dominance.

Beijing’s initial hopes that a

Becoming Strong
CAN CHINA KEEP RISING?

Biden administration would ease ten-

sions with China have been dashed.
Instead, it views Biden’s attempts at
The New Chinese isolating China diplomatically as a
Foreign Policy serious threat and is working on multiple
fronts to make the country less vulner-
Yan Xuetong able to U.S. aggression and pressure.
Beijing’s newfound confidence does
not mean it will challenge Washington

I
n March, China’s top diplomat, in every single domain. China rejects
Yang Jiechi, made headlines when U.S. leadership on some issues, but as a
he told U.S. officials at a summit in developing country, it will limit compe-
Alaska that they did “not have the tition to areas in which it feels it has an
qualification . . . to speak to China from a advantage, such as the fight against
position of strength.” Even after years of COVID-19, poverty reduction, trade,
heightened tensions between Beijing and international infrastructure and devel-
Washington, the remark seemed unusu- opment, digital payment systems, and
ally harsh, especially coming from a 5G technologies, among others. Across
seasoned diplomat. The setting, too, was the board, however, a post-pandemic
noteworthy: Yang was speaking at the first China will make its voice heard with
high-level diplomatic meeting between greater determination than before and
China and the United States since U.S. will push back forcefully against any
President Joe Biden entered the White attempts to contain it.
House. It seemed like an unmistakable
warning to the new administration. CHINA’S DUAL IDENTITY
At home, Yang’s comment circulated To be the world’s “largest developing
widely on social media, resonating with country” (a popular moniker in Beijing)
the belief of many Chinese that their once meant that China’s capabilities
country has found its voice on the surpassed those of its immediate peers.
global stage. International media read Nowadays, it means the country’s power
the statement as reflective of a post- is second only to that of the United
pandemic China: ambitious and outspo- States. Consider the sharp contrast
ken in its claim to global leadership. between Chinese success and American
Yang’s statement did, indeed, reflect a failure in the fight against COVID-19:
paradigm shift underway in Beijing: China suffered the least among all major
China believes that its rise to great- powers during the pandemic and is the
power status entitles it to a new role in only major economy to have grown over
world affairs—one that cannot be the past year. By the end of 2020, its
reconciled with unquestioned U.S. GDP had reached 71 percent of U.S. GDP,
up from 66 percent in 2019, and Chi-
nese policymakers are confident that
YAN XUETONG is a Distinguished Professor
and Dean of the Institute of International they will close the remaining gap in the
Relations at Tsinghua University. coming decade. In their eyes, China has

40 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
July/August 2021 41
Yan Xuetong

gone through the stages of standing up speech, “forever belong to the family of
and getting rich and is now advancing to developing countries.”
the stage of becoming strong. The This dual identity will color all
U.S.-led unipolar order is fading away, aspects of China’s post-pandemic foreign
its demise hastened by China’s rise and policy. As a developing country, China
the United States’ relative decline. In its still lacks the resources required of a
place will come a multipolar order, with true world leader, with globe-spanning
U.S.-Chinese relations at its core. responsibilities, especially in the mili-
Until recently, Beijing viewed this tary realm. As a great power, however, it
once-in-a-century shift with unalloyed will not follow the United States’ lead,
optimism, predicting a “bright future for and on some issues, competition with
Chinese national rejuvenation.” The Washington will be inevitable.
turmoil of the Trump years—especially Take the issue of ideological rivalry.
Washington’s decision in 2017 to label On the one hand, China is anxious not
China a “strategic competitor”—caused to frame relations with the West as a
Chinese officials to dial down their new Cold War: leaders in Beijing
enthusiasm. China’s most recent five- believe that Soviet-style ideological
year plan strikes a more sober tone, expansionism could trigger a backlash
listing opportunities in the realm of that might hinder their country’s
technology and development and continued growth, and they do not
warning of the instability fueled by expect their ideology to become as
“unilateralism, protectionism, and popular as Western liberalism is to-
hegemonism.” Yet the bottom line, in day—hence their insistence that China
Beijing’s eyes, remains the same: China is a developing country “with Chinese
has become a global power that can meet characteristics,” a phrase meant to
the rest of the world on an equal footing. imply that its political system and
China’s global reach still has its governance model cannot merely be
limits. Despite being a major power, exported to other countries.
China also thinks of itself as a develop- On the other hand, China will try to
ing country—and rightly so, consider- shape an ideological environment
ing that its GDP per capita remains far favorable to its rise, pushing back
behind those of advanced economies. against the notion that Western politi-
(The International Monetary Fund puts cal values have universal appeal and
China’s 2020 GDP per capita at only validity. The United States defines
$10,484, compared with $40,146 for democracy and freedom in terms of
Japan, $45,733 for Germany, and electoral politics and individual expres-
$63,416 for the United States.) The sion, for example, whereas China
“developing country” label is also meant defines them in terms of social security
to signal Beijing’s geopolitical align- and economic development. Washing-
ment: even if China catches up with the ton will have to accept these diver-
West economically, the thinking goes, gences of opinion rather than try to
its loyalties will still lie firmly with the impose its own views on others.
developing world—it will, as Chinese The same conviction will animate
President Xi Jinping put it in a 2018 China’s post-pandemic diplomatic

