1.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Valenzuela

Hardwood vs. CA
(GR 102316, 30 June 1997)
FACTS:
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. (VHIS) entered into an
agreement with the Seven Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on
board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s lauan round logs
numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.
VHIS insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety
and Insurance Co.

The said vessel sank resulting in the loss of VHIS’ insured logs. VHIS
demanded from South Sea Surety the payment of the proceeds of the
policy but the latter denied liability under the policy for non-payment of
premium. VHIS likewise filed a formal claim with Seven Brothers for the
value of the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.Both Seven Brothers and South
Sea Surety appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment except
as to the liability of Seven Brothers.South Sea Surety and VHIS filed
separate petitions for review before the Supreme Court. In a Resolution
dated 2 June 1995, the Supreme Court denied the petition of South Sea
Surety. The present decision concerns itself to the petition for review filed
by VHIS.

ISSUE:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the “(o)wners shall not be responsible
for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the
cargo” valid?

HELD:
Yes. Xxx [I]t is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private
carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other
Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner
may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their
charter party.

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that

responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the
shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by
the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil
Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the
parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even
a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the
parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce
would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier,
private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general
public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods
as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not
contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the
protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.

xxx

The general public enters into a contract of transportation with common

carriers without a hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding
public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot
submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus,
the law on common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided
stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other documents over which the
riding public has no understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the
general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly
situated. It can -- and in fact it usually does -- enter into a free and
voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private
carriage can stipulate the carrier’s obligations and liabilities over the
shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration of the charter.
Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to
set aside the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer
decides to exercise this option, he takes a normal business risk.
 2. CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Sabena vs.
Court of Appeals
Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs. CA
(GR 104685, 14 March 1996)

FACTS:

Private respondent MA. PAULA SAN AGUSTIN was a passenger on board

Flight SN 284 of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels,
Belgium on her way back to Manila. She checked in her luggage which
contained her valuables all amounting to $4,265.00, for which she was
issued Tag No. 71423. She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage
was left on board Flight SN 284. Upon Arrival in Manila, she learned that
her luggage was missing and was advised to accomplish and submit a
property Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day.

Upon follow up, it remained missing; thus, she filed her formal complaint
with the office of Ferge Massed, petitioner’s Local Manager, demanding
immediate attention.

Two weeks later she was notified that her luggage was found. But
unfortunately plaintiff was informed that the luggage was lost for the second
time. She demanded payment but the airline refused to settle the claim.

The trial court ruled in favor of Ma. Paula San Agustin. The appellate court
affirmed in toto the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of

private respondent should be considered the primary cause for the loss of
her luggage, avers that, despite her awareness that the flight ticket had
been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that her flight from
Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the
luggage upon arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent,
being a seasoned international traveler, must have likewise been familiar
with the standard provisions contained in her flight ticket that items of value
are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability of the
airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event,
to only US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and
corresponding additional charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca
International Airport, private respondent, in checking in her luggage,
evidently did not declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites Section 5(c),
Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw,
Poland, on 02 October 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955,
generally observed by International carriers, stating, among other things,
that:

“Passengers shall not include in his checked baggage, and the carrier may
refuse to carry as checked baggage, fragile or perishable articles, money,
jewelry, precious metals, negotiable papers, securities or other valuables.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the airline is negligent? Whether respondent’s negligence is

the sole and proximate of the loss?

HELD:

Yes.

Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is

demanded by the nature of an obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place. When the
source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or non-
fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault on the part
of the obligor. This rule is not different in the case of common carriers in the
carriage of goods which, indeed, are bound to observe not just the due
diligence of a good father of a family but that of “extraordinary” care in the
vigilance over the goods. The appellate court has aptly observed:

“x x x Art. 1733 of the [Civil] Code provides that from the very nature of
their business and by reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. This extraordinary responsibility, according to Art.
1736, lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of and received by the carrier until they are delivered actually or
constructively to the consignee or person who has the right to receive
them. Art. 1737 states that the common carrier’s duty to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
‘remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit.’ And Art. 1735 establishes the presumption that if the
goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they had observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

The above rules remain basically unchanged even when the contract is
breached by tort although noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may
then be assimilated as also forming part of the governing law. Petitioner is
not thus entirely off track when it has likewise raised in its defense the tort
doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the
doctrine cannot, in this particular instance, support its case. Proximate
cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result
would not have occurred.

The above findings, which certainly cannot be said to be without basis,

foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have had to the possible
limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw
Convention .

The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment ‘of the
provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the
law of the court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct,’ or ‘if the damage is (similarly) caused x x x by any agent of
the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.’

The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the

instances of an airline’s liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability.

4THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. CA AND FELMAN SHIPPING LINES
G.R. NO. 116940, FIRST DIVISION, JUNE 11, 1997, (BELLOSILLO, J.)

