Revolution In Military Affairs and

Preventive Arms Control

Gtz Neuneck
IFSH, University of Hamburg [www.ifsh.de]
Interdisciplinary Research Group Disarmamanet and
Arms Control [www.armsControl.de]

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Science, Technology and the War

Revolution in Military Affairs
Three examples: CM/UAVs, Lasers, Space
Preventive Arms Control
Some Conclusions
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War and Unpredictability

As long as we have no personal knowledge of war, we cannot
conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much is said, and
what that genius, and those extraordinary mental powers required in
a general have really to do. All appears so simple, all the requisite
branches of knowledge appear so plain, all the combinations so
unimportant, that, in comparison with them, the easiest problem in
higher mathematics impresses us with a certain scientific dignity. But
if we have seen war, all becomes intelligible; and still, after all, it is
extremely difficult to describe what it is which brings about this
change, to specify this invisible and completely efficient Factor.
Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is
difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction, which
no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war.
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831): On War (1832) , Book 1, Chapter
7, [J.J. Graham translation London in 1873]

War and Unpredictability

Clausewitz ought to display a deep and abiding
concern for unpredictability and complexity, and
consequently to search for ways to express the
importance of such matters as context, interaction,
effects disproportionate to their causes, sensitivity to
initial conditions, time-dependent evolutionary
processes, and the serious limitations of linear
analysis".
A. Beyerchen Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and Unpredictability, Int
l Security 1992

1. Science and Technology (S&T) - Today

Science is an dominant factor in modern society: The
outcome of scientific research can strongly influence the
norms and conditions of our civilization
Applications of science are beneficial to human society,
but can also lead to the development of means to destroy
the human civilization
Research in physics is fascinating and deeply satisfactory. To understand or to discover something is a basic instinct just as well as an
artistic work. It cannot be suppressed, restricted or prohibited. (...)
Technology helps mankind to facilitate daily work. It gives him an
tolerable and worth living existence. However, we have to be aware
of the fact that technology can be misused for death and
destruction and that this was and is done of the recent past in
wars and terror attack.
Memorandum Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft, 3rd Edition 2002, p. 9

Science, Engineering & Technology

The military sector is a major player in the commercial
partnerships in gy (SET) supported by government
The military sector, esp. in the UK and USA, has a very large
and disproportionate effect on SET
Current military thinking is based predominantly upon the
idea of security through superiority of military force, and
marginalises broader concepts of security based on social
justice and environmental sustainability
Military support of emerging technology such as IuC,
Biotechnology or nanotechnology is high
S. Parkinson/P. Webber: Soldiers in the Web, January 2005

2. Revolution in Military Affairs

Revolution= a drastic change that usually occurs
relatively quickly.
In History there were many technological factors
(Low Tech and HighTech) which influenced warfare
A military revolution occurs when the application of
new technologies into a significant number of military
systems combines with innovative operational
concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that
fundametally alters the character and conduct of
conflict. Andrew Krepinevich, 1994
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Technology

Politics&Doctrine
Training

Strategies

Military
Institutions

Elements and Technologies

Technologies:

New weapon effects (Laser, Microwaves etc.)

Precision weapons
Surveillance, Intelligence, sensors
Computer capacities, data fusion

Elements:

Networking a elements
Realtime intelligence
Communication
Global access
Space infrastructure
Strong R&D basis including integration

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Netcentric Warfare (NCW)= new organizational

principle which binds surveillance, communication and
weapons use in an network together

Communication
Control
Command

Computer
Intelligence

C4 I
NCW

Joint Vision 20210/2020)

Dominant battlefield
knowledge

Precision Guided Weapons

Full dimensional protection

Precision strikes
Dominant maneuver

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Sceptics

Justification for reforming force structures

Very expensive and less efficient
High Tech might be very vulnerable
Lowering the threshold to go to war
Kills arms control obligations
Is an evolution not an revolution
Will trigger asymmetric responses by antagonists
Will force others to invest in WMD

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Iraq war 2003 and Technology (ex.)

