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September 6, 2022
Hoine and LA'-'-' ENFORCEMENT sENs1nvE OIG-22-64
ecurity
LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov
September 6, 2022
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D. JOSEPH V Digitally signed by JOSEPH V
CUFFARI
Inspector General CUFFARI Date: 2022.09.02 15:29:46
-()4'00'
SUBJECT: DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect

All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis -
l.au.1 Enforssms1=1-,t Ssnsitil:J.B
Attached for your action is our final report, DHS Encountered Obstacles to
Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis -
1.aw Enforssms1=1-,t Ssnsitil:J.B. We incorporated the formal comments provided by
your office.
The report contains two recommendations to improve the Department's
screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees and coordination and planning efforts
for future similar emergency situations. The Department did not concur with
either recommendation. Based on information provided in your response to the
draft report, we consider recommendations 1 and 2 open and unresolved. As
prescribed by Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up,
and Resolutions for Office ofInspector General Report Recommendations, within
90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a
written response that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2)
corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date for each recommendation.
Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting
documentation necessary to inform us about the status of the
recommendations. Until your response is received and evaluated, the
recommendations will be considered open and unresolved. Please send your
response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs .gov.
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as
amended, we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with
oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland
Security. We will post a redacted version of the report on our website.
Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Bruce Miller,
Deputy Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.
Attachment
www.oig.dhs.gov
DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet,
and Inspect All Evacuees
during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis
September 6, 2022 What We Found

Why We Did After meeting with more than 130 individuals
from the Department of Homeland Security, we
This Audit determined DHS encountered obstacles to
screen, vet, and inspect all Afghan evacuees
The United States welcomed arriving as part of Operation Allies Refuge
more than 79,000 Afghan (OAR)/Operation Allies Welcome (OAW).
evacuees between July 2021 Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
and January 2022, as part of (CBP) did not always have critical data to
OAR/OAW. The President properly screen, vet, or inspect the evacuees. We
directed the Secretary of determined some information used to vet
Homeland Security to lead the evacuees through U.S. Government databases,
coordination across the Federal such as name, date of birth, identification
Government to resettle number, and travel document data, was
vulnerable Afghans arriving as inaccurate, incomplete, or missing. We also
part of OAW. We conducted this determined CBP admitted or paroled evacuees
audit to determine the extent to who were not fully vetted into the United States.
which DHS screened, vetted,
and inspected evacuees arriving We attribute DHS’ challenges to not having: (1) a
as part of OAR/OAW. list of Afghan evacuees who were unable to
provide sufficient identification documents; (2) a
contingency plan to support similar emergency
What We situations; and (3) standardized policies. As a
result, DHS may have admitted or paroled
Recommend individuals into the United States who pose a
risk to national security and the safety of local
We made two recommendations communities.
to improve the Department’s
screening and vetting of Afghan
evacuees and coordination and
planning efforts for future
DHS Response
similar emergency situations.
The Department did not concur with the
For Further Information: recommendations. Appendix B contains the
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at Department’s comments in their entirety.
(202) 981-6000, or email us at
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov
www.oig.dhs.gov LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE OIG-22-64


Table of Contents
Background .................................................................................................... 1
Results of Audit .............................................................................................. 8
DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Afghan

Evacuees Admitted or Paroled into the United
States…………………………………………………………………………………….8
Recommendations ......................................................................................... 14
Management Comments and OIG Analysis……………………………………….…..15
Appendixes
Appendix A:
Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 17
Appendix B:
DHS Comments to the Draft Report ................................. 20
Appendix C:
Afghan Evacuee OAW Travel Process................................ 27
Appendix D:
Reports from DOD and DOS Inspectors General and Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
Related to OAR/OAW ...................................................... 28
Appendix E: Report Distribution .......................................................... 29
Abbreviations
--
CBP
DOB
DOD
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
date of birth
Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
IC Intelligence Community
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INA Immigration and Nationality Act
--
LPR
OAR
OAW
POE
lawful permanent resident
Operation Allies Refuge

Operation Allies Welcome
port of entry
SIV Special Immigrant Visa
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
UCG Unified Coordination Group
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-22-64

Background
In the summer of 2021, the United States withdrew its military and diplomatic
personnel from Afghanistan. The White House launched Operation Allies
Refuge (OAR) with the Department of State (DOS) as the lead to help relocate
interested Afghan nationals and their immediate family members in the Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) application pipeline.1 DOS activated the Afghanistan
Coordination Task Force on July 19, 2021 to coordinate the U.S. Government’s
efforts to bring qualified SIV applicants to the United States once their security
vetting was complete.
On August 15, 2021, the Kabul-based Afghan government fell to Taliban

militants. Some individuals fled without their belongings, including
identification documents. The Department of Defense (DOD) accelerated its
efforts to evacuate individuals from Afghanistan to facilities in other countries
known as “lily pads.” These countries included Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, Spain, Italy, Bahrain, and Germany. The lily pads served as transit
points to screen and vet evacuees prior to their arrival into the United States.
DOD provided temporary housing, sustainment, and other support at the lily
pads. On the same day the Afghan government fell to Taliban militants, DHS
personnel2 began supporting operations overseas.
On August 29, 2021, the President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security
to lead the coordination across the Federal Government to resettle vulnerable
Afghans, known as Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). The Secretary established
the Unified Coordination Group (UCG)3 to ensure Federal resources,
authorities, and expertise were used in a unified and synchronized manner to
support the goals of OAW. See Figure 1 for a timeline of the Afghanistan
evacuation. The U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal and evacuation
operation concluded on August 30, 2021, with the departure of U.S. forces
from Afghanistan.

1 For this report, we used the definition of an Afghan evacuee from Public Law 117-43 as a
person whose evacuation from Afghanistan to the United States, or a U.S.-controlled location
overseas, was facilitated by the United States as part of OAR.
2 Approximately 400 DHS personnel supported operations at overseas locations; these
personnel were from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security
Administration, United States Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
United States Secret Service, and DHS Headquarters.
3 According to DHS’ National Response Framework, a UCG is made up of senior leaders
representing various interests including state, tribal, territorial, and Federal, and in some
instances local jurisdictions, private sector, and non-governmental organizations. UCG
responsibilities include coordinating staff based on incident requirements, operations,
planning, and logistics to integrate personnel for unity of government effort.

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-22-64

Figure 1. Timeline of Afghanistan Evacuation, July – August 2021
House launched White H ous e

Operation Allies Refuge
to s rt the Kabul, Afghanistan designated D H S as
· inte r ested fell to the Taliban the lead Federal
n ~~ Department for
immediate families w l10 facilitating the entry
supported the U.S. of vulnerable Afghans
Government
7/19/21 8/15/21 into the U .S.
7/14/21 Department of S tate 8/15/21 DHS per sonnel 8/29/21

activated began supporting
Afghanistan operations
Coordination Task overseas.
Force.
Source: DHS Office of Inspector General analysis of DOD IG reports, DOS IG reports, and press
releases
During OAW, DHS paroled Afghan evacuees into the country. Parole is a
discretionary immigration mechanism that grants foreign nationals, who are
otherwise inadmissible, entry to the United States and permission to remain for
a designated period, during which they are eligible to apply for temporary
employment authorization.4 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security5 to temporarily parole
individuals applying for admission into the United States for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit on a case-by-case basis.6
DHS may revoke parole at any time if it is no longer warranted or the individual
violates the conditions of the parole.7 See Table 1 for a comparison of three
different pathways for individuals to enter the country.

