Morada V Randy Rias
Morada V Randy Rias
Morada V Randy Rias
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SEC()ND DIVISION
FE J. MORADA, ·'"1_ n
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Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - HERNA1"1:DO,
INTING,
GAERLAN, and
DIMAAl\/IPAO, JJ.
R,A.NDY RIAS~ EX-O ROLLY
CEBU, DESI( OFFICER ROMY
DONALDO, DESK OFF."JCER
FERNANDO DOMINGO and
OTHER JOHN DOES OF
BARANGAY 176, CALOOCAN Promulgated:
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CITY,
Respondents. FEB 14 2022
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l)ECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
Antecedent Facts
1\1orada alleged that on OctQber 14, :2015 at around 8:00 a.m,, she received
a text message frorn her daughter, Jermilyn J. rviorada; that Johnson was arrested
1
Rolla., pp, 12-2~,
2 Id. at 32-37.
Id. itt 38-43.
A/
Decision 2 G.R. No. 222226
and detained by the barangay tanods of Barangay l 76, Caloocan City for alleged
theft of a mobile phone in the house of another barangay tanod, herein respondent
Randy Rias (Randy). 4
Morada went to the barangay hall at about 7:00 p.m. of October 14, 2015.
At the barangay hall, respondent Rolly Cebu (Rolly) informed Morada that
Johnson was already released by either respondent Fernando Domingo (Fernando)
or respondent Romy Donal do (Romy) from the custody of the barangay as
evidenced by the entry in the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself. 5
In the meantime, rumors circulated within Barangay 176 that Johnson had
been extrajudicially killed and that his body was mixed in cement in order to
conceal the incident. This prompted Morada to institute a petition for the issuance
of a writ of amparo to detennine whether respondents had violated or threatened to
violate Johnson's right to life, liberty and security, and to compel respondents to
detennine the whereabouts of Johnson, and the person/s responsible for his
disappearance or possible death, among others. 7
On January 25, 2016, Morada filed before the RTC a Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Amparo, 8 docketed as SP. PROC CASE NO. C-5159.
On January 26, 2016, the RTC rendered the assailed Order9 denying the
petition. The RTC held that there was no showing of any refusal on the part of the
respondents to acknowledge or to give information on Johnson's whereabouts such
that there was no intention to remove him from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Thus, the third and fourth elements of enforced
disappearance are absent. The decretal portion of the RTC Order reads:
SO ORDERED. 10
4
Id. at 39.
5
Id. at 48.
6
Id. at 40.
7
Id. at 40-42.
8
Id. at 38-43.
9
Id. at 32-37.
10
Id. at 37.
-;v
Decision 3 G.R. No. 222226
Issue
The issue for resolution is whether the RTC gravely erred in not giving
due course to the petition for issuance of writ of amparo despite substantial
evidence submitted in support of the same.
Our Ruling
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
11
Id. at 34.
12 SEC. 19. Appeal. -Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
11,
Decision 4 G.R. No. 222226
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 13
There is no question that the first and second elements are attendant in this
case. However, We agree with the RTC that the third and fourth elements are sorely
lacking. While it is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he
committed in the house of Randy, it was sufficiently established by the respondents
that he was already released from their custody on October 14, 2015, as evidenced
by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself. 14 In fact, Morada neither
denied nor refuted the said document of release. As opposed to the unsubstantiated
allegations of Morada that it is respondents who are responsible for Johnson's
disappearance, We accord greater weight to the documentary evidence presented
by the respondents exhibiting that Johnson was no longer in the custody of the
respondents when he disappeared. Such evidence strongly militate against
Morada's claim of enforced disappearance.
Morada further argues that the lack of cooperation on the part of the
respondents constitutes a refusal on their part to acknowledge Johnson's
disappearance and the corresponding intention to remove him from the protection
of the law.
By her own admission, Morada disclosed that when she inquired about her
son Johnson at the barangay hall, she was immediately informed by respondent
Rolly that Johnson was captured but was also released from detention the same
day. In support thereof, Rolly showed the barangay blotter which bore Johnson's
signature showing his release. Thus, it is clear that there was no refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Johnson.
This documentary proof of Johnson's release from detention is, to the mind of the
Court, substantial evidence to establish that the respondents have not refused to
acknowledge or give information on the whereabouts of Johnson, as in fact it
should be regarded as information positively showing that Johnson was no longer
under the hold of the barangay officials. 15
13
Navia v. Pardico, 688 Phil. 266, 279 (2012r
14
Rollo, p. 48.
15
Id. at 36.
"/
Decision 5 G.R. No. 222226
"For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is
endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has
disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a
refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts
of the missing persons." 16
In the instant case, the Court agrees with the RTC that Morada failed to
prove by substantial evidence her claim of enforced disappearance. Morada's
petition is mainly anchored on the alleged rumor which circulated in their
community that Johnson was killed and his dead body was mixed in cement.
However, said allegation lacked corroborations. The presentation of
testimonial, documentary or at least circumstantial evidence could have made a
difference in light of the denials made by the respondents as regards Morada's
claims, as well as the documentary evidence, showing that Johnson is no longer
in the charge of the barangay. Morada's continued reliance on mere rumors and
speculations, without presenting any clear and independent evidence showing
that there was a threat to Johnson's life, liberty, and security, even prior to his
arrest or that he was physically harmed by the respondents while in detention,
does not amount to substantial evidence.
Given the foregoing, there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
The liberality accorded to amparo does not mean that a claimant is excused from
the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial
evidence demands some adequate evidence." 17
16 Callo v. Morente, 818 Phil. 454, 460-461 (2017), citing Navia v. Pardico, supra note 13.
17 See Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 695 Phil. 781, 799 (2012).
---z.
Decisio~1 6 G.R. No. 222226
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ESTELAM. ~~ERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson
/
~Ji,~
HE~INTfNG SA1VIUEL JI. GAERL
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RB. DIIViAAMPA
Associate Justice
Decision 7 G.R. No. 222226
ATTEST.ATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached ip
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
AAOtJ..t,..A/
ESTELA. M:"PERLAS-B.ERNABE.
, . . . . 1 .
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assig1.wd to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.