Very weak enemy and well known territory

Joint integration of forces and special ops.
Unprecented integration of space systems
Problems with urban operations, Psy Op.,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconaissance
More problems: fracticide prevention,
mobilization,deployment
UAV use only with air superiority and heavy
use of U-2 but also more manned platforms
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Fallujah

Tabelle: US Killed/Injured/ during Combat/preCombat

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3. Examples
1. Cruise Missiles and UAVs
2. High Energy Lasers
3. Space
Key Areas:
Effectiveness
Costs
Non-Proliferation
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1000

Cruise Missiles

900

955

800
700
600
500
400

415

300

332

200
100
0

Desert Storm

Desert Fox

Iraqi Freedom

Number of CM used by the US

Paradigmatic for RMA
80.000 CMs and 75 typs are deployed in 81 countries
90 % are short-range (max.100 km) or ASCM
20 countries have ALCM
42 systems are in development
Only RUS and US have long-range CM. China, Israel and India
might follow
Technology is available to any country that builds aircraft

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) US

Global Hawk (US)
11.600 kg, 35,4 m wingspan, 900kg
payload (EO/IR/SAR), 36+ hrs, 630
km/h, 4.800 km action radius

Predator (US)
4.500 kg, 10.7 m, 680 kg
(EO/IR/SAR), 15.200 m altitude,
25+ hrs, 390 km/h, 640 km action
radius, With Hellfire missile

Miniaturization
Real time transmission

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Performance Speed, range, autonomy

UAV Proliferation (2005)

32 UAV countries are developing or
manufacturing UAVs
41 user countries have 80 models in operation
AV technology widely available
The spread of UAV systems will affect US
military dominance, regional stability and
homeland defense Dennis Gormley, Monterey
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Possible Access for Terrorists: Simple Alternatives

modification of manned (Light weight-) aircrafts
commercial model airplanes
2 Scenario: Bioweapon or Radiological Dissemination

Source: Eugene Miasnikow 2004

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High Energy Lasers

Airborne Laser (ABL) for Missile Defense and ASAT ?

Space Based Laser?
MEL-COIL in Germany (Meppen)
Tactical HE Laser (US)
Project Starfire: ground-based laser for blinding
satellites
Russia, France, China ??
Wouldnt it be better to ban new wepon principles
from the future battlefield?
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United States: Space Dominance?

US Space Commission 2001
Pearl Harbour in Space
US Space Command: Long
Range Plan
Space Superiority provides
freedom to attack as well as
freedom from attack
Air Force Doctrine 2-2.1
Counterspace Operations

Technologies:
- Air-Borne Laser (2008)
- Missile Defense
- Space Based Laser ?
- Minisats
- Ground-based lasers

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Problems with space weaponization

Satellites are more predictable and
vulnerable then warheads
Most of space technologies and assets are
dual-use
A competition of spare nations is likely
Space law is limited and has loopholes
Space weapons are expensive
Other alternatives are there: hardening,
maneuvering, redundancy, surveillance
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Collateral Damage - Myth Precision Weapons

Precision weapons are destroying point targets

CBU-87 has 202 Bomblets 300 shrapnels 150 m

High Accuracy Munition is fighting military targets

But who defines what a military target is?

High-Tech wars are clean wars

casualities are on the enemy side

High Accuracy is not automatically identical with small damage

on the ground.
The following factors are decisive:
weapons effects
target information
fail-safe technology

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4. Preventive Arms Control

Arms control comprises measures aimed at
a) reducing the likelihood of war;
b) lowering the cost of preparing for war; and
c) minimizing the death and destruction that occur if control
and it comes to war.

fails

effectiveness can be underrun by technological

innovation/proliferation
limited ability to integrate different categories of actors
It cannot engage asymmetric capabilities in specific regions of
concern
Various agreements lack effective verification procedures
No new initiatives and erosion of existing treaties

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Arguments for PAC

Arms control in 21st century should deal with
arms dynamics and proliferation of new
weapon capabilities
Preventive arms control can include
qualitative parameters before acquisition and
deployment
Arms Control should become more
comprehensive with regard to actors, areas,
options and criteria
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Preventive-Arms-Control Considerations
Linear model of "life cycle" of a weapon technology/system:
Research
Development
Testing
Acquisition
Use
Modernisation
Taking out of service

What is Preventive Arms Control?

