2021 01 30qr

SIGAR
SIGAR
SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JANUARY 30, 2021
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL Special Inspector General for JAN 30
FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Afghanistan Reconstruction 2021
2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202
www.sigar.mil
SIGAR 2021-QR-1
QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
WASTE, FRAUD, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE
By phone: Afghanistan
Cell: 0700107300
DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.
By phone: United States

Toll-free: 866-329-8893
DSN: 312-664-0378
All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.
By fax: 703-601-4065
By e-mail: sigar.hotline@mail.mil
By Web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx
1
SIGAR
Report Waste, Fraud, or Abuse
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-
181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).
SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the
independent and objective
• conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
• leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed
to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the
programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse
in such programs and operations.
• means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and
progress on corrective action.
Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement,

or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the
U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made
available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Tasbih—beads used for prayer and meditation—await buyers in the Mandavi marketplace in Kabul.
(UNAMA photo by M. Akram Darwish)
As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No.
115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008: Pub. L. No. 115-91,
”National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018,” 12/12/2017.
(For a list of the Congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)
Quarterly Report Staff
Atif Ahmad, Research Assistant Vong Lim, Senior Visual Information Specialist
Harrison Akins, Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert James Misencik, Security Subject Matter Expert
Cover photo: Michael Bindell, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate Heather Robinson, Security Subject Matter Expert
Afghan security-force members walk past a bombed truck in Kabul. (AFP photo by Zakeria Hashimi) Theodore Burns, Funding Subject Matter Expert Deborah Scroggins, Director of Research and Analysis Directorate
Craig Collier, Security Subject Matter Expert Omar Sharif, Project Coordinator
Jason Davis, Visual Information Specialist Daniel Weggeland, Governance Subject Matter Expert
PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIGIE QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTION AND EVALUATION.
Clark Irwin, Lead Writer/Editor
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
I am pleased to submit to Congress, and to the Secretaries of State and Defense,

SIGAR’s 50th quarterly report on the status of reconstruction in Afghanistan. This
report will be the first for the new Administration and Congress, and it comes at a
time when Afghanistan faces what many consider its most perilous moment since
the United States first intervened in the country nearly twenty years ago.
Although almost exactly a year ago the United States entered with some
fanfare into a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban, peace talks between the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban have so far yielded few substan-
tive results. There has been no cease-fire agreement and high levels of insurgent
and extremist violence continued in Afghanistan this quarter despite repeated
pleas from senior U.S. and international officials to reduce violence in an effort to
advance the peace process. According to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), the
Taliban this quarter has carried out a “campaign of unclaimed attacks and targeted
killings” of Afghan government officials, civil society leaders, and journalists. Nor is
it evident, as SIGAR discusses in this report, that the Taliban has broken ties with
the al-Qaeda terrorists who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
On November 17, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced
that, on instructions from President Donald J. Trump, U.S. troop levels in
Afghanistan would be reduced from the 4,000–5,000 reached in November, to
2,500 by January 15, 2021. The 2,500-troop level was not specified in the U.S.-
Taliban agreement signed in February 2020 and defense officials acknowledge that
this lower force level introduces some limitations on force capacity and on the
train, advise, and assist mission. However, USFOR-A said this quarter that its abil-
ity to execute and/or oversee costly and necessary taxpayer-funded contracts to
train and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), and
to provide them hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment and direct-
assistance funds has thus far not been adversely affected—an assurance that has
been tested neither by time nor independent audit.
But time is critical. The new Administration and Congress have only three months
to decide whether the United States will withdraw all U.S. troops by April 30, 2021,
pursuant to the U.S.-Taliban agreement. As discussed in the report, Congress recently
imposed detailed conditions for further reduction in troop levels in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 passed on January 1, 2021.
Also in November, donor nations gathered virtually at a conference in Geneva,
Switzerland, and pledged approximately $3.3 billion in new development assis-
tance for 2021 and expressed the potential for providing between $12 billion and
$13.2 billion through 2024—a drop from the $15.2 billion pledged for four years in
the 2016 donors’ conference. The amount pledged represents the bare minimum
of what World Bank analysts say would be required to maintain Afghanistan as
a viable state, due to the failing Afghan economy, which this report discusses in
greater detail.
2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

In this quarterly report, we also note that, despite Afghanistan’s status as
the world’s leading opium producer, international donors at Geneva did not
include poppy-cultivation estimates among the outcomes or targets outlined in
the Afghanistan Partnership Framework (APF) agreed to at the conference. The
APF is supposed to reflect a revised form of conditionality, so this would appear
to be a missed opportunity for donors to demand measurement of an important
crosscutting indicator of Afghanistan’s enduring poverty, lawlessness, insecurity,
and corruption.
This omission came as disagreements between Afghanistan’s National Statistics
and Information Authority and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime mean
that no detailed, consistent, and public estimate for Afghanistan’s opium cultiva-
tion has been published since the 2018 harvest. This assessment has been one of
the most important tools used since 1994 by both the Afghan government and the
international community to measure the extent of the narcotics problem and the
impact of countermeasures to address this global threat.
Donor nations at the Geneva conference also missed an opportunity to strongly
address the growing problems of corruption in Afghanistan. As highlighted by
SIGAR since 2016, corruption is one of the major threats to developing a functional
Afghan government and effective ANDSF to address the insurgency. The confer-
ence donors failed—again—to articulate specific, measurable actions that the
Afghan government needs to perform to seriously address corruption. This quar-
terly report discusses that issue. More detail will appear in a forthcoming SIGAR
audit report, which will be the third report on Afghanistan’s anticorruption efforts
requested by Congress.
During this quarter, SIGAR issued 10 products, including this report. SIGAR
work to date has identified approximately $3.82 billion in savings for the
U.S. taxpayer.
SIGAR issued two performance-audit reports: a classified report reviewing
efforts to build up the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing, and
a report on DOD’s transfer of military equipment to the Afghan govern-
ment. SIGAR also issued an alert letter highlighting key challenges to ongoing
anticorruption efforts.
SIGAR issued five financial-audit reports of U.S.-funded projects to rebuild
Afghanistan that identified $26,993,829 in questioned costs as a result of internal-
control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These financial audits covered
a range of topics including USAID’s Power Transmission and Connectivity
Program, the U.S. Air Force’s support for AAF C-130H airlift capabilities, and
the State Department’s Mine Detection Dog Center.
This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued one report examin-
ing ongoing efforts to counter cash smuggling at Hamid Karzai International
Airport in Kabul.
During the reporting period, SIGAR criminal investigations resulted in three
federal charges, three guilty pleas, one sentencing, and over $190,000 in restitutions
and forfeitures.

SIGAR has often pointed out in its oversight products and in editions of its bien-
nial High-Risk List for Congress that many equipment acquisitions, construction
projects, programs, and other aspects of reconstruction in Afghanistan are at risk
of failure for lack of sustainability.
As the new Administration and Congress start to deal with the thorny issues
related to Afghanistan, they should be aware that not only do those risks per-
sist, but they now also extend to wider concerns that the Afghan state itself may
be unsustainable without continued international engagement. These concerns
include the possibly imminent withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign military
personnel, the continuing decline in U.S. oversight capability in the country, the
COVID-19 pandemic and other pressures on the Afghan economy, and the potential
disruptions of a post-peace government that could weave former insurgents into
the security apparatus and positions of authority.
The survival of a stable, peaceful, and democratic Afghan state has always been
important for U.S. counterterrorism, security, diplomatic, and humanitarian objec-
tives. But the leverage of a substantial foreign troop presence in Afghanistan for
stability and a negotiated peace is rapidly diminishing. In the current volatile cli-
mate of uncertainty, U.S. reconstruction programs aimed at promoting economic
development, rule of law, respect for human rights, good governance, and security
for the Afghan people may become the primary lever of U.S. influence in the coun-
try, heightening the need to protect those programs against waste, fraud, and abuse
with unrelenting and effective oversight.
As the largest U.S. oversight presence—and the only one with whole-of-govern-
ment authority—SIGAR looks forward to working with the new Administration and
Congress in this year of great portent for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.
Yours respectfully,
John F. Sopko


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report summarizes SIGAR’s oversight work and updates developments

in four major areas of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from October 1 to
December 31, 2020.*
During this reporting period, SIGAR issued 10 audit reports, reviews, and other
products assessing U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve
governance, facilitate economic and social development, and combat the
production and sale of narcotics. In this period, SIGAR criminal investigations
produced three federal charges, three guilty pleas, one sentencing, and over
$190,000 in restitutions and forfeitures.
SIGAR OVERVIEW
AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

This quarter, SIGAR issued two performance-audit reports, one alert letter, and five finan-
cial-audit reports.
The performance-audit reports included:

• a classified report reviewing efforts to build up the Afghan Air Force and Special
Mission Wing
• a report on DOD’s transfer of military equipment to the Afghan government and
challenges to end-use monitoring
The alert letter highlighted key challenges to ongoing anticorruption efforts in

Afghanistan and provided recommendations to international donors.
The five financial-audit reports identified $26,993,829 in questioned costs as a result

of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues.
iv SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SPECIAL PROJECTS
This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued one review which found that cus-
toms officials at Hamid Karzai International Airport failed to enforce controls against
cash smuggling, and have not even connected U.S.-provided cash-counting machines to
the internet.
LESSONS LEARNED
SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program has four projects in development: U.S. government
support to elections, monitoring and evaluation of reconstruction contracting, efforts to
advance and empower women and girls, and a report on police and corrections.
INVESTIGATIONS
During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations resulted in three federal charges, three
guilty pleas, one sentencing, and over $190,000 in restitutions and forfeitures. SIGAR initi-
ated two new cases and closed 24, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations
to 96.
Investigations highlights include:

• the arrest of a U.S. defense contractor executive for perpetrating a scheme to defraud
the U.S. government of millions of dollars through false invoices
• the arrest of an Afghan national in connection with the attempted exportation of 41.37
kg of gold as part of a money-laundering scheme
• the guilty plea of a U.S. contractor who stole $775,000 from the State Department
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

SIGAR’s Research & Analysis Directorate issued its 50th Quarterly Report to the United
States Congress, which summarizes SIGAR’s oversight activities in the quarter, provides
an overview of current U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, and includes a detailed
account of all U.S. funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for these activities.
* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and events
issued or occurring after December 31, 2020, up to the publication date of this report.
Unless otherwise noted, all afghani-to-U.S. dollar conversions used in this report are
derived by averaging the last six months of exchange-rate data available through XE
Currency Charts (www.xe.com), then rounding to the nearest afghani. Exchange-rate data
is as of December 28, 2020.
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN

BALKH TAKHAR
SAMANGAN
FARYAB BAGHLAN
SAR-E PUL
PANJSHIR NURISTAN
BADGHIS
PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR
BAMYAN LAGHMAN
HERAT KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
GHOR LOGAR
DAYKUNDI PAKTIYA
GHAZNI KHOST
URUZGAN
FARAH
PAKTIKA
ZABUL
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR Provinces where SIGAR has conducted
or commissioned audit, inspection,
special project, and/or investigation
work as of December 31, 2020.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 1
3 SIGAR OVERSIGHT
3 Audits
10 Inspections
11 Special Projects
13 Lessons Learned
13 Investigations
19 SIGAR Budget
19 SIGAR Staff
SECTION 2
21 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE
23 Reconstruction in Brief
25 Status of Funds
47 Security
81 Governance
117 Economic and Social Development
SECTION 3
155 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT
156 Completed Oversight Activities
157 Ongoing Oversight Activities
APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

166 Appendix A: Cross-Reference of Report to Statute
172 Appendix B: U.S. Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction
174 Appendix C: SIGAR Written Products
179 Appendix D: SIGAR Investigations and Hotline
186 Appendix E: SIGAR Data Call Questions that Received Classified
or Unclassified But Not Publicly Releasable Responses
189 Appendix F: Abbreviations and Acronyms
196 Endnotes
“As the footprint of U.S. agencies
continues to shrink, it will become
more important that the U.S. and other
donors perform aggressive and effective
oversight of its dollars and programs
through the inclusion in funding
agreements of measurable and verifiable
benchmarks with tangible outcomes,
periodic reassessment of both the goals
of funding and the needs of the Afghan
people, and high-level political buy-in
from all sides.”
—SIGAR Inspector General John F. Sopko
Source: SIGAR, Inspector General John Sopko, Alert Letter (21-09-AL) to the Department of State, Department of Defense, and
U.S. Agency for International Development, 11/6/2020.
1 SIGAR
OVERSIGHT
1
SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
OVERSIGHT CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Audits 3
Inspections 10
Special Projects 11
Lessons Learned 13
Investigations 13
Quarterly Highlight: Legislative Update 17
SIGAR Budget 19
SIGAR Staff 19
Photo on previous page

Scrapped chairs pile up in USAID-funded school. (SIGAR photo)
2 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION


This quarter, SIGAR issued 10 products. SIGAR work to date has identified
approximately $3.82 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer.
SIGAR issued two performance-audit reports: a classified report review-
ing efforts to build up the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission PERFORMANCE AUDITS ISSUED
Wing, and a report on DOD’s transfer of military equipment to the Afghan • SIGAR 21-11-AR: Military Equipment
government. SIGAR also issued an alert letter highlighting key challenges to Transferred to the Afghan Government:
DOD Did Not Conduct Required
ongoing anticorruption efforts. Monitoring to Account for Sensitive
SIGAR issued five financial audits of U.S.-funded projects to rebuild Articles
Afghanistan that identified $26,993,829 in questioned costs as a result of • SIGAR 21-14-C-AR: Afghan Air Forces:
DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Afghan
internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These financial Aviation Capability but Continued U.S.
audits covered a range of topics including USAID’s Power Transmission and Support is Needed to Sustain Forces
Connectivity Program, the U.S. Air Force’s support for AAF C-130H airlift ALERT LETTER ISSUED
capabilities, and the State Department’s Mine Detection Dog Center. • Alert Letter 21-09-AL: Afghanistan’s
This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued one review, which Anti-Corruption Efforts
examined ongoing efforts to counter cash smuggling at Hamid Karzai
FINANCIAL AUDITS ISSUED
International Airport in Kabul. • Financial Audit 21-07-FA: Department
During the reporting period, SIGAR criminal investigations resulted in of State’s Demining Activities in
Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by
three federal charges, three guilty pleas, one sentencing, and over $190,000 the Mine Detection Dog Center
in restitutions and forfeitures. • Financial Audit 21-08-FA: Department
of Defense’s Cooperative Biological
Engagement Program to Enhance
Biosafety and Biosecurity in Afghanistan:
AUDITS Audit of Costs Incurred by CH2M Hill Inc.
• Financial Audit 21-10-FA: USAID’s Power
SIGAR conducts performance and financial audits of programs and projects Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
connected to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. This quarter, SIGAR Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by Da
Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
has 20 ongoing performance audits and 36 ongoing financial audits.
• Financial Audit 21-12-FA: Department of
the Air Force’s Support for the Afghan Air
Performance Audit Reports Issued Force’s C-130H Airlift Capability: Audit
of Costs Incurred by AAR Government
This quarter, SIGAR issued two performance-audit reports: a classified Services Inc.
report reviewing efforts to build up the Afghan Air Force and Special • Financial Audit 21-13-FA: USAID’s
Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and
Mission Wing, and a report on DOD’s transfer of military equipment to the Resilience Program: Audit of Costs
Afghan government. SIGAR also issued an alert letter highlighting key chal- Incurred by DAI Global LLC
lenges to ongoing anticorruption efforts. A list of completed and ongoing Continued on the next page
performance audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 3

Performance Audit 21-14-C-AR: [Classified] Afghan Air Forces:

Continued from the previous page DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Afghan Aviation Capability
but Continued U.S. Support is Needed to Sustain Forces
SPECIAL PROJECT ISSUED Unclassified summary: Since 2010, the United States has spent over $8.5 bil-
• Review 21-15-SP: Hamid Karzai
International Airport: Despite lion to support and develop the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the Special
Improvements, Controls to Detect Cash Mission Wing (SMW). Together, the AAF and SMW comprise Afghanistan’s
Smuggling Still Need Strengthening
air forces. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the Afghan air
QUARTERLY REPORT ISSUED forces provide “critical capabilities,” and enhancing and growing the air
• SIGAR 2021-QR-1: Quarterly Report to forces are a priority for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.
the United States Congress, January 30,
2021 DOD noted that the fiscal year 2021 AAF sustainment budget request is
$534 million, nearly 64% of the Afghan Security Forces Fund budget request
for the AAF and just over 13% of the total fiscal year 2021 Afghan Security
Forces Fund request.
This classified report examined the extent to which DOD’s efforts have
resulted in a professional and sustainable AAF and SMW. SIGAR found that
PERFORMANCE AUDITS ISSUED DOD has taken steps to develop sustainable Afghan air forces but will need
• SIGAR 21-14-C-AR: Afghan Air Forces:
DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Afghan to provide continued contractor logistics support for years. The reduction
Aviation Capability but Continued U.S. of U.S. and Coalition Forces will increase DOD’s reliance on contractors
Support is Needed to Sustain Forces
• SIGAR 21-11-AR: Military Equipment to develop a sustainable AAF and SMW. However, this reliance poses addi-
Transferred to the Afghan Government: tional operational challenges and risks for the United States as well as the
DOD Did Not Conduct Required
Monitoring to Account for Sensitive potential for waste due to the challenging oversight environment. Further,
Articles the potential withdrawal of contractors from Afghanistan, in addition to
U.S. and Coalition Forces, may leave the AAF and SMW without the support
needed to sustain and develop the Afghan air forces if DOD does not iden-
tify alternative sources of support. SIGAR also found that the AAF has not
developed a recruiting strategy and the SMW does not have a recruiting pol-
icy or recruiting strategy, which may hamper their ability to recruit qualified
personnel in the future. In addition, SIGAR found that DOD cannot verify
that Afghan air forces personnel, such as pilots and maintainers, are placed
in positions that utilize their unique training, even though DOD provides
financial incentives to personnel in such positions. Moreover, neither DOD
nor the Afghan air forces have prioritized the training or development of
personnel in support positions, which comprise the majority of the autho-
rized positions in the air forces even though those positions are essential to
overall success and sustainability to the Afghan air forces.
The report includes three recommendations to the Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan Commander, TAAC-Air Commander, and
NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan Commander
to assist the sustainment of the Afghan air forces at all levels. SIGAR recom-
mends that the commands coordinate with the AAF and SMW to develop
and implement formal recruiting strategies and personnel placement
procedures, to include personnel and position qualification verification;
incorporate support personnel and their training requirements, including
institutional training, into the Afghanistan Master Training Plan; and finalize

a mitigation plan to ensure the continuation of essential maintenance,

operation, and advisory support to the AAF and SMW should the U.S. and
Taliban agreement require the withdrawal of contractors from Afghanistan.
Performance Audit 21-11-AR: Military Equipment Transferred

to the Afghan Government
DOD Did Not Conduct Required Monitoring to Account for Sensitive Articles
SIGAR found that DOD did not meet enhanced end-use monitoring (EUM)
requirements to account for all sensitive defense articles transferred to the
Afghan government. The requirements are designed to minimize national-
security risks by preventing the diversion or misuse of defense articles
that incorporate sensitive technology. SIGAR also found that DOD met the
more general requirements for its routine oversight of nonsensitive defense
articles, but had weaknesses with data reconciliation related to its EUM
activities in Afghanistan.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the DOD agency respon-
sible for overseeing the department’s worldwide EUM program, requires
that enhanced EUM efforts include inventorying 100% of applicable articles
by serial number every 365 days. Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did not meet this requirement because it inventoried
only 40% of applicable articles during the 365-day period from May 2019
through April 2020. According to CSTC-A officials, the command has never
met its 100% inventory requirement and is unlikely ever to do so because
the security situation in Afghanistan prevents some inventories from taking
place. DSCA and CSTC-A officials also agreed that DOD’s EUM program
was not designed to operate in combat environments, such as Afghanistan.
Without required inventories of approximately 60% of enhanced EUM-
designated transferred articles—among the most sensitive of all defense
articles transferred to the Afghan government—CSTC-A lacks a complete
account of articles in use by the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF). Consequently, sensitive technology remains susceptible
to theft or loss and CSTC-A is less able to verify that ANDSF units are using
these articles in accordance with their transfer agreements.
CSTC-A’s standard operating procedures also require it to reconcile dis-
crepancies between its EUM inspection reports and the data in the Security
Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP). However, SIGAR found discrepan-
cies between data from CSTC-A and data in SCIP. Records for 33 routine
EUM checks conducted since the beginning of FY 2017 were included in
SCIP, but CSTC-A’s documentation showed that at least 62 checks had taken
place. Similarly, the data in SCIP show that enhanced EUM checks covered
at least 6,012 articles in FY 2019, but CSTC-A’s records showed only 4,253
articles covered during this period. By not updating and reconciling SCIP
data with CSTC-A documentation, the command may lack access to an
accurate, readily available inventory of all active articles that are supposed

to be in the ANDSF’s possession. As a result, it may be difficult for CSTC-A

to account for potential theft, loss, or misuse of these items.
Finally, SIGAR found that a lack of communication between DOD and
State hindered reporting and investigation into a potential end-use violation
in Afghanistan. State is the lead agency for investigating potential viola-
tions and determining whether they are substantial violations that must
be reported to Congress. Both DSCA’s EUM requirements and CSTC-A’s
standard operating procedures require the agencies to report potential vio-
lations to State and support State in its investigations.
SIGAR recommends that the DSCA Director work with the commanders
of U.S. Central Command and CSTC-A to (1) implement modifications to
enhanced EUM procedures or requirements applicable to Afghanistan that
take into account the country’s combat environment, for example by requir-
ing that sensitive equipment regularly rotate through maintenance facilities
or other central hubs where U.S. personnel have increased opportunities for
oversight; (2) determine whether changes in the end-use status of defense
articles transferred to the Afghan government that are subject to routine
EUM should be tracked in SCIP’s EUM module; and (3) if DOD decides to
use SCIP’s EUM module to track such changes, modify EUM procedures
or requirements applicable to Afghanistan to require tracking. This report
also recommends that the CSTC-A Commander (4) modify CSTC-A’s EUM
standard operating procedures to require that SCIP data be reconciled in a
timely manner with information from documentation generated through the
command’s EUM checks.
Alert Letter 21-09-AL: Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Efforts

On November 23 and 24, 2020, the U.S. government and more than 70
ALERT LETTER ISSUED other donors participated in a conference to make key funding deci-
• Alert Letter 21-09-AL: Afghanistan’s
Anti-Corruption Efforts sions regarding international support for the Afghan government. In light
of this significant event, this alert letter to the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
details the status of Afghanistan’s fight against corruption and is intended
to help ensure that decisions regarding future assistance address the
challenges to meaningful reform SIGAR has observed and reported over
the years.
Past donor conferences have played an important role in advancing
Afghanistan’s anticorruption and government-reform efforts. In July 2012,
the Afghan government and international donors agreed to the Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework which established mutually agreed-upon
goals and indicators, committed donors to channeling more of their aid
through Afghanistan’s national budget, and established a Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board to assess progress.
In September 2015, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
was consolidated with the Afghan National Unity Government’s

comprehensive reform agenda and renamed the Self-Reliance through

Mutual Accountability Framework, which was updated and endorsed at
the Brussels Conference in October 2016. In November 2018, Afghanistan
agreed to the Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework (GMAF), which
laid out deliverables for the Afghan government in several categories,
including a category on anticorruption, governance, rule of law, and
human rights.
SIGAR’s two previous anticorruption assessments, as well as ongoing
work on a third, have shown that the Afghan government has taken limited
steps to curb systemic corruption and that more tangible action is required.
The Afghan government often takes paper or process steps, such as drafting
regulations or holding meetings, rather than concrete actions that would
reduce corruption, such as arresting or enforcing penalties on powerful TABLE 1.1
Afghans. SIGAR’s work has repeatedly identified the impunity of powerful
Afghans as an ongoing issue, and the Afghan government continues to face SIGAR’S FINANCIAL AUDIT
COVERAGE ($ BILLIONS)
challenges with the extradition, arrest, and prosecution of corrupt indi-
178 completed audits $8.50
viduals. Furthermore, this work has found that the Afghan government is
36 ongoing audits 0.52
most likely to take meaningful action when donors are engaged and call for
Total $9.02
reforms to curb systemic corruption.
Given that international donors were expected to pledge billions of dol- Note: Numbers have been rounded. Coverage includes
auditable costs incurred by implementers through U.S.-
lars in additional funding at the November 2020 donor conference, and funded Afghanistan reconstruction contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements.
that their contributions make up 75% of the Afghan government’s national
Source: SIGAR Audits and Inspections Directorate.
budget, this letter highlighted key issues from SIGAR’s prior reports and
ongoing work related to the Afghan government’s progress in combating
corruption. The letter called on donors to include measurable and verifiable
benchmarks with tangible outcomes, periodic reassessments of their pro- FINANCIAL AUDITS ISSUED
grams, and high-level political buy-in from all sides in their funding pledges. • Financial Audit 21-10-FA: USAID’s Power
Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by Da
Financial Audits Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
SIGAR launched its financial-audit program in 2012, after Congress and the • Financial Audit 21-12-FA: Department
oversight community expressed concerns about oversight gaps and the of the Air Force’s Support for the Afghan
Air Force’s C-130H Airlift Capability: Audit
growing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts and grants awarded of Costs Incurred by AAR Government
Services Inc.
in support of overseas contingency operations. SIGAR competitively
• Financial Audit 21-08-FA: Department
selects independent accounting firms to conduct the financial audits and of Defense’s Cooperative Biological
ensures that the audit work is performed in accordance with U.S. govern- Engagement Program to Enhance
Biosafety and Biosecurity in Afghanistan:
ment auditing standards. Financial audits are coordinated with the federal Audit of Costs Incurred by CH2M Hill Inc.
inspector-general community to maximize financial-audit coverage and • Financial Audit 21-07-FA: Department of
avoid duplication of effort. State’s Demining Activities in Afghanistan:
Audit of Costs Incurred by the Mine
This quarter, SIGAR completed five financial audits of U.S.-funded Detection Dog Center
projects to rebuild Afghanistan, in addition to 36 ongoing financial audits • Financial Audit 21-13-FA: USAID’s Strong
Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience
with over $524 million in auditable costs, as shown in Table 1.1. A list of Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by DAI
completed and ongoing financial audits can be found in Appendix C of this Global LLC.
quarterly report.

SIGAR issues each financial-audit report to the funding agency that

made the award(s). The funding agency is responsible for making the final
Questioned amounts: the sum of poten- determination on questioned amounts identified in the report’s audit find-
tially unallowable questioned costs and ings. Since the program’s inception, SIGAR’s financial audits have identified
unremitted interest on advanced federal nearly $500 million in questioned costs and $364,907 in unremitted interest
funds or other revenue amounts payable to on advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts payable to the govern-
the government. ment. As of December 31, 2020, funding agencies had disallowed more than
$27.9 million in questioned amounts, which are thereby subject to collec-
Questioned costs: costs determined to be
tion. It takes time for funding agencies to carefully consider audit findings
potentially unallowable. The two types of
questioned costs are (1) ineligible costs and recommendations. As a result, final disallowed-cost determinations
(violation of a law, regulation, contract, remain to be made for several of SIGAR’s issued financial audits. SIGAR’s
grant, cooperative agreement, etc. or an financial audits also have identified and reported 574 compliance findings
unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure and 623 internal-control findings to the auditees and funding agencies.
of funds); and (2) unsupported costs
(those not supported by adequate docu- Financial Audit Reports Issued
mentation or proper approvals at the time The five financial audits completed this quarter identified $26,993,829 in
of an audit). questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompli-
ance issues.
Financial Audit 21-10-FA: USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion

and Connectivity Project
Audit of Costs Incurred by Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
On December 5, 2012, USAID awarded $698.9 million through an imple-
mentation letter to Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Afghanistan’s
national utility, to support the Power Transmission Expansion and
Connectivity project. The purpose of the project was to support the Afghan
government in providing affordable, reliable, accessible, and sustainable
power, and to promote political, economic, and social development. The
project was implemented through a partnership between USAID, DABS,
the Afghan Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Energy and Water. After
three modifications to the letter, total funding increased to $830 million,
and the period of performance was extended from December 31, 2016, to
December 31, 2018.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Crowe LLP, reviewed $186,707,186
in total costs incurred by DABS for funds received under the implementa-
tion letter from January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2018. The auditors
found five material weaknesses and four significant deficiencies in DABS’s
internal controls and seven instances of noncompliance with the terms of
the letter. Crowe identified $15,991,544 in questioned costs charged to the
implementation letter related to these issues.

Financial Audit 21-12-FA: Department of the Air Force’s Support

for the Afghan Air Force’s C-130H Airlift Capability
Audit of Costs Incurred by AAR Government Services Inc.
On June 5, 2017, the U.S. Department of the Air Force’s Life Cycle
Management Center awarded AAR Supply Chain Inc. (AAR) a task order
in support of the Afghan Air Force’s C-130H airlift operational capabili-
ties. The objectives of the task order were to support and sustain up to
four C-130H aircraft in Kabul, Afghanistan, and provide on-call support at
other locations. Total funding for the task order included $12,425,998 in
cost-reimbursable items and $10,847,508 in firm-fixed-price line items. The
task order was modified three times, with no change to total funding or the
period of performance, which began on July 30, 2017, and ended on July 29,
2018. On January 8, 2019, the task order was transferred from AAR to AAR
Government Services Inc.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Crowe LLP, reviewed $5,689,922
in reimbursable costs within the period from July 30, 2017, through July
29, 2018. The auditors identified three material weaknesses in AAR’s
internal controls and three instances of noncompliance with the terms of
the task order. Crowe identified $6,184,524 in questioned costs related to
these issues.
Financial Audit 21-08-FA: Department of Defense’s Cooperative

Biological Engagement Program to Enhance Biosafety and
Biosecurity in Afghanistan
Audit of Costs Incurred by CH2M Hill Inc.
On July 22, 2013, the Defense Threat and Reduction Agency within the
Department of Defense awarded an $11,850,127 task order under a cost-
plus-award-fee contract to CH2M Hill Inc. to support the Cooperative
Biological Engagement program’s efforts to enhance the Afghan and Iraqi
governments’ biosafety and biosecurity capabilities. After 11 modifications,
the task order’s total funding decreased to $10,403,756 and the period of
performance was extended from January 19, 2015, to March 31, 2017.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by CohnReznick LLP, reviewed
$6,649,119 in costs charged to the task order from July 19, 2013, through
March 31, 2017. The auditors found two material weaknesses and two
significant deficiencies in CH2M’s internal controls and four instances
of noncompliance with the terms of the task order. CohnReznick identi-
fied $4,418,512 in questioned costs charged to the task order related to
these issues.

Financial Audit 21-07-FA: Department of State’s Demining

Activities in Afghanistan
Audit of Costs Incurred by the Mine Detection Dog Center
On April 1, 2013, the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement awarded the Mine
Detection Dog Center a series of three grants to clear land mines through-
out Afghanistan. The grants’ goal was to conduct community-based
demining activities to allow internally displaced Afghans to return home.
The initial grant was for $1 million. State modified the first two grants 12
times, but did not modify the third. The cumulative value of the three grants
was $5,259,325, and the period of performance was extended from April 1,
2013, to September 26, 2018.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Williams, Adley & Co.-DC LLP
reviewed $5,259,325 in costs charged to the grants from April 1, 2013, through
September 26, 2018. The auditors identified three material weaknesses in
internal controls, two significant deficiencies in internal controls, four internal
control deficiencies, and seven instances of noncompliance with the terms
of the grant and applicable laws and regulations. Williams Adley identified
$399,249 in questioned costs charged to the grants related to these issues.
Financial Audit 21-13-FA: USAID’s Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and
Resilience Program
Audit of Costs Incurred by DAI Global LLC
On November 30, 2014, USAID awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for
$73,499,999 to DAI Global LLC to support the Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope
and Resilience program. Its objective was to create well-governed Afghan
municipalities capable of meeting the needs of growing urban popula-
tions. The contract included a period of performance from November 30,
2014, through November 29, 2017. USAID modified the contract 12 times,
which decreased the funding to $72 million and extended the end date to
November 29, 2019.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Davis Farr LLP (Davis Farr),
reviewed $11,598,960 in costs charged to the contract from December 1,
2018, through November 29, 2019. The auditors did not identify any material
weaknesses or significant deficiencies in the auditee’s internal controls, or
any instances of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the con-
tract. Accordingly, the auditors did not identify any questioned costs.
INSPECTIONS
SIGAR issued no inspection reports this quarter. A list of ongoing inspec-
tions can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

Status of SIGAR Recommendations

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires SIGAR to report
on the status of its recommendations. This quarter, SIGAR closed 89
recommendations contained in 32 performance-audit, inspection, and finan-
cial-audit reports.
From 2009 through December 2020, SIGAR issued 401 audits, alert let-
ters, and inspection reports, and made 1,123 recommendations to recover
funds, improve agency oversight, and increase program effectiveness.
SIGAR has closed 1,043 of these recommendations, about 93%. Closing a
recommendation generally indicates SIGAR’s assessment that the audited
agency either has implemented the recommendation or has otherwise
appropriately addressed the issue. In some cases where the agency has
failed to act, SIGAR will close the recommendation as “Not Implemented”;
this quarter, SIGAR closed 68 recommendations in this manner. In some
cases, these recommendations will be the subject of follow-up audit or
inspection work.
SIGAR is also required to report on any significant recommendations
from prior reports on which corrective action has not been completed. This
quarter, SIGAR continued to monitor agency actions on 80 open recom-
mendations. Of these recommendations, 21 have been open for more than
12 months because the agency involved has not yet produced a corrective-
action plan that SIGAR believes would resolve the identified problem, or
has otherwise failed to appropriately respond to the recommendation(s).
For a complete list of open recommendations, see www.sigar.mil.
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects was created to quickly obtain and access SPECIAL PROJECT REVIEW ISSUED
information necessary to fulfill SIGAR’s oversight mandates; examine • Review 21-15-SP: Hamid Karzai
emerging issues; and deliver prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies International Airport: Despite
Improvements, Controls to Detect Cash
and the Congress. Special Projects reports and letters focus on providing Smuggling Still Need Strengthening
timely, credible, and useful information to Congress and the public on all
facets of Afghanistan reconstruction. The directorate comprises a team of
analysts supported by investigators, lawyers, subject-matter experts, and
other specialists who can quickly and jointly apply their expertise to emerg-
ing problems and questions.
This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued one review.
A list of completed Special Projects can be found in Appendix C of this
quarterly report.
Review 21-15-SP: Hamid Karzai International Airport

Despite Improvements, Controls to Detect Cash Smuggling Still Need Strengthening
This review is a follow-up of SIGAR’s 2012 report on the use of cash-count-
ing machines at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan.

In that report, SIGAR found that customs officials rarely used the machines,
and did not record and send serial number data to the proper Afghan
authorities. SIGAR also reported that senior government officials and other
individuals with political influence, designated by the Office of the President
as very important persons (VIP), were exempted from the customs process.
The objectives of the follow-up review were to (1) determine whether
customs officials are using the cash-counting machines to help Afghan
officials and their international partners track the serial numbers of cash
leaving Afghanistan, and (2) evaluate the controls in place at the airport
to prevent cash, bearer-negotiable instruments such as cashier’s checks or
bonds, precious and semiprecious stones, artifacts, and gold from being
smuggled out of the country.
SIGAR found that customs officials are not regularly using the cash-
counting machines to track cash leaving Afghanistan; in fact, the machines
were still not connected to the internet, nearly a decade after the U.S. gov-
ernment installed them.
SIGAR found that the security and screening procedures for non-VIP
passengers have improved. Non-VIP passengers go through an extensive
screening process including five checkpoints, managed by four different
Afghan government entities and a private security company. The govern-
ment has posted its anti-money-laundering law requirements at the entrance
to the boarding area and outside the customs office in the non-VIP termi-
nal to inform passengers leaving Afghanistan that they must submit forms
at the customs office to declare possession of more than $10,000 in cash,
bearer-negotiable instruments, precious and semiprecious stones, and gold,
and cannot take more than $20,000 in cash or bearer-negotiable instruments
out of the country. Customs officials provide passengers with declaration
forms to declare cash or bearer-negotiable instruments in excess of $10,000.
VIP passengers are transported directly to the VIP terminal where their
luggage is scanned, but there are no signs showing cash-export limita-
tions, no declaration forms provided to passengers, and no cash-counting
machines. VVIP (very very important persons) passengers arriving at the
VIP terminal are not screened and can be transported directly to the plane
for boarding.
To improve screening procedures and prevent cash smuggling out
of Hamid Karzai International Airport, SIGAR suggests that the Afghan
government: (1) fully integrate cash-counting machines with functioning
internet capability into the normal customs process both at the non-VIP
and VIP terminals and serial numbers captured for use by the Financial
Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) and
its international partners; and (2) strengthen controls at the VIP terminal by
requiring all VIP and VVIP passengers to fill out customs declaration forms,
and having airport staff count any cash declared and send serial numbers
to FinTRACA.

LESSONS LEARNED
SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program was created to identify lessons and
make recommendations to Congress and executive agencies on ways to
improve current and future reconstruction efforts. To date, the program has
issued seven reports. Four reports are currently in development. Topics are
U.S. government support to elections, monitoring and evaluation of recon-
struction contracting, efforts to advance and empower women and girls,
and police and corrections.
FIGURE 1.1
INVESTIGATIONS SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS:

During the reporting period, SIGAR’s criminal investigations resulted in NUMBER OF OPEN INVESTIGATIONS
three federal charges, three guilty pleas, one sentencing, and over $190,000
in restitutions and forfeitures. SIGAR initiated two new cases and closed 24, Total: 96
bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 96.
To date, SIGAR investigations have resulted in 158 criminal convictions.
Criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, civil settlements, and U.S. govern- Corruption
ment cost savings and recoveries total over $1.6 billion. and Bribery
26
Procurement Other/
Former Company Executive Officers Charged for Scheme to and Contract Miscellaneous
Fraud
Defraud U.S. Government 32
17
Theft
On October 27, 2020, in the Northern District of Alabama, a criminal infor- 11
mation (a prosecutor’s accusation, as distinct from a grand-jury indictment) Money
was filed against Keith Woolford, charging him with one count of con- Laundering
spiracy. On November 17, 2020, also in the Northern District of Alabama, a 10
nine-count indictment was filed charging Woolford’s co-conspirator, Paul

Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/4/2021.
Daigle, with one count of conspiracy, four counts of wire fraud, and four
counts of false claims.
Daigle and Woolford were executives for AAL USA, a Department of
Defense subcontractor engaged in the repair and maintenance of aircraft
in Afghanistan under contracts issued from Red Stone Arsenal, Huntsville,
Alabama. CEO Daigle and CFO Woolford perpetrated a scheme to fill
contract labor positions with employees who did not meet the education
requirements, and in some cases, with employees who were not actually
assigned work on the contract. As part of the fraud, in order to satisfy the
requirements of the labor categories contained in the statement of work for
a U.S. government contract, they instructed employees to obtain fake col-
lege degrees from an online diploma mill.
As result of the scheme, false invoices were created and passed to the
prime contractor and then on to the U.S. government for payment. Through
prime contractor Lockheed Martin, Woolford submitted to the United States
multiple invoices for payment, including one for approximately $1,872,280.
Woolford knew the invoice contained materially false information because

it incorporated inflated hourly rates for nonqualifying labor, and contained a

false certification that the billed services had been performed.
The investigation is being conducted by SIGAR, Defense Criminal
Investigative Service, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Division
Major Procurement Fraud Unit.
Afghan National Arrested in Connection with Money

Laundering Conspiracy
On October 13, 2020, SIGAR was informed that on September 7, 2020, the
Afghanistan Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) Corruption Investigation
Unit Team 1 arrested Abdul Aziz Sarwari (a U.S. Green Card holder)
at Hamid Karzai International Airport, pursuant to an arrest warrant
issued by the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC). Sarwari is awaiting
further adjudication.
The arrest is in connection with the attempted exportation of 41.37 kg
of gold involving Sarwari and co-conspirators Bashir Sediqi, Rafi Baha,
Mohammad Zarif Baha, and Tamin Sediqi. In August 2017, SIGAR special
agents at Bagram Airfield encountered Bashir Sediqi as he was attempting
to depart Afghanistan via DFS Airline with the 41.37 kg of gold. After an ini-
tial interview, Bashir Sediqi turned the gold over to SIGAR. SIGAR and the
MCTF then initiated an investigation that uncovered money-laundering vio-
lations. The investigation identified numerous other trips whereby Bashir
Sediqi and Sarwari illegally transferred gold out of the country. It was deter-
mined that by use of a fraudulent document obtained by Baha, hundreds
of millions of dollars in gold were smuggled out of Afghanistan.
As previously reported, Bashir Sediqi and Rafi Baha were prosecuted in
October 2019 for violating Afghanistan anti-money-laundering and criminal-
income law relating to the scheme. The ACJC Primary Court Delegation
ordered the gold, worth $1.9 million, to be confiscated, in accordance with
Afghanistan criminal code.
U.S. Contractor Pleads Guilty to Submitting False Claims to

Steal State Department Funds
On December 4, 2020, in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Oyetayo Fagbenro pleaded guilty to a criminal information
charging one count of submitting false claims in connection with his role
in a scheme to divert hundreds of thousands of dollars in State Department
funds to his own use.
Between 2010 and 2015, the State Department awarded three grants
for the construction of media centers at Afghan universities to HUDA
Development Organization, an Afghan non-governmental organization con-
trolled by Fagbenro. Between September 2010 and August 2012, Fagbenro
received approximately $6.9 million for these projects. During that period,
Fagbenro admitted he sent approximately $1.38 million from Afghan

accounts funded by the State Department to people he knew and by entities

he controlled in the United States and other countries. Of the $1.38 million,
Fagbenro admitted sending approximately $775,000 to friends, relatives,
and corporate entities he controlled that had no connection to the purposes
of the grants. In addition, he admitted that in December 2012, he filed a
document with the State Department for one of the grants, certifying he
had spent the funds properly and that he needed additional funds to com-
plete the project. Both statements were false. As a result of Fagbenro’s
fraudulent activities, the financial loss to the State Department was
approximately $775,000.
Sentencing is scheduled for February 12, 2021. SIGAR and the State
Department Office of Inspector General investigated the case.
Former Employees of U.S. Contractor Prosecuted for

Theft Conspiracy
On October 13, 2020, Varita V. Quincy pleaded guilty to one count of con-
spiracy to defraud the United States and to commit theft of property of
value to the United States, one count of theft of property of value to the
United States, and one count of false statements.
On November 19, 2020, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Quincy’s co-
conspirator, Larry Green, was sentenced to 41 months’ imprisonment and
two years’ supervised probation. He was ordered to pay restitution totaling
$179,708 and a forfeiture of $11,480.
During 2015, Green and Quincy participated in an organized theft ring
responsible for the theft of equipment, including generators and vehicles,
from Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. They carried out the theft during the
course of their duties while employed by a U.S. government contractor. In
furtherance of the scheme, they caused fraudulent official documents to be
filed with the U.S. military at Kandahar Airfield.
Suspensions and Debarments

This quarter, SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 19 indi-
viduals and 34 companies for debarment based on evidence developed as
part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United
States. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies
referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 1076, encompassing 582 individuals and
494 companies to date.
As of December 31, 2020, SIGAR’s efforts to utilize suspension and debar-
ment to address fraud, corruption and poor performance in Afghanistan
have resulted in a total of 141 suspensions and 582 finalized debarments/
special entity designations of individuals and companies engaged in U.S.-
funded reconstruction projects. An additional 31 individuals and companies
have entered into administrative compliance agreements with the U.S.

government in lieu of exclusion from contracting since the initiation of

the program.
SIGAR makes referrals for suspensions and debarments—actions taken
by U.S. agencies to exclude companies or individuals from receiving federal
contracts or assistance because of misconduct—based on completed inves-
tigations that SIGAR participates in. In most cases, SIGAR’s referrals occur
in the absence of acceptance of an allegation for criminal prosecution or
remedial action by a contracting office and are therefore the primary rem-
edy to address contractor misconduct.
In making its referrals to agencies, SIGAR provides the basis for a
suspension or debarment decision, as well as supporting documentation
in case the contractor challenges the decision. As SIGAR is an oversight
agency without contracting responsibility, SIGAR does not have its own
suspension and debarment official. Instead, SIGAR refers all suspensions
and debarments to other agencies for adjudication, resulting in a high
degree of interagency coordination. This operational necessity to work with
other agencies fosters information-sharing and coordination, enhancing
SIGAR’s program.
SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program addresses three chal-
lenges posed by U.S. policy and the contingency contracting environment
in Afghanistan: the need to act quickly, the limited U.S. jurisdiction over
Afghan nationals and Afghan companies, and the vetting challenges inher-
ent in the use of multiple tiers of subcontractors. To address these issues,
in 2011, SIGAR embedded two attorneys experienced with suspensions
and debarments within its Investigations Directorate, to provide oversight
over case development and guidance on the use of the suspensions and
debarments. This integration enables them to identify individuals, organiza-
tions, and companies accused of criminal activity or poor performance at
an early stage of an investigation, resulting in the development of detailed
referral packages.
SIGAR’s suspension and debarment referrals constitute the basis for
the majority of suspension and debarment actions taken by all agencies in
Afghanistan. SIGAR’s use of suspension and debarment has previously been
recognized by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
through recognition by a Special Act Award for Excellence in October 2014
and identification as an agency “best practice” during SIGAR’s peer review
in 2017. Going forward, SIGAR will continue to use suspension and debar-
ment referral opportunities to maintain the integrity of the acquisition
process and protect U.S. taxpayers’ investment in Afghanistan from waste,
fraud, and abuse.

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
H.R. 133, CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021

On December 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law H.R. 133, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which provides funding for the fed-
eral government through September 30, 2021. The bill provides $54.9 million
for SIGAR’s operations for fiscal year 2021.
The bill also provides $3 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF) for fiscal year 2021, and rescinds $1.1 billion from the $4.2 billion
ASFF appropriation for fiscal year 2020. The bill further requires that not
less than $20 million from the ASFF be made available for recruitment and
retention of women in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF), and for recruitment and training of female security personnel.
H.R. 133 specifies that civilian assistance for Afghanistan shall be made
available for programs that implement and support comprehensive strat-
egies to combat corruption in Afghanistan, with an emphasis on public
disclosure of government receipts and expenditures, and on prosecution
and punishment of corrupt officials, among other purposes. Further provi-
sions require the Secretary of State to promote and ensure the meaningful
participation of Afghan women in intra-Afghan negotiations, and directs the
Secretary of State to provide greater information on the U.S.-Taliban peace
agreement and on Taliban adherence to agreed-upon conditions. The State
Department is also directed to develop a multiyear diplomatic and devel-
opment strategy for Afghanistan, to include a component to protect and
strengthen Afghan women and girls’ welfare and rights, and a description of
the anticipated U.S. diplomatic and military presence in Afghanistan over a
multiyear period and related strategy for mitigating and countering ongoing
terrorist threats and violent extremism.
H.R. 6395, WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY NATIONAL

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
On January 1, 2021, the Senate, by the required two-thirds majority, voted
to override President Trump’s December 23, 2020, veto of the conference
report (H. Rept. 116-617) to accompany H.R. 6395, the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2021. The House had previously voted to override the President’s veto on
December 28, 2020. With the Senate’s vote to override, the bill was enacted
into law.