42 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
strategy. Contrary to the common
perception, Beijing does not reject
multilateral rules and institutions out of
hand. It will not, however, accept rules
that the United Sates makes without
consultation with China. Instead,
Beijing’s objective is for international
norms to rest on a truly inclusive multi-
lateralism. Such is the idea behind the
China-based multilateral forums that
Beijing has been building with a host of
states and regions, such as its coopera-
tion forums with African, Arab, Latin
American, Pacific island, and Southeast
Asian states. From other major powers,
meanwhile, Beijing expects treatment
based on equality and mutual respect, as
illustrated by its assertive retaliatory
sanctions strategy. When the Trump
administration imposed sanctions on 14
high-ranking Chinese officials over the
disqualification of some Hong Kong law-
makers, China took revenge with sanc-
tions on 28 American officials, including
then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Likewise, Beijing quickly retaliated
against British and EU sanctions over the
Xinjiang issue. On both of these matters,
the Chinese government considers any
sanctions or criticism of its policies as
interference in its internal affairs.
China’s economic policies are shift-
ing, too, impelled both by the pandemic,
which revealed the vulnerability of
global supply chains, and by U.S.
attempts at economic decoupling. In
fact, the Chinese government believes
that protectionism, a slowing world
economy, and shrinking global markets
will outlast the pandemic. Under a new
“dual circulation” strategy, which was
unveiled at a high-profile Chinese
Communist Party meeting in May
2020, Beijing therefore aims to lessen

July/August 2021 43
Yan Xuetong

its dependence on foreign markets. The post-pandemic world. Beijing seeks to

goal is to shore up China’s massive turn the People’s Liberation Army into
internal market and to build robust a world-class fighting force ready for
domestic chains of supply, distribution, war at any moment, emphasizing
and consumption, thus reducing the quality over quantity, cyber-capabilities
country’s vulnerability to outside over conventional prowess, and artificial-
economic pressure, especially from the intelligence-based weapons systems
United States. Science and technology over individual combat skills. Yet the
will be at the center of this effort, laying PLA’s mission will remain one of deter-
the groundwork for future develop- rence, not expansion. China’s 2021
ment. The resulting domestic boom, it military budget, albeit larger than that
is hoped, will in turn improve economic of other major powers, is less than a
relations with other states and aid the third of what the United States spends
recovery of the world economy. on defense. On top of this budget
Beijing will also seek to reduce its disparity, China’s military lacks experi-
exposure to U.S. financial sanctions, ence: the PLA has not been involved in a
including by promoting the use of the shooting clash since 1989 and has not
renminbi in foreign trade and invest- fought a real war since 1979. As a result,
ment. Last year, it started trials of a Beijing remains wary of direct military
digital currency in a handful of large confrontations and will continue to
cities, an innovation that could one day reject military alliances, which could
allow China and its business partners to drag it into an unnecessary war. For the
conduct international transactions same reason, China has been careful not
outside SWIFT, the financial messaging to let territorial conflicts in the South
system, which is under de facto U.S. China Sea and on the Sino-Indian
control and a major source of American border escalate into live-fire clashes.
geopolitical leverage. China will, of
course, not turn inward altogether: the A HEALTHY COMPETITION
Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s Biden’s election initially raised hopes
massive global infrastructure campaign, among Chinese officials and media that
will continue, although progress has Washington’s China policies were due for
been slow during the pandemic. Since a fundamental rethink. That optimism
the “dual circulation” strategy enshrines quickly faded. Instead of a radical break,
the domestic market, and not global Biden’s policies to date are in many ways
linkages, as Beijing’s primary political a continuation of his predecessor’s
focus, the BRI’s projects will henceforth confrontational approach. As a result,
be based more on market demand than U.S.-Chinese relations are unlikely to
on political considerations. China will grow any less tense or competitive than
also continue to seek technological they have been in recent years.
cooperation with other countries, The Biden administration’s forays
provided they can resist U.S. pressure into exclusive multilateralism—that is,
to decouple from China on this front. its attempts to form issue-based coali-
China’s military strategy, by contrast, tions in opposition to China on tech-
will remain largely unchanged in the nology and human rights—are bound to

