NASA, Post-Apollo and the Rise of the Space Shuttle: A

Glance at the Definition of a Launch Vehicle.

Brian Woods

SATSU Working Paper N27 2003

This is a preprint draft.

Citation should conform to normal academic standards. Please use either the 'SATSU
Working Paper' number and date. Or, where a paper has entered into print elsewhere,
use normal journal/book citation conventions.
Acknowledgements
Thanks go to NASA and Lockheed Missiles & Space Company for permission to
reproduce the images.

1
A discreet announcement to an audience of the British Interplanetary Society in early

1968 marked the first public acknowledgement by the NASA (National Aeronautic and

Space Administration) Office of Manned Space Flight that it intended to develop a

reusable launch vehicle. 1 The announcement came as Apollo, NASA's grand mission to

land an American on the Moon, approached its conclusion. NASA had not fully

resolved the issue of what to do next, but the disclosure did marked a consolidation of

thinking within organisation’s upper echelons on future programmes, objectives and

direction.

NASA’s funding had peaked in1966 and 1967 marked the transition from

expansion to retrenchment. 2 Various groups within NASA's space divisions thus began

to mobilise in 1968 with the aim of strengthen their positions by re-defining the shape

of space activity. Those that advocated the development of a space shuttle represented

only one of a variety of movements that sought to control over a seemingly burgeoning

future in space. The NASA Centers devoted to space science saw their hopes ready to

expand now that Apollo was nearing completion. In the eyes of many space scientists,

the Moon landing programme had curtailed the scientific endeavour. The rise of

another large, human centred programme sent a wave of consternation through the

space science community as once again their goals looked in danger of being

submerged. 3 James Van Allen, discoverer of the vast radiation belts that bear his name,

was one of the most outspoken, claiming that non-human space programmes could best

serve scientific purposes. 4

2
 Nonetheless, in its 1969 report, America's Next Decade in Space, NASA's

upper management gave a prominent and permanent position to the human element of

the national space programme. Outlined was a quixotic inventory of projects to take the

"space age" into the next century, which included: three Earth orbiting space stations

and one space station in Lunar orbit – a fleet of reusable shuttles that would link the

Earth with the three Earth orbiting space stations – a nuclear powered shuttle that

would form a link between the Earth space stations and the Moon – a Lunar base

equipped with a Lunar Module that would link the ground base with the Lunar orbiting

station – and a human expedition to Mars, which would also conduct a fly by of Venus

on its journey back to Earth. 5 In the politics of post-Apollo, NASA's higher echelons

sought to fortify the organization's position through an expansion of the space

enterprise and the creation of a vast new space infrastructure.

Central to the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight was the permanent Earth

orbiting space station and a fleet of reusable shuttles. The concept of a permanent

human-inhabited space station had been 'a gleam in the eye of numerous NASA

engineers' since the agency was founded. Indeed, the original planning for Apollo

incorporated an Earth orbiting rendezvous method, which, NASA planners hoped,

would eventually lead to an Earth-orbiting space station by 1967. 6 Nevertheless,

pressure to complete Apollo within the time frame set by President John Kennedy in

1961, to land an American on the Moon by the end of the decade, forced NASA to

adopt a Lunar orbit rendezvous method. What this effectively meant to some NASA

officials was that the agency would have no productive technology with which to

3
establish extensive near Earth orbit operations. 7 Many in NASA, therefore, perceived

Apollo as imparting no logical legacy upon which to build a space infrastructure. 8

This artist’s concept from 1970 shows propulsion concepts such as the Nuclear Shuttle and Space Tug in
conjunction with other proposed spacecraft. Because of the recommendations from President Nixon’s Space Task
Group for more commonality and integration in the American space program, Marshall Space Flight Engineers
studied many of the spacecraft depicted here.

The large Saturn boosters and the Apollo spacecraft were single mission

technologies, built to carry people and machines to the lunar surface. Expansion of the

space enterprise, according to NASA, had to rest on operations in near Earth orbit. If

space was to be colonised then according to NASA, the US needed a stepping-stone in

near Earth orbit. Rapid growth could only be encouraged by means of a revolution in

launch vehicle and spacecraft technology; a revolution in the means would provide a

4
revolution in the ends. A growing contingent, therefore, converged around the idea of

developing an entirely new launch vehicle for Earth orbit logistics. 9 Ultimately, this

orientation towards leapfrog innovation rather than incremental innovation became

dominant because of NASA's penchant for the development of advanced technology.

Ideas to move in an incremental fashion and modify both the Saturn or Titan boosters

and the Apollo or Gemini spacecraft were quickly silenced.

By the end of 1968 project planning was well under way and by early 1969 the

Office of Manned Space Flight had established two task groups, during a

reorganization of its management structure; one to take responsibility for the proposed

space station and the other to take responsibility for the shuttle. The Office of Manned

Space Flight delegated the task of evaluating the diverse technical issues of Phase A to

the Space Shuttle Task Group, headed by Apollo Test Director LeRoy Day. Labelled

advanced studies, Phase-A was the first part of an anticipated four-phase shuttle

development process, including Phase-B, project definition, Phase-C, actual vehicle

design and Phase-D, production and operations. 10

Major sections of the US aerospace industry were involved with NASA's

Phase-A shuttle planning studies and as 1969 drew to a close, the contractors put

forward a variety of designs. The Office of Manned Space Flight selected a fully

reusable, two-stage shuttle design as the most promising concept to go forward into

Phase-B. The design comprised of two separate vehicles, a booster, about the size of a

Boeing 747 that would provide the thrust to lift the system off the Earths surface and

riding piggy-back, an orbiter, about the size of a Boeing 707 that would disengage at

5
between 10 to 20 miles altitude and go on into orbit on its own. NASA projected a ten-

year life cycle for the systems during which time it would have to conduct a minimum

of 100 missions before requiring any major refurbishment. 11 The Office of Manned

Space Flight envisaged that the shuttle wo uld be operational by the second half of 1977

and capable of conducting 75 flights per year by the end of that decade. 12

Lockheed’s two-stage shuttle design, circa 1970: a Lockheed Missiles & Space Company image.

6
 The configuration of NASA's proposed space station had also taken shape by

mid-1969. Earlier plans to launch a small fully constructed space station had been

rejected on the grounds that it would be too conservative in size, scope, and potential

accomplishments. Instead, NASA opted for a modula r design with the intention of

constructing the station in orbit rather than on Earth. This would allow development of

a platform that could accommodate up to 100 people by 1980. 13

An artist’s concept of a modular space station circa 1972.

7
 These concepts were both grandiose in design, potential and cost. In 1969,

NASA estimated cost of development for the space station at over $10 billion and $5.2

billion to develop the shuttle. By January 1970, the figure for the space shuttle climbed

to just under $10 billion14 and reached $12 billion before the year concluded. 15

Including the space station, NASA was asking for an investment of well over $20

billion from the American taxpayer.

Forces of Resistance
Such an outlook was overly optimistic and out of line with the political and economic

conditions of the time: 1968 had been a watershed year on many fronts. Incipient

contradictions in the consensus politics promoted by both the Kennedy and Johnson

Administrations had surfaced by 1967. Riots swept through American cities exposing

the fragility of the solutions offered by liberal democracy to the problems of civil rights

and social exclusion and destabilizing Johnson's Great Society programme. Opposition

to the Vietnam War had also intensified as it escalated. Economic crisis threatened in

the spring of 1968 as inflation reached an unprecedented 4.7 per cent and the federal

deficit crept towards $25 billion, far more than in any other post war year. Although

unemployment remained relatively stable, sections of organized labour, not least in the

public services, were showing signs of discontent. 16

Each of these factors impinged upon NASA's future planning. The most

decisive was the collapse of the Democratic hegemony. President Johnson had

announced that he would not be seeking re- nomination for another term; and in an

8
election fought in 1968 over the Vietnam War, support for Republican, Richard Nixon

grew in strength. 17 Prior to and during his presidency, Johnson's politicking had been

crucial to NASA. 18 When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I in October 1957, he

interpreted it as the second Pearl Harbour, an invasion of US skies. 19 The then

Republican President, Dwight Eisenhower attempted to play down the significance of

the Soviet Union's entry into space, but under political and public pressure during the

post-Sputnik paranoia agreed to remodel the National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics to take charge of a new civilian space programme. 20 As Vice President,

Johnson convinced the newly elected President Kennedy to recruit NASA in their

campaign against a perceived Soviet threat by engaging in the lengthiest battle, en

route to the Moon. 21 When Johnson himself became president in 1964, NASA received

almost unqualified support from his administration despite political opposition and

programmatic friction between Apollo, the Vietnam War, and the Great Society

programme. The Johnson Administration regarded a victorious outcome for the US in

the space race as so important that NASA was in a position to continue with its project

no matter what the cost. Even the deaths of three astronauts in the Apollo fire of 1967

did not deter NASA or the government from persisting with its main objective: to beat

the Soviets to the Moon. 22 It is clear then, that Johnson's departure from office had an

important bearing on the political support NASA would receive for its post-Apollo

planning. Its immediate consequence however, was to influence the departure of

another significant individual, James Webb.

9
 Lambright describes NASA Administrator James Webb as the power behind

Apollo. 23 His management skills and political sophistication were well recognized

within NASA. 24 Indeed, Webb's leadership unquestionably led to the location of the

Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas and the building of the southern crescent: a

political manoeuvre which assured NASA powerful congressional support. 25 By

locating NASA facilities right across the south at a time when these areas were trying

to get out from an agricultural based economy, Webb managed to make powerful

members of the Congress 'stakeholders in Apollo'. 26 After Johnson's announcement of

departure, Webb became concerned that the agency's leadership would become a

political issue. If he remained NASA Administrator after the election political conflict

would be inevitable. Vice President Hubert Humphery, the Democratic favourite, and

Webb had had tensions and if Nixon succeeded then it was likely that Webb would be

removed. Webb felt that his removal would also cut deeper into NASA's leadership,

with Nixon excising those that he regarded to be loyal to Webb or Johnson. After a

meeting with Johnson on September 17, 1968, Webb announced his retirement and

Thomas Paine, NASA's Deputy Administrator, took up the reins. 27 In November 1968,

Nixon won the presidential election and the new administration took office in January

1969.

10
President Richard M. Nixon announcing the appointment of Dr. Thomas O. Paine as Administrator for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. From left to right: President Richard M. Nixon NASA Administrator Dr.
Thomas O. Paine Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.

Over 1.5 billion people around the globe witnessed the planting of Old Glory at

Tranquillity Base, 28 assuring Neil Armstrong's place in history as the first man to walk

on the Moon on July 20 1969. 29 In the public's eyes, NASA had reached the zenith of

the "space age". Over ten years of planning, research, development, and production

accomplished what Francis Hoban called, the 'greatest engineering feat of all time.' 30

The Apollo euphoria was short lived nonetheless. Rather than a mechanism for uniting

a nation, Apollo reflected its divisions. Not missing the potential of good publicity, the

11
newly elected President Richard Nixon, had declared July 20, 1969 a 'National Day of

Participation'. But the events of the day were not universally shared. Although

exemplified as the embodiment of the "frontier spirit" of America, Apollo remained at

odds with everyday life. 31 Discontent quickly spilled over into the space programme.

Student groups from Boston and New York disrupted meetings of the American

Association for the Advancement of Science, and formed picket lines at a NASA

exhibition of Lunar rock brought back from Apollo XI. 32 Hans Mark, then director of

NASA's Ames Center, recalled a formal dinner, hosted by the President, to celebrate

the return of the Apollo XI astronauts. He described the atmosphere inside the Century

Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, as both 'festive and patriotic'.33 Outside a large

demonstration had amassed. Its message, a brusque reply to Vice President Spiro

Agnew’s proposition that America’s next venture in space should be a 'manned flight

to Mars by the end of this century.'34

A major feature of the demonstration was a huge sign with the legend
"Fuck Mars" printed on it in large letters that the demonstrators had
somehow been able to hang along the upper floors of one of the office
buildings across the street from the Century Plaza. The same message
was clearly repeated on signs that some of the demonstrators carried. 35

Political activists were not however, alone. The very success of the Moon landing led

to a general public disinterest in space. 36 Leaders within the agency feared that NASA's

decline would be sharp without continued public support. Television had become an

important medium for NASA, beaming their achievements back to a captivated

audience on Earth. Soon after Armstrong's historic footsteps, NASA's TV ratings

12
dropped rapidly. George Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, put together a group of

very senior NASA officials to address this problem. Nicknamed the Think Group,

discussions centred on efforts to create a TV extravaganza during Apollo's next visits

to the Moon. 37 All of their endeavours failed and public curiosity continued to drop,

and was only briefly rekindled during the abortive flight of Apollo XIII.

