannot be considered separate from the legal framework in which it is
organized and the institutions by which it is adopted and implemented,
justifying the use of the term “LFIs” as an inseparable amalgam.156 The
inseparable nature of LFIs explains why many law reform projects promot-
ing an identical set of laws (e.g., those promoting deregulation) have had a
limited and inconsistent impact where reformers may not have given due
consideration to applicable legal frameworks and institutional arrange-
ments in the design and implementation of these projects.157
In the inter-dynamics among the constituent elements of LFIs, the
adoption of law also affects relevant legal frameworks and institutions just
as it is affected by the latter. For example, a law that mandates additional
funding and personnel to an institution that administers the law, such as a
government agency in charge, may increase that institution’s capacity to
implement the law, provided that the government can secure funding and
personnel as the law mandates. The increase in legislation in common law
countries has diminished the distinctions in the legal system (legal frame-
work) between common law and civil law countries. The logical consis-
tency and policy compatibility among laws within a legal system also affect
the effectiveness of the system as a whole.
An optimal regulatory design, which increases synergies among LFIs
and their overall effectiveness, will strengthen regulatory impact on devel-
opment. By contrast, an ineffective regulatory design will lack supportive
synergies and even create conflicts among the constituent elements of LFIs.
For example, the enactment of a statute empowering the government to
expropriate private land without due process and adequate compensation
may not produce synergies with the institutions already in place to protect
FPPRs and the other laws in the legal system that aim to do the same. This
type of conflict may occur when a law is enacted without due considera-
tion of applicable legal frameworks and institutional arrangements. In par-
ticular, consideration should be given to relevant details such as whether
there is any potential inconsistency between the promoted law and the
existing legal frameworks and institutions, how legislation should be trans-
lated into administrative rule making, and how and where in the legislation
government discretion should be lodged.158
To aid with the assessment of the organization of LFIs and regulatory
structure, it would be useful to develop an analytical model by which the
impact of LFIs on economic development can be analyzed systematically. I
have proposed the development of such a model, entitled “Analytical Law
and Development Model” or “ADM.”159 The ADM is an analytical legisla-
tive reference to be developed in several key areas to facilitate economic
155. For further discussion of legal frameworks as applied in an empirical develop-

ment case, see infra Part IV B.
157. See, e.g., supra note 23. R
158. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 104. R
development,160 from the LFIs that are found to be effective, through

empirical analysis, in the countries that have recently achieved or are
undergoing successful economic development.161 The ADM is distin-
guished from previous approaches in that it does not make blind references
to the “best practices” of developed countries, which may not be adoptable
under different socioeconomic conditions in developing countries seeking
legislative guidance. These countries’ socioeconomic conditions, which
will be further discussed in the next sub-section, may be closer to those
prevailing in other developing countries; thus, law and institutional
arrangements from the other successful developing countries in the pre-
sent or recent past could be more adoptable.162
The ADM can be adopted for both diagnostic and implementation pur-
poses. In the former mode, suppose that a country attempts to assess the
effectiveness of a law that empowers a government agency to coordinate
other government departments and agencies in the implementation of
industrial development policies for their effective and consistent implemen-
tation. The ADM, by conducting comparative analysis of the LFIs in the
successful development cases, can examine whether the applicable legal
frameworks and the institutional arrangements adequately support the role
that the legislation intends to play. For example, if the authorizing law is
subordinate to a higher statute (or does not override another statute) that
also grants another government agency a conflicting supervisory role in
development policies (inadequate legal frameworks), or, if the authorizing
law does not accord the agency a budget control necessary for this coordi-
nation (insufficient institutional arrangements), the law may not be that
effective. In the implementation mode, the references drawn from the
model LFIs could also guide how LFIs should be organized in the host
country. These references will examine what legal frameworks and institu-
tions are required and how LFIs should be organized to maximize their
160. See id. at 8 n. 36. These areas include property rights (including intellectual
property rights), political governance, the regulatory framework for business transac-
tions, state industrial promotion, public health and the environment, taxation, corporate
governance, competition law, banking and financing, labor, corruption, the criminaliza-
tion of economic offences, and the international legal framework (i.e., international eco-
nomic law and international development law). In the original article, id., the legal
system as well as compliance and enforcement were also included among these areas,
but their impact on development is analyzed in this Article under the context of the
general theory. An assessment will be made as to whether it is still necessary to perform
a separate analysis under the ADM.
161. These countries may include the NICs, Chile, Spain, and others undergoing suc-
cessful economic development in recent decades, such as China, Vietnam, and Rwanda.
For a discussion of the successful development of these countries, see LEE, supra note 54, R
chs. 1.4, 10; RICARDO FRENCH DAVIS, ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHILE: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO
DEMOCRACY 1– 28 (2002); World Bank, The Economic Development of Spain (1963), http:/
/documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/764341468782083806/The-economic-develop-
ment-of-Spain [https://perma.cc/B8EF-KHD8]; Bui Tat Thang, After the War: 25 Years of
Economic Development in Vietnam, NIRA REV. (2000), http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/
review/2000spring/06thang.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZFV-DXZU]; and World Bank,
Rwanda Overview, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview [https://
perma.cc/G595-NKEP].
162. See Lee, supra note 3, at 29– 35. R
contribution to development. In making these references, reformers must

also consider relevant socioeconomic conditions, as discussed below.163
3. Adaptability to Socioeconomic Conditions

Law may not be effective if it does not conform to the socioeconomic
conditions on the ground,164 and law’s adaptability to socioeconomic con-
ditions is the third sub-element determining the effectiveness of regulatory
design. Socioeconomic conditions are a range of social, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural conditions that are essential to the successful opera-
tion of law, including social or religious norms that may or may not
support the law. For example, legislation that authorizes the charging of
an interest rate by financial institutions in order to grow the financial
industry and facilitate economic development would not be effective where
the majority of the population observes a religious code prohibiting it.165
The following example further illustrates the importance of socioeco-
nomic conditions. Several developing countries, including Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, have shown interest in adopting certain
Korea laws, including the Code of Ethics for Government Officials and the
Information Disclosure Act, to improve their governance.166 The success of
this legal adoption would depend on whether the cited laws could operate
effectively under the different legal frameworks, institutions, and socioeco-
nomic conditions in those countries.167 These developing countries may
not have strong internal monitoring and surveillance systems within their
governments to detect and deal with any improper conduct of public offi-
cials and may lack effective infrastructures for accessing and disclosing
information in a timely manner, which would be an impediment to the
implementation of those laws. Thus, successful implementation requires
reinforcement of the necessary socioeconomic conditions, including com-
petent personnel, technical expertise, financial resources, and cultural and
political acceptance of their regulatory objectives.
The foregoing examples demonstrate the importance of identifying
socioeconomic conditions for the assessment of regulatory impact on
development. The essential socioeconomic conditions may vary depend-
ing on the particular law to be implemented. They may include economic
163. The ADM also identifies and analyzes key socioeconomic conditions for the
implementation of LFIs. See Lee, supra note 3, at 9. The ADM may present different sets R
of LFIs for a reference, in accordance with the socioeconomic conditions of the host
country, including the country’s stage of economic development.
164. Practitioners and advisors have cautioned against neglecting these differences on
the ground. See, e.g., Thomas W. Waelde & James L. Gunderson, Legislative Reform in
Transition Economies: Western Transplants: A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status?,
43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 347, 349 (1994).
165. The Qur’an characterizes charging an interest as unfair, as implied by the use of
an Arabic word “zulm” meaning oppression or exploitation. The Qur’an, 2:279. Thus
“Islamic banking,” a banking practice compliant with the rules of Sharia law, has been
developed. For further discussion of Islamic banking, see generally A. ABDUL RAHEEM,
ISLAMIC BANKING: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND PERFORMANCE (2013).
167. Id.
conditions such as financial resources, the applicable stages of economic

