GSM Association Non-confidential

Official Document IR.70 - SMS SS7 Fraud

SMS SS7 Fraud

Version 4.0
25 July 2013

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Executive Summary 3
1.2 Definition of terms 3
1.3 References 3
1.4 SMS call-flow 3
2 Spamming Case 5
2.1 Defintion 5
3 Flooding Case 6
3.1 Definition 6
3.2 Technical Aspect 6
4 Faking Case 6
4.1 Defintion 6
4.2 Technical Aspect 7
5 Spoofing Case 9
5.1 Definition 9
5.2 Technical Aspect 9
6 GT Scanning 11
6.1 Definition 11
6.2 Technical aspect 11
7. Open SMS-C Case 11
7.1 Definition 11
7.2 Technical aspect 12
Document Management 14
Document History 14
Other Information 14

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1 Introduction
1.1 Executive Summary
Many Mobile operators are facing with SMS problems (Spamming, Fraud or illegal use of
their SMS-C addresses).
The document:
 Defines each SMS Fraud case
 Describes technical aspects for each case

1.2 Definition of terms

Term Description
MAP Mobile Application Part
SMS Short Message Service
SMS-C SMS Centre
VPLMN Visited PLMN
C7 SS7
SS7 Signalling System N° 7
STP Signalling Transfer Point
HLR Home Location Register
IGP International Gateway Point
VLR Visitor Location Register
BSS Base Station Subsystem
SCCP Signalling Connection Control Part
GT Global Title
MSU Message Signalling Unit
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
TCAP Transaction Capabilities Application Part
MSISDN Mobile Subscriber ISDN

1.3 References
Ref Doc Number Title
[1] IR.71 SMS SS7 Fraud Prevention
[2] BA.43 SMS Handbook
[3] AA.50 SMS Fraud Criteria

1.4 SMS call-flow

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C7 CARRIER

International C7 Network
HLR

IGP

IGP STP
SMSC STP

C7 CARRIER
SMSC

MSC / VLR Mobile Network B

BSS
SMSC : Short Message Service Center
STP : Signalling Transfert Point
Non Mobile Operator / HLR : Home Location Register
IGP : International Gateway Point
Third Party VLR : Visited Location Register
Mobile Network A BSS : Base Station Subsystem
SS7 : Signalling System N°7

First, you will find in this figure the C7 architecture with all the necessary nodes.
The International Gateway Point (IGP) is the gate to the C7 Network for roaming or SMS
interworking services.
Below, the message flow related to the normal SMS sending:

Step one: the mobile sends the SMS to the SMS-C:

BSS
STP SMS-C
MSC / VLR

Subscriber A

 MAP «Forward Short Message / SMS Submit »

Called SCCP Party Address = @ SMS-C,

MSISDN A / MSISDN B

  TCAP End « Forw ard Short Message / SMS Submit »

Step two: the SMS-C recovers the VLR address and the IMSI of the recipient subscriber:

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International C7
Network

SMS-C STP IGP IGP STP HLR


 MAP « Send Routing Info for Short Message »

Called SCCP Part y Addr ess = MSISDN B

  TCAP End « Send Routing Inf o for Shor t Message »

IMSI Subscriber B, VLR address of Subscriber B

Step three: the SMS-C sends the SMS to the subscriber B:

International C7
Network
BSS
SMS-C STP IGP IGP STP MSC / VLR

Subscriber B

 MAP «Forward Short Message / SMS Deliver»

Called SCCP Party Address = @ VLR,

IMSI B / MSISDN A

 TCAP End « Forw ard Short Message / SMS Deliver » 

2 Spamming Case

2.1 Defintion
Spamming is an action where the subscriber receives an unsolicited SMS. As an unsolicited
SMS, the subscriber did not request to receive this message.
The act of spamming does not define the content but only the fact that the SMS was
received without solicitation. The content of the spam SMS is incidental to the act. The spam
SMS may take on various forms of content to include: commercial information, bogus
contest and other message generally intended to invite a response from the receiver.
It is important to note that the SMS could be sent from a valid originator and may be
correctly billed to the sender.
Technical Aspect
In the Spamming case, there are no specific technical aspects. The spamming Originator
could be a single person, a commercial company or a mobile operator.
A normal way of sending could be used through the SMSC like described below:

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Non Mobile Operator /

Third Party

SMSC

STP

MSC / VLR

BSS

Mobile Network A

The SMS is submitted by a mobile phone or by a third party connected to the SMS-C
(Content provider for example).