44 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Becoming Strong

be a particular source of tension in the Beijing still hopes it can confine

years ahead. Beijing views this as the tensions with Washington to the
most serious external threat to its politi- economic realm and avoid an escalation
cal security and the biggest obstacle to to military clashes. Yet the risk of a
its national rejuvenation. U.S.-led conflict over Taiwan, especially, is
anti-China technology coalitions are an growing. Beijing’s most recent five-year
obstacle on China’s path to technologi- plan reiterates its commitment to
cal superiority, and similar ideological pursuing peace and prosperity across
coalitions will encourage secessionists the Taiwan Strait, a policy that has long
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and prevented a potential U.S.-Chinese war
Xinjiang. Both involve core interests on over the island. Although China has not
which China will not make concessions. given up the principle of peaceful
To counter U.S. attempts at forming unification to date, it may abandon it if
such coalitions, Beijing has already Taiwan announces de jure indepen-
begun shoring up its bilateral strategic dence. The more other countries
partnerships. Within weeks of the support Taiwan’s secessionist policies,
public clash between American and the more the PLA will carry out military
Chinese representatives at the Alaska exercises to deter Taiwan. In the mean-
summit earlier this year, Beijing em- time, Beijing hopes to reach a tacit
barked on an extensive diplomatic understanding with Washington that
campaign, dispatching its defense maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait
minister to the Balkans and its foreign is a shared interest.
minister to the Middle East, where the This is not to suggest that cooperation
latter official signed a 25-year strategic with Washington is out of the question.
cooperation agreement with Iran and Beijing has expressed its willingness to
pledged $400 billion in Chinese invest- play an active role in reforming global
ment in the country. At home, China governance regimes, in aiding the global
received foreign ministers from Indone- economy’s post-pandemic recovery, and
sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa- in tackling transnational challenges in
pore, and South Korea and signed a concert with Washington. Xie Zhenhua,
joint statement with Russia that, in a China’s climate envoy, has already met
departure from tradition, omitted the with his U.S. counterpart, John Kerry.
usual assurances that Chinese-Russian Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has
cooperation does not target any third signaled that China does not oppose the
party. (In the years ahead, Moscow is Biden administration’s efforts to relaunch
likely to be an important partner of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and U.S. and
Beijing’s in pushing back against the Chinese diplomats have discussed plans
politicization of human rights issues for each side to recognize the other’s
and in promoting alternative models of COVID-19 vaccinations for the purposes
democracy and nonideological multilat- of overseas travel. Meanwhile, China is
eralism.) Xi also sent the North Korean open to trade negotiations based on the
leader Kim Jong Un a message stating so-called Phase One agreement signed by
his willingness to further consolidate the Trump administration in 2020, and
Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang. even some U.S. officials, such as Tom