development,168 technical expertise, political and social support, adminis-
trative capacity, and/or cultural and religious acceptance of the particular
law.169 This is a broad categorization, and assessment of socioeconomic
conditions relevant to the successful operation of a specific law may
require more detailed identification. To perform this task, it would be
essential to secure the participation of local experts in the analysis who
have detailed knowledge of socioeconomic conditions on the ground.170
The need for the adaptation of law to socioeconomic conditions also
explains the impact development has on law. Development changes socio-
economic conditions and creates regulatory gaps because of these changes.
States and societies then attempt to fill this regulatory gap (“regulatory
adjustment”) and reinforce regulatory support for development (“regula-
tory reinforcement”), which, in turn, causes changes to law. For example,
the development of information technology and internet-based commercial
transactions necessitated rules that address issues arising from increased
online transactions, such as the validity of electronic signatures. In the
United States, forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) in 1999 to harmonize state laws concerning retention of paper
records and the validity of electronic signatures.171
The growth of the financial industry may also call for the establish-
ment of an institution that oversees the conduct of players in the financial
markets, such as banks and companies listed in the stock markets, to pre-
vent the disruption of the financial system and protect the general public
from misleading and fraudulent practices. In the United States, the devel-
opment of the financial industry in the early twentieth century necessi-
tated the enactment of the Securities Act of 1934, which established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).172 The SEC monitors the
securities industry and enforces laws and rules governing the latter, e.g.,
requiring the disclosure of certain information by companies listed in the
securities markets.173
168. See supra note 146 (for an explanation of stages of economic development). R
169. As relevant to socioeconomic conditions, Richard Posner opined that precisely
written rules, rather than institutions, such as the working judiciary, that are expensive
to develop or abstract legal standards that require sophisticated legal technique to apply,
are more conductive to economic development in developing countries with limited eco-
nomic resources and weak legal traditions. See Posner, supra note 10, at 2– 10. R
170. See id. at 5– 6 (adopting foreign laws).
171. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (1999).
172. Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1– 16 (2012).
173. Id. The foregoing analysis of regulatory design is also applicable beyond law and
development and explains regulatory impact generally. For example, France has enacted
a law that bans face covering in public places, including those practiced in Islam religion
such as the burka and the niqab. See Loi 2010– 1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la
dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 ban-
ning the covering of one’s face in public], Oct. 11, 2010. The stated regulatory objec-
tives are the enhancement of pubic security and facilitation of minimal social
interactions by prohibiting the concealment of face in public places, and these objectives
are not directly related to development.
B. Regulatory Compliance
This section discusses the second element of the regulatory impact
mechanisms, “regulatory compliance,” which refers to compliance with law
by those who are subject to the application of law. This section also exam-
ines the factors influencing regulatory compliance, some of which are asso-
ciated with historical, economic, cultural, and political conditions that may
largely be immune to top-down attempts at reform174 and some others
associated more directly with state action, such as regulatory enforcement.
Regulatory compliance in the context of law and development does
not mean only the absence of rule violations, but also the knowledge of law
and participation in the processes mandated by law. For example, judicial
reform would not be as effective where only a small minority of a popula-
tion uses the court for dispute resolution.175 Strong regulatory compliance
is an essential precondition to the success of law reform, and a reform that
does not take regulatory compliance into consideration may end up a
hollow declaration without real impact. For this reason, regulatory compli-
ance is one of the key elements in determining regulatory impact on
development.
Regulatory compliance can be classified into general regulatory com-
pliance, which refers to the general level of regulatory compliance in a
given jurisdiction, and specific regulatory compliance, which pertains to a
particular law. In a place where general regulatory compliance is not
strong, regulatory impact on development may generally be weak. But,
Applying the analysis of regulatory design, the anticipated policy outcomes include
the enhancement of public security by facilitating identification of a suspect individual,
although the law’s positive effect on the minimal social interactions would be more con-
troversial. The law is also supported by the effective organization of legal frameworks
and institutions: the law is in the form of legitimate statutory enactment that is effective
throughout France (effective legal framework) and supported by the enforcement of
police and public prosecution that effectively imposes a penalty for a violation (effective
institution).
The law raises further issues with its adaptability to socioeconomic conditions. Even
if the actual number of Muslim population in France wearing full face covering might
not be large, millions of Muslims and non-Muslims in French society nevertheless sup-
port the freedom to engage in this religious practice, resulting in a conflict and division
in French society. See Edward Cody, Tensions flare in France over veil ban, WASH. POST
(Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tensions-flare-in-france-over-
veil-ban/2012/08/08/67b56fc2-e150-11e1-98e7-89d659f9c106_story.html?utm_term=
.2a15a15b3dea [https://perma.cc/C76N-HLYC]. The law’s adaptability to the socioeco-
nomic conditions on the ground (i.e., incompatibility to the religious practice and belief)
is weakened due to this conflict, diminishing the effectiveness of its regulatory design
and regulatory impact. The application of the regulatory design analysis reveals the
weakness of the French law, as demonstrated by widespread resistance to the law.
174. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 920. R
175. This lack of use may be a result of limited access to the court due to the cost of
litigation, absence of the knowledge required to use the court, the physical remoteness of
the court, or cultural reasons, i.e., local residents may prefer to use informal, traditional
venues to resolve disputes. Thus, a recent study indicated the necessity to engage cus-
tomary dispute resolution processes in developing countries. See Paul Zwier, Human
Rights for Women in Liberia (and West Africa): Integrating Formal and Informal Rule of
Law Reforms through the Carter Center’s Community Justice Advisor Project, 10 LAW &
DEV. REV. 187 (2017).
even in a society where general regulatory compliance is strong, a particu-

lar law may still have weak compliance or even resistance when it does not
conform to the socioeconomic conditions prevailing on the ground. The
subsequent discussion examines both general regulatory compliance and
specific regulatory compliance.
1. General Regulatory Compliance

Several elements affect general regulatory compliance.176 First, legal
culture is relevant. Legal culture is defined as “those characteristics pre-
sent in a legal system, reflecting the common history, traditions, outlook
and approach of that system”177 that may be “reflected in the actions or
behaviors of the actors, institutions, and even of the substance of the sys-
tem.”178 Legal culture, which may vary significantly according to the coun-
try and the jurisdiction, is said to exist “not because of regulation of
substantive law, but as a result of the collective response and actions of
those participants in the legal system.”179 Legal culture affects general reg-
ulatory compliance by influencing the manner in which the public per-
ceives law and the degree to which they comply with it.
Second, public knowledge and understanding of law influence general
regulatory compliance. The public would be more inclined to comply with
law in general if they believe, based on their knowledge and appreciation of
law, that compliance is in the interest of their communities, families, and
themselves.180 Public education and their confidence in the government
that develops and implements law are also essential. Because the govern-
ment is in charge of developing and administering most laws, except cus-
tomary law, compliance would, therefore, be less likely where the public
does not trust that the government develops and implements law to serve
the public interest. Thus, it is not surprising to see weak regulatory compli-
ance in failing states where public confidence in the government is weak.
This does not, however, necessarily mean that public confidence exactly
correlates with the level of regulatory compliance. As the axiom, “an
unjust law is nonetheless a law,” indicates, there is a degree of morality and
duty attached to obeying the law, regardless of its content and/or the gov-
ernment that administers it. Thus, it goes back to the question of the legal
culture in place.
Yet another element that affects general regulatory compliance is the
general quality of law, including its design and implementation. Well-
designed and effectively-implemented laws that fulfill the needs of the pub-
176. H.L.A. Hart also considered that regulatory compliance (“allegiance to the sys-
tem”) may be based on various elements, such as “calculations of long-term self-interest;
disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the
mere wish to do as others do.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (1994).
177. Colin B. Picker, International Trade and Development Law: A Legal Cultural Cri-
tique, 4 LAW & DEV. REV. 43, 46 (2011).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. For a relevant discussion, see Michael Ilg, Profit, Persuasion, and Fidelity: Why
People Follow the Rule of Law, 10 LAW & DEV. REV. 275 (2017).
lic and fit the socioeconomic conditions are more likely to command
strong compliance and active participation by the public. Well-designed
and implemented LFIs in fact have been spread and complied with beyond
their original jurisdictions. For example, the highly-developed Roman law
not only laid the foundation for the Roman Empire, but it remained a work-
ing reference for the development of modern law in Europe and beyond,
centuries after Rome itself perished.181 Also, a vast number of countries in
Asia, Africa, and North America have adopted the modern civil law system,
developed by France and Germany, and the common law system, by
England. Additionally, a number of countries around the world have
adopted and referenced the institutions of the British parliamentary gov-
ernment system and the American presidential system as the standard
forms of modern democratic government. These examples illustrate the
importance of regulatory design and implementation to induce
compliance.
Lastly, the strength of regulatory enforcement also affects general reg-
ulatory compliance. The likelihood of regulatory compliance increases
where a violation is sanctioned with a real penalty, including financial and
penal ones, as a result of regulatory enforcement. Therefore, enforcement
induces compliance, with a threat of a penalty, and enforcement is also an
evaluative criterion for determining the level of the rule of law.182 Enforce-
ment also requires considerable resources and capacity on the part of the
state, such as efficient monitoring, policing, and the appropriate execution
of penalties, which can be an issue for developing countries that lack suffi-
cient personnel, financial resources, and technical expertise. Thus, the
enforcement issue goes to the question of state capacity, which will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
2. Specific Regulatory Compliance
Specific regulatory compliance is associated with the resource con-

straints that inevitably compel governments to prioritize laws for enforce-
ment. Laws supported by a stronger political will are more likely to be
enforced as a priority and, in turn, result in stronger compliance. Some
laws may not have real enforcement by a state when an external force
imposes on the state to adopt them. For example, where a state is required
to legislate a system of “good governance” as a condition for receiving a
181. For a further discussion of Roman law, see generally Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic
Dictionary of Roman Law (1953); and H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the
Study of Roman Law (1996). See also Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connec-
tion with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas 75– 78 (1861).
182. See World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2015 (2015), http://worldjus-
ticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf) [https://perma.cc/HV68-YJJM]. For
´
further discussion of compliance theories and relevant literature review, see Julien Eti-
enne, La Conformation Des Gouvernes, 60 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 493
(2010), English version available at http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_RFSP_603_
0493— compliance-theories.htm [https://perma.cc/TD24-3Z28].
loan from an international financial institution,183 the state may be reluc-

tant to devote resources and personnel to enforce the imposed system if it
does not agree on the need for such a system but nevertheless accepts it for
the purpose of obtaining the loan. In this case, the donor development
agency could try to ensure enforcement by threatening to discontinue the
loan or requiring early repayment upon failure. An interesting question
arises as to whether the public will comply with laws that a state adopts,
perhaps reluctantly, for a condition imposed externally. The answer
depends on whether the public would see the “imposed” laws as justified if
they meet their needs or that of the state, although the public may gener-
ally not favor this type of external intervention, viewing it as an encroach-
ment on national sovereignty (and their own national pride), regardless of
its specific content.184
Another key element determining specific regulatory compliance is
the consistency between a particular law and the socioeconomic condi-
tions on the ground. Any conflict should be weighed against the regulatory
benefit, as perceived by the public, in adopting the law. In the case of the
French law banning face covering in public places,185 French female Mus-
lims under the religious practice of wearing the burka or the niqab may not
be inclined to comply with the law, unless they considered the claimed
benefits of improved communication through facial recognition and
enhanced public security, coupled with the benefit of avoiding the penalty
for a violation and potential persecution by non-Muslims who oppose any-
one wearing them, to outweigh the conflict with their religious practice.
Specific regulatory compliance can also be classified into “passive
compliance” and “active compliance.” Passive compliance refers to a mini-
mal level of compliance with the requirements of law, primarily to avoid a
penalty for a violation. Active compliance refers to the type of compliance
that exceeds fulfilling the minimum requirements, seeking to assist the
state in meeting a regulatory objective by actively participating in the pro-
cess mandated by law, often with encouragement to others to do the same.
A voluntary public campaign against the use of illegally imported prod-
ucts, in compliance with customs law and industrial policy to promote
domestic production, is an example. One can expect active compliance
when the population identifies the regulatory objective to be in their own
interest. In successful developing countries, governments secured active
compliance for development-facilitating laws, because the general public
considered the regulatory objective of these laws— economic development—
as fulfilling their own interest in escaping from poverty.
Finally, a nation could be divided with respect to specific regulatory
compliance with a particular law, because the law may result in a net bene-
183. For a discussion of the emphasis on “good governance” by the international