4 INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(11).
5 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296 (codified as 6 U.S.C. § 251),
transferred authority from the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to the DHS Secretary.
6 There is no statutory or regulatory definition of “urgent humanitarian reasons” or “significant
public benefit.” However, “urgent humanitarian reasons” call for immediate or other time-
sensitive action, such as critical medical treatment. “Significant public benefit” parole
includes, but is not limited to, law enforcement and national security reasons or foreign or
domestic policy considerations.
7 The conditions for this parole under OAW/OAR included medical screening, reporting
requirements, and compliance with Federal, state, and local laws and ordinances.

LAV.' ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Table 1. Comparison of Pathways to Enter the United States
Process Parole of OAR/ OAW U.S. Refugee 8 Admissions

Afghan SIV
Attribute Afghan Evacuees Program
Application Upon determination by Years Varies from less than 1
Processing U.S . Customs and Border year to more than 2 years
Time Protection (CBP) after
successfully clearing
screening, vetting, and
ins ection
Applicant's At U .S . Port of Entry (POE) Outside the United States Generally, outside the
Location individual's country of
nationali
Discretionary/ Discretionary decision Adjudicative decisions by Adjudicative decision by
Adjudicative made byCBP U.S . Citizenship and users
Decision Immigration Services
and Deciding (USCIS) and DOS 9
Entity
Path to Lawful No path to LPR Grants LPR upon Gives a path to LPR after 1
Permanent admission year in the country
Resident LPR
Interview None until December 2021 Requires in-person Requires in-person
Requirements interview interview
Screening and Lily pads: Biometric and USCIS reviews background Biometric and biographic
Vetting Layers biographic screening and checks and DOS or DOD screerung occurs
in Place vetting by screening. USCIS conducts throughout. USCIS
biographic queries in reviews the biographic
checks , conducts
biometric checks
=grant visa applications

and interviews the an mterviews
applicants, as well as app cants for eligibility.
ht conducts internal checks U.S. POE: CBP inspection.
the and coordinates
interagency security
checks.
U .S . POE: CBP ins ection. U.S. POE: CBP ins ection.
Source: DHS OIG analysis of DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (DHS Policy) , USCIS, and
other publicly available documents.
8
A refugee is a person outside his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to
return to his or her country of nationality because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race , religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion. An asylee is a person who meets the definition of refugee and is already
present in the United States or is seeking admission at a POE. Refugees are required to apply
for LPR ("green card") status 1 year after being admitted, and asylees may apply for green card
status 1 year after their grant of asylum.
9 Starting July 20, 2022 , most new applicants no longer need to file the previously required
Form I 360 with USCIS but must file Form DS-157 with DOS .
www. oiq.dhs.qov 3 OIG-22- 64

I.AW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
On August 23, 2021, pursuant to

Figure 2. Demographics of U.S. Arrivals
INA Section 212(d)(5), the DHS
from Afghanistan as of April 19, 2022
Secretary issued Guidance for the
Immigration Processing of Afghan
Citizens During Operation Allies
Refuge to CBP’s Acting Commissioner
directing CBP officers to parole
certain Afghan nationals into the
United States, on a case-by-case
basis, for a period of 2 years and
subsequent to appropriate vetting.10
According to the Department of
Homeland Security Operation Allies
Welcome Afghan Evacuee Quarterly
Status Update 1, Fiscal Year 2022
Report to Congress (April 21, 2022), I ADULT MALE I ADULT FEMALE I MINORS
CBP paroled about 72,550 of the

more than 79,000 Afghan evacuees
who arrived between July 2021 and Source: UCG OAW Daily Report April 19, 2022
January 2022. Figure 2 provides a
breakdown of arrivals by demographic. The remaining evacuees included
LPRs, SIV holders and applicants, and individuals who had valid nonimmigrant
visas to enter the country. See Appendix C for the Afghan evacuee OAW travel
process.
The U.S. Government established a multi-layered process to screen, vet, and

inspect evacuees from Afghanistan. These individuals were supposed to undergo
the following:
 Screening is an initial examination or review of evacuees and their

belongings to identify individuals who may pose a threat and/or were
ineligible for access to the United States. During screening at the lily
pads, DOD and CBP collected biometric data (facial images and
fingerprints) for individuals ages 14 to 7911 who were not LPRs or U.S.
citizens, as well as biographic data (name, date of birth (DOB),
10
identification number, and phone number) for all travelers. DOD and
CBP used devices to collect this information and submitted it to

-
According to a DHS Policy official, the White House’s National Security Council was involved
in discussions to use immigration parole as a means to bring Afghan evacuees into the
country.
11 CBP may require certain individuals to provide biometric identifiers to determine their
admissibility, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(ii).

• Vetting is an analysis of evacuees' biometric and biographic data by the

to ensure
individuals do not have derogatory information in U.S. Government
databases. Evacuees who cleared both biometric and biographic vetting
were placed on flight manifests to U.S. POEs. CBP used- to vet
traveler information on each manifest. CBP also conducted preflight
vetting of the flight manifests. Individuals who cleared manifest vetting
~ for onward travel to the United States. T h e
- supported additional security vetting of OAW parolees for
the duration of their parole to supplement their initial overseas vetting.
• Inspecting is a routine inspection conducted at all U.S. POEs to verify

an evacuee's identity and admissibility. At primary inspection, CBP
officers compared facial features of travelers to documents presented and
asked additional questions to determine citizenship and admissibility. 13
They also captured and verified biometric data through fingerprints,
which are run a ainst and other holdings, including the
. CBP officers vetted
Afghan evacuees against . As they would under normal
primary inspection procedures, CBP officers referred any evacuees with
unresolved issues, including potential matches to derogatory
information, to secondary inspection, during which officers conduct
interviews and additional research to determine the individual's
admissibility. Evacuees who did not clear secondary inspection were
found to be inadmissible and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), pend:iing removal proceedings.
See Figure 3 for a flowchart of the interagency screening, vetting, and

inspecting process.
rrective No. 3340-052A, Pri.mary Processing at Airports, August 24, 2016.
www.oiq.dhs.gov 5 OIG-22-64
Figure 3. OAW Interagency Screening, Vetting, and Inspecting Process 14
D Biometric/Biographic Collection
DOD or CBP collect biometrics (facial image and fingerprints)
and biographies (e.g., name, DOB, and ID number)
, -_ _ _ _ _ _ _...__ _ _ _ _ _..__,, lnterage ncy Vetting ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Biometric Vetting
Prints are compared aga inst DOD, DHS, and - simultaneous -
FBI repositories
DHS Consolidates
Biome tric and
Biographic Results
[2J Passenger Se lection Process (DHS)
Evacuee population is compared against interagency vetting results to identify individuals cleared for
o nward travel to United States.
0 Manifest Building (DOD/State)
Individuals that successfu lly clear veUingare manifested for flights to the United States. Those that do
not clear initial vetting are set aside for further processing.
Manifest Vetting (OHS)
Routi ne p reflight manifest vetting is conducted by CBP.
0 Manifest Clearance {DHS/0O0)
DHS/DOD review manifest vetting results 21,1d ~nly approve individuals tha t clear manifest vetting for
onward travei to the United States.
IL] Port6f Entry Processing {DHS)
CSP officers conducts routine port o f entry primary processing to include biographic and biometric checks.
For those that clear processi ng:

Arncric.an Citizcn5/lawfu l Perrna ne nt Rc5idcnt3 adrnittcd and able to proceed
• Afghan nationals with vis:is admitted and able to proceed
Afghan nationals without a visa are p aroled into the country for humanitarian reasons, on a case-by-case
basis, and subject to certa in conditions, including medical requirements
For those that need further review as a result of POE processing:

Any unresolved issues that arise at primary, including potential matches to derogatory information, are
referred to secondary for further processing
In secondary, further review of informa tion is examined by CBP officers
Those that clear secordary processing a re admitted or paroled, on a case-by-case basis, into the United States
depending on their immigration status.
Those that do not clear secondary processing and are fou nd to be inadmissible are placed into ICE custody
pending removal proceedings; some are, on a case-by-<:ase, provided an opportunity to voluntarily withdraw
thei r application for admission.
Source: DHS Policy official sent via e-mail
14In addition to DOD and DOS, DHS (Transportation Security Administration) participated in
Step 4, above.
Afghan evacuees who cleared inspection at U.S. POEs independently departed
the airports15 or went to a military base known as a safe haven to receive
additional resettlement assistance from DHS, DOS, or other non-governmental
agencies.16 At safe havens, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
conducted immigration processing by verifying the identity of individuals
applying for a work authorization and performing additional security vetting.
Months after the evacuation operations began, the UCG issued additional
guidance modifying some activities. For example:
 On December 4, 2021, the UCG Senior Response Official issued OAW

guidance, Implementing Deputies Small Group Guidance for Operation
Allies Welcome CONUS Parole Eligibility, to ensure all Afghan evacuees
traveling from an overseas location to a U.S. POE under OAW met the
eligibility criteria determined by the Deputies Small Group. According to
an official from DHS Policy, the National Security Council leads this
group to discuss, evaluate, and decide policy issues.
 The UCG issued superseding and subsequent guidance in a March 28,

2022 memorandum titled, Implementing Deputies Small Group Guidance
for Operation Allies Welcome CONUS Eligibility. According to the memo,
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program would be explored as an option for
Afghans without an existing SIV and Immigrant Visa pathway, including
certain SIV/Immigrant Visa-eligible Afghans for whom a visa was not
immediately available. This audit did not cover these new processes
established in this memorandum. DHS and CBP did not provide formal
policies and procedures governing the screening and vetting processes
for Afghan evacuees when OAR and OAW initially began.
We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS screened,

vetted, and inspected evacuees arriving as part of OAR/OAW. To obtain an
understanding of overall processes established for OAR/OAW and dispositions
of travelers who arrived in the United States, we met with more than 130
personnel from the UCG; DHS-level offices such as the Screening and Vetting
Office in DHS Policy; the Office of Biometric Identity Management; USCIS’
Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate, Fraud Detection

15 According to a February 18, 2022 Operation Allies Welcome Daily Report, 8,576 evacuees
departed independently from U.S. POEs and did not receive resettlement assistance. A
National Vetting Center official noted in April 2022 these individuals will be captured in a
future recurrent vetting effort.
16 Safe havens were eight military bases and facilities in the United States set up to house and
provide resettlement support to evacuees. These bases included Marine Corps Base Quantico,
VA; Fort Pickett, VA; Fort Lee, VA; Holloman Air Force Base, NM; Fort McCoy, WI; Fort Bliss,
TX; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; and Camp Atterbury, IN.

and National Security Directorate and Field Operations Directorate; ICE
Homeland Security Investigations and Enforcement Removal Operations; and
CBP’s Emergency Operations Center, the Office of Information Technology, the
National Targeting Center, the National Vetting Center, and other CBP Office of
Field Operations offices. We also interviewed representatives from DOD and
FBI to understand their roles in OAR/OAW.
In January 2022, we issued DHS a Notice of Findings and Recommendations

document notifying the Department of the urgent need to take action to
address security risks of evacuees from Afghanistan who were admitted or
paroled into the United States without sufficient identification documents to
ensure proper screening and vetting. Additionally, DHS OIG currently has
multiple ongoing reviews, as well as one completed review related to DHS’
resettlement of Afghan nationals in the United States.17 We coordinated with
the broader Inspector General community conducting reviews related to these
issues, including the IC, DOD, and DOS. Appendix D provides a list of the
reports resulting from these reviews to date.
Results of Audit
DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All

Afghan Evacuees Admitted or Paroled into the United States
CBP did not always have critical data to properly screen, vet, or inspect Afghan
evacuees arriving as part of OAR/OAW. We determined some of the
information used to vet evacuees through U.S. Government databases, such as
name, DOB, identification number, and travel document data, was inaccurate,
incomplete, or missing. CBP also admitted or paroled evacuees who were not
fully vetted into the United States. We attribute the challenges to DHS not
having: (1) a list of Afghan evacuees who were unable to provide sufficient
identification documents; (2) a contingency plan to support similar emergency
situations; and (3) standardized policies. As a result, DHS paroled at least two
individuals into the United States who posed a risk to national security and the
safety of local communities and may have admitted or paroled more individuals
of concern.

17 DHS OIG reviews include UCG’s role in Afghan resettlement; independent departures of
Afghan evacuees from safe havens; DHS’ preparations to provide long-term legal status to
paroled Afghan evacuees; and DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to
U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome (OIG-22-54, July 27, 2022).

CBP Did Not Always Have Critical Data to Properly Screen, Vet, and
Inspect Afghan Evacuees at U.S. POEs
At all U.S. POEs, CBP is required to verify that traveler information in identity
documents is correct. To do so, according to CBP Directive No. 3340-052A,
Primary Processing at Airports (August 24, 2016), CBP officers compare the
facial features of the traveler with the document presented and ask questions
to determine citizenship and admissibility, such as the purpose of the visit,
where the traveler will stay, means to support oneself during the visit to the
United States, and whether the document is compatible with the
purpose/intent of the travel. CBP scans the machine-readable document into
a CBP system of record, TECS, or manually enters the travel document
information into TECS. The traveler’s information is then vetted against
various U.S. Government databases to determine whether there is derogatory
information, such as known or suspected terrorists, criminals, or immigration
violators. According to CBP and FBI officials, IC vetting databases are founded
on biographic data. However, we identified discrepancies with the CBP data
used to vet Afghan evacuees against U.S. Government databases.
CBP admitted or paroled evacuees who had questionable names and dates of
birth partly due to cultural differences. It is customary in Afghanistan for
some individuals to have only one name. It is not always part of the Afghan
culture to record or know exact DOBs. In Afghanistan, even though national
legislation requires registration of children at birth, years of conflict decimated
the administrative mechanisms and the social institutions supporting them.18
One CBP official discussed how evacuees at the lily pads did not always know
their DOB, and without a verification document to cross-check against, the
official simply entered the evacuee’s biographic information as told by the
individual. For example, if an evacuee stated he/she was 20 years old, the
DOB most likely assigned was January 1, 2001. Several CBP officials said they
often had to rely on translators or interpreters to identify evacuees’ names and
DOBs. Based on the cultural differences and questionable data in the
biographic fields, it was challenging for DHS to fully screen and vet the
evacuees. The Federal Government provides guidance on how to nominate and
screen travelers with incomplete names. However, it also identifies the
inherent limitations that exist in any primarily name-based system such as two
of the systems described in the guidance.
The records we refer to below include adults, as well as minors, but due to
challenges with the DOB field, we could not separate adults from minors.
During our meetings, CBP officials estimated that half the evacuation