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT
The conference report had authorized $4 billion for the Afghanistan

Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in fiscal year 2021, with the goal that at least
$29.1 million, and no less than $10 million, be used for programs and activi-
ties for the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of
women in the ANDSF, and for the recruitment, training, and contracting of
female security personnel for future elections.
The conference report limits the availability of funds to reduce the total
number of U.S. armed forces deployed to Afghanistan below 2,500 (or, if
higher, the total number deployed on the date of enactment of the Act) until
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
Director of National Intelligence, submits a report on the effect a further
reduction of U.S. forces would have on U.S. counterterrorism objectives, on
an enduring diplomatic solution in Afghanistan, and on ANDSF capabilities.
The report provides that the President can waive the limitation in the inter-
est of national security.
The conference report also requires increased information sharing from
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, on the
status of the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement and the extent to
which the Taliban are upholding commitments made in that agreement or
any subsequent agreement.
The conference report further directs the Secretary of State, in consulta-
tion with the USAID Administrator, to develop a strategy for post-conflict
engagement on human rights in Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the
human rights of women and girls.
Finally, the conference report modifies the semiannual Enhancing
Security and Stability in Afghanistan report produced by the Department
of Defense by requiring reporting on civilian casualties and by requiring
DOD to include a section providing a district-level stability assessment dis-
playing insurgent control versus Government of Afghanistan control and
influence of districts to include district, population, and territorial control
data. In 2018, DOD stopped producing such an assessment, which SIGAR
had reported in its quarterly reports to Congress. Both new sections are to
be made publicly available by DOD.

SIGAR BUDGET
SIGAR is funded through September 30, 2021, under H.R. 133, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, signed into law on December 27, 2020. This Act
provides $54.9 million to support SIGAR’s oversight activities and products
by funding SIGAR’s Audits and Inspections, Investigations, Management
and Support, and Research and Analysis Directorates, and the Lessons
Learned Program.
SIGAR STAFF
SIGAR’s staff count has remained steady since the last report to Congress,
with 184 employees on board at the end of the quarter. SIGAR has 23 billets
assigned to the U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan with 10 of those positions
encumbered. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic and other uncertainties
in Afghanistan, decisions on returning the other employees are on hold.
SIGAR also employed six Afghan nationals in its Kabul office to support the
Forward Operations, Investigations, and Audits Directorates. SIGAR sup-
plemented its resident staff this quarter with one employee on short-term
temporary duty to Afghanistan.

“The price for leaving too soon or in an
uncoordinated way could be very high
... Afghanistan risks becoming once
again a platform for international terror-
ists to plan and organize attacks on our
homelands. And ISIS could rebuild in
Afghanistan the terror caliphate it lost
in Syria and Iraq.”
— NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Source: Reuters, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO chief warns against rapid troop withdrawal from Afghanistan,” 11/17/2020.
2 RECONSTRUCTION
UPDATE
21
TITLE OF THE SECTION
RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE CONTENTS

CONTENTS
Reconstruction in Brief 23
Status of Funds 24
Security 46
Governance 80
Economic and Social Development 116

Workers carry electric cables to a Kabul warehouse and pole-manufacturing plant. (World Bank photo by Sofie Tesson)

RECONSTRUCTION IN BRIEF
Section 2 of this quarterly report summarizes the key events of the
reporting period as well as the programs and projects concerning
Afghanistan reconstruction across four areas: Funding, Security,
Governance, and Economic and Social Development
U.S. TROOPS AT LOWEST LEVEL SINCE 2001 • The negotiation teams recessed until January 5, 2021,
• The Department of Defense (DOD) announced to consult on the agenda; substantive discussions
on November 17, 2020, it would execute a further began on January 9.
troop reduction in Afghanistan from the 4,000–5,000 AFGHANISTAN FACES SECOND WAVE OF
ordered last quarter to 2,500 by January 15, 2021. COVID-19 PANDEMIC
• DOD announced on January 15 that the 2,500 level • Poverty levels were forecast to rise to 61–72% of the
had been reached. population in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
• Top generals said the new force level is sufficient while Afghanistan braced for a second wave of the
to protect U.S. forces and their Afghan partners, disease in early 2021.
as well as to carry out the U.S. training and • While Afghan government revenues continued to
counterterrorism missions. recover from the impact of COVID-19 this quarter,
Afghanistan’s sustainable domestic revenues fell by
VIOLENCE ESCALATES IN KABUL AND 2.8%, year-on-year, during 2020.
SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN • A number of U.S. economic and social-development
• U.S. Forces-Afghanistan said this quarter enemy programs fell short of their FY 2020 performance
attacks in Kabul were higher than they were last goals due to COVID-related restrictions that hindered
quarter, and “much higher” than in the same quarter project activities.
a year prior.
• Recent heavy fighting between U.S., Afghan, and OPIUM SURVEYS STILL DELAYED
Taliban forces in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces • The biannual Afghanistan Opium Survey
has forced thousands of Afghan civilians to flee reports are still delayed after more than a year of
their homes. disagreements between Afghanistan’s National
DONORS PLEDGE CONTINUED ASSISTANCE Statistics and Information Authority and the United
• International donors pledged at least $3.3 billion Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
in civilian assistance to Afghanistan for 2021 at a U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING
November 23–24 conference in Geneva, Switzerland. • Cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and
• Donors expressed the potential for between $12 related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002 rose
billion and $13.2 billion through 2024 if subsequent to $143.27 billion in the quarter. The Consolidated
annual commitments could stay at similar levels Appropriations Act, 2021, enacted on December
to the 2021 commitment—a drop from the $15.2 27, 2020, provided $3.05 billion for the Afghanistan
billion pledged for four years at the 2016 donors’ Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for FY 2021, and
conference. rescinded $1.10 billion from the ASFF FY 2020
• The amount pledged represents the bare minimum of account.
what World Bank analysts say would be required to • Of the $119.98 billion (84% of total) appropriated to
maintain Afghanistan as a “viable state.” the eight largest active reconstruction funds, about
$8.23 billion remained for possible disbursement.
AFGHAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE • DOD’s latest Cost of War Report, dated September
• On December 2, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 30, 2020, said its cumulative obligations for
and Taliban negotiating teams agreed to rules Afghanistan, including U.S. warfighting and
and procedures to guide peace talks that might reconstruction, had reached $815.7 billion.
lead to a political roadmap and a permanent and Cumulative Afghanistan reconstruction and related
comprehensive ceasefire. obligations reported by State, USAID, and other
civilian agencies reached $48.5 billion.
JANUARY 30, 2021 | SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION | RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE
STATUS OF FUNDS
GOVERNANCE
STATUS OF FUNDS
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan 26

KEY ISSUES & EVENTS 3
U.S. Cost of War and Reconstruction
in Afghanistan 28
Afghanistan Reconstruction Funding Pipeline 29
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 30
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 33
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities 34
Economic Support Fund 35
International Disaster Assistance 36
International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement 37
Migration and Refugee Assistance 38
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs 39
International Reconstruction Funding
for Afghanistan 40

STATUS OF FUNDS
STATUS OF FUNDS
In accord with SIGAR’s legislative mandate, this section details the status
of U.S. funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
activities in Afghanistan. As of December 31, 2020, the United States had CERP: Commanders’ Emergency
appropriated approximately $143.27 billion for reconstruction and related Response Program
activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002. Total Afghanistan reconstruction DICDA: Drug Interdiction and Counter-
funding has been allocated as follows: Drug Activities
• $88.32 billion for security (including $4.60 billion for ESF: Economic Support Fund
counternarcotics initiatives) IDA: International Disaster Assistance
• $35.95 billion for governance and development ($4.41 billion INCLE: International Narcotics Control
for counternarcotics initiatives) and Law Enforcement
• $4.13 billion for humanitarian aid MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance
• $14.87 billion for agency operations NADR: Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs
Figure 2.1 shows the eight largest active U.S. funds that contribute to
these efforts. SIGAR previously reported on the nine largest active funds,
but one of these funds, the Public Law 480 Title II account, is no longer
used to provide food aid to Afghanistan and it has been removed from this
section of our reporting.
FIGURE 2.1
U.S. APPROPRIATIONS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS ($ BILLIONS)
EIGHT LARGEST ACTIVE RECONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS – $119.98 BILLION

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE USAID & OTHER AGENCIES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASFF CERP DICDA ESF IDA INCLE MRA NADR
$82.90 $3.71 $3.28 $21.10 $1.15 $5.42 $1.53 $0.88
OTHER RECONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS – $8.42 BILLION

$2.80 $3.84 $1.78
AGENCY OPERATIONS – $14.87 BILLION
N/A $2.32 $12.55
TOTAL AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION – $143.27 BILLION
$92.70 $28.42 $22.16
Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

STATUS OF FUNDS
U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN

As of December 31, 2020, cumulative appropriations for reconstruction and
related activities in Afghanistan totaled approximately $143.27 billion, as
shown in Figure 2.2. This total can be divided into four major categories of
DOD USAID & OTHER STATE
reconstruction and related funding: security, governance and development,
humanitarian, and oversight and operations. Approximately $9.00 billion of
The amount provided to the eight largest these funds support counternarcotics initiatives that crosscut the security
active U.S. funds represents more than ($4.60 billion) and governance and development ($4.41 billion) categories.
83.7% (nearly $119.98 billion) of total For complete information regarding U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B.
reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan
ASFF President Donald J. Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
since FY 2002. Of this amount, over
2021 (H.R. 133) into law on December 27, 2020, providing appropriations for
90.8% (more than $108.90 billion) has
been obligated, and over 87.8% (nearly
all the agencies that are active in Afghanistan, including the Departments of
DOD
$105.37 billion) has been disbursed. An Defense, State, and Justice; the U.S. Agency for International Development;
estimated $6.38 billion of the amount the U.S. Agency for Global Media; the U.S. International Development
appropriated for these funds has expired Finance Corporation; and SIGAR. Three appropriations were specifically
and will therefore not be disbursed.
CERP
DOD
FIGURE 2.2
CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ BILLIONS)
$150 143.27
140.15
135.53
129.81
123.03
120 116.45
110.77
104.31USAID & OTHER
90
60 IDA
30 USAID & OTHER
0
FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021
Security Governance/Development Humanitarian Civilian Operations Total
INCLE
STATE
DICDA

DOD
STATUS OF FUNDS
targeted for Afghanistan, consisting of the Afghanistan Security Forces TABLE 2.1
Fund (ASFF), the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP),

U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO
and the SIGAR appropriation. These appropriations, totaling $3.10 billion,
AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2002 ($ MILLIONS)
combined with $0.02 billion from other agency actions, comprise the FY
Disbursements
2021 appropriations of $3.12 billion through December 31, 2020, as shown
in Figure 2.3. Total On-Budget Assistance $16,900.17
Since 2002, the United States has provided more than $16.90 billion Government-to-Government 10,943.24
in on-budget assistance to the government of Afghanistan. This includes DOD 10,085.59

USAID 772.46
more than $10.94 billion provided to Afghan government ministries and
State 85.19
institutions, and nearly $5.96 billion to three multilateral trust funds—the
Multilateral Trust Funds 5,956.93
World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the
ARTF 4,127.68
United Nations Development Programme-managed Law and Order Trust
LOTFA 1,675.58
Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the Asian Development Bank-managed
AITF 153.67
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). Table 2.1 shows U.S. on-
budget assistance disbursed to the Afghan government and multilateral Note: Numbers have been rounded.
trust funds. Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2021;

State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2018; DOD,
response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2021; World Bank, ARTF:
Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of November 20,
2020 (end of 11th month of FY 1399), accessed 1/13/2021;
UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts
2002–2020, updated 12/31/2020, in response to SIGAR
data call, 1/8/2021.
FIGURE 2.3
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY ($ BILLIONS)
$8.0
6.87 6.79
6.46 6.58
6.0 5.68 5.72
4.62
4.0
3.12
2.0
0.0
FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021
Security Governance/Development Humanitarian Civilian Operations Total


STATUS OF FUNDS
U.S. COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

IN AFGHANISTAN
Reconstruction costs for Afghanistan equal approximately 16% of all funds
obligated by the Department of Defense for Afghanistan since 2001. DOD
reported in its Cost of War Report as of September 30, 2020, that it had
obligated $815.7 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan, including the cost of maintaining U.S.
troops in Afghanistan.1
The comparable figures for Afghanistan reconstruction, consisting of
obligations (appropriated funds committed to particular programs or proj-
ects for disbursal) of the DOD, Department of State, USAID, and other
agencies was $130.5 billion at that date. Note that the DOD contribution
to the reconstruction of Afghanistan is contained in both the $815.7 billion
Cost of War and $130.5 billion Cost of Reconstruction figures. Figure 2.4
presents the annual and cumulative costs for war and reconstruction
FIGURE 2.4 in Afghanistan.
AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2020 Q4 ($ BILLIONS)
$100 97 98
CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS
THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2020
COST OF WAR $815.7

80 77 78
Department of Defense*
COST OF RECONSTRUCTION $130.5

Department of Defense* 81.9 60
60 USAID 25.2
Department of State 21.7
Other Agencies 1.6
47 47
* DOD’s Cost of Reconstruction amount
also included in its total Cost of War. 41 40
40 38 38
36
32
20 20
20
14 15 15
12 12 13
10 10 10 9
6 6 6 6 6 7
5 5
3 3 2
1 1
0
FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Cumulative obligations reported by DOD for the Cost of War through September 30, 2020, differ markedly from cumulative appropriations through
December 31, 2020, as presented elsewhere in the Status of Funds section, because the former figures do not include unobligated appropriations and DOD Cost of War reporting lags
by one quarter.
Source: DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, Total War-related Obligations by Year Incurred, data as of September 30, 2020. Obligation data shown against year funds obligated. SIGAR
analysis of annual obligation of reconstruction accounts as presented in SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2020. Obligation data shown against year
funds appropriated.

STATUS OF FUNDS
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING PIPELINE FIGURE 2.5
Since 2002, Congress has appropriated nearly $143.27 billion for reconstruc- STATUS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS,
tion and related activities in Afghanistan. Of this amount, nearly $119.98 EIGHT LARGEST ACTIVE ACCOUNTS
billion (83.7%) was appropriated to the eight largest active reconstruction AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ BILLIONS)
accounts, as shown in Table 2.2.
As of December 31, 2020, approximately $8.23 billion of the amount Total Appropriated: $119.98 Billion
appropriated to the eight largest active reconstruction funds remained for
possible disbursement, as shown in Figure 2.5. These funds will be used to
train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
(ANDSF); complete ongoing, large-scale infrastructure projects, such as Disbursed
$105.37
those funded by the AIF and ESF; combat narcotics production and traffick-
ing; and advance the rule of law, strengthen the justice sector, and promote Remaining
$8.23
human rights.
Expired
$6.38
TABLE 2.2
CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, DISBURSED,

AND REMAINING FY 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ BILLIONS)
Appropriated Obligated Disbursed Remaining
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) $82.90 $74.75 $74.00 $5.23
Economic Support Fund (ESF) 21.10 20.03 18.00 2.21
International Narcotics Control and Law
5.42 5.17 4.59 0.61
Enforcement (INCLE)
Commanders’ Emergency Response
3.71 2.29 2.29 0.00
Program (CERP)
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
3.28 3.28 3.28 0.00
Activities (DICDA)
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) 1.53 1.52 1.50 0.02
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) 1.15 1.12 0.97 0.15
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
0.88 0.74 0.74 0.00
and Related (NADR)
Total Eight Largest Active Accounts 119.98 108.90 105.37 8.23
Other Reconstruction Funds 8.42
Agency Operations 14.87
Total $143.27
Note: Numbers have been rounded. The amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the eight largest
active reconstruction accounts after deducting approximately $6.38 billion that has expired. Expired funds equal the amount
appropriated but not obligated after the period of availability for obligation has ended and thereafter includes amounts deobligated
and canceled. The amount remaining for potential disbursement for Other Reconstruction Funds is less than $50 million; for
Agency Operations the amount can not be determined but is most often less than the most recent annual appropriation.
Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriation laws and obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID,
1/20/2021.

STATUS OF FUNDS
DOD USAID & OTHER STATE
AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

ASFF Congress has created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide
the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding for sala-
ries, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.
DOD The primary organization responsible for building the ANDSF is the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). A Financial and Activity
ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Plan (FAP) must be approved by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council
Appropriations: Total monies available (AROC), concurred in by the Department of State, and prior notification pro-
for commitments vided to the U.S. Congress before ASFF funds may be obligated.2
CERP President Donald J. Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
into law on December 27, 2020, which under Division C-Department of Defense
Disbursements: Monies that have Appropriations Act, 2021, provided an appropriation of $3.05 billion for ASFF
been expended
DOD FY 2021 and a rescission of $1.10 billion for ASFF FY 2020. This decrease in the
funding for ASFF FY 2020 reduced the original appropriation from $4.20 billion
to an adjusted appropriation of $3.10 billion, as shown in Figure 2.6.3
As of December 31, 2020, cumulative appropriations for ASFF stood
Financial and Activity Plan: DOD notifica-
at nearly $82.90 billion, with nearly $74.75 billion in funding having been
tion to Congress of its plan for obligating
obligated, and more than $74.00 billion having been disbursed, as shown
the ASFF appropriation, as well as updates
to that plan involving any proposed new in Figure 2.7. DOD reported that cumulative obligations increased by more
projects or transfer
USAIDof&funds
OTHER between than $782.07 million during the quarter ending December 31, 2020, and that
budget subactivity groups in excess of cumulative disbursements increased by more than $653.01 million.4
$20 million, as required by the annual FIGURE 2.6 FIGURE 2.7
DOD appropriation act.
ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
($ BILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)
Rescission: LegislationIDA
enacted by
Congress that cancels the availability of
Appropriated Appropriated
budget authority previously enacted before $12 $80 $80.95 $82.90
USAIDotherwise
the authority would & OTHER expire. Obligated Obligated
$73.97 $74.75
Disbursed Disbursed
$73.35 $74.00
Reprogramming: Shifting funds within 9 60
an appropriation or fund to use them for
purposes other than those contemplated
INCLE
at the time of appropriation.
6 40
STATE
Source: GAO, Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget 3 20
Process, 9/2005; DOD, response to SIGAR data call,
1/23/2020.
DICDA
0 0
05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
DOD
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from
FY 2011 ASFF, $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, $178 million from FY 2013 ASFF, and $604 million from FY 2019 ASFF to fund other
DOD requirements. DOD reprogrammed $230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. ASFF data reflect the following rescissions: $1 billion from
FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, $764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, $400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No.
114-113, $150 million from FY 2016 in Pub. L. No. 115-31, $396 million from FY 2019 in Pub. L. No. 116-93, and $1.10 billion
from FY 2020 in Pub. L. No. 116-260.
ESF Source: DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2020,” 1/19/2021; DFAS, “AR(M)
1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2020,” 10/17/2020; Pub. L. Nos. 116-260, 116-93,
115-141, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, and 113-6; OSD Comptroller, 16-22 PA: Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request,
6/30/2016.
USAID & OTHER

STATUS OF FUNDS
ASFF Budget Activities

DOD budgeted and reported on ASFF by three Budget Activity Groups Budget Activity Groups: Categories within
(BAGs) through the FY 2018 appropriation. These BAGs consisted of: each appropriation or fund account that
• Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, ANA) identify the purposes, projects, or types
• Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, ANP) of activities financed by the appropriation
or fund.
• Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations)
Subactivity Groups: Accounting groups
Funds for each BAG are further allocated to four subactivity groups
that break down the command’s disburse-
(SAGs): Sustainment, Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, and ments into functional areas.
Training and Operations. The AROC must approve the requirement and
acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of $50 million annu-
ally and for any nonstandard equipment requirement in excess of $100
Source: DOD, Manual 7110.1-M Department of Defense
million. In addition, DOD is required to notify Congress prior to obligating Budget Guidance Manual, accessed 9/28/2009; Department
funds for any new projects or the transfer of funds between budget subac- of the Navy, Medical Facility Manager Handbook, p. 5,
accessed 10/2/2009.
tivity groups in excess of $20 million.5
As of December 31, 2020, DOD had disbursed more than $69.34 billion from
the ASFF appropriations for FY 2005 through FY 2018. Of this amount, nearly
$47.45 billion was disbursed for the ANA, more than $21.49 billion was dis-
bursed for the ANP, and nearly $0.39 billion was disbursed for Related Activities.
As shown in Figure 2.8, the largest portion of the funds disbursed for the
ANA—nearly $23.53 billion—supported ANA troop and equipment sustainment.
Of the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion—more than $9.62 bil-
lion—also supported sustainment of ANP forces, as shown in Figure 2.9.6
FIGURE 2.8 FIGURE 2.9
ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP, BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005 TO FY 2018 APPROPRIATIONS FY 2005 TO FY 2018 APPROPRIATIONS
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ BILLIONS) THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ BILLIONS)
Total: $47.45 Billion Total: $21.49 Billion
Infrastructure
Infrastructure Training and $3.17 Training and
$6.00 Equipment and Operations Equipment and Operations
Transportation $4.32 Transportation $3.95
$13.60 $4.75
Sustainment Sustainment
$23.53 $9.62
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Excludes the ASFF FY 2019, FY 2020, and FY 2021 appropriations, which are presented
by four Budget Activity Groups, consisting of the ANA, ANP, AAF, and ASSF.
Source: DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2020,” 1/19/2021.

STATUS OF FUNDS
New ASFF Budget Activity Groups for FY 2019 and FY 2020

DOD revised its budgeting and reporting framework for ASFF begin-
ning with its ASFF budget request for FY 2019, submitted to Congress in
February 2018, and with its reporting beginning on October 1, 2018. The
new framework restructures the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP) budget activity groups (BAGs) to better reflect the
ANDSF force structure and new budget priorities. In FY 2018 and previous
years, all costs associated with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) fell under the
ANA BAG and costs for the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) were
split between the ANA and ANP BAGs. Beginning with the ASFF FY 2019
appropriation, the ANDSF consists of the ANA, ANP, AAF, and ASSF BAGs,
as presented below in Table 2.3.
TABLE 2.3
ASFF FY 2019 AND ASFF FY 2020 BUDGET EXECUTION THROUGH

DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ MILLIONS)
ASFF FY 2019 ASFF FY 2020
Budget Disburse- Budget Disburse-
Budget Activity Groups (FAP 19-5) Obligations ments (FAP 20-2) Obligations ments
Afghan National Army $1,528.99 $1,441.29 $1,351.34 $1,222.37 $705.91 $434.21
Afghan National Police 665.00 541.10 491.76 540.20 247.29 154.43
Afghan Air Force 995.95 894.66 873.95 1,086.42 511.09 476.46
Afghan Spec. Sec. Forces 730.06 704.31 621.98 1,350.99 199.37 159.47
Total $3,920.00 $3,581.36 $3,339.03 $4,199.98 $1,663.66 $1,224.57
Note: Numbers have been rounded. The current ASFF FY 2020 budget, based on FAP 20-2, does not yet reflect the $1.10 billion
rescinded from the account in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2021, enacted on December 27, 2020. Totals
exclude undistributed obligations and disbursements.
Source: DOD, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2019, 19-5, July 2020,
10/13/2020; Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Financial and Activity Plan, Fiscal Year 2020, 20-2, August 2020,
10/13/2020; AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2020, 1/19/2021.
NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF) has
contributed nearly $1.70 billion to ASFF for specific projects funded by
donor nations through December 31, 2020, and ASFF has returned more
than $400.18 million of these funds following the cancellation or comple-
tion of these projects. DOD has obligated nearly $1.05 billion and disbursed
more than $913.79 million of NATF-contributed funds through ASFF
through September 30, 2020.7 These amounts are not reflected in the U.S.
government-funded ASFF obligation and disbursement numbers presented
in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.

STATUS OF FUNDS
ASFF
DOD
COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables U.S. com- CERP
manders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief
and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting
DOD
programs that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this
program is restricted to small projects whose cost may not exceed $500,000.8
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021, decreased the annual CERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY
appropriation for CERP from $5.0 million in FY 2020 to $2.0 million in FY 2021, Appropriations: Total monies available
bringing total cumulative funding to more than $3.71 billion. House Report 116- for commitments
453 accompanying the Appropriations Act states that “the Committee believes
that after nearly two decades the time has come to wind down this program
[CERP]. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to transition activities Disbursements: Monies that have
USAID & OTHER
to the Afghanistan Security Forces and other agencies of the United States gov- been expended
ernment, as appropriate, and to phase out this program during fiscal year 2021.”9
Notably, CERP annual appropriations had equaled or exceeded $400.00 mil-
lion per year during the FY 2008 to FY 2012 period, as shown in Figure 2.10, and
IDA
nearly $1.12 billion in appropriations from this period were realigned to other
Operations and Maintenance, Army account requirements, or expired without
being disbursed. DOD reported that CERP cumulative appropriations, obliga- USAID & OTHER
tions, and disbursements stood at approximately $3.71 billion, $2.29 billion, and
$2.29 billion, respectively, at December 31, 2020, as shown in Figure 2.11.10

INCLE
CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
($ MILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)
STATE
$1,000 $4
$3.71 $3.71
800 DICDA
3
600 Obligated Obligated DOD

and and
2 Disbursed Disbursed
$2.29 $2.29
400
ESF
1
200
USAID & OTHER

0 0
04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers. Analysis includes data from a draft DOD financial
report because the final version had not been completed when this report went to press.
MRA
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2021 and 10/19/2020; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2013;
Pub. L. Nos. 115-141, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10.
STATE

NADR
USAID & OTHER
STATUS OF FUNDS
INCLE
STATE
DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES

DICDA The Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA), Defense appro-
priation provided funding for efforts intended to stabilize Afghanistan by
combating the drug trade and related activities. The DOD Counterdrug group
DOD allocated this funding to support the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan
units (mentored by the DEA and U.S. Army Special Forces) who investigated
DICDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY high-value targets and conducted drug-interdiction operations. Funding was
Appropriations: Total monies available also provided to the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing (SMW) to support their
ESF
for commitments fleet of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The SMW’s aircraft provided air mobil-
ity to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations aimed
at counterdrug operations in country.11
USAID & that
Disbursements: Monies OTHERhave
The DOD Counterdrug group allocated modest amounts of funding to
been expended Afghanistan programs in recent years as the number of counterdrug missions
performed by the SMW decreased, falling from $118.01 million in FY 2018 to
MRA
$10.18 million in FY 2019 and $24.30 million in FY 2020. The Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2021, provided no DICDA Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding for FY 2021. The DOD Counterdrug group con-
STATE sequently has no plans to fund activities in Afghanistan in FY 2021, and the
appropriation for FY 2021 stands at zero, as shown in Figure 2.12.12 Cumulative
amounts appropriated and transferred from the Central Transfer Account
remain unchanged between September 30 and December 31, 2020, at $3.28
NADR billion, as shown in Figure 2.13.13
STATE
DICDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR DICDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
$500 $3.5
and and
Transferreda Transferreda
$3.28 $3.28
400 2.8
300 2.1
200 1.4
100 0.7
0 0
04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed $125.13 million out of FY 2015 DICDA and $122.18 million out of
FY 2019 DICDA due to requirements for the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing being funded from the ASFF instead of DICDA.
a DOD reprograms all DICDA funds to the military services and defense agencies for obligation and disbursement.
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2021 and 10/15/2020; OSD Comptroller, 15-23 PA: Omnibus 15 Prior
Approval Request, 6/30/2015, p. 42.

INCLE
STATE
STATUS OF FUNDS
DICDA
DOD
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs are intended to advance U.S. ESF
interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, eco-
nomic, and security needs. ESF programs support counterterrorism;
bolster national economies; and assist in the development of effective, USAID & OTHER
accessible, and independent legal systems for a more transparent and
accountable government.14 ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY
The ESF was allocated $200.00 million for Afghanistan for FY 2020 Appropriations: Total monies available
through the Section 653(a) consultation process that was concluded among MRA
for commitments
State, the U.S. Congress, and OMB in the quarter ending June 30, 2020. In
the quarter ending September 30, 2020, $93.00 million in FY 2015 ESF-OCO
funds were reprogrammed to Afghanistan, and obligated for Afghanistan Disbursements: Monies that have STATE
programs. These two allocations, together amounting to $293.00 million in been expended
resources, represent a 16% reduction from the Section 653(a) allocation to
Afghanistan of $350.00 million for FY 2019. Cumulative appropriations for
NADR
the ESF now stand at more than $21.10 billion, of which nearly $20.03 bil-
lion had been obligated and nearly $18.00 billion had been disbursed as of
December 31, 2020.15 Figure 2.14 below shows ESF appropriations by fiscal STATE
year, and Figure 2.15 shows cumulative appropriations, obligations, and dis-
bursements as of September 30 and December 31, 2020.
ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

($ BILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)
$4 $24
FY 2021 §653(a) ALLOCATION HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED
$21.10 $21.10
Obligated Obligated
3 18 $20.03 $20.03
Disbursed Disbursed
$17.87 $18.00
2 12
1 6
0 0
02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects the following transfers from AIF to the ESF: $101 million for FY 2011,
$179.5 million for FY 2013, and $55 million for FY 2014. FY 2016 ESF for Afghanistan was reduced by $179 million and
put toward the U.S. commitment to the Green Climate Fund.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/19/2021 and 10/12/2020; State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021,
7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, 10/5/2018, 10/11/2017, 5/4/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, and 4/15/2014.

DOD
STATUS OF FUNDS
USAID & OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

IDA USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), created through the
combination of its Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
and Food for Peace (FFP) in June 2020, administers International Disaster
USAID & OTHER Assistance (IDA) funds. BHA is responsible for leading and coordinating the
U.S. government response to disasters overseas, and obligates funding for
IDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY emergency food-assistance projects when there is an identified need and
Appropriations: Total monies available local authorities do not have the capacity to respond. BHA works closely
for commitments INCLE with international partners such as the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN’s World
Health Organization (WHO) to deliver goods and services to assist conflict-
Disbursements: Monies that have STATE and disaster-affected populations in Afghanistan.16
been expended USAID reported more than $1.15 billion in IDA funds had been allocated
to Afghanistan from 2002 to December 31, 2020, with obligations of more
DICDA
than $1.12 billion and disbursements of nearly $0.97 billion reported as of
that date, as shown in Figure 2.17. USAID appropriated more than $178.61
million in IDA funds in FY 2020, the highest level of appropriations that it
DOD had recorded in Afghanistan since 2002, as shown in Figure 2.16.17
ESF
IDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR IDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
USAID & OTHER $200 $1.25

FY 2021 ALLOCATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN ARE NOT FINALIZED
$1.15 $1.15
Obligated Obligated
1.00 $1.12 $1.12
150
Disbursed Disbursed
MRA $0.93 $0.97
0.75
100
STATE
0.50
50
0.25
NADR
0 0.00
02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
STATE
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/19/2021 and 10/12/2020.

USAID & OTHER
STATUS OF FUNDS
IDA
USAID & OTHER
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT INCLE
The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which funds projects and programs STATE
for advancing the rule of law and combating narcotics production and
trafficking. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including police, INCLE FUNDS TERMINOLOGY
counternarcotics, and rule of law and justice.18 Appropriations:
DICDATotal monies available
The INCLE account was allocated $88.00 million for Afghanistan for FY for commitments
2020 through the Section 653(a) consultation process that was concluded
among State, the U.S. Congress, and OMB in the quarter ending June 30, DOD
2020. This amount is consistent with the $87.80 allocation for FY 2019, Disbursements: Monies that have
which itself represented a 45% reduction from the $160.00 million allocation been expended
for FY 2018.19 Cumulative funding for INCLE stands at more than $5.42 bil-
lion, of which nearly $5.17 billion has been obligated and more than $4.59 ESF
billion has been disbursed as of December 31, 2020. Figure 2.18 shows
INCLE appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 2.19 shows cumulative
appropriations, obligations, and disbursements as of September 30 and USAID & OTHER
December 31, 2020.20

MRA
INCLE APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
STATE
$800 $6
FY 2021 §653(a) ALLOCATION HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED
700 $5.42 $5.42
5 Obligated Obligated
$5.17 $5.17 NADR
600
Disbursed Disbursed
4 $4.56 $4.59
500
STATE
400 3
300
2
200
1
100
0 0
02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2021 and 10/15/2020.

DOD
STATUS OF FUNDS
ESF
USAID & OTHER
MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

MRA The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
(PRM) administers the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account
that funds programs to protect and assist refugees, conflict victims,
STATE internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants.
Through MRA, PRM supports the work of the UN High Commissioner for
MRA FUNDS TERMINOLOGY Refugees (UNHCR), other international organizations, and various nongov-
Appropriations: Total monies available ernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan to support Afghan refugees
NADR throughout the region and upon their return to Afghanistan.21
for commitments
The MRA allocation for Afghan refugees, internally displaced persons,
and returnees has increased for the past two years, rising from nearly
Disbursements: Monies that have STATE $77.19 million in FY 2018 to nearly $86.69 million in FY 2019 and nearly
been expended $100.53 million in FY 2020. Cumulative appropriations since 2002 have
totaled nearly $1.53 billion through December 31, 2020, with cumulative
obligations and disbursements reaching more than $1.52 billion and nearly
$1.50 billion, respectively, on that date. Figure 2.20 shows MRA appropria-
tions by fiscal year, and Figure 2.21 shows cumulative appropriations,
obligations, and disbursements as of December 31, 2020.22
MRA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR MRA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

$150 $1.6
FY 2021 ALLOCATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN ARE NOT FINALIZED
$1.53 $1.53
Obligated Obligated
120 $1.52 $1.52
1.2 Disbursed Disbursed
$1.49 $1.50
90
0.8
60
0.4
30
0 0.0
02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/14/2021 and 10/15/2020.

USAID & OTHER
STATUS OF FUNDS
MRA
STATE
NONPROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM, DEMINING,

AND RELATED PROGRAMS NADR
The Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
(NADR) account plays a critical role in improving the Afghan government’s
capacity to address terrorist threats, protect its borders, and remove dan- STATE
gerous explosive remnants of war.23 The majority of NADR funding for

Afghanistan is funneled through two subaccounts, Antiterrorist Assistance NADR FUNDS TERMINOLOGY
(ATA) and Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD), with additional Appropriations: Total monies available
funds going to Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) and for commitments
Counterterrorism Financing (CTF). The Office of Foreign Assistance
Resources makes allocated funding available to relevant bureaus and
offices that obligate and disburse these funds.24 Disbursements: Monies that have
The NADR account was allocated $38.50 million for Afghanistan for FY been expended
2020 through the Section 653(a) consultation process that was concluded
among State, the U.S. Congress and OMB in the quarter ending June 30,
2020. This amount is consistent with the allocation of $38.30 million for FY
2019 and the $36.6 million allocation for FY 2018. Figure 2.22 shows annual
allocations to the NADR account, and Figure 2.23 shows that the cumula-
tive total of NADR funds appropriated and transferred remained unchanged
between September 30, 2020, and December 31, 2020, at $881.34 million.25
NADR APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR NADR FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

($ MILLIONS) ($ MILLIONS)
$100 $1,000
FY 2021 §653(a) ALLOCATION AMOUNT HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED
and and
80 800 Transferreda Transferreda
$881.34 $881.34
60 600
40 400
20 200
0 0
02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 As of Sep 30, 2020 As of Dec 31, 2020

a State and Congress agree on the country-by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign assistance accounts,
including NADR, through the Section 653(a) process. The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding
available to relevant bureaus at State that obligate and disburse these funds.
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021, 7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, and 10/5/2018.

STATUS OF FUNDS
INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING

FOR AFGHANISTAN
The international community provides significant funding to support
Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts through multilateral institu-
tions. These institutions include multilateral trust funds; United Nations and
nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations; two multilateral
development finance institutions, the World Bank Group and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB); and two special purpose United Nations orga-
nizations, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN
Development Programme (UNDP).
The four main multilateral trust funds are the World Bank-managed
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the UNDP-managed
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the NATO-managed
Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF), and the ADB-managed
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).
The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
leads emergency appeals and annual or multi-year humanitarian response
plans for Afghanistan, and provides timely reporting of assistance provided
by donors to the full range of humanitarian assistance organizations to
facilitate funding of targeted needs.
The four multilateral trust funds, ARTF, LOTFA, NATF, and AITF, as well as
UNAMA and UN OCHA-coordinated humanitarian assistance organizations,
FIGURE 2.24
CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BY 10 LARGEST DONORS AND OTHERS TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

(ARTF, UN OCHA-REPORTED PROGRAMS, LOTFA, NATO ANA TRUST FUND, UNAMA, AND AITF) SINCE 2002 ($ BILLIONS)
United States 4.13 2.88 1.68 0.65 9.38
Japan 0.49 1.14 1.66 0.39 3.73
United Kingdom 2.15 0.71 0.40 3.60

ARTF - $12.80 Billion
as of Nov. 20, 2020
Germany 0.99 0.52 0.66 0.77 3.13
UN OCHA - $10.31 Billion
European Union 1.14 0.97 0.72 2.83 as of Dec. 31, 2020
LOTFA - $6.24 Billion

Canada 0.85 0.35 1.73 as of Dec. 31, 2020
Australia 0.46 0.68 1.45 NATO ANA TF - $3.23 Billion

as of Nov. 16, 2020
Norway 0.59 0.36 1.18
Other - $2.83 Billion
Various Dates
Italy 0.43 1.17
Netherlands 0.60 1.17 Total - $35.42 Billion
All Others 1.22 2.77 0.65 1.12 6.05
$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10
Note: Amounts under $350 million are not labeled. Numbers may not add due to rounding. “Other” consists of UNAMA contributions of $2.24 billion for 2007−2019 calendar year
assessments, and AITF contributions of $0.59 billion at 6/30/2020.
Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of November 20, 2020 (end of 11th month of FY 1399) at www.artf.af, accessed 1/13/2021; UN OCHA,
Financial Tracking Service at https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 12/31/2020; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts 2002–2020, updated through 12/31/2020,
in response to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2021; NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status of Contributions Made as of 16 November 2020, at www.nato.int, accessed 1/14/2021;
ADB, AITF Quarterly Report (April−June 2020), p. 10, in response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021; State, UNAMA approved budgets and notified funding plans, in response to SIGAR data
calls, 10/8/2020 and 7/13/2020; UN, Country Assessments, at www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/scale, accessed 10/9/2020.

STATUS OF FUNDS
TABLE 2.4
all report donor contributions for their Afghanistan programs. Cumulative
contributions to these six organizations since 2002 have amounted to $35.42
2020 AFGHANISTAN CONFERENCE
billion, with the United States contributing $9.38 billion of this amount, as PLEDGES FOR 2021 ($ MILLIONS)
shown in Figure 2.24. The World Bank Group and the ADB are funded through Donors Pledges
general member assessments that cannot be readily identified as allocated to United States $600.00
Afghanistan. These institutions have collectively made financial commitments of Germany 511.70
$11.88 billion to Afghanistan since 2002, as discussed in the sections that follow. European Union 357.00
The sources of funding for U.S. contributions are shown on Table 2.6 on page 45. World Bank Group 334.00
India 250.00
Donor Pledges at the Afghanistan Conference in Geneva Asian Development Bank 221.00
The international donor community met virtually in Geneva for the 2020 United Kingdom 207.70
Afghanistan Conference in November 2020 to pledge their support for civilian Japan 180.00
assistance to Afghanistan for the 2021 to 2024 period. The donors made one-, Sweden 95.10
two-, three-, or four-year pledges at the Conference; defined the scope of their Norway 69.31
pledged civilian development assistance (excluding emergency humanitar- Canada 67.50
ian assistance) in various ways; and many attached significant conditions Denmark 64.00
to their pledges. The United States made a single-year pledge of $300 mil- Netherlands 59.50
lion for 2021, with up to an additional approximately $300 million available Italy 41.64
in the near term depending on the Afghan government making “meaningful Australia 38.85
progress” in the peace process. The U.S. pledge would be funded from obli- Turkey 37.50
gated but unexpended FY 2019 ESF, INCLE, and NADR funds, but not IDA or Finland 35.70
MRA humanitarian assistance funds. The account makeup of the additional Other 76.50
approximately $300 million, if released, is yet to be finalized but would like- Total $3,247.00
wise exclude IDA or MRA humanitarian assistance funds.26 Afghanistan’s Note: Pledges for civilian assistance made for 2021 or for an
average year in a multiyear pledge that may be conditional.
Ministry of Finance estimates the pledges will result in nearly $3.25 billion Donor pledge conditions are assumed to be met.
in contributions for 2021, with the U.S. providing $600 million, assuming all
Source: Ministry of Finance, GIROA, response to SIGAR
donor pledge conditions are satisfactorily met as shown in Table 2.4.27 information request, 1/20/2021.
Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan government’s
operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF. From 2002
to November 20, 2020, the World Bank reported that 34 donors had paid
in more than $12.80 billion. Figure 2.24 shows the four largest donors over
this period as the United States, the UK, the European Union, and Germany.
Figure 2.25 on the following page shows that these four were also the largest
donors to the ARTF for Afghan FY 1399 (December 22, 2019–December 20,
2020). The ARTF has received paid in and indicated contributions of $920.34
million in Afghan FY 1399, which if realized would represent an increase of
18% from the $780.38 million it received in Afghan FY 1398.28
Contributions to the ARTF are divided into two funding channels, the
Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window. As of November
20, 2020, according to the World Bank, more than $5.07 billion of ARTF funds
had been disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window to
assist with recurrent costs such as civil servants’ salaries.29 To ensure that the

STATUS OF FUNDS
FIGURE 2.25
RC Window receives adequate funding, donors to the ARTF may not “prefer-
ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, ence” (earmark) more than half of their annual contributions.30
AFGHAN FY 1399 (PERCENT) The Investment Window supports development programs. As of
November 20, 2020, according to the World Bank, nearly $5.88 billion had
Total Paid In and Indicated:
$920.34 Million
been committed through the Investment Window, and more than $5.08
billion had been disbursed. The Bank reported 29 active projects with a
combined commitment value of nearly $2.21 billion, of which nearly $1.41
United States billion had been disbursed.31
Norway Others 39%
3% 12%
Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
Sweden EU The UNDP had historically administered the LOTFA to pay ANP sala-
15%
6% Germany UK ries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).32 Since
12% 13% 2015, UNDP had divided LOTFA support between two projects: the
Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project, and the MOI and Police
Development (MPD) project.
Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
The SPM project has aimed to develop the capacity of the Afghan gov-
“Others” includes 14 national government donors. Donors ernment to independently manage all nonfiduciary aspects of its payroll
had paid in $647.62 million and pledged $272.72 million
for their FY 1399 contributions as of the report date. function for the ANP and Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) staff. Almost
Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on 99% of SPM project funding goes toward ANP and CPD staff remuneration.
Financial Status as of November 20, 2020 (end of 11th
month of FY 1399) at www.artf.af, accessed 1/13/2021. The MPD project focused on institutional development of the MOI
and police professionalization of the ANP. The project concluded on
FIGURE 2.26 June 30, 2018.
The LOTFA Steering Committee, composed of Afghan ministries, interna-
LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, tional donors, and the UNDP, approved restructuring the fund and changing
CALENDAR YEAR 2020 (PERCENT) its scope of operations on November 25, 2018. The organization has
expanded its mission beyond the management of the SPM project to include
Total Paid In: $385.23 Million the entire justice chain (police, courts, and corrections), and thereby cover
all security and justice institutions, with an increased focus on anticorrup-
tion. A new multilateral trust fund, the LOTFA Multi-Partner Trust Fund
Germany
19%
EU (MPTF), was launched to fund this expanded mission, and donations of
18% nearly $306.05 million have been received from 12 donors, led by the United
Others
11%
Japan
Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union (and without financial participa-
16% tion from the United States).33
Canada
12% UK Italy Donors have paid in nearly $6.24 billion to the two LOTFA funds from 2002
12% 12% through December 31, 2020. Figure 2.24 shows the fund’s two largest donors
on a cumulative basis have been the United States and Japan. Figure 2.26
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. “Others”
shows the largest donors to the LOTFA in 2020. The United States has signifi-
includes the United States, ten other countries, and the
UNDP that made contributions to the two LOTFA funds.
cantly reduced its support to LOTFA in recent years, contributing $1.04 million
Source: UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF
in 2018, $0.95 million in 2019, and $5.54 million in 2020.34
Receipts 2002–2020, updated 12/31/2020, in response to
SIGAR data call, 1/8/2021.
Contributions to UN OCHA-Coordinated Humanitarian
Assistance Programs
The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) leads
emergency appeals and annual or multiyear humanitarian-response plans

STATUS OF FUNDS
FIGURE 2.27
for Afghanistan, and provides timely reporting of humanitarian assistance
provided by donors to facilitate funding of targeted needs. Donors have con- UN OCHA-COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONS
tributed nearly $10.31 billion to humanitarian-assistance organizations from BY DONOR, CALENDAR YEAR 2020 (PERCENT)
2002 through December 31, 2020, as reported by OCHA. OCHA-led annual
humanitarian-response plans and emergency appeals for Afghanistan Total Paid In: $713.05 Million
accounted for nearly $6.79 billion, or 65.8%, of these contributions.
The United States, Japan, and the European Union have been the largest Germany
4%
contributors to humanitarian assistance organizations in Afghanistan since Others
UN CERF 26%
2002, as shown in Figure 2.24; while the United States, United Kingdom, 5%
and the European Union were the largest contributors in 2020, when the World Bank
international community contributed $713.05 million to these organizations, 5% United States
EU 34%
as shown in Figure 2.27. The UN World Food Programme (WFP), the UN 13% UK
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of 14%
the Red Cross, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) have been the largest recipients of humanitarian assis-
tance in Afghanistan, as shown in Table 2.5.35 Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
“Others” includes 21 national governments and 14 other
entities. UN CERF refers to the the UN’s Central Emergency
TABLE 2.5 Response Fund.
Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at
https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 12/31/2020.
LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN
UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA)
CUMULATIVE RECEIPTS, 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2020 ($ MILLIONS)
Largest Recipients Receipts
United Nations Organizations

World Food Programme (WFP) $3,152.11
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1,249.80
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 561.86
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 336.32
International Organization for Migration (IOM) 281.53
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 220.69
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) 144.29
World Health Organization (WHO) 150.15
Nongovernmental Organizations
International Committee of the Red Cross 761.15
Norwegian Refugee Council 193.86
HALO Trust 118.05
Save the Children 111.56
ACTED (formerly Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development) 101.45
All Other and Unallocated 2,922.33

Total Humanitarian Assistance Reported by OCHA $10,305.15
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 12/31/2020.

