THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 179243. September 7, 2011.]

JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS,

CARMINA A. ABBAS and MA. ELENA GO FRANCISCO,
petitioners, vs. ATTY. JOSE A. BERNAS, ATTY. MARIE
LOURDES SIA-BERNAS, FERNANDO AMOR, EDUARDO
AGUILAR, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1
dated May 23, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
94229.
The facts of the case follow.
Petitioner Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro (Alejandro) is the lessee-
purchaser of condominium unit No. 2402 (the Unit), 4th Floor, Discovery
Center Condominium in Pasig City under the Contract of Lease with Option to
Purchase 3 with the lessor-seller Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI). On October
15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other petitioners Firdausi I.Y.
Abbas (Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go
Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be used as a law office. 4 However, a defect in the
air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to suspend payments until the
problem is fixed by the management. 5 Instead of addressing the defect, OPI
instituted an action for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Pasig City, 6 against Alejandro for the latter's failure to pay rentals. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9209. Alejandro, for his part, interposed
the defense of justified suspension of payments. 7
In the meantime, the Discovery Center Condominium Corporation
(DCCC) was organized to administer the Discovery Center Condominium
independent of OPI. Respondent Fernando Amor (Amor) was appointed as
the Property Manager of DCCC.
During the pendency of the ejectment case, or on June 10, 2004, OPI,
allegedly through respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas (Sia-Bernas),
ordered that the Unit be padlocked. In an Order 8 dated June 11, 2004, the
MeTC directed OPI to remove the padlock of the Unit and discontinue the
inventory of the properties. The order was reiterated when the MeTC issued
a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of Alejandro. However, on August 11,
2004, at 8:00 in the evening, OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Jose
Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. The padlocking was allegedly executed by
Amor, as property manager, and respondent Eduardo Aguilar (Aguilar) as
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 head of the security unit, together with security officers John Doe and Peter
Doe. Respondents, likewise, cut off the electricity, water and telephone
facilities on August 16, 2004. 9
On August 17, 2004, the MeTC rendered a Decision 10 in the ejectment
case in favor of Alejandro and against OPI. The court found Alejandro's
suspension of payment justified. The decision was, however, reversed and
set aside by the Regional Trial Court 11 whose decision was in turn affirmed
12 by the CA.

On October 27, 2004, petitioners filed a criminal complaint 13 for grave

coercion against respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar, Peter Doe
and John Doe with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig. The case
was docketed as I.S. No. PSG 04-10-13650. In their Joint Affidavit-Complaint,
14 petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal, felonious
and unlawful which prevented them from entering the premises. 15
Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the cutting off of facilities
had unduly prejudiced them and thus constituted grave coercion. 16
In their Counter-Affidavit, 17 Bernas and Sia-Bernas averred that the
elements of grave coercion were not alleged and proven by petitioners. They
also claimed that nowhere in petitioners' complaint was it alleged that
respondents employed violence which is an essential element of grave
coercion.
In addition to the above defenses, Amor and Aguilar maintained that
petitioners did not allege that the former actually prevented the latter to
enter the Unit. They added that petitioners in fact gained access to the Unit
by forcibly destroying the padlock. 18
On March 22, 2005, the OCP issued a Resolution, 19 the pertinent
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, respondents Fernando Amor and Eduardo Aguilar are
charged with unjust vexation and the attached information be filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. Bail is not necessary
unless required by the Court.aCcHEI

The charges against respondents Jose Bernas and Marie Lourdes

Sia-Bernas is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 20

The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave coercion as
no violence was employed by the latter. In padlocking the leased premises
and cutting off of facilities, respondents Amor and Aguilar were found to be
probably guilty of the crime of unjust vexation. 21
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), but the appeal was dismissed 22 for their failure to comply with
Section 12, paragraph (b) of Department Circular No. 70. The DOJ Secretary,
acting through Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, explained that petitioners
failed to submit a legible true copy of the joint counter-affidavit of some of
the respondents. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 23 was likewise
denied in a Resolution 24 dated April 3, 2006. He denied the motion after a
careful re-evaluation of the record of the case vis-à-vis the issues and
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 arguments raised by petitioners.
Undaunted, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA that rendered the
assailed Decision 25 on May 23, 2007. The appellate court recognized the
DOJ's authority to dismiss the petition on technicality pursuant to its rules of
procedure. The CA explained that while the DOJ dismissed the petition on
mere technicality, it re-evaluated the merits of the case when petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration. On whether or not there was probable
cause for the crime of grave coercion, the CA answered in the negative. It
held that the mere presence of the security guards was insufficient to cause
intimidation. 26 The CA likewise denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration on August 8, 2007. 27
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING IN THE CASE OF SY VS.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (G.R. NO. 166315, DECEMBER 14, 2006),
WHEREIN THE HIGHEST COURT OF THE LAND DEVIATED FROM THE
NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL ARM OF THE
GOVERNMENT BY HOLDING THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IF THE RECORDS CLEARLY SHOW PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
OF THE CRIME CHARGED, IS APPLICABLE TO [THE] INSTANT CASE,