Political support for Apollo was also decidedly weak. The Lunar landing

signalled a turning point. With the space race won, many in the political arena believed

that the programme should be terminated. 38 Apollo was to include nine further visits to

the Moon after the initial landing, but pressure on NASA's fiscal year (FY) 1971

budget forced the agency to phase out production of the Saturn rocket and cancel the

final two Lunar landings. 39 NASA astronauts visited the Moon on December 11, 1972

for the last time, and have not returned since.

Congress had severely downsized NASA's Apollo Applications programme in

the politics of 1967 and 1968 and the agency had no mission objectives beyond the

mid-1970s. The newly formed Nixon Administration did not place civilian space

activity very high on its agenda and instead of making any immediate announcement

decided to establish a Space Task Group to examine the issue. Chaired by Vice

President Spiro Agnew, the Space Task Group consisted of a variety of actors,

including the new NASA Administrator, Thomas Paine 40 and was in charge of

providing a 'definitive recommendation on the direction the US space program should

take in the post-Apollo period'. 41 In addition to the Space Task Group, several other

planning activities were also under-way. The President's Science Advisory Committee

13
had established the Branscomb committee, headed by Lewis Branscomb, then director

of the National Bureau of Standards; and within NASA, George Mueller, Associate

Administrator for Manned Space Flight, had expanded the Office of Manned Space

Flight's management committee.

The Space Task Group reported at the end of 1969 and provided a selection of

spending options that ranged between a maximum pace, where the limits were set by

technology, not available funding; and a low level pace, which did not include any

human missions for the 1970s. Paine and Agnew, both endorsed a human expedition to

Mars as the next logical step in space exploration. The Office of Manned Space Flight,

however, were still pushing hard for the development of the space shuttle and the space

station. Whereas the President's Science Advisory Committee's followed its earlier

position, and recommended that NASA should concentrate its efforts on only

developing a reusable transportation system for the 1970s. 42 Moreover, the President's

Science Advisory Committee suggested that automated equipment should conduct

planetary exploration and NASA should adopt a slow pace development of a space

station; examining its viability during the 1970s and progressing to full development in

the 1980s.

It was clear that a schism was beginning to develop between the ideas that the

Office of Manned Space Flight generated and the ideas that other actors were

considering. The Office of Manned Space Flight placed the highest priority on the

creation of new technologies to operate in space. What they would actually do with

these technologies was secondary in importance. In contrast, the Space Task Group, the

14
President's Science Advisory Committee and other areas of NASA concentrated on

mission objectives. They saw technology as something that would have to be created in

order to execute the missions that were being proposed. 43 Notwithstanding this rift, the

Office of Manned Space Flight was successful in translating its interests into the

interests of the other groups. By advancing the idea that the shuttle and the space

station represented steppingstones in space, the Office of Manned Space Flight

managed to persuade each of the groups to include at least one or the other in their

proposals. This strategy was particularly effective with the Space Task Group who

incorporated the shuttle in three out of four of its options. 44

In the immediate politics of post-Apollo, NASA's higher echelons sought

allegiance with the White House through the chair of the Space Task Group, Vice

President Spiro Agnew, in the expectation that his approval would result in a new

mandate. Initially this strategy appeared to work. Agnew endorsed NASA's grand plans

and the agency had partial success in influencing the direction of the other groups

involved in the post-Apollo planning. NASA soon found however, that it had few

friends in the White House and was entering a new world of post-Apollo with no real

identity. 45

Richard Nixon monitored political reaction to the post-Apollo planning reports

before delivering his space policy message in March 1970. The message was

considerably less ambitious than even the third option offered by the Space Task

Group. It did not include any commitment to a space station, a shuttle, or an expedition

to Mars. Instead, Nixon expressed the need for a balanced space programme, which

15
would combine all the elements of exploration, accumulation of scientific kno wledge,

and practical applications. Nixon indicated that studies into the development of a space

station and a shuttle were proposed, but he detailed no new projects. Nixon's

submission of NASA's Fiscal Year (FY) 1971 budget to the Congress remained well

below the $4 billion minimum needed if NASA were to begin its programme in that

fiscal year. 46

NASA's budget had been on a steady decline from its peak of 0.9 per cent of

GNP in FY 1966, to 0.47 per cent of GNP in FY 1969. The primary objective pursued

by NASA Administrator, Thomas Paine, was to reverse this trend and push for an

investment commitment of 1 per cent of GNP.47 Agnew gave his patronage to a venture

on the scale of Apollo, but the shapers of space policy were vastly out of step with the

shapers of macro-economic policy. Fiscal and monetary constraint were the primary

tools advocated by the Council of Economic Advisors, to stave off the threat of

economic crisis, perceived because of the growing federal deficit, a slow down in

economic growth, high inflation and signs of rising unemployment. Hence, the

dictation of economic policy was to maintain a federal budget in which expenditures

matched revenues. 48 Policy implementation was under the control of the newly formed

Office of Management and Budget and they were showing a growing concern over

NASA's lack of justifications for its expensive programmes. 49

Sceptical of NASA's development cost estimates, the Office of Management

and Budget directed the agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of its proposed

shuttle design. At the end of this study, NASA projected development costs of between

16
$6.4 and $9.6 billion for its fully reusable, two-stage shuttle system. 50 Unconvinced,

the Office of Management and Budget made an extraordinary manoeuvre and

demanded that NASA contract an outside evaluation of shuttle development costs.

NASA's upper management were reluctant to conduct such a study, fearing that it

would raise the whole issue of what constituted a good space programme.

Nevertheless, given the political climate, NASA bowed to White House pressure and

contracted Aerospace Corporation and Lockheed Corporation to assess the impact of

the shuttle on reducing payload and launch costs; and Mathematica Incorporated, to

provide an overall economic analysis. 51

The Office of Management and Budget were not the only White House agency

seeking control over NASA's activities. The Office of Science and Technology and the

President's Science Advisory Committee also demonstrated apprehension over both the

costs and the technological risks associated with the agency's proposals. In the summer

of 1971, the Presidents Science Advisory Committee established a high level scientific

panel to examine NASA's post-Apollo plans. Chaired by Alexandria Flax, President of

the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Flax panel worked closely with the Office of

Science and Technology and the Office of Management and Budget to curtail NASA's

ambitious plans. Critical of NASA's programme cost estimates, the Flax panel

concluded that cost overruns could be in the region of 30 to 50 per cent. Armed with an

open mandate, the Flax panel also focused attention on technological matters. In an

effort to reduce research and development costs, but retain a national space

programme, the panel expended a lot of energy on proposing alternatives to NASA's

17
baseline shuttle design. While making no single recommendation, the panel did outline

three alternative options: (i) defer the decision on new technology until a later data; (ii)

develop a new expendable ballistic launch vehicle; or (iii) develop a small partially

reusable launch vehicle. 52

The major difference between NASA and the White House on the type of space

transportation system required revolved around a trade-off between operational costs

and development costs. The shuttle designs that had emerged from the Phase-B studies

reflected NASA's vision of a future of “mass space transportation.” Development costs

were, therefore, a secondary consideration to a system designed around reducing

operational costs. 53 The White House however, wanted to disembark from a heavy

funding curve. Consequently, many of NASA's debates in Washington related to the

annual funding of its proposed programmes, as Space Shuttle Programme Manager,

Robert Thompson, recalled:

A lot of our debates in Washington had to do with what the annual

funding in support of the program would be. And I know lots of times
up there the meetings would kind of come to the bottom and say, we
don't care what you build, but we don't want the annual funding to get
over $1 billion a year. 54

In the fragile politics of post-Apollo, NASA discovered that many members in

both houses of Congress had also developed a negative response to the costly and

seemingly intangible proposals coming from the agency. Opponents in the Congress to

funding large technological programmes had steadily mushroomed as social, political

and economic conditions declined.

18
 Within the House of Representatives, two main issues dominated the space

policy debate during 1970 and 1971: whether to support NASA's proposals for human

space flight and whether space programmes should receive such a large slice of the

national budget. Some members of the subcommittee on Space Science and

Applications and the subcommittee on Advanced Research and Technology positioned

themselves against the quixotic visions of a post-Apollo age. In an address to the

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Space Science and Applications

subcommittee chairman, Joseph Karth (Democrat, Minnesota), condemned the Space

Task Group's report as 'totally unrealistic'. 55 It was the decision by NASA to delay

several space science and applications projects to make room for the space station and

the shuttle as budget items that led the Space Science and Applications subcommittee

to campaign against both programmes. 56

When the debates unfolded on the House floor, it was evident where the battle

line had been drawn. The Manned Space Flight subcommittee jostled to increase

NASA's budget for human space flight and the Space Science and Applications

subcommittee, sought to fix the human space flight budgets under the Office of

Management and Budget's recommendations. A continuing rise in unemployment

during 1970, however, spurred many within the House to increase public spending; and

John Wydler (Republican, New York), expressed a common sentiment in 1971 when

he told the House during a shuttle authorization debate:

I have been going along with these cuts year to year. I really feel we
have reached a point where we should stand up and say "enough." ... I

19
 think we had better start redirecting the public's attention to the fact they
... [are spending public money] ... to hire American people, to do
American productive work. 57

Nevertheless, opposition to the shuttle and the space station was at its height in 1970

and both failed to get development approval.

In the years between 1968 and 1970, neither strong advocates nor influential

opponents of the civilian space programme successfully dictated the political agenda.

Public and political support for any new space programme on a similar scale to Apollo

was, at best, indifferent. Those that exhorted the development of the space station and

shuttle were successful only in negotiating for further research into the possibilities.

Although NASA had secured funding for the Apollo applications programme, which

would utilize the remaining Apollo hardware in near-earth orbit, the prospects for

NASA's space station and shuttle were bleak.

Internal Dissidents
The plans of the Office of Manned Space Flight were not only frustrated by external

factors. Internal obstacles also appeared as factions within NASA mobilized their

forces in an attempt to capture control of the shuttle programme's resources. 58 At the

end of 1969, no firm consensus existed between, or within, the NASA Centers about a

shuttle design. Supporters for partially, or completely recoverable versions of the

Saturn rocket and some minor patronage for a single stage to orbit vehicle could still be

found. 59 Advocates for further development of lifting body technology could also be

20
found at the Flight Research Center and the Office of Advanced Research and

Technology. 60 The greatest pressure though, came from the Johnson Space Center. 61

Max Faget, the Mercury capsule designer, was leading a group of engineers in

an attempt to influence the Office of Manned Space Flight to develop a small interim

shuttle to test the concept of a logistics system. Known as the DC-3 because of its

relative simplicity, the design was much smaller than those under consideration by the

Office of Manned Space Flight. 62 But despite his efforts Faget did not find much

support for his ideas. 63 The Office of Manned Space Flight favoured building a large-

scale shuttle that would qualify immediately as an operational system. 64 Nevertheless, a

realization that the White House would not restore NASA's to the heights of Apollo

slowly filtered through the organization. NASA Administrator, Thomas Paine, thus

agreed to establish a separate Phase-A effort in the event that budget limitations forced

NASA into a redesign. 65

Proponents of the large fully reusable two-stage shuttle also began to seek

alternatives that would allow them to continue with their design and reduced peak

funding. Two versions of a similar idea, one adva nced by Marshall's former director,

Wernher von Braun and the other proposed by the new Associate Administrator for

Manned Space Flight, Dale Myers, involved spreading the development costs over a

longer period by phasing the programme. Von Braun started his campaign early in an

attempt to persuade top NASA officials that the agency should develop the reusable

booster first, thus allowing NASA to go operational with an expendable orbiter while

the reusable version was under development. 66 The concept did gain credence within

21
certain sections of NASA. Milton Thompson, from the Flight Research Center,

described the idea as ‘not only ... the most attractive alternative, but also the most

logical.’ 67 Von Braun and his advocates considered that if NASA did develop the

reusable booster first, then not only would it provide a proof of concept, but the next

logical step would be to build the reusable orbiter. 68

It was during a meeting on November 27, 1970, at the home of NASA's Deputy

Administrator, George Low, that Myers suggested 'a course of action in which a

reusable orbiter could be developed for initial operations using an expendable Saturn-

IC booster.' 69 For Myers it was clear that the development of the orbiter first was the

logical path to take because 'it focussed all the attention on the toughest technology

problem.' 70 Low, however, was not convinced by the argument for an interim booster

and told the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board in 1971 that:

… the most promising [expendable interim booster is] the S-IC, the Saturn V
first stage. But even the S-IC presents formidable problems. There are technical
difficulties, especially in the area of combined vehicle control, and also
economic problems arising from the high cost of modifying the SI-C and the
high repetitive cost of each launch. 71

Nevertheless, the concept of a phased approach became increasingly attractive

within NASA, though the agency found it much harder to sell to the contractors

working on Phase-B. Discussions held at McDonnell Douglas resulted in them

recommending 'against any interim booster system' preferring instead 'a slip of a year

or so in the launch date.' 72 North American Rockwell 'also presented similar arguments

to those heard at the McDonnell Douglas briefing'. 73 North American Rockwell’s

22
Shuttle Project Manager, Bastian Hello, highlighted the reasoning behind their negative

reaction:

As the programme went on doubts were raised about the R&D costs ...
NASA started looking at partially reusable and partially throw-away
vehicles ... we thought we were leading the pack ... in the all-reusable
design and we were a little reluctant to let go of what we thought was
our advantageous perch. 74

As the programme moved into 1971 the orbiter- first strategy gained more weight.