financial institutions, see Rittich, supra note 22, at 210. R
184. For a discussion of the symbolic effects of law, see John Griffiths, Do Laws Have
Symbolic Effects?, in SOCIAL AND SYMBOLIC EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE RULE OF
LAW 147 (Nicolle Zeegers, Willem Witteveen, & Bart van Klink eds., 2005).
185. See supra note 173. R
fit for a group in a population and cause a net loss for another simultane-
ously. For example, traders would generally welcome a free trade
agreement (“FTA”), as the FTA lowers trade barriers, such as customs tar-
iffs, and their costs in trade. For this reason, they would have an interest in
complying with the law necessary for the adoption of the FTA, such as a
statute implementing the FTA. In contrast, domestic producers competing
with the imported products and domestic laborers whose jobs might be
adversely affected by the imports may well oppose the FTA and the domes-
tic law implementing it, as the FTA lowers the cost of imports, thereby mak-
ing competing domestic products less competitive in the domestic market.
To improve specific regulatory compliance in the presence of conflicts of
interests among different groups, a government will endeavor to devise the
implementation of law in such a way as to reduce the perceived loss and
provide compensation to the losing groups.186 However, the government
may not always be “neutral” in this divide, and its ideological orientations
and political preferences also affect the divide and its outcome. For exam-
ple, the government supporting free trade would try to find a way to legis-
late for the FTA despite the perceived loss to a population group.
C. Quality of Implementation
1. Definition and Importance
The quality of implementation, which includes regulatory enforce-

ment, is the third and final element of the regulatory impact mechanisms.
Implementation refers to the act of a state meeting the requirements of law
and undertaking mandates under the terms of law to fulfill its objectives.
For example, to implement a statute that prohibits gender discrimination
in work places, the state will have to monitor its application in work places,
review suspect discrimination cases, and impose a penalty for a violation
under the terms of the statute. It is the quality of implementation that
determines the effectiveness of law, and it is measured by the extent to
which a state meets the requirements set forth by the terms of law and
fulfills the mandates under these terms, including its enforcement and
monitoring terms. Cases of violations (particularly those not responded to
by the state), omissions, and incomplete implementation on the part of the
state count against the quality of implementation. Factors such as corrup-
tion and incapacity of the state adversely affect implementation.
For example, a law that requires the removal of customs tariffs on
imports would not be as effective if customs officials at the border under-
mined the law by requiring an informal payment equivalent to a certain
percentage of the value of an imported product as a condition for passing it
through customs. A perceived difficulty in the implementation of the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agree-
186. In the cited FTA example, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Programs under
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and as defined further under the Trade Act of 1974
serve this purpose. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1911– 1920 and §§ 2341– 2356.
ment)187 in least-developed countries (LDCs) is another example of such

implementation issues. According to a study, the cost of implementing the
TRIPS Agreement, including investments in buildings, equipment, and
training, was $150 million in the 1990s and this amount would have repre-
sented a full-year’s development budget for many LDCs at the time.188 In
this circumstance, the implementation of TRIPs obligations in LDCs would
be difficult due to lack of financial resources.
A question arises as to whether a state is the only entity that imple-
ments law. For example, customary law and common law exist without the
state act of legislation. As for common law, it is a state (the court) that
“finds” its existence, identifies its terms, and enforces them. Thus, it can
be said that the role of a state is essential in the implementation of com-
mon law. As for customary law, to the extent that it exists by voluntary
recognition and compliance by the general public, it may not require state
implementation. The state may also be called on to recognize its existence
and enforce customary law where there is a dispute, so the state has an
implementation role for customary law.189 A state may also delegate some
of its role to another entity in the implementation of law, likely under its
own monitoring and supervision.190
Finally, the other two elements of the regulatory impact mechanisms
discussed in the preceding sections, regulatory design and regulatory com-
pliance, also affect the quality of implementation. Laws that are well
designed, congruent with socioeconomic conditions (including other
social norms), and commanding strong compliance are more likely to be
implemented effectively than those that are not. In addition, the two exter-
nal factors, state capacity and political will, have a determinative impact on
the quality of implementation as further discussed below.
2. State Capacity
As previously discussed, the state191 implements laws relevant to

development through legislation, judicial decisions, and administrative
actions. Thus, the state must have due capacity to implement law. State
capacity includes its financial, technological, and administrative capabili-
187. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
188. See J. Michael Finger, The WTO’s Special Burden on Less Developed Countries, 19
CATO J. 425, 435 (2000).
189. Traditional community forums, rather than state courts, may hear and adjudi-
cate claims based on customary law, as is the case in many underdeveloped regions. See
Zwier, supra note 175. R
190. A state delegates its role of implementation when, for example, it contracts with
a private company to operate a correctional facility. A commentator has also observed a
trend of the “third sectorization of law and policy” in which numerous non-state, non-
market civil organizations such as voluntary associations, NGOs, and religious groups
become independent sources of normative authority. See Rittich, supra note 22, at 223. R
191. For a definition of a state, see supra note 31. R
ties, including internal controls against corruption, to implement laws and

fulfill regulatory objectives.
State capacity is essential to the implementation of law regardless of
the ideological orientation of the development policies. Even in a develop-
ment model in which the role of the private sector is predominant, the state
still has an important role in the functioning of the market economy. For
example, freedom of contract192 is necessary for the market economy to
operate. Therefore, a state advocating for the market must enforce con-
tracts in an appropriate legal framework (“contract law”) that ensures the
rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. The recognition and
enforcement of contractual rights through legislation, judicial decisions,
and administrative actions are essentially state activities. The market econ-
omy cannot successfully function if the state lacks capacity in one or more
of these areas.193
Developing countries often lack sufficient financial, technological, and
administrative resources to implement all of their laws effectively. Thus,
the question arises as to how a developing country with limited resources
could secure state capacity to implement the laws necessary for develop-
ment. Arguably, wealth may not necessarily be a precondition to the devel-
opment of high-quality laws and institutions (e.g., personnel cost is lower
in developing countries).194 Successful East Asian countries found at least
a partial answer to the question in their cultural tradition. They derived
considerable state capacity from well-educated public officials and effi-
cient government bureaucracies. Despite financial constraints (i.e., mod-
est government salary), they were able to recruit elite public officials
because their Confucian tradition encouraged educated elite individuals to
seek government positions with the notion that it is an honor to serve the
state as a government official.195 As a result, these countries were able to
recruit and deploy highly disciplined and devoted officials to develop and
administer law.196
192. Freedom of contract refers to the freedom of individuals and legal persons
(legally recognized entities) including corporations, to form contracts and determine
contractual terms. Freedom of contract is essential to the free market economy. See
David Bernstein, Freedom of Contract (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law: Law & Econ. Ctr.
Research Paper Series No. 08– 51, 2008).
193. This explains the initial failure and economic confusion after the unprepared
privatization in the former Soviet countries after the fall of communism in the 1980s
where the state lacked the capacity to implement LFIs necessary for the market econ-
omy. For a discussion of the economic difficulty faced by the former Soviet countries,
see William W. Hogan, Economic Reforms in the Sovereign States of the Former Soviet
Union (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 2, 1991), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/1991/06/1991b_bpea_hogan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH5J-PZ
XR].
194. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 922– 23. R
195. For a discussion of the Confucian tradition in East Asia, see generally CON-
FUCIAN TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN MODERNITY (Tu Wei-Ming ed., 1996).
196. See generally ROY HOFHEINZ, JR. & KENT E. CALDER, THE EAST ASIA EDGE: WHY AN
ENTIRE REGION IS OVERTAKING THE WEST IN TECHNOLOGY, EXPORTS AND MANAGEMENT
(1982); LUCIAN W. PYE, ASIAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
State capacity was also a determining factor for other countries that
successfully accomplished economic development. Germany achieved
remarkable economic development in the late nineteenth century when
Otto von Bismarck adopted state-led developmental policies, aided by sub-
stantially increased state capacity as a result of Germany’s unification.197
A similar development took place in the United States when President Lin-
coln led the Union to victory in the Civil War and stopped the Southern
States’ secession from the Union (an outcome that would have weakened
the state capacity of the United States), followed by North-based industrial-
ization and trade protection for industrial development.198 Generals
Franco and Pinochet also implemented strong state-backed economic
reforms in Spain and Chile, respectively, which paved the path for their
economic development, notwithstanding the authoritarian and repressive
nature of their regimes.199 By contrast, weak states in Africa and Latin
America200 could not successfully implement the LFIs needed for eco-
nomic development for much of the twentieth century.201
State capacity is an overarching factor that is not only essential to the
implementation of law, but also influences the two other elements of the
regulatory impact mechanisms, regulatory design and regulatory compli-
ance. The state’s evaluative and analytical capacity influences regulatory
design, particularly legislation. Its capacity to enforce and raise public
AUTHORITY (1985); and IN SEARCH OF AN EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL (Peter L. Berger
& Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao eds., 1988).
197. See OTTO PFLANZE, BISMARCK AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMANY, VOLUME II: THE
PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION, 1871– 1880, at 67– 92, 207– 45 (1990).
198. Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln’s early mentor, is known to have advocated the
“American System” of trade protection in opposition to what he called the “British Sys-
tem” of free trade, which, he argued, was part of the British imperialist system that con-
signed the United States to the role of primary product exporter. See P. CONKIN,
PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA’S FIRST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS 302 (1980).
199. These policies included the 1959 Spanish Stabilization Plan and Pinochet’s mar-
ket-oriented reforms deliberated in 1973– 75 and implemented afterwards. See Leandro
Prados de la Escosura, Joan Rosés, & Isabel Sanz Villarroya, Stabilisation and Growth
under Dictatorships: Lessons from Franco’s Spain, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL (Mar. 22,
2010), http://voxeu.org/article/stabilisation-and-growth-under-dictatorships-new-les-
sons-franco-s-spain [https://perma.cc/GT28-4M7M]; and Robert A. Packenham & Wil-
liam Ratliff, What Pinochet Did for Chile, HOOVER DIGEST (Jan. 30, 2007), http://
www.hoover.org/research/what-pinochet-did-chile [https://perma.cc/2R9J-8QMJ].
200. For further discussion on weak states, see Robert Rotberg, Failed States, Col-
lapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS
IN A TIME OF TERROR 1 (Robert Rotberg ed., 2003); and Susan E. Rice & Stewart Patrick,
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 26, 2008), https:/
/www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/02_weak_states_index.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/SZ7W-7N6X].
201. However, state capacity should not be confused with the state’s ability and will-
ingness to use or abuse its power. A state being “weak,” lacking the cited key capacities
to meet their development objectives, does not mean that it is completely powerless.
Some of the weak states, as listed in the Index of State Weakness in the Developing
World, were known to use brutal force against their own populations, including torture
and summary executions. See Rice & Patrick, supra note 200. For another account of
the mismatch between “state power” and “state capacity” (in the context of transnational
law enforcement), see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch between State Power
and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15 (2004).
confidence in law influences regulatory compliance, as discussed in the