STATUS OF FUNDS
Contributions to the NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF) sup-
ports the Afghan National Army and other elements of the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces through procurement by the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and the NATO Support and Procurement
Agency (NSPA).36 The Fund has received contributions from 24 NATO
members, including the United States, and from 12 other Coalition partners
totaling more than $3.23 billion through November 16, 2020.37 Figure 2.24
shows Germany, Australia, and Italy as the three largest contributors to the
fund. The United States made its first contribution in FY 2018 to support
two projects under an existing procurement contract.38
World Bank Group in Afghanistan

The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) has com-
mitted nearly $5.11 billion for development, emergency reconstruction
projects, and eight budget support operations in Afghanistan from 2002
through August 2020. This support consists of over $4.67 billion in grants
and $434 million in no-interest loans known as “credits.” The Bank, as of
August 2020, has 11 active IDA-only projects and 18 active projects jointly
funded with the ARTF and other global trust funds with a combined com-
mitment value of over $2.24 billion from IDA.
In addition, as of August 2020, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) maintains a committed portfolio valued at nearly $300 million and its
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has a gross exposure of
nearly $114 million on projects in Afghanistan.39
The United States is the World Bank Group’s largest shareholder, with
ownership stakes ranging between 10% and 25% of the shares in the IDA,
IBRD, MIGA, and IFC.40
Asian Development Bank in Afghanistan

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has committed over $6.36 billion for
167 development projects and technical assistance programs in Afghanistan
from 2002 through December 2020. This support has consisted of $5.38
billion in grants (of which the Asian Development Fund, or ADF, provided
$4.28 billion, and the ADB provided $1.10 billion in co-financing), $0.872 bil-
lion in concessional loans, and $111.2 million in technical assistance. ADB
has provided $2.66 billion for 20 key road projects, $2.12 billion to support
energy infrastructure, and $1.08 billion for irrigation and agricultural infra-
structure projects. The United States and Japan are the largest shareholders
of the ADB, with each country holding 15.57% of total shares.41
The ADB manages the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF),
a multi-donor platform that provides on-budget financing for technical
assistance and investment, principally in the transport, energy, and water
management sectors. The AITF has received contributions of $588.97 million

STATUS OF FUNDS
from the NATO ANA Trust Fund, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, and had disbursed $314.18 million through June 30, 2020.42 ASFF CERP DICDA ESF IDA INCLE MRA NADR
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a politi- DOD USAID & OTHER STATE
cal UN mission established at the request of the government of Afghanistan.

UNAMA maintains its headquarters in Kabul and an extensive field presence
across Afghanistan, and is organized around its development and political
affairs pillars. The Department of State has notified the U.S. Congress of its
annual plan to fund UNAMA along with other UN political missions based
ASFF
on mission budgets since FY 2008. The U.S. contribution to UNAMA, based
on its fixed 22.0% share of UN budgets and funded through the Contribution
to International Organizations (CIO) account, has totaled $493.81 mil- DOD
lion from FY 2008 through FY 2020. Other UN member governments have
funded the remainder of UNAMA’s budget of $2.24 billion over this period.43
TABLE 2.6
SOURCES OF U.S. FUNDING FOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CERP

AND ORGANIZATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Multilateral Assistance Programs and Organizations Sources of U.S. Funding

DOD
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) ESF
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) ASFF and INCLE
Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF) ASFF
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF) ESF

* State and USAID have requested that SIGAR not disclose the
UN OCHA Coordinated Programs names of NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan, and have
cited various authorities that underlie their requests. State has
UN World Food Programme (WFP) IDA and Title II cited OMB Bulletin 12-01, Collection of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Data (2012), which provides an exemption to federal agency foreign
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) MRA USAID &“when
assistance reporting requirements OTHERpublic disclosure is likely
to jeopardize the personal safety of U.S. personnel or recipients of
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) GHP, IDA, MRA, and Title II U.S. resources.” USAID has cited the Federal Funding Accountability
and Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006, (P.L. 109-282), which pro-
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ESF and NADR vides a waiver to federal agency contractor and grantee reporting
International Organization for Migration (IOM) ESF, IDA, and MRA requirements when necessary “to avoid jeopardizing the personal
safety of the applicant or recipient’s staff or clients.” The so-called
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ESF and IDA FFATA “masking waiver” is not available for Public International
Organizations (PIOs). Both State andIDA USAID provide “branding waiv-
UN OCHA and its Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund IDA ers” to NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan.
UN World Health Organization (WHO) GHP, ESF, and IDA Note: SFOPS TAF refers to The Asia Foundation account in the
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)* ESF, IDA, MRA, and NADR Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
USAIDIP&refers
(SFOPS) appropriation; Treasury OTHERto the International
Programs account in the Department of the Treasury appropriation.
The Asia Foundation (TAF) SFOPS TAF and ESF
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019; State,
UN Development Programme (UNDP) ESF responses to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021, 4/17/2020, 4/9/2020
and 8/21/2019; SFOPS Congressional Budget Justification,
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) CIO FY 2021, at www.state.gov/cj, accessed 1/15/2021; Treasury,
response to SIGAR data call, 4/20/2020; UNDP , response to
INCLE
World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) Treasury IP SIGAR data call, 4/5/2020; USAID, response to SIGAR data calls,
1/10/2021, 4/3/2020 and 1/13/2020; and USAID, Afghanistan-
Asian Development Bank (ADB and ADF) Treasury IP Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4 FY 2017 at www.usaid.gov,
accessed 4/9/2020.
STATE
DICDA
SECURITY
SECURITY CONTENTS
Key Issues & Events 47

United States Forces-Afghanistan 54
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 58
Afghan National Army 69
Afghan Air Force 72
Afghan National Police 74
Removing Unexploded Ordnance 77
Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians 79

SECURITY
SECURITY
The United States has reduced the number of its troops in Afghanistan to 2,500, as of January 15, 2021, the lowest
level since 2001.
KEY ISSUES Commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan General Austin Scott Miller said on December 16 that the
Taliban’s continued high level of violence was putting the Afghan peace process at risk.
& EVENTS
According to U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, enemy-initiated attacks this quarter (October–December 2020) were “slightly
lower” than the high levels of last quarter, but exceeded those of the same period in 2019.
The Afghan Special Security Forces took on more operational responsibility this quarter, conducting the highest
number of ground operations in over a year (since April–June 2019).
On November 17, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller

announced another reduction in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, from the
4,000–5,000 reached in November, to 2,500 as of January 15, 2021. Acting
Secretary Miller said President Donald Trump had made the decision in
order to bring the war “to a successful and responsible conclusion” and to
either bring service members home or reposition them.44
At the new force level, U.S. military leaders say they can continue
contributing to the NATO Resolute Support (RS) train, advise, and assist
mission, and conducting the unilateral U.S. counterterrorism mission, while
protecting U.S. forces and Afghan partners. The order will lead to fewer
U.S. bases in the country, and to more advising being done at the corps level
of the Afghan security forces and higher, with advising at the lower levels
as needed.45
Peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban
continued this quarter amid sustained high levels of insurgent and extremist
violence in Afghanistan.46 The Taliban’s participation in the talks provides
them an opportunity to fulfill one commitment in the February 2020 U.S.-
Taliban agreement—to discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and

SECURITY
comprehensive cease-fire and complete an agreement over the political

future of Afghanistan.47 However, several Taliban actions continue to belie
other commitments in the agreement, including continued affiliation with
terrorist groups, high levels of overall violence, and attacks on major popu-
lation centers and on U.S. and Coalition personnel.48
In an escalated effort to reduce the Taliban’s high level of violence over
the last several months, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark Milley
met with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, on December 16. General Milley told
the Associated Press, “The most important part of the discussions that I
had with both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan was the need
for an immediate reduction in violence. ... Everything else hinges on that.”49
After these meetings, General Austin Scott Miller, commander of U.S. and
Coalition forces in Afghanistan, held a press conference and said, “I’ve
been very consistent that the Taliban must reduce the violence. That’s one,
because they’re the instigators of it, and that’ll bring the violence down all
around. … My assessment is that it puts the peace process at risk … the
higher the violence, the higher the risk. And I also believe that it’s an oppor-
tunity that should not be squandered by Afghans either here in Afghanistan
or the Taliban.”50
The next day, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani again called for an end to
hostilities, saying the Afghan people would not allow the release of more
Taliban prisoners, one element of the negotiations, until violence decreased.
He insisted the Taliban “must stop the bloodshed so we can talk.”51 As this
report went to press, there has been no demonstrable progress on moving
toward a comprehensive cease-fire.
Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable

United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) continued to classify or oth-
erwise restrict from public release the following types of data due to Afghan
government classification guidelines or other restrictions (mostly since
October 2017):52
• enemy-initiated attacks and effective enemy-initiated attacks
• Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) casualties, by
force element and total
• unit-level Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police
(ANP) authorized and assigned strength
• detailed ANDSF performance assessments
• some Special Mission Wing (SMW) information, including the number
of pilots and aircrew, aircraft inventory, the operational readiness (and
associated benchmarks) of SMW airframes, and the cost of the SMW’s
aircraft maintenance being paid by the United States or other countries

SECURITY
U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Security

As of December 31, 2020, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more
than $88.3 billion to help the Afghan government provide security in
Afghanistan. This accounts for about 62% of all U.S. reconstruction funding
for Afghanistan since FY 2002. Of the $3.9 billion ASFF appropriation for
FY 2019, roughly $3.6 billion had been obligated as of December 31, 2020;
and of the $3.1 billion recently adjusted ASFF appropriation for FY 2020,
roughly $1.7 billion had been obligated as of December 31, 2020.53
Congress established the ASFF in 2005 to build, equip, train, and sus-
tain the ANDSF, which comprises all forces under the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). A significant portion of ASFF money
is used for Afghan Air Force (AAF) aircraft maintenance, and for ANA, AAF,
and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) salaries. The rest of ASFF is
used for fuel, ammunition, vehicle, facility and equipment maintenance, and
various communications and intelligence infrastructure. For more detailed
information about ASFF budget breakdowns, appropriations, obligations,
and disbursements, see pages 30–32.54
Security-Related Congressional Legislation Passed This Quarter
H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021: The conference report limits the availability of funds to reduce the total
On December 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law H.R. 133, the number of U.S. Armed Forces deployed to Afghanistan below the number
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which provides funding for the deployed on the date the Act was enacted (then roughly 4,000) until
federal government through September 30, 2021. The bill provides $3.05 the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for fiscal year (FY) Director of National Intelligence, submits a report on the effect a further
2021, and rescinds $1.1 billion from the $4.2 billion ASFF appropriation reduction of U.S. forces would have on U.S. counterterrorism objectives, on
for FY 2020. The bill further requires that not less than $20 million from an enduring diplomatic solution in Afghanistan, and on ANDSF capabilities.
the ASFF be made available for recruitment and retention of women in the The report provides that the President can waive the limitation in the
ANDSF, and for recruitment and training of female security personnel. interest of national security.
H.R. 6395, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense The conference report also requires increased information sharing from the
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021: Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, on the
On January 1, 2021, the Senate overrode President Trump’s December status of the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement and the extent
23, 2020, veto of the conference report (H. Rept. 116-617) to accompany to which the Taliban are upholding commitments made in that or any
H.R. 6395, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization subsequent agreement.
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021. The House had previously overridden the
Finally, the conference report modifies DOD’s semiannual Enhancing
President’s veto on December 28, 2020.
Security and Stability in Afghanistan report by requiring reporting on civilian
The conference report had authorized $4 billion for the ASFF in FY 2021, casualties and a district-level stability assessment displaying insurgent
with the goal that at least $29.1 million, and no less than $10 million, be versus Afghan government control and influence of districts to include
used for programs and activities for the recruitment, integration, retention, district, population, and territorial control data. In 2018, the DOD stopped
training, and treatment of women in the ANDSF, and for the recruitment, producing such an assessment, which SIGAR had reported in its quarterly
training, and contracting of female security personnel for future elections. reports to Congress. Both new sections are to be made publicly available by
the Department.
Source: U.S. Congress, H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021; U.S. Congress, H.R. 6395, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021; AP,
“After years fighting them, Milley talks peace with Taliban,” 12/17/2020.

SECURITY
ASFF monies are obligated by either Combined Security Transition

Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) or the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency. Funds that CSTC-A provides to the Afghan government to manage
(on-budget) go directly to the Ministry of Finance, which then transfers
them to the MOD and MOI based on submitted funding requests.55 While
the United States funds most ANA salaries, a significant share of ANP per-
sonnel costs is paid by international donors through the United Nations
Development Programme’s (UNDP) multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund
for Afghanistan (LOTFA).56 According to the UNDP, the United States
stopped its large donations to LOTFA in 2017, after which DOD provided
$1.04 million in both 2018 and 2020, and State provided $0.95 million
in 2019 and $4.50 million in 2020.57 A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-
managed) and off-budget (U.S.-managed) expenditures of ASFF is found
on pages 93–94.
Violence Trends
High levels of insurgent and extremist violence continued in Afghanistan
this quarter despite renewed calls from U.S. officials for all sides to reduce
violence in an effort to advance the ongoing peace process between the
Taliban and the Afghan government.58 According to USFOR-A, enemy-ini-
tiated attacks from October through December 2020 were “slightly lower”
than the high levels last quarter, but higher than the same period in 2019.59
Following a meeting with the Taliban in Doha on December 16, General
Miller said the Taliban’s continued high level of violence was putting the
peace process at risk.60 Key trends in the group’s violent activity this quarter
include increased attacks in Kabul City; an uptick in targeted assassinations
Clearly, the Taliban use of Afghan government officials, civil-society leaders, and journalists; and
intensified efforts of progovernment forces against Taliban strongholds in
violence as leverage. It is a
Helmand and Kandahar Provinces.
tool they’ve used for a long USFOR-A data on enemy attacks in Kabul this quarter confirm open-
time and it’s one they are source reporting that violence in Kabul has increased considerably.
loath to abandon. We press According to USFOR-A, “enemy attacks in Kabul were higher than during
them pretty hard on vio- the previous quarter. They were much higher than in the same quarter last
year.”61 The uptick in activity includes attacks by Islamic State-Khorasan
lence. You know, we have (IS-K), the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan and a U.S.-designated terror-
been pressing them since ist organization. On January 13, Afghanistan’s intelligence service released
1 March 2020. a statement saying they had foiled an IS-K plot to assassinate U.S. Chargé
d’Affaires Ambassador Ross Wilson as well as some Afghan officials.62
-General Austin Scott Miller, RS and
Additionally, on January 17, unidentified gunmen killed Qadria Yasini and
USFOR-A Commander
Zakia Herawi, two female judges from Afghanistan’s supreme court.63
Recent media reports detail accounts of Afghan officials and civilians
Source: RS, response to SIGAR vetting, “Transcript: COMRS, becoming more anxious about the drawdown of U.S. troops as they see vio-
CJCS, US EMB On-Record Interview 16 December 2020,”
1/6/2021. lence escalating in Kabul. According to Andrew Watkins of the International
Crisis Group, “The Taliban are not only at the gates of Kabul, but inside the

SECURITY
“Sticky Bomb” Attacks Rise in Kabul City

In recent months, Kabul City has seen a rise in the use of magnetic or small, vehicle-adhering bombs (often called “sticky bombs”) by the Taliban
and other extremist groups targeting Afghan government officials, civil-society leaders, and journalists. Though not a new tactic, it is particularly
effective in causing terror because attaching a magnetic bomb to a vehicle in a city with often stagnant traffic is a quick, cheap, simple, and relatively
unpredictable way for the Taliban to demonstrate their reach into the capital while avoiding mass civilian casualties.
More than 10 government officials—including the deputy governor of Kabul—and their aides have been killed by sticky bombs in recent months,
mostly in the capital. According to one unnamed Western diplomat responsible for Afghanistan, “the Taliban are systematically eliminating mid-career,
ambitious government officials and other prominent individuals who are clearly against their hardline stance,” but not killing the government’s top
leaders, as “they can’t afford to generate large-scale furor, for it would impinge upon the peace process.”
These attacks expose one of the Afghan government’s vulnerabilities as the Taliban seek leverage at the next round of peace talks in Qatar. A Taliban
spokesman took responsibility for some of these attacks on government officials, but claimed the group is not targeting journalists or social activists.
IS-K has also claimed responsibility for some of the attacks. Retired Afghan general Atiqullah Amarkhel told the New York Times that “Kabul is an open
city—these Taliban live here and make their bombs here. … After each one of the magnetic bomb explosions, the government gets more discredited.”
Afghanistan’s interior ministry has blamed the Taliban for all the sticky bomb attacks.
Source: NPR, “People in The Afghan Capital Kabul Are Uneasy About U.S. Troop Drawdown,” 12/16/2020; New York Times, “‘Sticky Bombs’ Sow Terror and Chaos in a City on Edge,”
12/16/2020; Reuters, “‘The Fear is Intense’: Afghan ‘Sticky Bombs’, Used by Taliban, On the Rise,” 12/17/2020; Washington Post, “Targeted killings of journalists are on the rise across
Afghanistan,” 12/27/2020; New York Times, “Targeted Killings Are Terrorizing Afghans. And No One Is Claiming Them,” 1/2/2021; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021.
city gates.” He added that for security, protection of minority communities,

and other reasons, “it’s certainly alarming news.”64
The Taliban and IS-K have increased targeted assassinations outside of
Kabul as well. Five journalists were killed in the last two months of 2020,
as well as a number of civil-society leaders.65 For more information, see
pages 83–84.
Meanwhile, both U.S. and Afghan forces continue to fend off Taliban
offensives, especially in southern Afghanistan. Following recent terrorist
and insurgent activity in Helmand Province, General Miller traveled there
on December 17 to assess the security situation and meet with provincial
leaders. When asked what recent enemy activity was most concerning to
him, General Miller said it was “out of the ordinary” Taliban offensives in
Helmand and Kandahar Provinces.66 Less than two weeks later, the Afghan
Ministry of Defense reported killing 15 al-Qaeda operatives alongside senior
Taliban facilitators and fighters in Helmand Province.67
Regular clashes between the Taliban and ANDSF in Kandahar Province
since October have reportedly led to thousands of families fleeing their
homes over the last three months, similar to the exodus that occurred in
Helmand in early October.68 USFOR-A also publicly acknowledged an air
strike against armed Taliban fighters attacking an ANDSF checkpoint in
Kandahar on December 10.69 All told, nearly 200 checkpoints in Kandahar
were abandoned to the Taliban by the ANA’s 205th Corps in December.70
RS and USFOR-A Commander General
For more information about ANDSF checkpoints, see page 67–68. Austin Scott Miller met with Helmand
U.S. air strikes increased this quarter as U.S. forces provided defensive Province security and provincial leadership
support to the ANDSF, USFOR-A told SIGAR. USFOR-A reiterated that in December. (USFOR-A photo)

SECURITY
Peace Problem: Taliban Links to al-Qaeda and Other Terrorists

On October 25, 2020, Afghan security forces killed an Egyptian man of al-Qaeda remains present in Afghanistan, as well as hundreds of
known as Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf, alias Abu Muhsin al-Masri. This was armed operatives, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and groups
significant partly because he was a senior member of al-Qaeda for 20 of foreign terrorist fighters aligned with the Taliban.” The report added
years who was on the FBI’s “Most Wanted Terrorists” list. that “Relations between the Taliban, especially the Haqqani Network
[a State Department-listed terror group], and al-Qaeda remain close,
His death was also significant because he was in Ghazni Province, about based on friendship, a history of shared struggle, ideological sympathy
100 miles south of Kabul, in an area reputed to be under Taliban control and intermarriage.”
near the border with Pakistan. He was not the first al-Qaeda leader to be
killed in Taliban-controlled areas. The UN team’s report notes that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have had
strong historic links, and suggests the threat is growing, as information
Such linkages to al-Qaeda may portend a problem for the peace process indicates that “Al-Qaida is quietly gaining strength in Afghanistan while
in Afghanistan. As part of the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement continuing to operate [in 12 provinces] with the Taliban under their
that paved the way for intra-Afghan negotiations, the Taliban agreed that protection.” The report also cites Afghan officials’ judgments that other
it “will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including terrorist groups including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jaish-i-Mohammed,
al-Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the and Lashkare-Tayyiba are operating in eastern Afghanistan “under the
United States and its allies.” The next day, Secretary of State Michael umbrella of the Afghan Taliban.”
Pompeo told CBS News that “the Taliban have now made the break” with
“their historic ally,” al-Qaeda. The UN report raises questions whether the Taliban intend to and actually
can carry out their anti-terrorism commitment—and, if they try, whether
Not everyone agrees. Last quarter, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) die-hard Taliban members will defect to other movements.
told DOD Office of Inspector General that al-Qaeda leaders support the
U.S.-Taliban agreement because it does not require the Taliban to publicly During a congressional hearing in September 2020, senior DOD and
renounce al-Qaeda and it includes a timeline for U.S. and Coalition forces’ State officials testified that the Taliban have made incremental progress
withdrawal, the latter accomplishing one of al-Qaeda’s main goals. DIA toward implementing their counterterrorism commitments, but are not yet
also said al-Qaeda remains willing to abide by any agreements made fully compliant. Ambassador Khalilzad stated that “with regard to terrorism
by the Taliban in order to preserve a guaranteed safe haven in Taliban- and al-Qaeda, in this setting, what I can say is the Talibs have taken some
controlled areas. steps, based on the commitment they have made, positive steps, but they
have some distance still to go … We are in the middle of the process. The
Likewise, a May 2020 report to the UN Security Council from its Analytical picture is one of progress but it’s not completed.”
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said, “The senior leadership
Source: FBI, “Wanted by the FBI: Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf,’ audio transcript of broadcast spot, 1/8/2020, fbi.gov/audio-repository/wanted-podcast-husam-abd-al-rauf-010820.mp3/view; State,
Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United
States of America, 2/29/2020; CBS News, “Transcript: Mike Pompeo on “Face the Nation,” 3/1/2020; United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” transmitting the eleventh report of the Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 5/27/2020; DOD OIG, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020–September 30, 2020,
11/2020, p. 17.
following the U.S.-Taliban agreement’s signing in February 2020, U.S. forces

have “ceased offensive strikes against the Taliban and conducted almost
exclusively defensive strikes in support of Afghan forces.”71 The Taliban
made several accusations this quarter that the United States violated the
U.S.-Taliban agreement, alleging certain USFOR-A air strikes killed Afghan
civilians. USFOR-A denied each allegation and said it was operating in
line with the agreement, which stipulates that U.S. forces can defend the
ANDSF against Taliban attacks.72 USFOR-A also reported no civilian casual-
ties as a result of its air strikes this quarter.73

SECURITY
Civilian Casualties
RS reported 2,586 civilian casualties this quarter (October 1–December 31,
2020), which included 810 deaths and 1,776 injuries. Despite the ongoing
violence, this quarter’s casualties decreased by 14% compared to last quar-
ter (July 1–September 30, 2020).74 Additionally, civilian casualties in 2020
have decreased by approximately 5% compared to 2019 and 6% compared to
2018.75 Despite these modest improvements, this quarter’s civilian casualties
remain exceptionally high for the winter months when fighting normally
subsides. As seen in Figure 2.28, the number of civilian casualties this quar-
ter was the third highest in the last two years.76
FIGURE 2.28
RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY QUARTER
4,500
4,029
4,000
3,064 3,064
3,500
3,017
3,000
1,959 2,586
2,500 2,357
1,776
1,562 1,878
2,000 1,764 1,787
1,518 1,251 1,205
1,500 1,228 1,309
1,116
1,000 799
965 1,058
500 795 810
536 627 582
402 510
0
Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Q4 2020
Deaths Injuries
Note: This quarter’s data covers the period from October 1–December 31, 2020. Prior quarterly numbers may change.
RS updates data each quarter as civilian casualty investigations are concluded and database numbers are improved.
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call 1/6/2021, 10/21/2020, 1/7/2020, and 10/7/2019; SIGAR, analysis
of RS-provided data, 1/2021.
Most of the decrease in civilian casualties compared to last quarter is

attributed to fewer ANDSF-caused casualties (142, down by 237), casual-
ties attributed to unspecified parties (36, down by 206), and Taliban-caused
casualties (1,119, down by 98). However, this was tempered by IS-K-caused
casualties increasing substantially (234, up by 152).77
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and
other institutions continue to emphasize that ANDSF air strikes account
for a disproportionate number of casualties.78 Most recently, on January 16,
2021, a nighttime ANDSF air strike appears to have killed 18 civilian mem-
bers of a single family in southwestern Nimroz Province.79 This quarter, the

SECURITY
FIGURE 2.29 number of civilians killed by ANDSF air strikes rose by over 11 percentage
RS-REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY points, to 54% of total ANDSF-caused casualties.80
PARTY ATTRIBUTION Seen in Figure 2.29, RS attributed about 93% of this quarter’s civilian
casualties to antigovernment forces (43% to the Taliban, 41% to unknown
insurgents, 9% to IS-K, and none to the Haqqani Network), roughly a 10-per-
centage-point increase since last quarter’s breakdown. Another 5% were
attributed to progovernment forces (5% to ANDSF and no incidents attrib-
uted to Coalition forces), a decrease of three percentage points since last
Unknown Taliban quarter, and about 1% to other or unknown forces.81
Insurgents 43% Improvised-explosive devices continued to account for the majority of
41%
civilian casualties this quarter (55%), followed by direct fire (24%), indirect
fire (9%), and assassinations (5%). The proportion of casualties caused by
improvised-explosive devices (IED) increased by nearly 17 percentage
points this quarter. This correlates to the uptick in magnetically attached
Other/ IEDs or “sticky bomb” attacks, as RS classes most casualties caused by
Unknown IS-K these incidents as IED-caused casualties. Indirect-fire-caused casualties
1% ANDSF 9% decreased by over eight percentage points, while direct-fire casualties and
5% assassinations remained relatively consistent with last quarter.82
UNAMA had not issued its civilian casualty report covering October–
Total: 2,586
December in time to be included in this report.
Note: The data covers the period October 1–December 31,
2020. Casualties include dead and wounded. “Other/unknown”
civilian casualties include those caused by undetermined
elements, local militia, and/or the Pakistani military.
Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021; SIGAR,
analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2021.
U.S. Forces Reduced to Lowest Level Since 2001
On November 17, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller
announced the latest reduction in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan—from
4,000–5,000 ordered last quarter and reached in November—to 2,500,
reached on January 15, 2021. DOD said this new level is the lowest
since 2001.83
Acting Secretary Miller said that President Trump made the decision in
order to bring the war “to a successful and responsible conclusion” and to
either bring service members home or reposition them elsewhere. He called
the decision “consistent with our established plans and strategic objectives,
supported by the American people, and does not equate to a change in U.S.
policy or objectives.”84
Miller also said that American allies and partners abroad, including
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President Ashraf Ghani, were
briefed on the change. Miller reiterated that DOD’s position on the force
level in Afghanistan is, “We went in together, we adjust together, and when
the time is right, we will leave together,” a sentiment echoed by Secretary
General Stoltenberg.85 Stoltenberg said on December 1 that more than half
of the military personnel supporting the RS mission are now non-U.S. forces

SECURITY
and NATO “will have to take some hard decisions [on force levels] when If we stay, we risk con-
NATO defense ministers meet next February.”86
The 2,500-troop level is not specified in the U.S.-Taliban agreement, in
tinued fighting and an
which the United States committed to withdrawing all troops by May 2021 even longer-term engage-
if the Taliban meets its commitments. But Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of ment. If we leave, we risk
Staff General Mark Milley said on December 2 that the additional draw- Afghanistan once again
down was “in support” of the agreement. He also said any future changes to
becoming a safe haven for
the force level “will be up to a new administration.”87
Congress recently imposed conditions for further reductions in troop international terrorists and
levels in the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), passed on the loss of the gains made
January 1, 2021. The NDAA limits the availability of funds to reduce the total with such sacrifice.
number of U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan below the number deployed
–NATO Secretary General Jens
on the date the Act was enacted (roughly 4,000) until the Secretary of
Stoltenberg
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Director of National
Intelligence, submits a report on the effect a further reduction of U.S. forces
would have on U.S. counterterrorism objectives, on an enduring diplomatic Source: NATO, “Online press conference by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg following the first day of the meet-
solution in Afghanistan, and on ANDSF capabilities.88 ings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs,” 12/1/2020.
However, President Trump reportedly issued a waiver to enable U.S.
forces to reduce below the level stipulated in the NDAA. A DOD spokesman
said in a statement on January 15, “The President has determined that waiv-
ing the limitations of this section with respect to a reduction in the total
number of U.S. armed forces deployed to Afghanistan is important to the
national security interests of the United States.”89
When asked to what extent DOD had finalized the details of the smaller
footprint in Afghanistan, General Milley said Acting Secretary of Defense
Miller had approved a plan based on the recommendations of General
Miller and CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie. The plan
includes reducing U.S. bases in the country to “a couple of larger bases
with several satellite bases that provide the capability to continue our
train, advise, assist mission and continue our counterterrorist mission.” He
did not discuss exactly which bases would be closing. Additionally, DOD
reported that it has 6,346 U.S. contractors remaining in Afghanistan as of
January 2021, a decrease of roughly 1,500 since October 2020.90
On December 13, General Miller also repeated DOD’s position that the
full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan will be done “in accordance
with conditions,” adding that it was “important for the Afghan people to
understand that we have discussed this very carefully with the Afghan secu-
rity forces.”91
This is the third reduction in the presidentially authorized U.S. troop
level since the U.S.-Taliban agreement was signed. Following the United
States meeting its commitment in the agreement to reduce force levels to
8,600 ahead of schedule in June 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
announced on August 8 that he would order an additional force reduction
to below 5,000 troops by the end of November.92

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The Afghan security forces U.S. Force Reduction Impact on Capabilities and the Train,
are absolutely essential to Advise, and Assist Mission
At a press conference in Kabul on December 16, Generals Miller and Milley
the peace process. They continued to assert that the new force level of 2,500 troops is sufficient to
have to hold. They have to protect the U.S. force and its Afghan partners, as well as carry out its train-
hold terrain. They have to ing and counterterrorism missions. General Miller said at this number, the
protect the people. We talk United States will retain its ability to train, advise, and assist the Afghan
about that routinely. They security forces at the ministerial level down to the corps level and will
retain “the ability to project to what we refer to as ‘points of need,’ which
certainly have our support are lower than the corps level” using expeditionary, fly-to-advise efforts.
from an institutional viabil- He also said the ANDSF need the most help “ensuring that the proper flow
ity standpoint. It is at times of those things that field an army or field a police force, which are logistics
a very direct combat sup- or classes of supply … [and] making sure [the ANDSF] know[s] we’re still
there from an air support standpoint and able to help and protect them dur-
port role. ing combat operations.”93
–General Austin Scott Miller, According to General McKenzie on December 10, with fewer troops to
RS and USFOR-A Commander advise and assist Afghan forces, “We will have to be very careful and very
smart how we pick and choose where we go and where we don’t go. And
the margins will be less, but we believe it still will enable us to carry out
Source: RS, response to SIGAR vetting, “Transcript: COMRS,
CJCS, US EMB On-Record Interview 16 December 2020,” our core objective” of preventing terrorist groups from attacking the U.S. or
1/6/2021.
other partner countries from Afghanistan.94
This is not the first time changes to U.S. force levels in Afghanistan
have yielded a modified TAA effort. SIGAR reported in the first year of the
Trump Administration that defense officials said the 11,000-troop level in
September 2017 was sufficient for the U.S. counterterrorism mission, but
insufficient for the U.S. contribution to the TAA mission. Adding roughly
3,000 troops, most of whom would be TAA advisors, was a key part of the
administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan. Additionally, expanding the
level at which they advised was considered to be vital to the TAA mission
and to improving the ANDSF’s capabilities. The change was to move advi-
sors from the corps level and higher, at which they are mainly advising now,
lower to the battalion and brigade levels.95 Yet, despite a surge to 14,000
troops, a level sustained until October 2019, and the continued—though
reduced—U.S. advisor presence since then, the ANDSF still face a num-
ber of operational capability, capacity, and institutional challenges” and
“require” continued advisory and logistical support.96
DOD acknowledges that the latest force level introduces some limi-
tations on force capacity and on the train, advise, and assist mission.97
However, USFOR-A insists this quarter that its ability to execute and/or
oversee costly and necessary taxpayer-funded contracts to train and sustain
the ANDSF, and to provide them hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of
equipment and direct-assistance funds has thus far “not been adversely
affected by the reduction of force levels.”98

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U.S. and Coalition Forces’ Advising Efforts

Train, Advise, and Assist Efforts During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Due to continuing COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, U.S. and Coalition
personnel may still conduct only limited, mission-essential, face-to-face
advising with their Afghan counterparts.99 CSTC-A said this quarter that
COVID-19 continued to impact their TAA efforts by reducing the number of
face-to-face interactions between advisors and Afghan partners, and forcing
CSTC-A’s MOD and MOI Ministry Advisory Groups (MAG-I and MAG-D) to
use videoconferencing, e-mail, text messaging, telephone, and other remote
methods to carry out their mission.100
Pandemic-related restrictions on some CSTC-A and NATO Special
Operations Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) advisors to Afghan Special
Security Forces (ASSF) were slightly relaxed in October and November.
This allowed them to develop better rapport with Afghan counterparts and
complete difficult advisory tasks that required in-person engagement. But
restrictions on face-to-face advising were reinstated when cases rose in
late November.101
This quarter, CSTC-A’s MAG-I increased targeted COVID-19 testing for
advisors participating in face-to-face advising. To help maintain COVID-19
mitigation procedures, the MOI created an outdoor, tented meeting area to
facilitate in-person TAA. CSTC-A said MOI personnel have also been wear-
ing masks to mitigate the potential exposure to and spread of COVID-19.102
While the COVID-19 mitigation strategies have stressed some ANDSF
capabilities and reduced advisor contact, CSTC-A and NSOCC-A said they
also have the ancillary benefit of requiring MOD and MOI to operate more
independently. However, CSTC-A also said this quarter that virtual TAA lim-
its the advisor’s ability to discourage corruption and theft of supplies by, for
example, being present when supply deliveries are made.103
Additionally, contracts requiring in-person training have been delayed
but are occurring. For a training course to be conducted, CSTC-A requires
social distancing and personal protective equipment (PPE) to be worn by
trainers during the entire course. To ensure compliance, ANDSF counter-
parts are asked for photographic verification. The Afghans are also asked to
provide an overview of how the contractor performed.104
NSOCC-A said this quarter, “there was no long-term substantial impact
on ANDSF counterterrorism operational output … [and] ANASOC and
GCPSU remained capable of performing independent, coherent, and
well-coordinated operations with support from SMW.” They nonetheless
acknowledged that “COVID-19 did disrupt our ability to TAA.”105 For more
information about the ASSF’s operations and performance, see pages 63–64.
To continue providing prompt pandemic-related assistance to the
ANDSF, CSTC-A approved the use of ASFF funds for three COVID-19
assistance packages that the MOD will procure for ANA this quarter. The

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packages included PPE, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and medical-

grade cleaning supplies for ANA medical facilities. In addition, donations
from other countries through the NATO ANA Trust Fund were used to pur-
chase 280,000 influenza vaccinations for the ANDSF. All COVID-19-related
supplies and flu vaccinations will be delivered directly to the national sup-
ply depots in Kabul and shipped to forward support depots and regional
logistics centers for further distribution.106
Two COVID-19-related Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases were coor-
dinated by the Defense Logistics Agency for delivery in October 2020,
but were delayed due to limited supplies; cases will be tracked until
delivery can be made. U.S. military medical facilities have priority for
these supplies.107
CSTC-A is holding weekly TAA sessions with MOI’s Office of the Surgeon
General and MOD’s Office of the Medical Commander to discuss preventive
measures for COVID-19. Recent issues addressed include the use of COVID-
specific clinics, inventory management of PPE, and patient education to
avoid the spread of the virus. The ministries are analyzing COVID-19 reports
and data to pinpoint highly affected areas for more targeted PPE distribu-
tion. CSTC-A staff visited the medical supply depots from September to early
November and completed inventory checks of COVID-19 supplies to ensure
they were adequate to protect the ANDSF through the second wave of the
virus. The only challenge CSTC-A reported for this process this quarter was
the potential for corruption within the distribution system. CSTC-A says it
will continue to verify supplies and distribution on future site visits.108
U.S. and Coalition Forces Casualties and Insider Attacks

From October 7, 2001, through January 16, 2021, 1,909 U.S. military person-
nel were killed in action in Afghanistan. Another 534 personnel died as a
result of non-hostile causes. A total of 20,722 military personnel have been
wounded in action.109
USFOR-A reported no insider attacks, nor casualties resulting from
insider attacks, among U.S. and Coalition forces this quarter. Earlier, an
insider attack on February 8, 2020, killed two U.S. military personnel and
wounded seven. Five insider attacks in 2019 killed two U.S. personnel and
wounded six.110
AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

ANDSF Strength
This quarter, the ANDSF continued to report its highest strength since it
began using the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) in July 2019.
APPS leverages biometric enrollment and Afghan self-reporting for more

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accurate accounting compared to the prior system that relied only on

self-reporting.111
As of October 29, 2020, CSTC-A reported 305,021 ANDSF personnel
(186,899 MOD and 118,122 MOI) biometrically enrolled and eligible for
pay in APPS. There are an additional 8,152 civilians (4,684 MOI and 3,468
MOD). Figure 2.30 shows that ANDSF total strength reflects a 6% increase,
16,319 personnel, since last quarter (data as of July 25). This can mainly be
attributed to an increase of nearly 15,000 MOI personnel as a result of the
dissolution of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the transfer of some of its
personnel to the rolls of other MOI elements, increased recruiting, low attri-
tion, and efforts to get ANP and ALP personnel enrolled in APPS. Before the
force was dissolved, ALP strength figures had long been reported separately
from MOI strength figures.112
FIGURE 2.30
REPORTED ANDSF ASSIGNED STRENGTH FROM APPS
350,000
305,021
300,000 281,548 288,418 288,702
272,465 272,807 118,122
253,850 99,375 105,671 103,224
250,000 91,596 96,788
91,435
200,000
180,869 182,173 182,747 185,478 186,899

176,019
150,000 162,415
100,000
50,000
0
5/2019 7/2019 10/2019 1/2020 4/2020 7/2020 10/2020
ANA including AAF ANP
Note: This quarter's data is as of October 29, 2020. The “as of” date of the data each quarter is between the 25th and
31st of the indicated month. ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF =
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. No civilians are included in the strength numbers.
Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020, 9/22/2020, 6/18/2020, 3/17/2020, 12/19/2019, and
9/18/2019; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020.
These ANDSF strength figures include 5,956 female personnel enrolled

in APPS as of December 18, 2020. This reflects a slight increase of 97 female
personnel (roughly 2%) since July 25. The majority of ANDSF women con-
tinue to serve in the ANP (3,629 personnel), with the other 1,433 in the ANA,
286 in the ASSF, 168 in the AAF, and 440 MOD and MOI civilians.113

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ANDSF Authorized Strength Reduced

CSTC-A reported this quarter that the authorized (goal) strength of MOD
forces has been adjusted downward to 208,000; it had been roughly 227,000
for many years. Because MOD forces have been able to maintain an end
strength in the low- to mid-180,000 range, this keeps the MOD in the high
80% range of its authorized strength, so they will not have to continue trying
to recruit to a much higher authorized strength as in the past.114
The new authorized strength for MOI forces is 136,000, up from 124,626
level of June 2019 partly to provide space for some ALP personnel to
transfer to the regular ANP’s rolls. Responding to a SIGAR question as to
whether the ANDSF is manned and can be sustained at adequate levels,
CSTC-A said both MOD and MOI forces are manned at sustainable levels
given current attrition and recruitment trends. CSTC-A also said this slightly
smaller force size will meet the Afghan government’s security needs.
CSTC-A previously told a SIGAR fact-finding team that it was not realistic
for the ANDSF to recruit to the previously authorized force numbers as they
had historically been unable to meet their strength targets.115
Afghan Personnel and Pay System

CSTC-A reported this quarter that it continues its efforts to transition to the
Afghan government some of the roles and responsibilities for management
of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), which accounts for and
manages ANDSF payroll. DOD clarified this quarter that the full transition
of APPS ownership, management, and sustainment will be accomplished
when U.S. funding is no longer being used to pay Afghan salaries. CSTC-A
developed APPS to reduce opportunities for corruption and fraud—such as
fake personnel records corrupt actors used to pocket salaries for “ghost”
police—and to create better accountability, transparency, and auditability in
ANDSF payroll processes. The United States initially spent $35.8 million on
the development contract for APPS in 2016. An additional $14.4 million has
been spent since 2019, when another sustainment contract for the system
began. This brings the total amount spent on APPS to $50.2 million as of
January 2021.116
SIGAR has been tracking MOD and MOI’s progress on CSTC-A-mandated
goals the ministries must meet in order to begin transitioning key aspects
of APPS sustainment and management to the Afghan government. CSTC-A
said because the transition is contingent on several factors, a specific
timeline for achieving it has not been determined. So far, factors for
transition include:117
• establishment of an Afghan APPS Program Management Office (PMO),
which will first require the ministries to create and approve authorized
positions in APPS for personnel assigned to the office

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• an Afghan government budget for an APPS sustainment contract using

Afghan funds (APPS sustainment is expected to cost roughly $9.6
ONGOING SIGAR AUDIT
million per year)
• full MOI implementation of APPS to inform pay, as the MOD does SIGAR is completing an audit of the
• advancement in APPS proficiency, with training provided to each of Department of Defense’s efforts to en-
the ministries in the areas of user functions, help desk, and “train sure the accuracy of APPS records and
the trainers” the accountability for funds provided
to the MOD. This audit will determine
Last quarter, CSTC-A told SIGAR that MOD had authorized and was the extent to which DOD, since the
working to staff a five-person APPS PMO. This quarter, MOD’s APPS PMO beginning of FY 2019, has ensured:
office reached “initial operating capability”— which involves the office (1) the accuracy and completeness of
reviewing all APPS system changes—with three of five staff members hired. data used in APPS; and (2) the funds
Additionally, the officer in charge conducts the fortnightly planning team it provides to the Afghan government
meeting, during which CSTC-A HRM recently worked with the MOD APPS to pay MOD salaries are disbursed to
Program Manager to define roles and responsibilities required to support intended recipients.
transition efforts. MOD’s APPS PMO also completed its first train-the-
trainer, 70-day course on October 31. Recently, APPS developer Netlinks
made available training courses that will enable MOD to develop subject-
matter experts to lead internal training. Additional courses and help-desk
training classes began in November. Coalition advisors for MOD continue to
provide training, with subject-matter experts providing “over the shoulder”
support to APPS operators.118
Separately, the incentive-pay results from MOD’s Pay and Compensation
Board were updated in APPS. This involved a number of updates, from sim-
plifying pay incentive categories to improvements in hazard pay for each
district. MOD gave positive feedback about a change to the process that
managed killed-in-action (KIA) updates in APPS, which now allows ANA
corps to more efficiently remove KIA personnel records from the system.119
Though MOD has been using personnel data in APPS to inform its payroll
since October 2019, MOI still does not. CSTC-A told SIGAR this quarter that
MOI is scheduled to begin using APPS to inform payroll beginning February
19, 2021.120 CSTC-A said MOI is also still waiting for approval to create 25
new civilian positions to establish its APPS PMO. CSTC-A’s MAG-I provided
a memo to the Minister of Interior explaining the importance of approval Configuration control: applying technical
to facilitate the creation of and hiring for the APPS PMO. MOI personnel and administrative direction and surveil-
also completed additional train-the-trainer and help-desk training courses lance to: (1) identify and document the
in November.121 functional and physical characteristics
CSTC-A says until MOD and MOI accomplish their APPS transition goals, of the software, (2) control changes to
CSTC-A’s APPS PMO will oversee the system. The current APPS sustain- those characteristics, and (3) record
ment contract ends April 30, 2021, but a follow-on ASFF-funded contract and report changes to processing and
implementation status
is pending solicitation and award, and could run up to five more years.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government will maintain configuration control of
APPS, as it has since APPS was established, to maintain transparency until
the system is fully transitioned.122 CSTC-A said this quarter it will continue Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020.