Despite Milton Thompson's observations that NASA had 'some tremendous gaps in the

knowledge and experience required to design a successful shuttlecraft,' 75 development

of the reusable booster first was 'never taken seriously by the shuttle program

management' and after 1970 gained no further credibility. 76

An Inconspicuous Coup
Tensions between NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, the Congress, and other

executive branch officials had been working against NASA. Constantly agitating for

additional funding, Paine publicly criticized the Nixon Administration for cutting

NASA's budget 77 and after the White House ignored the Space Task Groups

recommendations, he resigned from the post of NASA Administrator. 78

Deputy Administrator George Low was thus in the position of Acting

Administrator at a crucial juncture in the organizations history.

23
 Low then led what was a very interesting exercise ... he said we have
got make a choice, whether to do the space station first or the shuttle
first. ... Technically the space station was easier but, we recognized that
the shuttle was the pacing item in this thing and, therefore, we said look
... let's do the difficult thing first and the space station will follow. 79

It was clear that the Station would be very expensive using expendable
launch vehicles to build ... so it was deferred until the Shuttle was
assured. 80

Initially this idea met with some scepticism, as future NASA Administrator, James

Fletcher reflected:

When we first began thinking about the Space Shuttle, we thought of it

as a vehicle to serve a large space station in Earth orbit. But we ran into
a dilemma: we found that we could not expect to get funding to build
both a large space station and the Space Shuttle in this decade. A space
station would be of no use without the Shuttle. And at first we thought
that the reverse was also true - that the Shuttle would be of little use
without a space station to serve. But the more we looked at this, the
clearer it became that no dilemma existed but rather an opportunity. 81

As NASA's programmatic plans were remodelled, justifications for the shuttle

became more elaborate. The predominant rationale for the shuttle was based upon a

perceived requirement for a new vehicle to serve a space station. Now that NASA

postponed hardware development of the space station, the role of the shuttle needed to

expand. 82 Early conceptual thinking had characterized the shuttle's operational goals as

'broad' and able to serve 'a large number of users'. 83 Revitalized, these justifications

now served as the key to the shuttle's promotion. During a meeting on November 27,

1970, top NASA officials, agreed that:

24
 [NASA] should probably change the baseline mission for the shuttle ...
[from] the 270 nautical mile orbit and 55 degrees which is primarily for
the space station to something more representative of the needs of
NASA and DOD. This step would uncouple the prime justification of
the shuttle as support for the space station to one of a transportation
system for space satellites. 84

The shuttle, now unhinged from the space station, was touted as a utilitarian space

vehicle that would usher in a new age of space transportation. To emphasise the

economic impact the shuttle would have on future space operations, Myers went as far

as to suggest the possible savings the shuttle wo uld bring:

With the largest and most efficient present launch vehicles, the present
cost is somewhat under $1,000 a pound. With the Space Shuttle, we
expect to get this down to less than $100 a pound. 85

This statement eventually proved controversial and stirred up a debate both within and

outside of the political forum that continued throughout the programme and placed the

economic rationale in jeopardy.

George Low appreciated that the economic argument might prove tenuous.

Indeed true to Mueller's vision, importance for Low was in the new capabilities that the

shuttle would provide.

NASA is not seeking to justify the space shuttle program on purely

economic grounds. The principal justification for the space shuttle is the
new capability it can bring both to our civilian and military space
programs for versatile and efficient operations in space. 86

25
Routine access to earth orbit was seen as the catalyst for future infrastructure building

in space, as one NASA official recalled:

George Low, when we started this program, had a vision of making

NASA more relevant and that relevancy would come when we had a
whole new group of customers, and these would be the entrepreneurs
and the cheap experimenters and the Edison’s of their time, and we
would provide them, easy, cheap access to space and they in turn would
come up with new industries. 87

After Paine's resignation Low, 'attempted to heal the breach between NASA

and other agencies in the executive branch' 88 while simultaneously embarking upon a

potent campaign for the shuttle. The aftermath of the 1970 Congressional battle left

NASA in the role of appeaser. George Low aimed to win the Congress over by arguing

that NASA's requests were moderate. 89

We believe that in moving toward the decision on the development of

the space shuttle, NASA is proceeding in a conservative manner ... In
connection with the decisions on FY 1972 budget request, we have
deferred the development of the space station to avoid what would other
wise have been unrealistic funding peaks dur ing the 1970s. 90

In an effort to rebut criticism, Low emphasised that Mars was not the hidden agenda

and he stressed that:

the space shuttle program does not represent a commitment to a huge

manned space program. ... The space shuttle can be justified by its
potential contributions to programs relying entirely on unmanned
spacecraft. Decisions on future manned space programs ... can and have
been decoupled from the decision on the space shuttle. 91

26
Upgraded in status as NASA's principal programme for the 1970s, the shuttle 'became

more and more important relative to the other elements' of the space programme. 92

Precarious Affiliations
Left at the end of 1970 with no human missions beyond 1975 and concerned by the

Office of Management and Budget's emphasis on cost-effectiveness, NASA believed

that in order to gain political approval, it had to show that the shuttle could perform a

much larger role than they had originally intended. NASA thus embarked on a

campaign to persuade other communities of the benefits of its new launch vehicle;

especially the national security community whose space hardware were projected to

constitute some 34 per cent of all future space traffic. 93

Since the establishment of NASA, the United States has had two space

programmes; a civilian one, housed in NASA, and a military one controlled by the Air

Force. NASA's long relationship with the US Air Force has invariably been both

confrontational and cooperative. In the race for space among the services during the

post-Sputnik months of 1957/58, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force all had their long-

range space programmes on the table. The Air Force saw space power as 'merely the

cumulative result of the evolutionary growth of air power' and, space flight as the

'natural and logical extension of air flight.' 94

Although left out of the competition to launch the first American satellite, the

failure of the Navy's Vanguard rocket and the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile

27
Agency to NASA in 1960 solidified the Air Force's hold on military space flight.95 The

Air Force, however, considered that a programme split between them and NASA was

unworkable. They lobbied hard in both the Pentagon and the Congress during the early

1960s to gain dominion over human space flight. Submerged in the rhetoric of space as

a "sanctuary", exploited only for peaceful purposes and scientific advancement,

arguments for total military control over space operations failed to dislodge NASA's

hold over the Lunar-landing programme. 96 This did not mean that the Air Force were

driven out of space entirely. As the Moon- landing programme progressed the transfer

of Air Force technology (the Atlas and Titan rockets) and personnel to NASA impacted

significantly on the space agency's culture, management systems, and relationship to

the service. 97 The Air Force continued to fund research projects for human space flight

during the 1960s, but the termination of its space-plane, Dyna-Soar in 1963 and the

cancellation of the Manned Orbital Laboratory in 1969, had left the Air Force hesitant

over its role within a national space programme.

Despite this, the Air Force had demonstrated an interest in NASA's space

station/shuttle development programme. Although NASA and the Air Force conducted

their research separately, there was some cooperative agreement between them in

generating shuttle concepts during 1969. 98 They established a framework for DOD

participation in NASA's shuttle programme through two groups: the Aeronautics and

Astronautics Coordinating Board and the Space Transportation System Committee.

The Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board had been in existence since

1965 and served primarily as a mechanism for the formulation of policy. The Space

28
Transportation System Committee signed into existence on February 17 1970, was co-

chaired by Grant Hansen, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for R&D, and Dale

Myers, NASA's new Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. The committee

had a broad mandate to review shuttle operational plans, technology requirements,

programme objectives, and development plans to ensure that both NASA and DOD

could agree on specifications. 99

Cooperation in developing concepts for a reusable space vehicle between the

Air Force and NASA had begun in 1966. At the time, NASA and the DOD concluded

that the numerous cost uncertainties and technical risks could not be resolved. Their

report did, however, consider that future demand for access to space would encourage

the development of reusable launch vehicle technology and, that the current (1966)

launch vehicle system would only fulfil NASA and DOD requirements for the next 7 to

10 years. 100

Though the DOD viewed a NASA operated shuttle as potentially useful, the Air

Force were not prepared to fund any part of the programme from its own budget.

Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans was a former NASA top official and as

such, sympathetic to the agency's aspirations, but few other high ranking Air Force

officers favoured the shuttle and were content with their expendable launchers like the

Atlas and Titan. 101

The job of securing Air Force support had become paramount for NASA if the

economic arguments given to the White House and the Congress were to stand ground.

29
Before 1971 ended, NASA's efforts to gain the Air Force as an ally would have a

significant impact on a shuttle design.

Three key shuttle requirements insisted on by the Air Force were: lifting

capability, orbiter payload bay size and orbiter crossrange (the lateral manoeuvrability

of an aircraft). The Air Force based the dimensions of the payload bay and the lifting

capability of a shuttle on a new generation of DOD reconnaissance satellites. Far

heavier and larger than any previous observation satellites, it was lifting these kinds of

payloads that the Air Force saw its most frequent use of the shuttle. 102 Air Force

projections for the 1980s required a shuttle capable of lifting payloads between 40 000

to 50 000 pounds to orbit, within a 15 feet diameter by 60 feet long payload bay. 103

The crossrange requirements arose from a tactical judgement. The Air Force

wanted an orbiter that could rendezvous with a satellite and return to Earth after

completing only one orbit, thus removing the need for flying over hostile territory in

times of crisis. This demanded a high-crossrange capability of between 1100 and 1500

nautical miles on either side of the orbiter's re-entry ground track. A requirement that

arose from the physical reality that the landing strip would have moved east some 1100

miles as the Earth rotated during the shuttle's first orbit. This requirement for a return

to runway after a single orbit dictated a relatively shallow angle of attack and the high

lift of a delta wing. In a series of reports, the Air Force also argued that a delta wing

would produce a more aerodynamically stable and thus far safer orbiter.

Nonetheless, crossrange was of no great concern to some of NASA's engineers.

Their primary interest was providing a routine daily opportunity to return to the

30
Kennedy Space Center, which only demanded a low 200 nautical mile crossrange

capability. Many of the orbiter configurations emanating from Johnson, the NASA

Center that traditionally controlled spacecraft design, thus adopted straight wings,

essentially for simplicity. Indeed as Max Faget recalled, several of Johnson’s engineers

were:

dead set against the [high] crossrange, it cost us a lot on performance.