3 Flooding Case

3.1 Definition
The act of flooding is when a large number of messages are sent to one or more
destinations. These messages may be either valid or invalid. The value or parameter used to
define flooding is the extraordinary number of messages sent.
The flooding parameter is compared to the average or normally expected load, and the
expected peak value of a selected message flow. When the parameter is unusually high,
without other explanation, then this is considered ‘flooding’.
3.2 Technical Aspect
The sending of the messages in a case of ‘flooding’ is within the normal methods of sending
messages. Consequently, there is no specific technical aspect for this case.

4 Faking Case

4.1 Defintion
A fake SMS is originated from the international C7 Network and is terminated to a mobile
network. This is a specific case when SCCP or MAP addresses are manipulated. The SCCP
or MAP originator (for example: SMSC Global Title, or A_MSISDN) is wrong or is taken from
a valid originator.

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4.2 Technical Aspect

In general, a SM-SC is used to send mobile terminated SMs to a PLMN user but in a manner
that hides the true identity of the source SM-SC. Typically, this is done by substituting a valid
address with another PLMN address. When the faking case technique is used in conjunction
with spam content, the complaints are then sent to the incorrect, that is, the innocent PLMN.
Furthermore, any protective escalation actions by the receiving PLMN, such as suspension
of MT-SMS service from the apparent-source PLMN are both ineffective and damaging to
proper users of SMS between the two PLMNs.
An example of commercial model for Spammers using the “Faking Case” for PRS (Premium
rate service) fraud is described below:
The spammer leases Premium rate lines ’0906‘from a fixed-line carrier in the country of
PLMN ‘A’. The spammer arranges for an overseas SM-SC to send messages to customers
of PLMN ‘A’ that read like: “This is the 2nd attempt to contact U. You have won this week’s
top prize of either 1000 cash or a holiday in Bahamas. Just call 0906xxxxx TcsBox6017
1.50ppm”.
PLMN “A” customers call the number but discover after some expensive minutes that there
is no prize. The spammer collects the premium rate revenue from PLMN “A”, pays off the
access charges to the fixed line carrier and disappears with the profit.
Subsequently the mobile customers complain to their network operator or mobile service
provider, in this case PLMN “A”. PLMN “A” raises the issue with the Regulatory Authority, but
the fraudster has disappeared. PLMN “A” contacts the source of the SMs (owner of the SM-
SC), who denies any knowledge of the SMS-Spam messages.
The delivery of a Mobile Terminated SM is in two parts:
a) The SM-SC uses the destination MSISDN to address a MAP message <Send
Routing Information for Short Message>, to the Home Location Register (HLR) for
that customer to find out whether the MSISDN is valid, can receive SMs, and if so,
to determine the current switch (MSC) that the destination user is registered on.
The HLR responds to the SM-SC with the information.
b) The SMSC sends the actual text of the SM to the currently registered MSC and a
MAP message <Forward Short Message>. The MSC responds to confirm the
message was delivered, and generates a CDR containing all relevant information
including the SM-SC address.

In the faking case, the first part is done exactly as described above. However, the second
part is changed so that the source address in the MAP message <Forward Short Message>
is changed, often to someone else’s SM-SC address. The manipulation of the SM-SC
address causes any inter-PLMN SM accounting to be in error, and means that any policing
against the apparent Spam generator harms innocent parties and is ineffective against the
real Spam generator.
The faking of the source address in the SCCP called party Global Title and the Service
Centre Address in the MAP message <Forward Short Message> whilst having the correct
equivalent address in the MAP message <Send Routing Information for Short Message> is
impossible without considerable efforts by the technical staff running the SM-SC. In other
words, it does not happen either by accident, faulty configuration data or as the result of raw
text messages received from the Internet. It happens because in most cases it requires a
software patch on the SM-SC. Therefore; any instances of this happening are as the result
of direct action by SM-SC staff, and probably in conjunction with assistance from the staff of
the Associated PLMN.

