november 2018 | issue 3

Strategic Security Analysis

The South Asian Nuclear Posture:

A Vicious Nuclear Arms Race
Authors: Gaurav Sharma and Marc Finaud

www.gcsp.ch
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Key Points
▪ The current evolution of military doctrines and technological choices
by India, Pakistan and China in favour of the full triad of nuclear
capacities contribute to lowering the threshold of an all-out nuclear
war.

▪ This is all the more worrying in a context characterised by

protracted conflict, bilateral and regional tensions, as well as lack of
communication, transparency and long-term strategic vision.

▪ Due to the global and regional consequences of such a dangerous

trend, this paper recommends urgent measures to prevent escalation
or mitigate this threat.

▪ These measures include more transparency in nuclear doctrines, more

focus on non-use of nuclear weapons, greater mutual communication,
and a long-term outlook.

The authors
Gaurav Sharma is an Indian Alumnus of the 2010-2011 GCSP
International Training Course (ITC) and Master’s Programme. He also
holds a Diploma in Human Rights, International, Humanitarian and
Refugee Laws from the ISIL and a degree in Information Technology
from APJAKTU. He has worked at the Observer Research Foundation
(ORF), the Asia Division of the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, the German Embassy in New Delhi and in different
roles in the corporate sector in Mumbai, Singapore and Australia.
He is the founder of the Indo-Swiss Future Leaders Forum.

Marc Finaud is Senior Programme Advisor, Emerging Security

Challenges Programme, and ‘Arms Proliferation’ Cluster Leader at
the GCSP. He is a former French diplomat with extensive experience
in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2013-2015
he also worked as Senior Resident Fellow at the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research UNIDIR).

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Introduction
The year 2018 marks the 20th anniversary of the last nuclear tests
conducted by India and Pakistan. Since 1998, both nation states have
pursued their nuclear ambitions via the use of new ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles and sea-based nuclear delivery systems. Events in the last five
years have put emphasis on nuclear weapons technology, research and
development, as well as production and testing. This evolution has taken
place in a context of deteriorating bilateral and regional relations: the tense
situation across the line of control (LoC); China’s support for Pakistan’s
missile programme; the one-month stand-off between Indian and Chinese
military forces; India’s test of the Agni-V ICBM; Pakistan’s testing of the
nuclear capable Ababeel missile with a multiple warhead (MIRV) payload;
and India’s surgical strike response to attacks attributed to Pakistani
terrorists. These developments underscore the growing nuclear complexity
in South Asia, the increasing investments in nuclear capabilities, and a
dangerous nuclear arms race in the region. This paper aims to analyse the
current nuclear posture in South Asia and provide policy recommendations
for reducing the tensions and lowering the risk of regional nuclear war
by publicly clarifying nuclear doctrines, strengthening a non-use policy,
including for tactical weapons, promoting mutual communication and a
providing a long-term strategic outlook.

India and Pakistan possess simple warhead designs with low (0.1 kiloton
to 50 kilotons) to medium yields of a few tens of kilotons (100 kiloton
and multiple of 10).1 However, China and India are now systematically
transitioning to triad capability, i.e. the ability to launch nuclear weapons
from air, land and sea. China, India and Pakistan all possess short- (75-100
km) to medium-range (250 to 1,500 km) nuclear missile strike capability.
Only China has deployable long-range and inter-continental (>5000 km)
nuclear strike capability,2 with India and Pakistan quickly developing the
capability of testing many long and inter-continental missile systems.
India’s successful testing of cruise missiles and sub-sonic missiles has also
brought New Delhi closer to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) (<100 km)
capability (see Annex).

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I. The Nuclear Framework of South Asia

and China: Doctrines and Strategy
India and Pakistan have fought four wars since 1947, and India lost
the war with China in 1962. The year 2017 was the most painful for
the Indian armed forces, having lost 106 personnel in combat,3 with
regular exchange of fire across the border and a high number of
casualties due to terrorist attacks. This portrays South Asia to be a
region with a volatile security situation.