Having a [higher] crossrange on the way down meant you had to carry a
heavier vehicle up there, and that extra weight on the vehicle meant less
payload. 104

Advocates of the low crossrange design also claimed that the Air Force did not

appreciate NASA's expertise in low-lift-to-drag ratio wing designs that used

exceptionally high angles of attack; a critical point in safely operating a straight winged

orbiter. 105 Nevertheless, the Air Force rejected arguments for a straight winged orbiter.

The controversy over crossrange continued through 1970 because the Office of

Manned Space Flight failed to generate any decision on the subject. Indeed both the

200 nautical mile and 1500 nautical mile crossrange options were still included in a

second Office of Manned Space Flight shuttle requirements document released in

December 1970. 106

In contrast with other modes of transportation, such as ships, cars and trains etc,

the problems associated with the stability and controllability of an aircraft take a

position of pre-eminence in its design, because it has to move within three dimensional

space as opposed to two. 107 Determining design issues were: wing design, wing-body

31
integration and integration of aerodynamic and flight control requirements. For the

orbiter (as with all aircraft), wing design was key, because of its influence on vehicle

weight, thermal environment, aerodynamic stability, buffet characteristics and gliding

and landing performance. 108 Wing shape was also important because it determined the

vehicle's aerodynamic performance. To define the shape of a wing, aerodynamicist

need to make a decision about the planform (the outline of the wing when viewed from

above) and the profile of the fore and aft sections, referred to as the airfoil. Two kinds

of forces exert on the surface of a wing; pressure at right angles to the surface, known

as lift and, skin friction tangential to the surface, known as drag. Lift depends almost

entirely on the distribution of pressure. Drag, by contrast, depends primarily on the skin

friction, which exists by virtue of the viscous flow in a thin boundary layer next to the

surface of the wing. 109 The problem confronting the aeroplane designer is how to shape

a wing that will obtain the optimum lift and drag characteristics needed for the

vehicle's performance requirements. Wing design for the orbiter was further

complicated however, because it had to satisfy the conflicting aerodynamic

characteristics of the entire flight regime. Stuart Treon, chief of the Experimental

Investigations Branch at the Aimes Center, told Aviation Week and Space Technology

at the time, that the aerodynamic problems posed by the shuttle were 'extremely

unusual'. 110

Orbiter configurations emanating from Johnson had adopted a straight wing

design, essentially for simplicity. During the re-entry phase of flight, the orbiter’s

position would be at a very high angle of attack, almost 60 degrees. This would

32
produce a lot of drag to slow the vehic le down until it reached adequate velocity for

level flight. Max Faget, the champion of the straight wing design, maintained that the

important advantage of this configuration was that it minimized heating rates and

reduced overall system weight. At such a high angle of attack, only the lower surfaces

would be directly exposed to the on-coming airflow, which reduced the amount of

protective insulation. Nevertheless, as highlighted above, the low crossrange produced

by Faget's straight wing design combined with a high angle of attack at re-entry was

unacceptable to the Air Force. Demand for a return to runway after a single orbit

dictated a relatively shallow angle of attack and the high lift of a delta wing to produce

the desired 1500 nautical mile crossrange.

Crossrange was not the only point of contention between the straight and delta

wing designs. Slight centre of gravity shifts and balance consideration tended to move

the straight wings aft, closing the gap between the tail and the wing. Many of the early

orbiter designs carried internal fuel tanks, resulting in the centre of gravity being near

the middle of the vehicle's length. It thus made sense to have the wings in roughly the

same position for stability. But when the external tank was introduced and the weight

of the orbiter's main engines grew, arguments were raised that Faget's design, with its

long leading and trailing edges, would incur more heating problems than a shorter

vehicle with lower aspect ratio delta wings. Wind tunnel and drop tests of models also

indicated that the straight wing design might be dynamically unstable. The tests

suggested the possibility of a divergent oscillation in a falling- leaf mode and a

tendency for the orbiter to flat spin. Further analysis did show that the motions could be

33
easily dampened by reaction control thrusters, but performing complex control

commands during reentry was not favoured by many at NASA or the Air Force. 111

Although both configurations were technically feasible, Air Force pressure

eventually swayed NASA away from the straight wing design. Despite the weight

penalty and increased complexity of thermal protection, in the political arena Air Force

support for the programme was far more important. As NASA winnowed out various

shuttle concepts, they eventually adopted an orbiter configuration that incorporated a

blended delta wing in August 1972. 112

A series of wind-tunnel tests conducted during 1972 indicated that the original

configuration did not meet NASA's landing performance requirements. Initially NASA

had not stipulated a landing velocity on which to design the orbiter's wings, but

midway through Phase-B the Office of Manned Space Flight defined a subsonic design

velocity of 165 knots. This would produce a touch down velocity of between 180 to

190 knots, which was well within the state of the art in landing gear systems. The need

to meet these requirements, then led to a re-configuration of the wing in late 1972. In-

house studies by NASA and activity at Grumman indicated that a double-delta

planform produced a more efficient lifting surface than the blended delta and had

exceptional landing performance. In late 1972, NASA instructed Rockwell to

incorporate a double delta wing design. In addition, the double-delta wing allowed for

aerodynamic stability and trim adjustment by modifying the lightly loaded forward

delta (glove). This simple control of aerodynamic features meant that the design of the

main delta wing box could be frozen and any centre of gravity shifts or aerodynamic

34
stability problems could be corrected by glove modification, thereby minimizing the

impact on the shuttle programme as a whole. 113

Shifts in the Baseline Design

In line with Nixon's original request to former NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, to

cut NASA's human space flight budget in half, NASA had come to the conclusion in

early 1971 that by postponing the space station they could continue with the reusable

two-stage shuttle at a development cost of $12 billion. 114 The National Academy of

Engineering, however, were still troubled by the proposed development cost of

NASA's shuttle, as the following letter extract shows:

Basically, I'm afraid our concern today, as it has been in the past, is that
the justification of the space shuttle program is still weak. It appears to
us that the reason for this weakness is not so much the ultimate utility of
the system but the fact that we still have not found the way to spread out
the development costs in order not to have such a tremendous
development peak that the entire NASA budget is placed in jeopardy. In
the present environment of the anti-technologists, it seems to us even
more important that we somehow solve the cost problem, particularly
the development cost impact. 115

In replying to the National Academy of Engineering, George Low alluded to the

shifting position of NASA's higher echelons towards an alternate shuttle system:

Spreading out the development costs of the shuttle so as not to place the
NASA budget in jeopardy has been a subject of concern both to NASA
and to our Phase-B shuttle definition contractors. We are devoting a
great amount of study to cost reduction and cost alternatives. ... As part

35
 of our Phase-A activity, we have under study several alternate concepts
for the space shuttle. 116

The preferred orbiter configuration to emerge from the Phase-B and

alternate Phase-A studies was a delta wing vehicle, which incorporated external

liquid hydrogen fuel tanks that would jettisoned before entering orbit. 117 The

incorporation of external fuel tanks allowed for a simplification of the orbiter's

design, with the overall size of the orbiter now driven by the payload bay rather

than the size of the internal tanks. Removal of the orbiter's internal fuel tanks

represented the most significant deviation from NASA's original shuttle design

and paved a way for NASA to manoeuvre around both the political and

economic obstacles that stood in the way of the shuttle's development. Space

Shuttle Program Manager, Robert F. Thompson considered the removal of the

fuel tanks from the orbiter as 'the single most important configuration decision

made in the shuttle program.'118

I think the biggest thing that broke [the] logjam was our willingness to
give up on everything being reusable. To take the propellants out of the
orbiter. Propellants just made a mess out of trying to build the orbiter.
You get them out and get them in a fairly simple tank, get some great
big manifolds there to pump the propellant through and then throw that
aluminum tank away, looked like a good common sense way of
going. 119

Grumman Aerospace had put forward the idea was most forcefully in its

alternate Phase A studies, persuaded by some early ideas emanating from Johnson, as

Grumman's Shuttle Engineering Manager, Richard Kline, recollected:

36
 When we heard those we felt that really was the answer. Not the
technical answer but the pragmatic answer in view of the financial
restrictions. So we went after the external tank concept quite heavily and
validated the practicality of doing that. 120

A series of design reviews conducted in early 1971, indicated that significant

advantages when the orbiters liquid hydrogen fuel tanks were an external structure. The

innovative move by Grumman was to extract the orbiter's liquid hydrogen tanks, which

were far larger than the liquid oxygen tanks, and place them externally either side of

the payload bay. The concept allowed the orbiter to shrink in size, thus altering the

energy balance between the orbiter and the booster. Further studies by both NASA and

the shuttle contractors demonstrated additional savings in development costs when both

the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen tanks were housed in a single external tank

structure. The complexity of building and operating an orbiter with internal fuel tanks

had also aroused a lot of concern within NASA and that, as Johnson Director, Chris

Kraft, recalled drove the tanks outside:

The structure was driven by our lack of confidence in being able to

build a tank that could be an internal part of the aeroplane structure,
because you had to be able to test it structurally after every flight ... and
there was no way you could guarantee you weren't going to blow the
aeroplane up by testing it. ... That's what drove the tank out of the
machine ... I don't think structurally we could have done otherwise. 121

In August 1971, the introduction of a single external structure housing both the liquid

oxygen/hydrogen tanks for the orbiter had become a NASA baseline design.

37
The first Space Shuttle External Tank (ET), the Main Propulsion Test Article (MPTA), rolls off the assembly line on
September 9, 1977 at Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, Louisiana.

The primary function of the external tank, namely to house the liquid oxygen

and liquid hydrogen that would fuel the orbiter's three main engines, was the basic

determinant of its overall size. Thrust output and the operation time of the orbiter's

three main engines both dictated the amount of fuel the system would be required to

carry. A thrust specification of 400,000 pounds for each engine translated into a

combined consumption rate of over 64,900 gallons of liquid propellant per minute.

Since NASA had selected a parallel burn stacking arrangement, the main engines,

ignited before lift-off, would have to propel the shuttle virtually all the way to orbit: a

duration of about eight minutes. The external fuel tank, thus had to be sized to contain

over 520,000 gallons of liquid propellant. 122

38
 Another critical design parameter shaping the external tank was its mass ratio.

As the external structure had to go virtually all the way to orbit, it had to withstand all

the aerodynamic forces, vibrations and speeds (around 27 000 feet per second) of the

flight. In addition, because mass is of vital importance in travel to orbit, every pound of

tank was equivalent to every pound of payload. Hence, NASA's tank designers had to

keep the mass fraction of the tank as high as they could get it: the tank had to be very

light, yet structurally very sound. The result was a unique tank design that comprised a

very thin aluminium wall, which would call for some innovative steps in welding

techniques. 123

Although distinct in its requirements, the design of external tank drew heavily

on NASA's experience with the tanks in the Saturn rockets.

In concept [the external tank] ... was from the Saturn V, but it was
designed differently because its shape was different. It was not as big in
diameter ... it used less pieces to make a circle. ... The bulk heads were
different shapes ... The technologies however, were the same. 124

The Saturn tanks were several feet in diameter larger, so NASA had learnt a lot about

welding capabilities. Nevertheless, in each tank there was going to be almost a mile

and a half of weld:

So every weld had to be perfect because if any one of them starts

leaking, it doesn't have to rupture, just leak, then you can ... lose a
vehicle. 125

39
 Predictions of aerodynamic forces on ascent were one of the first factors to

modify areas of the external tank's design. Late in 1972, Martin Marietta changed the

external tank's original cone-shaped nose to an ogive shape as early aerodynamic

studies indicated that this shape would give a better performance and throughout 1973,

they gradually decreased the overall length of the external tank and increased its

diameter as the aerodynamic characteristics and interference effects of the integrated

vehicle were better understood. 126

To be able to fly a vehicle stable you want to have the center of pressure
in front of the center of gravity. So what we had to do was balance the
diameter and the size to where basically the center of gravity was
countered near to what we call the intertank, that bolts the [liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks] together, because that was about
where the combination of the whole vehicle center of gravity would be.
We wanted the center of pressure to be a few feet ahead of that; that
way, as long as those two are separate, then your control laws are a lot
simpler. 127

Towards the end of 1973, negotiations and further refinements to an external

tank design tapered off as a configuration acceptable to NASA was established. In

early 1974, the design process appeared at a satisfactory point of closure and hardware

development began.