18 Innocenti Insight Birth Registration and Armed Conflict by the United Nations Children’s Fund
Innocenti Research Centre (2007).

population were children. We found missing, incomplete, or inaccurate first
and last names, DOBs, travel document numbers, travel document types, and
visa data in TECS. We questioned data in many of the 88,977 TECS records,19
including:
Biographic Data
 417 records had first name unknown or “FNU.”20
 242 records had last name unknown or “LNU.”
 11,110 records had the DOB recorded as “January 1.”
Travel Document Data

 36,400 records had “facilitation document” as the document type.
However, during the audit, CBP could not define or provide an
explanation for this document type, indicating potential inaccuracies.
 7,800 records had invalid or missing document numbers.
Additionally, CBP could not provide reliable data on evacuees admitted or

paroled into the United States. Specifically, we could not rely on the visa class
code in CBP’s data to determine the number of evacuees paroled into the
United States or the document type code to determine the individuals admitted
or paroled into the United States without proper identification. CBP’s Concept
of Operations for Operation Allies Refuge21 allowed its officers to admit or parole
evacuees into the country without presenting proper identification documents
at a POE if they had no derogatory information. However, during the audit,
when we requested a list of individuals admitted or paroled without proper
identification, CBP officials responded that they did not maintain such a list.
Biometric screening and vetting processes may help to mitigate the risk of
limited biographic data.
CBP Allowed Some Evacuees Who Were Not Fully Vetted to Travel from
the Lily Pads or Enter the United States with Derogatory Information
According to the CBP’s vetting process, evacuees who passed both biometric
and biographic vetting processes would receive a “green status” clearing them
to travel to the United States from a lily pad. Additionally, individuals with a
potential match to derogatory information who could not be cleared, would

19 These 88,977 records represent the number of records in reports provided by CBP to identify
OAR/OAW travelers; the figure includes travelers of all ages.
20 DOS SIV guidelines state SIV applicants should enter their names as they appear on their
passports. If there is only one name, applicants should put “FNU” in the SIV application.
21 Concept of Operations: Operation Refuge issued for Houston Field Office Area Port of Houston
– Airports (August 25, 2021), Philadelphia International Airport (August 26, 2021), Chicago
Field Office – Area Port of Chicago (August 25, 2021), and Washington-Dulles International
Airport (August 26, 2021).

receive a “red status,” meaning they should not have boarded a plane to the
United States. Green versus red status is dynamic as it changes frequently
based on the information circulating and the databases used for screening and
vetting. This state of flux, along with the challenges with obtaining complete
and accurate data among different agencies, such as DOD OIG, contributed to
a variance in numbers reported for OAR/OAW. However, we found some
evacuees traveled to the United States without undergoing established vetting
processes. According to CBP’s data extracted in March 2022:
 CBP allowed 35 Afghan evacuees to board a flight to the United States

although they had not received a green status clearing them to travel.
 CBP did not collect biometrics (fingerprints) for 1,299 evacuees prior to
travel to the United States.
In August 2022, CBP provided additional information asserting all 35 Afghan

evacuees noted above received a green status when they arrived in the United
States. At the same time, CBP provided additional information related to the
1,299 Afghan evacuees noted above, in which CBP asserted: 120 were
biometrically enrolled prior to departing the lily pad; 1,127 were enrolled at the
U.S. POE; 22 were enrolled after arrival; 23 were not enrolled; and 7 were out
of scope due to data inaccuracies in the original data set provided.
CBP also allowed some evacuees to enter into the United States who may not
have been fully vetted. According to internal DHS reports, CBP admitted or
paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory information into the country. We
confirmed two such cases:
 CBP paroled one evacuee into the United States who had been liberated
from prison in Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021. The
individual cleared lily pad screening and vetting processes and flew to
the United States. At the U.S. POE, CBP officers identified derogatory
information during the primary inspection. However, a supervisor
“unreferred” the individual and paroled the individual into the country
without a secondary inspection. Although the supervisor acted within
policy, we could not determine whether the supervisor was aware of the
evacuee’s prior incarceration. Approximately 3 weeks after this evacuee’s
parole, the FBI obtained derogatory information. Subsequently, ICE
removed this individual from the United States.
 CBP paroled another evacuee into the United States who posed national
security concerns. The evacuee initially cleared vetting at the lily pad
and 3 months after being paroled into the United States, CBP obtained

derogatory information from the FBI. According to ICE, at the time of
our audit, the individual was undergoing removal proceedings.
DHS Did Not Have a List of Evacuees Who Were Unable To Provide
Sufficient Identification Documents, a Contingency Plan to Support
Similar Emergency Situations, and Standardized Policies
DHS officials attributed screening and vetting issues to the time constraints at
lily pads. According to DHS, the timeframes were limited to just days or weeks,
and DHS needed to expedite screening and vetting to meet these time
constraints. For example, we reviewed DOS agreements with four of at least
six lily pad host countries and confirmed the expedited vetting timeframes, as
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Lily Pad Time Constraints

Host Time Number of
Country Constraint Evacuees who
(# days) Arrived in the
United States
GERMANY 10 41,195
ITALY 14 3,945
KUWAIT 14 4,122
QATAR 30 10,233
Source: DHS OIG analysis of DOS documents and
a CBP report
CBP officials also attributed screening and vetting issues to the language
barrier, Afghans not knowing their personal data, and the lack of automated
systems. According to officials, due to the lack of automated systems, CBP
sometimes deviated from its automated preflight manifest vetting processes at
the lily pads. In some cases, staff had to manually enter evacuees’ data from
photographs of handwritten flight manifests, which could cause delays
receiving vetting results as well as errors in the information collected. See
Figure 4 for an example of a handwritten manifest.

Figure 4. Handwritten Flight Manifest
Source: CBP official sent by email
We attribute the challenges to DHS not having: (1) a list of Afghan evacuees
who were unable to provide sufficient identification documents; (2) a
contingency plan to support similar emergency situations; and (3) standardized
policies. Although CBP followed its established processes by admitting or
paroling evacuees without sufficient identity documents, neither DHS nor CBP
developed a contingency plan for U.S. POEs to verify an evacuee’s identity.
Although this was an unprecedented humanitarian event, CBP was aware that
evacuees might arrive without sufficient documentation. Yet, CBP did not
develop a backup plan for validating the identity of Afghan evacuees entering
the United States at the POEs.
Additionally, DHS did not have formal screening and vetting policies to support
OAW. Instead, during the initial months of OAW, DHS officials said screening
and vetting requirements were decided on an ad hoc basis. DHS and CBP did
not have standardized formal policy documents and instead could only provide
informal flowcharts, meeting minutes, and draft documents.