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to provide oversight and management of on-budget funds used for programs

like APPS “through an enduring comptroller and engagements section.”123
CSTC-A Reports Closing DOD OIG Recommendation on Biometric Record Number Vulnerability in APPS
An August 2019 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG) audit found that MOD and MOI were not using APPS as intended to
generate payroll data (as of April 2019), with the overall finding that CSTC-A had paid $26.2 million for a system that “does not accomplish [its] stated
objective of reducing the risk of inaccurate personnel records or fraudulent payments through the use of automated controls.”
DOD OIG said APPS failed to reduce the risk of inaccurate records and fraudulent payments because there was no link between the two systems to
validate the authenticity of the biometric number recorded in APPS. This quarter, CSTC-A told SIGAR that its Human Resource Management Program
Management Office (HRM PMO) completed the final outstanding recommendation from the audit: to develop an auditable process that could be
implemented on a regular schedule to ensure personnel records have an authentic biometric identification number validated in the Afghan Automated
Biometric Information System (AABIS).
CSTC-A said in August 2020 they had begun a process of 100% monthly validation of APPS biometrically enrolled personnel with the information in
the AABIS allowing for the recurring identification and correction of records with missing biometric information, and of records containing the same
biometric information as other records. CSTC-A undertakes this process by comparing a file with all biometric records in AABIS with all properly enrolled
and slotted ANDSF personnel in APPS to ensure the APPS personnel are “biometrically verified.” Biometrically verified personnel are those who have a
matching biometric Transaction Control Number (TCN) listed in both the AABIS and APPS. Personnel who have no valid TCN in APPS, or who have a TCN
in APPS that has no corresponding TCN in AABIS, are considered to be not biometrically verified. CSTC-A acknowledges this process minimizes errors
but is not entirely error-proof.
To date, there is no automated link between APPS and AABIS. However, an early effort is underway to create an Application Program Interface (API)
between APPS and AABIS. CSTC-A said APPS is already API capable, but AABIS will also require this change before the interface between the two
systems is complete.
Source: DOD OIG, Audit of the Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System, 8/15/2019, i; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response to
SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021 and 1/15/2021.
ANDSF Attrition – Some Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify detailed ANDSF attrition information this
quarter because the Afghan government classifies it.124 SIGAR’s questions
about ANDSF attrition can be found in Appendix E.
This quarter, CSTC-A reported that overall MOD attrition was in line
with normal levels (a monthly average of roughly 2% this quarter), and that
MOI’s was slightly elevated at 4%. CSTC-A said that to reduce attrition the
MOD implemented recently approved pay incentives from the July 20, 2020,
Pay and Compensation Board. These incentives include a raise in base
pay, updated district-level hazard pay, and simplified and improved incen-
tives for special skills across the MOD. The simplification of incentive pay
decreases the number of incentive categories, easing implementation and
tracking mechanisms to ensure soldiers receive appropriate pay. The MOD
is also reviewing reenlistment bonus programs to increase reenlistments.125
MOI’s efforts to reduce attrition are focused on meeting the basic needs
of police personnel (food, pay, etc.). MOI is also working on maintaining
and improving facilities to help with morale, security, and the survivability

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of its police force. Priority areas include addressing salary payments

and logistics issues. CSTC-A said MOI’s Director of Security and Deputy
Minister of Support meet weekly with the provincial police chiefs to
address these challenges.126
ANDSF Casualties
USFOR-A continues to classify all ANDSF casualty data because the Afghan
government classifies it.127 SIGAR’s questions about ANDSF casualties can
be found in Appendix E.
ANDSF Insider Attacks

USFOR-A reported 23 insider attacks targeting the ANDSF this quarter
that resulted in 82 personnel killed and 22 wounded.128 This reflects a 41%
decrease in insider attacks against the ANDSF compared to the same period
in 2019. This quarter also saw a 30% decrease in total deaths caused by
insider attacks and a 40% decrease in wounded compared to the previous
year. However, USFOR-A noted that individual insider attacks were slightly
more fatal this quarter compared to the same period in 2019.129
Afghan Special Security Forces

The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are the ANDSF’s primary
offensive forces. The ASSF include a number of elements, such as the ANA
Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), the General Command Police Special
Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). SIGAR tracks ASSF
operations data because DOD has said the ASSF’s growing size and capa-
bilities are important both for the ANDSF’s overall performance and for
the United States to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its small-
footprint military campaign in Afghanistan.130
DOD reported in June 2020 that ASSF elements have nearly doubled in
size since that reform goal was laid out in President Ashraf Ghani’s 2017
four-year ANDSF Road Map for developing the force.131 Though they have
a mainly offense-centered mission, NSOCC-A said the ASSF are currently
operating under the authority of Joint Order 125, which adjusts the force’s
operational design to be in an active-defense posture, disrupt enemy attacks Active defense: Includes the ANDSF: (1)
on checkpoints, and reduce ANDSF and civilian casualties.132 patrolling forward from checkpoints, (2)
conducting limited offensive actions and
ASSF Operations counterattacks within the vicinity of check-
NSOCC-A reported that the ASSF conducted the highest number of ground points, and (3) consolidating checkpoints.
operations this quarter (October–December 2020) in more than a year
(since April–June 2019). NSOCC-A attributed this to more ASSF opera-
tional responsibility due to the COVID-19-related decline in U.S.- and Source: NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021.
Coalition-partnered and -enabled ASSF operations, and U.S. commitments

in the U.S.-Taliban agreement to conduct only defensive strikes against the
Taliban.133 Though this appears to be a positive development, it is difficult to

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characterize operational successes (as a quantitative increase does not nec-

essarily indicate a qualitative increase) because many of the details of ASSF
operations remain classified.
The 1,152 ASSF ground operations conducted this quarter were nearly
double the number the ASSF conducted during the same period last year
(587), and reflect a 4% increase compared to last quarter (July–September
2020). November saw the highest number of operations (393) during the quar-
ter compared to October (384) and September (375). As seen in Figure 2.31,
the ASSF conducted 94% of its operations this quarter independent of U.S.
and Coalition advisor support or accompaniment. The number of indepen-
dent ASSF operations this quarter are the second highest they have been
since January 2019, when SIGAR began obtaining complete records.134
Except for aircraft maintenance, daily operations are conducted indepen-
dent of advisors, as in-person TAA restrictions have remained in place.135
Overall, NSOCC-A said this quarter, “there was no long-term substantial
impact on ANDSF counterterrorism operational output … [and] ANASOC
and GCPSU remained capable of performing independent, coherent, and
well-coordinated operations with support from SMW.”136
FIGURE 2.31
ASSF GROUND OPERATIONS BY QUARTER
1,200 1,168 1,152

1,111
51% 94%
1,000 96%
819
800 750
53%
92%
600 544 534 525
6%
20%
43% 9% 31% 53%
400
11% 72% 11%
200 36% 57% 9%
38% 4% 3% 5%
4% 1% 1%
0
Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Q4 2020
Partnered Enabled Independent
Note: Partnered = operations conducted by ASSF in which U.S./Coalition forces accompany ASSF to the target; Enabled = operations planned and executed by ASSF in which U.S./Coalition
forces supply intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance, or other support but do not accompany ASSF to the target; Independent = operations planned and executed by ASSF without any
U.S./Coalition assistance. Percentages may sum to more than 100% due to rounding.
Source: NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021; SIGAR, analysis of NSOCC-A-provided data, 1/2021.

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ANA Territorial Force

The Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANA-TF) is the newest
ANDSF force element. It is responsible for holding terrain in permissive
(less violent) security environments. Falling directly under the command of
the regular ANA corps, the ANA-TF is designed to be a lightly armed local
security force that is more accountable to the central government than local
forces like the ALP. DOD says that some of the ANA-TF companies may
replace conventional ANA companies, where authorized positions exist, in
areas where conditions are appropriate for the units to thrive. Following a
final Afghan peace deal, DOD assesses that the ANA-TF or a similar force
may serve as a vehicle to reintegrate insurgent fighters.137
The locations of the ANA-TF’s operational and planned tolays (compa-
nies, with a strength of up to 121 soldiers) are intended to deny the Taliban
freedom of maneuver, and keep the Taliban away from urban areas and key
lines of communication and transportation.138 These tolays are currently
providing local security in their areas of responsibility, so that the regular
ANA forces are freed to conduct other operations.139
This quarter CSTC-A reported continued progress on the ANA-TF’s
expansion and the transition of some ALP personnel into its ranks. As of
December 13, there were 126 operational ANA-TF tolays, with one more
in training. This is an increase of 26 operational tolays since September
18. CSTC-A said 21 of these tolays were established to support the ALP to
ANA-TF transition. ANA-TF tolays are serving under six ANA corps and
111th Capital Division in 32 of 34 provinces. The 215th Corps, responsible
for Helmand and Nimroz Provinces, still does not have ANA-TF presence.140
Last quarter, CTSC-A told SIGAR it endorsed the authorization of an
additional 81 ANA-TF tolays for a total of 186 in order to support up to
10,851 ALP members transitioning to the ANA-TF.141 This quarter, the 81 Contested Areas: For the purposes of es-
tablishing the ANA-TF, contested areas are
additional tolays were approved and established. The 21 new tolays estab-
districts in which progovernment and an-
lished in support of the ALP transition are part of the 81 tolays that will
tigovernment forces have limited freedom
come from MOI over to MOD. The next 26 tolays to support the transition of movement and access into the district,
were expected to be operational no later than December 21, 2020. CSTC-A but the area also has an ANDSF presence
said this did occur, except for those tolays located in Kandahar, Uruzgan, that an ANA-TF tolay can align with, as well
and Helmand Provinces, where deployments have been placed on a tempo- as support from tribal and ANDSF leaders.
rary hold until at latest February 2021 due to the security situation. The final To fill the security vacuum created by the
24 tolays established will be located in contested areas. This is expected to ALP dissolution, ANDSF leaders decided on
be complete in early 2021.142 locations of new ANA-TF tolays to ensure
CSTC-A also reported improvements to ANA-TF management by MOD continuation of a local security mechanism
and the corps. CSTC-A said their recent TAA efforts at the national and with increased oversight, integration, and
corps level have focused on addressing shortcomings in oversight, owner- support from the ANA.
ship, and support to the ANA-TF. CSTC-A said they have seen improvement
over the last quarter with MOD holding weekly working groups focused on
the ALP transition to the ANA-TF and wider ANA-TF challenges, including Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.

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increased oversight and management from the MOD, and evidence of

increased tactical support to individual tolays.143
This quarter, CSTC-A saw some examples of increased incorporation of
the ANA-TF into joint operations with the larger ANA force. ANA-TF has
reportedly remained aligned with their principal tasks of holding terrain and
providing local security, and CSTC-A believes the increased integration of
the tolays has increased their effectiveness.144
However, CSTC-A also said the increased ANA-TF effectiveness has not
yet led to relieving the ANA from manning checkpoints because the ANA
generally mistrusts the ALP, even though they now serve in ANA-TF tolays
under the command of conventional ANA leadership. CSTC-A believes that
confidence in the new ANA-TF companies will increase after they attend
Basic Warrior Training (the basic-training course for all MOD personnel),
where they will be more thoroughly integrated into ANA culture.145
CSTC-A reiterated this quarter that the ANA-TF’s shortcomings are the
same as those of the regular ANA corps, but that the ANA-TF continue to
suffer few casualties from Taliban and insurgent attacks and overall con-
tribute to corps-led local security initiatives.146
Ministry Performance Assessments – Most Data Classified

USFOR-A continued to classify most information about MOD and MOI
performance because it is classified by the Afghan government.147 SIGAR’s
questions about the ministries’ performance can be found in Appendix E of
this report.
CoreIMS Implementation Improves

In 2010, CSTC-A began limited use of the Core Inventory Management
System (CoreIMS), then a laptop-based, off-the-shelf software package at
a CSTC-A-managed warehouse to manually track inventory. Since then,
CoreIMS has evolved into a network-accessible system of record to manage
and track equipment, weapons, and vehicles provided to the Afghan govern-
ment by DOD.148
Although CoreIMS is being used as a logistics automation system,
DOD said the ANDSF has not yet been able to fully implement CoreIMS
across the force. For example, the ANDSF are able to use CoreIMS at all
national warehouses and regional depots, but not at all local sites, due to
lack of technical capacity, and internet connectivity, among other reasons.
However, DOD reported modest progress in expanding CoreIMS and its
modules at some ANDSF local sites.149
CSTC-A said advisors look at several “measures of effectiveness” for
MOD and MOI use of CoreIMS:150
• completion of equipment inventories (10% monthly and 100% annual)
• inventory accuracy
• number of sites actively using CoreIMS

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• number of sites actively using the Property Book Management (PBM)

and Military Maintenance Management (M3) modules (PBM allows
for a much closer tracking of assets below the kandak level, even to
individuals. M3 allows the visibility and oversight of repairable assets.)
A CSTC-A update this quarter showed increases in the number of sites

active in CoreIMS, PBM, and M3. As of December 2, 124 of 191 possible
ANDSF sites are active in CoreIMS, a 25-site increase since September
18. This includes 83 ANA sites and 41 ANP sites. In June, DOD reported
CoreIMS being used at only 78 of 191 possible sites. MOI and MOD are
implementing CoreIMS at provincial headquarters and brigades with
independent plans to implement the system and begin training at all sites
by December 2020. As of January 6, 2021, training had commenced in
all but four ANP and nine ANA sites where security concerns delayed
the process.151
CSTC-A said inventories for the PBM module have also increased at
many sites, from the ANA corps down to the battalion and special-forces
unit level. Last quarter the ANP was not utilizing PBM, but this quarter
implemented it at one national organization, one regional logistics center,
and two provincial headquarters. Additionally, MOI is using M3 at one
organization.152 CSTC-A acknowledges that the ANDSF is far from full inde-
pendent use of CoreIMS and is not scheduled to achieve this until 2024. The
ANDSF will continue to contract out technical maintenance of the system,
which the United States will likely fund for at least the next several years.153
Checkpoint Reduction
RS has long identified the need for an orderly reduction or elimination of
the most vulnerable (minimally manned or unsupportable) checkpoints, as Checkpoints: nonpermanent positions
well as to consolidate personnel into patrol bases (the new standard fight- manned by or housing 10–20 soldiers or
ing structures for the ANA).154 police without logistics support or officer
In November 2019, the Afghan government in coordination with CSTC-A leadership.
estimated that the ANDSF had over 10,000 checkpoints nationwide, with
an average of 10–20 personnel at each checkpoint.155 Coalition TAA efforts Patrol bases: a fortified platoon or com-
in 2020 helped the ANA develop its Checkpoint Reduction and Base pany position with towers, concertina wire,
and other reinforcements, with a limited
Development Plan (CPRBD) for this year.156
logistical capability for the care and feed-
However, some checkpoints were not eliminated by plan, but abandoned
ing of soldiers assigned to the position.
to the Taliban. Nearly 200 checkpoints manned by the ANA’s 205th Corps The construction of patrol bases is now
in Kandahar Province were abandoned to the Taliban during December ordered by MOD to be the standard field
2020.157 According to Kandahar provincial leaders and security personnel, fortification for the ANA.
the ANDSF and the Taliban have clashed regularly in Kandahar Province
since October, and the recent checkpoint abandonment let government
weapons and ammunition fall in Taliban hands.158 Following the retreat,
Source: CSTC-A, response to DOD OIG data call, 4/7/2020.
CSTC-A said that representatives from the MOI, NDS, and the MOD general
staff were debriefed by the Kandahar governor, soldiers and commanders

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from the 205th Corps, and provincial and district chiefs of police. A lack of
ANDSF cooperation, 205th Corps personnel shortfalls, adversarial relation-
ships between the 205th Corps soldiers and Kandahar citizens, and the lack
of adequate fuel and personnel reserves for 205th Corps checkpoints con-
tributed to the collapse.159
CSTC-A reported that all of “the issues are concerns that MOD senior
leaders [are addressing] and continue to improve.”160
In total, CSTC-A estimated that there are now under 6,000 checkpoints
in the country.161 ANDSF still had approximately one-third of its total force
or 95,000 personnel (29,000 ANA and 66,000 ANP) manning checkpoints
as of December 2020.162 CSTC-A noted that effort is still required to reduce
checkpoints across the country. Recent planning conferences should also
help reduce some checkpoints as the ANP refocuses their efforts in popula-
tion centers.163
Ground-Vehicle Maintenance
DOD contractors provide maintenance services for ANDSF ground vehi-
cles and train ANDSF technicians under the 2018 National Maintenance
Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support (NMS-GVS) contract. The contractors also
develop ANA and ANP maintenance capacity through a workshare plan
intended to have the ANA and ANP performing 90% and 65%, respectively,
of their maintenance by the end of the five-year contract in 2023.164 CSTC-A
has said the final objective of the NMS-GVS workshare is to ensure suffi-
cient ANDSF maintenance capacity.165 As of October 2020, the United States
has obligated $787.5 million for ANA and ANP training, mentoring, and con-
tract logistics-support services through the NMS-GVS contract.166
CSTC-A continued to report this quarter that the ANDSF are falling well
below their benchmarks for the share of the maintenance work orders
they, versus contractors, are supposed to perform. According to CSTC-A,
the ANA filled on average just under 20% of maintenance work orders from
October through December 2020, roughly the same as last quarter. Their
goal for the period was to complete 80% of maintenance work orders.
Similarly, the ANP filled on average slightly more than 12% of maintenance
work orders during this same time period, a slight improvement from last
quarter but also well below its 35% goal.167
When asked the reason for this, CSTC-A told SIGAR that the pandemic
and increased attacks have prevented the ANDSF from expanding its share
of maintenance work. ANDSF mechanics have been moved to checkpoints
to conduct combat operations because they are trained riflemen. The force
has begun rotating mechanics in and out of checkpoints to continue repair-
ing equipment. CSTC-A added that while benchmarks and timelines have
not been adjusted, NMS-GVS has largely shifted to only a training and men-
toring role, except in major cities—Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif, and
Herat—where they must still perform maintenance.168

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AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

As of December 31, 2020, the United States had obligated and disbursed
nearly $47.5 billion of ASFF appropriated from FY 2005 through FY 2018
to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA, AAF, and parts of the Afghan
Special Security Forces (ASSF). These force elements constituted the ANA
budget activity group (BAG) for reporting purposes through the FY 2018
appropriation.169 For a detailed breakdown of ASFF appropriations, obliga-
tions, and disbursements, for the ANA and AAF in FY 2019 and 2020, see
page 32.
ANA Sustainment Funding

As of December 31, 2020, the United States had obligated $23.6 billion and
disbursed $23.5 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropriations
for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF sustainment. These costs include salary and
incentive pay, fuel, transportation services, and equipment-maintenance
costs, including aircraft, and other expenses.170
For Afghan FY 1399 (December 2019–December 2020), CSTC-A planned
to provide the Afghan government the equivalent of up to $725.3 million to
support MOD force elements. Of this amount, approximately $636.7 million SIGAR AUDIT
(88%) was slated for salaries.171
As of November 30, 2020, CSTC-A had provided the Afghan government A SIGAR audit report issued this
the equivalent of $727 million to support the MOD for FY 1399. Almost all of quarter focused on the extent to
these funds (90%) paid for salaries.172 which DOD, since the beginning of
FY 2017, conducted required routine
ANA Equipment and Transportation and enhanced post-delivery end-use
As of December 31, 2020, the United States had obligated and disbursed monitoring of defense articles (such
approximately $13.6 billion from FY 2005 through FY 2018 ASFF appropria- as HMMWVs, aircraft, and other types
tions for ANA, AAF, and some ASSF equipment and transportation costs.173 of equipment) provided to the ANDSF,
Although CSTC-A has moved away from procuring major equipment reported and investigated potential
and systems like High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs, end-use violations in Afghanistan,
commonly known as “Humvees”), items already procured are still being and took steps to ensure corrective
delivered to the ANA.174 actions occurred, when applicable.
On the following page, table 2.7 lists the highest-cost items of equipment SIGAR found that DOD did not meet
provided to the ANA this quarter (August 1 to October 31, 2020), which enhanced end-use monitoring require-
included 217 HMMWVs (valued at about $51.8 million), 324 units of rocket ments to account for all sensitive
ammunition (valued at nearly $9.7 million), and nearly 2.5 million .50 caliber defense articles transferred to the
ammunition cartridges (valued at over $7.1 million). DOD said last quarter Afghan government. The requirements
that as part of the revised HMMWV strategy implemented in 2017, about are designed to minimize national-
1,600 excess U.S. Army armored HMMWVs have been refurbished for trans- security risks by preventing the diver-
fer to the ANDSF in addition to procurement of about 6,000 new HMMWVs sion or misuse of defense articles that
from 2015 through 2018. The refurbished vehicles cost about $80,000 less incorporate sensitive technology. For
than new vehicles. CSTC-A reported that more deliveries are pending. All more information about SIGAR’s find-
ongoing and any remaining deliveries of HMMWVs since a pause in 2019 ings, see page 5.
have been of refurbished HMMWVs.175

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TABLE 2.7
MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS PROVIDED TO THE ANA

Equipment Units Issued
Type Equipment Description in Quarter Unit Cost Total Cost
Vehicle M1151 HMMWV (utility truck) 217 $238,500 $51,754,500
Ammunition 2.75 in. rocket guidance section 324 29,863 9,675,612
Ammunition .50 caliber cartridge 2,416,000 3 7,731,200
Ammunition 2.75 in. rockets 3,264 1,906 6,221,151
Ammunition 60 mm high-explosive mortar cartridge 5,600 313 1,752,800
Parts MX-15 turret air surveillance imaging system 2 865,800 1,731,600
Parts Vehicle engine analyzer 198 7,248 1,435,104
Parts Vehicle hydraulic transmission 208 14,604 1,401,400
Ammunition 40 mm cartridge 23,400 55 1,296,126
Ammunition 7.62 mm cartridge 1,792,000 0.63 1,128,960
Total $84,128,453
Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANA this quarter (August 1–October 31,
2020). The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases.
Unit costs are rounded to the nearest dollar except for items valued under $1.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
ANA Infrastructure
The United States obligated and disbursed roughly $6 billion of ASFF
appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, and some
ASSF infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2020.176
As of December 5, 2020, CSTC-A was managing nine ongoing, DOD-
funded ANA infrastructure projects costing roughly $33.4 million in total.
CSTC-A awarded no new projects this quarter, and completed five projects
that cost nearly $24.7 million.177
Of the ongoing projects, the costliest include an electrical-grid connec-
tion project for the ANA in Baghlan Province (costing about $9.5 million), a
new School of Excellence for the ANASOC’s Camp Commando (roughly $7
million), and one phase of an SMW facilities expansion plan for its Hamid
Karzai International Airport airbase in Kabul ($5.6 million).178
The costliest completed projects this quarter were a $10.7 million electri-
cal-grid connection project for the ANA and ANP in Kunduz Province, a $5.9
million morgue and visitor facility for the Kabul National Military Hospital,
and a $4.6 million electrical-grid connection project for the ANDSF’s Central
Supply Depot in Kabul.179
Four of the ongoing infrastructure projects for MOD elements are slated
for completion after May 2021, at which time U.S. forces, depending on con-
ditions, may leave Afghanistan.180
Regarding how CSTC-A would continue to oversee construction projects
after a potential U.S. withdrawal, CSTC-A said:

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Around 1,000 soldiers graduated from Basic Warrior Training at the Regional Military
Training Center in Mazar-e Sharif in November. (RS photo)
We are keenly aware of the need to provide proper oversight

of projects and protect taxpayer dollars. Therefore, in order
to meet our fiscal oversight responsibilities CSTC-A and
USACE have established construction verification and qual-
ity assurance contracts with local national engineers. These
contractors conduct regular and reoccurring site visits and
provide detailed photographic and written reports back to
us. This allows CSTC-A and USACE to effectively oversee
construction completion regardless of U.S. or Coalition
troop levels.181
SIGAR asked CSTC-A if projects completed since the beginning of

this calendar year were being used for their intended purposes and how
CSTC-A was tracking this. CSTC-A said, “When projects are completed, they
are transferred or turned over to the host nation. When possible, the RS
requirement owners that requested the projects on behalf of MOD or MOI
confirm that projects are being used as intended.” For projects for which
CSTC-A is the requirement owner, they said “our Combined Joint Engineers
(CJ-ENG) is the requirement owner for three completed electrical-grid
projects, and they confirm that these projects are being used for their
intended purposes.”182
CSTC-A reported that the estimated annual facilities-sustainment costs
funded by the United States for all ANA facility-sustainment requirements
continues to be $108.8 million. Of this, $74.7 million is provided directly to
the Afghan government and $34.1 million is spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan
government.183 CSTC-A said it is reducing the budgeted amount of ASFF

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that will be provided as a direct contribution for infrastructure costs pro-

grammed for FY 2021 by 10%.184
ANA Training and Operations

approximately $4.3 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through
FY 2018 for ANA, AAF, some ASSF, and MOD training and operations.185
According to CSTC-A, ASFF funds currently pay for a number of high-
cost, mission-critical training programs for MOD force elements. The
costliest is a roughly $110 million training program for the ASSF, supporting
the NSOCC-A-partnered units as they further develop critical operational
and institutionalized special operations training and build sufficient capac-
ity within the ASSF. This is followed by a nearly $80 million contract to train
AAF and SMW aircraft maintainers, and a roughly $50 million program to
train Mi-17, PC-12, and UH-60 aircraft technicians and instructor pilots, and
provide flight simulator maintenance.186
Shown in Table 2.8, just the 10 most costly U.S.-funded contracts to train
ANA, AAF, and ANASOC personnel could total roughly $430 million by the
time the current contracts’ terms end. The majority of these contracts (six
of 10) are scheduled to run into the late summer or early fall of 2021.187
CSTC-A has said they intend to continue contract oversight should U.S.
forces execute their planned withdrawal in or before May 2021. CSTC-A
said this is being considered as USFOR-A is conducting its prudent planning
for future force levels under several different scenarios, and that final policy
guidance for future force levels will be forthcoming, determined by condi-
tions on the ground, and aligned with NATO planning guidance.188
AFGHAN AIR FORCE

U.S. Funding
As of November 27, 2020, the United States had appropriated approximately
$8.3 billion for ASFF to build and develop the AAF and fund its combat
operations from FY 2010 to FY 2020, about $200 million less than the
amount reported last quarter.189 The change reflects a decrease in the appro-
priated funding for the AAF for FY 2020 (down from $1.3 billion to $1.1
billion). This puts FY 2020’s funding level closer to FY 2019’s roughly ($996
million), and slightly lower than levels from FY 2017 and FY 2018.190
As in most previous years, sustainment remains the costliest funding cat-
egory for the AAF (55% of FY 2020 authorized funds), followed by training
(32%), equipment and aircraft (12%), and infrastructure (1%). AAF sustain-
ment costs primarily include contractor-provided maintenance, major and

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TABLE 2.8
TRAINING CONTRACTS FOR MOD ELEMENTS

Contract Total Case/Contract Value
ASSF Training Program $108,000,000
AAF Aviation Maintenance Development Center 79,000,000
ASSF Training Support Services 51,000,000
National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Services (ANA/AAF/ASSF) 39,000,000
Initial Entry Rotary Wing and Initial Entry Fixed Wing Outside Continental
39,000,000
United States AAF Pilot Training
A-29 Pilot & Maintainer Training (AAF) 34,000,000
C-208 Contractor Logistics Support and Maintenance Training (AAF) 28,000,000
Initial Entry Rotary Wing and Initial Entry Fixed Wing Outside Continental
27,000,000
United States AAF Pilot Training
A-29 Lead-In High Power Turbo Propeller Pilot Training (AAF) 12,000,000
AAF English Language Training 11,000,000
Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value training contracts supporting MOD force elements. ASSF = Afghan
Special Security Forces, AAF = Afghan Air Force, ANA = Afghan National Army. Total case/contract values have been rounded.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2021; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/22/2021.
minor repairs, and procurement of parts and supplies for the AAF’s in-coun-
try inventory of seven air platforms: UH-60, MD-530, and Mi-17 helicopters;
A-29, C-208, and AC-208 fixed-wing aircraft; and C-130 transport aircraft.191
The United States has obligated about $6 billion of ASFF for the AAF
(including roughly $2.5 billion for the SMW) from FY 2010 to FY 2020, as
of November 30, 2020.192 U.S. funds can be obligated for up to two years;
$904.3 million in FY 2019 funds have been obligated (of the $996 million
authorized) and $192 million in FY 2020 funds have been obligated (of the
roughly $1.1 billion authorized).193
AAF Inventory and Status

As of January 1, 2021, the AAF had 136 available aircraft and 162 aircraft in
its inventory. The changes to these figures this quarter are due to TAAC-Air
reporting errors last quarter that DOD caught after publication and has now
corrected.194 See Table 2.9 on the following page, for more details about the
AAF’s inventory and aircrew.
AAF Operations and Readiness

The AAF’s flight hours this quarter (October–December 2020) increased by
about 4% compared to the same period last year, but decreased compared
to last quarter.195 Four of seven AAF airframes flew over their recommended
flight hours this quarter, and the readiness of five of seven airframes
decreased this quarter compared to last quarter (July–September 2020).196
Two airframes, the MD-530 and A-29, failed to meet their readiness bench-
marks; the other five airframes met their targeted readiness benchmarks
this quarter, one fewer than last quarter.197

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TABLE 2.9
AAF AVIATION SUMMARY AS OF JANUARY 1, 2021

Usable / Authorized Assigned
AIRCRAFT Authorized Total Inventory In-Country Aircrews Aircrews
Fixed Wing
A-29 26 24 17 38 21
AC-208 10 10 10 15 13
C-208 24 23 21 28 31
C-130 4 4 2 5 3
Rotary Wing
Mi-17 0 13 12 — —
MD-530 60 47 38 58 33
UH-60 43 41 36 49 27
Total 167 162 136 193 128
Note: These figures do not include the aircraft for the Special Mission Wing, which are classified. As of January 2021, six A-29s
are still en route to Afghanistan from Moody Air Force Base. The AAF is phasing out its Russian-made Mi-17s. FY 2022 is the
last year DOD will seek sustainment funding for the Mi-17s. Some will remain in the fleet to provide operational capability
until the UH-60 capability matures and the transition to CH-47s is completed. TAAC-Air did not provide data for Mi-17 aircrews
because it does not provide train, advise, and assist support for the AAF’s Mi-17s. Changes to total and usable MD-530 num-
bers this quarter are due to two combat losses and aircraft in repair due to battle damage.
Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2021; SIGAR, analysis of TAAC-Air-provided data, 1/2021.
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

As of December 31, 2020, the United States had obligated nearly $21.7 bil-
lion and disbursed nearly $21.5 billion of ASFF funds from FY 2005 through
FY 2018 appropriations to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANP and the
GCPSU. These force elements constituted the ANP budget activity group
(BAG) for reporting purposes through FY 2018 appropriation.198 For a
detailed breakdown of ASFF appropriations, obligations, and disburse-
ments, for the ANP in FY 2019 and 2020, see page 32.
ANP Sustainment Funding

approximately $9.6 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appro-
priations for ANP sustainment costs. Unlike the practice for the ANA, a
significant share of ANP personnel costs (including ANP salaries) is paid by
international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s
(UNDP) multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).199
To support the MOI, CSTC-A planned to provide up to $146.6 million in
FY 1399. Of these funds, approximately $54 million (37%) was for salaries,
with the remaining funds for purchase of goods, services, or assets.200 As
of November 30, 2020, CSTC-A had provided the equivalent of $63 million
directly to the MOI and an additional $1.04 million to the LOTFA for UNDP-
administered support of the MOI.201

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TABLE 2.10
MAJOR EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE ANP

Units Issued
Equipment Type Equipment Description in Quarter Unit Cost Total Cost
Ammunition 60 mm high-explosive mortar round 14,400 $313 $4,507,200
Parts Transmission, hydraulic, vehicular 390 7,007 2,732,730
Ammunition 5.56 mm cartridge 6,042,960 .35 2,115,036
Weapons Pistol, M9 9 mm 2,313 630 1,457,537
Ammunition Practice grenades, 1.3G 10,000 141 1,410,000
Weapons M2A1 .50 cal machine-gun 92 14,808 1,362,371
Ammunition 7.62 mm cartridge 1,464,000 1 1,098,000
Uniform Gloves, men/women 25,525 29 733,844
Uniform Shirts, various sizes 20,900 32 668,382
Ammunition Blank cartridge, 1.4S M200 424,000 .36 152,640
Total Cost of Equipment $16,237,740
Note: The above list reflects only the 10 highest-value equipment provided to the ANP this quarter (August 1–October 31, 2020).
The “unit costs” listed reflect the average costs paid for items procured under multiple Foreign Military Sales cases. Unit costs
are rounded to the nearest dollar except for items valued under $1.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
ANP Equipment and Transportation

approximately $4.8 billion of ASFF from FY 2005 through FY 2018 appro-
priations for ANP equipment and transportation costs.202
Although CSTC-A has moved away from new procurements of major
equipment and systems, items already procured are still being delivered to
the ANP.203 Table 2.10 lists the highest-cost items of equipment provided to
the ANP this quarter (August 1, 2020, through October 31, 2020). Of these
items, the costliest was the delivery of 14,400 units of 60 mm high-explosive
mortar rounds ($4.5 million total).204
ANP Infrastructure
The United States had obligated and disbursed approximately $3.2 billion
of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018 for ANP and some
GCPSU infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2020.205
As of December 13, 2020, CSTC-A was managing three ongoing, DOD-
funded ANP infrastructure projects. These projects are the joint NATF- and
ASFF-funded closed-circuit television surveillance system in Kabul ($19
million of this funded by ASFF), the ASFF-funded GCPSU project at Kabul
Garrison Command ($2.6 million), and the recent ASFF-funded Kabul
Security Forces Checkpoints ($300,000) project that was awarded on
October 1, 2020.206 CSTC-A also reported that no projects were completed,
cancelled, or terminated this quarter.207

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Afghan Interior Minister Mohammad Massoud Andarabi spoke at an event connecting

the police with religious leaders in January. (MOI photo)
CSTC-A continued to report this quarter that the estimated annual facil-
ities-sustainment costs funded by the United States for all ANP facility and
electrical-generator requirements will be $68.8 million. Of this, $42.4 million
will be provided directly to the Afghan government and $26.4 million will be
spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.208
ANP Training and Operations

As of December 31, 2020, the United States had obligated $4 billion and dis-
bursed $3.9 billion of ASFF appropriations from FY 2005 through FY 2018
for ANP and some GCPSU training and operations.209
This quarter, CTSC-A provided SIGAR an update on current U.S.-funded
ANP training contracts. According to CSTC-A, ASFF funds currently pay for
two training contracts for the ANP.
One is a $14 million contract to train the ANP to maintain its ground
vehicles, which will continue until August 31, 2021, with the option to con-
tinue services beyond that date if CSTC-A desires.210 The other is a contract
to support training MOI women in occupational skills as part of the Gender
Occupational Opportunity Development Program; the roughly $1 million
contract runs until May 1, 2021.211
According to DOD, the MOI continued to focus on the ANP’s future
role in a stabilized security environment. This includes an evidence-based
assessment intended to understand how the ANP should be structured and
equipped in a stable environment. This is part of a continuing plan to transi-
tion the ANP away from its current organization as a paramilitary security
force and toward a more traditional police force focusing on “community

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policing” and the rule of law. DOD noted, however, that “The security envi-
ronment during the reporting period did not allow the MOI to transition
from its focus as a paramilitary security focus to a force focused on ‘com-
munity policing.’”212
Efforts in that direction include reducing the numbers of the most dan-
gerous checkpoints and reevaluating the training pipeline and training
curriculum for police personnel. Specifically, MOI reviewed the curriculum
of initial entry police training to better align with a civil law-enforcement
mission. Nonetheless, MOI continues to lack institutional training that rein-
forces civil law enforcement. Furthermore, beyond early training, the ANP
also lacks an institutionalized leadership-development program at the dis-
trict and local levels.213
REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

Afghanistan is riddled with land mines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) such as live shells and bombs, according to the United Nations
(UN).214 Although contamination includes legacy mines laid before 2001,
most casualties today are caused by mines and other ERW that have accu-
mulated since 2002.215 In recent years, casualties have been reported from
ordnance exploding in areas formerly used as firing ranges by Coalition
forces. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also has
documented a direct correlation between civilian casualties and ERW in
areas following heavy fighting.216 According to UN reporting from March
2020, approximately 2.5 million Afghans live within one kilometer of areas
contaminated with explosive hazards that are in need of immediate clear-
ance.217 From April 2019 through March 2020, the Mine Action Programme
for Afghanistan (MAPA) reported an average of 130 civilian casualties per
month from ERW.218
State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement (PM/WRA) manages the conventional-weapons destruction
program in Afghanistan. Since FY 2002, State has allocated $420 mil-
lion in weapons-destruction and humanitarian mine-action assistance to
Afghanistan (an additional $11.6 million was obligated between 1997 and
2001 before the start of the U.S. reconstruction effort). As of September 30,
2020, PM/WRA had released $20 million in FY 2019 funds.219
State directly funds seven Afghan nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), four international NGOs, and one Afghan government organization
to help clear areas in Afghanistan contaminated by ERW and conventional
weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar rounds), which insurgents can use to
construct roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs).220
From 1997 through September 30, 2020, State-funded implementing
partners have cleared approximately 299.1 square kilometers of land (115
square miles) and removed or destroyed over eight million landmines and

SECURITY
other ERW such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance

(AO), stockpiled munitions, and homemade explosives. Table 2.11 shows
conventional-weapons destruction figures, FY 2010–2020.221
The estimated total area of contaminated land continues to fluctuate:
clearance activities reduce the extent of hazardous areas, but ongoing sur-
veys find new contaminated land. On July 1, 2020, there were 701 square
kilometers (271 square miles) of contaminated minefields and battlefields.
As of September 30, 2020, the total known contaminated area was 843.5
square kilometers (326 square miles) in 4,132 hazard areas. PM/WRA defines
a minefield as the area contaminated by landmines; a contaminated area
can include both landmines and other ERW.222
In 2012, the Afghan government was granted an extension until 2023 to
fulfill its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty to achieve mine-free status.
Given the magnitude of the problem and inadequate financial support, the
country is not expected to achieve this objective. According to State, the
drawdown of Coalition forces in 2014 coincided with a reduction in interna-
tional donor funds to MAPA.223 In June 2018, MAPA transitioned to Afghan
national ownership within the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination.224
From a peak of $113 million in 2010, MAPA’s budget for the year end-
ing March 2020 was $45.3 million. The Afghan government is expected to
request another 10-year extension to meet its treaty obligations. However,
according to the State Department, the extension request cannot be initi-
ated or acknowledged sooner than 18 months before April 2023—the end
date of the current extension.225
TABLE 2.11
DEMINING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2020

Estimated Contaminated
Fiscal Year Minefields Cleared (m2) AT/AP Destroyed UXO Destroyed SAA Destroyed Area Remaining (m2) a
2010 39,337,557 13,879 663,162 1,602,267 650,662,000
2011 31,644,360 10,504 345,029 2,393,725 602,000,000
2012 46,783,527 11,830 344,363 1,058,760 550,000,000
2013 25,059,918 6,431 203,024 275,697 521,000,000
2014 22,071,212 12,397 287,331 346,484 511,600,000
2015 12,101,386 2,134 33,078 88,798 570,800,000
2016 27,856,346 6,493 6,289 91,563 607,600,000
2017 31,897,313 6,646 37,632 88,261 547,000,000
2018 25,233,844 5,299 30,924 158,850 558,700,000
2019 13,104,094 3,102 26,791 162,727 657,693,033
2020 23,966,967 2,879 7,197 85,250 843,517,435
Total 299,056,524 81,594 1,984,820 6,352,382
Note: AT/AP = antitank/antipersonnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition.
There are about 4,047 square meters (m2) to an acre.
a Total area of contaminated land fluctuates as clearance activities reduce hazardous areas while ongoing survey work identifies and adds new contaminated land in the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
Source: PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021.

SECURITY
CONFLICT MITIGATION ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIANS

USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a $40 mil-
lion, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018. It supports
Afghan civilians and their families who have suffered losses from military
operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC provides
assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members who
have experienced loss due to:226
• military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against
insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
• landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnance,
suicide attacks, public mass shootings, or other insurgent or
terrorist actions
• cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting
COMAC provides in-kind goods sufficient to support families affected by

conflict for 60 days. Additional assistance includes referrals for health care
and livelihood service providers, and economic reintegration for families
impacted by loss or injury.227 From October 1, 2019, through September 30,
2020, COMAC provided 9,540 immediate assistance packages and 2,452 tai-
lored assistance packages for a total program expense of $1.9 million. The
provinces receiving the most assistance included Nangarhar ($217,983),
Faryab ($142,584), and Kandahar ($135,883), while the provinces receiv-
ing the least assistance included Bamyan ($956), Nuristan ($320), and
Nimroz ($303).228
As of October 30, 2020, USAID has obligated $26.4 million for
this program.229

GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE CONTENTS

U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Governance 81
Peace and Reconciliation 81
Mutual Accountability 88
U.S. Assistance to the Afghan
Government Budget 91
Subnational Governance 94
Rule of Law and Anticorruption 97
Counternarcotics 106
Refugees and Internal Displacement 113
Women’s Advancement 114

GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE
On December 2, in what State called a “breakthrough,” the negotiating teams of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
and the Taliban agreed to rules and procedures to guide negotiations that might lead to a political roadmap and a
permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.
KEY ISSUES The negotiation teams recessed until January 5, 2021, to consult on the agenda, and held a preparatory meeting on
January 6 to prepare for substantive discussions that began January 9.
& EVENTS
Donors pledged at least $3.3 billion in civilian assistance for 2021 at the November 23–24 Afghanistan Conference.
U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR GOVERNANCE

As of December 31, 2020, the United States had provided nearly $35.9 billion
to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most
of this funding, more than $21.1 billion, was appropriated to the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) administered by the State Department (State) and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).230
Since counternarcotics is a crosscutting issue that encompasses a variety
of reconstruction activities, a consolidated list of counternarcotics recon-
struction funding appears in Appendix B.
PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

Teams Reach Agreement on the Rules and Procedures
for the Negotiations
Afghanistan peace negotiations between the Islamic Republic team and the
Taliban began on September 12, 2020, after resolution of long-running dis-
putes on prisoner exchanges.231 On November 21, Secretary of State Michael
R. Pompeo said he met with the two negotiating teams to encourage
“expedited” discussions on a political roadmap and a permanent and com-
prehensive ceasefire.232 He also called on the Taliban to significantly reduce
violence.233 On November 23, Afghan media reported that the negotiating

GOVERNANCE
teams had reached a breakthrough in agreeing to rules and procedures for

the negotiation process. The media also reported that President Ashraf
Ghani opposed this agreement,234 which a Ghani spokesman denied.235
The following day, at the 2020 Afghanistan Conference, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs David Hale confirmed a tentative agreement
on rules and procedures that should allow the negotiators to move ahead
to start setting an agenda. However, Hale spoke of “disturbing reports” of
efforts to delay, disrupt, and thwart progress in the negotiations, and said
the U.S. government concluded that “support to the peace process must
also be one of our conditions” for continued assistance to Afghanistan.236
State, in comments to SIGAR, noted the limited steps that the Afghan
government has taken during the quarter to help move forward the peace
process, but also noted Afghan government concerns that it had made too
many concessions (such as prisoner releases) without sufficient reciprocal
steps by the Taliban.237
On November 28, one of the Islamic Republic’s negotiators said the two
teams had agreed only “in principle” to 21 articles of rules and procedures,
but disagreed on the preambulatory language.238 The New York Times
reported on November 29 that Afghan officials told them Ghani continued to
hinder the peace process, despite the tentative agreement.239 The following
day, Ghani’s spokesman issued a statement saying some unspecified views
expressed in the Times article were “unwarranted and baseless” and claimed
Ghani had “done everything possible to initiate and drive the process and he
will do everything within his constitutional powers to end the long-time suf-
fering of the Afghan people and bring a durable peace to Afghanistan.”240
Another Afghan government official appeared to blame the Taliban for
the impasse, writing on December 1 that the Afghan government had not
stalled negotiations. To the contrary, the official wrote, the government had
made extraordinary concessions to a group “who isn’t even ready to recog-
nize us as a gov[ernment].”241
The Islamic Republic’s negotiating team announced on December 2 that
the preamble was finalized—a “significant milestone” according to U.S.
Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad—
resulting in a three-page agreement codifying rules and procedures for
the negotiations.242
On December 12, the negotiators agreed to recess until January 5, 2021,
to consult their respective leaders and constituencies on the proposed
agenda items the two teams exchanged.243 During the recess, members of
the Islamic Republic negotiating team were quoted in Afghan media saying
the Taliban’s positions on several social and political matters (including
women’s rights and elections) are similar to those the organization held in
the 1990s.244 A Taliban delegation traveled to Pakistan for a three-day visit
and met with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, who called for all sides
to reduce violence to facilitate a cease-fire.245 Reuters reported that the

GOVERNANCE
Taliban delegation would also meet with the movement’s Pakistan-based

leadership during the trip.246 Videos subsequently appeared on social media
depicting Taliban negotiating team members meeting commanders and
injured fighters to discuss progress in the peace negotiations.247
During the recess, Afghan media outlet TOLOnews released what it said
were the preliminary agenda items verbally agreed to by the two teams.
(The Afghanistan Analysts Network reported that the TOLOnews list was
confirmed to them by one of the Islamic Republic negotiation team mem-
bers.)248 Whereas the Islamic Republic side reportedly had a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire and a mechanism for its monitoring and imple-
mentation at the top of its proposed agenda list, the Taliban list focused on
issues associated with Afghanistan’s future political order (including discus-
sions on the establishment of an “Islamic government,” the “type of future
Islamic government,” and “leadership”). These latter concerns are lower
down on the Islamic Republic team’s reported list, with the government
framing the discussion around a “roadmap for political participation.”249
On January 6, 2021, the two negotiating teams said they had held a
“preparatory meeting” to prepare for substantive discussions that started
on January 9.250 Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson is the lead
Following Afghan media reports that President Ghani refused to meet U.S. diplomat in Afghanistan. (State photo)
with Ambassador Khalilzad due to the latter’s raising the topic of an interim
government with Afghan politicians,251 on January 13, Chargé d’Affaires
Ross Wilson said the United States has not advocated and is not advocating
for an interim Afghan government, and that the ultimate outcome of Afghan
peace negotiations is “up to Afghans.”252 That same day, Afghan politicians
spoke on the Afghan constitution as it related to peace talks. Second Vice
President Mohammad Sarwar Danish was quoted in Afghan media say-
ing there was no need to amend the constitution to achieve peace with
the Taliban.253 Some parliamentarians also pushed back on the idea of an
interim government, while others questioned the degree to which the pres-
ent Afghan government could be considered a democracy.254
Attacks Against Civil-Society Representatives and

Journalists Cause Alarm
Despite ongoing peace talks with the Afghan government this quarter, the
Taliban carried out a “campaign of unclaimed attacks and targeted killings”
of Afghan government officials, civil society leaders, and journalists, United
States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) said. Following the assassinations
of two female supreme court judges, Ambassador Wilson said “the Taliban
should understand that such actions for which it bears responsibility outrage
the world and must cease.”255 The Taliban denied responsibility for these
attacks, saying they condemned the killings and rejected any involvement in
them, while the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has claimed responsibility for

GOVERNANCE
“The Elections Support some.256 Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s minister of interior and director of the
National Directorate of Security insisted the Taliban is responsible.257
Group (ESG) strongly The numerous civil-society and media organizations that have emerged
condemns [the] killing of in Afghanistan since 2001 have been one of reconstruction’s success stories.
Mohamed Yousuf Rashid, Since 2001, USAID spent at least $220 million on media- and civil-society-
Executive Director of Free focused programs.258 Beyond these initiatives, other USAID programs also
invested in media, such as $2.2 million in start-up funding for what would
and Fair Election Forum
become Afghanistan’s largest media company, Moby Media Group.259
of Afghanistan (FEFA). A former USAID Afghanistan mission director reflected in 2017 that
Mr. Rashid has been a Afghanistan’s vibrant and active media was one of the agency’s results that
long-standing advocate for spoke for itself.260
the rights of all Afghans Although attacks on media-affiliated persons are not as numerous as in
past years, their pace has accelerated, particularly in the last two months of
to elect their representa- 2020.261 According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, five journalists
tives and determine their were murdered in Afghanistan in 2020 (down from a high of 10 in 2018).262
country’s future. His life- The Afghan nongovernmental organization Nai reported seven media-
long dedication and his affiliated persons killed in 2020 (lower than previous highs of 20 in 2017
and 18 in 2018).263 The journalists murdered this quarter included 26-year-
contribution to strengthen- old Malala Maiwand, a television host popular in eastern Afghanistan, and
ing Afghanistan’s electoral Fardin Amini, a television news anchor.264
process is both enduring Prominent civil-society representatives have also been targeted in this
as well as widely recog- campaign. One particularly egregious example was the killing of Yousuf
Rasheed, the pro-democracy executive director of the Free and Fair
nized within Afghanistan
Elections Forum of Afghanistan Organization (FEFA).265
and internationally.” President Ghani declared these attacks on journalists and civil-society
–Elections Support Group of the representatives as “an attack on a generation” meant to destabilize the
United States, UNAMA, NATO, country and create a sense of helplessness.266 The Islamic Republic’s chief
the EU, Denmark, Italy, Japan, negotiator said on January 1, 2021, that he would raise the issue of attacks
Norway, and Sweden on journalists with the Taliban.267
For more information on overall violence in Afghanistan, see pages
50–54 of this report.
Taliban Demand Additional Prisoner Releases as the