Ballistic Solutions
To circumvent criticism by the Congress and the White House, NASA's higher

echelons publicly announced in June 1971 what they had been considering at the end of

1970: to proceed with phasing the shuttle's development. NASA would develop the

40
orbiter first followed by the booster. An interim, expendable booster would then serve

the system while the reusable, human operated booster was under development. NASA

argued that this would keep programme peak funding to just under $2 billion. 128 This

change in the programme's approach translated into very different set of booster

requirements.

Multi-stage rockets had played a vital role in NASA's crusade to the Moon.

Staging methodologies provided stepwise increases in velocities with systems of

conservative propellant-to-stage mass ratios. 129 Staging the rocket was a practice

established very early in the history of space flight and continued on into the shuttle. 130

Indeed, in 1970, neither NASA nor the contractors considered that structural design,

materials or fabrication techniques were sufficiently advanced to produce a single stage

to orbit vehicle, which is why a vehicle incorporating two separate stages was first
131
considered as the most viable configuration.

NASA explored two sets of staging criteria when it moved to the interim

booster approach: series burn and parallel burn systems. Series burn was a known

stacking arrangement, traditionally exploited on NASA's previous launch vehicles.

Orbital velocity would be achieved via stages, with the booster powering the initial

ascent on its own and then, after separation, the orbiter's engines would ignite for the

final climb. Three different booster concepts came under consideration within this

category: the Saturn I-C as proposed by Dale Myers; a winged version of the Saturn V,

proposed by Boeing; and a modified Titan III, proposed by the contractor Martin

Marietta. Although NASA favoured the use of the SI-C, David Vine, Vice President of

41
Martin Marietta, lobbied hard for the Titan III, claiming that development costs would

be low because most of the components were already in production and that a modified

Titan would also provide a basis for active Air Force participation in the shuttle

programme. 132 Boeing's idea, to convert the Saturn V into a booster system that could

be recoverable after a sea ditch or a human-occupied fly-back vehicle, met with mixed

reaction within NASA. Some considered the approach pragmatic because it utilized

technology already in existence, while others were concerned that such a system would

mean that the two-stage, fully reusable shuttle would 'never come to full fruition.'133

This illustration shows different configurations of the Saturn V test vehicles and flight vehicle.

42
Launching of the first human Gemini flight, Gemini-Titan 3.

Parallel burn was a new procedure and presented the 'challenge of a previo usly

untried stacking arrangement.' 134 The concept involved the orbiter's main engines

working simultaneously with the boosters allowing both to provide the necessary thrust

for lift-off. The stacking arrangement was conducive to the use of relatively low

performance boosters, as the orbiter's main engines would perform a larger share of the

boosting, so the staging velocity could be reduced to around 3000 to 4000 feet per

second. In addition, the parallel burn concept meant that verification of main engine

ignition could be made before booster ignition. 135 The technical proposals were due on

43
the December 15, 1971, but as late as November NASA was still undecided on whether

to opt for a series burn or parallel burn configuration.

The type of booster technology to be used, however, was not established until

after Nixon’s decision to approve the programme.

When we first got the go-ahead for the program ... we were still not
clear whether we were going to use liquid boosters ... or solid rockets
and that was a major controversy in the early part of the program. 136

The choices surrounding booster technology at the outset of 1972 were development of

a new liquid fuelled pressure- fed system or modification of a solid propellant rocket. 137

Grumman Aerospace and Boeing Corporation were also promoting the traditional

series-burn, pump-fed liquid system. 138

Recovery versus expendable, coupled with development versus operational

costs, hinged the debate between liquid fuelled and solid fuelled booster technology.

Initial thinking within NASA had centred around reusable liquid systems fashioned for

recovery after a sea ditch. This would keep operational costs low because NASA could

reuse the rockets, but development costs would be high, because they were complex

boosters to fabricate. Hence, NASA also examined expendable solid fuelled booster

systems, because as relatively simple vehicles they would keep development costs low.

However, throwing them away after each launch vastly increased operational costs. 139

Liquid fuelled rocket technology had been the mainstay of NASA's experience in

human space flight. For many, both within NASA and the aerospace industry, it

44
appeared a given that NASA would use liquid propellants for the shuttle's booster

system.

The solid rocket people didn't understand why they were still being
asked to study this and study that because we had never used solid
rockets on a manned program as a major propulsion element. ... they
came to me ... and said you are kind of stringing us along, we could be
doing some other things here. We just can't understand why you are
having us carry on these studies because we don't believe NASA can be
serious about using solid rockets. ... They asked von Braun's opinion, he
told them he felt sure that NASA, when they settled down, they would
make the decision to go with the liquid booster. ... So the contractors
were a little perplexed as to why we were still pushing that way. 140

The liquid booster technologies though, were presenting a number of problems for

NASA's engineers.

The initial approach was to use liquids ... stay with what we know.
However, a group came into the picture which said I think we can
recover these [solid] boosters and reuse them. It [was proving] pretty
difficult with the liquids. Once you get those engines soaked in sea
water the probability of using them over is pretty remote, but the solid,
which doesn't have a lot of complex mechanisms or machinery, has a
chance. And so Thiokol and a couple of other solid people worked on it
... and when they went out and began demonstrating and throwing the
thing into salt water and pulling it out and trying to reuse it, it became
pretty convincing. 141

External political pressures also influenced NASA's booster technology

decision. Although the Office of Management and Budget had agreed not to become

directly involved in any technical judgment after Nixon's announcement, their power

over NASA's budget commitments was an effectual leverage on the agency's

45
technological decision making. Office of Management and Budget Director, George

Shultz told NASA Administrator James Fletcher, early in 1972:

With these very real funding constraints in mind, I believe that NASA
would be well advised to select a shuttle system which minimizes the
risk of cost overruns and allows flexib ility to absorb possible cost
increases within overall funding constraints. Otherwise, a cost overrun
on the shuttle could lead to an undesirable stretch-out of the operational
date for the shuttle or serious cutbacks in other productive NASA
programs which, in turn, could jeopardize the shuttle program. 142

In addition, Congress was forcing NASA to act quickly on a final configuration

commitment. The House Committee on Science and Astronautics had 'demanded a

firm decision' on NASA's choice of booster and shuttle configuration by the time they

appear before the committee on March 16, 1972, 143 which especially concerned

William Lilly, NASA's Comptroller:

In reviewing the approach to the shuttle cost analysis ... we [have]

become a bit apprehensive that some considerations that appear vital to
a well rationalized decision on the shuttle configuration may not be
adequately treated in the time frame which has been established for the
final study effort.'144

In connection with the booster technologies Lilly felt that it was important to expose

'the degree of uncertainty associated with pressure- fed development costs versus solid

development costs,' given the tight budget and lack of flexibility for contingencies. 145

46
 Early in March, NASA Administrator James Fletcher came to the conclusion

that the 'use of solid boosters in the parallel staged configuration represents the

optimum choice from combined technical and budgetary points of view:' 146

The decision concerning liquid or solid boosters was a difficult one. It

involves a trade-off between future benefits ... and earlier savings ...
liquid boosters have lower potential operating costs, while solid boosters
have lower development cost. The decision concerns development risk
which is lower for the solids because the technical unknowns are less,
and also risks in operational costs which favor the solids because the
economic exposure of failing to recover a booster is much less. Another
approach to reaching this decision involved adding all costs together -
development, investment and operating. However the conclusions here
are heavily dependent on the mission model, with the liquid booster
favored if we assume a large number of flights per year, and the solids if
the number of flights per year is less. Based on the results of our
contractor studies and our in- house estimates, and with our great
concern about holding down development costs in these years of tight
fiscal constraint, our decision must be in favor of the solid booster. 147

A meeting between George Low and Donald Rice, of the Office of Management and

Budget on March 7, confirmed that NASA was going to go ahead with the

development of the solid rocket boosters for the shuttle. 148 In announcing the decision,

Fletcher said the development costs would be reduced by $350 million and that the

decision was based on lower development costs at less technical risk. 149

47
Enervation, Resurgence and Ratification
George Low's role as NASA's acting Administrator ended with the appointment of

James Fletcher in March 1971. Fletcher, after a long career in industry as a physicist

and as president of the University of Utah, came to NASA with strong Republican

credentials. Initially he presented a very cynical attitude towards human space flight

and questioned the judgement of NASA's top officials on the need for a shuttle. Within

a short time, however, he had become convinced that approval of the shuttle

programme was essential. 150 With over $4 billion invested in facilities to support

human space flight and NASA's three main Centers, Kennedy, Johnson, and Marshall

almost totally dedicated to it, support was imperative if NASA's organizational

structure was to remain intact.

Within Congress, a continuing rise in unemployment was spurring on a

campaign for increased public spending. The 1970 recession and the refusal of

Congress to hold down public spending meant that the deficit for the fiscal year ending

in June 1971 was $23 billion, far more than in any post-war year except 1968.

Unemployment was up to 6.1 per cent in May and the dollar had steadily grown more

vulnerable in the international exchanges. A flight from the dollar in the money

markets grew to rout proportions, finally leading to the Bank of England requesting

that the US guarantee convertibility of Britain's dollar holdings into gold. In an attempt

to stabilize the economy, on August 15 Nixon made a radical economic policy u-turn

reverting to tight controls, including: a ninety day freeze on wages and prices;

48
suspension of convertibility of the dollar into gold; and a $4.7 billion cut in federal

spending. 151

James Fletcher, [NASA's new Administrator] by a total mistiming went

to see Nixon on the day that the dollar was floated and Nixon said, listen
I don't have $12 billion ... do something for half. 152

The Office of Management and Budget, equally concerned to limit budget requests

going to the Congress confirmed the reduced sum. The two-stage shuttle that top

NASA officials had been pushing for the past two years had an estimated peak funding

level of over $2 billion.

Top NASA officials had earmarked December 1971 as the deadline for a

presidential decision on the shuttle. Many in NASA were growing concerned about

both the costs and psychological effects of a stretch out. Holding the industrial teams

together would become problematic if the White House and Congress deferred the

programme for another year. Once it was clear that the economic climate would not

sustain a $12 billion programme, Fletcher instructed the Phase-B contractors to develop

alternative design configurations tha t would cost no more than $5 billion to develop. 153

This was no easy task as North American Rockwell's Shuttle Manager, Bastian Hello,

reflected:

We were directed to move over to the other vehicle, and proposal time
was hurrying along and we had some catch up work to do. So it became
... intense ... we were given some three months to propose and that
became a nightmare. 154

49
In addition to the new Phase-B contracts, Fletcher also let out a new contract to

Mathematica to study all the alternative designs emanating from the extensions. The

Office of Management and Budget forced the first study upon NASA – they went into

the second voluntarily in the hope that it would justify an economical and practical

programme. 155

The key factor in the economic analysis was market demand; the number of

flights. Accurate mission models were elusive and scenarios for future flight traffic

rates over the 1979-90 time-period varied considerably. 156 Indeed forecasting future

demand was an impossible task and so political considerations drove it as much as

anything else. It was believed that the agency's 'position would be significantly

weakened' 157 if Mathematica's economic analysis eliminated the space station. Some

models, therefore, included the space station while others simply escala ted the

commercial demand. The debate over the number of flights persisted for some time

before Mathematica eventually settled on a 514- mission model for its study. 158

Controversy, nevertheless, persisted, with traffic models and estimates of operational

costs continually modified and attacked as the programme progressed.