Conclusion
The safety and the security of the American people is the highest priority for
the U.S. Government. Preventing criminals, suspected terrorists, or other
nefarious actors from entering the United States requires thorough screening
and vetting. CBP’s use of incomplete or inaccurate data would not have yielded
positive matches from intelligence databases if the individuals had derogatory
records under a different name or DOB. Therefore, DHS and CBP cannot be
sure they properly screened, vetted, and inspected all evacuees. We found they
paroled at least two individuals into the United States who may have posed a
risk to national security and the safety of local communities and may have
admitted or paroled more individuals of concern.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: We recommend the U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Commissioner:
a. Immediately identify evacuees from Afghanistan who are in the United

States and provide evidence of full screening and vetting based on confirmed
identification – especially for those who did not have documentation; and
b. Ensure recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled evacuees are
carried out for the duration of their parole period.
Recommendation 2: We recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security

develop a comprehensive contingency plan to support similar emergency
situations in the future and account for, screen, vet, and inspect all individuals
during unprecedented events when limited biographic data is available.
Specifically:

a. The plan should include, at a minimum, lessons learned from departmental
after-action reports that can be incorporated into the plan for future events,
lead roles and responsibilities, points of contact, established processes, and
expected timeframes.
b. The policies and procedures should ensure accountability, standard

practices, and quality assurance across DHS components involved in
screening, vetting, and inspecting individuals in emergency situations.

DHS Management Comments and OIG Analysis
DHS responded that it was proud of its OAW efforts and highlighted multiple
agencies involved in the screening and vetting of the Afghan evacuees. The OIG
acknowledges the interagency efforts supporting this unprecedented event to
screen and vet all evacuees. However, DHS’s response does not address the
concerns of this audit and the recommendations which are aimed at reviewing
the execution of OAW’s efforts and improving future, similar OAW efforts.
DHS did not concur with our recommendations and did not provide an action
plan to address them or better prepare for similar future events. Appendix B
contains DHS’ management comments in their entirety. On August 15, 2022,
DHS provided technical comments on our draft report, and we revised the
report as appropriate. We consider both recommendations unresolved and
open. A summary of DHS’ management response and our analysis follows.
DHS Response to Recommendation #1: DHS did not concur. According to

DHS, CBP provided evidence to the OIG that all individuals were screened,
vetted, and inspected. Additionally, DHS indicated CBP provided
documentation and evidence that it (1) established recurrent vetting processes
for all paroled Afghan nationals, and (2) will carry out vetting for the duration
of their parole period. DHS requested the OIG consider this recommendation
resolved and closed.
OIG Analysis of DHS’ comments: We do not consider DHS’ actions responsive

to the recommendation, which is unresolved and open. OIG acknowledges
CBP’s role in supporting interagency efforts throughout this unique emergency.
The OIG also understands CBP is responsible for verifying an individual’s
identity and admissibility at U.S. ports of entry (POEs). However, CBP did not
always have critical data to properly screen, vet, and inspect Afghan evacuees
at the POEs. Although the Department asserted it provided sufficient evidence
that all individuals were properly screened, vetted, and inspected, we could not
confirm this assertion and reported data inaccuracies. DHS explained that
recurrent vetting processes were established for all paroled Afghan evacuees for
the duration of their parole period. However, we did not receive supporting
data or other evidence to validate these assertions. The OIG recognizes the
continued security risks to our Nation, and we will close the recommendation
when CBP provides evidence the Department confirmed the identification of all
evacuees and screened and vetted them accordingly. Further, CBP must show
proof that every evacuee paroled into the United States during OAR/OAW went
through recurrent vetting throughout their parole period.

DHS Response to Recommendation #2: DHS did not concur. According to
DHS, this emergency situation was a rare and extraordinary evacuation effort,
which involved multiple agencies. DHS also asserted it will work with
interagency partners, as appropriate, to tailor existing procedures to the
unique facts and circumstances in any future event. DHS requested the OIG
consider this recommendation resolved and closed.
OIG Analysis of DHS’ comments: The OIG recognizes and appreciates the
interagency efforts supporting this unprecedented event to screen and vet all
evacuees. The OIG also understands the designation of DHS as the OAW lead
and, therefore, recognizes the importance of accounting for the Department’s
efforts and to better prepare for future similar efforts. Throughout the audit
process, the OIG worked closely with the Department to obtain policies and
procedures governing this emergency situation. Although we received
explanations, flowcharts, meeting minutes, and draft documents related to the
event, no formal policies were issued until months after DHS’ involvement.
Additionally, the recommendation does not exclude DHS’ collaboration with
other interagency partners. In fact, the OIG worked with the Department
repeatedly to revise the recommendation to allow the Department flexibility in
developing plans to support similar future emergency situations. DHS’
response does not acknowledge the need for improvement in the specific
aspects for which it is responsible. We will close the recommendation once
DHS develops a contingency plan to better prepare for future similar
emergency situations.

Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS screened,

vetted, and inspected evacuees arriving as part of OAR/OAW. Our audit scope
was April 2021 through June 2022. To answer our objective, we reviewed
applicable laws; regulations; DHS reports to Congress; Department and
component guidance; policies; and screening, vetting, and inspecting
procedures for Afghan evacuees who were part of OAR/OAW. We also reviewed
prior OIG, U.S. Government Accountability Office, and other related reports;
media articles; congressional activity and testimony; and DOS agreements with
other countries that agreed to temporarily house Afghan nationals during
OAR/OAW. We did a comparative analysis of immigration pathways to enter
the United States. After we completed our fieldwork, DHS Policy and CBP
provided additional documentation.
To obtain an understanding of overall processes established for OAR/OAW and

dispositions of travelers who arrived in the United States, we met with more
than 130 personnel from the UCG; DHS-level offices such as the Screening and
Vetting Office in DHS Policy; the Office of Biometric Identity Management;
USCIS’ Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate, Fraud
Detection and National Security Directorate and Field Operations Directorate;
ICE Homeland Security Investigations and Enforcement Removal Operations;
and CBP’s Emergency Operations Center, the Office of Information Technology,
the National Targeting Center, the National Vetting Center, and other CBP
Office of Field Operations offices. We interviewed representatives from DOD
and FBI to understand their roles in OAR/OAW.
We conducted site visits and met with DHS officials at the Philadelphia
International Airport and the safe havens at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
and Fort McCoy. We observed CBP processing an inbound flight of Afghan
evacuees. We also observed USCIS staff at one safe haven verifying and
collecting biometric information from Afghan nationals.
To obtain insight into lily pad operations, we interviewed 55 CBP officers,

analyzed their responses to 41 questions to confirm most of the common
themes and trends we identified, and reviewed any documentation provided to
support their responses. We also identified the personnel who supported
OAR/OAW overseas from the Transportation Security Administration, Coast
Guard, ICE, the Secret Service, and DHS Headquarters. We opted not to

interview additional DHS personnel for a few reasons, one of which was
because CBP represented the majority of DHS personnel supporting
OAR/OAW.
Additionally, we reviewed biographic and biometric enrollment results at the

lily pads from to determine how many Afghan evacuees had a red
-
status or lacked a complete green status at the time CBP ran the report from
(March 2022). We also reviewed a report on Afghan evacuees who did not
have a complete green status, as they had results from one or none of the two
required entities — the National Targeting Center and the IC prior to flying to
the United States. We compared these evacuees against TECS’ primary
inspection and secondary inspection data to determine what happened to these
data reliability assessment on

-
individuals at a U.S. POE. Due to audit time constraints, we did not conduct a
from which CBP obtained the biographic
and biometric enrollments and vetting results. In August 2022, CBP provided
additional data related to the evacuees who did not have a complete green
status. We relied solely on the data CBP provided to us and attributed it
accordingly in the report.
We obtained and analyzed TECS encounter, referral, and refusal records of