U.S. and Afghan Governments Dispute the Attribution
of Certain Attacks
When the U.S.-Taliban agreement was signed on February 29, 2020, the
Afghan government held more than an estimated 13,000 Taliban prisoners,
according to U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation
Zalmay Khalilzad.268 According to this agreement, up to 5,000 Afghan-
government held Taliban prisoners, and up to 1,000 Taliban-held Afghan
government prisoners were expected to be released by the start of Afghan
peace negotiations. (These prisoners were released prior to the start
of these negotiations in Doha). The unspecified number of remaining

GOVERNANCE
prisoners were supposed to be released over the three months after the
start of negotiations.269
SIGAR AUDIT
On December 6, Afghan media said Ambassador Wilson told them that
the Taliban expected the Afghan government to release 7,000 additional On September 26, 2019, the Senate
government-held prisoners by mid-December.270 State told SIGAR that this Appropriations Committee issued
media reporting misreported Ambassador Wilson’s statements, but did not S. Rept. 116-126, accompanying
provide a preferred version.271 the Department of State, Foreign
The day after Ambassador Wilson’s reported comments, Afghanistan’s Operations, and Related Programs
National Security Council spokesman was quoted criticizing the release of Appropriations Act, 2020. The report
additional Taliban prisoners, saying previous releases did not achieve the directed SIGAR to assess “the extent
desired results and that some released prisoners had returned to the battle- to which the Department of State
field.272 On December 17, President Ghani escalated the matter when he told and USAID have developed strategies
an audience in Kandahar that there should be no further prisoner releases and plans for the provision of
until violence decreased, saying the Taliban “must stop the bloodshed so we continued reconstruction assistance
can talk.”273 to Afghanistan in the event of a peace
Another point of tension between the U.S. and Afghan governments has agreement, including a review of any
been assigning responsibility for certain high-profile attacks. For example, strategies and plans for monitoring and
following a November 2020 attack on Kabul University, Afghanistan’s First evaluating the effectiveness of such
Vice President Amrullah Saleh declared the mastermind a Taliban affiliate, a assistance and for protecting the rights
charge the Taliban rejected.274 Ambassador Khalilzad said the “horrendous” of Afghan women and girls.” SIGAR
and “barbaric” attack was claimed by IS-K. He appeared to chastise the initiated this work in May 2020.
Afghan government and Taliban, saying the attack was “NOT an opportunity
for the government and the Taliban to score points against each other.”275
Leadership Committee of the High Council for National

Reconciliation Meets for First Time
On December 5, the Leadership Committee of the High Council for National
Reconciliation held its first meeting. According to State, this “inclusive
body” brought together Afghan leaders across the political spectrum to
provide counsel and guidance to the Islamic Republic negotiating team with
the Taliban on the terms of an agreement on a political roadmap, power
sharing, and a permanent ceasefire.276
On August 29, 2020, President Ghani issued a decree naming 46 members
to the High Council for National Reconciliation. (This decree generated The Leadership Committee of the High
controversy last quarter with some members rejecting their announced Council for National Reconciliation
discussing the peace process and the
inclusion.277) This body, with Ghani’s former electoral rival Abdullah
upcoming second round of Afghan peace
Abdullah as its chair, was established under the May 2020 political agree- negotiations. (High Council for National
ment between Ghani and Abdullah. According to that agreement, the Reconciliation photo)
council would lead on the peace process and issue final and binding deci-
sions following a majority vote.278
In early January 2021, on the eve of the second round of talks with the
Taliban, the Leadership Committee provided the Islamic Republic negotiat-
ing team with “clear guidelines,” Abdullah said.279

GOVERNANCE
Peace Process Contributes to Uncertainty in Election-

Support Planning
In a November meeting with United Nations (UN) elections experts, USAID
officials asked about the probability of any elections or a peace referen-
dum being held in 2021. The UN experts responded that it is difficult to
predict whether the delayed 2019 elections for the lower house of parlia-
ment in Ghazni Province (which were not held due to insecurity280) or the
nation-wide provincial council would be held in 2021. They said security
challenges were the main concern, but increased domestic pressure on
the Afghan government’s budgets could also impact the ability to take on
additional requirements such as elections. Further, the UN said there is
presently no high-level political support for electoral reform as the gov-
ernment appeared primarily focused on forming the cabinet and on the
peace process.281
USAID and UN officials agreed that they need to prepare for the pos-
sibility that a peace agreement will be subject to referendum, potentially
requiring UN assistance. It is also possible that a peace agreement could be
ratified through parliament or a peace Jirga, the UN said.282
Foreign Assistance and the Taliban: Challenges

and Opportunities
Ambassador Andreas von Brandt, head of the European Union (EU) del-
egation in Afghanistan, said on November 17 that the Taliban had lost the
opportunity to attend the 2020 Afghanistan Conference in Geneva because
they failed to reduce violence.283
Despite the Taliban’s exclusion, the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) announced in December that it had reached an agreement
with the Taliban to establish 4,000 community-based classes in Taliban-
controlled areas in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Faryab Provinces,
aiming to reach 140,000 boys and girls. The agreement followed two years
of discussions with local and Doha, Qatar-based Taliban leaders.284
The Taliban reportedly wished to distribute teacher salaries themselves,
but UNICEF insisted these funds be deposited directly into teachers’ bank
accounts. The Taliban will be able to recruit school staff to serve in areas
they control, provided the prospective teachers can pass a Ministry of
Education test.285 A number of studies have found that the Taliban already
registers and regulates aid service providers in districts they control (see
SIGAR’s July 2019 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, pages
122–124, for a discussion of these studies).
In September, Ambassador Khalilzad told Congress that current U.S.
policy prohibits providing assistance to the Taliban. He added that the
U.S. Congress and Executive Branch would need to make legal and policy
changes to allow for continued foreign assistance to any future Afghan
government that included the Taliban.286 This quarter, State told SIGAR that

GOVERNANCE
since Ambassador Khalilzad’s testimony, the U.S. has taken appropriate

steps to allow for the provision of certain COVID‐19-related assistance in
Taliban-influenced and -controlled areas.287
According to the World Bank, conflict has been the binding constraint to
Afghanistan’s development over several decades. A sustained peace would
bring enormous opportunities in terms of improved access to services and
infrastructure, increased private-sector development, and accelerated eco-
nomic growth, due to reduced costs and risks of investment and trade. The
outlook over the next four years is uncertain, however.288
Critical challenges the World Bank sees over the next four years
could include:289
• providing alternative livelihood opportunities to former combatants, in
a setting of very difficult economic conditions and existing high levels
of unemployment
• financing the provision of services and infrastructure in new areas,
given severe fiscal constraints
• maintaining capacity of critical government institutions in the context
of demands for politically driven distribution of public-sector jobs
• providing services and infrastructure in ways that address, rather than
exacerbate, local-level contestations and grievances
• protecting standards of governance, human right, and equitable access
to services under new power-sharing arrangements in which the Taliban
are likely to play a major role
International experience shows that failure to adequately address these

challenges may lead to the breakdown of any peace agreement and to fur-
ther cycles of violence, the World Bank says.290
Asia Foundation Survey Finds Respondents Wish to Maintain

Existing System in Peace Talks
According to the first set of data released by the Asia Foundation 2020
flash survey, 54% of respondents believe peace is achievable in Afghanistan
within the next two years, while 34% say it is not. Respondents were asked
how important it is to protect a number of areas as part of the peace pro-
cess including the current constitution, a democratic system, a strong
central government, freedom of the press, and women’s rights. Of the areas
respondents said are “very important” to be protected, most cited a strong
central government (85%), women’s rights (85%), equality among different
groups of people regardless of ethnicity (84%), and protection of the current
constitution (79%).291
U.S. Funding for Peace and Reconciliation

In July 2020, USAID/Afghanistan made $2.5 million available for the Office
of Transition Initiatives (OTI) for its Peace Stabilization Initiative (PSI).

GOVERNANCE
According to USAID, this short-term effort will help ensure key stakehold-
ers can participate in the intra-Afghan negotiations, build awareness and
support for the peace process among Afghans, and equip USAID and oth-
ers with the tools and information to successfully reinforce peace at a
local level.292
OTI is working with a number of civil-society organizations and media
outlets to hold and amplify discussions between Afghans about the future
of the country, their expectations from the peace process, and their demand
for a resolution to the conflict. For example, OTI is working with a coali-
tion of Afghan nongovernmental organizations to hold public meetings
on the peace process. Radio and social media content will be produced
on these events and aired on a national broadcaster. OTI is also support-
ing a number of research initiatives to inform future USAID and Afghan
government programming.293
MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Donors Pledge at Least $3.3 Billion for 2021 at the
November Afghanistan Conference Despite Concerns over
Persistent Corruption
On November 23–24, representatives of over 60 countries, some 30 inter-
national organizations, and civil-society groups virtually attended the 2020
Afghanistan Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. In the adopted communi-
On November 23–24, representatives of qué, participants called for an immediate, permanent, and comprehensive
over 60 countries, some 30 international ceasefire, and a meaningful peace process with the participation of women
organizations, and civil-society groups and young people, as well as ethnic, religious and other minorities. They
virtually attended the 2020 Afghanistan
affirmed a renewed partnership to strengthen a sovereign, unified, demo-
Conference. (UN graphic)
cratic and peaceful Afghanistan on its path towards self-reliance, and
welcomed a new Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
(ANPDF II) and the Afghanistan Partnership Framework (APF) to guide
their relationship with the government.294
According to the UN, donors pledged at least $3.3 billion in development
assistance for 2021, with annual commitments expected to stay at the same
level year-on-year through 2024.295 According to the UN and Finnish confer-
ence co-chairs, donors expressed the potential for between $12 billion and
$13.2 billion through 2024 if subsequent annual commitments stay at similar
levels to the 2021 commitment.296 (This was down from the $15.2 billion
donors committed to provide at the 2016 donors conference over four years
through 2020.297)
At the conference, the United States pledged $300 million for 2021, with
up to an additional $300 million available in the near term depending on the
Afghan government making “meaningful progress” in the peace process. (At
the 2016 donors conference, the United States pledged $4 billion over four

GOVERNANCE
years.)298 The development-assistance pledges do not include the substan-

tial contributions the United States provides for security assistance.299
Donors outlined a number of principles in the APF, writing that they
established the “conditions that are necessary for continued international
support to the [Afghan] Government.”300 These principles included:301
• commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and
gender equality embedded in the Afghan Constitution, and respect
for Afghanistan’s international commitments as prerequisites for
international support
• commitment to ensuring full equality between women and men, girls
and boys, in all aspects of life—political, economic, and social
• commitment to effective implementation of the governance principles
embedded in the Afghan Constitution
• commitment to an inclusive Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace
process and sustainable peace, with a meaningful role for victims of
conflict and due account taken of victims’ rights
• a secure and stable environment that underpins sustainable economic
and human development
ANPDF II, per its guiding principles, is to articulate, integrate, and roll
out the processes of peace-building, state-building, and market-building as
instruments of nation-building, and be operationalized through a realistic
monitoring and results framework, with clear annual indicators lending
themselves to effective monitoring and verification.302
The APF also outlines a number of outcomes and jointly agreed priority
areas distinct from the principles. These include established reform targets
for 2021, but targets for 2022 and beyond are merely “indicative” and sub-
ject to revision in subsequent annual meetings.303
Presently, there appears to be no direct financial consequence if the
Afghan government does not achieve these outcomes or reform targets.
According to USAID, donors formally and informally track outcomes or
reform targets to gauge progress in Afghanistan and the APF “implies that
there will be financial consequences” if the Afghan government does not
achieve the minimum conditions.304 While specific dollar values are not
tied to the Afghan government achieving these outcomes and reform tar-
gets, many are designed to closely align with milestones in the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) incentive program and EU state build-
ing program.305
According to State, the World Bank told ARTF donors that it planned to
align its objectives with the APF and the ANPDF II,306 meaning funding may
be conditional on these targets when some of the APF’s outcome indicators
are linked to the ARTF 2021 incentive program.307
Several of the APF outcome-level targets remain vague, with many call-
ing for unspecified improvements or reductions against well-established

GOVERNANCE
indicators that donors have regularly cited for years to gauge progress in
Afghanistan. These include:
• For the Peace-Building Pillar, donors intend to measure outcome-level
progress by tracking unspecified improvements in Afghanistan’s Human
Development Index and Gender Inequality Index. Further, donors desire
reductions in UNAMA-tracked civilian casualties and the proportion
of the population who fear for their personal safety as reported in the
annual Survey of the Afghan People.308
• For the State-Building Pillar, donors intend to measure outcome-level
progress by tracking unspecified increases in Afghan government
revenue as a share of economic output, the proportion of women
civil service employees, and the effectiveness of high-level corruption
prosecution and law enforcement. Further, donors wish to see
improvements in Afghanistan’s standing in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Justice Project’s Rule of
Law Index.309
• For the Market-Building Pillar, donors intend to measure outcome-
level progress by tracking unspecified reductions in the proportion of
Afghans living below the basic-needs poverty line. Further, donors wish
to see improvements in the annual growth rate of real gross domestic
product per employed person, the real rate of economic growth, the
gross value of exports, and Afghanistan’s score recorded in the World
Bank Group Doing Business survey.310
Disappointing Results Despite Pressure to Demonstrate Real

Anticorruption Reforms Before the Conference
According to the UN Secretary-General, little action resulted from intensi-
fied pressure on the Afghan government to enhance tangible anticorruption
results ahead of the conference.311 SIGAR reached a similar conclusion,
issuing an alert letter on November 6 saying the Afghan government has
taken limited steps to curb systemic corruption, but more tangible action is
required. SIGAR found the Afghan government often takes paper or process
steps, such as drafting regulations or holding meetings, rather than taking
concrete actions that would reduce corruption, such as arresting or enforc-
ing penalties on powerful Afghans.312
Donors continue to demand concrete anticorruption actions from the
Afghan government. The Afghanistan Partnership Framework calls for the
Afghan government to carry out a “meaningful, demonstrable fight against
corruption” as a condition for continued international support.313 Secretary
of State Michael R. Pompeo said the Afghan government must imple-
ment “real anticorruption efforts” essential for stability and security in the
country.314 At the conference panel on corruption, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires
Ambassador Ross Wilson called for “vigorous public action to identify,

GOVERNANCE
Donor and Afghan government representatives prepare to discuss corruption during a

side event of the 2020 Afghanistan Conference. (UN photo)
On-budget assistance: encompasses
prosecute, and effectively punish corrupt officials involved in the taking of donor funds that are aligned with Afghan
public resources.”315 UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General government plans, included in Afghan gov-
ernment budget documents, and included
Deborah Lyons said it was “past time for those who are responsible [for
in the budget approved by the parliament
corruption] to be held accountable,” labeling corruption a “silent cancer
and managed by the Afghan treasury
steadily affecting all aspects of the lives of Afghan citizens.”316 system. On-budget assistance is primarily
delivered either bilaterally from a donor
to Afghan government entities, or through
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BUDGET multidonor trust funds. (DOD prefers the
term “direct contributions” when referring
Summary of Assistance Agreements to Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
Security aid makes up the vast majority of current U.S.-funded assistance to monies executed via Afghan government
the Afghan government. Participants in the NATO Brussels Summit on July contracts or Afghan spending on personnel.)
11, 2018, had previously committed to extend “financial sustainment of the
Afghan forces through 2024.” The public declaration from that meeting did Off-budget assistance: encompasses
donor funds that are excluded from the
not specify an amount of money or targets for the on-budget share of secu-
Afghan national budget and not managed
rity assistance.317
through Afghan government systems.
At the November 2020 Afghanistan Conference, according to the UN,
donors pledged at least $3.3 billion in civilian development assistance for
the first year of the 2021–2024 period, with annual commitments expected
to stay at the same level year-on-year. The resulting conference commu- Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, 7/30/2014, p. 130; Ministry of Finance, “Aid
niqué and the Afghanistan Partnership Framework did not include any Management Policy for Transition and Beyond,” 12/10/2012,
p. 8; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2016; DOD,
reference to targets for the on-budget share of civilian assistance.318 OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018.

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TABLE 2.12
USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS

Cumulative
Afghan Government Total Disbursements,
Project/Trust Fund Title On-Budget Partner Start Date End Date Estimated Cost as of 1/8/2021
Bilateral Government-to-Government Projects
Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Da Afghanistan Breshna
1/1/2013 12/31/2023 $316,713,724 $272,477,914
(PTEC) Sherkat
Textbook Printing and Distribution II Ministry of Education 9/15/2017 12/31/2020 35,000,000 0
Multilateral Trust Funds
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
Multiple 9/29/2020 12/31/2025 $700,000,000 $55,686,333
(current award)*
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF) Multiple 3/7/2013 3/6/2023 153,670,184 153,670,184
Note: *USAID had two previous awards to the ARTF: One that concluded in March 2012 with $1,371,991,195 in total disbursements, and a second that ended in September 2020 with
$2,555,686,333 in total disbursements. Cumulative disbursements from all ARTF awards is currently $3,983,363,861.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021.
As shown in Table 2.12, USAID’s active, direct bilateral-assistance pro-

grams have a total estimated cost of $352 million. USAID also expects
SIGAR AUDIT to contribute $700 million to the World Bank-administered Afghanistan
On September 26, 2019, the Senate Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) from 2020 through 2025 in addi-
Appropriations Committee issued S. tion to nearly $4 billion disbursed under the previous grant agreements
Rept. 116-126, accompanying the between USAID and the World Bank (2002–2020). (USAID’s new ARTF
Department of State, Foreign Opera- grant of $133 million per year is less than half the estimated total equiva-
tions, and Related Programs Appropria- lent of $300 million per year in the previous grant.) USAID has disbursed
tions Act, 2020. The report directed $154 million to the Asian Development Bank-administered Afghanistan
SIGAR to assess “the internal controls Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).319
of multilateral trust funds for Afghani-
stan reconstruction that receive U.S. Civilian On-Budget Assistance
contributions, to include any third-party USAID provides on-budget civilian assistance in two ways: bilaterally to
evaluations of the internal controls Afghan government entities; and through contributions to two multidonor
of the Afghan government ministries trust funds, the ARTF and the AITF.320 According to USAID, all bilateral-
receiving assistance from multilateral assistance funds are deposited in separate bank accounts established by the
trust funds, and SIGAR is directed to Ministry of Finance (MOF) for each program.321
report to the Committee if access to re- The ARTF provides funds to the Afghan government’s operating and
cords is restricted for programs funded development budgets in support of Afghan government operations, policy
with U.S. contributions.” SIGAR has ini- reforms, and national-priority programs.322 The AITF coordinates donor
tiated this work and anticipates issuing assistance for infrastructure projects.323
multiple public reports in 2021, each As of November 2020, the United States remains the largest cumulative
examining a different trust fund. donor to the ARTF (32.2% of contributions); the next-largest donor is the
United Kingdom (16.8% of contributions).324

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ARTF Recurrent-Cost Window

The ARTF recurrent-cost window supports operating costs, such as
Afghan government non-security salaries and operations and maintenance
expenses. The recurrent-cost window is the vehicle for channeling reform-
based incentive funds, such as the Incentive Program Development Policy
Grant (IP DPG).325 According to the World Bank, currently all recurrent-
cost window funds provided to the Afghan government are incentivized for
achievement of policy reforms.326
In September 2020, the World Bank told donors it plans to align its
recurrent-cost window incentive program with new mutual-account-
ability framework (presumably referring to the Afghanistan Partnership
Framework that was released at the November 2020 donors’ confer-
ence). The World Bank said it is also focused on having these conditions
based on actual implementation and results, rather than preliminary
“paper-based” reforms.327
As of November 2020, the ARTF recurrent-cost window has cumulatively
provided the Afghan government approximately $2.6 billion for wages,
$600 million for operations and maintenance costs, $1.1 billion in incentive-
program funds, and $773 million in ad hoc payments since 2002.328
On-Budget Assistance to the ANDSF

Approximately 70% of total U.S. on-budget assistance goes toward the
requirements of the Afghan security forces.329
DOD provides on-budget assistance through direct contributions from
the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to the Afghan government
to fund a portion of Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior
(MOI) requirements.330 For the multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund
for Afghanistan (LOTFA), DOD described its current funding of about
$1 million as a “token amount” so that CSTC-A can participate in donor
deliberations on LOTFA and maintain voting rights.331 The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) administers LOTFA primarily to fund
Afghan National Police salaries and incentives.332
According to DOD, most of the ASFF appropriation is not on-budget
because it flows through DOD contracts to buy equipment, supplies, and
services for the Afghan security forces.333 The Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provides direct-contribution funding to
the MOF, which allots it incrementally to the MOD and MOI.334
For Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1399 (December 2019–December 2020),
CSTC-A planned to provide the Afghan government the equivalent of up
to $725.3 million to support the MOD. Of this amount, approximately
$636.7 million (88%) was for salaries.335 To support the MOI, CSTC-A
planned to provide up to $148 million in FY 1399. Of these funds, approxi-
mately $58 million (39%) was for ALP salaries, with the remaining funds for
purchase of goods, services, or assets.336

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As of November 30, CSTC-A provided the Afghan government the equiva-

lent of $727 million to support the MOD for FY 1399. Almost all of these
funds (90%) paid for salaries.337 Also as of November 30, CSTC-A directly
provided the Afghan government the equivalent of $63 million to support
the MOI and $1.04 million to UNDP for LOTFA-administered support of
the MOI. State also provided $4.5 million to LOTFA in 2020.338
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Provincial and Municipal Programs
USAID has two subnational programs focused on provincial centers and
municipalities: the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA)
and Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) programs.
Table 2.13 summarizes total program costs and disbursements to date.
TABLE 2.13
USAID SUBNATIONAL (PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL) PROGRAMS

Total Cumulative Disbursements,
Project Title Start Date End Date Estimated Cost as of 1/8/2021
Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) 11/30/2014 3/31/2021 $73,499,999 $70,850,817
Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA) 2/1/2015 3/31/2021 52,500,000 48,046,035
Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP)* 3/31/2012 12/31/2025 N/A 97,110,000
Note: *This includes USAID contributions to ARTF with an express preference for the Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project. Data as of 11/20/2020.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021; World Bank, “Administrator’s Report on Financial Status,” 11/20/2020, p. 5.
Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations

The $53 million ISLA program is meant to enable the Afghan government to
improve provincial governance in the areas of fiscal and development plan-
ning, representation of citizens, and enhanced delivery of public services.
ISLA aims to strengthen subnational systems of planning, operations, com-
munication, representation, and citizen engagement, leading to services that
more closely respond to all citizens’ needs in health, education, security,
justice, and urban services.339 To accomplish this, ISLA tries to enhance the
institutional and human capacity of provincial line directorates and provin-
cial development committees to ensure that local priorities are integrated
into the national budgets through provincial development plans (PDPs).340
According to ISLA, over the past three completed Afghan fiscal years
(1396, 1397, 1398), the 16 ISLA-supported provinces were able to spend an
average of only 51% of the budgets allocated for PDP-proposed projects.341
Looking at the first three quarters of Afghan fiscal year 1399 (December
2019–December 2020), ISLA found that the expenditure rate for PDP-
proposed projects was similar to previous years, 48%. Only five of the 15

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The U.S.-supported World Bank Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project provides grants
to communities to implement community projects, such as this canal rehabilitation.
(U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)
provinces ISLA examined received their first-quarter budget allotments in

the first quarter, with the remaining 10 receiving these funds in either the
second or third quarters. According to ISLA, provincial execution rates
remain low due to poor coordination between provincial departments and
their central ministries, as well as to delayed budget allocations.342
In addition to the regular budget process, ISLA assisted three provinces
(Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Parwan) to access unconditional funding from
the Afghan government to help respond to community priorities reflected
in their PDP submissions, but omitted from the national budget. For Afghan
fiscal year 1398 (December 2018–December 2019), ISLA found that the
experiences of these three provinces differed. Nangarhar had 14 approved
projects and executed 32% of its allocated funds. Funds for four of these
projects were not provided, while the remaining projects were either
completed or still being implemented. Kandahar proposed fewer projects
(construction of a hospital for Spin Boldak district, a basic health center in
Kandahar City, an industrial park, and 30 greenhouses in 10 districts), with
all completed and 98% of allocated funds executed. Parwan proposed eight
development projects, but no funds were actually transferred and no proj-
ects were implemented.343
Since ISLA began in 2015, the program has provided 222 youths with
internships of at least six months in duration at province government
offices.344 In December 2019, 176 of these interns had their internship rec-
ognized as equivalent to one year’s work experience with the government,
reportedly the first time the Afghan government extended such recogni-
tion to an externally sponsored internship program. Over the past year,
20 ISLA interns have found employment with the Afghan government or
private employers.345

GOVERNANCE
Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience

The objective of the $74 million SHAHAR program is to create well-gov-
erned, fiscally sustainable Afghan municipalities capable of meeting the
needs of a growing urban population. SHAHAR partners with municipalities
to deliver capacity-building for outreach and citizen consultation, improved
revenue forecasting and generation, and budget formulation and execution,
among other things.346
As of September 2020, SHAHAR reported that 6% of the 10,479 munici-
pal employees in the 15 cities the program tracks are female. Maimanah
Municipality in Faryab Province had the largest share of female employees
(17%) while Lashkar Gah City in Helmand Province had only one female
employee out of 90 total staff.347
SHAHAR recently assisted its partner municipalities in conducting the
“National Urban Culture Campaign.” These municipalities distributed post-
ers and video discs to government and nongovernmental organizations. The
campaign aimed to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the national
government and demonstrate to local citizens the benefits of peace and
public participation in urban governance.348
Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project

In October 2018, USAID began contributing a portion of its ARTF funds
($34 million of its $300 million contribution) specifically to the Citizens’
Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP). The Afghan government said CCAP,
which began in 2016, is the centerpiece of its national inclusive develop-
ment strategy for rural and urban areas. CCAP works through Community
Development Councils (CDCs) to implement community projects. CCAP
defines a suite of minimum basic services for each local covering health,
education, and their choice of an infrastructure investment (such as road
access, electricity, or small-scale irrigation for rural communities).349
Both the World Bank and Afghan government have proposed expand-
ing CCAP in the event of peace.350 In November 2020, the World Bank
proposed to donors that CCAP initiate peace pilots involving local con-
flict analyses, local-level peace dialogues, peace grants, and conflict and
dispute-resolution training activities.351 The proposal includes $10 million
for 300 rural CDCs in Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman Provinces (secu-
rity permitting) and $9 million for 75 new urban CDCs in Jalalabad City in
Nangarhar Province. Unlike the normal CCAP process, the implementation
for the rural peace pilot would not involve facilitating partners. Instead,
the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development would fully imple-
ment the program in rural areas, the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance would be solely responsible for a portion of the urban sites,
and nongovernmental facilitating partners would implement the remainder.
These peace pilots target areas where the Afghan government regained con-
trol from antigovernment forces.352

GOVERNANCE
The APF target for rolling out the CCAP peace pilot to 300 communities
is 2022.353
RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION

Summary of Rule-of-Law and Anticorruption Programs
As shown in Table 2.14, the United States supports a number of active rule-
of-law and anticorruption programs in Afghanistan.
TABLE 2.14
RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAMS

Cumulative
Total Disbursements,
Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) 4/18/2016 4/17/2021 $68,163,468 $38,875,409
Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT) 8/23/2017 8/22/2022 31,986,588 11,110,865
Corrections System Support Program (OASIS CSSP) Option Year 2* 6/1/2018 5/31/2022 17,754,251 13,669,296
Justice Sector Support Program OASIS Contract* 8/28/2017 8/27/2022 45,514,200 36,658,885
Transferring Professional Development Capacity (TPDC)* 8/31/2020 8/31/2023 8,499,902 8,499,902
Note: *Disbursements as of 12/16/2020.
Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021.
Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability

and Transparency (AMANAT)
In August 2017, USAID awarded the contract for Afghanistan’s Measure
for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT) program to support the
Afghan government’s efforts to reduce and prevent corruption in govern-
ment public services.354 According to USAID, AMANAT supports select
Afghan government institutions with technical assistance to plan for and
implement recommended procedural reforms.355
In September 2020, the program was modified to remove certain
anticorruption-related program tasks, such as conducting vulnerability-
to-corruption assessments of Afghan government bodies and assisting
Afghan government institutions to self-identify their corruption risks.
In lieu of these anticorruption tasks, AMANAT is now tasked with
assisting the Access to Information Commission (AIC) in the imple-
mentation of the Access to Information Law.356 On December 14, the
AMANAT program and the AIC signed a letter of agreement to facilitate
capacity-building activities.357
According to USAID, access to information enables citizens to exercise
their voice and to monitor and hold government to account. Afghanistan’s
Access to Information Law came into effect in 2014, and its implementa-
tion and enforcement has been challenging. Each Afghan government

GOVERNANCE
entity should have a department or section in charge of providing informa-

tion to those who request it. Complaints regarding lack of cooperation or
transparency should be submitted in writing to the entity in question. If the
complaints are not addressed within three days, the applicant can send the
complaints to the AIC. Created in January 2019, the AIC oversees the imple-
mentation of the law, disseminates information about it to the public, and
handles complaints.358
In the latest AMANAT-issued corruption-vulnerability assessment of the
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), corruption reportedly flourished dur-
ing the COVID-19 crisis. One of the most often cited examples relates to
contractors making payments throughout the procurement and payment
processes. Contractors pay hospital staffs to get the contract, pay each
member of the hospital team that inspects and approves the goods being
delivered, and pay officials involved in processing their payments.359
Over the past year, AMANAT assisted four ministries to develop their
internal auditing capacity, whereby they identified corruption. The internal-
audit department of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations found fraud
involving land distribution in Ghazni Province. The case was referred to the
Attorney General’s Office. Auditors with the MOPH uncovered fraud in four
provinces involving contracts for medical equipment, public construction,
and information-technology equipment. Within the Ministry for Martyrs and
Disabled Affairs, auditors found employees had created ghost beneficiaries
in order to receive payments of $1.9 million.360
Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP)

State’s Justice Sector Support Program is the largest rule-of-law program
in Afghanistan. JSSP was established in 2005 to provide capacity-building
support to the Afghan justice system through training, mentoring, and advi-
sory services. The current JSSP contract began in August 2017 and has an
estimated cost of $45.5 million. The previous JSSP contract, which began in
2010, cost $280 million.361
JSSP provides technical assistance to Afghan justice-sector institutions
to: (1) build the capacity of justice institutions to be professional, transpar-
ent, and accountable; (2) assist the development of statutes that are clearly
drafted, constitutional, and the product of effective, consultative drafting
processes; and (3) support the case-management system so that Afghan jus-
tice institutions work in a harmonized and interlinked manner, and resolve
cases in a transparent and legally sufficient manner.362
JSSP advises various Afghan government offices on how to use its Case
Management System (CMS). CMS is an online database that tracks the
status of criminal and civil cases in Afghanistan, across all criminal justice
institutions, from the moment a case is initiated to the end of confine-
ment.363 In September 2020, the Afghan government finalized a regulation

GOVERNANCE
making the CMS the national system of record, requiring all justice-sector
institutions to use it.364
As of November 15, 2020, the CMS contained 550,452 criminal and
123,798 civil case records.365 Ministry of Justice (MOJ) CMS operators
reported that unreliable electricity and slow internet connections are major
challenges for CMS users.366 According to JSSP program reporting, Afghan
government justice officials in areas that lack internet access still use paper
forms when recording information; such records are later entered into CMS
by operators working at sites with internet access.367
According to State, COVID-19-related challenges delayed numerous JSSP
meetings and trainings until October and November. In late November,
COVID-19 cases began to rise again, and some Afghan program staff who
went back to their offices returned to teleworking.368
Assistance for the Development of Afghan Legal Access

and Transparency (ADALAT)
In April 2016, USAID launched the $68 million Assistance for the
Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) pro-
gram. ADALAT aims to (1) increase the effectiveness and reach of the
formal justice sector, (2) strengthen the linkages between the formal and
traditional justice sectors, and (3) increase “citizen demand for quality
legal services.”369 ADALAT collaborates with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
Department of the Huquq (“rights”). Huquq offices provide citizens the
opportunity to settle civil cases within the formal system before beginning
a potentially more involved court case.370 ADALAT’s efforts to increase
demand for quality legal services includes providing grants to civil-society
organizations to promote legal awareness and legal rights, and to private
universities to prepare future “practical problem-solvers” within formal and
traditional dispute-resolution institutions.371
To date, ADALAT has trained 326 Huquq professional service providers
on subjects practically related to their field, including family law, media-
tion, inheritance law, commercial law, and contracts, debts, property law.
According to ADALAT, on average, the trainees saw a 63% increase in test
scores following the training.372
Transferring Professional Development Capacity (TPDC)

In August 2020, State began the Transferring Professional Development
Capacity (TPDC) program, a follow-up of their Continuing Professional
Development Support (CPDS) program that ended the same month. CPDS
was itself a follow-on to the 2013–2016 Justice Training Transition Program.
All three programs have used the same implementing partner. The new
TPDC program continues efforts to build the capacity of Afghan justice
institutions to provide continuing professional development to their staff,
with a special emphasis on the revised penal code.373 CPDS reported that it

GOVERNANCE
helped Afghan justice institutions deliver 149 penal-code trainings, observ-

ing an average 28% increase in test scores across the 3,332 trainees.374 (In
2019, there were 6,909 mid- and senior-level employees working for the
AGO, MOJ, and the Supreme Court.375)
The new program, similar to the preceding CPDS, aims to enable Afghan
justice institutions to independently conduct needs assessments, develop
training curricula, deliver train-the-trainer courses, and monitor their train-
ing impact. TPDC partners with the professional training departments of
these justice organizations to develop their long-term departmental strate-
gies, and enable them to manage their training-related human resources,
procurement, and budgeting needs.376
Corrections System Support Program (CSSP)

State’s Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) provides mentoring
and advising support, training assistance, leadership capacity-building ini-
tiatives, infrastructure assistance, and nationwide case management for
correctional facilities.377 As of October 2020, CSSP employed 113 advisors
who assisted 405 Afghan prison authority advisees. These advisors primar-
ily supported case-management efforts, such as reviewing case files and
identifying inmates either eligible for release or who had not yet made their
mandated court appearance.378
As of November 30, 2020, the latest date for which adult prison popula-
tion data is available, the Office of Prison Affairs (OPA) was incarcerating
22,346 males and 486 females (down from 23,201 males and 514 females as
of July 30, 2020). This OPA total does not include detainees held by other
Afghan governmental organizations, for which INL has no data. According
to State, since June 2020, the Afghan government has not released any
more prisoners to prevent the spread of COVID‐19.379 Between mid-July
and September 2020, the UN Secretary-General said no prisons reported
any new cases of COVID-19 among prisoners or staff (though there may be
under reporting due to limited testing).380
Continued prison overcrowding and reduced disinfection efforts have
increased the risk of a second COVID-19 outbreak, the UN Secretary-
General reported. As of October 2020, approximately two-thirds of prisons
operated above full capacity. Further, many prisons appear to be unpre-
pared for a possible second wave of the disease.381
State also observed prison overcrowding this quarter, describing it
as “a persistent, substantial, and wide‐spread problem” affecting OPA-
managed male prison facilities. As of December 2020, State estimated that
55% of male prison facilities exceeded International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) recommended standards.382 Whereas the UN reported that
women are held in “overcrowded conditions” at Pul-e Charkhi Prison,383
State reported that no OPA-managed female prisoners exceed ICRC-
recommended capacity. Overall, State says that the male prison population

GOVERNANCE
is 28% over total prison capacity, whereas the female prison population is
only 25% of total capacity.384
From October 1 to December 7, 2020, State learned of 10 major internal-
security incidents affecting civilian prisons in Afghanistan. Of these 10
incidents, five were hunger strikes and five were protests or riots. Half of
the incidents related to prisoner transfers, with prisoners either request-
ing a transfer or protesting a planned transfer (both to other facilities and
within cell blocks at their facility). Of the remaining incidents, one riot was
a protest against a major search of the facility, one was a protest because
the prisoners were not released under a presidential decree, one was a pro-
test of the duration of their prison sentences, one was a demand by national
security threat inmates to repatriate to their home countries, and one was a
protest against the transfer of the prison commander to another facility.385
Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K)-affiliated prisoners were
among those leading some, but not most, prison disturbances. In one
October incident, 126 IS-K-affiliated prisoners held a hunger strike demand-
ing to be transferred from the Kabul Detention Facility to Pul-e Charkhi
Prison after their convictions were upheld on appeal. In the same month,
Taliban-affiliated prisoners in Nimroz Province barricaded themselves in
their cellblock to protest the Afghan government’s decision to transfer
national-security-threat prisoners to Pul-e Charkhi Prison.386
A number of detained IS-K-affiliated families pose unique challenges,
prompting State to coordinate a broader response. Following military
defeats in late 2019 and early 2020, many IS‐K fighters and their families
surrendered to Afghan government forces. Approximately 135 women and
275 children, mostly foreign citizens, are held in the Kabul Female Prison
and Detention Center.387 According to the UN Secretary-General, many of
the IS-K-affiliated prisoners have been held in pretrial detention for almost
a year.388
State was unable to provide the typical support it offers to incarcerated
women and children due to concerns with providing material support to
known terrorist affiliates. Following discussions in November 2020, ICRC
and UNICEF agreed to work with State to develop long-term solutions for
individual IS-K-affiliated prisoners, including potential prisoner repatriation
to their home countries.389
Anticorruption
According to the latest Asia Foundation survey results, 85% of respondents
surveyed in 2020 reported that corruption was a major problem in their
daily life, and 95% said it was a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole.390
The Afghan government’s anticorruption strategy expired in December
2019.391 In September, donors expressed several concerns with the draft of a
new strategy in comments they shared with the Afghan government, including:

GOVERNANCE
A mural painted by the group ArtLords on one of Kabul’s ubiquitous blast walls calls out corruption. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)
• The draft displayed insufficient candor regarding the Afghan

government’s achievements on anticorruption. For example, donors
wrote that “it is disingenuous to hail efforts to prosecute high-level
officials when many of those culpable have gone unpunished, and when
the former [chief executive officer] of Kabul Bank was granted early
release last year.”392
• The draft lacks a “theory of change” linking the Afghan government’s
proposed “low-level benchmarks” to the broader outcome of reducing
corruption.393 Donors appreciated that the Afghan government wrote
that anticorruption strategies tend to propose a large number of
discrete actions which, while useful, lack an overarching rationale that
explains how they fit together. However, they complained that the draft
strategy “turned into wish lists in their own right.”394
• The draft strategy paid insufficient attention to “the impact of
corruption on the everyday lives of citizens, whether through policy
or in access to services, and particularly on those least protected by
patronage, and the most vulnerable among them, including women.”
Donors called on the Afghan government to increase recruitment of
women into the civil service and in key senior positions and pay more
attention to the accessibility of services to women, claiming these
measures will reduce women’s vulnerability to corruption.395
In June 2020, the UN expressed concern at the government’s failure

to establish the Anticorruption Commission called for in the 2017/2018
anticorruption strategy.396 On November 12, President Ghani announced
the appointment of the five commissioners (including two women) to the

GOVERNANCE
Anticorruption Commission, thus finalizing the establishment of anticor-

ruption institutions. The framework for anticorruption legislation, however,
SIGAR AUDIT AND ALERT LETTER
remained incomplete, the UN reported. The Office of the Ombudsperson
continued to operate without a confirmed legal basis.397 S. Rept. 116-126, accompanying the
On October 6, the lower house of parliament rejected the anticorruption Department of State, Foreign Opera-
law, which had been enacted in September 2018 by presidential legislative tions, and Related Programs Appro-
decree. The lower house argued that the process through which the law priations Act, 2020, directed SIGAR to
was enacted was irregular. On November 1, the upper house of parliament assess “the Government of Afghani-
approved the law, with amendments. The law remains in force pending a stan’s implementation, resourcing, and
decision of a joint committee of both houses.398 administration of the ‘Afghanistan
Donors called for a functionally independent Anticorruption Commission National Strategy for Combating
to be operational, with sufficient resources, by June 2021, making this one Corruption,’ including whether such
of the 2021 targets in the APF. For 2024, donors hope that the commission government is making progress toward
will have conducted at least 15 independent, objective, and evidence-based achieving its anti-corruption objec-
evaluations on high-level institutional processes vulnerable to abuse, and on tives, addressing impunity of powerful
organizational cultures enabling corruption, and that these evaluations will individuals, and meeting international
have resulted in effective reform.399 commitments.” SIGAR has initiated this
work and anticipates issuing a public
Anti-Corruption Justice Center report in 2021.
In May 2016, President Ghani announced the establishment of a special- On November 6, 2020, SIGAR issued
ized anticorruption court, the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC). At an alert letter saying the Afghan govern-
the ACJC, elements of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) investigators, ment has taken limited steps to curb
AGO prosecutors, and judges work to combat serious corruption. The systemic corruption, but more tangible
ACJC’s jurisdiction covers major corruption cases in any province involv- action is required. The Afghan govern-
ing senior officials (up to the deputy minister), generals and colonels, or ment often takes paper or process
cases involving substantial monetary losses. Substantial losses are defined steps, such as drafting regulations or
as a minimum of five million afghani—approximately $73,000—in cases of holding meetings, rather than taking
bribes, money laundering, selling of historical or cultural relics, illegal min- concrete actions that would reduce
ing, and appropriation of Afghan government property; or a minimum of corruption, such as arresting or enforc-
10 million afghani—approximately $146,000—in cases of embezzlement.400 ing penalties on powerful Afghans,
As of November 2020, the Afghan government reported that 49 of SIGAR found.
255 ACJC warrants remain unexecuted and 32 fugitives are presently
outside Afghanistan.401
According to DOJ, the ACJC had an active docket that included high-
profile cases this quarter. These cases included:402
• On October 12, 2020, the ACJC appellate court convicted Mohammed
Mossa Ali, the former head of the Norms and Standards Department, of
bribery and sentenced him to 16 years’ imprisonment, and a $100,000
fine. Ali was previously convicted and given the same sentence in the
ACJC primary court in August. According to DOJ, the case was notable
for its efficient and effective investigation involving a call by the victim
to an AGO hotline, referral to the National Directorate of Security and
Kabul police and cooperation between the two agencies, the availability
and use of $100,000 in marked AGO currency for the victim to pay the

GOVERNANCE
bribe, videotaping the transaction, and arresting the defendant as he left

the meeting site.
• On October 18, 2020, the ACJC primary court convicted three Ministry
and Energy and Water officials in absentia of misuse of authority in a
case dating to 2006. When an initial contract for the construction of
a hydroelectric dam in Panjshir Province was terminated, the three
officials improperly awarded the contract to a new company in a
restricted bidding process. Each defendant was convicted of misuse
of authority sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, fined $306,718.
The court also ordered that the officials of the company receiving the
contract be prosecuted.
• The ACJC appellate court convicted five defendants of embezzlement
and forgery in a scheme to negotiate fraudulent checks at the Azizi
Bank. The court sentenced the defendants to prison terms ranging from
one year and six months to seven years and six months, and cash fines.
The defendants are all in custody.
According to CSTC-A, the Afghan Supreme Court has significantly con-

strained the MOD’s ability to combat serious crime and corruption through
its narrow interpretation of the prosecutorial authority of military lawyers
and the jurisdiction of military courts. Afghanistan’s Supreme Court limited
the authorities of these bodies to “military crimes” that are specified in
the penal-code annex pertaining to the military. Instead of being handled
through military courts and prosecutors, major crimes and corruption
cases have to be referred to other bodies, such as the ACJC. Following the
Supreme Court’s decision, CSTC-A said there have been no meaningful
ACJC prosecutions of senior MOD officials.403
MOD believes that the Supreme Court’s decision negatively affects
military discipline and has hindered the ministry’s response to corruption.
CSTC-A supports MOD’s efforts to reconsider the authorities of military
lawyers and the jurisdiction of military courts over corruption cases.404
CSTC-A Anticorruption Partners Make Some Progress

Among the MOD and MOI elements tasked with combating corruption,
CSTC-A provided the following assessments and updates:
• This quarter, the MCTF, acting on intelligence and supported by
CSTC-A, executed search warrants on a Kabul trucking company
compound, arresting two civilian suspects and seizing approximately
45,000 boots and 65,000 Afghan security-force uniform sets. Initial
reports suggest the trucking company stole the items in 2015/2016 and
planned to resell them to the Afghan government. CSTC-A said this
case shows the ability of reliable MCTF partners to develop corruption
cases, despite continuing organizational problems.405 According to
DOJ, the MCTF director was unexpectedly dismissed after leading

GOVERNANCE
an investigation that resulted in the arrest of the mayor of Herat on

October 26, 2020.406
• The MOD Inspector General (MOD IG) was recently involved in a fuel
corruption case that CSTC-A views as an example of an effectively
coordinated MOD response to corruption. After an MOD IG inspection
of the 201st Corps found that fuel was stolen, the matter was referred
to the MOD Criminal Investigative Directorate (MOD CID). This group
investigated the matter, confirmed fuel was stolen, and referred the case
to MOD legal authorities for prosecution. CSTC-A observed the MOD IG
sharing the related reports and complaints to facilitate follow-up.407
• MOD CID is not effectively investigating complex criminal cases, such
as crimes involving senior officials or high-dollar amounts, CSTC-A
says. (This is in contrast to the minister of defense’ statement to IG
Sopko during an October 2019 meeting that he was very optimistic
about the potential for the MOD CID.408) While CSTC-A says it does
not “do investigative work on behalf of the Afghan government,” U.S.
government-contracted law enforcement professionals have been
investigating these cases and sometimes identify tips and leads that
are provided to the Afghan security forces. Senior MOD leaders review
the information produced through these contracted-out investigations
and may take administrative actions in response. CSTC-A says that
unclassified portions of these investigation reports are provided to
MOD CID for criminal investigation.409 MOD CID, with assistance from a
number of NATO Resolute Support elements, is currently investigating
a case of fuel and medical-supply theft, ghost soldiers, and overcharging
for electricity at the Regional Military Hospital in Balkh. CSTC-A
suspected theft when it observed funding requests for generator fuel
and electricity utilities were higher than normal. CSTC-A has been
decreasing its funding for fuel and sees such theft as a threat to the
Afghan security forces’ viability.410
This quarter, CSTC-A helped MOD legal and investigative bodies agree
on the importance of clear lines of authority for developing case files neces-
sary for criminal convictions. CSTC-A said the various MOD bodies charged
with responding to corruption (including the MOD IG, intelligence officials,
and MOD CID investigators) have agreed that professional MOD CID inves-
tigators should be responsible for identifying, collecting, recording, and
preserving evidence. Afghan law regarding these responsibilities is unclear,
CSTC-A says, making meaningful and immediate change difficult. Some of
these MOD entities lack a mission statement, the ability to compel coopera-
tion, and meaningful measurements of success.411