preceding section. Despite this overarching influence, state capacity alone
does not determine regulatory impact on development. Although states
with sufficient analytical capacity are more likely to make laws, for exam-
ple, with a better regulatory design than states without such capacity, there
are numerous cases in which poorly designed laws, as a result of political
compromise or other reasons, are implemented in states that otherwise
have high capacities.202 Likewise, regulatory compliance may also be
affected by state capacity, but it is not necessarily controlled by the latter,
particularly when a major segment of the general public does not support
the objective of the law proposed by the state due to political, economic,
cultural, or religious grounds.203
3. Political Will
Political will is another essential element affecting the implementation

of law. In the context of regulatory implementation, political will is
defined as the commitment and devotion of a country’s political leadership
to the implementation of law.204 Lack of political will can result in effec-
tive laws, regardless of state capacity, where the government expects politi-
cal challenges against the implementation of the laws and is reluctant to
implement or enforce them in order to avoid any adverse political ramifica-
tions. By contrast, sustained political will instills consistency in regulatory
implementation and enforcement.205
202. See, e.g., Frank Holmes, FATCA: Good Intentions, Poor Design, U.S. GLOBAL INVES-
TORS (June 25, 2014), http://www.usfunds.com/investor-library/frank-talk/fatca-good-
intentions-bad-execution/#.V-28rIKQL3g [https://perma.cc/246B-QURS].
203. See, e.g., Cody, supra note 173 (reporting religion-based public resistance to the R
French law that prohibits face covering in public places). A recent study has highlighted
the importance of state capacity to regulatory impact concerning crime control. The
study has concluded that the suppression of sexual and gender-based violence has not
been very effective in Liberia where the government has enacted laws that substantially
increase penalties for these crimes, but the state lacks the capacity to implement these
laws effectively, due to absence of resources to supply sufficient police force,
prosecutorial services, and courts to monitor, prosecute, convict, and punish offenders.
See Zwier supra note 175. The weak state capacity, prevailing in developing countries, R
has resulted in poor regulatory impact. See Rotberg, supra note 200. R
204. For a general definition of political will, see Political will, OXFORD LIVING DICTION-
ARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/political_will [https://perma.cc/
L3G8-R45Q]. Political will, in the context of development, should be distinguished from
a mere interest in development facilitation, which the leadership of almost every devel-
oping country would have, given the state of their economies. Political will is more than
a mere interest, which may be demonstrated by the continued implementation of consis-
tent development policies for an extended period of time, allocating substantial political
and economic capital.
205. Conversely, successful economic development and improved state capacity, such
as increased financial resources, may also reinforce political will. Initial success can
provide encouragement and motivation for the continuation of a successful development
path, and improved state capacity, such as a larger government budget and development
funds, as well as a larger staff, can generate better conditions under which to carry out
the will.
After the Second World War, many successful developing countries

achieved economic development under authoritarian regimes, such as the
East Asian countries from the 60s to the 80s (China since the 80s), Spain
in the 60s and the 70s, and Chile in the 70s and the 80s.206 The success of
these countries often hinged on the decision to save available resources for
future investments, as opposed to immediate consumption. For example,
the Korean government, which controlled commercial banks until the
1980s, did not make bank loans available for home mortgages so that the
available capital could be used for long-term productive pursuits, such as
building factories and social infrastructures. While this was an essential
investment for the future that led to the highest sustained economic growth
for over three decades, this type of policy is nevertheless unpopular to the
general public who are then compelled to save much of their income for
many years to purchase homes.207 Elective democracy tends to cater to
voters’ immediate concerns, rather than long-term strategic development
plans that may require public sacrifice until the development potential
materializes.208
I do not argue that the political will necessary for sustained growth
could never be generated in a democracy.209 However, its deliberative and
elective nature is likely to present considerable challenges when making a
long-term development decision that may require voters to make an imme-
diate sacrifice, particularly in the early stages of economic development
when resources are limited and difficult choices have to be made.210 Like-
wise, a change of regime, which is an inevitable outcome in elective democ-
racies, can also lead to a change in development policy and even in
development objectives. Some of these changes are for political reasons
rather than for development, and they may be adverse to the development
interests, the fulfillment of which necessitates a sustained and consistent
development policy over time. A level of development may realistically be
necessary before a democratic system of governance operates efficiently
and continues to promote development. A working democracy requires
economic and social resources,211 such as public education, access to
206. For a discussion of the development of Spain under General Franco and of Chile
under Pinochet, see supra note 76. The East Asian countries also had legendary political R
leaders devoted to national development, such as Park Jung Hee of Korea (1917– 1979),
Chang Kai-shek of Taiwan (1885– 1975), Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (1923– 2015), and
Deng Xiaoping of China (1904– 1997).
207. See Daekeun Park & Changyong Rhee, Saving, growth, and demographic change in
Korea, 19 J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 394, 394– 95, 410 (2005).
208. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITU-
TIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD 1950– 1990, at 143 (2000).
209. For instance, India, which is considered a democracy, has shown substantial
economic growth in recent decades. Democratized Chile also benefitted from the eco-
nomic reforms completed during the authoritarian regime of Pinochet. For a further
discussion of Chile’s development under the Pinochet regime, see supra note 143. R
210. It took several decades before democratic India could finally embark on sus-
tained economic growth, whereas authoritarian NICs and China achieved much more
rapid economic development.
211. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69– 124 (2002).
information, and the rule of law, which may not be achievable without
economic development in place.
The inherent difficulty with elective democracy does not mean that
dictatorships or authoritarian regimes are the answer; these regimes also
do not automatically generate the political commitment and devotion to
development. The political will necessary for development is not deter-
mined by the length of time when one is in power. Otherwise, a number of
authoritarian regimes and dictatorships still existing would have made pro-
gress in development, but that is not the case. This reality presents a
dilemma— while authoritarian leaders in successful developing countries
have led their countries to decades of successful economic development, a
system of dictatorship or authoritarian governance does not guarantee the
appointment of a “good leader” with the requisite political will.212 There is
no political system that guarantees a leader who will uphold the political
will for development, ready to resist popular demand for short-term eco-
nomic gain in order to meet long-term development objectives. The cited
systematic issues with elective democracies and the uncertainty character-
izing authoritarian regimes are likely a reason that only a small number of
countries have achieved development successfully since the Second World
War.
IV. Application of the General Theory
A. Development of South Korea (1962– 1996): An Overview
This part applies the theoretical framework discussed in the earlier

sections to an empirical development case, the development process of
Korea (1962– 1996), a mid-sized country located in Northeast Asia between
China and Japan.213 The application serves two purposes: verify the gen-
eral theory by applying it to an empirical case and assist readers in clarify-
ing any conceptual ambiguity from the preceding theoretical discussion.
212. The majority of successful developing countries with “benevolent” or “good”

authoritarian leaders have been located in East Asia where the prevailing Confucian tra-
dition emphasized the duty of the elite to their state and people. Such tradition may
have been a reason for the production of a higher ratio of leaders devoted to economic
development, compared to that in other regions in the world without such tradition. For
a discussion of the Confucian tradition in East Asia, see supra note 195. Another view R
has been raised that individuals and groups interested in predation, rather than develop-
ment, are more likely to capture the government in countries with rich natural resource
endowments from which they can easily appropriate large economic rents. See Richard
M. Auty, Natural Resource Endowment, the State, and Development Policy, 9 J. INT’L DEV.
651 (1997). Note that none of the NICs were resource-rich. Yet another difficulty in
forging a united political will towards development could be associated with enduring
divisions along ethnic, religious, linguistic, and economic lines within countries. The
East Asian countries were relatively homogeneous in ethnicity and culture and did not
suffer from the degree of contentious ethnic, religious, and cultural division experienced
by many developing countries in other regions.
213. South Korea, NATIONS ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/
economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Korea-South.html [https://perma.cc/BWB8-RS53].
With a long history of over 5000 years,214 Korea has gone through
treacherous modern times, including a period of colonization by Japan
(1910– 1945), the division of the country into North and South Koreas
(1945), and a major war (the Korean War, 1950– 1953). Despite its ardu-
ous path, the country achieved unprecedented success in development
from the 1960s to the 1990s.215 This part examines Korea’s development
policies and discusses how changes in LFIs affected development in Korea,
applying the analytical elements presented in the preceding discussion.
Korea is chosen for its unique reference value as a “model” develop-
ment case. As of the early 1960s, Korea had much of the characteristics
shared by many developing countries today, such as low per-capita income
causing prevalent poverty, an economy relying heavily on primary, non-
manufacturing industries, low levels of technology and entrepreneurship
in society, insufficient capital, poor endowment of natural resources, over-
population in a relatively small territory, internal political instability, and
external threats to its security.216 Successfully overcoming these unfavora-
ble conditions, Korea’s economy progressed from one relying on low-pro-
ductive primary industries and characterized by absolute poverty in the
1960s to an advanced economy based on large industrial capacity generat-
ing high per-capita income by the mid-1990s.217 The Korean development
process exhibits all major stages of economic development in an easily
traceable time period of three decades, raising its reference value, and suc-
cessful social and political development from authoritarian rule to elective
democracy based on the rule of law by the 1990s.
The examination of Korean development will also fill the gaps in law
and development studies identified by leading scholars. They point out
that law reform projects and development studies have not properly refer-
enced and incorporated the successful development experiences of the East
Asian countries.218 Scholars have emphasized the essential importance of
studying them in the context of law and development,219 and this Article
214. For a history of Korea, see KYUNG MOON HWANG, A HISTORY OF KOREA (2016);
MICHAEL J. SETH, A HISTORY OF KOREA: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (2010); and
CARTER J. ECKERT, KI-BAIK LEE, YOUNG ICK LEW, MICHAEL ROBINSON, & EDWARD W. WAG-
NER, KOREA OLD AND NEW: A HISTORY (1991).
215. In 1962, Korea’s GNI per capita was mere $120, lower than most other develop-
ing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America at the time. As a result of successful
economic development, its GNI increased to $13,040 in 1996, which was a high-income
country category as defined by the World Bank at that time, with income distribution
better than some of the most advanced developed countries, including the United States.
See GNI per capita, Atlas method, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2014&start=1962&year_low_desc=false [https://perma.cc/
BT6X-5Y6T].
216. As a result, Korea’ per capital GDP grew at only one percent a year prior to 1962.
See KWANG-SUK KIM & JOON-KYUNG PARK, SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN KOREA:
1963– 1982 6 (1985).
218. See John Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2007);
Trubek, supra note 3; and Newton, supra note 2, at 187. R
219. See Ohnesorge, id.
references the NICs, as well as other successful developing countries, in the