July/August 2021 45
Yan Xuetong

Vilsack, the agriculture secretary, have making it an essential source of national

noted that China has so far made good wealth. The race for leadership on 5G
on the promises made in that agreement. and 6G telecommunications networks
Even if competition carries the day, it will increasingly shape the contest, and
would be best thought of as a race, not a for the time being, China seems to be in
boxing match: each side is doing its best the lead. By February 2021, Chinese
to get ahead, but neither has any inten- companies, including the technology
tion of destroying or permanently giant Huawei, accounted for 38 percent
changing the other. In 2019, prior to of approved 5G patents, compared with
becoming high-level national security around 17 percent for U.S. companies.
officials in the Biden administration, (In other areas, however, American
Kurt Campbell (the National Security digital platforms remain ahead of their
Council’s top Asia official) and Jake Chinese counterparts, and U.S. digital
Sullivan (now the national security platforms account for some 68 percent
adviser) argued as much in these pages. of the global digital economy in terms
“The basic mistake of engagement,” they of market capitalization, compared with
wrote, “was to assume that it could bring just 22 percent for Chinese companies.)
about fundamental changes to China’s Meanwhile, international coopera-
political system, economy, and foreign tion will increasingly take the form of
policy.” A more realistic goal, they issue-specific coalitions instead of truly
continued, was to seek “a steady state of international (or even regional) institu-
clear-eyed coexistence on terms favor- tions. At times, Beijing and Washington
able to U.S. interests and values.” That might belong to some of the same
view is not too far removed from Wang’s clubs: for example, when it comes to the
hope that both sides should engage in nonproliferation of cyberweapons and
“healthy competition” based on “im- certain kinds of artificial intelligence
proving oneself and illuminating the tools. In the long run, the digital
other side, rather than mutual attacks superpowers could even have a shared
and a zero-sum game.” If neither Beijing interest in introducing and enforcing
nor Washington intends to subjugate the some international tax regulations to
other, their rivalry will be fierce—but protect their own companies from being
milder than the existential great-power overtaxed by other countries. For the
struggles of the twentieth century. most part, however, China and the
United States will build rival teams,
NEW BATTLEGROUNDS with other countries deciding which to
How will such competition play out in join on a case-by-case basis, depending
practice? It will, for one, unfold on on which arrangement best serves their
novel battlegrounds, chief among them national interests. Most governments
cyberspace. As the digital sphere takes will welcome this trend, having already
over more and more of people’s lives, adopted hedging strategies to avoid
cybersecurity will become more impor- picking sides between the two powers.
tant than territorial security. Already, Of course, a club-based international
the digital economy is growing rapidly system will bring complications of its
as a share of major powers’ GDPs, own: a country that joins some coali-

46 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Becoming Strong

tions led by Washington and others led shifting domestic and foreign circum-
by Beijing will be a less trustworthy stances, following Deng Xiaoping’s
partner for both powers. It could also approach of “crossing the river by
become common for members of the feeling the stones.” The coming era will
same coalition to punish one another be no different: achievements and
for actions required by their member- failures will inform China’s path and
ship in other clubs. For instance, both choices. The backdrop to these adjust-
Australia and China are members of the ments, however, will be a radically
Regional Comprehensive Economic altered global landscape, in which
Partnership, a trade agreement among a unilateral decisions by Washington and
dozen states in the Asia-Pacific, yet the various alliances and issue-specific
disputes over human rights recently led coalitions it leads will no longer be as
Australia to cancel its BRI deal with viable as they once were. As many
China, which responded by suspending states prepare for a return to life after
an economic dialogue between the two the pandemic, they should come to
countries. Likewise, eastern European terms with this new reality.∂
states have often told Chinese diplo-
mats that their membership in the EU
forces them to side against China on
political matters. The same countries,
however, cooperate with China on
infrastructure investment and technol-
ogy, at the risk of violating EU regula-
tions, citing their participation in the
Cooperation Between China and
Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries, a diplomatic forum in the region
initiated by China.
Such conflicts are likely to heighten
political instability and accelerate the
trend toward deglobalization in the
decade ahead, but they are preferable to
a world split into rigid geopolitical
blocs. As long as individual states
remain members of clubs on both sides
of the divide, it will not be in their
interest to throw in their lot with one
side only. This bipolar configuration
will cause some tension, but on the
whole, it will be far less dangerous than
all-out, Cold War–style competition.
China’s post-pandemic foreign policy
is just beginning to take shape. Beijing
has always adjusted its policies to

July/August 2021 47