By the end of the summer, the Mathematica study had revealed that even if

operational costs rose to $10 million per launch all but 5 per cent of the shuttle's

planned missions would be cost effective. 159 The configuration favoured by Klaus

Heiss, who was leading the Mathematica staff, was a parallel burn Thrust Assisted

Orbiter System based on a design first derived at McDonnell Douglas. 160

50
 ... WE CONCLUDE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TAOS
[Thrust Assisted Orbiter System] SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM IS
ECONOMICALLY JUSTIFIED, within a level of space activities
between 300 and 360 Shuttle flights in the 1979-1990 period, or about
25 to 30 Space Shuttle flights per year, well within the U.S. Space
Program including NASA and DOD. 161

Resistance to the thrust assisted orbiter configuration primarily came from Marshall

because it eliminated the need for a future human piloted booster, which Marshall

hoped to build. 162

Heiss's strongest recommendation came in the form of a memo sent to Fletcher

on October 28, 1971. In it, he stated that the Mathematica studies showed the thrust

assisted orbiter to be the economically preferred choice. Among the reasons given for

its economic superiority were: lower development costs of less than $6 billion; lower

development risks; equal capability with the originally proposed system; elimination of

the need for an immediate decision on a reusable booster; and the assurance of an early

programme definition and thus a purpose to the agency. 163

Although the final Mathematica report was not due for release until the end of

January 1972, the memo gave a clear indication to Fletcher of its conclusions. Armed

with this information and under pressure from the Office of Management and Budge t,

the Office of Science and Technology and the Presidents Scientific Advisory

Committee, the Program Office began to push hard for the thrust assisted orbiter

configuration. 164

The debate continued right through November and December, but TAOS

eventually emerged as the leading candidate presented to President Nixon on January

51
5, 1972. During that 40- minute meeting, Nixon stated that both military and civilian

applications should be emphasised if the programme was to be accepted. He also

appeared to like the idea that 'ordinary people' would be able to fly in the shuttle. Low

and Fletcher stressed 'the fact that the shuttle is not a $7 billion toy, that it is indeed

useful, and that it is a good investment'. 165 Nixon replied:

... that even if it were not a good investment, we would have to do it

anyway, because space flight is here to stay. Men are flying in space
now and will continue to fly in space, and we'd best be part of it. 166

Nixon thus accepted the programme on the terms set out by Fletcher and Low and on

the same day he publicly announced

I have decided today that the United States should proceed at once with
the development of an entirely new type of space transportation system
designed to help transform the space frontier of the 1970s into familiar
territory, easily accessible for human endeavour in the 1980s and '90s.
... It will revolutionize transportation into near space, by routinizing it. It
will take the astronomical costs out of astronautics. ... The new year
1972 is a year of the conclusion for America's current series of manned
flights to the moon. ... they bring us to an important decision point - a
point of assessing what our space horizons are ... and of determining
where we go from here. ... the space shuttle program is the right next
step for America to take, in moving out from our present beach head in
the sky to achieve a real working presence in space. 167

Nixon also sent a letter to the chairman of his New Hampshire campaign committee on

that day announcing his candidacy for reelection. 168

52
President Richard M. Nixon and Dr. James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, discussed the proposed Space Shuttle
vehicle in San Clemente, California, on January 5, 1972.

Unbeknown to NASA, senior White House staff members had started to

support a shuttle development programme. Although Nixon's economic policies were

slowing down the rate of inflation, unemployment continued to hover around 6 per

cent. While much of the domestic bureaucracy was busy implementing the new

economic policy, a few technicians at the Office of Management and Budget were

assigned to develop statistical models plotting the effect of economic conditions on the

outcomes of presidential elections. The study's results not surprisingly showed that

rapid economic growth benefited an incumbent president seeking re-election. 169 Nixon

53
did not need statistical models to know that falling unemployment in 1972 would

increase his chances of reelection. He thus decided to plunge ahead with increased

federal spending to produce boom conditions in the election year. 170 The approval of

the shuttle programme may well have been part of that agenda. It is certainly believed

that Peter Flanigan, a White House policy level staffer, persuaded Nixon to go ahead

with the shuttle because the continuing depression in the aerospace industry and that

the relatively high rate of unemployment among the national pool of scientists and

engineers would soon become election issues. 171 Whatever Nixon's motivations were,

the shuttle's proponents had finally cleared the first hurdle, presidential approval, and

the shuttle's development was programmed into NASA's FY 1973 budget.

Nixon's January 5 decision, to commit $5.15 billion to the development of a

partially reusable shuttle initially prompted an adverse response in Congress. As

Representative Don Fuqua (Democrat, Florida) recalled, many members of the

congressional space committees were perturbed by NASA's conversion to a partially

reusable system:

We had just finished defending one configuration on the Floor and the n
suddenly they announced they were going to change it. ... We all wanted
to know how long they had known they were going to change and how
much of this kind of thing was going on behind the committee's back.
They explained the reasons behind the changes, and everybody calmed
down. 172

Despite the initial consternation over NASA's "sudden" shift, strong allies quickly

mobilized in support of the new configuration against a notably weak opposition. After

54
a morning of government and industry witnesses describing how necessary the shuttle

was for America's future, Representative Bella Abzug (Democrat, New York) told the

Manned Space Flight Subcommittee:

Now that NASA has reached the Moon, it is seeking a new, similarly
glamorous toy for its next project and it feels that the Space Shuttle
would be just the ticket. ... I would remind you that the President
recently vetoed as fiscally irresponsible a bill that would provide only
$2 billion for child care Centers, a mundane but urgent issue for the
millions of working parents in this country. 173

Defenders of the shuttle counteracted such arguments by portraying the programme as

one solution to America's rising unemployment problem. Support for Nixon’s decision

came from the American Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (AFL-CIO) executive council, which Congress to defend the programme

and its potential 50 000 jobs. 174 NASA's authorization bill thus passed with a

comfortable majority: 277-60.175 Opposition in the Senate also found themselves in a

similarly weak position. A bipartisan coalition of 61 Senators successfully defeated

Walter Mondale's amendment to cut shuttle funding, which only received 21 votes. 176

The shuttle plans had thus passed through both houses giving NASA the sanction to

proceed.

However, 1972 was an election year and the award of a multi-billion dollar

project during such a volatile period did not go unchallenged. NASA's selection of

North American Rockwell sent out minor shock waves, which caused some factional

eruptions in Congress. Jean Westwood, Chair of the Democratic National Committee,

55
considered that NASA's preference for North American Rockwell had come from more

than just practical considerations. Five directors of North American Rockwell had

contributed to Nixon's 1968 election campaign, so Westwood claimed that the

Rockwell award represented the 'latest, and perhaps most blatant example of President

Nixon's calculated use of the American tax payers dollars for his own re-election

purposes.' 177 As such, Westwood pushed for an investigation into the relationship

between contributions from directors of North American Rockwell to the presidential

election campaign and NASA's award of the shuttle contract. 178 North American

Rockwell declined to make any comment on the allegations, but NASA was eager to

deny that politics played any part in the selection process and stated that North

American Rockwell was 'chosen on technical and management merits alone.' 179 Within

Congress Westwood received severe criticisms from her fellow Democrats.

Representative Olin Teague (Democrat, Texas), claimed the shuttle contract was 'one

of the most thoroughly and objective studied contract awards in any recent major

government program.' 180 The call for an investigation was seen by others as a political

manoeuvre to force ground between Nixon and one of the Democratic candidates,

George McGovern

As in 1968, the continued involvement of the US in Vietnam dominated the

1972 election. Nixon's 'secret plan' to end the war in six months and ensure 'peace with

honour' had proven disastrous. The Administration appeared no closer to a solution at

the end of their four-year term, in spite of their detente and Vietnamization policies. 181

56
A resolution to Vietnam, therefore, clouded many other issues during the election

campaign, including Watergate.

An overwhelming majority in all the Republican primaries ensured Nixon his

nomination to stand again. 182 The Democratic primaries had furnished a sufficient

majority for Senator George McGovern to stand as Nixon's adversary: a nomination

that had surprised many because of McGovern's radical platform. The mainstay of

McGovern's manifesto was his proposals for a 'peace economy', which involved: the

immediate pull out of US troops from Vietnam; the 'phasing down' of military spending

and a corresponding increase in government spending on welfare, education, health,

housing and other civilian projects; and the tightening up of the tax structure which was

perceived as 'only benefiting big business.' For the aerospace industry in particular,

McGovern's plan was for conversion, with military production replaced by civilian

production. 183 Although NASA was a civilian agency and prided itself on its civilian

status, McGovern believed the shuttle to be primarily a military programme. Two

weeks after Nixon's announcement to develop the shuttle, McGovern told a Florida

campaign audience that if elected he 'wouldn't manufacture a foolish project like the

Space Shuttle to provide jobs' and that furthermore he considered the programme to be

'an enormous waste of money.' 184 The shuttle had thus become part of the divide

between the McGovern and Nixon tickets.

An early campaign speech from Vice President Spiro Agnew also focused on

the shuttle as an election issue. Agnew launched a vicious attack on the shuttle's critics

labelling them as 'reactionaries, utopians and unrealistic' in arguing that spending on

57
space technology should be redirected to social problems. Such policies he argued,

would 'bring to a virtual halt this country's technological progress.' 185 The advancement

of science and technology, the accumulation of new knowledge, spin-off technology

and investment in high skilled employment were all well rehearsed compositions of

promotional rhetoric for the space programme and Agnew cited them all as examples

of the 'benefits from the space program that will improve the quality of life for all

mankind.' 186

On the side of the Nixon campaign, was a large portion of the aerospace

industry. The shuttle's relationship to jobs in that sector and its embodiment of

scientific and technical progress meant that McGovern's intentions received a hostile

reaction from many in the business. One of its public voices, Aviation Week and Space

Technology took a strong stance against McGovern in its editorial at the time:

His campaign speeches make it clear, that if elected, he intends not only
to wipe out the future defense posture of this nation, but also strip its
new technology to bare bones. 187

The diatribe went on to claim that McGovern stood against 'every major aerospace

technical development program including the shuttle,' and that his policies would

'wreak havoc upon the US.' In their view, 'for an aerospace worker to vote for Sen.

McGovern would be to vote for self-destruction'. 188 Much the same conclusion had also

been drawn within the higher echelons of the aerospace unions. The American

Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were so

58
vexed by McGovern's nomination that for the first time in its history the executive

council adjourned without voting for any presidential endorsement. 189

The AFL-CIO's declaration of neutrality however, did not prevent considerable

labour support for McGovern, even among central labour bodies constitutionally

subject to official policy. 190 Delegates to the 1972 International Association of

Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) convention voted to endorse McGovern

despite a resolution urging the IAM to remain neutral because of McGovern's

opposition to the Super-Sonic Transport programme, the Lockheed loan and the B-1

bomber. Nixon found no support among the IAM delegates. 191

Nevertheless, Nixon had the support of his "silent majority". A Gallup poll at

the end of August put Nixon in the lead with a 64 percent share of the vote and had

McGovern trailing behind with only 30 per cent. 192 Kissinger's secret talks in Vietnam

with Le Duc Tho had almost reached a point of agreement, inspiring Kissinger to

announce on October 26, just in time for the election, that 'peace is at hand.' Despite

McGovern's plea to the electorate, to not 'let this man fool you again', 60 per cent of the

voters chose Nixon in what was the largest election victory in modern American

history. 193

Although Nixon's Administration could not be described as ardent champions

of the human space programme, a Republican triumph assured relatively strong support

for NASA's shuttle programme. Presumably, given McGovern's rhetoric, the shuttle

would have been a symbolic peace economy victim. Even assuming that McGovern

59
could not have forced through all of his radical policies it is conceivable that a

Democrat win would have resulted in the programme's cancellation.

1
David Baker, 'Evolution of The Space Shuttle: Part 1' Spaceflight (June 1973), p 202.
2
Walter McDougall, The Heavens and The Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York:
Basic Books, 1985), pp 420-22; Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995); pp 139-141; Henry Lambright, Presidential
Management of Science and Technology: The Johnson Presidency (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1985), pp 142-150.
3
Bruce Murray, Journey Into Space: The First Thirty Years of Space Exploration (New York, London,
W.W. Norton & Company, 1990).
4
Jerry Grey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow and Co Inc, 1979), p 66.
5
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May 1995.
6
Sylvia Fries, '2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's Space Station System,'
Marcel Lafollette, Jeffrey Stine, (ed) Technology and Choice: A Technology and Culture Reader
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), p 234.
7
A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program, Report to the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics by a special committee on space technology, The Working Group
on Vehicular Program, July 18, 1958 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC); The Long
Range Plan of The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Program Planning and
Evaluation, December 16, 1959 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC); James Hansen,
Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept
(Washington DC, NASA History Office, Monographs in Aerospace History Series #4, December 1995).
8
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May 1995.
9
William Normyle, 'Large Station May Emerge As Unwritten US Goal,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (March 10, 1969), pp 103-109.
10
NASA changed this process as the programme progressed re-terming Phase-A as preliminary analysis,
and combining Phases C and D into one. Hans Mark, Arnold Levine, The Management of Research
Institutions: A Look at Government Laboratories (Washington DC, NASA, Scientific and Technical
Information Branch, 1984), p 93.
11
'Reusable Space Shuttle Effort Gains Momentum,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (October 27,
1969), pp 22-24.
12
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document: Level 1, Office of Manned Space Flight, July 1,
1970 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC).
13
William Normyle, 'NASA Aims at 100-Man Station,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (February
24, 1969), pp 16-17; William Normyle, 'Large Station May Emerge As Unwritten US Goal,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (March 10, 1969), pp 103-109.
14
'Shuttle Group Readies Proposal Requests,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 19, 1970),
pp 17-18.
15
Hans Mark, interview with the author, Texas, 8 September 1995.
16
Ronald Segal, America's Receding Future: The Collision of Creed and Reality (England:
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1968), pp 159-60, 242-244, 252-258, 260-261, 275-278; Noam
Chomsky, introduction to American Power and The New Mandarins (London, Chatto & Windus Ltd,
1969); James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p 205, 219; Michael Bradley, 'The Inexorable Rise
of the National Dept,' Philip Davis, (ed) An American Quarter Century: US Politics from Vietnam to
Clinton (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp 56-57.