OAR/OAW travelers who arrived in the United States from July 2021 through
December 2021. We conducted a data reliability assessment on the TECS data
and determined we could not rely on all of the data due to completeness and
accuracy issues that we reported. Because we were unable to rely on the
accuracy of some of the data fields in the list of OAR/OAW travelers, we did not
test a statistical sample. Due to the unreliability of the data and the lengthy
timeframes to obtain supporting documentation from CBP, we did not test a
larger judgmental sample.
We also reviewed a CBP report with data on Afghan evacuees without biometric
enrollments provided by CBP in March 2022. In August 2022, we received
additional information related to this report and analyzed it. We did not
conduct a data reliability assessment of either data set. CBP provided a report
of the number of passengers by foreign site code. We used this data to identify
how many passengers came from lily pads in countries that had agreements
with the United States specifying the amount of time evacuees could remain in
that specific country. We did not assess data reliability of this information.
We assessed the internal controls significant to the audit objective throughout

the audit. We identified control weaknesses in the control activities and
monitoring control components. However, because we limited our review to the
control activities and monitoring components, other internal control
deficiencies may have existed at the time of our audit.

We conducted this performance audit between September 2021 and June 2022
pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require
that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our
audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives.

Appendix B
DHS Comments to the Draft Report
U.S. Department or Homeland Se<:urlty
Washington, DC 20528
August 24, 2022
MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.

Inspector General
Digitally signed by JI M H
JIM H CTlUIIIPACKE11
FROM: Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE Date: 2022.08.24 16:46:22
Director
CRUMPACKER •<)4"00'
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office
SUBJECT: Management Response to Draft Report: " DHS Encountered

Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect all Evacuees during the
Recent Afghani stan Crisis"
(Project No. 21 -057-AUD-DHS)
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on thi s draft report. The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (OHS or the Department) appreciates the work of the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report.
DHS is pro ud to have supported Operation Alli es Welcome (QA W), an un precedented
whole-of-government effo1t , duri ng which the United States government fac ili tated the
relocati on of Afghans whose li ves were at ri sk while mai ntaining national secu1i ty and
public safety of the United States as our priori ty. The Department worked with
intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism professionals from the Department of
Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI), National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), Department of State (DOS), and other Intelligence Community partners
to screen, vet, and inspect all Afghan nationals prior to parole into the United States.
As relayed to the OIG as recently as August 10, 2022, senior DHS leadership is
concerned with the conclusions reached in this draft report. For example, the report does
not reflect the interagency nature of the vetting process, despite significant efforts and
multiple attempts by DHS program officials, subject matter experts, and others to provide
the OIG a comprehensive understanding of the extensive detail s related to the numerous
facts and nuances of the unprecedented OAW vetting process. Specifically, the OIG's
report creates confusion with regard to terminology and roles, such as conflating the
phases of Operation Allies Refuge with OAW, despite the Department's providing
definitions to the audit team.

In addition, the draft report does not adequately acknowledge, and account for, the
interagency and multilayered vetting process that started overseas, continued at the U.S.
Port of Entry (POE), and is currently ongoing with recurrent vetting. For example, the
report highlights a claim that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was unable to
appropriately "screen , vet, and inspect" all Afghan nationals during the recent operation,
when CBP was only one part of an interagency screening and vetting process and did, in
fact, screen, vet and inspect all Afghan nationals at the POE. The presence of a record in
CBP systems of parole indicates that the individual underwent this final screening and
inspection. In this context, parole into the United States cannot be granted without the
process of presenting to a CBP officer for screening and inspection, pursuant to Section
235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which defines the requirement for
inspection . Although DHS provided information to the OIG on multiple occasions to
clarify the end-to-end screening and vetting processes, as well as to identify the multiple
other agencies that are involved in these processes, this information is regrettably not
evidenced in the report.
As far back as November 2021 , and multiple times thereafter, various DHS program
officials, subject matter experts, and others briefed the audit team and provided
documentation on the interagency vetting process and procedures to vet biometric and
biographic data of Afghans prior to their travel to the United States. This included details
on how biographic information was submitted to multiple agencies for vetting, and it is
important to clarify that any Afghan nationals with sufficient derogatory information to
preclude travel while overseas were not cleared for travel to the United States. DHS also
provided briefings to the OIG team describing the recurrent vetting process, including
details on how vetting continues after an individual 's arrival into the United States.
Upon evacuation from Afghanistan and before being cleared to travel to the United
States, Afghan nationals were brought to international transit points where the U.S.
government collected and reviewed biometric (i.e., facial images and fingerprints) and
biographic information (e.g., name, date of birth, identity document information, etc.) on
all Afghans between the ages of 14 and 79 . Biometric data was compared against DOD,
DHS, and FBI repositories, while biographic information that was collected was vetted
by NCTC, the FBI, and other Intelligence Community partners. Additionally, all
Afghans, regardless of age, had their biographic information submitted for flight manifest
vetting consistent with standard vetting procedures for all other foreign populations
traveling to the United States. Only those Afghan nationals who cleared these
comprehensive checks were approved for onward travel to the United States. Those who
did not clear these checks remained outside the United States.
As with other arrivals to U.S . POEs, Afghan evacuees must complete a primary
inspection upon arriving at a U.S . airport as defined by Section 235 of the INA, which is
conducted by CBP officers and includes additional biometric and biographic checks.
Those Afghan nationals who are identified by CBP as requiring further review are then

referred to secondary inspection, where additional vetting is conducted by CBP and other
Federal partners, as appropriate. Only those Afghan nationals who clear POE processing
are permitted to enter the United States. Those who do not clear this processing are given
an opportunity to voluntarily withdraw their application for admission to the United
States and return to a third country transit site for further vetting , and those who do not
choose voluntary withdrawal are placed into removal proceedings. Senior DHS
leadership is concerned that the OIG ' s draft report erroneously maintains that DHS could
not demonstrate it screened, vetted, and inspected all Afghan nationals, despite the fact
that all of these screening and vetting procedures were in place for the Afghan
population .
Of additional concern, the OIG's draft report does not clarify the DOS 's role in the
adjudication of unclassified and classified records that are received from multiple
interagency partners as part of the vetting of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications.
Importantly, DOS, not DHS, oversees the vetting and adjudication of SIV applications
overseas. Although U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is responsible for vetting
information in the Form 1-130, "Petition for Alien Relative," DOS is now the overall
adjudicator of the SIV program.
The draft report also confuses terms such as "asylee" and "refugee ," which will likely
create confusion for readers regarding the OIG' s findings. Section 10l(a)(42) of the INA
establishes that a refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such person ' s
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Refugees who
meet certain other eligibility requirements, including vetting requirements, may be
granted refugee status as an exercise of discretion. Likewise, asylum maybe be granted
to a person who meets the definition of refugee and is already present in the United States
or is seeking admission at a port of entry and who meets other eligibility requirements,
including vetting requirements. However, a person is not an asylee until granted asylum ,
which is discretionary. Refugees are required by law to apply for lawful permanent
resident (LPR) status one year after being admitted to the United States, see INA §
209(a), 8 C.F.R. § 209 . l(a)(l); and asylees may apply for LPR status one year after their
grant of asylum, see INA§ 209(b), 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(l).
The draft report further states that CBP admitted or paroled individuals into the United
States without proper identification or documentation. DHS believes the OIG reached
this erroneous conclusion because the OIG misunderstood the procedures that are
administered for parole. Specifically, the report appears to assume that all individuals
must travel on a valid travel document (such as a passport) in order to be inspected and
granted parole into the U.S. However, when CBP personnel process individuals for