1. given that there is more than ample evidence of the

padlocking;

2. the padlocking has been admitted in no uncertain terms by

Respondents; aCITEH

3. the padlock was ordered removed by the court.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

TANTAMOUNT [TO] LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE
COURT OF APPEALS DENIED THE PETITION DESPITE SHOWING OF
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF GRAVE COERCION.
WHETHER OR NOT SUBJECT RESOLUTION OF THE DOJ IS ANOMALOUS
BECAUSE THE GROUND OF DISMISSAL WAS FABRICATED WHICH
NECESSITATES A JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SAID RESOLUTION.
WHETHER OR NOT GRAVE COERCION CAN BE COMMITTED THROUGH
INTIMIDATION ALONE WITHOUT VIOLENCE. 28

Petitioners claim that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove

the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities thereat. 29 They insist that
the allegations and evidence presented in the Joint Affidavit-Complaint are
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause for grave coercion
irrespective of any defense that may be put up by respondents. 30 Finally,
petitioners maintain that although violence was not present during the
commission of the acts complained of, there was sufficient intimidation by
the mere presence of the security guards. 31
In their Comment, 32 respondents aver that petitioners raised issues of
grave abuse of discretion which are improper in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. They also argue that the CA aptly held that
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 petitioners failed to establish probable cause to hold them liable for grave
coercion. They do not agree with petitioners that the mere presence of
security guards constituted intimidation amounting to grave coercion.
Finally, they insist that there is no legal impediment to cause the padlocking
and repossession of the Unit as a valid exercise of proprietary right under
the contract of lease. ETDSAc

In their Reply, 33 petitioners assail the propriety of the dismissal of

their appeal before the DOJ Secretary on technicality.
The petition must fail.
The propriety of the dismissal of petitioners' appeal before the DOJ
Secretary has been thoroughly explained by the CA. We quote with approval
the CA ratiocination in this wise:
It was also incorrect for petitioners to claim that the dismissal
was on mere technicality, and that the Department of Justice no longer
studied the appeal on the merits. The motion for reconsideration shows
that the records were carefully re-evaluated. However, the same
conclusion was reached, which was the dismissal of the appeal. The
first resolution was a dismissal on technicality but the motion for
reconsideration delved on the merits of the case, albeit no lengthy
explanation of the DOJ's dismissal of the appeal was inked on the
resolution. It was already a demonstration of the DOJ's finding that no
probable cause exists . . . 34

Besides, petitioners' failure to attach the required documents in

accordance with the DOJ rules renders the appeal insufficient in form and
can thus be dismissed outright. 35 Moreover, when the case was elevated to
the CA, the latter ruled not only on the procedural aspect of the case but
also on the merit of the determination of probable cause.
The next question then is whether the CA correctly sustained the DOJ's
conclusion that there was no probable cause to indict respondents of grave
coercion. We answer in the affirmative.
It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to
warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and
entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors. 36 To
accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's
determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped
with petitions to review the prosecutor's findings in such investigations. 37
The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to the determination of
whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause
was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. 38 DaTISc

Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined

as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. 39 As held in Sy v. Secretary of Justice, 40 citing
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice: 41
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 [Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 42

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:

1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will,
be it right or wrong;

2. that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats

or intimidation; and

3. that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has
no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made
under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 43

Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the electricity,

water and telephone facilities. Petitioners were thus prevented from
occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose for which it was intended,
that is, to be used as a law office. At the time of the padlocking and cutting
off of facilities, there was already a case for the determination of the rights
and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending
before the MeTC. There was in fact an order for the respondents to remove
the padlock. Thus, in performing the acts complained of, Amor and Aguilar
had no right to do so.
The problem, however, lies on the second element. A perusal of
petitioners' Joint Affidavit-Complaint shows that petitioners merely alleged
the fact of padlocking and cutting off of facilities to prevent the petitioners
from entering the Unit. For petitioners, the commission of these acts is
sufficient to indict respondents of grave coercion. It was never alleged that
the acts were effected by violence, threat or intimidation. Petitioners
belatedly alleged that they were intimidated by the presence of security
guards during the questioned incident. IaAScD