Under Art. 1733 of the Civil Code, "(c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 238 each case . . ." In the event of loss of
goods, common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently. FELMAN, the shipowner, was not
able to rebut this presumption.
FACTS: Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. loaded on board MV Asilda, a vessel owned and operated
by FELMAN, 7,500 cases of Coke softdrink bottles to be transported from Zamboanga to Cebu for
consignee Coca-Cola, Cebu. The vessel subsequently sank bringing down her entire cargo with her
including the 7,500 cases of Coke softdrink bottles. PHILAMGEN paid Coca-Cola its claim of under
the insurance contract. Claiming its right of subrogation PHILAMGEN sought recourse against
FELMAN. FELMAN disclaimed liability for the loss.

ISSUE: Whether or not MV Asilda was unseaworthy when it left the port of Zamboanga.

RULING: Yes. MV Asilda was unseaworthy when it left the port of Zamboanga. The proximate cause
of the sinking of MV Asilda was its being top-heavy. Evidence shows that around 2,500 cases of
softdrink bottles were stowed on deck. Several days after MV Asilda sank, around 2,500 empty Coca-
Cola plastic cases were recovered near the vicinity of the sinking. Considering that the ship's hatches
were properly secured, the empty Coca-Cola cases recovered could have come only from the
vessel's deck cargo. It is settled that carrying a deck cargo raises the presumption of
unseaworthiness unless it can be shown that the deck cargo will not interfere with the proper
management of the ship. However, in this case it was established that MV Asilda was not designed
to carry substantial amount of cargo on deck. The inordinate loading of cargo deck resulted in the
decrease of the vessel's metacentric height 7 thus making it unstable. The strong winds and waves
encountered by the vessel are but the ordinary vicissitudes of a sea voyage and as such merely
contributed to its already unstable and unseaworthy condition. Art. 587 of the Code of Commerce is
not applicable to the case at bar. The ship agent is liable for the negligent acts of the captain in the
care of goods loaded on the vessel. This liability however can be limited through abandonment of
the vessel, its equipment and freightage as provided in Art. 587. Nonetheless, there are exceptional
circumstances wherein the ship agent could still be held answerable despite the abandonment, as
where the loss or injury was due to the fault of the shipowner and the captain. The international
rule is to the effect that the right of abandonment of vessels, as a legal limitation of a shipowner's
liability, does not apply to cases where the injury or average was occasioned by the shipowner's own
fault. It must be stressed at this point that Art. 587 speaks only of situations where the fault or
negligence is committed solely by the captain. Where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed, Art.
587 will not apply, and such situation will be covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carrier. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, "(c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 239 of each case . . ." In the event of loss of
goods, common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently. FELMAN, the shipowner, was not
able to rebut this presumption

8. LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO., INC., Petitioner –versus- COURT OF APPEALS and THE MANILA
INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 131621, FIRST DIVISION, September 28, 1999, DAVIDE,
JR., C.J

For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a
sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in
seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty
prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code. LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a
seaworthy vessel and in having allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching
typhoon. The doctrine of limited liability does not apply where there was negligence on the part of
the vessel owner or agent. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 83