From 2016, there has been a gradual deterioration in India-Pakistan

diplomatic relations. The media on both sides have occasionally
crossed ethical and professional boundaries, amplifying aggressive
narratives that have intensified the crises, thereby increasing the
pressure on leadership of both countries.4 Thus, it is critical to analyse
the current nuclear posture between South Asia and China.

Country Deployed Other War- Total 2018

Warheads * heads **
China 280 280

India 130 – 140 130 – 140

Pakistan 140 – 150 140 – 150

Table 1: The current status of nuclear weapons in South Asia and China
World Nuclear Forces, January 2018, Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2018.
All estimates are approximate.
* ‘Deployed warheads’ refers to warheads placed on missiles or located
on bases with operational forces.
** ‘Other warheads’ refers to stored or reserve warheads and retired
warheads awaiting dismantlement.

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India:

India’s nuclear doctrine, which was made public in 2003,5 is based

on three main tenets – no-first-use (NFU), massive retaliation, and
force posture of credible minimum deterrence. Since 2016, India has
been party to three major non-proliferation regimes: in June 2016
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), aimed at curbing
missile proliferation; in December 2017 the Wassenaar Arrangement
that coordinates export control of dual-use goods and technology;
and in January 2018 the Australia Group that controls the transfer
of toxic chemicals and dangerous pathogens. The Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), which deals with nuclear non-proliferation, has
remained problematic because of China’s continual objection to India’s
membership. India has bolstered its credibility by putting NFU as part
of its nuclear doctrine. In addition, India has never considered nuclear
weapons to be a military solution; it refers to nuclear weapons as
a means of political deterrence. According to Dr Manpreet Sethi,
an Indian expert on nuclear security, “India’s development and
advancements in nuclear weapons are in line with India’s declared
nuclear doctrine and do not present any changes to the doctrine’s
baselines. So the development of a triad or the investment in research
and development in India’s nuclear technology is in line with India’s
declared and assured nuclear doctrinal commitments.”6 India has also
declared the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’, which is intended to allow Indian
conventional forces to perform holding attacks or limited retaliatory
strikes without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold to prevent
nuclear retaliation in case of a conflict, and is designed to reorient
India’s military forces towards a more aggressive, offensive capability.7

Pakistan:

Since testing its nuclear devices in 1998 in response to India’s tests,

Pakistan has not formally declared an official nuclear use doctrine.
The literature analysing the official statements, interviews and news
reports asserts that the derivation of ‘first use’ and a unilateral
moratorium against nuclear testing remain consistent. Pakistan’s
minimum credible deterrence with the evolution of the ‘Shaheen III’
and ‘Nasr’ tactical missiles has raised questions about references
to the status quo, since such developments clearly imply an early
use of nuclear weapons. Finally, the phrases 'full spectrum', 'non-
mention of escalation control' and 'war termination’ drive Pakistan’s
continuous development of its nuclear arsenal. In a sense, the
premise of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is specific against threats,
and perceived threats, from India. In the words of Pakistan’s Brig
Gen (Ret) Tughral Yamin, “Pakistani arsenal is meant to provide what
is officially described as full spectrum deterrence. Tactical nuclear
weapons are meant to deter any shallow Indian thrust at the lowest
level of engagement, within the framework of the so-called Cold Start
Doctrine / Pro-Active Operations. A second strike capability is being
developed by equipping the conventional submarines with nuclear-
tipped ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are being developed to beat
the Indian [ballistic missile defences (BMDs)]”.8

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China:

Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China has been consistent in
maintaining a nuclear policy of ‘no first use’ and maintenance of
a limited number of nuclear weapons and an effective arsenal in
a strategy known as ‘lean and effective’ deterrent capability, thus
maintaining a second-strike capability. China also reiterates the
policy of nuclear employment for self-defence and retaliation. China
has not published a nuclear military doctrine but has biannually
published a white paper on its national defence since 1998 (the year
of Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests). These documents include basic
descriptions on nuclear policy and the modernisation of Chinese
nuclear forces. In December 2015 the elevation of the Second Artillery
Corps, which controls the strategic and tactical missiles of China, to
a full military service and its renaming as ‘People’s Liberation Army
Rocket Force’ was a major step in reconfiguring China’s new nuclear
policy motivation. This was echoed in the words of Xi Jingping, “the
Rocket Force is our country’s core strategic deterrent force; it is the
strategic support for our country’s major power status; and it is an
important foundation for safeguarding our nation’s security.”9 China
is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that is
currently increasing the size of its strategic nuclear arsenal. Thus,
China seeks to maintain a degree of nuclear superiority in South Asia
and particularly over India. The development and deployment of eight
credible ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Jin-class Type 094
by 2020 and the launch of the indigenous aircraft carrier are China’s
most significant advances. The opening section of the 2015 Defence
White Paper has highlighted the main responsibilities of China’s
armed forces, “to maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear
counterattack.”10

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Command and Control

Pakistan: Islamabad's current Strategic Command Organisation for

Pakistani Atomic Weapons relies on a threefold structure consisting
The ability to of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans
authorise a Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), reporting
to the General Headquarters. The NCA and the SPD have joint
nuclear strike operational control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The SFC has only
rests solely within day-to-day ‘administrative control’ and provides technical support
for those weapon systems.
China’s highest
military decision- India: Indian nuclear weapons are kept under tight political control.

making body The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is the main organisation
determining all priorities for budgets, resources, strategy, policy and
operational command. The NCA consists of a Political Council and
an Executive Council. The Political Council is chaired by the Prime
Minister and is the only body in India capable of authorising weapons
release to operational commands. The Executive Council provides
advice and implements decisions taken by the Political Council. The
commands of the NCA are executed by the Indian SFC, a tri-service
military command with HQ Strategic Forces Command chaired by a
commander-in-chief of three-star rank. Emergency command in the
event of NCA decapitation is unknown, and other arrangements are
not declared policy.11

China: The ability to authorise a nuclear strike rests solely within

China’s highest military decision-making body, the eleven-member
Central Military Commission (CMC) of the People’s Republic of China,
controlled by the CMC of the Communist Party of China, both chaired
by the General Secretary of the Communist Party and President
of China. The members of the CMC are designated by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. Ultimately, the decision to wage
war lies with the Communist Party Politburo. The Ministry of Defence
does not have command authority. The emergent and completion
of Jin-class SSBNs and the formation of the Rocket Force coincides
with the changes in the Chinese command-and-control structure
introduced in 2015. Since 2016, the traditional five organs of the CMC
have been replaced with 15 functional sections. The new Joint Staff
Department is in charge of military operation planning, command
and control, studying and formulating military strategies, and
assessing operational capacity, among others functions.12

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II. Recent Developments Determining

the Nuclear Posture of South Asia
A multitude of conflicting national interests, growing
investments in second-strike or tactical nuclear capabilities,
new technologies such as cruise and hypersonic missiles and
the decision of each nuclear power to equip itself with full triad
forces (land-based, airborne, and submarine), combined with
the rise of tensions and mutual distrust, make the threat of a
nuclear war realistic in South Asia. For example, in March 2018,
China publicly confirmed via the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS) Institute of Optics and Electronics the sale of a “highly
sophisticated large-scale optical tracking and measurement
system” to Pakistan.13 Optical systems play a critical role in
missile testing and development. Pakistan’s military has defined
the roles and requirements for nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s
national security policy. Thus, most officials and experts in
Pakistan view nuclear weapons largely in terms of military
capabilities and potential use in warfare, further lowering the
threshold of nuclear war instead of applying only a policy of
deterrence. Pakistan has also shown urgency of development
of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the military modernisation of
Indian armed forces and India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD)
programme. Table 2 below lists down the important nuclear-
capable systems of the three nation states.