GOVERNANCE
COUNTERNARCOTICS
Little Progress Combating Opium Poppy Production
U.S. drug-control priorities for Afghanistan, according to the Department of
State, include disrupting the drug trade, targeting its revenue streams, pro-
moting alternative livelihoods for farmers, reducing demand, strengthening
law enforcement, and building Afghan government capacity. Unfortunately,
State said “overall progress in meeting these long-term objectives remains
slow, inconsistent, and insufficient.”412
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
2020 World Drug Report, an estimated 163,000 hectares of opium poppy
were cultivated in Afghanistan during 2019 (more current reporting has
been delayed). Although a 50% reduction from the record high in 2017
(328,000 ha), 2019 cultivation remained nearly three-times the pre-2002
average (1994–2001).413 Based on 2018 data, Afghan opiate production
accounted for 84% of the global morphine and heroin seized;414 seizure data
is important because it provides a rough indication of the share that Afghan
opiates have in the global market.
The statistics merely hint at the scope of the challenge posed by Afghan
narcotics production. As SIGAR quarterly reports have repeatedly noted,
the U.S. Congress has appropriated $9 billion for counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan since FY 2002, yet the opium-economy has grown exponentially
over that period, while interdiction efforts have had only a minimal impact
on the illicit narcotics trade. Importantly, that trade helps fund insurgents,
terrorists, and criminal networks; fosters corruption; undermines public
regard for the government; and creates public-health and social problems.415
New impediments to progress emerged in 2020, as the COVID-19 pan-
demic and economic distress simultaneously hindered counternarcotics
operations, delayed reporting, and increased financial incentives for farm-
ers and other Afghans to profit from the narcotics trade. U.S. and Afghan
counternarcotics strategies are in flux, and the formal organization of
Afghan counternarcotics agencies has been restructured. Further, despite
the long-standing problems with the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan
and the aggravating factors, international donors at the November 2020
Afghanistan conference in Geneva, Switzerland did not condition future
funding on counternarcotics indicators.416
Afghanistan Opium Surveys Still Delayed

State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) reported that the methodological disagreements between the UNODC
and the Afghan National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) that
derailed their collaborative opium-poppy survey projects in 2019 and
2020 remain unresolved. However, there has been incremental progress
with UNODC and NSIA signing a letter of assistance this quarter for the

GOVERNANCE
Afghanistan Opium Survey projects that should enable effective collabora-

tion on the 2020 and subsequent surveys.417 INL has disbursed $24.2 million
since 2006 for the surveys.418
The UNODC normally produces an annual Afghanistan Opium Survey:
Cultivation Estimate report along with an Afghanistan Opium Survey:
Socioeconomic Analysis report in partnership with the Afghan government.
The cultivation estimate tracks trends in the locations and extent of opium-
poppy cultivation, while the socioeconomic report focuses on the opium
economy’s effect on the social and economic situation of rural Afghans.
According to the UNODC, these reports are “essential for planning, imple-
menting, and monitoring measures required for tackling a problem that has
serious implications for Afghanistan and the international community.”419
SIGAR remains concerned that the biannual Afghanistan Opium Survey reports are still
delayed after more than a year of disagreements between the Afghan government’s National
Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC). SIGAR first reported on these delays in January 2020.425 Disagreements between
these partners emerged when NSIA objected to UNODC’s measurement of the opium-poppy
yield for the 2019 season, despite UNODC’s use of a long-standing methodology that
employs field measurements of mature poppy plants. NSIA specifically objected to the use
of opportunistic sampling, which UNODC has used since 2012 to improve data quality. INL
explained that UNODC’s opportunistic sampling method allowed surveyors operating in a
small number of highly insecure areas some discretion in selecting sample areas within a
district.426 SIGAR hopes that these disagreements will be resolved and that the 2019 and
2020 reports will be released in early 2021.
Both of these reports have been delayed; the most recent was published
in July 2019. Although INL reported last quarter that the 2019 Afghanistan
Opium Survey: Socioeconomic Analysis report was scheduled for publica-
tion by the end of 2020, the report is awaiting final clearance from the NSIA
and has no target release date.420
INL says the 2020 Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation Estimate
is expected to be released in early 2021. But if the report is released, it
still may not include the annual yield estimates.421 This is because NSIA
performed no field sampling, random or otherwise, in 2020. Without field
sampling, UNODC began developing a methodology to estimate the 2020
opium-poppy yield using satellite imagery.422 NSIA has not approved the
UNODC satellite imagery methodology and continues to review it.423
However, the recently signed agreement between UNODC and NSIA
includes language that should enable field-sampling surveys this spring for
the 2021 season and subsequent reports.424

GOVERNANCE
Policy-Making Body, Not Counternarcotics Police, Sets

Counternarcotics Policy
In a departure from previous responses, INL notified SIGAR this quarter that
a policymaking Counternarcotics High Commission (CNHC)427 sets high-
level Afghan counternarcotics policy, and not the Ministry of the Interior’s
(MOI) Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). Although the 2018
Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law formally created the CNHC, it has
President Ashraf Ghani chairs the inaugu- been directing policy only since early 2020.428 President Ashraf Ghani chaired
ral meeting of the Counter Narcotics High the inaugural CNHC meeting on February 4, 2020. In his opening statement,
Commission on February 4, 2020. (Afghan President Ghani summarized the CNHC role saying that “Fighting against nar-
Government photo) cotics and intoxicants is one of the five priorities of the government—there
is need for creating overall synergies among the security, justice, judicial, and
health sectors to take serious and appropriate actions accordingly.”429 The
second vice-president Sarwar Danish leads the Commission.430 The CNHC
delegates responsibility for coordination and development to the MOI, which
executes CNHC orders through government-wide implementation strategies.431
INL said that a number of the CNHC directives have already been imple-
mented. For example, in September 2020, the MOI, Afghan National Army
(ANA), and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) signed a trilateral
interagency memorandum of understanding that addressed counternarcotics
“cooperation in intelligence sharing, coordination, eradication, trafficking, and
drug distribution enforcement.”432
Nonetheless, INL noted that oversight of Afghan counternarcotics policy
has continued to evolve and that the policy-making process has at times
been unclear.433 In June and September 2020, INL told SIGAR that the CNPA
became the counternarcotics policy-making entity following the dissolution of
the Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) in 2019. At the time INL said moving
“MCN’s policy-making role under the [CNPA] has the potential for greater effi-
ciency and more effective coordination.”434 INL has subsequently clarified that
the CNPA’s policy development role was “likely unclear and confusing due to
the recent dissolution of MCN and distribution of its activities.”435 INL contacts
that were close to these developments also reported that these processes were
“very unclear and confusing.”436
Counternarcotics High Commission’s Directives Seek to

Produce a New Counternarcotics Strategy
INL said this quarter that the Afghan government has decided to produce
a new National Drug Action Plan (NDAP) based on the CNHC’s February
4, 2020, order issued at its inaugural meeting.437 The original 2015–2019
NDAP was widely regarded as Afghanistan’s “counternarcotics strategy”
and has been under revision since 2017. This new NDAP will follow CNHC
directives and MOI’s Planning and Policy Department is leading the NDAP’s
development with the MOI Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics chairing
the meetings.438

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT
PAST EFFORTS TO REVISE AFGHAN

COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY AND STRATEGY
Revising Afghanistan’s counternarcotics policy and The MCN’s NDAP revisions underway since 2017
strategy to effectively address the opium-economy were overtaken by events when the MCN was dis-
has been a perennial issue. INL noted that “Afghan solved in mid-2019. At the inaugural CNHC meeting,
CN policy transformation has been underway for President Ghani directed that a new NDAP be writ-
some time.”439 For example, as early as July 2013, ten.445 INL reported throughout most of 2020 that
then-President Hamid Karzai issued a decree the NDAP had been revised and was awaiting final
ordering the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the clearance.446 In retrospect, this does not appear to
Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) to develop a be correct. INL said that policy development in 2020
plan to merge the ministries.440 The MCN was not was unclear and confusing due to the MCN’s disso-
dissolved then and continued to be the ministry lution and distribution of its activities.447
coordinating counternarcotics efforts and reforms Rather, the Afghan government only began seri-
for the next six years. ously planning the current draft of the NDAP in
A major MCN task at the time was to formulate September 2020 when the first two planning confer-
Afghanistan’s National Drug Action Plan (NDAP). ences were held.448 In December 2020, INL reported
The MCN issued the initial 2015–2019 NDAP in that the MOI Deputy Minister for Policy Hosna Jalil
October 2015, providing the Afghan government recently approved some version of an NDAP and
with strategic policy guidance as well as annual sent that version to the president’s office for review.
objectives and metrics.441 In February 2017, the Once the president’s office reviews it, it will then
MCN presented its first NDAP implementation be sent to the CNHC for further consideration.449
report, noting that only 35% of its first-year objec- INL also elaborated that the current NDAP draft is
tives were achieved. The MCN also emphasized no longer in a narrative format. Instead, it is now a
improvements in government counternarcotics matrix-style planning tool that includes an overview
coordination, facilitated by establishing the Counter of CN goals, activities, indicators, implementation
Narcotics High Commission (CNHC).442 status, expected results, responsible entities, and
The CNHC was formalized in the February budget requirements.450
2018 Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law, but The results of the inaugural meeting of the
the CNHC took little further action. Meanwhile, CNHC and the new NDAP suggest that Afghan
President Ghani in January 2019 decreed that the counternarcotics structures remain in flux since
MCN would be dissolved and significant MCN the dissolution of the MCN. The original 2015–2019
components would be merged into the MOI.443 The NDAP was a five-year strategic plan451 whereas
CNHC would henceforth become the counternarcot- the current draft NDAP is being written as a two-
ics policy-making entity while MOI provided policy year plan.452 INL clarified that the “two-year NDAP
expertise and coordinated policy implementation will be the national action plan for CN and serve
across Afghan government bodies. INL said it was as a bridge until … a new five-year formal CN
not until the CNHC’s inaugural meeting in February national policy is developed before the NDAP’s two
2020 that “[President Ghani] rebooted the CNHC year expiration.”453
to account for MCN’s dissolution and to diversify
[CNHC] membership.”444

GOVERNANCE
CNPA Components and their Missions

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT REPORT CNPA personnel are located in all 34 provinces and comprise regular
police as well as specialized units. The CNPA’s counternarcotics operations
On January 14, 2020, SIGAR issued include controlling precursor chemicals, airport interdiction, operating
a special project report titled “Hamid the forensic laboratory, crop eradication, and managing mobile detection
Karzai International Airport: Despite teams. CNPA also coordinates with Afghan customs to stop drug traffick-
Improvements, Controls to Detect Cash ing.454 INL provides support to specialized units within the CNPA through an
Smuggling Still Need Strengthening.” interagency agreement with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).455
According to a 2015 Integrity Watch CNPA specialized units consist of three major components: the U.S.-
Afghanistan study, upwards of 65% supported National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and Sensitive Investigative Unit
of all cash leaving Afghanistan was (SIU), and the UK-supported Intelligence and Investigation Unit (IIU).456
illegally earned, transferred, or used, Additionally, the U.S.-supported Technical Investigative Unit (TIU) provides
and a significant portion of this cash support to the NIU and SIU components.457
is tied to the opium trade. To counter The NIU conducts interdiction operations and seizures, serves arrest
cash smuggling, the U.S. government warrants, and executes search warrants in high-threat environments.
installed cash counting machines at The NIU receives mentoring from DEA and NATO Special Operations
Kabul International Airport in 2011. Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), including U.S. Special
Nonetheless, SIGAR found that cus- Forces. The NIU typically maintains forward-based personnel in Kandahar
toms officials are not regularly using and has access to facilities in Kunduz, and Herat.458
the cash counting machines to track The SIU’s mission is to identify significant drug-trafficking organizations
cash leaving Afghanistan and the ma- operating in Afghanistan and dismantle them through the criminal-justice
chines are not even connected to the system. The SIU receives mentoring from the DEA and consists of hand-
internet. These findings come nearly picked, thoroughly vetted personnel.459 The SIU also has four officers
a decade after the U.S. government responsible for administrative management of court orders obtained by SIU
installed the machines. investigators to conduct Afghan judicially authorized intercepts.460
DEA reported that the NIU and SIU conducted a combined total of
47 DEA-mentored, -partnered, or otherwise-supported operations from
October 1 through December 8, 2020.461
The Technical Investigative Unit (TIU) is a CNPA component consisting
of 100 translators who work within the Judicial Wire Intercept Platform
(JWIP). The JWIP is a State-funded project to provide technical systems
associated with the wiretap program and is executed by DEA through an
interagency agreement with State. JWIP supports DEA operations as well as
SIU and NIU investigations.462
Other Afghan law-enforcement elements such as the special operations
General Command of Police Special Units execute high-risk arrests and
operations including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counter-orga-
nized crime.463 The Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police (ABP)
also participate in counternarcotics activities.464
This quarter, DOD notified SIGAR that the Special Mission Wing (SMW)
is now fully funded by ASFF and no longer funded by any counternarcotics
programs such as DOD’s Counternarcotics and Global Threats fund.465 The
SMW is a rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft force established in 2012 to sup-
port NIU counternarcotics missions, as well as counterterrorism missions

GOVERNANCE
conducted by Afghan special security forces. In recent years, however,

nearly all its missions have been counterterrorism support.466 Transitioning
all SMW funding to ASFF aligns funding with the counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency mission that the SMW has assumed in recent years.467
U.S. Funding for Afghan Counternarcotics Elements

INL continues to work under the 2017 South Asia Strategy, which is the
main policy document for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, including counternar-
cotics policy.468 Both INL and DEA continue to report that while there are
no formal U.S. interagency working groups focused on Afghan-specific or
regional counternarcotics, both entities coordinate with relevant Afghan or
regional CN stakeholders as needed. In addition to coordinating with one
another, other stakeholders often include DOD’s Central Command and
UNODC, among others. DEA also participates in the Kabul law-enforcement
working group that meets regularly.469
INL estimates that it funds approximately $21 million per year in opera-
tions and maintenance for INL programming in Afghanistan, including
for the NIU and SIU. INL has disbursed $43.4 million to DEA through an
interagency agreement to support the specialized units. Costs directly
attributable to NIU and SIU include $6 million for two years of JWIP (not
including other costs DEA and DOD may incur in support of the wiretap
system), $9.6 million for two years of other interagency-agreement support,
and $825,000 per year for NIU salary supplements.470 Salary supplements
are used to attract and retain the most qualified and highly trained officers
to join the specialized units rather than remain with the regular CNPA. A
graduated scale of supplements is provided to all NIU officers, from police
officers to unit commanders.471
Interdiction Results
In a new measure, DEA reported this quarter that the value of narcotics
intercepted from October 1 through December 8, 2020, was over $235 mil-
lion.472 DEA reported that it no longer uses denied revenue to measure the
value of interdicted narcotics and has instead developed the “drug value
intercepted” (DVI) method to measure value. DEA noted that estimated pro-
duction costs were previously used to estimate the value of revenue denied,
which proved inconsistent. In contrast, DVI measures the street value of
particular drugs by averaging three years of drug purchases.473
Between July 1 and September 30, 2020, DEA reported that U.S.-
supported interdiction activities by Afghan security forces included 39
operations resulting in seizures of 126 kilograms (kg) (278 lbs.) of opium,
201 kg (445 lbs.) of heroin, and 445 kg of methamphetamines (979 lbs.).
Additionally, 71 arrests were made and 6,049 kg (13,336 lbs.) of precursor
chemicals and approximately 730 kg (1,609 lbs.) of hashish were seized by

GOVERNANCE
Afghan security forces during this period.474 Table 2.15 contains interdiction
results provided by DOD and DEA.
Despite the improved capabilities of Afghan specialized units over the
years, drug seizures and arrests have had minimal impact on the country’s
opium-poppy cultivation and production. For example, total opium seizures
since FY 2008 are equivalent to approximately 8% of the country’s 6,400
metric tons of opium production for the single year of 2019, as reported
by UNODC.475
TABLE 2.15
INTERDICTION RESULTS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2020

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 TOTAL
Number of Operations 263 624 669 518 333 270 196 157 198 152 184 3,564
Arrests 484 862 535 386 442 394 301 152 274 170 263 4,263
Hashish seized (kg) 25,044 182,213 183,776 37,826 19,088 24,785 123,063 227,327 42,842 148,604 422,658 1,437,226
Heroin seized (kg) 8,392 10,982 3,441 2,489 3,056 2,859 3,532 1,975 3,242 3,507 585 44,060
Morphine seized (kg) 2,279 18,040 10,042 11,067 5,925 505 13,041 106,369 10,127 11,859 2 183,331
Opium seized (kg) 49,750 98,327 70,814 41,350 38,379 27,600 10,487 24,263 23,180 13,751 325 398,226
Precursor chemicals
20,397 122,150 130,846 36,250 53,184 234,981 42,314 89,878 22,863 81,182 30,849 864,894
seized (kg)
Methamphetamine1 (kg) — 50 — 11 23 11 14 31 143 1,308 672 2,263
– indicates no data reported.

1 In crystal or powder form.
Source: DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
Eradication Update
INL reported this quarter that the MOI began eradication planning sessions
on November 7, 2020, under the auspices of the Eradication Coordination
Committee (ECC). Discussion at this meeting included how to facilitate
high-level coordination amongst all entities involved in eradication as well
as complaints about a lack of functional equipment, timely funding avail-
ability, and the increasing strength of the insurgency.476 According to INL
contacts, the ECC will meet weekly with high-level participation including
from the president’s office, NSIA, and local security and governance entities
such as the National Directorate of Security, the Ministry of Defense, and
the Independent Directorate of Local Governance.477
The Director General of the CNPA, Colonel Sami Popalzai, and Deputy
Minister Aurtaq are expected to coordinate with the president or vice presi-
dent to obtain an executive order asking all relevant national and provincial
organizations to support eradication. Meanwhile, NSIA will ask UNODC and
the Afghan national security advisor staff for the latest data on poppy cul-
tivation. From these data, the NSIA will prepare a schedule for nationwide
eradication and prepare provincial-level presentations on opium-poppy

GOVERNANCE
cultivation. Once the eradication schedule is finalized, relevant authorities

will conduct provincial visits to coordinate eradication activities.478
As previously reported, INL is currently not providing direct support
for eradication programming in Afghanistan because Congress requires
an audit of financial control mechanisms before monies can be released
to the MOI for eradication following the dissolution of the MCN.479 INL is
contracting for a financial assessment of the CNPA so that direct monetary
assistance can be provided to the MOI for CNPA eradication assistance.480
Governor-Led Eradication
Prior to the MCN’s dissolution, INL provided direct eradication assistance
through the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program. According to INL,
the MOI now manages this ongoing program, with the CNPA implement-
ing independent Afghan eradication and GLE.481 When MCN managed the
GLE program beginning in 2005, INL reimbursed provincial governors
$250 toward the eradication costs of every UNODC-verified hectare of
eradicated poppy.482
INL did not provide an update on the GLE program this quarter because
there has been no change in the status of their relationship. INL is currently
unable to provide funding for the GLE program prior to the vetting of the
CNPA’s financial-control mechanisms.483
REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Refugees: persons who are outside their
Afghan Refugees country of origin for reasons of feared
persecution, conflict, generalized violence,
As of December 12, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
or other circumstances that have seriously
(UNHCR) reported that 2,045 refugees have voluntarily returned to
disturbed public order and, as a result, re-
Afghanistan in 2020. Most of the refugees returned from Iran (890) and
quire international protection. According to
Pakistan (1,055). COVID-19 led to temporary suspension of voluntary repa- the UNHCR, refugees have the right to safe
triation between March 4 and April 29, 2020. UNHCR agreed to continue asylum and should receive at least the
the facilitated voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees during the winter same rights and basic help as any other
season. Such a measure will allow Afghan refugees who plan to return dur- foreigner who is a legal resident.
ing winter to do so as well as enable other refugees who were unable to
return earlier due to COVID-19 related restrictions to also return during Migrants: persons who change their
the winter.484 country of usual residence, irrespective of
the reason for migration or legal status.
Undocumented Afghan Migrant Returnees According to the UN, there is no formal
legal definition of an international migrant.
According to State, the combined effects of COVID-19 and economic con-
traction has led to high numbers of spontaneous returns of Afghan migrant
laborers from Iran.485 As of December 31, the International Organization of
Migration (IOM) reported that 859,092 undocumented Afghans returned Source: United Nations, “Refugees and Migrants: Definitions,”
2019; UNHCR, “Protecting Refugees: questions and answers,”
from Iran (534,313 spontaneous returnees and 324,779 deportees) and 6,701 2/2002.

GOVERNANCE
undocumented Afghan migrants returned from Pakistan (5,956 spontaneous

returnees and 745 deportees) in 2020.486
By comparison, 476,887 undocumented Afghan migrants had returned
from Iran in 2019, as of December 28 of that year and 767,663 undocu-
mented Afghan migrants had returned from Iran in 2018, as of December 29,
2018.487 According to State, the Iranian economic downturn caused by U.S.
sanctions drove outward migration in 2018.
Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement

As of December 1, 2020, conflicts had induced 332,255 Afghans to flee their
homes, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA). That count of conflict-induced internally displaced per-
sons recorded is 25% lower than for the same period last year, when OCHA
reported 443,090 displaced persons.488
WOMEN’S ADVANCEMENT
Presently, USAID has only one remaining Promote program, which aims to
strengthen women’s participation in civil society.489 Table 2.16 shows the
current Promote and women-focused programs.
All the Promote programs that focused on employment and job readiness
training ended last quarter. USAID does not expect future updates on the
number of Promote beneficiaries who secure employment.490
To date, Promote’s Musharikat (Women’s Rights Groups and Coalitions)
program reports it has recruited over 7,000 women-focused advocates to
its network. This past year, Musharikat began requiring a certain number
of recruits from their grantees and began targeting university students.
According to the program, the strength and influence of the Musharikat
coalitions relies on continued growth of the number and diversity of mem-
bers within the coalitions, as well as in their participation in Musharikat
activities.491 Musharikat seeks to engage its coalition members through
registration with the network and participation in an online community and
live events. To help sustain this engagement, Musharikat developed a free
mobile phone application for easy access to the program’s online commu-
nity. Since its release in August 2019, the application has been downloaded
only 150 times, despite smart-phone usage being high among Musharikat’s
coalition members.492
COVID-19 has made Musharikat’s online engagement options more
popular for members. In the third quarter of 2020, Musharikat recorded
over 9,000 member log-ins (compared with 2,410 in the previous two quar-
ters).493 Many of the most popular discussion prompts on Musharikat’s
member website over the past year related to the ongoing peace
process, including:494

GOVERNANCE
• Since the talks started on September 12, 2020, what progress do you
think has been made?
• Do you think the Taliban will change their mentality, ambition and
behavior of 1990s and play an equal role in ensuring social justice?
• What are your specific opinions about women’s situation after a
potential agreement with the Taliban?
• What are your specific recommendations for women representatives
in peace process talks?
• Is there any guarantee that the released Taliban will not return to
the battlefield?
According to Musharikat, their member website offers a protected forum

for activists to discuss their perceptions of the peace process and to make
observations about where Afghan women’s own agenda for peace stood
among negotiators’ priorities.495 Two members of the Islamic Republic’s
negotiating team have undergone Musharikat’s persuasion training.
According to USAID, these negotiators communicate with other Musharikat
members in real time through meetings, roundtables, and surveys.496
TABLE 2.16
USAID GENDER PROGRAMS

Cumulative
Promote: Women’s Rights Groups and Coalitions 9/2/2015 9/1/2021 $34,534,401 $27,030,402
Promote: Rolling Baseline and End-Line Survey 2/21/2017 1/20/2021 7,577,638 7,357,293
Gender Based Violence (GBV) 7/8/2015 1/7/2021 6,667,272 6,667,272

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC CONTENTS

U.S. Support For Economic and Social
Development: Objectives and Prospects 119
Economic Profile 123
Fiscal Update 131
Economic Growth 133
Agriculture 137
Infrastructure and Essential Services 140
Education 144
Health 148


While Afghan government revenues continued to recover from the impact of COVID-19 this quarter, sustainable domestic
revenues fell by 2.8%, year-on-year, during 2020.
KEY ISSUES Poverty levels were forecasted to rise to 61–72% of the population in 2020 due to the pandemic, while Afghanistan
braced for a second wave of COVID-19 in early 2021.
& EVENTS
A number of U.S. economic and social development programs fell short of their FY 2020 performance goals due to
COVID-related restrictions that hindered project activities.
On November 23–24, the governments of Finland and Afghanistan co-hosted

the 2020 Afghanistan Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, with representa-
tives from various government agencies and international organizations
attending virtually due to COVID-19 restrictions. Major donors expressed
their continued commitment to support the Afghan government and high-
lighted the importance of economic and social development for sustaining
any future peace agreement.497
According to the UN, donors pledged at least $3.3 billion in development
assistance for 2021 and expressed the potential for between $12 billion and
$13.2 billion in civilian aid over the next four years, a drop from the $15.2
billion pledged for four years in the 2016 donors’ conference. (Security
assistance is pledged separately.) A number of donors said assistance
beyond 2021 would be contingent on demonstrated progress in the peace
process and a commitment to the protection of human rights.498
This reduction in pledged assistance came as Afghanistan struggles with
the COVID-19 pandemic. Afghan public health officials have warned that the
country faces a second wave of the disease as cases have surged in recent
months. As of January 14, 2021, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases
remained relatively low at 53,819, with 2,320 deaths.499 But public-health
officials caution that the number of confirmed cases vastly undercounts the
true spread and impact of the disease because of Afghanistan’s low testing
capacity and the limited reach of its public-health system.500 Acting Health

Minister Ahmad Jawad Osmani announced in August 2020 that a survey of

antibody tests showed that COVID-19 had likely infected approximately 10
million Afghans, or 31.5% of the population. The number of cases in urban
areas was even higher, with more than half of Kabul’s residents estimated to
have contracted the disease.501
Currently, the government can test only approximately 1,000 people per
day. A technical adviser for the Ministry of Public Health explained, “In
the first wave, we didn’t have the capacity to test people on time—patients
received their results after they had recovered or had passed away.”502 The
adviser also said health-care workers’ continued lack of personal protective
equipment (PPE) and failure to implement even basic infection prevention
and control (IPC) measures is contributing to uncontrolled spread of the
disease and rising cases among healthcare staff.503
Beyond the public-health impact, the COVID-19 pandemic has inflicted
significant harm on Afghanistan’s economy, exacerbating many existing chal-
lenges. By the end of 2020, Afghanistan’s unemployment rate was projected
to rise to 37.9%, up from 23.9% in 2019.504 The World Bank estimates the
overall poverty level increased from 55% to 72% of the population in 2020
due to the economic contraction, with the IMF projecting Afghanistan’s GDP
to drop by 5%.505 A spokesperson for the United Nations (UN) humanitarian
affairs office said the UN will require an additional $1.3 billion in 2021 for
humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, as the number of people who require assis-
tance will have doubled compared to a year ago.506 In a November 2020 Asia
Foundation survey, 74.2% of respondents reported that they and their fami-
lies had received no government support during the pandemic.507
Although the opening of Afghanistan’s international borders in July 2020
Food security: all people within a society helped ease food shortages, a lack of food security has persisted. According
at all times having “physical, social, and to the UN World Food Programme, the average price of wheat flour
economic access to sufficient, safe, and increased by more than 11% between March 14 (just before the government-
nutritious food to meet daily basic needs mandated lockdown) and December 2, 2020, with the cost of pulses (dry
for a productive and healthy life,” without edible seeds of plants in the legume family), sugar, cooking oil, and rice
being forced to deplete household assets increasing by 21%, 19%, 36%, and 21% respectively over the same period.
in order to meet minimum needs.
Higher prices were matched by a decline in purchasing power for many day
laborers, resulting in more individual debt as workers struggled to afford
basic necessities.508
Source: United Nations, Press Release, “World Food Summit As of early November 2020, 11.2 million people, or approximately 36% of
Concludes in Rome,” 11/19/1996.
the estimated population, faced either a crisis or emergency state of food
insecurity, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification,
a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food
insecurity and malnutrition.509 On December 21, 2020, Acting Minister of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development Mujib Rahman Karimi announced
that more than 20,000 families had received food aid as part of the first
phase of the government’s national assistance program.510

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representative in

Afghanistan, Abdallah Al Dardari, said “four years of progressive growth”
will be required to return to the pre-COVID economic conditions of 2019.511
To sustain this, however, UNDP estimated in early November 2020 that the
Afghan government will need an additional $6 billion in international grants
over the next five years, a 30% increase from current levels of donor fund-
ing, to offset COVID-related budget losses and maintain expenditure levels,
adding that a “clear commitment to continued grant support is vital for
improving confidence and investment.”512
Under any scenario, economic recovery in the coming years will be
hampered by continued violence and political uncertainties surrounding
the Afghan peace talks. Asian Development Bank (ADB) projections that
the Afghan economy will rebound in 2021 with modest growth of 1.5%,
for instance, assumes “that peace talks are successful and [will] enable
improved security and political stability.”513 Even with additional interna-
tional grants, the Afghan economy could lose the equivalent of 12.5% of
real GDP by 2024, according to UNDP estimates. Without additional inter-
national support and instead relying on increased taxes and reductions in
government expenditures, this number climbs to 14.3% of real GDP by 2024.
These losses, however, could be tempered by paired improvements in gov-
ernance, such as effective anticorruption efforts.514
Largely as a result of COVID-19, the Afghan government’s sustainable Sustainable domestic revenues:
domestic revenues contracted by 2.8%, year-on-year, during 2020, SIGAR’s According to Afghan Ministry of Finance
analysis of Afghan government accounting data showed.515 The contraction officials, these are revenues such as cus-
in government revenue during the first half of 2020 was particularly driven toms, taxes, and nontax fees. Multilateral
by the fall in customs duties and taxes—which comprised approximately institutions, including the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
20% of sustainable domestic revenues in 2019—due to the closing of the
use reports of these revenues to judge the
border. In July 2020, Afghan exports to Pakistan, Afghanistan’s leading
Afghan government’s fiscal performance.
trading partner, decreased by 56.8% compared to July 2019; imports from
Pakistan decreased by 43.6%.516 By Month 7 of FY 1399 (December 22, 2019, One-off domestic revenues: These are
to December 21, 2020), customs revenue had fallen by 28.2% from the previ- nonrecurring revenues arising from one-
ous year, according to publicly available data from the Afghanistan Revenue time transfers of funds, such as central
Department.517 With the partial lifting of the government-mandated lock- bank profits, to the Afghan government. The
down and reopening of the borders to trade over the summer, government IMF excludes central bank transfers from
revenues began to recover during the third and fourth quarters of FY 1399. its definition of domestic revenues for the
Government expenditures, on the other hand, increased overall by 8.1%, purpose of monitoring Afghanistan’s fiscal
year-on-year, during 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic.518 performance under its Extended Credit
Facility arrangement with the government.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

DEVELOPMENT: OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS Source: SIGAR, communications with MOF officials,
While the intensity and focus of U.S. reconstruction programs in 8/21/2017; SIGAR, communications with IMF officials,
9/7/2017.
Afghanistan have shifted over the years, the United States has consistently
highlighted the importance of economic and social development to support

U.S. national security interests and the broader political stability of the
country. The U.S. government’s current Integrated Country Strategy (ICS),
released in September 2018, highlights the need to strengthen economic
prosperity through U.S. support of private-sector-led export growth and
job creation and accompanying gains in health, education, and women’s
empowerment leading to increased revenue generation and budget sus-
tainability for the Afghan government.519 USAID’s FY 2019–2023 Country
Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Afghanistan, nested within
the ICS, further outlines the need to:520
• accelerate private-sector-driven, export-led economic growth
• advance social gains in health, education, and gender equality
• increase the Afghan government’s accountability to its citizens
Within the CDCS, USAID posits that progress in these three areas will,
in turn, “increase Afghanistan’s economic viability and enable the country
to become less reliant on donors”; “enable the country to become more
inclusive and stable, as Afghans gain confidence in their government’s abil-
ity to achieve reforms and deliver services”; and “help improve the country’s
stability and inclusivity, as Afghans’ trust in their government improves and
civic participation expands.”521
In pursuit of these objectives, USAID has shifted its approach under
the current CDCS to focus on direct interaction with Afghanistan’s pri-
vate sector and work with other U.S. government agencies to implement
various policy reforms and programs to support economic growth.522 In
particular, senior U.S. officials have pointed to the emerging role of the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)—the U.S. govern-
ment development finance institution formed in December 2019 from the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation and USAID’s Development Credit
Authority—and its potential as an alternative source of financing to support
private investments in Afghanistan’s agriculture and extractives industries.
The DFC is exploring co-investment and co-financing opportunities with
private investors that may emerge as the Afghan peace talks move forward,
supporting a gradual transition from grant-based aid to an investment
model for U.S. engagement with the Afghan economy.523
Both U.S. and Afghan officials have highlighted expected economic
opportunities following a peace agreement. On International Migrants Day
(December 17, 2020), U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson tweeted that peace
in Afghanistan “will bring economic opportunities for displaced people and
all Afghan citizens. Peace will increase trade, improving employment pros-
pects, economic outcomes, and futures of generations to come.”524 In early
January 2021, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation
Zalmay Khalilzad toured Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkmenistan,
in part, to “continue to encourage projects and plans for expanded regional

connectivity, trade, and development which will be aided by an Afghan

peace agreement and will help sustain peace.”525
In particular, Afghan officials point to the potential of the country’s extrac-
tives sector to fuel economic growth and promote economic self-sufficiency
following a successful peace settlement. Afghanistan’s First Vice President
Amrullah Saleh stated in a recent interview, “Daikundi has the biggest deposit
of lithium. Logar and Kabul have the biggest copper mines; northern provinces
have gas. We are sitting on treasure. When peace comes, we will lift everything
from underground and use it to be self-sufficient.”526 The Afghan government
has also extolled the promise of increased public-private partnerships to spur
investment in extractives, as well as other sectors of the economy.527 While the
U.S. government has estimated the total value of Afghanistan’s extractives at
more than $1 trillion, efforts to develop the sector, like so many other areas
of reconstruction, have been hindered by persistent insecurity, the Afghan
government’s unwillingness to complete the mutually agreed-upon reforms by
donors, as well as by its limited capacity to provide necessary infrastructure
and institutional support, and lingering corruption. In recent years, the extrac-
tives sector has represented only around 2% of the government’s sustainable
domestic revenues as a result of these issues.528
Overall, many uncertainties surround Afghanistan’s future economic
growth and social development: the ultimate outcome of peace talks;
the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; the effect, if any, of the
material withdrawal of U.S. forces; and the levels of future international
assistance. Even if the Afghan government controls the pandemic and
successfully negotiates a peace agreement with the Taliban—perhaps the
best-case scenario for Afghanistan—this will not translate immediately into
sustainable licit economic growth, as many enduring barriers to economic
growth remain. These include widespread corruption that continues to
undermine investor confidence in the Afghan government and economy,
limited skilled labor, the lingering effects of near-continuous conflict over
four decades, deficits in physical and institutional infrastructure, and
heavy reliance on foreign donor support. Following a peace agreement,
Afghanistan must also reintegrate into the economy ex-combatants and
potentially large numbers of Afghans returning from abroad.529 Upon their
return, they could face a weak licit labor market unable to fully absorb the
large influx of laborers in the short term, potentially exacerbating already
high unemployment and poverty figures.
As of December 31, 2020, the U.S. government has provided approxi-
mately $35.95 billion to support governance and economic and social
development in Afghanistan since 2002. Most of these funds—approxi-
mately $21.10 billion—were appropriated to USAID’s Economic Support
Fund (ESF). Of this amount, $20.03 billion has been obligated and $18 bil-
lion has been disbursed. Figure 2.32 on the following page shows USAID
assistance by sector.530

FIGURE 2.32
USAID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS, AS OF JANUARY 4, 2021 ($ MILLIONS)
Infrastructure 4,543
Governance 3,587
Stabilization 2,432
Agriculture 2,340
Health 1,414
Economic Growth 1,266
Education 1,236
Unpreferenced* 1,139
Program Support 450
Gender 263
$0 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000
Note: USAID Mission-managed funds. Numbers are rounded. USAID gender programs managed by the agency’s Office of Gender are presented as a separate category. Agriculture programs
include Alternative Development. Infrastructure programs include power, roads, extractives, and programs that build health and education facilities. OFM activities (e.g. audits and pre-award
assessments) are included under Program Support funds.
*Unpreferenced funds are U.S. contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives.
Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2021; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of November 20, 2020,
1/10/2021.
Donors Reduce Pledges of Conditions-Based Aid at

Afghanistan Conference in Geneva
On November 23–24, 2020, the governments of Finland and Afghanistan
co-hosted the quadrennial international donors’ conference in Geneva,
Switzerland. Most representatives of over 100 governments and interna-
tional organizations participated virtually due to COVID-19 restrictions.
International donors, including the United States, reiterated their support
for Afghanistan, but at a reduced level of assistance, pledging $3.3 billion
for 2021 according to the UN (including the U.S. government’s commitment)
with the expectation that annual commitments would stay at the same
level year-on-year through 2024, a drop from the $15.2 billion pledged for
2016–2020.531 According to World Bank estimates, this figure falls to the bare
minimum required for Afghanistan to remain a “viable state.”532
According to U.S. government statements, future U.S. assistance will be
conditioned on sufficient progress in the Afghan peace talks and the pro-
tection of human rights. In November, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
said, “I want to be clear that the choices made in peace negotiations will
affect the size and scope of future international support and assistance. The
United States looks forward to reviewing progress in the areas I mentioned
in one year’s time.”533

In a November 24 statement, the U.S. Mission to International

Organizations in Geneva clarified, “Future assistance beyond 2021 is
planned at comparable levels provided there is consistent progress on
transparency and accountability, as well as on the peace process, on the
part of the Afghan government.”534 On the same day, the Department of
State released a statement pointing to the conditionality of future U.S.
assistance: “The United States will continue to support Afghanistan Peace
Negotiations. All sides must seize this historic opportunity for peace and
commit to a reduction in violence that will enable these talks to succeed.
Future assistance decisions will reflect progress made in these negotiations.
… The United States and the international donor community are united in
the view that future assistance will be determined by the steps Afghanistan
takes to protect the human rights of all Afghans, especially those of women,
girls, and ethnic and religious minorities.”535
Along with pledges for assistance, international donors and the Afghan
government agreed to a new Afghanistan Partnership Framework (APF)
outlining foundational principles and expectations for continued interna-
tional engagement with and assistance to the Afghan government.536 One of
the three core reform priorities in the APF focuses on “market-building,”
with the intended outcome of “a reduction in poverty driven by a vibrant
private sector.” This is to be measured by vague and unspecified improve-
ments in several economic indicators:537
• a reduction in the proportion of Afghans (sex-disaggregated) living
below the basic-needs poverty line (around $1 a day) as measured by
Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA)
survey data
• improved annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person
• improved real rate of economic growth as recorded in NSIA data
• improved gross value of exports as recorded in Da Afghanistan Bank data
• improved overall score recorded in the World Bank Group Doing
Business survey
• domestic credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP increasing
to 10% by 2024
Additionally, the APF lays out key action items with incremental tar-
gets, including the Afghan government adhering to “sound policies for
macroeconomic stability,” undertaking reforms to ensure equal economic
opportunities for women, facilitating agribusiness and agricultural exports,
and mobilizing growth and investment in the mining sector.538
ECONOMIC PROFILE
U.S. efforts to bolster private-sector investment and growth are part of a
broader strategy to transition Afghanistan from being predominantly an

assistance recipient to becoming a long-term economic partner.539 Yet,

Afghanistan remains poor, aid-dependent, and conflict-affected, with any
potential economic growth in the short term further limited by COVID-19.540
Donor grants totaling $8.5 billion per year (covering both security and civil-
ian assistance) finance more than half the Afghan government budget and
approximately 75–80% of total public expenditures (including funds not
channeled through government ministries).541
Afghanistan’s economy also remains highly dependent on imports, gener-
ating a severe trade deficit that is almost entirely financed through external
aid.542 In 2019, Afghanistan imported goods totaling $7.33 billion while
exporting only $975 million worth, according to World Trade Organization
data; this produced a negative trade balance of $6.36 billion or 32.9% of
GDP.543 The trade deficit is in part caused by Afghanistan’s low manufactur-
ing capacity and poor domestic infrastructure which results in a narrow
export base—largely agricultural products and carpets—to limited destina-
tion markets.544
Increased government service provision and an economy fueled by
donor funds rapidly improved many development outcomes through the
2014 drawdown of most international troops. But licit GDP growth of just
under 10% dropped to low-single-digit levels as the Afghan government
assumed responsibility for the fight against the Taliban insurgency.545 In
early 2020, 55% of Afghans lived below the poverty line, according to the
most recent household survey data, an increase from 34% in 2008.546
Poverty worsened in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as remit-
tances from Afghans working in adjacent countries declined, household
budgets were stretched by a spike in food prices matched by an increase
in unemployment, and lockdowns and border closures dampened overall
domestic economic activity. According to a November 2020 Afghanistan
survey by the Asia Foundation, 70.9% of respondents agreed that “the finan-
cial situation of their household has gotten worse in the past 12 months,”
a drastic increase from the 31.1% who responded to the same question
in 2019.
Additionally, 66.8% of surveyed Afghans reported that the availability of
basic products in the market, such as wheat, rice, and oil, had worsened
over the previous year, with 77.3% also reporting decreasing affordability.547
In the survey, 85% also stated that corruption remained a major problem in
their daily lives, with 95% pointing to corruption as a major problem for the
country as a whole.548
Amid an overall economic downturn, the COVID-19 pandemic has exac-
erbated the Afghan government’s inability to generate sufficient domestic
revenue. The government’s over-reliance on international assistance and
inability to generate sufficient government revenue have been long-standing
challenges, stemming from limited government capacity, persistent corrup-
tion, tax evasion, and the strength of the informal and illicit economies.