60
17
The first Gallop poll after the Democratic convention showed that Nixon had a substantial lead with
43 per cent of the vote. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson
Ltd, 1978), p 318.
18
For a detailed analysis of the establishment of NASA see, Enid Schoettle, 'The Establishment of
NASA,' Lakoff, (ed) Knowledge and Power (New York: Free Press, Collier-Macmillian Ltd, 1966). For
detailed histories of the Apollo space programme see, Mary Holman, The Political Economy of the
Space Program (Pacific Books, 1974); John Logsdon, The Decision To Go The Moon: Project Apollo
and The National Interest (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1970); Walter McDougall, The Heavens and The
Earth; Dale Carter, The Final Frontier:The Rise and Fall of the American Rocket State (London, New
York: Verso, 1988); Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo.
19
Dale Carter, The Final Frontier p 127; John Logsdon, The Decision To Go To The Moon pp 21-22;
Enid Schoettle, 'The Establishment of NASA,' pp 185-186, 220-229; Walter McDougall, The Heavens
and The Earth pp 141, 148-149; H. Young, B. Silcock, P. Dunn, Journey to Tranquillity: The Long
Competitive Struggle To Reach The Moon (New Yo rk: Doubleday & Co Inc, 1970), p 53.
20
As Walter McDougall has demonstrated, the Eisenhower Administration had been anything but
complacent since the Technologies Capabilities Panel Report in 1955, accelerating research and
development of both missiles and satellite technology. None of this work could be made public for
security reasons. Such concerns with space strategy over propaganda left Eisenhower open to attack, but
as McDougall emphasises, loss of public face was less important than loss of potential secret satellite
intelligence. In practice Sputnik proved strategically beneficial to the US since it precluded potential
Soviet challenges to the legality of American satellite overflight. Walter McDougall, The Heavens and
the Earth pp 111, 117-124, 128, 221, 224.
21
Dale Carter, The Final Frontier p 158.
22
For a detailed analysis of the Apollo fire and its aftermath see Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo pp
142-188.
23
Ibid
24
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May1995.
25
Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth pp 373-374; Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo pp
106-107. The Manned Spacecraft Center was renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center on February
17, 1973. Further references will cite the Manned Spacecraft Center as the Johnson Space Center
notwithstanding the time period.
26
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May1995.
27
Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo pp 200-205.
28
Mary Holman, The Political Economy of The Space Program p 5.
29
Astronauts Armstrong and Aldrin, landed the Lunar Module to the Moons surface, leaving Collins in
the Command Module. Armstrong became the first human to set foot on the Moon at 9:56 pm (EDT).
They remained on the surface for a period of 21 hours, returning to a splash down in the Pacific Ocean
on July 24. Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA Historical Data Book Volume III: Programs and Projects 1969-
1978 (Washington DC: The NASA History Series, Scientific and Technical Information Division, 1988),
p 74.
30
Francis Hoban, Where Do You Go After You've Been To The Moon: A Case Study of NASA's
Pioneering Effort at Cost Control with Prescriptions for Today (Virginia: Draft Manuscript, George
Mason University, 1995), p 1.
31
Dale Carter, The Final Frontier. p 225.
32
'Space Effort Attacked,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (January 5, 1970) p 16.
33
Hans Mark, The Space Station: A Personal Journey (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p 37;
Hans Mark, interview with the author, Texas, 8 September 1995.
34
Spiro Agnew, quoted in Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice: The Space Shuttle
1969-1972 (MIT, Massachsetts: Unpublished MS Dissertation, 1982), p 20.
35
Hans Mark, The Space Station p 37
36
Francis Hoban, Where Do You Go After You've Been To The Moon p 3.

61
37
The "Think Group" consisted of George Low; Wernher von Braun, Chief of NASA Planning Robert
Jastrow, Director of the Goddard Institute for Space Studies; Homer Newell, Associate Administrator;
Edward Cortright, Langley Research Center Director; Richard McCurdy, Associate Administrator for
Organization and Management; and others as invited. The group spent a great deal of time debating the
value and appeal of watching an astronaut pushing a boulder into Hadley Rille. The slow motion fall of a
huge rock into a deep canyon at one-sixth gravity would prove incredible, but the scenario was dropped
when the danger was pointed out of the astronaut falling in behind the boulder. Several attempts at
viewer stimulation were made, including the feather and hammer drop, racing the Lunar Rover and
playing Golf. These stunts tended to reinforce public scepticism rather than capture their attention. Ibid.
pp 2-6.
38
M. Smith, 'The First Quarter-Century of Space Flight,' M. Schwarz, P. Stares, Ed 'Space - Past,
Present, and Future' Futures, 14 (October 1982), p 356.
39
Letter to Senator William Proxmire from George Low, September 28, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archives, Washington DC).
40
STG included representatives from NASA, Defence Secretary Malvin Laird, Secretary of State
William Rogers, Science Advisor Lee DuBridge and representatives from the State Department, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget. Input was also received from members of
Congress, the National Academy of Sciences, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
private citizens and industry. Normyle W. 'Broad New Space Program Urged,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 11, 1969) pp 22-23.
41
The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions For The Future, Space Task Group report to the
President, September 1969 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC), p 19.
42
The PSAC had released a report in early 1967 entitled The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period,
which recommended that studies should concentrate on more economic systems for the delivery of
payloads to orbit. The impact of the report was minimal as it had come at a time when the Johnson
Administration was preoccupied with the escalating Vietnam war. The United States poured more
money into the war in 1967 alone than it spent on the entire Apollo programme.
43
Hans Mark, The Space Station p 33.
44
Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 55.
45
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May1995.
46
Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 55.
47
William Normyle, 'Broad New Space Program Urged,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (August
11, 1969), p 23.
48
James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change pp 205-211; Michael Bradley 'The Inexorable
Rise of the National Dept,' Philip Davis, (ed) An American Quarter Century: US Politics from Vietnam
to Clinton (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1995), pp 56-57; John Kenneth
Galbraith, The New Industrial State (England: Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1977), pp 96-97, 243,
250-262.
49
The Office of Management and Budget replaced the less powerful Bureau of the Budget early in 1970.
50
Claude Barfield, Ibid.; Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 27-28.
51
John Logsdon, 'The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,' Space Policy (May, 1986), pp 103-119;
John Logsdon, 'The Space Shuttle Program: A policy Failure?' Science (May 30, 1986), pp 1099-1105.
52
Claude Barfield, 'Intense Debate, Cost Cutting Precedes White House Decision to Back Shuttle.'
53
David Baker, 'Evolution of the Space Shuttle,' Spaceflight p 230.
54
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, 7 September 1995.
55
Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 274.
56
Jerry Grey, Enterprise pp 65-66; John Logsdon, The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,' p 106.
57
Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier. p 285.
58
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author dated 16 April 1996.
59
Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle p 67.
60
Adelbert Tischler, letter to the author dated 16 April 1996.

62
61
William Normyle, 'NASA Asks Quick Shuttle Replies,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(February 23, 1970), pp 16-17; Le Roy Day, interview with author, Maryland, June 29, 1995; Robert
Thompson, interview with author, Texas, September 7, 1995; 'Mini Shuttle Proposed as Interim Project,'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (February 23, 1970), p 16.
62
It was named after the Douglas DC-3 aeroplane, which had become renowned for reliability and
simplicity of design.
63
Max Faget, interview with the author, Texas, 9 September 1995.
64
Letter to Adelbert Tischler from George Mueller, August 25, 1969 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC); LeRoy Day, interview with author, June 29, 1995.
65
Grumman001/310595; William Normyle, 'NASA Asks Quick Shuttle Replies,' Aviation Week and
Space Technology (February 23, 1970), pp 16-17.
66
Letter from Dale Myers to Thomas Paine, June 29, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington
DC).
67
Letter from Milton Thompson to Dr W. Von Braun, November 18, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
68
Ibid
69
Charles Donlan, memorandum for the record, discussion of the space shuttle program with Dr. Low,'
December 2, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
70
Dale Myers, quoted in Zack Strickland, 'Expendable Booster Gains Favor As NASA Studies Phased
Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 21, 1971), p 19.
71
Letter from Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Chairman The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
National Academy of Engineering, to George Low, December 18, 1970 (National Academy of Sciences
Archive, Washington DC).
72
Charles Donlan, memorandum for the record, trip report on visit to Phase-B contractors with Dale
Myers on December 21, 1970, dated January 4, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
73
Ibid
74
Bastian Hello, interview with the author, Maryland, 27 April 1995.
75
Letter from Milton Thompson to Dr W. Von Braun, November 18, 1970 (NASA History Office
Archive, Washington DC).
76
LeRoy Day, letter to the author dated 29 May 1996.
77
Roger Launius, 'NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72,' The Historian 57
(Autumn 1994) p 25.
78
Paine actually left office in September 1970 although his intentions were well known within NASA
months before. Hans Mark, The Space Station p 38; W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo p 208. For
background on the resignation of James Webb in 1968 and the appointment of Thomas Paine see pp 201-
202, 204, 206-207.
79
Hans Mark, interview with the author, Texas, 8 September 1995.
80
Robert Freitag, letter to the author dated 1 June 1996.
81
James Fletcher, banquet address before the Antelope Valley Board of Trade, Where Do We Go From
Here in Space? Lancaster, California, October 18, 1974 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington
DC), p 9.
82
The shuttle was always a key to the space station and the shuttle's systems and configurations were
driven, in part, by the station's requirements. Robert Frietag, letter to the author dated 1 June 1996.
83
LeRoy Day, abstract to a collection of papers presented at The Space Shuttle Symposium, October 16-
17, 1969 (Smithsonian Museum of Natural History, Washington DC).
84
Donlan Charles, memorandum for the record, discussion of the space shuttle program with Dr. Low,
December 2, 1970 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC).
85
Ibid
86
Letter to Clinton Anderson from George Low, May 28, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
87
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May 1995.
88
Roger Launius, 'NASA and the Decision to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72' p 26.