©Antônio Milena (ABr)

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III. Russia and the United States:

Interested External Nuclear Actors in
South Asia
United States: In August 2017, US President Trump gave a speech to
outline his South-Asian policy. He stated,“[f]or its part, Pakistan often
India cleared gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror. The threat
the buying of is worse because Pakistan and India are two nuclear-armed states
whose tense relations threaten to spiral into conflict. And that could
the Russian Air- happen.”14 This highlights the concern felt by the United States about
Defence S-400 Indo-Pakistan relations and their possession of nuclear weapons. The

missile system US administration peruses opposing policy objectives in India and

Pakistan. India is perceived with the lens of economic development
(five regiments) and seen as an ally in rebuilding Afghanistan, while Pakistan is
on 1 October perceived differently. The United States is intent to crack down on
terror outfits in Pakistan, such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani
2018, ahead of the Network, a Sunni Islamist group and offshoot of the Taliban, operating
Prime Minister's in the southeast of Afghanistan and the northwest of Pakistan against
visit to Russia on NATO forces. In early 2018, President Trump suspended $2bn in
security assistance aid to Pakistan alleging that Islamabad was not
5 October 2018. actively cracking down on terrorist groups.15 Moreover, the United
States is worried about the strategic rise of China in South Asia and
the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China’s strategic investments in the IOR
via the construction and operationalisation of naval bases in Gwadar
in Pakistan and in Djibouti, and the planned increase in the number
of SSBNs in the next decade remain a matter of grave concern for the
United States.

Russia: Russia remains India’s primary defence supplier (despite

increasing US sales).16 India’s nuclear submarine programme is
a result of Russia’s leasing of the ‘Arihant’ SSBN for ten years.
Due to its long-term legacy contracts, Russia has managed to
remain India’s only supplier of strategic weapon systems, including
aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, advanced combat
jets, main battle tanks and cruise missiles. Russia and India are
jointly developing the BrahMos-II hypersonic cruise missile (of an
estimated range of 450 km and speed of Mach 7).17 India cleared
the buying of the Russian Air-Defence S-400 missile system (five
regiments) on 1 October 2018, ahead of the Prime Minister's visit to
Russia on 5 October 2018.18 Russia and India are also collaborating
on building ten nuclear reactors for civilian use in India and on
the first nuclear power plant in Bangladesh. Russia has been
diversifying its interest in South Asia with its sale of Mi-35M
combat helicopters to Pakistan and two joint tactical exercises
with Pakistani Special Forces. These bilateral engagements with
the two rivals do not present any focused regional strategy in
South Asia, and hints at Russia deriving conditional economic
benefits from all. This is evident as Russia has also sold the
S-400 missile system to China in the past, and conducts military
exercises and wargames with all three states– India, China and
Pakistan.
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India's New Age Nuclear Capable Systems

Names System Variants Type Range (Km) Nuclear Payload

Prithvi Missile (I - II - III) Surface to Surface 500 - 1000 YES

Agni Missile (I to VI) Surface to Surface 2000 - YES

(ICBM variant as 8000
well)

K - 15 Missile Submarine 750 YES - Integrated

Sagarika Launched Cruise with Nuclear
Missile Submarine

K Series Missile (4 & 5) Submarine 3500 YES

Launched Ballistic
Missile

Shaurya Missile Hypersonic Surface 750 - 1900 YES

to Surface

BrahMos Missile (I - II - III) Supersonic (land, 290 YES

air and submarine)

Arihant Submarine Nuclear Powered YES

Russian made

*https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194054?scroll=top&needAccess=true

China's New Nuclear Capable Systems

Names System Variants Type Range (Km) Nuclear Payload

DF Missile 5B - 15 - Land based ballistic 1000 - YES

26 - 31A missile (ICBM) 11000+
- 41

JL-2 Missile Submarine launched 1000 - YES

ballistic missile 7000+
(ICBM)