Ban or limitation of military usable technology or weapons systems
before acquisition
See: Altmann 2004 and Mutz/Neuneck 2000

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Precedents
Arms control:
Partial Test Ban 1963 Comprehensive Test Ban 1996
ABM Treaty 1972-2002
ENMOD
Humanitarian law of warfare:
Protocol on Laser Blinding Weapons 1995

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Steps of Preventive Arms Control

1. Identify destabilizing weapon technologies
2. Develop methodology to assess destabilizing developments
3. Prospective scientific-technical analysis of technology
properties: implication, production, access, costs etc
4. Prospective analysis of military and operational aspects
probable use, which targets, unusual employment forms,
collateral effects etc.
5. Assessment under criteria of preventive arms control
6. Devising possible limits and verification methods
- stage (research, development, testing)
- ponder positive/legitimate uses
- verification: methods, procedures; CBMs
ideal case: international negotiations, Treaty/Protocol

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Fundamental Problems and Difficulties for S&T

assessments
Nonpredictability of scientific discoveries
Ambivalence (Misuse, military use, unintended use): What
are the correct criteria?
Nonlinearity of scientific findings
Unbalanced Ressources
Interactions of many actors and stakeholders
Intransparent processes of the generation and the intense
interaction of technologies, products, decisions
National oriented military R&D
Secrecy
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Criteria of Preventive Arms Control

I. Adherence to and further development of effective arms control,
disarmament, and international law
- prevent dangers to existing or intended arms control & disarm. treaties
- observe existing norms of humanitarian law
- no utility for weapons of mass destruction

II. Maintain and improve stability

- prevent destabilisation of the military situation
- prevent arms race
- prevent horizontal or vertical proliferation/diffusion of military-Relevant
technologies, substances or knowledge

III. Protect humans, environment, and society

- prevent dangers to humans, environment & sustainable development
- prevent dangers to the development of societal and political systems
- prevent dangers to the societal infrastructure

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5. Some Conclusions
RMA is until now a Revolution in American Affairs
RMA undermines arms control agreements which are based
on quantitative categories
The potential implications of specific military developments
for various weapon systems should be covered within the
terms of existing AC-Treaties such as CFE- Treaty, CTBT,
Outer Space Treaty, BTWC, CWC
Prospective military technology assessment under clear
defined criteria has to be developed in detail and should be
undertaken by experienced institutions
Concrete measures are possible in specific areas

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A specific example: Space Arms Control

The current threat to military and civilian satellites does
not justify the near term weaponization of space
The remaining low-probability/middle damage threat in
the longer run, can be met by passive measures or better
early warning capabilities.
A new treaty to prevent testing and the use of ASATs is
more effective than costly investments in hardening or
SBWs, which might not work effectively. First Confidence
measures are possible
A code of conduct for not attacking military or
commercial satellites is in the interest of all space-faring
nations.
In the longer run, a space arms control treaty would be
an important international challenge. Elements of such a
regime can be found in existing treaties (f.e. the OST) or in
current or historical proposals.
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Prohibition of Space Weapons could include ...

Ban of tests/ deployment, also production of ASATs
Keep-out-Zone in space
Ban of new weapon principles (Lasers, Microwaves)
Radar detection and surveillance by international
organisations absolute necessary
Verification measures to suppport such a treaty are:
Safeguards for Launch Facilities and SLVs
Notification and payload inspections before launch
Technically space but also launch preparation can easily
be monitored if the political will is there

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