Around 90% of economic activity in Afghanistan takes place within the

informal economy, which often overlaps with and strengthens the illicit
economy, including opium production, and so is not taxed by the govern-
ment, increasing the government’s reliance on external donors.549 As a
result, the government has largely relied on simpler forms of revenue gen-
eration, such as customs duties and income taxes. Given the relative ease
of their collection, customs taxes have typically been a primary source
of sustainable domestic revenues for the Afghan government, but were
particularly hard hit by pandemic-caused border closings and subsequent
shipping delays.
Afghanistan Braces for Second Wave of COVID-19

Public-health officials have warned that Afghanistan faces a second wave
Public-health officials distribute COVID-19
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of new cases per week has steadily
information in a rural community.
increased this quarter, rising from 741 in the first two weeks of October (UN photo)
2020 to 2,293 in the first two weeks of January 2021, numbers which under-
count the true number of cases given the country’s low testing capacity.550
Many Afghans reportedly have continued to disregard the government’s
public-health guidelines, such as wearing masks and practicing social dis-
tancing. Even within hospitals, there are consistent reports of medical staff
not wearing masks or failing to properly enforce IPC measures, further
spreading the disease.551
Much of the country’s health-care system has been redirected toward
addressing the pandemic, at the expense of many other public-health
issues. During March–August 2020, for example, polio vaccinations were
suspended over fears of spreading COVID-19 among vaccinators and the
recipient families, and polio-surveillance volunteers were redirected to
COVID-19 surveillance. World Health Organization (WHO) and United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) officials point to the suspension of the
vaccination campaign in different parts of the country, due to both the pan-
demic and continued insecurity, as contributing to the rising numbers of
polio cases in Afghanistan.552
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative reported 56 polio cases in
Afghanistan in 2020, compared to 29 total cases in 2019.553 In November
2020, the director of Mirwais Hospital in southern Kandahar Province also
explained that his hospital is still inundated with thousands of civilians
arriving daily for medical treatment, with many seeking care for inju-
ries sustained in the escalating violence. “The war has not finished,” he
explained. “If we make this hospital a COVID hospital, where will everyone
else go? I refuse to make this a COVID hospital.”554
COVID-19 has overwhelmed Afghanistan’s limited health-care system,
which continues to be hampered by limited resources, a shortage of trained
health-care workers, and poor management and implementation of IPC
measures, leaving it ill-prepared to handle a second wave.555 One physician

in Kabul’s only infectious-disease hospital expressed concern that if the

second wave intensifies, the hospital will not be able to handle the influx of
COVID-19 patients.556 Anecdotal reports persist of Afghans relying on home
treatments, including herbs, narcotics, and over-the-counter antibiotics,
instead of seeking treatment at hospitals.557
On November 18, 2020, the Acting Minister of Public Health announced
that wedding halls and other public places would be closing at the end
of December 2020 due to the rising number of cases.558 In late November,
the Ministry of Education also announced that schools would close in
December until spring 2021.559
During a December 3, 2020, speech at a special session of the UN
General Assembly, President Ashraf Ghani outlined the disease’s devastat-
ing impact on Afghanistan’s public health and economy in the short term,
which has “exacerbated existing gaps and inequalities between devel-
oped and developing countries.” The longer-term effects of the pandemic,
President Ghani stated, remain unclear. He warned, “Now, the second wave
of the pandemic is at our doorstep. We face this wave during the winter sea-
son, with very little understanding of how cold weather, particularly under
conditions of poverty, will affect the nature of the pandemic.”560 The effec-
tiveness of the Afghan government’s previous lockdown was undermined by
the inability of many people to stay quarantined at home given their need to
continue working to feed their families.
Afghanistan’s pandemic response has been further hampered by reports
of corruption. There were allegations of “ghost” workers in a COVID-19 hos-
pital in Kunduz Province. An administrative official in the hospital stated,
“These workers and vehicles do not exist but their wages are claimed,” cit-
ing the fact that the hospital has 25 beds but posted charges associated with
50 beds. Provincial public-health officials denied the claims.561 In mid-Octo-
ber 2020, reports also emerged of five private hospitals selling fake negative
COVID-19 test certificates to allow individuals to travel abroad.562
At the end of October, the former Wardak governor and 16 others were
charged with embezzling over 800,000 afghanis budgeted for the COVID-
19 response. This case came shortly after the Attorney General’s Office
announced charges against the Herat governor and 21 others for embezzling
20 million afghanis from the COVID-19 response budget.563 Additionally,
in late December 2020, former Acting Public Health Minister Osmani
announced that President Ghani had dismissed him after four individuals—
two Public Health Ministry employees and two of Osmani’s relatives—were
arrested for soliciting bribes using the acting minister’s name.564
In 2020, grants to the Afghan government increased by approximately
$500 million, helping to mitigate the pandemic-induced decline in domestic
revenues.565 This quarter, as Afghanistan prepared for the second wave of
the disease, the international community pledged continuing support for
Afghanistan’s COVID-19 response and recovery efforts. To supplement the

100 ventilators given to the Afghan government on October 1, 2020, USAID

informed SIGAR that the Bureau for Global Health approved an additional
$347,280 for consumables, such as ventilation tubes and plastic attach-
ments, as the initial consumables included with the October donation are
expected to last only a few months and Afghanistan lacks the ability to
procure replacement parts.566 As of January 2021, the United States has
provided a total of $39.4 million to support COVID-19 response efforts
in Afghanistan.567
During the quarter, the ADB approved a $100 million grant to support
the Afghan government’s COVID-19 response, including strengthening the
health-care system and expanding social protections for poor and vulner-
able communities.568 In late October 2020, the ADB approved an $18.28
million grant to improve water access and protect water infrastructure
from extreme weather to support agricultural productivity in the Panj-Amu
River Basin in northeastern Afghanistan. This grant, according to ADB offi-
cials, “will help Afghanistan in its recovery from COVID-19 by improving
water available for irrigated agriculture and [by] creating more employment
opportunities for rural communities.”569
In early November 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Executive Board approved a 42-month extended credit facility totaling
approximately $370 million to assist Afghanistan’s recovery from the pan-
demic, bolster needed economic reforms, and catalyze donor financing. Of
that, $115 million is available for immediate disbursement, with the remain-
ing funds to be disbursed over the duration of the program and subject
to semiannual reviews.570 The following month, however, the World Bank
warned in a letter to President Ghani that it would withhold $200 million
in aid to Afghanistan, intended to help mitigate the economic impact of
COVID-19, until the Da Afghanistan Bank provided banking-sector data to
assess “the adequacy of a recipient country’s macroeconomic policy frame-
work,” per the World Bank’s current operational policies.571 While this was
resolved in mid-December, the World Bank disbursed only $180 million and
withheld $20 million over issues with the Afghan government moving the
Public Private Partnership and Public Investment Advisory Project from the
Ministry of Finance to the Presidential Palace.572
President Ghani also announced that the World Bank and donors to the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund “in principle pledged to provide
us $100 million” for doses of a COVID-19 vaccine, with the ADB pledg-
ing another $40 million, as part of the International Vaccine Coalition. A
Ministry of Public Health spokesperson announced that it would take seven
months for the first doses of a vaccine to arrive in Afghanistan. The govern-
ment is planning to provide the vaccine first to public workers, teachers,
employees of companies, senior citizens, health workers, and patients.573
However, Duke University’s Global Health Innovation Center warned that
a vaccine may not be widely available to the populations of low-income

countries like Afghanistan until as late as 2023 or 2024, as high-income

countries have already purchased most of the short-term supply.574
12 Killed in Jalalabad During

Cross-Border Trade Problems with Pakistan Persist
Afghanistan’s trade with Pakistan, its largest trading partner, precipitously
Stampede Over Pakistani Visas
On October 21, 2020, 12 women were killed
dropped due to COVID-related border closures. Even with the reopening of
in a stampede in Jalalabad, sparked by the border crossings between the two countries in July, disruptions persisted.
demand for Pakistani visas. Before dawn, a In late October 2020, there were reported shipping delays due to shortages
crowd of around 10,000 had gathered in a of container-tracking devices necessary to clear goods at border crossings.
Jalalabad soccer stadium where Pakistani As a result, loaded trucks have been stranded on both sides of the border.
officials from the nearby consulate were This has been particularly troublesome for perishable cargo.575 In the first
handing out tokens allowing the holder to quarter of FY 2021, Pakistani exports to Afghanistan fell from about $244
apply for a visa. The consulate had recently million to $209.9 million (-14%) compared to the same period of the previ-
reopened, after being closed for eight ous fiscal year.576 In mid-December 2020, Pakistani exports to Afghanistan
months due to Pakistan’s COVID-related at the Torkham border crossing were completely halted when Pakistani
travel restrictions, and began to reissue
customs-clearing officials went on strike to protest inadequate facilities.577
visas, though they were limited to only 1,000
Despite these problems, the Afghan and Pakistani governments contin-
per day. The women who were killed, as well
as many others in the stadium, were seeking
ued to work to normalize and expand cross-border trade this quarter. On
visas for medical treatment in Pakistan. November 19, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan made his first visit to
The deadly stampede erupted as Pakistani Kabul to discuss the Afghan peace talks and other bilateral issues, includ-
officials began handing out the tokens. ing connectivity and trade between the two countries ahead of the expiring
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement in February 2021. His
Source: New York Times, Zabihullah Ghazi and Fahim visit sparked a number of protests around the country blaming Pakistan
Abed, “Demand for Pakistan Visas Sets Off Deadly
Stampede in Afghanistan,” 10/21/2020. for the continued violence, as militants have been able to operate from
Pakistani territory.578
In a November 30 statement by the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, Pakistan
announced that it would establish 12 Joint Trade Markets (JTM) along the
international border in conjunction with Afghanistan in an effort to “pro-
mote the well-being of the people living on both sides of the Durand Line
[the late 19th-century, British-drawn border], rehabilitate those affected
by anti-smuggling drive[s], economically integrate the neglected areas,
formalize bilateral trade and transform local economies.” The first JTM is
scheduled to open in February 2021 at Shaheedano Dand in Kurram Tribal
District in northwestern Pakistan as a pilot project.579
During an early-December 2020 visit to the border town of Chaman
in Balochistan, Pakistani Railways Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed also
announced a new, 11-kilometer railway connection between Chaman and
Spin Boldak across the border in Afghanistan, with the potential to extend
to Kandahar City. Pakistan is also improving railway connections between
the port of Karachi and Chaman.580 An Afghan delegation led by Afghan
Minister for Commerce and Industry Nisar Ahmad Ghoryani met with
Pakistani officials in Islamabad December 28–30, 2020, to continue discus-
sions on a revised Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and on a
preferential trade agreement between the two countries.581

Afghan Government Delays New Value Added Tax Until 2022

State informed SIGAR this quarter that the Afghan government has delayed
the implementation of the new value added tax (VAT), originally sched- Value added tax (VAT): A tax levied on the
uled for December 2020, until 2022 over concerns that implementing a value added to products at each stage of
new tax on consumers could have negative consequences in the midst of the supply chain, from production to point
the pandemic.582 of sale, minus the costs of any previous
Anticipating a decline in external donor funding in the coming years, the stages. Based on consumption rather than
income, it has the potential to increase
Afghan government has been formulating plans to improve revenue collec-
tax revenue without impinging on business
tion and develop additional sources of sustainable domestic revenue.583 In
investments.
2015, the government doubled the business receipts tax (BRT) from 2% to
4%, drawing much criticism from the business community, which argued Business receipts tax (BRT): A tax based
such a measure stifled growth in the private sector.584 on total gross income from sales of goods
In 2016, following several years delay, the Afghan government approved or services before any deductions.
plans for the VAT setting a 10% rate to replace the BRT—responsible for
around 17% of collected taxes—for businesses with revenue over 150 mil-
lion afghani.585 The VAT is intended to rectify many tax-evasion problems
Source: Government of Afghanistan, Income Tax Law, Official
associated with the BRT, increase tax revenue, and help formalize and doc- Gazette 976, 3/18/2009.
ument the production chain. Moreover, to encourage domestic production

and ensure cost competitiveness for Afghan exports, the 10% VAT rate will
be imposed on all imports, but not on exports.586 The Afghan government
projects that switching from a BRT to a VAT for taxpayers above the thresh-
old of 150 million afghanis will translate into an additional 1.8% of GDP in
revenue generation.587 According to the Ministry of Finance, the VAT “will
play a key role in achieving the Afghanistan’s leadership vision of building a
sustainable, self-reliant economy and reducing donor dependency.”588
While the VAT has potential benefits in the long term, the transition to the
new tax and the accrual of additional revenue for the Afghan government
will be gradual. In the first few years, it is not expected to bring in much
more revenue compared to the BRT, especially as the tax administration
and business community learn and adjust to the new tax regulations, and
may modestly increase poverty by partially shifting the cost burden onto
customers.589 The VAT’s impact on the poorest households will be partially
mitigated by exemptions for basic foodstuffs.590
Civil Aviation Struggles with COVID-Related Revenue Losses

Ahead of Airport Transfer
The COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on international and domestic
air travel has led to financial losses for Afghanistan’s civil aviation sec-
tor. The Afghan government grounded domestic flights on April 21, 2020,
and resumed them on June 17. On June 13, however, international airlines
suspended most air travel to Afghanistan due to the spread of COVID-19,
following a period of gradual reduction. Of the 11 international airlines that
fly to Afghanistan, according to State, only Air Arabia, Emirates, and Fly
Dubai had resumed international flights as of December 2020.591

Among Afghanistan’s domestic carriers, Ariana Afghan Airline (AAA)

lost $22.5 million and Kam Air $13 million.592 Moreover, AAA was forced to
cut most salaries by 30% and fired 650 employees. Kam Air placed 70% of its
employees on leave without pay. By the end of 2020, the revenue generated
by the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA), largely from fees for
the use of Afghan airspace and airports, declined by 28% compared to the
previous year due to suspended air travel, SIGAR analysis of Afghan govern-
ment accounting data showed.593
These revenue losses come as NATO’s Resolute Support mission is pre-
paring to hand over full responsibility to the ACAA for Afghanistan’s four
international airports in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif. The
airports are currently under joint control by NATO and the ACAA. NATO
plans to hand over the airports in 2021, State informed SIGAR last quar-
ter, but the precise timing remains under review by NATO and the Afghan
government.594
This transfer has long been planned. While the U.S. government initially
intended to transfer management of Afghanistan’s civil aviation to the
Afghan government at the end of 2014, the transfer was delayed one year in
part due to the lack of certified air traffic controllers, according to a 2015
SIGAR audit.595 Following the delay, the Afghan government failed to award
an airspace-management contract, citing high prices, which required State
to fund an interim $29.5 million DOD-managed contract through September
2015 to avoid air service interruptions.596 SIGAR’s 2015 civil aviation audit
further found that the Afghan government failed to use all of its overflight
revenue for airspace management, despite pledging to do so, which con-
tributed to Afghanistan’s inability to independently manage civil aviation
operations.597 In 2015, the U.S. government transferred control of airspace
management to the ACAA, but NATO’s Resolute Support continued to
shoulder key civil aviation responsibilities at Afghanistan’s international
airports, in particular for the five essential aviation functions of air traffic
control; fire, crash, and rescue; safety management; meteorological service;
and communication, navigation, and surveillance.598
In 2019, the ACAA director general noted that the ACAA remains roughly
two to three years away from achieving the necessary personnel, finan-
cial, and regulatory capacity to independently shoulder all civil aviation
responsibilities within Afghanistan.599 Some Afghan officials have contin-
ued to express concern over the insufficient number of trained Afghan
personnel able to take over the functions currently handled by NATO, as
the ACAA is unprepared to run the airports without international support.
In a November 2020 interview, the Director of Civil Aviation at Kandahar’s
Ahmad Shab Baba International Airport explained that local Afghans have
not been trained to run critical tasks such as air traffic control or manning
the radar. He added, “Our guys are not even able to start the fire trucks. If
the U.S. leaves, the airport will be in trouble.”600

NATO training of local Afghan civil aviation staff was delayed by COVID-
19, and then canceled after determining the Afghan trainees were “not
capable of being trained” as they lacked basic qualifications, according to
Kandahar Governor Hayatullah Hayat. An ACAA spokesperson, however,
announced that the Afghan government will be able to take control of
the international airports by May 2021, adding that “some of our foreign
colleagues will still be coordinating with us in some of the sectors of the
airports after the handover is finished.”601
FISCAL UPDATE
Afghanistan’s sustainable domestic revenues contracted by 2.8% during
2020 as compared to 2019, due to the economic downturn from the pan-
demic (Figure 2.33, on the following page).602 Overall government revenues
dropped 20.7% by Month 6 (May 21–June 20, 2020) of FY 1399 compared
to the previous year. With the partial lifting of the lockdown and the re-
opening of the border to trade, domestic revenue generation rebounded in
the second half of 2020. During Month 9 of FY 1399, for instance, customs
revenue increased by 42.2% from the previous month, according to publicly
available Afghan government revenue data.603
However, sustainable domestic revenues remained below the previous
year’s. Despite improvements following the reopening of the international
borders, customs revenue declined by 12.6%, year-on-year, during 2020.604
Afghan Deputy Minister of Finance Abdul Habib Zadran also announced
that the Afghan government had collected 174 billion afghanis ($2.25 bil-
lion) in tax revenue in FY 1399 (which concluded on December 20, 2020),
31 billion afghanis ($402 million) short of the FY 1399 revenue target and
a decrease from the previous year’s figure of 177 billion afghani ($2.29 bil-
lion). Zadran cited the COVID-19 pandemic for the tax-revenue shortfall and
noted the financial pressure of additional COVID-related expenses.605
As domestic revenues declined, government expenditures in 2020
increased by 8.1% compared to the previous year, SIGAR’s analysis of
Afghan government accounting data showed (Figure 2.34, on the following
page).606 The UNDP estimates total government expenditures will increase
Afghanistan’s deficit by around 4% of GDP. Deficit spending is expected to
be financed by the government’s cash reserves (around 10.6 billion afghanis
or $138 million as of September 2020) as well as short-term concessional
loans from the IMF’s Rapid Credit Facility and the World Bank.607

FIGURE 2.33
CUMULATIVE SUSTAINABLE REVENUE CHANGES (FY 1398–1399)

VERSUS SAME MONTH PRIOR YEAR
10%
Sustainable revenues were below prior-year levels throughout

5
the latest fiscal year, but the gap shrank in the second half...
0
-5 -2.8%
-6.9%
-10
-9.9% -9.8% -9.9%
-15 -13.1%
-15.2%
-15.9% -15.5%
-16.7%
-20 -18.5%
-20.7%
-25
-30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
MONTH
Source: SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1/10/2021 and 1/18/2020.
FIGURE 2.34
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE CHANGES (FY 1398–1399)

VERSUS SAME MONTH PRIOR YEAR
15% 13.5%
12.0%
10 8.4% 8.1%
5.1%
5 4.2%
3.1% 2.8% 3.2%
1.9%
-5 … while expenditures increased as compared to

-6.4% the previous year’s amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.
-10
-10.8%
-15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
MONTH
Source: SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1/10/2021 and 1/18/2020.

A USAID panel offers training for women-owned Afghan businesses.

(USAID Afghanistan photo)
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Under the current CDCS, USAID economic growth programs seek to
support and enhance export-led growth through direct interaction with
Afghanistan’s private sector, putting the country on the “road to self-reli-
ance.”608 Specifically, the strategy aims to:609
• strengthen trade connections between Afghanistan and
neighboring countries
• increase the competitiveness of Afghan private industry by
supporting export-ready firms
• create jobs via that firm-level support and by improving the
enabling environment for businesses
However, USAID programs face numerous obstacles in expanding licit

export growth within the timeframe set by USAID’s strategy (which covers
development support through 2023), particularly as a result of the COVID-
19 pandemic. During 2020, the World Bank projected the Afghan economy
to contract by an estimated 5.5–7.4% of GDP as a result of COVID-related
limitations on economy activity, inhibiting the impact of efforts to promote
future economic growth.610 Even before the pandemic hit, Afghanistan’s licit
economic growth was too low to reduce poverty rates and improve living
standards for most Afghans.611 Additionally, licit export levels stagnated in
2019, despite the fact that the Afghan government provided a majority of
the transit costs for exports through subsidized air corridors to incentivize
trade within the region.612 The pandemic exacerbated these economic chal-
lenges, along with uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of the Afghan
peace talks and the level of future donor support.
USAID’s active economic-growth programs have a total estimated cost of
$237.8 million and can be found in Table 2.17 on page 136.

USAID Programs Fall Short of FY 2020 Performance Targets

While USAID has been engaged in a number of economic growth projects
to promote international trade linkages and export competitiveness for
Afghan businesses, some of them have been forced to adapt or limit activi-
ties due to various COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. These restrictions
included mandatory teleworking for staff, limited ability to coordinate
with partners, impaired procurement processes, and suspension of in-
person activities such as trainings, in-person meetings, and monitoring
activities.613 As a result, some projects were unable to meet their FY 2020
performance targets.
The four-year, $9.5 million Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized
Population (LAMP) project was established in August 2018 to help create
sustainable jobs for internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and host
communities in Kabul, Ghazni, Khost, and Mazar-e Sharif through engag-
ing and supporting agricultural value chains, and helping with vocational
training and job placement.614 The World Bank and United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have noted the challenges IDPs and
returnees face in finding employment, with many living close to or below
the poverty line. Moreover, an influx of IDPs or returnees can create ten-
sions with host communities due to inadequate social services and scarce
economic opportunities.615
According to project implementer CARE International’s FY 2020 annual
report, LAMP already faced delays prior to the COVID-19 pandemic from
deteriorating security conditions and the dropout of program participants.
The government-mandated lockdown during the second quarter of FY 2020
led to the program staff switching to full-time telework and a suspension of
program activities, with staff providing support and advice to beneficiaries
using mobile communications. After the partial lifting of the lockdown, the
staff shifted to a 50% in-office rotating presence.616
As a result, the program was unable to meet its third and fourth quar-
ters’ performance targets for increasing employment and skills of Afghan
beneficiaries, gender equality and female empowerment, and private-sector
productivity, and so fell short of its annual targets.617 With a looming sec-
ond wave of the disease, the project’s annual report states, “COVID-19 is
still a severe challenge and threat to project staff members and its ben-
eficiaries. Due to the on-going COVID-19 threat and guidance by CARE
International, the project has limited access to communities, events, and
gatherings to a minimum. The risk of a second wave of COVID-19 and
quarantine persists.”618
As part of USAID’s Afghanistan Job Creation program, the four-year,
$9.7 million Goldozi Project also had its activities limited by COVID-19.
This project was launched in April 2018 to support the development, sales,
and marketing activities of Afghan women in the textile industry and to
bolster exports of their embroidered products. The government-mandated

lockdown caused project implementer FHI 360 to completely suspend train-

ing sessions, events, international travel, site visits, and other in-person
activities for nearly five months. As a result, Goldozi’s FY 2020 targets were
reduced by 30%.619
Conversely, USAID’s Exports, Jobs, and Market Linkages in Carpet and
Jewelry Value Chains project expanded its reliance on online platforms to
connect with customers during the pandemic and, therefore, was able to
exceed several performance targets for FY 2020, according to the project’s
annual report. The project created 3,046 new jobs in the carpet industry
against a target of 1,865, including surpassing the fourth-quarter target of
745 carpet jobs by creating 885. It also exceeded the annual target of 30
international clients engaged, reaching 104. With the partial lifting of the
lockdown, this project also saw sales increases for supported carpet pro-
ducers and jewelry artisans in the fourth quarter of FY 2020, rising from
$315,092 in the third quarter to $592,956.620
Amid COVID-19 Restrictions, USAID-funded Kabul Carpet

Export Center Addresses SIGAR Recommendations
In August 2020, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued its review of the
Kabul Carpet Export Center (KCEC). The KCEC was funded by USAID’s
Afghanistan Job Creation Program with a $9.4 million grant awarded to
Impact Carpet Associates (ICA) in June 2018 to establish the center. KCEC’s
purpose is to help bolster Afghan carpet exports and create jobs by address-
ing three main problems in the carpet industry: (1) burdensome processes
to airfreight carpets from Afghanistan, (2) a lack of access to export financ-
ing, and (3) the absence of a direct linkage and Web-based market for
overseas wholesale buyers.621
SIGAR found that KCEC was not yet fully operational as it had met
only four of the six requirements of the grant agreement; it has failed to
incorporate e-commerce capabilities into its website or engage with the
Afghan government to advocate for the streamlining of export regulations.
Moreover, the center has struggled to meet sales objectives and revenue
targets for both its first and second year of operations, inhibiting its ability
to become self-sufficient and sustain operations when USAID funding ends
in June 2021.
SIGAR’s review concluded with three recommendations, which USAID
agreed to implement by December 31, 2020: (1) direct ICA to immediately
update KCEC’s current website to include an HTTPS security protocol and
a comprehensive and secure public e-commerce capability for all current
and potential clients; (2) in conjunction with ICA, establish new targets
for performance and job creation and assess KCEC’s ability to achieve
financial self-sufficiency by June 2021. The assessment should also include
a reevaluation of KCEC’s marketing, sales, and operational strategies; and

TABLE 2.17
USAID ACTIVE ECONOMIC-GROWTH PROGRAMS

Cumulative
Afghanistan Competitiveness of Export-Oriented Businesses Activity (ACEBA) 1/28/2020 1/27/2025 $105,722,822 $5,000,729
Multi-Dimensional Legal Economic Reform Assistance (MELRA) 2/7/2018 9/30/2024 29,990,258 8,982,762
Extractive Technical Assistance by USGS 1/1/2018 12/31/2022 18,226,206 8,691,701
INVEST* 9/28/2017 9/27/2021 15,000,000 8,174,178
Afghanistan Investment Climate Reform Program (AICR) 3/27/2015 3/26/2022 13,300,000 6,911,319
Carpet and Jewelry Value Chains 1/31/2019 4/30/2023 9,941,606 3,606,929
The Goldozi Project 4/5/2018 4/4/2022 9,718,763 4,870,545
Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Population (LAMP) 8/1/2018 7/31/2022 9,491,153 3,190,783
Establishing Kabul Carpet Export Center (KCEC) 6/6/2018 6/5/2021 9,416,507 6,922,494
Recycling Plant Value Chain in Northern Afghanistan 6/5/2019 6/4/2023 7,250,000 849,373
Trade Show Support (TSS) Activity 6/7/2018 12/6/2020 6,921,728 6,216,187
Development Credit Authority (DCA) with Ghazanfar Bank 9/1/2018 8/30/2025 2,163,000 40,015
Afghanistan Loan Portfolio Guarantee 9/27/2017 9/26/2023 665,820 732
Total $237,807,863 $63,457,747
Note: *INVEST is a USAID initiative to mobilize and support private capital investment in development markets through technical assistance, networking, and capacity building.
(3) reassess the financing program and consider setting up a system that

conforms to prevailing lending norms of the Afghan industry.622
On December 30, 2020, USAID informed SIGAR that KCEC had success-
fully implemented the three recommendations; SIGAR therefore closed
them. ICA upgraded the project’s website with an enhanced HTTPS security
protocol which is updated regularly, and with a comprehensive and secure
public e-commerce capability for current and potential clients. Regarding
the second recommendation, USAID adjusted the indicator targets for job
creation (9,615 jobs), value of carpets exported (around $7.9 million), and
sales revenues (approximately $157,000). KCEC also changed its marketing
strategy focused digital platforms to help it achieve financial self-suffi-
ciency. To address the final recommendation, USAID terminated KCEC’s
loan program given the low likelihood of making any loans and authorized
the center to purchase $500,000 in carpets to support manufacturers during
the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.623
These reforms take place amid broader COVID-related restrictions on
KCEC’s activities. In the fourth quarter of FY 2020, KCEC participated in no
scheduled international carpet exhibitions and conducted no roadshows.
Following the reopening of the international borders and air travel during
summer 2020, KCEC was able to complete delayed carpet shipments to

the United States and Europe during the fourth quarter of FY 2020, totaling
1,187.35 square meters of carpet.624 USAID also informed SIGAR this quarter
that the 7% fee used for KCEC’s project income, based on the total value of
exports processed, was reduced to 2% due to changes in the roadshow sales
strategy and a marked decline in cargo industry export fees.625
To address COVID-related loss of business for Afghan carpet manufactur-
ers, KCEC has provided Trader Assistance Grants to spur new production
in the short term and provide immediate cash to manufacturers. With these
grants, KCEC is supporting two companies to establish cutting and washing
facilities in Afghanistan. Currently, about 90% of Afghan-made carpets are
sent to Pakistan for finishing according to international quality standards,
which adds most of the value to the final product, and for final export to
international markets, often with “Made in Pakistan” labels. The pandemic-
caused border closures, as well as on-going tensions between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, have highlighted the need to develop this domestic capacity as
part of the textile value chain.626
AGRICULTURE
Licit agriculture has served as a key foundation for Afghanistan’s formal
economy and one of its primary sources of exports. The agricultural sec-
tor directly employs approximately 40% of the country’s labor force and
directly or indirectly supports an estimated 80% of the total population.627
The service sector has gained prominence since reconstruction efforts
began, but agriculture is an important driver of GDP growth and developing
that sector remains a priority for external donors.628 In recent years, Afghan
farmers have struggled with the effects of nearly four decades of conflict,
poor market conditions, and the increasing prevalence of extreme weather
such as droughts and flash floods, with Afghanistan increasingly reliant on
agricultural imports to meet rising domestic demand for key crops.629
The COVID-19 pandemic has increased pressure on the agricultural sec-
tor as agribusinesses have lost revenues due to the economic contraction
and border closures. Even after the border crossings officially reopened, the
crossings were intermittently closed due to civil unrest or political clashes
with neighboring countries. Border crossings that remained open faced long
delays, resulting in the loss of large amounts of perishable cargo. Demand
for Afghan agricultural exports declined as overseas markets prioritized
domestic production to reduce reliance on imports.630 With limits on trad-
ing routes for Afghan exports, inadequate cold storage has made it difficult
for farmers to preserve crops while seeking markets for their goods. On
October 26, members of the Wolesi Jirga questioned Acting Minister of
Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock Anwarul Haq Ahadi over the lack of
construction of cold houses for farmers during FY 1399.631

Following the easing of the lockdown, USAID’s Agriculture Marketing

Program (AMP) conducted site assessments of broader limitations for agri-
businesses in Kabul, finding that:632
• The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant reduction in
production/processing as exports diminished due to border closures.
• Lack of stable and regular electricity is a common and persistent
challenge to these businesses.
• While large-scale exporters applied COVID-19 mitigation and prevention
plans in their workplaces, most medium- and small-scale agribusinesses
did not practice wearing masks or social distancing.
• Agribusinesses are usually understaffed or do not invest in human
resource for marketing, research, and business development.
• Agribusinesses take an interest in new markets, new product
development, value addition, but lack the capacity and skills for
such endeavors.
• Most businesses lack proper filing, accounting, inventory, and asset
registry systems.
If trade corridors for agricultural exports do not return to normal soon

and farmers continue to face limitations on what agribusinesses are able
to sell abroad, individual farmers might be tempted to offset income losses
from licit crops with the production and sale of illicit crops.633 During the
pandemic, there have been media reports of individuals engaging in poppy
cultivation to weather the economic downturn.634 However, as State told
SIGAR this quarter, overall there has been only a 2% decrease in agricultural
sales between FY 2019 and FY 2020, with expectations that the impact on
incomes and the potential for sales of illicit crops could be minimal.635
Since 2002, USAID has disbursed over $2.3 billion to improve licit agricultural
production, increase access to both domestic and international markets, and
develop income alternatives to growing poppy for opium production.636 USAID’s
active agriculture programs have a total estimated cost of $315.7 million and can
be found in Table 2.18. Total disbursements for State’s active alternative-liveli-
hood programs (Table 2.19)—which aim to transition opium-poppy farmers into
licit agriculture—were $109.2 million, as of December 16, 2020.
USAID Program Seeks to Bolster Agricultural Exports by Air

The USAID-funded Agriculture Marketing Program (AMP) is a three-year,
$33.8 million program focused on supporting Afghanistan’s agricultural sec-
tor through improving agricultural exports using five strategies:637
1. increase bulk agriculture exports to existing markets
2. expand the number of export products
3. develop new markets for Afghan exports
4. increase value-added of agriculture exports
5. develop remote rural areas to support the peace effort

TABLE 2.18
USAID ACTIVE AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS

Cumulative
Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management (SWIM) 12/7/2016 12/6/2021 $87,905,437 $37,761,922
Afghanistan Value Chains−Livestock 6/9/2018 6/8/2021 55,672,170 20,374,839
Afghanistan Value Chains−High Value Crops 8/2/2018 8/1/2023 54,958,860 18,614,502
Agricultural Marketing Program (AMP) 1/28/2020 1/27/2023 30,000,000 4,919,756
RADP East (Regional Agriculture Development Program−East) 7/21/2016 7/20/2021 28,126,111 21,498,943
Grain Research and Innovation (GRAIN) 11/8/2012 9/30/2022 19,500,000 11,856,867
Promoting Value Chain−West 9/20/2017 6/30/2021 19,000,000 16,300,963
USDA PAPA 9/30/2016 9/29/2021 12,567,804 127,323
Catalyzing Afghan Agricultural Innovation 5/28/2018 5/27/2023 8,000,000 3,450,955
Total $315,730,382 $134,906,070
TABLE 2.19
STATE-INL ACTIVE ALTERNATIVE-DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Obligated and
Disbursed, Cumulative,
Project Title Start Date End Date as of 12/16/2020
Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development - Access to Licit Livelihoods (CBARD-ALL) 8/25/2020 5/25/2025 $30,000,000
Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development (CBARD) West 9/1/2016 4/30/2022 24,368,607
Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development (CBARD) East 11/11/2017 4/30/2022 22,128,683
Boost Alternative Development Intervention Through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL) 8/12/2016 12/30/2021 20,000,000
Community-Based Agriculture and Alternative Development - Access to International Market (CBARD-AIM) 7/30/2019 4/30/2023 8,900,000
Monitoring and Impact Assessment of High-Value Agricultural Based Interventions 8/30/2016 12/30/2022 3,810,530
Total $109,207,820
Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
According to the project’s latest quarterly report (covering July–

September 2020), AMP has undertaken several initiatives to boost
agricultural exports amid the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19
pandemic and by border closures. One such initiative is organizing a new
air export program to boost agricultural exports in the near term. This new
program subsidizes agricultural exports by air to the UAE and India. The
first flight left Kabul for Sharjah, UAE, on September 27, 2020, carrying 37
metric tons of various horticultural products—totaling over 109,000 kilo-
grams with a value of almost $290,000—from three agribusinesses.638
The Afghan government’s current air-corridor exports largely rely upon
available cargo space on passenger flights, which prioritize passenger

Tons of Afghan fruit await USAID-facilitated air shipment to Dubai.

baggage, limiting the capacity for each shipment. As part of this new air
export program, AMP contracted dedicated charter flights for agricultural
exports, allowing participating agribusinesses to bypass limited space on
passenger flights and avoid spreading cargo over several flights. Instead,
they export commercial volumes within a single shipment to avoid the
delays associated with traditional export methods.639 AMP noted several
limitations of this pilot program, including the absence of sufficient cold
chain infrastructure to maintain product quality and high per-kilo costs due
to current high demand for cargo flights and current COVID-19 restrictions,
with the total cost of the pilot program adding up to over $304,000.640 These
shipments are in addition to the $2.6 million worth of agricultural exports
to existing markets in India, UAE, and Kazakhstan and $5 million worth
of exports to new markets facilitated by AMP during the fourth quarter of
FY 2020.641
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES

A major objective of U.S.-led reconstruction efforts has been to support
and expand Afghanistan’s physical infrastructure base, with the purpose of
bolstering economic development, stability in the country, and confidence
in the government. Since 2002, the U.S. government has built and expanded
electricity infrastructure, bridges and roads, urban water access, and edu-
cation and health facilities.642 USAID is still working to complete several
large capital projects involving the construction of transmission lines and
substations—legacy projects underpinned by the assumption that the best

way to expand electricity access in Afghanistan was to build a nationwide

power grid.643
While Afghans’ access to the power grid has increased since 2002, only
approximately 30% of the population currently has access to grid-based
power. Limited access to reliable power remains a factor in Afghanistan’s
sluggish economic growth. Moreover, the existing power infrastructure
remains inadequate to meet the economy’s power needs, leaving the coun-
try heavily reliant on imported power from neighboring countries. To
expand access to grid-based power, DOD and USAID have worked to con-
nect the country’s Northeast Power System, (NEPS) with its southeastern NEPS: imports electricity from Central Asia
counterpart, the Southeast Power System (SEPS). A 470-kilometer trans- to provide power to Kabul and the commu-
mission line constructed by USAID will eventually link them. nities north of Kabul.
The fragmented nature of Afghanistan’s power sector presents a number
of technical challenges to establishing this link, such as synchronization. SEPS: draws most of its power from the
Unconnected (“islanded”) power grids rely on different supply sources, Kajaki Dam and from diesel generators
in Kandahar City to provide power in the
including imported power, and therefore must handle electricity generated
Helmand and Kandahar areas.
at different speeds and frequencies. Afghanistan’s national power utility
Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) is responsible for working with
neighboring countries to match (or synchronize) imported power with
domestically generated power before electricity can safely flow from NEPS Source: DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability
in Afghanistan, 11/2013, p. 107.
to SEPS once the connection is established.
However, an expansive power infrastructure remains vulnerable to
persistent insecurity in many parts of the country. In late October 2020,
for instance, DABS announced that Taliban forces had severely damaged
an electricity pylon in Herat’s Ghoryan District responsible for transfer-
ring electricity from Iran to Herat Province. Local officials identified
such attacks as a lingering problem in the area. As a result of the October
attack, nearly 50% of Herat’s population was left without power. DABS
officials stated that security conditions around the damaged pylon delayed
engineers from making immediate repairs.644 During the fourth quarter of
FY 2020, agribusinesses in Kabul also reported frequent power outages due
to Taliban attacks on power lines and disruptions of electricity imports
from neighboring countries. This limited their ability to fulfill orders at full
capacity, given the high costs of running generators capable of powering
large processing machinery.645
In more recent years, however, U.S.-funded reconstruction has shifted
away from large capital projects like roads and transmission lines toward
smaller-scale projects, including solar and wind power plants. To incentiv-
ize more private-sector investments in the energy sector, in line with the
broader U.S. economic growth strategy, USAID has subsidized the upfront
costs of constructing solar and wind power plants for independent power
producers (IPPs). The profitability and commercial viability of such proj-
ects is premised on power-purchase agreements (PPA) with DABS that
allow IPPs to recover their upfront costs for construction.646 With the

Afghan government heavily reliant on international donors, DABS’ long-

term financial stability depends on either a continuation of the current
SIGAR OVERSIGHT
level of donor assistance or on the Afghan government’s ability to gener-
OF AFGHANISTAN’S
ate far greater domestic revenues—both areas of great uncertainty in the
ENERGY SECTOR
coming years.647
Given the U.S. government’s significant
investment in Afghanistan’s energy Some Remaining USAID Power-Infrastructure Projects
sector and the importance of available, Continue to Face Delays
reliable power to support the overall USAID has five ongoing power-infrastructure projects; DOD’s projects are
success of the reconstruction effort, complete. Current USAID projects include the construction of:648
SIGAR has focused a considerable • a transmission line between Ghazni and Kandahar Provinces
portion of its oversight portfolio on (87.1% complete as of October 9, 2020, with a completion date of
projects and programs in the sector. September 7, 2021)
An ongoing SIGAR audit is examining • substations along the transmission line from Ghazni to Kandahar (44%
the broad scope of U.S. investment in complete as of October 9, 2020, with an expected completion date of
the Afghan energy sector since 2009, July 30, 2023)
including efforts to improve generation, • transmission lines and substations in SEPS (34% complete as of October
transmission, and distribution. 9, 2020, expected completion date of July 23, 2023)
• a wind farm in Herat Province (the Notice to Proceed was issued on
Additionally, SIGAR has a number of October 28, 2020, with an expected end date in February 2021)
ongoing inspections of key energy- • a floating solar power plant to be constructed on the Naghlu Dam
infrastructure projects examining Reservoir in Kabul Province (no completion date established as the
whether construction was completed Notice to Proceed is pending finalization of a PPA with DABS, but at
in accordance with requirements and least one-and-a-half years away)
whether the constructed infrastructure
is being used as intended and Three of USAID’s five active projects are delayed.649 USAID’s work on
maintained. SEPS evolved from a separate contract that was originally supposed to be
complete by November 2013—meaning it is now over seven years behind
schedule.650 The NEPS-SEPS connecting transmission lines and substations
between Ghazni and Kandahar were originally supposed to be completed by
the end of 2016—meaning they are four years behind schedule.651 Moreover,
as of the end of FY 2020, this project failed to meet its FY 2020 construction
target, completing only 18 kilometers of a planned 280 kilometers of trans-
mission line between Ghazni and Kandahar, according to DABS’ annual
performance indicator progress report.
As an explanation for failing to meet its FY 2020 target, DABS cited a
January 2020 explosion that killed five project staff members and caused
a 38-day delay; the COVID-19 lockdown and border closures leading to
restrictions on mobility and lack of construction materials such as cement
and steel; and COVID-related delays with the procurement process for a
new demining and reclearance contract, which expired in May 2020. As a
result of these issues, construction on the transmission line has been halted
since May 30, 2020. With the project completion date originally set for
December 31, 2020, DABS noted that “the contract requires an extension

for the completion of the remaining construction work and the successful
implementation of the project.”652 USAID informed SIGAR this quarter that
the contract was extended to September 7, 2021, to enable the completion
of the transmission line.653
Cumulatively, USAID has disbursed approximately $2.02 billion since
2002 to build power plants, substations, and transmission lines, and to
provide technical assistance in the power sector.654 USAID’s active power-
infrastructure projects have a total estimated cost of $821.4 million and are
presented in Table 2.20.
TABLE 2.20
USAID ACTIVE ENERGY PROJECTS

Cumulative
Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) 1/1/2013 12/31/2023 $316,713,724 $272,477,914
Design and Construct of SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Connector Substations 7/3/2019 7/30/2023 159,794,733 64,035,450
Contribution to AITF (Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund) 3/7/2013 3/6/2023 153,670,184 153,670,184
Engineering Support Program 7/23/2016 1/22/2022 125,000,000 87,518,517
25 MW Wind Farm in Herat Province 10/22/2019 12/24/2021 22,994,029 0
Design and Acquisition of SEPS Completion and NEPS-SEPS Connector 3/7/2018 6/27/2022 20,151,240 7,370,421
20 MW Floating Solar Installation-Naghlu 1/27/2020 7/26/2021 16,100,000 0
Partnerships for Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER) grants 7/25/2011 7/23/2021 5,440,647 5,440,647
Energy Loss Management Visualization Platform Activity 1/25/2020 1/24/2022 1,579,973 473,991
Total $821,444,530 $590,987,124
Afghan Government Authorizes Permits for USAID-Funded

Wind Farm in Herat
On October 28, 2020, the Afghan government issued a notice to proceed,
allowing construction to begin on a 25 MW wind farm in Herat Province.
USAID will contribute $23 million to help subsidize the upfront construc-
tion costs of the $43 million project, developed jointly with the independent
power producer (IPP) 77 Construction. That IPP will operate the wind farm
under a 20-year power-purchase agreement with DABS, allowing them to
recoup their upfront construction costs. Once completed, the wind farm
will provide power to an estimated 300,000 Afghan citizens and businesses
in Herat and help “demonstrate the commercial viability of generating
affordable, reliable, and accessible power from wind resources in north-
west Afghanistan,” according to USAID.655

USAID has increasingly focused on supporting the development of

renewable energy resources in Afghanistan. On October 16, 2019, a 10
MW solar power plant in Kandahar began commercial operations. USAID
provided $10 million in incentive funds for an IPP to construct and oper-
ate the plant. This project represented the first private-sector investment
in Afghanistan’s renewable energy sector.656 In late-September 2020, DABS
signed deals for four new public-private partnership energy projects with
private investors representing $160 million in investment, with USAID
funding approximately $23 million of the total costs.657 The solar and wind
power plants are anticipated to add around 110 MW of capacity to the
national grid over the next 18 to 27 months.658
Speaking at the 2020 Climate Ambition Summit in mid-December,
President Ghani said, “We have some of the most abundant supplies of sun,
water, and wind” which could “collectively produce 300,000 megawatts of
power.” He then referenced the memorandum of understanding the Afghan
government signed with Siemens Energy on November 16, 2020, for the
company to develop, in part, the renewable-energy sector in Afghanistan,
which President Ghani argued will “position us to become the regional hub
for reliable, sustainable and affordable energy.”659
Given the absence of reliable, grid-based power, facilities with pressing
electricity needs, such as hospitals, have also turned to renewable energy.
In June 2020, DABS installed solar panels in 10 hospitals throughout Herat
Province to provide emergency power, in place of often-unreliable backup
generators plagued by gaps in power generation due to delays in supply
switchover. This power is primarily used for essential equipment within
intensive-care units, such as ventilators, defibrillators, and patient-moni-
toring devices. The solar panels were financed by the World Bank’s Herat
Electrification Project. Hospitals’ access to emergency power is especially
necessary during periods of peak electricity usage in summer and winter
months when demand exceeds available supply, overwhelming the limited
power infrastructure and resulting in frequent power outages.660
EDUCATION
USAID-funded education programs aim to increase access to, and improve
the quality of, basic education, while also building the management capac-
ity of the Ministry of Education (MOE) to develop a self-sustaining national
education system in the long term. USAID’s strategy is premised on the
understanding that gains in social development, including a strong educa-
tion system, will help to bolster Afghan’s confidence in the government,
improve the overall “stability and inclusivity” of the country, expand “civic
participation,” and “create the conditions necessary for peace.”661 With one
of the youngest populations in the world—more than 40% of the Afghan
population is aged 14 or younger—developing a quality education system

Afghan grade-school girls attend a USAID-supported reading class.

serves as a long-term investment in human capital for the Afghan economy

and democratic system of government. Despite donor assistance, however,
Afghanistan has struggled to improve its education outcomes in recent
years in the face of continued insecurity and MOE’s capacity issues, with
many students remaining out of school, particularly girls.
Since 2002, USAID has disbursed more than $1.2 billion for education pro-
grams, as of January 4, 2021.662 The agency’s active education programs have
a total estimated cost of $351.9 million and can be found in Table 2.21.
TABLE 2.21
USAID ACTIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Cumulative
Support to the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) 8/1/2013 2/28/2021 $94,825,445 $87,473,156
Afghan Children Read (ACR) 4/4/2016 4/3/2021 69,547,810 55,535,830
Advancing Higher Education for Afghanistan Development (AHEAD) 8/5/2020 8/4/2025 49,999,917 495,917
Strengthening Education in Afghanistan (SEA II) 5/19/2014 9/30/2021 49,828,942 41,272,958
Textbook Printing and Distribution II 9/15/2017 12/31/2020 35,000,000 0
Let Girls Learn Initiative and Girls’ Education Challenge Programme (GEC) 6/29/2016 6/28/2021 25,000,000 25,000,000
Capacity-Building Activity at the Ministry of Education 2/1/2017 1/31/2022 23,212,618 19,679,892
Financial and Business Management Activity 7/5/2017 1/15/2021 4,384,058 3,874,195
Non-U.S. Organization Pre-Award Survey (NUPAS) for AUAF 8/6/2020 9/30/2022 101,025 0
Total $351,899,815 $233,331,947

Afghan Students Targeted Amid

COVID-19 Closes Afghan Schools Again
On March 14, 2020, the Afghan government announced school closures for
Worsening Security Conditions
an initial one-month period due to COVID-19, which was extended into the
On October 24, 2020, a suicide bombing
at the Kawsar-e-Danish education center in
fall.663 Beginning in early-August, the Afghan government began a phased
Kabul killed 24 people, including a number reopening of schools, with all schools opened by October 3, 2020.664 As
of teenage students, and injured another schools reopened, COVID-related challenges persisted. Soon after reopen-
57, according to an Afghan Ministry of ing, Ghor University was again shut down after dozens of students tested
Interior spokesperson. The suicide bomber positive for COVID-19.665 In Herat, public-health officials estimated that
had attempted to enter the building but approximately 40–50% of students in the province had contracted the dis-
was stopped by a security guard. He then ease by October 2020, according to a survey of blood samples.666
detonated the explosives in an alley outside Teachers have expressed concern over the surge in COVID-19 cases
the center. A Taliban spokesperson denied within schools, with most students reportedly not wearing masks. In one
involvement and the Islamic State-Khorasan school in Herat City, every single sample taken from students and teachers
(IS-K) later claimed responsibility. The private
tested positive for COVID-19. As a result, schools reported teacher short-
education center provides tutoring for higher
ages due to teachers contracting the disease and needing to quarantine.667
education students and is located in the
largely Shia neighborhood of Dasht-e-Barchi
In late November 2020, the Afghan government announced that grades
in west Kabul. In 2018, another education 1–6 would close until the new year due to increasing cases and grades
center in the same area of Kabul was 7–12 would continue until early December and then close until the spring.
targeted in an IS-K-claimed suicide bombing Midterm exams also were postponed until spring 2021. At the university
that killed 48 people. level, the Ministry of Higher Education announced that all universities
would be closed from November 28, 2020, until March 5, 2021, with stu-
Source: BBC News, “Afghan bombing: Kabul education dents’ final exams postponed to the beginning of the next educational year
centre attack kills at least 24,” 10/25/2020; Reuters,
Abdul Qadir Sediqi and Orooj Hakimi, “Suicide bombing over concerns for a second wave of COVID-19.668
at Kabul education centre kills 24, students among the
victims,” 10/25/2020.
UNICEF Reaches Agreement with Taliban for
Community-Based Schooling
In mid-December 2020, UNICEF announced that it had reached an agree-
ment with the Taliban, known as the Helmand Sangin Workplan, allowing
the UN aid organization to establish 4,000 community-based education
(CBE) classes covering the first three grades of primary school by March
2021 within territory controlled or influenced by the Taliban. These classes
are estimated to be able to reach up to 140,000 Afghan boys and girls. In
the announcement, UNICEF stated that there are currently 680 such infor-
mal classes within the targeted provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan,
and Faryab.
The agreement, a product of discussions with both local Taliban leaders
and the Taliban’s political office in Doha according to a UNICEF spokes-
person, is currently valid through the end of December 2021 and subject to
extension based on the understanding of both parties.669 Under the agree-
ment, according to media reports, the Taliban will recruit the teaching staff,
who must then be able to pass a test set by the MOE.670 A MOE spokes-
person stated that UNICEF did not inform ministry officials about the
agreement but added, “we welcome any move that enables Afghans to earn
education.”671 Ahead of the November 2020 donors’ conference in Geneva,

the Taliban spokesperson in Doha had previously stated that international

assistance to Afghanistan should be coordinated with the Taliban.672
CBE is an alternative approach to education based on informal classes,
usually consisting of 25–35 students, and largely held in individuals’ homes,
mosques, or other community buildings. With limited MOE resources and
reach in many parts of Afghanistan, CBE has been held up as an effective
means of expanding access to education, especially for female students,
in rural or other hard-to-reach areas where children are “unable to attend
formal schools due to insecurity, distance, or other constraints.”673 Of the
estimated 3.7 million currently out of school, 1.5 million reside in such
areas.674 USAID is currently supporting CBE in Afghanistan through three
education programs (Afghan Children Read, Education Quality Reform
in Afghanistan, and Girls’ Education Challenge); estimated costs total
$194.5 million.675
USAID’s Troubled Textbook Printing and Distribution

Project Extended
USAID informed SIGAR this quarter that it plans to extend its Textbook
Printing and Distribution II project, an on-budget project with the MOE, by
one year to December 31, 2021. As of January 6, 2021, USAID and the MOE
have approved the implementation letter for this extension, and it is await-
ing the Acting Minister of Finance’s signature.676 This project, launched in
September 2017, was originally planned to print and distribute 135 million
textbooks to Afghan schools through three phases, at a total cost of $75
million. However, after printing 12.2 million Dari and Pashto textbooks for
primary education as part of the first phase of the project, the original con-
tractor, Baheer Printing and Packaging in Kabul, had its contract cancelled
for falsifying certification documents during the bidding process.677
The MOE subsequently issued a revised contract for the already-printed
textbooks, with distribution to primary schools beginning in late August
2019, and initiated a new procurement process for the remaining 37 million
textbooks of the first phase, awarding new printing contracts to three inter-
national firms in early January 2020.678 That same month, USAID extended
the contract by one year to December 31, 2020; reduced the overall funding
to $35 million; and limited the project to its first phase only, which, at 49.2
million textbooks total, was less than half the number originally planned.
USAID attributed the reduction to “changes in the programming and bud-
getary environment.”679 In a September 24, 2020, letter, USAID further
agreed to a MOE request to:
1. Eliminate some optional subjects from the printing list of 37 million
textbooks.
2. Include Afghan Children Read and the MOE’s recently developed and
approved Grades 1–3 Pashto and Dari language books in the printing
list of 37 million textbooks.