parole they may accept an identification document, such as traveler's birth certificate,
foreign driver's license, or other national identity document to establish identity pursuant
to Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, which authorizes the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security to exercise his/her discretion to parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission into the United States. On November 2, 2021 , CBP provided OIG with a copy
of the Secretary's "Guidance for the Immigration Processing of Afghan Citizens During
Operation Allies Refuge," dated August 23, 2021, which notes that Secretary of
Homeland Security Alejandro N . Mayorkas found it an appropriate exercise of
discretionary authority for CBP officers to parole certain Afghan national into the U.S.,
on a case-by-case basis, for a period of two years and subsequent to appropriate vetting .
It is also important to clarify that parole is an extraordinary measure, used to meet urgent
humanitarian needs or to support a significant public benefit, including in emergency
circumstances. Parole was not used by CBP to circumvent normal visa processes and
timelines; rather, evacuation of Afghans was an urgent and exigent circumstance, and the
Secretary used his authority accordingly. Per Section 212(d)(5) of the INA and Title 8,
Section 212.5 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), CBP may consider parole
requests of individuals of any nationality, who present a range of documents and
evidence to verify their identity. CBP officers are trained to use all available information
including documents and interviews to establish identities.
The draft report also claimed that data within CBP systems - where the ' document type'
field for 36,000 records was labeled as "facilitation document" - was evidence that there
was insufficient documentation. It appears as ifOIG misinterpreted the ' document type'
data field , which CBP used to document that over 36,000 individuals presented some
type of acceptable document that was used to verify identity and conduct proper vetting.
Specifically, this field was used to record any document that the Afghans had with them
that was not a passport, but nevertheless served as other acceptable identification ( e.g. ,
driver's licenses, national ID, etc.). The use of the ' document type' field means that
these individuals presented an acceptable form of identification at the time of processing,
and CBP briefed the OIG team several times between November 2021 and July 2022 to
confirm these facts. However, the report still inaccurately asserts that some Afghan
nationals arriving through OAW were admitted or paroled to the United States lacked
credible documentation.
The draft report also uses specific examples to allege how the vetting system does not
work, when in fact those examples highlight how the process worked as intended.
Specifically, the draft rep01t states that two individuals were paroled into the United
States with derogatory information in their vetting records, which is incorrect. In March
2022, DHS provided the OIG with information on these two individuals, clarifying that
they were cleared by the interagency vetting process at the time of travel, and no

derogatory information was reported prior to their parole into the United States. At
times, DHS may be alerted to new derogatory information after individuals are admitted
or paroled. This is what occurred in these two cases. That information was provided to
the OIG audit team . As expected, DHS and our interagency partners immediately acted
upon this new derogatory information; this is indicative of a vetting system that works as
designed.
These examples highlight the importance and value of recurrent vetting, which is in place
for the OAW parolees and leverages the multitude of partnerships DHS has across law
enforcement, intelligence community and counterterrorism agencies to identify national
security and public safety concerns as new information becomes available and to act
accordingly. Importantly, the National Vetting Center (NVC) also supports recurrent
vetting of OAW parolees for the duration of their parole. But it should be noted that this
is not a supplemental process as stated in the OIG's draft report. Rather, the NVC
recurrent vetting is ongoing and active for all OAW parolees, as the Department has
explained to the audit team .
DHS acknowledges that the unprecedented nature of the OAW effort, out of necessity,
resulted in rapidly built processes to enable the vetting of individuals prior to parole into
the United States. However, it also is critical to acknowledge that DHS was not and is
not solely responsible for the vetting of all Afghan nationals, and that interagency vetting
partners worked collaboratively to develop and implement a whole-of-government
vetting process that was designed based on current best practices and quickly deployed
out of necessity given the urgency of the situation. As a result, all Afghan nationals were
screened, vetted and inspected prior to parole into the United States.
The draft report contains two recommendations, with which the Department non-concurs.
DHS previously submitted technical comments addressing accuracy, contextual, and
other issues under a separate cover for OIG ' s consideration.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Please
feel free to contact me if you have any questions.
Enclosure

Enclosure: Management Response to Recommendations

Contained in 21-057-AUD-DHS
OIG recommended that the U.S CBP Commissioner:
Recommendation 1:
a. Immediately identify evacuees from Afghanistan who are in the United States and
provide evidence of full screening and vetting based on confirmed identification -
especially for those who did not have documentation; and
b. Ensure recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled evacuees are carried
out for the duration of their parole period.
Response: Non-concur. As far back as November 2021, CBP provided evidence to the
OIG that all individuals were screened, vetted, and inspected, to include information
regarding those without documentation - which is permissible as parole determinations
are discretionary per§ 212(d)(5) of the INA and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. Additionally, CBP
provided documentation and evidence to the OIG multiple times, as recently as
August 12, 2022, corroborating that recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled
Afghan nationals are carried out for the duration of their parole period.
During OAW, the DOS and DOD presented individuals to CBP for processing by
collecting biometrics and biographic information to submit for vetting through the
interagency vetting process, as previously described in this letter. Accordingly, CBP
personnel deployed at intermediary sites (i .e. , lilypads) and CBP Officers at POEs
reviewed available identity documentation, and gathered further biographic/biometric
information, when applicable, with the exception for individuals younger than 14 or over
79, which is aligned with required legal processes across other immigration pathways
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 235. l(f)(l)(iv)(A), for all evacuated individuals.
We request that the OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.
OIG recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security:
Recommendation 2: Develop a comprehensive contingency plan to handle similar

evacuation efforts in the future and account for, screen, vet, and inspect all individuals
during unprecedented evacuation events when limited biographic data is available.
Specifically:
a. The plan should include, at a minimum, lessons learned from departmental after
action reports that can be incorporated into the plan for future events, lead roles

and responsibilities, points of contact, established processes, and expected

timeframes.
b. The policies and procedures should ensure accountability, standard practices, and
quality assurance across DHS components involved in screening, vetting, and
inspecting individuals in emergency situations.
Response: Non-concur. As previously discussed in this management response letter,

OAW ' s rare and extraordinary evacuation effort, to include the vetting process, was an
interagency effort that included facts and nuances specific to the circumstances of OA W,
and this effort included U.S. government professionals from DOD, DOS, DHS, FBI,
NCTC, and other Intelligence Community partners. Ultimately, a recommendation that
DHS develop an internal contingency plan based on DHS after-action reports fails to
account for the interagency nature of the vetting effort- a point Department officials
have raised throughout the 010 audit process- and because the vetting process used in
OA W was built upon existing interagency procedures, DHS wi ll work with interagency
partners, as appropriate, to tailor these existing procedures to the unique facts and
circumstances in any future event. DHS will do so with the unique facts and nuances of
that event at the forefront. Further, any applicable OAW lessons learned will be
considered.
We request that the 010 consider this recommendation closed.