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Consequently, it is fair to state that the “Faking Case” can only be caused by deliberate
activities by a Spam-generating PLMN, a Spam-sponsoring PLMN, or a Spam-generating
SM-SC operator acting in conspiracy with a PLMN.
The figure below describes the example of a third party using the real SMSC address from
another mobile network. The SMS is sent to a real subscriber of mobile network B (The
originator must have the correct IMSI) or could be sent to a wrong IMSI (Just to generate C7
Overload).
The IMSI can be recovered by detecting the “Send Routing Information for Short Message".
In this case, the third party must use their own real SCCP / MAP SMSC address.

: Forward Short Message « SMS Deliver »

: Forward Short Message « SMS Deliver » Ack

Non Mobile Oper ator /
Third Party

International C7 Network

IGP

IGP

Mobile Network B

SMSC

HLR
STP

STP

MSC / VLR

BSS MSC / VLR

BSS

Subscriber B
Mobile Network A

The third party could send the SMS to all VLRs of mobile network B if he cannot recover the
location of the subscriber (SRI for SM blocked by Mobile Network B).
The A_MSISDN could be wrong or manipulated.
Below displays the transaction flow, for the SMS delivery:

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International C7
Network
SMS-C MSC / VLR
STP
THIRD PARTY

 TCAP Begin, MAP « Forward Short Message SMS Deliver», Called Party Address = GT of VLR B

Calling Party Address = GT of real SMSC from another Network, IMSI B = real or fake one

International C7
Network 
TCAP End, MAP « Forward Short Message SMS Deliver», Called Party Address = GT of the real SMSC

SMS-C A 

The acknowledgement is sent to the real SMSC.

Billing Impact associated with Faking
If MSISDN B is roaming, when the message is delivered, and if, the visited network has a
charging agreement in place with MSISDN B’s HPLMN. In this scenario, faking would impact
inter-operator accounting (or would at least give rise to discrepancies in the number of
messages the HPLMN and VPLMN believe were sent from one to another).
If MSISDN B is on its own, HPLMN when it receives the message, if this HPLMN has an
SMS inter-working agreement with the network whose SMSC is faked then once again there
could be inter-operator accounting issues.

5 Spoofing Case

5.1 Definition
The spoofing case is related to an illegal use of the HPLMN SMS-C by a third party.
In this case, a SMS MO with a manipulated A-MSISDN (real or wrong) is coming into the
HPLMN network from a foreign VLR (real or wrong SCCP Address).
5.2 Technical Aspect
To a HPLMN point of view, one subscriber is roaming and sending a SMS. In fact, this is not
a real subscriber; the message is not sent by a real mobile but is generated from a specific
system with a C7 application.
The A-MSISDN being used may in fact be real or not depending on the screening in place in
the HPLMN SMS-C (Screening on CC+NDC or No A-MSISDN screening in place).

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The figure below describes the case with a real A-MSISDN and real VLR SCCP address
from another Mobile Network.

: Forward Short Message « SMS Submit »

: Forward Short Message « SMS Submit » Ack

Non Mobile Oper ator /
Third Party

International C7 Network

IGP

IGP

Mobile Network B

SMSC

HLR
STP

STP

MSC / VLR

BSS MSC / VLR

BSS

Mobile Network A

The Map message "Forward Short Message / SMS Submit acknowledge" is sent to the real
VLR.
If the billing is made from the SMS-C data, the real subscriber will be invoiced. If the Billing is
made from the TAP file, no one will be invoiced.
Below the message flow for the SMS Delivery:

International C7
Network
THIRD PARTY STP SMS-C

TCAP Begin, MAP « For ward Short Message SMS Submit», Calling Party Address = GT of another VLR

Called Party Address = SMSC GT, A-MSISDN = real or f ake one

International C7
Network
TCAP End, MAP « Forward Short Message SMS Submit», Called Part y Address = GT of the real VLR