DH 10-10A Missile Cruise Missiles 1500 - YES

/ CJ 10 2000+

YJ Missile 100 - 12 Supersonic antiship

- 18 missile

CH-AS-X-13 Missile Air Launched Ballistic 3000+ YES

Missile

Type - 092 Submarine Nuclear Powered

/ 094

H6X1/H-6N Bomber 6000+ YES

*https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/figure/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194054?scroll=top&needAccess=true 10
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Pakistan's New Nuclear Capable Systems

Names System Variants Type Range (Km) Nuclear Payload

Ababeel Missile Medium Range 2,200 YES

Ballistic Missile

Hatf Missile 7 and 8 Cruise Missile 350 - 700 YES

Hatf Missile 5 and 6 Medium Range 1250 - 2000 YES

Ballistic Missile

Hatf Missile 3 and 4 Short Range Balistic 290 - 750 YES

Missile

Hatf 9 'Nasr' Missile SRBM 90 YES

*Missile Defense Project, "Missiles of Pakistan," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
published June 14, 2018, last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/.

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IV. Analytical Snapshot

India and Pakistan currently face complex challenges with regard to
their nuclear capability. The assessment of South Asia’s nuclear future
A potentially is speculative, simply because of the lack of security in the storage of
lethal act of nuclear source material, opaque knowledge of intentions, an increasing
number of warheads, and many other unknown variables consistently
terrorism has at play. In addition, technological developments, continued production
the potential to of fissile material, focus on miniaturisation of nuclear warheads and
escalate from a investment in new military hardware pose new challenges for the
South Asian nuclear posture. These developments all point towards
conventional a more nuclear South Asia in the future – improved warheads, agile
military option delivery vehicles and the triad capabilities becoming operational –
thus increasing the risk of nuclear confrontation, in particular due to
to a limited misperceptions.
nuclear conflict
between India China’s reconfiguration and command-and-control structure of
the armed forces under one umbrella, its close ties and support to
and Pakistan. Pakistan’s missile programme, its military outposts in the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR) and its build-up of advanced nuclear naval capabilities
complicate the already challenging nuclear posture of South Asia.
In addition, the role of terrorism in the region has not subsided and
India’s retaliation beyond its borders via surgical strikes has shown its
willingness and capability of power projection. Thus, a potentially lethal
act of terrorism has the potential to escalate from a conventional
military option to a limited nuclear conflict between India and
Pakistan.

With the increase of military tensions across borders, the rise of

nationalism, governments’ silence or opacity over their respective
nuclear policies and doctrines, South Asia presents a more
apprehensive than positive outlook with regards to its nuclear future.
The testing of new weapons such as the ‘Abadeel’ missile, Pakistan’s
first surface-to-surface medium-range ballistic missile, reportedly
capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs), India’s test of the Agni-V long-range intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), and the Chinese SSBN Jin-class Type-094A increase the
odds of a full-blown nuclear arms race in the region.

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V. Recommendations
It is evident that the South Asia/China nuclear paradigm is complex.
There is evidence that a nuclear arms race is occurring as each state
Until India, develops its nuclear weapons arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively
Pakistan and as a normal response to regional tensions, which is characteristic
of a zero-sum game instead of a conflict-resolution or cooperative
China can ensure approach. In addition, the active resort to nuclear-related literature
the survivability exacerbates tensions in an already complicated region, resulting in an
of their triad increased likelihood of war. This is why this paper makes the following
recommendations:
operations and a
fully operational 1) South Asia and China should clearly and publically define and
lay out their nuclear ambitions and objectives. As one Indian
command-and- analyst argued, “remember nuclear has never been easy and we
control structure, should not mess-up the issue by using complex English literature
they should avoid terminologies”.19 Placing the nuclear doctrines in the public domain
and reiterating and reasserting clear and simple objectives is the
emphasising the first step in keeping South-Asia safe. Transparency is indeed one of
possible use of the basic confidence-building measures.

nuclear weapons 2) Until India, Pakistan and China can ensure the survivability of their
in combat triad operations and a fully operational command-and-control
operations. structure, they should avoid emphasising the possible use of
nuclear weapons in combat operations, including early resort to
‘tactical’ weapons, which may only lead to escalation. The failure
of command-and-control due to a false alarm or human error
is the most compelling danger, and highlights the possibility of
inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. This is important
because if deterrence fails and there is no escalation control, it is
irrelevant whether a TNW or a 500-kiloton bomb is fired as an all-
out nuclear war in South Asia would become unavoidable.