LM\' ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Department of Hom ela n d Security
Appendix C
Afghan Evacuee OA@~l::~~:: @ i
O Travel from Afghanistan O Biometric and Biographic j

to Lily Pad 000 1 Checks and Vetting • i,',,,,_
August 2021: 000 evacuated more •

than 120,000 1 ind iviluals fran
Afghanist an and flew them to Lily uiuuuaw..: 4 111.1 u1vy1o1,111u.: v <uo 11 0m evacuees.
mm: i1 :If i
'"'"•·:=~~
:~-:~:,-~
~:t'i~~~~i~~-~-u tside the This information wasr~:~t:i.;tr:
(j}·· .. · 8 Cleared to travel to U.S.

0 Manifest Vetting 8 Manifest Process
000/00S/OHS created
Results of biometric and
biographic vetting determined
manifests for individuals who which individuals were cleared
successfully cleared to travel to the U.S.
biometric/biographic vetting.
lo vet the
manifests. OHS/000 approved
ind1v1dualswhocleared manifest ~
~
t..... .......... ......~ ..

veulng 101 uovel to the u S . -
~ ·1
a . 8 CBP Inspections at [
v Travel from Lily U.S. Port of Entry j
Pad to U.S. The U.S. welcomed more than 1
Flights atriv~ at U.S. airports such as 79,000 travelers between July 2021
2
I [
Washin91on Oulles International and J&1lu t)l'y 2022 with routine • ~
Airport 01 Philadelphia International ptimaty and secondary inspection [
Airport. ptocesses. CBP leveraoed various ·
systems, including th~ ..•··
Ci).. . . ;·· · · · ·~ . ·~:: ·,:::.~:~;~

G Resettlement
At.er clearing CBP Inspections,
O Cleared CBP Inspections Did not
evacuees ellher In<1epenoent1y After clearing the C6P Inspec1ion clear CBP Inspection
departed from the ai1port or went process, travelers departed from
to a U.S. Military Base known as a the Airport. Afghanevacuees are placed
"'S afe Haven" to receive additional into ICE c ustody
assistance from OHS, Department pending removal
of State or non·govemmental p1oceeoings.
orqanizations.
1 Statement byPrcsident Joe Bidcn,August 30, 2021
2 Deportment ofHomeland SccurityOpcrotionAl/ic, WclcomcAlghan Evacuee, QuarterlyStatus Update 1, Fiscal Year 2022
Report to CongrcS3 {April 21, 20221 This report includ ed d ata ofAfghan ev.xuees who e n:ered the U.S. between J ul)' 2021
and January 2022 based on OHSOfficeof Immigration Statistics' analysis ofdataprovided by CBP, USCIS, DOS, and other
departments and agencies.
Source: DHS OIG analysis of press releases, DOD Inspect or General reports, DHS and CBP
reports and documents.
www.oiq.dhs.gov 27 OIG-22 -64

LM\' ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Department of Hom ela n d Security
Appendix D
Reports from DOD and DOS Inspectors General and Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
Related to OAR/OAW
Report Title Report Date
DOD
Special Report: Lessons Learned From the Audit of DoD Support for the 8/5/2022
Relocation of Afghan Nationals (DODIG-2022- 114)
Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals 3/9/2022
at Camp Atterbury, Indiana (DODIG-2022-070)
at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico (DODIG-2022-067)
Management Advisory on the Lack of Memorandums of Agreement for DoD 3/1/2022
Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (DODIG-2022-066)
at Fort Bliss, Texas (DODIG-2022-064)
Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan 2/15/2022
(DODIG-2022-065)
at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin (DODIG-2022-063)
at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey (DODIG-2022-059)
at Fort Pickett, Virginia (DODIG-2022-055)
at Fort Lee, Virginia (DODIG-2022-051)
at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia (DODIG-2022-050)
at Rhine Ordnance Barracks (DODIG-2022-045)
at Ramstein Air Base (DODIG-2022-040)
DOS
Information Report: Office of Inspector General's Analysis of Open 1/2022
Recommendations Specific to U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (AUD-
MERO-22- 18)
SIGAR
Interim Report, Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security 5/2022
Forces : An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise (SIGAR 22-22-
IP)
Status of U.S. Funding and Activities for Afghanistan Reconstruction: On- 4/2022
budget Assistance Has Ended, Off-budget Assistance Continues, and
Opportunities May Exist for U.S. Agencies to Recover Some Unliquidated
Funds (SIGAR 22 -20)
Source: DOD, DOS, and SIGAR
Appendix E
Report Distribution
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
CBP Audit Liaison
DHS Component Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at:
www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov.
Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.
OIG HOTLINE
To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click
on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at
(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

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LAV/ ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

September 6, 2022 What We Found

www.oig.dhs.gov LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE OIG-22-64

Results of Audit .............................................................................................. 8

DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Afghan

Management Comments and OIG Analysis……………………………………….…..15

INA Immigration and Nationality Act

Operation Allies Refuge

On August 15, 2021, the Kabul-based Afghan government fell to Taliban

House launched White H ous e

7/14/21 Department of S tate 8/15/21 DHS per sonnel 8/29/21

Table 1. Comparison of Pathways to Enter the United States

Process Parole of OAR/ OAW U.S. Refugee 8 Admissions

=grant visa applications

www. oiq.dhs.qov 3 OIG-22- 64

On August 23, 2021, pursuant to

CBP paroled about 72,550 of the

The U.S. Government established a multi-layered process to screen, vet, and

 Screening is an initial examination or review of evacuees and their

admissibility, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(ii).

• Vetting is an analysis of evacuees' biometric and biographic data by the

• Inspecting is a routine inspection conducted at all U.S. POEs to verify

See Figure 3 for a flowchart of the interagency screening, vetting, and

rrective No. 3340-052A, Pri.mary Processing at Airports, August 24, 2016.

, -_ _ _ _ _ _ _...__ _ _ _ _ _..__,, lnterage ncy Vetting ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[2J Passenger Se lection Process (DHS)

0 Manifest Building (DOD/State)

Manifest Vetting (OHS)

Routi ne p reflight manifest vetting is conducted by CBP.

0 Manifest Clearance {DHS/0O0)

IL] Port6f Entry Processing {DHS)

For those that clear processi ng:

For those that need further review as a result of POE processing:

Source: DHS Policy official sent via e-mail

 On December 4, 2021, the UCG Senior Response Official issued OAW

 The UCG issued superseding and subsequent guidance in a March 28,

We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS screened,

In January 2022, we issued DHS a Notice of Findings and Recommendations

DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All

Travel Document Data

Additionally, CBP could not provide reliable data on evacuees admitted or

 CBP allowed 35 Afghan evacuees to board a flight to the United States

In August 2022, CBP provided additional information asserting all 35 Afghan

Table 2. Lily Pad Time Constraints

Figure 4. Handwritten Flight Manifest

Source: CBP official sent by email

Recommendation 1: We recommend the U.S. Customs and Border Protection

a. Immediately identify evacuees from Afghanistan who are in the United

Recommendation 2: We recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security

b. The policies and procedures should ensure accountability, standard

DHS Management Comments and OIG Analysis

DHS Response to Recommendation #1: DHS did not concur. According to

OIG Analysis of DHS’ comments: We do not consider DHS’ actions responsive

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was

We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS screened,

To obtain an understanding of overall processes established for OAR/OAW and