We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to

cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his
person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. 44 Material violence is not
indispensable for there to be intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind
of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. 45
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and
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 cut off the facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the
CA, it was not alleged that the security guards committed anything to
intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged that the guards were not
customarily stationed there and that they produced fear on the part of
petitioners. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind. 46 Here, the petitioners, who
were allegedly intimidated by the guards, are all lawyers who presumably
know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by
petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint
Affidavit-Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit
prevented them from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This,
according to the petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
The case of Sy v. Secretary of Justice, 47 cited by petitioners, is not
applicable in the present case. In Sy, the respondents therein, together with
several men, armed with hammers, ropes, axes, crowbars and other tools,
arrived at the complainants' residence and ordered them to vacate the
building because they were going to demolish it. Intimidated by respondents
and their demolition team, complainants were prevented from peacefully
occupying their residence and were compelled to leave against their will.
Thus, respondents succeeded in implementing the demolition, while
complainants watched helplessly as their building was torn down. The Court
thus found that there was prima facie showing that complainants were
intimidated and that there was probable cause for the crime of grave
coercion.
On the contrary, the case of Barbasa v. Tuquero 48 applies. In Barbasa,
the lessor, together with the head of security and several armed guards,
disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by the complainants-
lessees because of the latter's failure to pay the back rentals. The Court held
that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon the lessees' employees when the cutting off of electricity
was effected. On the contrary, the Court found that it was done peacefully
and that the guards were there not to intimidate them but to prevent any
untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of the lessor's right
under the contract. We reach the same conclusion in this case. TECIHD

In the crime of grave coercion, violence through material force or such

a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over
the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient. 49
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction. 50 While probable cause should be
determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence
with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional
right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect
the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged
offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless
charges. 51 It is, therefore, imperative upon the prosecutor to relieve the
accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
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 accused. 52

A preliminary investigation is conducted for the purpose of securing

the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial. 53
Notwithstanding the DOJ's conclusion that respondents cannot be
charged with grave coercion, it ordered the filing of information for unjust
vexation against Amor, the Property Manager of DCCC and Aguilar as head
of the security division. We find the same to be in order.
Petitioners' Joint Affidavit-Complaint adequately alleged the elements
of unjust vexation. The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code which defines and provides for the penalty of unjust vexation is broad
enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of
some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent
person. 54 Nevertheless, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners' charges
but such matters may only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits
where the presence or absence of the elements of the crime may be
thoroughly passed upon. 55
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Resolution
dated August 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 94229, are AFFIRMED. DcSEHT

SO ORDERED.
Corona, * C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, ** Abad and Villarama, Jr., *** JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral

Mendoza, per Raffle dated July 19, 2010.

**Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J.

Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated August 31, 2011.

***Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes

P.A. Sereno, per Special Order No. 1076 dated September 6, 2011.

1.Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose
Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
concurring; rollo, pp. 36-48.
2.Rollo , p. 50.
3.Records, pp. 129-151.

4.Id. at 125.
5.CA rollo, p. 439.
6.Branch 69.
7.Records, p. 153.
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 8.Id. at 166.
9.Id. at 126-127.

10.Id. at 153-163.
11.Branch 268, Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2712. The
decision was embodied in an Omnibus Order dated June 27, 2007; id. at 580-
587.
12.The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95241. The CA rendered the Decision
on September 29, 2008; id. at 591-617.
13.Embodied in a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, records, pp. 125-128.

14.Records, pp. 125-128.

15.Id. at 87.
16.Id. at 388-389.
17.Id. at 77-87.
18.Id. at 170-174.

19.Id. at 119-124.
20.Id. at 124.
21.Id. at 123.
22.Embodied in a Resolution dated December 15, 2005, id. at 263-264.

23.Records, pp. 231-233.

24.Id. at 266-267.
25.Supra note 1.
26.Rollo , pp. 42-48.
27.Supra note 2.

28.Rollo , p. 17.
29.Id. at 21.
30.Id. at 22-23.
31.Id. at 29.
32.Id. at 453-501.

33.Id. at 516-523.
34.Id. at 45.
35.Id. at 43-44.
36.First Women's Credit Corporation v. Baybay, G.R. No. 166888, January 31,
2007, 513 SCRA 637, 644.

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 37.Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA
318, 335.
38.First Women's Credit Corporation v. Baybay, supra note 36, at 644-645.
39.Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 176291, December 4, 2009, 607
SCRA 355, 363; Sy v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 166315, December 14,
2006, 511 SCRA 92, 96.
40.Supra.
41.G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495.
42.Sy v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 39, at 96-97.
43.Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 39; Sy v. Secretary of Justice,
supra note 39, at 97.
44.Lee v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 90423, September 6, 1991, 201 SCRA 405,
408. Civil Code, Art. 1335.
45.People v. Alfeche, Jr., G.R. No. 102070, July 23, 1992, 211 SCRA 770, 779.

46.Lee v. Court of Appeals , supra note 44. Civil Code, Art. 1335.
47.Supra note 39.
48.G.R. No. 163898, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 102.
49.Id. at 109; People v. Alfeche, Jr., supra note 45, at 780.
50.Borlongan, Jr. v. Peña, G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 106, 130;
Baltazar v. People , G.R. No. 174016, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 278, 294.
51.Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609,
629-630; Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No.
163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 410.
52.R.R. Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 369, 395.
53.Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez, 473 Phil. 758, 780 (2004); Baltazar v. People , supra
note 50, at 292-293.
54.Maderazo v. People , G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 234, 247.
55.Sy v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 39, at 99.

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