63
89
Letters to Walter Mondale and William Proxmire from George Low, September 28, 1970 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
90
Letter to Walter Mondale from George Low, April 28, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
91
Letter to Clinton Anderson from George Low, May 28, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC), emphasis in the original.
92
Hans Mark, The Space Station pp 39-40.
93
John Logsdon, 'The Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,' Space Policy 2 (May 1986), pp 103-119;
John Logsdon, 'The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?' Science (May 30, 1986), pp 1099-1105.
94
John Logsdon, The Decision To Go To The Moon pp 28, 30; J. Manno, 'The Military History of the
Space Shuttle,' Science for the People (September/October, 1983), p 7.
95
Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth pp 197-200.
96
Ibid pp 312-324.
97
Howard McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the US Space
Program (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1993), pp 14-17.
98
This was, in part, due to the fact that the aerospace companies working for the Air Force were the
same four under contract with NASA: General Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and North
American Rockwell. 'Air Force Pushing Studies of Reusable Space Shuttle,' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 11, 1969), p 25.
99
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 100-101.
100
Report of the Ad-Hoc Subpanel on Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology, September 14, 1966
(NASA History Office Archive, Washington DC), pp 1-8.
101
Bill Sneed, interview with the author, Alabama, 21 August 1995.
102
Joining the separate functions of area surveillance and close-look photography into one satellite was
responsible for the increased size and weight of this new system. Increasing the length of the satellite
made possible increases in focal length of the camera, which when combined with increases in the
camera aperture provided new a new level of ground resolution. T. Greenwood, 'Reconnaissance and
Arms Control' Progress in Arms Control? (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co, 1979), p 99.
103
The increase in diameter represented early thinking within the Air Force on the size of a third stage,
or space tug that would deliver satellites to higher synchronous orbits.
104
Max Faget, interview with the author, Texas, 9 September 1995.
105
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice pp 111-113; Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle pp
67-69.
106
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document Level 1, Change No.2, Office of Manned Space
Flight, December 3, 1970 (NASA History Office Archives, Washington DC), p 3.
107
Bernard Etkin, Dynamics of Flight: Stability and Control (New York, John Wiley & Sons Inc,
Second Edition, 1982), p 3.
108
James Young, Jimmy Underwood, Ernest Hillje, Arthur Whitnah, Paul Romere, Joe Gamble, Barney
Roberts, George Ware, William Scallion, Bernard Spencer, James Arrington, Deloy Olsen, 'The
Aerodynamic Challenges of the Design and Development of the Space Shuttle,' Norman Chaffee, (ed)
Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 1 (Houston, Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342,
1985), pp 209-263.
109
Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It pp 18, 34; A.C. Kermode, An
Introduction to Aeronautical Engineering: Vol 1, The Mechanics of Flight (London, Sir Issac Pitman &
Sons, Ltd, 1940).
110
Richard O'Lone, 'Shuttle Test Pace Intensifies at Aimes,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (June
24, 1974), p 71.
111
James Young, Jimmy Underwood, Ernest Hillje, Arthur Whitnah, Paul Romere, Joe Gamble, Barney
Roberts, George Ware, William Scallion, Bernard Spencer, James Arrington, Deloy Olsen, 'The
Aerodynamic Challenges of the Design and Development of the Space Shuttle,' Norman Chaffee, (ed)
Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 1 (Houston, Texas, NASA, JSC, Conference Publication 2342,
1985), pp 209-263.

64
112
Ibid
113
Ibid; Richard Kline, interview with the author, Washington DC, 31 May 1995.
114
Hans Mark, interview with the author, Texas, 8 September 1995.
115
Letter from Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, National Academy of Engineering, to George Low, April 22,
1971 (National Acadeny of Sciences Archive, Washington DC).
116
Letter to Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, Chairman The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
National Academy of Engineering, from George Low, May 21, 1971 (National Academy of Sciences
Archive, Washington DC).
117
Letter from James Fletcher to Dr O'Brian, June 16, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive, Washington
DC); Letter from James Fletcher to Robert Seamans, June 16, 1971 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC); Strickland Z. 'Expendable Booster Gains Favor As NASA studies Phased Shuttle'
Aviation Week and Space Technology (June 21, 1971) p 19.
118
Robert Thompson, The Space Shuttle: Some Key Program Decisions, American Institute for
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Von Karman Lecture, 22nd Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Reno, Nevada,
January 9-12, 1984 (supplied to the author by Robert Thompson), pp 3-4; Michael Yaffee, 'Program
Changes Boost Grumman Shuttle' Aviation Week and Space Technology July 12, 1971), pp 36-39;
119
Robert Thompson, interview with the author, Texas, 7 September 1995.
120
Richard Kline, interview with the author, Washington DC, 31 May 1995.
121
Christopher Kraft, interview with the author, Texas, 1 September 1995.
122
Dennis Jenkins, Space Shuttle pp 225-226; W.H. Morita, (ed) Space Shuttle System Summary p 28.
123
James Odem, interview with the author, Alabama, 21 August 1995; James Kingsbury, interview with
the author, Alabama, 16 August 1995.
124
Ibid
125
Ibid
126
Ibid; 'Shuttle Weight Cut 20 Percent Over Last Year,' Defense/Space Business Daily (March 1, 1974),
p 5; Charlie Dill, J.C. Young, B.B. Roberts, M.K. Craig, J.T. Hamilton, W.W. Boyle, 'The Space Shuttle
Ascent Vehicle Aerodynamic Challenges: Configuration, Design and Data Base Development,' Norman
Chaffee, (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 1 pp 151-152.
127
James Odem, interview with the author, Alabama, 21 August 1995.
128
Robert Thompson, Von Karman Lecture pp 3-4; M. Yaffee 'Program Changes Boost Grumman
Shuttle' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 12, 1971) pp 36-39;
129
Mass ratio is a design parameter, which relates the total mass at ignition and the final rocket mass at
burn-out.
130
Max Faget, interview with the author, Texas, 9 September 1995; Myron Uman, email to the author, 7
October 1996; Myron Uman, interview with the author, Washington DC, 24 April 1995; Adelbert
Tischler, interview with the author, Washington DC, 3 May 1995; Adelbert Tischler, letters to the author
dated 13 November and 4 December 1996 Lyn Dutton. Etal Military Space pp 30-36; Arthur C. Clark.
The Exploration of Space pp 27-28; Joseph Thiboaux. 'Propulsion and Power Systems Perspective'
Norman Chaffee. (ed) Space Shuttle Technical Conference, Part 2. (Houston Texas, NASA, JSC,
Conference Publication 2342, 1985) pp 581-584.
131
Single stage to orbit vehicles are only just recently becoming a distinct possibility with developments
in new high-strength, light-weight materials and fabrication techniques. Adelbert Tischler, letter to the
author dated 16 June 1997
132
Z. Strickland, 'Titan 3L Studied As Expendable Booster' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(August 2, 1971) pp 40-41.
133
Ibid
134
Robert Thompson, Von Karmen Lecture p 8.
135
NASA. Technology Influence on the Space Shuttle Development p 5-20.
136
NASA007/260695.
137
William Hieronymus, 'Three Shuttle Booster Concept Studied,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(January 10, 1972), pp 46-48; 'Shuttle Decision Hailed as NASA Victory,' Aviation Week and Space

65
Technology (January 10, 1972), pp 15-16; Zack Strickland, 'Pressure-Fed Booster Explore,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (January 24, 1972), pp 40-41.
138
The Grumman\Boeing concept was based on a modified Boeing S-1C, which they claimed could be
developed for about half the cost of a liquid pressure-fed system and would entail less technological risk.
They also cited an advantage of less weight over the pressure-fed system, 300 000 pounds as compared
to 1 million pounds, because it would not need thick walls to withstand tank pressurization. Despite the
obvious benefits associated with thrust to weight specifications, reduction in weight was considered less
of a risk because there was great uncertainty at the time as to what would happen to a million pound
pressure-fed booster on water impact. Michael Yaffee, 'Alternate Booster Evaluation Set,' Aviation Week
and Space Technology (January 24, 1972), pp 36-37.
139
William Hieronymus, 'Three Shuttle Booster Concept Studied,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(January 10, 1972), pp 46-48; 'Shuttle Decision Hailed as NASA Victory' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (January 10, 1972), pp 15-16; Zack Strickland, 'Pressure-Fed Booster Explore,' Aviation
Week and Space Technology (January 24, 1972), pp 40-41.
140
LeRoy Day, interview with the author, Maryland, 29 June 1995.
141
Robert Frietag, interview with the author, Virginia, 5 June 1995.
142
Letter from George Shultz, Director of the OMB to James Fletcher, February 16, 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
143
Letter from James Fletcher to Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB, March 6, 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
144
Letter from William Lilly to Dale Myers, February 11, 1972 (NASA History Office Archive,
Washington DC).
145
Ibid
146
Letter from James Fletcher to Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director, OMB, March 6, 1972 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washington DC).
147
Ibid
148
George Low, memorandum for the record, meeting with Don Rice, March 8, 1972 (NASA History
Office Archive, Washington DC).
149
Zack Strickland, 'Single Shuttle Contractor Planned' Aviation Week and Space Technology (March
20, 1972), pp 14-15.
150
Jerry Grey, Enterprise p 71; Joseph Trento, Prescription for Disaster pp 105-106; John Logsdon
John, 'Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,' p 107.
151
James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change pp 219-225.
152
Hans Mark, interview with the author, Texas, 8 September 1995.
153
The Grumman/Boeing team and Lockheed also received Phase-B extension contracts even though
they had not technically participated in Phase-B.
154
Bastian Hello, interview with the author, Maryland, 27 April 1995.
155
Grey Jerry. Enterprise pp 78-79.
156
Memorandum from Dale Myers to Deputy Associate Administrator, Planning, June 17, 1971 (NASA
History Office Archive, Washing ton DC). Flight rates varied from 492 to 732.
157
Ibid
158
Heiss K.P. Morgenstern O. Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System: Volume 1.
159
The two-stage fully-reusable configuration had a projected per-launch cost of $4.6 million.
160
LeRoy Day, letter to the author dated 5 May 1996.
161
Heiss K.P. Morgenstern O. Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System: Volume 1. p 1-11.
Emphasis in original.
162
LeRoy Day, letter to the author dated 5 May 1996.
163
Scott Pace, Engineering Design and Political Choice p 40.
164
LeRoy Day, letter to the author dated 5 May 1996.
165
George Low, memorandum for the record, January 12, 1972 (NASA History Office, Washington
DC).
166
Ibid

66
167
Statement by President Richard Nixon, press release from the Office of the White House Press
Secretary, January 5, 1972 (National Air and Space Museum Archive, Washington DC).
168
Nixon Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon p 541.
169
Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1978) p
136.
170
James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change p 226.
171
Francis Hoban, interview with the author, Virginia, 15 May 1995.
172
Don Fuqua, quoted in Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 289.
173
Bella Abzug, quoted in Ibid. p 290.
174
'AFL-CIO Backs Space Shuttle' The Machinist (March 2, 1972) p 1.
175
Ibid pp 292-293; 'Senate Vote Coming on Space Shuttle' The Machinist (May 4, 1972), p 3; Jeffrey
Banks, 'The Space Shuttle,' Linda Cohen, Roger Noll, (ed) The Technology Pork Barrel (Washington
DC, The Brookings Institute, 1991), p 203.
176
'Shuttle Vote Brightens Aerospace Job Outlook' The Machinist (May 18, 1972), p 1.
177
Jean Westwood, quoted in 'The Democratic National Committee' Aviation Week and Space
Technology (August 7, 1972), p 15.
178
The five identified by Jean Westwood were: J.L Atwood, contributed $2000; George Karch, $1000;
Frederick Larkin Jr, $1000; Henry Mudd, $3000; and Willard Rockwell, $1000 (1972 dollars), Ibid.
179
Zack Strickland, 'Shuttle costs Remain $5 billion' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 31,
1972), pp 12-13.
180
Olin Teauge, quoted in 'The Democratic National Committee,' Aviation Week and Space Technology
(August 7, 1972), p 15.
181
Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1980 (Middlesex, England,
Penguin Books Ltd, Second Revised Edition, 1981), pp 308-334.
182
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon p 544.
183
George McGovern, An American Journey: The Presidential Campaign Speeches of George
McGovern (New York, Random House, 1974).
184
George McGovern, quoted in Ken Hechler, Towards the Endless Frontier p 289.
185
Spiro Agnew, address by the Vice President of the United States at the Florida Jaycees State
Convention, Daytona Beach, Florida, January 29, 1972 (Kennedy Space Center Archive, Florida), pp
1,2.
186
Ibid pp 5,6.
187
R. Hotz, 'Editorial,' Aviation Week and Space Technology (July 31, 1972), p 7.
188
Ibid
189
Conservative politics prevailed within the AFL-CIO executive long after Vietnam had shattered the
cold war consensus. Although its middle class allies had deserted Johnson and campaigned for an end to
the war the AFL-CIO continued to support the conflict. To the AFL-CIO, McGovern's nomination was a
manifestation of what they perceived as an extremist take over of the Democratic Party. David Brody,
Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1980), pp 238-244.
190
Ibid p 242.
191
'Convention Backs McGovern, No Support at all for Nixon' The Machinist (September 14, 1972), pp
1,7.
192
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon p 680.
193
Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism pp 333-334.

67