preceding discussions. Further examination of Korea’s development pro-
cess under the proposed theoretical framework will contribute to bridging
this gap.
B. Applying the General Theory

1. Applying the Disciplinary Parameters
The first part of the general theory sets the disciplinary parameters of
law and development. “Law” that is primarily considered in the develop-
ment case of Korea is legislation. This is because Korea’s economic devel-
opment policies, as further discussed below, centered on the active
government promotion of industries and export activities, and the govern-
ment used legislation and subordinate administrative rules as a primary
regulatory means to promote development. There is a potential role for
customary law in development process,220 but in the case of Korea, its role
in the development process seems to have been limited. As to the second
constituent element of law and development, i.e., “development,” this appli-
cation examines both economic and social development. As discussed in
Part II, economic development includes the notions of economic growth,
increase in income, and industrial development. Social development
includes the development of elective democracy and the rule of law, as rec-
ognized to be the substantive elements of social development in Korean
society.
The following analysis applies the second part of the general theory,
the regulatory impact mechanisms comprised of the three elements: “regu-
latory design,” “regulatory compliance,” and “quality of implementation.”
The last element is assessed by state capacity and political will.
2. Regulatory Design
The primary objective of Korea’s development policies was to relieve
the majority of its population from extreme poverty.221 To meet this objec-
tive, the government sought to develop industries that would generate sus-
tainable income for the majority of its population. The government
adopted export-led development policies, which were necessary to over-
come the constraints of insufficient purchasing power within the domestic
market due to prevalent poverty,222 and focused on developing manufac-
turing industries that utilized the abundant labor which were both edu-
220. For the role of customary law for development, see PETER ØREBECH ET AL., THE
ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2005).
222. Empirical studies concluded that exports lead to economic growth under certain
conditions and that export promotion policies are effective in increasing exports. See
Michael Michaely, Exports and Growth: An Empirical Investigation, 4 J. DEV. ECON. 49
(1977); Woo S. Jung & Gyu Lee, The Effectiveness of Export Promotion Policies: The Case
of Korea 122 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 340 (1986); and Sae Ran Koh & Jai S. Mah,
The Effect of Export Composition on Economic Growth: The Case of Korea, 47 J. DEVELOP-
ING AREAS 171 (2013). See also Pangestu, supra note 77 (discussing an evolution of R
industrial policies of the NICs).
cated and inexpensive.223

To implement these policies, the Korean government enacted statutes
mandating state support for trade and exports, including the Tax Exemp-
tion and Reduction Control Act (1961), the Act on Temporary Measures for
the Grant of Export Subsidies (1961), and the Export Promotion Act
(1962, replaced by the Trade Transactions Act of 1967). The terms of these
acts mandated that the government grant tax reductions for the profits gen-
erated by exports, ensure timely payment of export subsidies (subsidies
contingent upon exports), prioritize allocation of scarce foreign reserves to
purchase raw material to produce export products, and permit only traders
with export performance to import.
The government also enacted a series of statutes providing direct sup-
port for specific industries, including the Act on Temporary Measures for
Textile Industrial Facilities (1967); the Acts on Promotion of Mechanical
Industries (1967), Shipbuilding Industries (1967), Electronic Industries
(1969), Petrochemical Industries (1970), and Steel Industries (1970); the
Act on Refining Service of Non-Ferrous Metals (1971); and the Act on the
Promotion of the Modernization of Textile Industries (1979).224 These
statutes mandated that the government adopt various supportive measures
for the designated industries, such as tax incentives, policy loans (govern-
ment-backed loans offering more favorable terms than the prevailing com-
mercial terms, such as lower interest rates), subsidy grants, tariff rebates,
import control, and loan guarantees (particularly for loans offered by over-
seas banks).
In the 1980s, as the economy matured into a technology-based one
after two decades of successful economic development and as the country
became a middle-income country undergoing the later stages of economic
development, the legislative focus shifted to supporting the robust private
sector as a whole, rather than specific industries, and reducing government
control of the economy. To facilitate this policy shift, the government
enacted the Manufacturing Industry Development Act in 1986 (later
replaced by the Industrial Development Act in 1999), repealed the cited
statutes mandating specific industry-wide support, and granted assistance
to industries on a more selective basis where there was a need to improve
their efficiency by restructuring or reorganization.225
Development economics in the 1950s and 60s226 would have sup-
ported Korea’s state-led development policies to be implemented by the
cited statutes, with the anticipated policy outcomes to be economic growth,
industrial development, and relief of poverty. The prospect of success was
223. The other NICs also adopted this type of export-led, development policies based
on building manufacturing industries, with varying details. For an evolution of indus-
trial policies of the NICs, see Pangestu, supra note 77. R
224. See HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LAWS IN KOREA FROM LIBERATION TO PRESENT, VOLUME 1,
at 216– 27 (Duol Kim ed., 2011).
225. See id. at 222– 27.
226. For a discussion of development economics in the 50s and the 60s, see supra
note 138. R
initially uncertain. The Korean government did not have sufficient finan-
cial and industrial resources to implement these policies, and the United
States, the primary aid provider for Korea at the time, reportedly had con-
cerns that its development policies emphasizing the role of the state in
economic development might lead to a socialist development model.227
The latter did not happen, but the government played an essential role in
the economic development initiatives. The government developed and exe-
cuted the Five-Year Economic Development Plans from 1962 to 1996,
which stipulated specific economic-development and industrial-promotion
goals, including target economic growth and export promotion for each of
the five-year terms.228 It also coordinated and supported private sector
activities that were consistent with its development goals through its con-
trol of bank loans and grant of government subsidies.229 The government
supported strategically chosen leading industries, which were likely to
spur growth in other related industries, through various measures, such as
tax incentives, policy loans, favorable exchange rates for exporters, a flexi-
ble import tariff regime that supported exporters, and inducement of social
support for economic development through extensive public campaigns
and education.230
Substantial flexibility and adaptability were other key features of
Korean development policies. The government set its export expansion
and industrial development goals according to what was feasible given the
available resources, technology, and industrial experiences at the time. In
the 1960s, Korea focused on labor-intensive industries, such as textile and
clothing, which did not require large capital or technological resources
unavailable then, and promoted exports of these products to generate
income. The country subsequently transitioned into more advanced and
potentially more profitable industries, such as heavy and chemical indus-
tries in the 1970s and electronics in the 1980s, that required larger capital,
technology, and industrial knowhow, using the resources and experiences
that Korean producers had gained from successful exports.231
The market performance of the supported industries, particularly in
export markets, was a benchmark of success for economic development
efforts. Even if the government took the initiative in economic develop-
ment, with development planning and regulatory support, private sector
227. Lee Jong-Seuk, The Launching of Economic Development Plan (The Half Century of
Korean Economy), E DAILY (May 5, 2005), http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/
news_detail.asp?newsId=01331686576565968&mediaCodeNo=257&OutLnkChk=Y
(Kor.) [https://perma.cc/XMY3-MMTZ].
228. For further details of the Five-Year Plans, see LEE, supra note 54, at 304– 05. R
229. See id. at 305– 09. These subsidies had distributive effects, allocating resources
to those industries considered at the time that would have the strongest growth effect for
the economy, resulting in the high economic growth in the 60s and the 70s. In addition
to this policy, other factors, such as pre-war industrial experience, land reform, the rise
of national firms, administrative quality, and precision in policy targeting, are known to
have contributed to this success. See ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA
AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989).
230. See LEE, supra note 54, at 305– 13. R
231. See id. at 303– 05.
companies played a primary role. The government supported private sec-