FACTS: On 19 November 1984, LOADSTAR received on board its M/V "Cherokee" (hereafter, the
vessel) goods for shipment. The goods, amounting to P6,067,178, were insured for the same
amount with MIC against various risks including "TOTAL LOSS BY TOTAL OF THE LOSS THE VESSEL."
The vessel, in turn, was insured by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (hereafter PGAI) for P4
million. on its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, the vessel, along with its
cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total loss of its shipment, the consignee made a
claim with LOADSTAR which, however, ignored the same. As the insurer, MIC paid P6,075,000 to the
insured in full settlement of its claim, and the latter executed a subrogation receipt therefor. MIC
filed a complaint against LOADSTAR and PGAI, alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to the
fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees. It also prayed that PGAI be ordered to pay the
insurance proceeds from the loss the vessel directly to MIC, said amount to be deducted from MIC's
claim from LOADSTAR. In its answer, LOADSTAR denied any liability for the loss of the shipper's
goods and claimed that sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure. PGAI, on the other hand,
averred that MIC had no cause of action against it, LOADSTAR being the party insured. In any event,
PGAI was later dropped as a party defendant after it paid the insurance proceeds to LOADSTAR. As
stated at the outset, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of MIC, prompting LOADSTAR to
elevate the matter to the court of Appeals, which, however, agreed with the trial court and affirmed
its decision in toto. LOADSTAR submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not
issued certificate of public convenience, it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route,
and there was only "one shipper, one consignee for a special cargo." LOADSTAR argues that as a
private carrier, it cannot be presumed to have been negligent, and the burden of proving otherwise
devolved upon MIC. In refutation, MIC argues that While it is true that the vessel had on board only
the cargo of wood products for delivery to one consignee, it was also carrying passengers as part of
its regular business. Moreover, the bills of lading in this case made no mention of any charter party
but only a statement that the vessel was a "general cargo carrier." Neither was there any "special
arrangement" between LOADSTAR and the shipper regarding the shipment of the cargo. The
singular fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper is not sufficient to
convert the vessel into a private carrier. ISSUES: 1. W/N the M/V "Cherokee" is a common carrier?
(YES) 2. Did LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence in these premises. (YES) RULING:
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 84 1. We hold that LOADSTAR is a common
carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this
public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic,
occasional, episodic or unscheduled. In support of its position, LOADSTAR relied on the 1968 case of
Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., where this Court held that a common
carrier transporting special cargo or chartering the vessel to a special person becomes a private
carrier that is not subject to the provisions of the Civil Code. Any stipulation in the charter party
absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent is void only if the strict
policy governing common carriers is upheld. Such policy has no force where the public at is not
involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. LOADSTAR also cited
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and National Steel Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, both of which upheld the Home Insurance doctrine. These cases invoked by
LOADSTAR are not applicable in the case at bar for the simple reason that the factual settings are
different. The records do not disclose that the M/V "Cherokee," on the date in question, undertook
to carry a special cargo or was chartered to a special person only. There was no charter party. The
bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general provision to the effect that
the M/V"Cherokee" was a "general cargo carrier." Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying
a particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely coincidental, is not reason
enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially where, as in this case, it
was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers. Under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case, LOADSTAR fits the definition of a common carrier under Article 1732 of the
Civil Code. In the case of De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court juxtaposed the statutory
definition of "common carriers" with the peculiar circumstances of that case, viz.: The Civil Code
defines "common carriers" in the following terms: Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. The
above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
"a sideline". Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think
that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. xxx xxx xxx It appears to the
Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely
"back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019
– UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 85 such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than
regular or scheduled manner, and eventhough private respondent's principal occupation was not
the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers
a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant
here. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public
convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of
public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common
carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of
the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of
public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a
common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would
be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing
to comply with applicable statutory requirements The business of a common carrier impinges
directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and property of those members of the
general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and liabilities
upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the law
cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply
failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations. 2. YES. We find that the M/V "Cherokee"
was not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984. The vessel was not even
sufficiently manned at the time. "For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for
the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The failure of a
common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a
clear breach of its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code. Neither do we agree with
LOADSTAR's argument that the "limited liability" theory should be applied in this case. The doctrine
of limited liability does not apply where there was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or
agent. LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in having
allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon. In any event, it did not sink
because of any storm that may be deemed as force majeure, inasmuch as the wind condition in the
performance of its duties, LOADSTAR cannot hide behind the "limited liability" doctrine to escape
responsibility for the loss of the vessel and its cargo.

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, Respondents
G.R. No. L-47822, THIRD DIVISION, December 22, 1988, FELICIANO, J.

The law makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom
as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. Here, Ernesto Cendana is deemed a common carrier. He is a junk dealer who
was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient
quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He
utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the return
trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted
delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight
rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates.

FACTS Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap
metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would
bring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he owned for
hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan. For
that service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial
rates. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer
of General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for
the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to
petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970. Accordingly, on 1 December
1970, respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a
truck driven by respondent himself, while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which
was driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver and employee. Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled
milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck
which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY
OF CIVIL LAW 13 MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the
truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo. On 6 January 1971, petitioner commenced action against
private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, demanding payment of P 22,150.00,
the claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner argued that
private respondent, being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of him by the law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods. In
his Answer, private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not
be held responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure.

ISSUES I. Whether respondent is a common carrier (YES)

II. Whether respondent is liable (NO)

RULING I. The law makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying
of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local
Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the
general population. So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be
seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on
common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service
Act, "public service" includes: ... every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or
control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier,
railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or
both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of
any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged
in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock,
ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water
supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or
wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. It appears to the Court that private
respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled"
goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 14 such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than
regular or scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not
the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers
a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant
here. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public
convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of
public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common
carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of
the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of
public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a
common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would
be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing
to comply with applicable statutory requirements. The business of a common carrier impinges
directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and property of those members of the
general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and liabilities
upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the law
cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply
failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

II. The precise issue that we address here relates to the specific requirements of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried in the specific context of hijacking or
armed robbery. Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible — and will not
be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility — even for acts of strangers like thieves or
robbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat,
violence or force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery
which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." In the instant case, armed men
held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. The record
shows that an information for robbery in band was filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 198 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon
Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John Doe." There, the accused were charged with
willfully and unlawfully taking and carrying away with them the second truck, driven by Manuel
Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk destined for delivery at petitioner's
store in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The decision of the trial court shows that the accused acted with
grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force. Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed
with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver
and his helper, detaining them for several days and later releasing them in another province (in
Zambales). The hijacked truck was subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. The Court of
First Instance convicted all the accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band

In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as
quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is
necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen
or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary
diligence. We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private
respondent Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost
because of an event entirely beyond private respondent's control