SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 170863. March 20, 2013.]

ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J : p

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Engr.

Anthony V. Zapanta, challenging the June 27, 2005 decision 2 and the
November 24, 2005 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
28369. The CA decision affirmed the January 12, 2004 decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 20109-R,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. The CA resolution
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner,
together with Concordio O. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft,
committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court,
. . . accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the Project Manager of
the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then
by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A.
Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and
implement the fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing
of the Porta Varga building including the receipt, audit and checking of
all construction materials delivered at the job site — a position of full
trust and confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a
telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating,
and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and
with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site
along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams of different
sizes with a total value of P2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and
consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager
LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of ANMAR,
Inc., in the aforementioned sum of P2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency.
5

Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not

guilty." 6 Loyao remains at-large.

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 testimonies of Danilo Bernardo, Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo,
private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus, 7 as well
as documentary evidence consisting of a security logbook entry, delivery
receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The prosecution's pieces of
evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook
the Porta Vaga building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS
subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building's structural and steel
framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its
construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig City. It hired Junio
Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It
assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties,
including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction
materials. 8 AHcDEI

On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo,

Junio Trucking's truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and
Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams
at Anmar's alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City.
Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo and
several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5
meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well
as on Mabini Street, Baguio City. 9
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS' project manager,
informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been
returned to Anmar's warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in
the security guard's logbook. Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to
explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported return took
place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an
inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from
Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos
Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing steel
beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and
contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck
came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The
stolen steel beams amounted to P2,269,731.69. 10
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him.
He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his
own company had been Engr. Marigondon's motive in falsely accusing him of
stealing construction materials. 11
The RTC's Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision, 12 the RTC convicted the petitioner of
qualified theft. It gave credence to the prosecution witnesses' straightforward
and consistent testimonies and rejected the petitioner's bare denial. It
sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to indemnify Anmar
P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment, and
to pay Engr. Marigondon P100,000.00 as moral damages. cHSIAC

The CA's Ruling

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution

witnesses' statements, and reiterated his status as an AMCGS employee. 13
In its June 27, 2005 decision, 14 the CA brushed aside the petitioner's
arguments and affirmed the RTC's decision convicting the petitioner of qualified
theft. It found that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies deserve full credence
in the absence of any improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioner. It
noted that the petitioner admitted his status as Anmar's employee and his
receipt of salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner's defense of
denial for being self-serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral damages
to Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied 15 the motion for reconsideration 16 that followed,
the petitioner filed the present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts
committed "sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for
acts not covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. He further argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact
of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus delicti was never identified and
offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, counters that the issues raised by the petitioner in the
petition pertain to the correctness of the calibration of the evidence by the RTC,
as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of fact, not of law, and beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent contends that the
evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner's liability for qualified theft.
cDCSET

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a

reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision convicting the petitioner of the
crime of qualified theft.

Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.

Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the

commission of the crime

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down
the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information,
provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of
them shall be included in the complaint or information. (italics
supplied; emphasis ours)

As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the

offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of
the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on
a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]

Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint
is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed
at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action. DIEAHc

In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of
qualified theft since the information stated the approximate date of the
commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the month of
October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the
criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the
information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know
about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense.

We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date
when the offense was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November
2001" since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the
offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near
as possible to the actual date of its commission. 17 Clearly, the month of
November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was
committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to
Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of
personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking
be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. 18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution's evidence
proved, through the prosecution's eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner's
instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice
in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini
Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on
him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from
the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the
owner of the construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission
of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the
alleged stolen beams or corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that
the failure to present the alleged stolen beams in court was fatal to the
prosecution's cause. cTCADI

The petitioner's argument fails to persuade us.

"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged
or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to
the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the
person murdered" or, in this case, to the stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even
a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it
and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence." 19 "[I]n theft, corpus delicti has two elements,
namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by
felonious taking." 20
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully
established the corpus delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating that the petitioner
directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini
Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner's
conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs
proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a different
location other than the project site.

Proper Penalty
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and three months, as minimum, to 20
years, as maximum, and to indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest
from November 2001 until full payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to
specify the appropriate name of the penalty imposed on the petitioner.
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 proper legal terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the
substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and accessory
penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified as under the
scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a felony has its own
specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. 21 Thus, the courts
must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion
perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten days of arresto menor" not "ten days
of imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion
perpetua based on Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "[t]he crime of
[qualified] theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in [Article 309]." 22 cSTCDA

To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel
beams, which is P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the
value of the items exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, to be imposed in the maximum period, which is
eight years, eight months and one day to 10 years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct P22,000.00
from P2,269,731.69, which gives us P2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should
then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00.
We now have 224 years that should be added to the basic penalty. However,
the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of 20 years.
Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20
years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees
higher, the correct imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the
corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27, 2005 decision
and the November 24, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28369 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V.
Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 13-71.

2.Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Vicente S. E. Veloso; id. at 76-83.
3.Id. at 85-86.
4.Id. at 154-163.
5.Id. at 154-155.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 6.Id. at 21.

7.Ibid.
8.Id. at 203-204.
9.Id. at 204-206.
10.Id. at 207-208.
11.Id. at 160.

12.Supra note 4.
13.Rollo , p. 167.
14.Supra note 2.
15.Supra note 3.

16.Rollo , pp. 176-179.

17.See People v. Dion , G.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 117, 131. See also
People v. Ching, G.R. No. 177150, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 117, 129;
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 177744, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 733,
738; and People v. Ibanez , G.R. No. 174656, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 136,
142.
18.Matrido v. People , G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 534, 541.
19.Villarin v. People, G.R. No. 175289, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 500, 520-521;
and Rimorin, Jr. v. People, 450 Phil. 465, 474-475 (2003). Italics supplied.
20.Gulmatico v. People , G.R. No. 146296, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 82, 92;
citation omitted, italics supplied. See also Tan v. People , 372 Phil. 93, 105
(1999).

21.People v. Latupan, 412 Phil. 477, 489 (2001); Austria v. Court of Appeals, 339
Phil. 486, 495-496 (1997).

22.People v. Mirto , G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 814;
Astudillo v. People , 538 Phil. 786, 815 (2006); and People v. Mercado , 445
Phil. 813, 828 (2003).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com