tor entrepreneurs who successfully developed industries and expanded
exports. The world-class Korean industrial brand names, such as Hyundai
and Samsung, are as much the outcome of this government support as the
result of their own efforts and innovations. In the 1980s, as discussed
below, the government discontinued industry-specific support and
reduced its control over the economy. This market focus is different from a
socialist planned economy favored by dependence theorists.232 China sub-
sequently adopted this approach by initiating a series of market-oriented
reforms since 1978 towards “the socialist market economy.”233
As a result of the development policies sustained for over three
decades, the anticipated policy outcomes of economic growth, industrial
development, and relief of poverty became a reality for Korea. In 1962,
when the Korean government implemented the first Five-Year Economic
Plan, its per capita GNI was $120,234 among the lowest in the world with
the majority of its population stricken with poverty. By 1996, when
Korea’s seventh and final Five-Year Economic Development Plan was com-
pleted, the nation found itself among the advanced developed countries
with affluent economies and world-class industries. Its per capita GNI
reached $13,040,235 classified by the World Bank as a high-income coun-
try at that time,236 and Korea became a major industrial power and leading
trader, joining the ranks of the other advanced countries in Europe and
North America at the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development).237
232. See generally SOCIALIST MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT (Charles K. Wilber & Kenneth
P. Jameson eds., 1982).
233. For further discussion of the socialist market economy, see CHINA’S TRANSITION
TO A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY (Osman Suliman ed., 1998).
234. World Bank, GNI per capita, supra note 215. According to the Bank of Korea, R
Korea’ GNI per capita in 1962 (nominal USD) was even lower, at $91. Bank of Korea,
Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ [https://perma.cc/Q7KR-QL6L].
235. As a result of successful economic development, the Korean economy grew at the
remarkable rate of 8.75 percent on average per annum from 1991 to 1996, the highest
among the NICs. See Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, supra note 75. R
236. See World Bank, GNI per capita (current USD), supra note 215. The interna- R
tional community recognized Korea’s remarkable economic success, and as a result,
Korea became the second Asian country to host the Olympic Games in 1988.
237. The analysis of the anticipated policy outcome also explains the change of eco-
nomic conditions in Korea after 1996; after a long period of unprecedented economic
growth and prosperity, Korea faced a financial crisis in 1997, caused by a short-term
shortage of foreign exchanges. Unable to resolve this crisis, Korea requested a bailout
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the latter, in return for the bailout,
demanded neoliberal changes in policies and law which would reduce the role of the
state in the economy, more so than the government had been implementing since the
1980s. Korea was compelled to accept this demand to avoid national default, but the
policy outcome that the demanded changes attempted to deliver, such as one to balance
the financial market through hikes in interest rates, was not consistent with the decades
of economic management and practices in Korea that supported a substantial number of
firms with short-term loans on a rolling basis. These abrupt changes demanded by the
IMF caused over 3000 companies to fail and millions to lose jobs, reduced industrial
investments, and lowered economic growth, which have never recovered to the pre-crisis
As to the organization of LFIs, flexible legal frameworks supported the

enactment of the development-facilitating statutes cited above. Korea
adopted a civil law system,238 which was developed by Germany and
France and subsequently transplanted by its colonial predecessor, Japan.
The Korean legal system is composed of core “codes,” such as the civil
code,239 with elaborate legal structures and embedded legal principles
(i.e., not easily amenable to revision), and the state implemented develop-
ment policies by enacting separate statutes that were not directly con-
trolled by its major codes. In other words, Korea set up a separate legal
apparatus, outside its codes, for the adoption and implementation of its
development policies. This approach, which other countries have also
adopted, enabled expedient implementation of specific development poli-
cies through on-point legislation and amendments, without having to
revise its codes, which would be a time-consuming process. The provisions
of these statutes took precedence over an inconsistent provision in any
other statute earlier enacted, including the codes, except the national
constitution.
Effective institutions implemented the development-facilitating laws
legislated under the flexible legal frameworks. The government set up a
large number of institutions both inside and outside the government to
support economic development. The most important development-facili-
tating institution was the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which was
established in 1961 as a body within the central government.240 The EPB
coordinated and instructed other government departments on a wide range
of policy measures related to economic development until its merger with
the Ministry of Finance in 1994.241 The government also established vari-
ous financial institutions to support economic development, such as the
Korea Development Bank to provide financial support for select industries
and the Korea Export-Import Bank to provide export credit, as mandated
by the development-facilitating legislation cited above.242 Korea also set up
trade support organizations, such as the Korea Trade Promotion Corpora-
tion (KOTRA), which provided support for export companies, including
access to overseas market information and business networks, and the
Korea International Trade Association (KITA), which promoted the inter-
ests of Korean traders.243
The adaptation of law to changing socioeconomic conditions has also
been essential for sustained development in Korea. As discussed earlier,
the government repealed the statutes mandating specific industrial sup-
port in response to changed socioeconomic conditions in the later stages
level. For further discussion of the financial crisis in Korea and in other Asian countries
in the 1990s, see KHAN, supra note 50. R
238. For an explanation of a civil law system, see supra note 63. R
239. The other major codes include the criminal code, the civil procedure code, the
criminal procedure code, and the administrative code.
240. See LEE, supra note 54, at 313. R
241. See id.
242. See id. at 307– 08.
243. See id. at 312.
of economic development. The government consistently monitored the

implementation and operation of existing statutes, assessed their effective-
ness, and made necessary amendments to increase their adaptability to the
changing socioeconomic conditions as a result of rapid development; from
1977 to 1979, the government reviewed 2790 then-existing statutes and
made 288 adjustments.244 Moreover, in the 90s, the government made 604
statutory adjustments.245 Consistent legislative monitoring and adjust-
ment undertaken by the Ministry of Government Legislation, a separate
government ministry devoted to this work, allowed Korea’s laws to adapt to
the country’s changing socioeconomic conditions, resulting in their
increased effectiveness for development.246
3. Regulatory Compliance
In 1996, by the time Korea’s development era was being ended, Korea
marked the percentile rank of 71.4 (0 to 100) for the rule of law assessment
by the World Bank.247 Assuming the validity of this rating, it indicates a
relatively high level of general regulatory compliance, without which the
rule of law would not be feasible. At least in part, Korea’s political and
cultural tradition explains its strength of regulatory compliance. In the
Confucian tradition shared by Korea and other East Asian countries, the
state is responsible for the wellbeing of its subjects, and the citizens, in
turn, perceived their compliance with policies and laws that the state set
up to meet this obligation, as a political and moral duty.248 Additionally,
the colonial government of Japan (1910– 1945) and the subsequent author-
itarian regimes, which sought to control the Korean population with strict
rules of law, imposed severe penalties for any violation, and thus com-
pelled regulatory compliance,249 even though it was passive compliance
due to fear of penalty.250
The Korean government was able to turn this passive compliance into
active compliance. Aided by the early success of its initial development
policies, the government was able to instill confidence in its citizens that
they could escape poverty by trusting the government and cooperating
with one another. Specifically, Koreans actively complied with develop-
ment-facilitating laws and policies, such as encouraging savings by offer-
ing high interest rates and promoting strong work ethics which was
subsequently compensated by rising wages and increased employment
244. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LAWS IN KOREA FROM LIBERATION TO PRESENT, supra note
224, at 15. The ruling party supporting the government maintained the majority in the R
Korean legislature until 1988, and this legislative control enabled the government to
make timely legislative adjustments and new enactments.
245. Id. at 15– 16.
246. Id. at 16– 17.
247. WORD BANK, Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/gover
nance/wgi/index.aspx#reports [https://perma.cc/P37N-M5LF].
248. For a discussion of the Confucian tradition in East Asia, see supra note 195. R
249. Control was tighter in the political area in an effort to prevent direct challenges
to the regime. For a relevant discussion, see MARTIN HART-LANDSBERG, THE RUSH TO
DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN KOREA (1993).
250. See supra Part III B.
opportunities. During this period, Koreans’ active compliance was evi-

denced by their longest working hours among industrialized countries and
highest savings rate in the world.251 The low illiteracy rate also assisted
with active compliance. Despite the prevalent poverty in the early 1960s,
the illiteracy rate was very low,252 thanks to the cultural emphasis on edu-
cation and a solid public education system, which enabled Koreans to
understand and comply with government policies and the requirements of
the law. Korea achieved inclusive growth,253 and this provided further
motivation for Koreans to comply with the development policies and laws
promoted by the government. They believed that the growth of the national
economy and the prosperity of Korean companies was a prerequisite to
higher incomes and better economic lives for themselves.254
As to the specific regulatory compliance, the cited statutes, which were
enacted to grant direct support for exports and specific industries, stipu-
lated terms and conditions of support, such as the criteria for receiving tax
benefits and other types of government subsidies, so it was in the interest
of the potential beneficiaries to comply with those terms and receive the
support mandated by the statutes. The Korean government chose regula-
tory incentives, such as subsidy grants, to motivate individuals and compa-
nies to comply with laws and policies, rather than imposing inefficient
compulsory measures as socialist countries had done. As discussed ear-
lier, Korea’s major codes255 did not provide for direct support for indus-
tries, but they did make an essential contribution to development by
protecting fundamental economic rights, such as the freedom to contract
and right to property guaranteed under the civil code. This protection
motivated Koreans to participate in economic activities pursuant to the
government development plans by offering legal security for their rights to
the economic returns from these activities.
While laws promoting economic development were met with active
compliance, laws that the administration enforced in the 70s and the 80s to
reinforce its political control over citizens were met with strong resistance.
These laws included the constitutional revision in 1972, which consoli-
dated political powers in the presidency and restricted some of the funda-
251. In 1993, Korea’s average annual working hours and savings rate were as high as
2656 hours and 34.0 percent, respectively. OECD, Hours Worked, OECD Data, https://
data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm [https://perma.cc/D34D-YQ8C] and Park
Daekeun & Changyong Rhee, A Study on the Savings Rates in Korea: Synthetic Cohort
Analysis, KOREA INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE RESEARCH REPORT (May 1997).
252. The illiteracy rate in Korea was 4.1 percent in 1958. See National Archives of
Korea, The Path that Hangul (Korean Alphabet) Waked on, http://theme.archives.go.kr/
next/hangeulPolicy/business. (Kor.) [https://perma.cc/94VK-GUAE].
253. Korea’s Gini co-efficient, which shows income distribution, was 0.28– 0.29 in the
90s (based on the disposable income), which was lower (i.e. better income distribution)
than most other countries such as the United States (0.34).
254. However, this sense of partnership has been weakened since the late 1990s
because the growth of large corporations (“Chaebols”) has not been translated into the
growth of national economy, employment, and household income, as was the case from
the 60s to the 80s.
255. For a discussion of these codes, see supra note 239. R
mental rights, such as freedom to speech, and the subsequent “Emergency