3) A
 s the notion of 'strategic autonomy' is prevalent in South Asia,
due to a need to maintain an independent foreign policy, none
of the nuclear states would consider giving up their nuclear
ambitions in the short or medium term. Thus, a need for deeper
and long-term thinking in establishing a ‘communication block’ is
required, not necessarily militarily but where exchange of nuclear
dialogue can take place in a professional and rational environment.
The necessity of effective communication channels and mutual
confidence and transparency building measures to avoid
misperceptions has never been more acute.

4) A
 new generational nuclear outlook is required in South Asia to
instigate a win-win scenario based on strategic stability rather than
a doomsday scenario and over-articulation of threats. There is a
need for new political will, new-age strategists, think-tank scholars
and academics to look to the future, take lessons from the past
and from other regions, uphold the challenges of the present and
provide an optimistic solution defining a stable South Asian nuclear
posture, creating the conditions for a mutually beneficial process
of balanced force and risk reduction.
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South Asia and China Nuclear Capabilities

Nuclear Weapon Type China India Pakistan

Bomber YES NO NO

Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) YES *Under Test NO

Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) YES *Under Dev. NO

Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) YES YES YES

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) YES YES YES

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) YES YES YES

Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) YES YES YES

Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) YES YES YES

Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) *Under Dev. YES

Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) YES YES YES

Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry YES *Under Dev. YES

Vehicle (MIRV)

Solid Fuelled Tactical Ballistic Missile YES *Under Dev. *YES

Sources: Hans M. Kristensen, Matthew G. McKinzie, “Nuclear Arsenals: Current developments,

trends and capabilities”, International Review of the Red Cross, 2015, https://www.icrc.org/en/
download/file/24537/irc97_6.pdf, Table 2, p. 570. Additional links provided by the authors with
an updated account of nuclear weapons development in South Asia for tabs marked with *:
‒ ICBM: https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/18/asia/india-icbm-tests/index.html;
‒ SLBM: http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/2018/aug/08/underwater-test-of-
slbm-likely-1854796.html;
‒ Solid Fuelled Tactical Ballistic Missile India: https://www.wisconsinproject.org/indias-
expanding-missile-force/;
‒ Solid Fuelled Tactical Ballistic Missile Pakistan: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/defence/pakistan-successfully-test-fires-short-range-ballistic-missile-nasr/
articleshow/59468060.cms

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2017 (https://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-india-
cold-start-doctrine-military-strategy-india-pakistan-indian-armed- 17 Vladimir Karnozov, “Russia and India Test Hypersonic and Supersonic
forces-4854019/). See also: Walter C. Ladvig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Missiles”, AINonline, 25 April 2017.
Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine”, International
Security, Winter 2007/2008. 18 Franz Stefan Gady, 'India Quietly Approves S400 Deal Ahead of Modi-
Putin Summit', The Diplomat, 1 October 2018 (https://thediplomat.
8 Sadia Tasleem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine”, Carnegie Endowment com/2018/10/india-quietly-approves-s-400-deal-ahead-of-modi-putin-
for International Peace, 30 June 2016, http://carnegieendowment. summit/
org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use-doctrine-pub-63913.
19 Interview with anonymous Indian expert, June 2018.
9 Eric Heginbothan et al. China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent – Major
Drivers and Issues for the United States, RAND Corporation, 2017
(www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/
RR1628/RAND_RR1628.pdf).

15
Where knowledge meets experience
The GCSP Strategic Security Analysis series are short papers that address a current security
issue. They provide background information about the theme, identify the main issues and
challenges, and propose policy recommendations.

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