MSC / VLR

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6 GT Scanning
6.1 Definition
The GT scanning is the fact to send SMS MO to all Global Title address from one mobile
operator in order to find unsecured SMS-C (SMS-C that are not controlling the A number).
6.2 Technical aspect
Multiple SMS Forward SM Submits are received, generally, from the same mobile MSISDN
with the Called SCCP Address and Service Centre Address incremented on each attempt.
It would appear that individuals using a mobile with a computer connection are instigating
these scans.
The easiest of these scans to spot are sequential in nature scanning 10,000 GT at a time. It
has also been seen randomised scans, though on sorting the data it is clear that blocks are
being scanned.
This type of messaging is picked up in normal statistics in monitoring expected and
unexpected combinations of direction, GT and message type.
There can be no valid reason for such scanning of networks other than locating unsecured
SMSC. With simpler computer integration with mobiles and SMS emulation software readily
available this type of activity is likely only to increase. It would be desirable for such activities
to be reported to the Home PLMN of the originating MSISDN in order to have service
removed.

7. Open SMS-C Case

7.1 Definition
An open SMS-C is a SMS-C that accepts SMS submissions from mobile subscribers that are
not clients of the open SMS-C operator. The SMS-C delivers the submitted SMS to the
destination subscriber for free.

The subscriber has to change the SMS-C address in his UE to that of the open SMS-C.

The figure below shows the parties involved in the open SMS-C case.

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PMN D
PMN C

SMS-IW Charge
HLR
Open SMS-C C
Destination Subscriber D
(2) SRI-for-SM

(3) SMS-DELIVER MSC D

Int SS7 network

(1) SMS-SUBMIT
HPMN B
Origin Subscriber B

MSC A Home SMS-C

Roaming Charge
VPMN A

When roaming, the HPMN B will not be able to charge subscriber B for the SMS as it does
not provide the service. But VPMN A will charge HPMN B for the roaming cost. HPMN B
bears the cost without being able to receive revenues. PMN C may incur charges to deliver
the SMS to the destination subscriber D if:

 Destination subscriber D is not a PMN C subscriber.

 PMN C has an SMS interworking agreement with destination PMN D.

7.2 Technical aspect

There are two scenarios to be considered in relation to the technical solutions that can be
implemented to mitigate the fraud risk caused by open SMS-C.

- Scenario 1: the open SMS-C is NOT located in the VPMN A country. It is

described by the above figure.

- Scenario 2: the open SMS-C is located in the VPMN A country. The PMN C
and VPMN A can be connected using a direct connection, a national SS7
network or the international one.

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PMN D
PMN C
HLR

Open SMS-C C
(2) SRI-for-SM Destination Subscriber D

(3) SMS-DELIVER MSC D

Nat or Int
Int SS7 network
SS7
network
(1) SMS-SUBMIT
Origin Subscriber B

MSC A
Home SMS-C
VPMN A HPMN B

Same country

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Document Management

Document History
Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor / Company
Authority
Produced by Matthieu IREG/EMC
December 15th, FOUQUET Bouygues Matthieu Fouquet /
1.0.0
2003 Telecom (France) and T- Bouygues Telecom
Mobile Group
IREG/EMC Matthieu Fouquet /
1.1.0 Mach 29th, 2004 First remarks added.
Bouygues Telecom
Rename as IR.71 IREG/EMC Matthieu Fouquet /
2.0.0 July, 19th 2004
document Bouygues Telecom
IREG/EMC Matthieu Fouquet /
2.1.0 July, 20th 2004 Title modification
Bouygues Telecom
IREG/EMC Matthieu Fouquet /
2.2.0 July, 20th 2004 Final version for approval
Bouygues Telecom
3.0.0 August, 4th 2004 Version approved IREG/EMC Matthieu Fouquet /
Bouygues Telecom
3.1 February, 16th GT Scanning case added IREG/EMC Matthieu Fouquet /
2005 Bouygues Telecom
3.1 11 July 2005 This document has been IREG/EMC
declassified from
RESTRICTED to Matthieu Fouquet /
UNRESTRICTED. This Bouygues Telecom
was approved by
GSMA/CTO.
includes CR1001 that IREG/PSMC
creates a new section 7 to Laurent Dequidt,
4.0 May 2013
describe the open SMSC Bouygues Telecom
issue.

Other Information
Type Description
Document Owner IREG
Editor / Company Laurent Dequidt, Bouygues Telecom

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