Decrees” (“Kin-Keup-Jo-Chi”) that further restrained citizens’ political
rights.256 The administration justified these measures as necessary to pro-
mote economic development in the uncertain and unstable international
environment of the 70s,257 but many Koreans disagreed and considered
them retarding, rather than promoting, social and political progress. The
resulting political discontent led to a series of civil unrests towards the end
of the 1970s, climaxing in during the “Gwangju Movement for Democracy”
in 1980 (also called the “Gwangju Massacre” for the hundreds of casualties
caused by the military action against the Movement), and finally, the 1987
civil resistance culminating in another constitutional amendment granting
democratic presidential election.258
4. State Capacity and Political Will
As discussed in the preceding part, state capacity and political will

determine the quality of implementation. The remainder of this section
discusses them in the context of Korea’s development. In the beginning of
economic development, Korea lacked some of the key resources constitut-
ing state capacity, such as financial resources, as reflected in the small
government budget and the virtual disappearance of foreign reserves as of
1963.259 The history of Korean development is full of anecdotes and epi-
sodes associated with efforts to save scarce resources. For instance, in
order to save electricity, President Park Jung Hee refused to use the air
conditioner in his office during the summer, except when he met foreign
guests, and placed two bricks inside a toilet tank for the purpose of saving
water.260 In the case of Korea, however, the leadership’s strong political
will filled the gap created by insufficient resources available to the state, so
I will discuss state capacity and political will together with cross references
to each other.
Despite insufficient financial resources, Korea had considerable
strength in the other constituent elements of state capacity, such as man-
power, government organization, and administrative implementation. In
1960, Korea had over 237,400 government officials in its population of 25
256. See HART-LANDSBERG, supra note 249, at 185– 87, 197. R

257. Facing a hostile communist North Korea at the time, the withdrawal of the
United States from Vietnam in 1973 alerted the Korean administration and provided
national security justifications for President Park to suspend the constitution and con-
solidate his powers. See id. at 186– 87.
258. See id.
259. In 1962, the national budget was 74 billion won (after the second amendment),
equivalent to $290 million at the time, which was less than twenty percent of the net
income of a single U.S. company, General Motors, in the same year. See EPB, Govern-
ment Budget Allocation in 1962, BA0084326 (National Archives of Korea document call
number) (1962) (Kor.).
260. Ahn Sung-mi, Park Chung-hee biography published in Vietnamese, KOREA HERALD
(Feb 26, 2015), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150226000769 [https://
perma.cc/MP2Z-GR4P].
million.261 As discussed earlier, the Confucian tradition that values ser-

vice to the government and the state, coupled with the lack of employment
opportunities in the private sector, motivated the most educated and tal-
ented individuals to apply for positions in the government. These elite
individuals, who often had academic training in North America and
Europe,262 possessed strong analytical abilities to develop economic devel-
opment strategies and the supporting LFIs, including the numerous devel-
opment-facilitating statutes and institutions such as the Economic
Planning Board.
Furthermore, Korea has had a long tradition of strong central and
local government administration. The country was united into a single
state in the seventh century, and since then Korea had established a strong
central administration with regional territorial reach.263 Japanese colonial
rule in the early twentieth century also reinforced central and local admin-
istration, albeit for the purpose of exploitation. Building on this existing
strength, President Park Jung Hee, who took power in 1961 by a military
coup, instilled military discipline and organizational strength in the gov-
ernment. By the time Korea embarked on economic development in the
early 1960s, it had the foundation of well-trained central and local adminis-
trators ready to serve the state and carry out its development agenda. They
effectively implemented and enforced development policies and laws.264
Moreover, the political will of the leadership to achieve economic
development compensated for the weaker elements of Korea’s state capac-
ity, e.g., insufficient financial and natural resources. The Extended Meet-
ings for Export Promotion, presided over by the President himself and
attended by a number of government officials and private sector players,
demonstrated the strength and consistency of the political will.265 These
meetings were held on a monthly basis and continued for fourteen years
from 1965 to 1979 (until President Park’s death). They discussed a range
of issues associated with export promotion, sought solutions, and
reminded the nation consistently that the top national priority was the
achievement of economic development through the implementation of
261. The number increased to over 315,000 in 1965. See National Index System,
Annual Public Official Status, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do
?idx_cd=1016 (Kor.) [https://perma.cc/5DTH-X69W].
262. Dr. Nam Duk Woo, a former Minister of EPB from 1974 to 1978 is a good exam-
ple of Korea’s elite bureaucrat. Dr. Woo was initially an academic with a doctorate train-
ing in the United States and subsequently led Korea’s economic success after joining the
administration under Park.
263. For further discussion of the development of administration in Korea, see supra
note 214. R
264. Korea was not free of corruption of its government officials, just as many other
developing countries, during the period of its development. The difference lied in the
extent of corruption, rather than its existence, which was not extensive enough to over-
turn the successful process of development. The situation of corruption improved in
Korea when the government was able to offer public officials improved salaries as a
result of economic development and the improved government budget. The process of
political democratization, which took place in the 90s, also made public officials more
accountable to the public and deterred corruption.
265. See LEE, supra note 54, at 313. R
export-led growth strategies.266 The focus on the development agenda,

sustained throughout the entire period of Korea’s development, would not
have been possible without this extraordinary political will.
Korea’s economic climate, political uncertainty, and growing security
issues in the 60s and 70s explain the leadership’s will for economic devel-
opment. While Koreans suffered from crushing poverty in the early 1960s,
the new administration was struggling with questions on its legitimacy.
Having risen to power through a military coup, the government needed to
resolve the poverty problem as a top priority in order to gain political sup-
port from the public.267 The security situation in the Korean peninsula
also provided the leadership with strong motivation to strive for economic
development. The presence of communist North Korea, which proclaimed
its goal to “liberate” Korea, had superior economic and military capacities
in the 60s and early 70s. Moreover, decreasing aid from the United States
and their suggestion to withdraw U.S. military forces from Korea after its
failure in Vietnam in the 70s, spurred a sense of urgency that Korea needed
a strong economy to build military forces to protect its security.268
Most Koreans shared the sense of this urgency and the desire to over-
come prevalent poverty. They supported the leadership’s political will with
strong compliance with development-facilitating laws and enthusiastic par-
ticipation in its development agenda. As discussed earlier, it does not
mean that Koreans supported all of the legal changes that were made in the
name of fostering economic development and protecting national security.
Rather, the political will and the administration’s endeavor for economic
development gained popular support and contributed to the continuing
economic development for over three decades.269
As to social development, the 1992 election of the nation’s new presi-
dent, Kim Young Sam, who had long been the leader of the opposition to
the previous authoritarian regimes, marked a new beginning. He initiated
a series of legal reforms to promote a democratic and transparent soci-
ety.270 For instance, one reform required the disclosure of personal iden-
tity and the use of authentic legal names in all financial transactions, and
another reduced the government planning and control of the economy,
demonstrated by the merger of the EPB with the Ministry of Finance.271
266. See id.

267. See also HWANG, supra note 214, at 198– 99; and SETH, supra note 214, at 318, R
331– 32.
268. See HWANG, id. at 199.
269. Based on this support, Park Jung Hee won presidential election three times since
1963 until he suspended the constitution in 1972. See supra note 214. R
270. See Kwon Se Jun, Kim Yong Sam’s Drive: His Unique Drive Achieves Political, Eco-
nomic, and Social Reforms, CHOSUN MONTHLY (June 2017), http://pub.chosun.com/client
/news/viw.asp?cate=C03&mcate=M1001&nNewsNumb=20170625068&nidx=25069
(Kor.) [https://perma.cc/7YHJ-PC84].
271. See id. The EPB was the control tower of Korea’s economic development since
the 1960s. Its authority in budget allocation and control over the adoption and the
implementation of economic development policies created tensions and rivalry with
other government departments such as the Ministry of Finance. Its 1994 merger with
the Ministry of Finance aimed at resolving this issue, and represented the change of
These reforms represented another political will, supported by the general

public, for developing civil democracy and the rule of law in Korea. The
subsequent election of President Kim Dae Joong, a Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner and a legendary freedom fighter in the 1970s and 1980s, renewed the
political will for democracy. Under his presidency, Korea recovered from
the 1997 financial crisis and implemented economic reforms, showing that
economic and social development agendas were not necessarily in conflict
with each other and can be co-promoted successfully.272
In conclusion, the preceding application of the general theory to the
empirical development case of Korea demonstrates the validity of the the-
ory. This empirical application has shown how the constituent elements of
the general theory can be adopted to explain the contribution of law to
policy implementation and successful development in Korea.273 One may
also apply the general theory’s analytical framework to other empirical
cases, including development cases currently in progress, to analyze the
impact of relevant laws on development.274
Conclusion: Does Law Matter for Development?

There has long been a call for a working theory in the field of law and
development. In response to this call, this Article attempts to set the disci-
plinary parameters, which have been rather unclear in law and develop-
ment studies, and explores the “missing links” between law and
development; i.e., the mechanisms that explain regulatory impact on devel-
opment. This Article presents the three categorical elements necessary to
economic paradigm in Korea to one that emphasizes on the role of the private sector. In
contrast, an expert cited that the reduced government oversight in the economy resulted
from the dissolution of the EPB was a cause of the 1997 financial crisis. See Lee Tae
Hee, Issues and Solutions at the Time of the IMF, THE HANKYOREH, Dec. 17, 1997, 3 (Kor.).
272. President Kim Dae Joong continued with neoliberal economic reforms that
reduced government’s control of the economy and strengthened the private sector’s
autonomy, including a neoliberal labor reform that relaxed the legal preconditions to
dismissal. The IMF required these reforms as a condition for its bailout package for
Korea. The package was imperative for Korea to recover from the financial crisis, but
after the reforms, Korea’s economic growth slowed down to approximately four percent
per annum and never returned to its pre-crisis level. For a discussion of Korea’s finan-
cial crisis and the IMF conditionalities, see KHAN, supra note 50, at 60– 75. R
273. The analysis has also shown how changes in LFIs, particularly in the aftermath
of the financial crisis in the 1990s, have affected development and economic perform-
ance. See supra note 237. There is also a contrasting observation that the function R
served by law was limited in the development of Korea because there were fewer courts,
lawyers, and institutions promoting Western-style legal learning during Korea’s develop-
ment periods from the 1960s to the 1980s. Y.H. Jung, How Did Law Matter for Korean
Economic Development?: Evidence from 1970s, paper prepared for the Korean Economic
Association Conference (June 2012). As seen from the preceding discussion, there is a
sufficient scope for considering the role of law in Korean economic development in con-
junction with its institutional arrangements, since the government meticulously legis-
lated all of the major development policies during the development era and implemented
them by legal means.
274. As shown in the preceding part, regulatory impact mechanisms are also applica-
ble beyond law and development and can be adopted to explain regulatory impact gener-
ally. See supra notes 173 and 203. R
analyze the regulatory impact mechanisms: regulatory design, regulatory

compliance, and quality of implementation.275 None of these elements
operates in isolation, but, instead, each one interacts with and influences
one another. Many of the failed law reform projects have focused on which
particular laws and institutions to adopt, rather than on these elements,
which are essential to the successful development and implementation of
these laws and institutions.
As discussed, state capacity is important for the implementation of
law and influences regulatory design and regulatory compliance. Law
reform projects, regardless of their specific content or ideological orienta-
tion, have not been very successful where the host state lacks the essential
capacity to implement the law, which is necessary to meet the projects’
objectives. This experience justifies examining the state capacity to imple-
ment the proposed law, identifying any gaps in the capacity, and attempt-
ing to build on it, when it is found to be insufficient for implementation.
The proposed general theory also indicates that imposing laws and
institutions to fulfill the agendas and priorities of donor countries, rather
than providing the development needs that the host country identifies, is
not effective.276 Where changes are imposed from the outside without an
internal consensus of the host country, the regulatory design may not meet
the needs on the ground. Additionally, public support and strong regula-
tory compliance may not follow, and the state may not be willing to allo-
cate its capacity and political capital toward implementation.
With the emergence of liberal law reforms in the 1980s, law and devel-
opment projects have become “big business,”277 but have not been a big
success. For these reforms to be more successful, reformers must learn
from the successful development experiences of countries in East Asia and
elsewhere. These lessons include the successful marriage between state
and market, which can overcome the problems associated with the weak-
nesses of an underdeveloped private sector in the early stages of economic
development. The reform projects should also be flexible so as to allow
progressive changes in development policies and the law used to imple-
ment them, in accordance with the changing socioeconomic conditions
over time. In contrast, the inflexible and prescriptive one-size-fits-all type
of approach has not been very successful and is unlikely to succeed in the
future.
The perceived difficulty in understanding successful development in
275. Scholars may have known these elements implicitly, but it is necessary to formu-
late them in a theoretical framework to explain systematically the causal mechanisms
between law and development. Regulatory impact (Ir) can be described as a function of
regulatory design (Dr), regulatory compliance (Cr), and quality of implementation (Qi): Ir
= f(Dr, Cr, Qi). This Article has also discussed the impact of development on law albeit
briefly and advanced additional elements, such as “regulatory adjustment” and “regula-
tory reinforcement” to explain this impact. See discussion supra Part III A.
276. See also Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING
THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 25, at 56– 59. R
277. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 47, at 3. R
East Asian countries278 lies in the fact that, throughout much of their
development periods from the 1960s to the 1980s, these countries
achieved remarkable economic development under authoritarian regimes
adopting state-led development. This outcome seems to defy the liberal
propositions of Max Weber and Friedrich Hayek279 as well as the
neoliberal market prescriptions. As to the governance issue, what is identi-
fied as social development, including democratic governance, varies
according to the time and place and is influenced by cultural orientation,
tradition, and socioeconomic constraints in place.280 The resource con-
straints and poverty issues that still prevail in many developing countries
create practical difficulties in fostering both economic and social develop-
ment simultaneously and with equal strength. Thus, each developing
country needs to decide how to sequence and prioritize different develop-
ment goals in accordance with its own needs, preferences, and available
resources.
History has shown that increased individual economic capacity
obtained as a result of successful economic development tends to create
internal pressure for a more democratic and representative form of govern-
ment. For example, East Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, priori-
tized economic development in the 1960s and 1970s. However, once they
achieved a substantial level of economic development by the 1980s, they
embarked on democratic reforms in response to strong public demand.281
This process of “democratization” after successful economic development
also occurred in other countries, such as Spain and Chile, suggesting that
economic development tends to spur social development.282
The preceding discussions enable us to address a key question that
has been raised and debated for decades: “Does law matter for develop-
ment?”283 Classical thinkers such as Weber and Hayek advocated for the
relevance and importance of formal and rational laws that afford predict-
278. See Ohnesorge, supra note 218, at 282– 83; and Trubek, supra note 3, at 4. R
279. For further discussion of their propositions, see supra Part I A.
280. See discussion supra Part II B.
281. For a relevant discussion, see HART-LANDSBERG, supra note 249; LIQUIN CAO, R
LANYING HUANG & IVAN Y. SUN, POLICING IN TAIWAN: FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOC-
RACY (2014); and ALAN M. WACHMAN, TAIWAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
(1994). By contrast, the 1989 student protest in China, at a time when the country was
still in the early stages of economic development, did not lead to social and political
transformation.
282. Trubek recounted that the transition from economic growth to democracy and
protection of individual rights did not occur by the 1970s. He described how reformers
saw the possibility that legalism, instrumentalism, and authoritarianism might form a
stable amalgam so that their efforts to improve economic law and lawyering could
strengthen authoritarian rule. See David Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assis-
tance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 1, at 79. Still, the transition did occur by the 1990s in successful developing coun- R
tries, such as the NICs, Spain, and Chile; the length of time before the transition could
take place was perhaps longer than the reformers had initially expected.
283. This question is whether or not law affects development. It should be distin-
guished from an inquiry about whether law should be considered to be an end in itself
or an objective of development. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 157. For the latter ques- R
tion, see supra Part II B, on the identification of social development.
ability in economic transactions284 and protect civil liberty for economic

prosperity.285 Yet, the cases of successful development in East Asia seem
to indicate otherwise.286 The role of law or the importance of the (formal)
rule of law for economic development may remain controversial, and it
seems to depend on other contingencies such as institutional frameworks,
relevant capacities, and cultural orientations. There is less controversy on
the point that development is not feasible without a degree of internal sta-
bility that provides for economic predictability.287 Measures to secure and
sustain such stability may include non-legal forms, particularly in the early
stages of economic development, but tend to evolve into formal legal rules
over time to secure consistency and transparency. Thus, law is important
to the extent that it secures and sustains internal stability and guides the
policies that countries should implement throughout the process of devel-
opment, and it is subject to local variances.
If law matters, subject to local variances, then how is its effectiveness
for development determined? The general theory presented by this Article
helps to answer this inquiry. The theory indicates that the effectiveness of
law in a country’s development depends on several elements: its design,
including the consistency of its anticipated policy outcome with develop-
ment objectives; the flexibility and effectiveness of applicable legal
frameworks and institutional arrangements; and its adaptability to the pre-
vailing socioeconomic conditions on the ground. The strength of regula-
tory compliance and the quality of implementation as influenced by state
capacity and political will are also determinants of its effectiveness. The
successful development history of Korea demonstrates the importance of
these elements. I conclude this Article with the hope that the general the-
ory helps to set disciplinary parameters, clarifies the causal mechanisms
between law and development, and makes a contribution toward increasing
the effectiveness of future law reform projects.
284. See WEBER, supra note 37, at 55– 69. R

285. For more on Hayek’s discussion on law, liberty, and economic prosperity, see
generally HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 38. R
286. Hayek considered that under the rule of law, individual decisions, rather than
the government authority, guide the productive activity. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD
TO SERFDOM 80– 96 (1944). The successful state-led development in East Asia was not
consistent with this position. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Introduction: A Framework for the
Analysis of Legal Institutions in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM, AND POWER IN ASIA 1, 7
(Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999); Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Develop-
ment? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829 (2000); and Amanda J. Perry,
The Relationship Between Legal Systems and Economic Development: Integrating Economic
and Cultural Approaches, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 282 (2002).
287. An empirical study, based on a survey of 113 countries from 1950 to 1983,
concluded that economic growth is negatively correlated with political instability. See
Alberto Alesina et al., Political Instability and Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 4173, 1992).

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General Theory of Law and

416 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 417

despite decades of research.3 Leading scholars, such as Trubek and

418 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

ment (“the general theory”).20 The general theory is comprised of two

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 419

The first element of the regulatory impact mechanisms, “regulatory

420 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

should be explored in future research.34

I. Law and Development: History and Context

34. I am offering a further discussion in my forthcoming book, LAW AND DEVELOP-

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 421

422 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

devastating economic outcome of the market-shock therapy in Russia, the

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 423

become a development objective and not just a means to achieve develop-

B. “Law” in the Context of Law and Development

57. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 156– 57. R

424 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

Another concept that is closely relevant to the discussion of law in the

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 425

impact.70 For example, the impact of a law may vary depending on

70. See id.

426 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

tivity/pwt/pwt-releases/pwt8.1 [https://perma.cc/YA5R-A3PK]; see also World Bank,

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 427

tion of key institutional elements that support FPPRs, such as an affordable

428 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

under varying socioeconomic conditions affecting them.86

II. The Question of Development

This part continues to examine the disciplinary parameters of law and

A. What Constitutes Development?

86. See Rodrik et al., supra note 84, at 157– 58. R

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 429

rule of law,91 as the key elements of development.92

430 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

necessary for developing countries without sufficient resources to promote

B. Economic and Social Development

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 431

Given this interrelatedness between economic and social development,

432 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

general concept of economic development, which denotes the process of

C. Extension of the Concept of Development

110. There is, however, no consensus on the measurement of economic development,

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 433

render it applicable to economic problems in developed countries to the

434 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

new analytical approaches, such as legal and institutional approaches (i.e.,

2017 General Theory of Law and Development 435

caused by natural catastrophes and other types of emergencies,123 and has

III. Regulatory Impact Mechanisms

436 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50

as general and specific regulatory compliances. Section C addresses the

1. Anticipated Policy Outcome

127. An effective impact analysis would require a clarification and predetermination