3. Extend the contracts date until January 10, 2021, for 37 million
textbooks.
Following these changes, the total project cost was revised to about $24
million.680 USAID had previously signaled to the Afghan government its
intention to no longer engage directly on textbook procurement once this
project ends. A January 16, 2020, letter from USAID to Afghanistan’s Acting
Ministers of Education and Finance stated, “USAID encourages exploring
other mechanisms for the printing and distribution of future textbooks such
as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund/Education Quality Reform
in Afghanistan.”681
Ministry of Education Introduces Sexual-Abuse Prevention

Policy in Response to Logar Investigation
As a result of the investigation by the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) into
allegations that at least 165 boys were sexually abused in Logar Province,
the MOE introduced this quarter a policy on the prevention of sexual
harassment and abuse in schools. MOE officials worked with Logar legal
advocates to reform school regulations and curricula, emphasizing the
safety of children and awareness of child protection and antiharassment
laws. Further, legal advocates worked with the MOE to develop guidelines
and protocols to address sexual harassment and abuse on university cam-
puses, State informed SIGAR this quarter.682
In late-2019, allegations of sexual abuse were made public by the Logar
Youth, Social, and Civil Institution, which said it had discovered more than
100 videos of abuse on a Facebook page.683 To assess the truth of the allega-
tions, MOE officials visited the schools where the abuse was said to have
occurred and distributed confidential questionnaires to students and teach-
ers.684 According to the MOE’s analysis of data collected, “some respondents
reported [the] possibility of individuals who could have [an] inclination
towards child abuse; however, no child abuse was reported.”685 According
to the MOE, ministry officials then requested that the AGO investigate.686
According to State, the AGO’s investigation has identified 20 perpetrators;
there have been a total of nine convictions and a further four suspects,
including a Logar school official, indicted with warrants issued for their
arrest.687 In response to the investigation, the MOE announced its intentions
to reform its existing Comprehensive School Safety Framework to include
training on awareness and prevention of sexual harassment, sexual assault,
and gender-based violence.688
HEALTH
Afghanistan’s struggle with COVID-19 since late February 2020 has demon-
strated the many limitations and inadequacies of the country’s health sector.

TABLE 2.22
USAID ACTIVE HEALTH PROGRAMS

Cumulative
National Health Technical Assistance Program (NHTAP) 7/10/2020 7/9/2025 $117,000,000 $3,290,697
Urban Health Initiative (UHI) 10/14/2020 10/13/2025 104,000,000 458,906
Helping Mothers and Children Thrive (HEMAYAT) 1/7/2015 12/6/2020 66,292,151 64,850,473
Disease Early Warning System Plus (DEWS Plus) 7/1/2014 6/30/2022 54,288,615 34,588,615
Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey (ADHS) Follow-On 10/9/2018 9/9/2023 10,500,000 2,000,005
Central Contraceptive Procurement (CCP) 4/20/2015 11/28/2023 3,599,998 1,350,309
Sustaining Technical and Analytic Resources (STAR) 5/1/2018 9/30/2023 2,186,357 748,828
TB Data, Impact Assessment and Communications Hub (TB DIAH) 9/24/2018 9/24/2023 600,000 284,171
Total $358,467,121 $107,572,004
USAID asserts in its current strategy that advancing gains in Afghanistan’s

health sector will help the country become more stable and self-reliant.689
As the agency told SIGAR when it was developing the strategy in December
2017, “healthy people and health[y] communities are the bedrock of a
peaceful and stable nation.”690
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, though, Afghanistan struggled to
contain outbreaks of treatable diseases due to poor access to healthcare
services stemming from continued insecurity, repeated population dis-
placement, and insufficient resources, limiting the ability for public health
improvements to bolster political stability.691 “Nonetheless,” USAID told
SIGAR, “the health sector has continued to improve the population’s health
status by focusing on the main causes of morbidity and mortality as an
essential element of the social contract.”692 Even severely insecure areas
have demonstrated some progress in health-service delivery in recent years,
according to the World Bank.693
U.S. on- and off-budget assistance to Afghanistan’s health sector totaled
more than $1.4 billion as of January 4, 2021.694 USAID’s active health programs
have a total estimated cost of $358.5 million, and are listed in Table 2.22.
USAID-Funded Health Surveillance System Supporting

COVID-19 Response
The Disease Early Warning System (DEWS), established to monitor 15 pri-
ority, “epidemic-prone diseases” among other public-health indicators and
events, has been active in monitoring COVID-19 in Afghanistan. The surveil-
lance system has 513 active sentinel sites operating in regional, provincial,

UNDP-supported treatment centers offer preventive measures against transmission of

COVID-19. (UNDP photo)
and district hospitals and comprehensive and basic health centers covering
92% of the country’s districts, as of September 30, 2020.695
According to the project’s latest quarterly report (covering July–
September 2020), DEWS established an electronic data-entry program for
sharing epidemiological and laboratory COVID-19 data in all provinces
to assist with improved on-time data sharing and help accelerate early
response at the national and subnational levels, and reduce morbidity and
mortality.696 For COVID-19 data, DEWS’ sentinel sites have maintained 100%
daily reporting through the end of September 2020.697 In addition, the project
supported the expansion of lab capacity to 14 public-health labs in eight
provinces (with only one of the 14 labs testing for other diseases besides
COVID-19) and trained 208 mobile, rapid-response teams (RRTs) and 28
fixed-location teams on COVID-19 case definition, specimen collection,
investigation of cases, health education for refereeing mild or moderate
cases for home quarantine and severe cases to designated hospitals, as of
September 30, 2020.698

COVID-19 Slows Launch of USAID’s New Health Programs

As SIGAR reported in its October 2020 quarterly report, USAID moved
up the end date for its Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition to
September 11, 2020, as part of a transition to two new health programs:
the National Health Technical Assistance Program (NHTAP) and the Urban
Health Initiative (UHI).699
NHTAP is a five-year program to support the quality of and access to pri-
mary and secondary health services and improve health practices in rural
and peri-urban (or urban-adjacent) regions, especially for women of child-
bearing age and preschool-aged children. It will also support the Afghan
government’s management of the public health-care system in both the pub-
lic and private sectors.700
NHTAP was awarded on July 10, 2020, with a total estimated cost of
$117 million. The COVID-19 pandemic slowed the project’s start-up activi-
ties, particularly with the limitations on in-person meetings with Ministry
of Public Health officials and other stakeholders. Many of the introductory
meetings as part of the work-planning phase have taken place virtually as a
result. USAID also informed SIGAR last quarter that staff recruitment took
longer than usual.701 While a number of the 227 budgeted staff positions
remain unfilled, the project has been able to hire sufficient personnel (72
as of September 30, 2020) to ensure functional operations, according to the
project’s latest report (covering July–September, 2020).702
The Urban Health Initiative (UHI) was awarded on October 14, 2020,
with an estimated cost of $104 million. This is a five-year program to
improve the quality of and access to public and private health services,
public health education, and public health management within urban com-
munities in Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif. The
project is especially focused on supporting women, children, and other vul-
nerable populations such as slum dwellers and IDPs.703 UHI is currently in
the work-planning phase.704

3 OTHER AGENCY
OVERSIGHT
153
OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT
GOVERNANCE
OTHER AGENCYCONTENTS
OVERSIGHT CONTENTS
Completed Oversight Activities 156

KEY ISSUES & EVENTS 3
Ongoing Oversight Activities 157

A U.S. Marine liaison and an interpreter from the country of Georgia talk with villagers during a training exercise there to prepare
Georgian troops to contribute to the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. (USMC photo)


SIGAR’s enabling legislation requires it to keep the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems relating to the
administration of Afghanistan reconstruction programs, and to submit a
report to Congress on SIGAR’s oversight work and on the status of the
U.S. reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal
quarter. The statute also instructs SIGAR to include, to the extent possible,
relevant matters from the end of the quarter up to the submission date of
its report.
Each quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed
and ongoing oversight activities. This section compiles these updates.
Copies of completed reports are posted on the agencies’ respective
public websites.
The descriptions appear as submitted, with minor changes to maintain
consistency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations
in place of full names; standardized capitalization, punctuation, and pre-
ferred spellings; and third-person instead of first-person construction.
These agencies perform oversight activities in Afghanistan and provide
results to SIGAR:
• Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG)
• Department of State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)
• Government Accountability Office (GAO)
• U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
• U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General
(USAID OIG)

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This quarter, the participating agencies issued no oversight reports related
to reconstruction in Afghanistan.
U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

DOD OIG completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction
this quarter.
U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General–Middle

East Regional Operations
State OIG completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction
this quarter.
Government Accountability Office

The GAO completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction
this quarter.
U.S. Army Audit Agency

The USAAA completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction
this quarter.
U.S. Agency for International Development Office of the

Inspector General
USAID OIG completed no audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction
this quarter.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As of December 31, 2020, the participating agencies reported 17 ongoing
oversight activities related to reconstruction in Afghanistan. These activities
are listed in Table 4.1 and described in the following sections by agency.
TABLE 4.1
ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Agency Report Number Date Initiated Report Title
DOD OIG D2020-DEV0PD-0121.000 7/20/2020 Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injury Screening in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility
DOD OIG D2020-D000RJ-0155.000 7/6/2020 Audit of Coalition Partner Reimbursements for Air Transportation Services in Afghanistan
DOD OIG D2020-DEV0PD-0130.000 5/11/2020 Evaluation of U.S. Combatant Commands’ Responses to the Coronavirus Disease–2019
DOD OIG D2020-DEV0SR-0095.000 3/2/2020 Evaluation of the Operational Support Capabilities of Naval Support Activity Bahrain Waterfront Facilities
Evaluation of U.S. Central Command’s Defense of Critical Assets Within its Area of Responsibility
DOD OIG D2020-DEV0PC-0079.000 2/18/2020
Against Missiles and Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD OIG D2020-DEV0PD-0026.000 10/28/2019 Evaluation of Combatant Command Counter Threat Finance Activities
DOD OIG D2019-DEV0PD-0192.000 8/26/2019 Evaluation of DOD Processes to Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices
DOD OIG D2019-DISPA2-0051.000 2/6/2019 Evaluation of U.S. CENTCOM Kinetic Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures
Audit of Selected Grants and Cooperative Agreements Administered by the Public Affairs Section at
State OIG 21AUD011 12/3/2020
U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan
Audit of the Use of Non-Competitive Contracts in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations in
State OIG 20AUD111 9/30/2020
Afghanistan and Iraq
State OIG 20AUD098 9/10/2020 Audit of Department of State Compliance with Requirements Relating to Undefinitized Contract Actions
Information Report: Review of Department of State Preparations to Return Employees and Contractors
State OIG 20AUD110 9/02/2020
to Federal Office During the Global Coronavirus Pandemic
GAO 104616 11/4/2020 Budget Justification Review: Afghanistan Security Forces
GAO 104132 3/24/2020 Review of DOD’s Contingency Contracting
GAO 104151 2/28/2020 DOD Oversight of Private Security Contractors
GAO 103076 10/1/2018 Afghanistan Reconstruction Projects–Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
USAID OIG 881F0119 9/30/2019 Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Risk Management and Project Prioritization
Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/15/2020; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/15/2020; USAID OIG, response to
SIGAR data call, 12/15/2020; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 11/19/2020.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

DOD OIG has eight ongoing projects this quarter that relate to reconstruc-
tion or security operations in Afghanistan.
Evaluation of Traumatic Brain Injury Screening in the U.S.

Central Command Area of Responsibility
DOD OIG is determining whether U.S. Central Command screened, docu-
mented, and tracked DOD service members suspected of sustaining a
traumatic brain injury to determine whether a return to duty status for cur-
rent operations was acceptable, or whether evacuation and additional care
was required.
Audit of the Coalition Partner Reimbursements for Air

Transportation Services in Afghanistan
DOD OIG is determining whether DOD sought full reimbursement for air
transportation services provided to Coalition partners in Afghanistan in
accordance with DOD policy and international agreements.
Evaluation of U.S. Combatant Commands’ Responses

to COVID-19
DOD OIG is determining how the geographic combatant commands (less
U.S. Northern Command) and their component commands executed
pandemic-response plans, and is identifying the challenges encountered
in implementing the response plans and the impact to operations resulting
from COVID-19.
Evaluation of the Operational Support Capabilities of Naval

Support Activity Bahrain Waterfront Facilities
DOD OIG is determining whether the Ship Maintenance Support Facility
and Mina Salman Pier, which the U.S. Navy accepted in 2019, meet the oper-
ational requirements of the U.S. Navy. Specifically, DOD OIG is determining
whether the Ship Maintenance Support Facility meets staging and laydown
requirements, and whether the Mina Salman Pier meets berthing require-
ments for homeported and deployed vessels.
Evaluation of U.S. Central Command’s Defense of Critical

Assets Within its Area of Responsibility Against Missiles and
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
DOD OIG is determining whether U.S. Central Command is prepared to
defend critical assets within its area of responsibility against missile and
unmanned aircraft system threats.

Evaluation of Combatant Command Counter Threat

Finance Activities
DOD OIG is determining whether U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central
Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are
planning and executing counter-threat finance activities to impact adversar-
ies’ ability to use financial networks to negatively affect U.S. interests.
Evaluation of DOD Processes to Counter Radio Controlled

Improvised Explosive Devices
The objectives for this DOD OIG evaluation are For Official Use Only.
Evaluation of U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Kinetic

Targeting Processes and Reporting Procedures
DOD OIG is evaluating CENTCOM’s target-development and prosecution
processes, as well as poststrike collateral damage and civilian-casualty
assessment activities.
U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General–Middle

East Regional Operations
State OIG has four ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan
reconstruction.
Audit of Selected Grants and Cooperative Agreements

Administered by the Public Affairs Section at U.S. Embassy
Kabul, Afghanistan
The audit will examine grants and cooperative agreements administered by
the public affairs section at U.S. Embassy Kabul.
Audit of the Use of Non-Competitive Contracts in Support of

Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
The audit will examine the use of noncompetitive contracts in support of
Overseas Contingency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Audit of Department of State Compliance with Requirements

Relating to Undefinitized Contract Actions
The audit will examine the Department of State’s compliance with require-
ments relating to undefinitized contract actions.
Information Report: Review of Department of State

Preparations to Return Employees and Contractors to Federal
Office During the Global Coronavirus Pandemic
The information report will examine the Department of State’s preparations
to return employees and contractors to federal offices during the global
coronavirus pandemic.

Government Accountability Office

GAO has four ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan
reconstruction.
Budget Justification Review: Afghanistan Security Forces

Congress established the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in 2005
to build, equip, train, and sustain the Afghanistan National Defense and
Security Forces, which comprise all forces under the Ministry of Defense
and the Ministry of Interior. DOD data indicate that Congress has appro-
priated more than $83.1 billion in ASFF funding since 2005. In previous
technical assistance provided to the congressional defense committees,
GAO found that over $4 billion in funds for prior fiscal years were unex-
pended. Appropriations for the ASFF are available for obligation for two
years with five additional years available for disbursements.
Since fiscal year 2019, the ASFF has included four budget activity groups
(BAG): Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, Afghan Air Force,
and Afghan Special Security Forces. Each BAG is further divided into four
subactivity groups (SAG): sustainment, infrastructure, equipment and trans-
portation, and training and operations.
GAO will review (1) how much has been appropriated for Afghanistan
Security Forces Funds (ASFF) since the fund’s inception in 2005; (2) the
extent to which ASFF funds remain unobligated, and how that compares
with obligations since the fund’s inception in 2005; and (3) the extent to
which have ASFF funds been cancelled since the fund’s inception in 2005.
Review of DOD’s Contingency Contracting

DOD has long relied on contractors to support a wide range of worldwide
operations in a contingency environment, including military and stabil-
ity operations, and recovery from natural disasters, humanitarian crises,
and other calamitous events. Contracting in the contingency environment
includes logistics and base-operations support, equipment processing, con-
struction, and transportation. During recent U.S. military operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, contractors frequently accounted for more than half of the
total DOD presence. In 2008, Congress established in law the Commission
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) to review and make
recommendations on DOD’s contracting process for current and future con-
tingency environments. The CWC issued its final report in August 2011.
GAO will review (1) the extent to which DOD has addressed the recom-
mendations of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in policy, guidance,
education, and training; (2) how DOD has used contractors to support con-
tingency operations from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2019; and (3) the

extent to which DOD has established processes to track and report contrac-
tor personnel to support contingency operations.
DOD Oversight of Private Security Contractors

In 2007, private security contractors (PSCs) working for the U.S. govern-
ment killed and injured a number of Iraqi civilians, bringing attention to the
increased use of PSCs supporting the military in contingency environments,
such as ongoing operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. In 2020, DOD reported
that almost one-fifth of the roughly 27,000 contractors in Afghanistan were
performing security functions, including some 3,000 armed PSCs. DOD’s
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
and the Geographic Combatant Commands are responsible for guiding and
monitoring the department’s use of PSCs. GAO has previously reported on
and made several recommendations to improve DOD’s tracking and over-
sight of PSCs.
GAO will review the extent to which, since calendar year 2009, (1) DOD
has tracked and reported on the use of PSCs in support of contingency,
humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations and exercises; and (2) whether
laws, regulations, and requirements on the use of PSCs changed and how
DOD has implemented them into its processes to improve oversight.
Afghanistan Reconstruction Projects–Waste, Fraud,

and Abuse
The U.S. government has funded numerous reconstruction projects in
Afghanistan since September 2001. Since then, costs for U.S. military,
diplomatic, and reconstruction and relief operations have exceeded $500
billion, and GAO has issued about 90 reports focused in whole or in part on
Afghanistan. GAO received a request to review past work assessing recon-
struction efforts in Afghanistan and to identify the dollar value of any waste,
fraud, or abuse uncovered during the course of those reviews.
GAO will review prior work conducted on reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan that identified waste, fraud, and abuse, and will assess the
overall dollar amount of waste, fraud, and abuse uncovered through
these efforts.
U.S. Army Audit Agency

The USAAA has no ongoing audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction
this quarter.

U.S. Agency for International Development Office of

Inspector General
This quarter, USAID OIG has one ongoing report related to Afghanistan
reconstruction.
Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Risk Management and Project

Prioritization
The objectives of this audit are to determine to what extent USAID/
Afghanistan has a risk-management process in place to identify and mitigate
risks in the face of potential staff and program reductions that could impact
its development programs; how programs recommended for reduction or
elimination were determined; and what impact recommended changes
would have on USAID/Afghanistan’s current and future programs and
related risk management.

APPENDICES AND
ENDNOTES CONTENTS
Appendix A 166
Appendix B 172
Appendix C 174
Appendix D 179
Appendix E 186
Appendix F 189
Endnotes 196
The Official Seal of SIGAR

The official seal of SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts between the United States and
Afghanistan to provide accountability and oversight of reconstruction activities. The phrases in
Dari (top) and Pashto (bottom) on the seal are translations of SIGAR’s name.
APPENDICES
AND ENDNOTES
165
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
This appendix cross-references the sections of this report to the quarterly
reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), and to the semiannual reporting requirements
prescribed for inspectors general more generally under the Inspector
General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2) and the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91,
§1521. (Table A.3)
TABLE A.1
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Purpose
Section 1229(a)(3) To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping Ongoing; quarterly report Full report
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity
for and progress on corrective action
Supervision
Section 1229(e)(1) The Inspector General shall report directly Report to the Secretary of State Full report
to, and be under the general supervision and the Secretary of Defense
of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
Duties
Section 1229(f)(1) OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION — Review appropriated/ Full report
It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, available funds
and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment,
handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise Review programs, operations,
made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and of the contracts using appropriated/
programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such available funds
funds, including subsections (A) through (G) below
Section 1229(f)(1)(A) The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of Review obligations and SIGAR Oversight
such funds expenditures of appropriated/ Funding
available funds
Section 1229(f)(1)(B) The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by Review reconstruction activities SIGAR Oversight
such funds funded by appropriations and
donations
Section 1229(f)(1)(C) The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds Review contracts using Note
appropriated and available
funds
Section 1229(f)(1)(D) The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and Review internal and external Appendix B
associated information between and among departments, transfers of appropriated/
agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and available funds
nongovernmental entities
Continued on the next page

APPENDICES
TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)
Section 1229(f)(1)(E) The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate Maintain audit records SIGAR Oversight
future audits and investigations of the use of such fund[s] Appendix C
Appendix D
Section 1229(f)(1)(F) The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States Monitoring and review Audits
coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor as described
countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and
the Afghanistan National Development Strategy
Section 1229(f)(1)(G) The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments Conduct and reporting of Investigations
or duplicate billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions investigations as described
of Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated entities, and the
referral of such reports, as necessary, to the Department of Justice
to ensure further investigations, prosecutions, recovery of further
funds, or other remedies
Section 1229(f)(2) OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT — Establish, maintain, and Full report
The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee oversee systems, procedures,
such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General and controls
considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph (1)
Section 1229(f)(3) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT Duties as specified in Inspector Full report
OF 1978 — General Act
In addition, … the Inspector General shall also have the duties and
responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General
Act of 1978
Section 1229(f)(4) COORDINATION OF EFFORTS — Coordination with the Other Agency
The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the inspectors general of Oversight
cooperation of, each of the following: (A) the Inspector General DOD, State, and USAID
of the Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector General of the
Department of State, and (C) the Inspector General of the United
States Agency for International Development
Federal Support and Other Resources
Section 1229(h)(5)(A) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES — Expect support as Full report
Upon request of the Inspector General for information or requested
assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the
Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is
practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish
such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an
authorized designee
Section 1229(h)(5)(B) REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE — Monitor cooperation N/A
Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector
General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably
refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the
circumstances to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
Defense, as appropriate, and to the appropriate congressional
committees without delay

APPENDICES
Reports
Section 1229(i)(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS — Report – 30 days after the Full report
Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year end of each calendar quarter Appendix B
quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report summarizing, for the period of Summarize activities of the
that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end Inspector General
of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the
activities during such period of the Inspector General and the Detailed statement of all
activities under programs and operations funded with amounts obligations, expenditures,
appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of and revenues
Afghanistan. Each report shall include, for the period covered by
such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures,
and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation
activities in Afghanistan, including the following –
Section 1229(i)(1)(A) Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds Obligations and expenditures Appendix B
of appropriated/donated
funds
Section 1229(i)(1)(B) A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the Project-by-project and Funding
costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, program-by-program Note
together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, accounting of costs. List
the Department of State, and the United States Agency for unexpended funds for each
International Development, as applicable, of the costs to project or program
complete each project and each program
Section 1229(i)(1)(C) Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by Revenues, obligations, and Funding
foreign nations or international organizations to programs and expenditures of donor funds
projects funded by any department or agency of the United States
Government, and any obligations or expenditures of
such revenues
Section 1229(i)(1)(D) Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or Revenues, obligations, and Funding
frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any expenditures of funds from
U.S. government department or agency, and any obligations or seized or frozen assets
expenditures of such revenues
Section 1229(i)(1)(E) Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts Operating expenses of Funding
appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction agencies or any organization Appendix B
of Afghanistan receiving appropriated funds
Section 1229(i)(1)(F) In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding Describe contract details Note
mechanism described in paragraph (2)*—
(i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism;
(ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding
mechanism;
(iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United
States Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement,
or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from
potential contractors to perform the contract, grant, agreement,
or other funding mechanism, together with a list of the potential
individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers;
and
(iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based
the determination to use procedures other than procedures that
provide for full and open competition

APPENDICES
Section 1229(i)(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY — Publish report as directed at Full report
The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available www.sigar.mil
Internet website each report under paragraph (1) of this
Dari and Pashto translation
subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector
in process
General determines are widely used and understood in
Afghanistan
Section 1229(i)(4) FORM — Publish report as directed Full report
Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the
Inspector General considers it necessary
Section 1229(j)(1) Inspector General shall also submit each report required under Submit quarterly report Full report
subsection (i) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense
Note: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR’s website (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed,
and organized for future SIGAR use and publication.
* Covered “contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms” are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of Pub. L. No. 110-181 as being—
“any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:
To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.
To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.
To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan.”
TABLE A.2
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER

SECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (5 U.S.C. APP. 3) (“IG ACT”)
IG Act Section IG Act Language SIGAR Action Section
Section 5(a)(1) Description of significant problems, abuses, Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG Other Agency Oversight
and deficiencies member reports SIGAR Oversight
List problems, abuses, and deficiencies from See Letters of Inquiry at
SIGAR audit reports, investigations, and www.sigar.mil
inspections
Section 5(a)(2) Description of recommendations for corrective Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG Other Agency Oversight
action … with respect to significant problems, member l reports SIGAR Oversight
abuses, or deficiencies See Letters of Inquiry at
List recommendations from SIGAR audit reports www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(3) Identification of each significant recommendation List all instances of incomplete corrective action Posted in full at
described in previous semiannual reports on from previous semiannual reports www.sigar.mil
which corrective action has not been completed
Section 5(a)(4) A summary of matters referred to prosecutive Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG Other Agency Oversight
authorities and the prosecutions and convictions member reports
which have resulted
List SIGAR Investigations that have been referred SIGAR Oversight
Section 5(a)(5) A summary of each report made to the [Secretary Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG Other Agency Oversight
of Defense] under section 6(b)(2) (instances member reports
where information requested was refused or
not provided) List instances in which information was refused SIGAR Oversight
SIGAR auditors, investigators, or inspectors
Section 5(a)(6) A listing, subdivided according to subject matter, Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG Other Agency Oversight
of each audit report, inspection report and member reports
evaluation report issued ... showing dollar value
of questioned costs and recommendations that List SIGAR reports SIGAR Oversight
funds be put to better use

APPENDICES

Section 5(a)(7) A summary of each particularly significant report Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG Other Agency Oversight
member reports A full list of significant
reports can be found at
Provide a synopsis of the significant SIGAR reports www.sigar.mil
Section 5(a)(8) Statistical tables showing the total number Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG See reports of SWA/JPG
of audit reports and the total dollar value of member reports members
questioned costs
Develop statistical tables showing dollar value In process
of questioned cost from SIGAR reports
Section 5(a)(9) Statistical tables showing the total number of Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG See reports of SWA/JPG
audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation member reports members
reports and the dollar value of recommendations
that funds be put to better use by management Develop statistical tables showing dollar value In process
of funds put to better use by management from
SIGAR reports
Section 5(a)(10) A summary of each audit report, inspection Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG See reports of SWA/JPG
report, and evaluation report issued before the member reports members
commencement of the reporting period for which
no management decision has been made by the Provide a synopsis of SIGAR audit reports in Posted in full at
end of reporting period, an explanation of the which recommendations by SIGAR are still open www.sigar.mil
reasons such management decision has not been
made, and a statement concerning the desired
timetable for achieving a management decision
Section 5(a)(11) A description and explanation of the reasons for Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG See reports of SWA/JPG
any significant revised management decision member reports members
Explain SIGAR audit reports in which None

significant revisions have been made to
management decisions
Section 5(a)(12) Information concerning any significant Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG See reports of SWA/JPG
management decision with which the Inspector member reports members
General is in disagreement
Explain SIGAR audit reports in which SIGAR No disputed decisions
disagreed with management decision during the reporting period
Section 5(a)(13) Information described under [Section 804(b)] of Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG See reports of SWA/JPG
the Federal Financial Management Improvement member reports members
Act of 1996 (instances and reasons when an
agency has not met target dates established in a Provide information where management has not No disputed
remediation plan) met targets from a remediation plan decisions during the
reporting period
Section 5(a)(14)(A) An Appendix containing the results of any peer None conducted during the reporting period None
review conducted by another Office of Inspector
General during the reporting period; or
Section 5(a)(14)(B) If no peer review was conducted within that SIGAR has posted in full the results of, and Posted in full at
reporting period, a statement identifying the date reports from, SIGAR’s last peer review by FDIC OIG www.sigar.mil
of the last peer review conducted by another for the period ending 4/29/2019
Office of Inspector General
SIGAR received a rating of pass

APPENDICES

Section 5(a)(15) A list of any outstanding recommendations from All peer review recommendations have been Recommendations and
any peer review conducted by another Office implemented related materials posted in
of Inspector General that have not been fully full at www.sigar.mil
implemented, including a statement describing
the status of the implementation and why
implementation is not complete
Section 5(a)(16) Any peer reviews conducted by SIGAR of another SIGAR assisted the SBA OIG in conducting Final report published
IG Office during the reporting period, including a an inspection and evaluation peer review in full at www.hudoig.gov
list of any outstanding recommendations made of the HUD OIG’s Office of Evaluation.
from any previous peer review . . . that remain A report was issued May 12, 2020
outstanding or have not been fully implemented
TABLE A.3
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 115-91, §1521
Public Law Section NDAA Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Section 1521(e)(1) (1) QUALITY STANDARDS FOR IG PRODUCTS—Except as Prepare quarterly report in accordance Section 1
provided in paragraph (3), each product published or issued with the Quality Standards for Reconstruction Update
by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs Inspection and Evaluation, issued by Funding
and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces the Council of the Inspectors General
Fund shall be prepared— on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE),
(A) in accordance with the Generally Accepted Government commonly referred to as the “CIGIE
Auditing Standards/Government Auditing Standards Blue Book,” for activities funded under
(GAGAS/GAS), as issued and updated by the Government the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
Accountability Office; or
(B) if not prepared in accordance with the standards referred
to in subparagraph (A), in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (commonly referred to as the ‘‘CIGIE Blue Book’’)
Section 1521(e)(2) (2) SPECIFICATION OF QUALITY STANDARDS FOLLOWED— Cite within the quarterly report Inside front cover
Each product published or issued by an Inspector General the quality standards followed in Appendix A
relating to the oversight of programs and activities funded conducting and reporting the work
under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall cite within concerned. The required quality
such product the quality standards followed in conducting standards are quality control, planning,
and reporting the work concerned data collection and analysis, evidence,
records maintenance, reporting, and
follow-up

APPENDICES
APPENDIX B
U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Table B.1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by agency and fund per year, and Table B.2 lists
funds appropriated for counternarcotics initiatives, as of December 31, 2020.
TABLE B.2 TABLE B.1
COUNTERNARCOTICS ($ MILLIONS) U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ($ MILLIONS)

Cumulative Appropriations U.S. Funding Sources Agency Total FY 2002–09
Fund Since FY 2002 Security
ASFF 1,311.92 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) DOD $82,899.77 18,666.47
DICDA 3,284.94 Train and Equip (T&E) DOD 440.00 440.00
ESF 1,456.03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) State 1,059.13 1,059.13
International Military Education and Training (IMET) State 19.57 7.41
DA 77.72
Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO) State 69.33 69.33
INCLE 2,381.56
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) DOD 550.00 550.00
DEAa 490.54 Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA) DOD 3,284.94 1,118.23
Total $9,002.71 Total - Security 88,322.73 21,910.58
Table B.2 Note: Numbers have been rounded. Counternarcotics Governance & Development
funds cross-cut both the Security and Governance & Development
spending categories; these funds are also captured in those Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) DOD 3,711.00 1,639.00
categories in Table B.1. Figures represent cumulative amounts Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) DOD 988.50 0.00
committed to counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan since
2002. Intitatives include eradication, interdiction, support to Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) DOD 822.85 14.44
Afghanistan’s Special Mission Wing (SMW), counternarcotics-
related capacity building, and alternative agricultural development
Economic Support Fund (ESF) USAID 21,100.94 7,706.18
efforts. ESF, DA, and INCLE figures show the cumulative amounts Development Assistance (DA) USAID 887.59 884.90
committed for counternarcotics intiatives from those funds.
SIGAR excluded ASFF funding for the SMW after FY 2013 from Global Health Programs (GHP) USAID 559.63 392.09
this analysis due to the decreasing number of counterternarcotics Commodity Credit Corp (CCC) USAID 34.95 23.79
missions conducted by the SMW.
USAID-Other (Other) USAID 54.06 30.27
Table B.2 a DEA receives funding from State’s Diplomatic &
Consular Programs account in addition to DEA’s direct line Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR) State 881.34 348.33
appropriation listed in Appendix B. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) State 5,421.16 2,275.13
Table B.2 Source: SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding, Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) State 13.77 3.19
1/16/2021; State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2021;
DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2021; USAID, response Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE) State 96.56 36.58
to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2021; DEA, response to SIGAR data Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) State 493.81 29.47
call, 1/6/2021.
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) DFC 320.39 205.05
Table B.1 Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed
$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) USAGM 281.17 15.54
$178 million from FY 2013 ASFF, and $604 million from FY 2019 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) DOJ 281.13 127.44
ASFF to fund other DOD requirements. DOD reprogrammed
$230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. ASFF data reflects the following Total - Governance & Development 35,948.86 13,731.41
rescissions: $1 billion from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6,
$764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, $400 million Humanitarian
from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113, $150 million from FY 2016 P.L. 480 Title II USAID 1,095.68 664.39
in Pub. L. No. 115-31, $396 million from FY 2019 in Pub. L. No.
116-93, and $1.10 billion in FY 2020 in Pub. L. No. 116-260. International Disaster Assistance (IDA) USAID 1,152.67 342.27
DOD transferred $101 million from FY 2011 AIF, $179.5 million Transition Initiatives (TI) USAID 37.54 33.33
from FY 2013 AIF, and $55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF
to fund infrastructure projects implemented by USAID. Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) State 1,526.47 529.84
Table B.1 Source: DOD, responses to SIGAR data calls, Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) State 25.20 25.20
1/15/2021, 1/15/2021, 10/12/2017, 10/22/2012, USDA Programs (Title I, §416(b), FFP, FFE, ET, and PRTA) USDA 288.26 288.26
10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; State, responses to SIGAR
data calls, 1/14/2021, 1/13/2021, 1/7/2021, 10/13/2020, Total - Humanitarian 4,125.83 1,883.29
10/9/2020, 10/8/2020, 7/13/2020, 6/11/2020, 1/30/2020,
10/5/2018, 1/10/2018, 10/13/2017, 10/11/2017, Agency Operations
5/4/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, Diplomatic Programs, incl. Worldwide Security Protection (DP) State 11,220.07 1,481.50
10/5/2012 and 6/27/2012; OMB, responses to SIGAR data
calls, 4/16/2015, 7/14/2014, 7/19/2013 and 1/4/2013; USAID Operating Expenses (OE) USAID 1,661.97 309.70
USAID, responses to SIGAR data calls, 1/19/2021, 1/8/2021,
10/12/2020, 10/7/2020, 10/8/2018, 10/15/2010, Oversight 702.83 42.00
1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to SIGAR data Other 1,287.78 515.42
call, 1/6/2021, 10/7/2019, 6/30/2017 and 7/7/2009; DFC,
response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2020; USAGM, response Total – Agency Operations 14,872.65 2,348.62
to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020; USDA, response to SIGAR data
call, 4/2009; DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Total Funding $143,270.07 39,873.89
Program and Subaccounts December 2020,” 1/19/2020; OSD
Comptroller, 16-22 PA: Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request,
6/30/2016; Pub. L. Nos. 116-93, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235,
113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10, 111-212, 111-118.

APPENDICES
FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021
9,166.77 10,619.28 9,200.00 4,946.19 3,962.34 3,939.33 3,502.26 4,162.72 4,666.82 3,920.00 3,099.98 3,047.61
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.76 1.56 1.18 1.42 1.50 1.05 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.43 0.80 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
392.27 379.83 472.99 255.81 238.96 0.00 138.76 135.61 118.01 10.18 24.30 0.00
9,560.80 11,000.67 9,674.16 5,203.43 4,202.80 3,940.38 3,641.88 4,299.12 4,785.62 3,930.61 3,125.08 3,047.61
1,000.00 400.00 400.00 200.00 30.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 5.00 2.00
0.00 299.00 400.00 145.50 144.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
59.26 239.24 245.76 138.20 122.24 3.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3,346.00 2,168.51 1,836.76 1,802.65 907.00 883.40 633.27 767.17 500.00 350.00 200.00 0.00
0.30 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.00 0.00
92.30 69.91 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00
4.22 3.09 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.95 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.45 6.25 7.10 1.84 0.80 0.82 2.91 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00
70.74 69.30 65.32 52.60 43.20 43.50 37.96 37.00 36.60 38.30 38.50 0.00
589.00 400.00 357.92 593.81 225.00 250.00 210.00 184.50 160.00 87.80 88.00 0.00
1.29 0.60 1.98 1.63 0.10 0.99 0.76 0.25 2.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
5.76 6.45 8.17 2.46 7.28 3.95 2.65 2.39 2.71 9.08 9.08 0.00
36.92 49.92 58.73 53.03 43.17 41.79 41.35 40.31 36.12 32.72 30.28 0.00
60.25 40.25 3.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
27.41 24.35 21.54 21.54 22.11 22.68 23.86 25.91 25.74 25.89 24.60 0.00
19.20 18.70 18.70 17.00 18.70 9.05 3.31 11.03 11.11 13.01 12.92 0.96
5,316.09 3,795.57 3,425.34 3,030.85 1,573.62 1,270.90 961.06 1,075.81 783.64 567.89 413.71 2.96
58.13 112.55 59.20 46.15 65.97 53.73 26.65 4.69 4.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
29.61 66.23 56.00 21.50 28.13 24.50 39.78 93.84 119.64 152.35 178.61 0.23
0.84 1.08 0.62 0.32 0.82 0.49 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
80.93 65.00 99.56 76.07 107.89 129.27 84.27 89.24 77.19 86.69 100.53 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
169.51 244.85 215.38 144.04 202.82 207.99 150.74 187.76 201.05 239.04 279.14 0.23
859.14 730.08 1,126.56 1,500.79 752.07 822.19 743.58 843.20 858.27 824.94 677.76 0.00
197.60 172.20 216.02 174.64 61.75 137.00 95.30 102.17 77.52 72.34 44.16 1.58
34.40 37.20 59.00 58.70 62.65 68.60 62.37 55.74 55.67 55.81 55.76 54.94
610.33 2.02 4.48 4.69 12.95 12.81 23.55 15.98 23.85 25.96 23.33 12.41
1,701.47 941.50 1,406.06 1,738.82 889.41 1,040.60 924.79 1,017.08 1,015.31 979.05 801.01 68.93
16,747.87 15,982.59 14,720.94 10,117.14 6,868.65 6,459.87 5,678.47 6,579.78 6,785.61 5,716.59 4,618.94 3,119.74

APPENDICES
APPENDIX C
SIGAR WRITTEN PRODUCTS*
SIGAR AUDITS
Alert Letters Issued
SIGAR issued one alert letter during this reporting period.
SIGAR ALERT LETTER ISSUED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Report Identifier Report Title Date Issued
SIGAR 21-09-AL Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Efforts 11/2020
Performance Audit Reports Issued

SIGAR issued two performance-audit reports during this reporting period.
SIGAR PERFORMANCE-AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Report Identifier Report Title Date Issued
Afghan Air Forces: DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Afghan Aviation
SIGAR 21-14-C-AR 1/2021
Capability but Continued U.S. Support is Needed to Sustain Forces
Military Equipment Transferred to the Afghan Government: DOD Did Not
SIGAR 21-11-AR 10/2020
Conduct Required Monitoring to Account for Sensitive Articles
New Performance Audits

SIGAR initiated one new performance audit during this reporting period.
NEW SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS

Project Identifier Project Title Date Initiated
SIGAR 146A APPS 11/2020
Ongoing Performance Audits

SIGAR had 11 ongoing performance audits during this reporting period.
ONGOING SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

SIGAR 145A State Conventional Weapons Destruction 10/2020
SIGAR 144A ANDSF Women’s Incentives 10/2020
SIGAR 143A No Contracting With The Enemy Follow-Up 6/2020
SIGAR 142A Vanquish NAT Contract 7/2020
SIGAR 141A Post-Peace Planning 5/2020
SIGAR 140A ACC-A BAF Base Security 4/2020
* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and
events occurring after December 31, 2020, up to the publication date of this report.

APPENDICES
SIGAR 139A Anti-Corruption 3 2/2020

SIGAR 138A-2 DOD Enforcement of Conditionality (Full Report) 11/2019
SIGAR 137A ANA Trust Fund 12/2019
SIGAR 135A U.S. Investments in Afghan Energy 9/2019
SIGAR 132A-2 Counternarcotics/Counter Threat Finance (Full Report) 2/2019
Ongoing Evaluations
SIGAR had four ongoing evaluations during this reporting period.
ONGOING SIGAR EVALUATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

SIGAR-E-007 ARTF-2 5/2020
SIGAR-E-005 Financial Audit Summary 2/2020
SIGAR-E-003 Capital Assets 10/2019
SIGAR-E-002 Fuel Follow-Up 10/2019
Financial-Audit Reports Issued

SIGAR issued five financial-audit reports during this reporting period.
SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS ISSUED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Project Identifier Project Title Date Issued
USAID’s Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience Program: Audit of
SIGAR 21-13-FA 1/2021
Costs Incurred by DAI Global LLC.
Department of the Air Force’s Support for the Afghan Air Force’s C-130H
SIGAR 21-12-FA 9/2020
Airlift Capability: Audit of Costs Incurred by AAR Government Services Inc.
USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Project: Audit of
SIGAR 21-10-FA 9/2020
Costs Incurred by Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
Department of Defense’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program to
SIGAR 21-08-FA Enhance Biosafety and Biosecurity in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred 8/2020
by CH2M Hill Inc.
Department of State’s Demining Activities in Afghanistan: Audit of Costs
SIGAR 21-07-FA 8/2020
Incurred by the Mine Detection Dog Center

APPENDICES
Ongoing Financial Audits

SIGAR had 36 financial audits in progress during this reporting period.
ONGOING SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

SIGAR-F-221 International Legal Foundation 11/2020
SIGAR-F-219 Albany Associates International Inc. 11/2020
SIGAR-F-218 MCPA 11/2020
SIGAR-F-217 Premiere Urgence Internationale 11/2020
SIGAR-F-216 International Medical Corps 11/2020
SIGAR-F-215 Medair 11/2020
SIGAR-F-214 Chemonics International Inc. 11/2020
SIGAR-F-213 DAI 11/2020
SIGAR-F-212 Roots of Peace (ROP) 11/2020
SIGAR-F-211 Davis Management Group Inc. 11/2020
SIGAR-F-210 MSI - Management Systems International Inc. 11/2020
SIGAR-F-209 Engility LLC 9/2020
SIGAR-F-208 PAE Government Services 9/2020
SIGAR-F-207 Miracle Systems LLC 9/2020
SIGAR-F-206 The Asia Foundation (TAF) 9/2020
SIGAR-F-205 Demining Agency of Afghanistan (DAFA) 9/2020
SIGAR-F-204 AECOM International Development Inc. 3/2020
SIGAR-F-203 FHI 360 3/2020
SIGAR-F-202 The Asia Foundation 3/2020
SIGAR-F-201 DAI-Development Alternatives Inc. 3/2020
SIGAR-F-200 Development Alternatives Inc. 3/2020
SIGAR-F-199 Development Alternatives Inc. 3/2020
SIGAR-F-197 Internews Network Inc. 3/2020
SIGAR-F-196 ATC 12/2019
SIGAR-F-195 IDLO 12/2019
SIGAR-F-194 AUAF 12/2019
SIGAR-F-193 IAP Worldwide Services Inc. 12/2019
SIGAR-F-192 IAP Worldwide Services Inc. 12/2019
SIGAR-F-191 Sierra Nevada Corporation 12/2019
SIGAR-F-190 International Rescue Committee 12/2019
SIGAR-F-189 Save the Children Federation Inc. 12/2019
SIGAR-F-188 Associates in Rural Development 12/2019
SIGAR-F-187 Blumont Global Development Inc. 12/2019
SIGAR-F-186 Roots of Peace 12/2019
SIGAR-F-185 Counterpart International Inc. 12/2019
SIGAR-F-183 Tetra Tech ARD 12/2019

APPENDICES
SIGAR INSPECTIONS
Inspection Reports Issued
SIGAR issued no inspection reports during this reporting period.
Ongoing Inspections
SIGAR had 10 ongoing inspections during this reporting period.
ONGOING SIGAR INSPECTIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

SIGAR-I-072 Salang Tunnel Substation 9/2020
SIGAR-I-071 KNMH Morgue 10/2020
SIGAR-I-070 ANP FPT Phase 1 10/2020
SIGAR-I-068 Pol-i-Charkhi Substation Expansion 4/2020
SIGAR-I-067 MSOE @ Camp Commando 4/2020
SIGAR-I-066 KNMH Elevators 3/2020
SIGAR-I-065 ANA NEI in Dashti Shadian 1/2020
SIGAR-I-063 Inspection of the ANA MOD HQ Infrastructure & Security Improvements 11/2019
SIGAR-I-062 Inspection of the NEI Kunduz Expansion Project 11/2019
SIGAR-I-061 Inspection of the Kandahar 10 MW Solar Power Plant 7/2019
SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECTS

Special Projects Reports Issued
SIGAR issued one special-projects report during this reporting period.
SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT ISSUED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Product Identifier Product Title Date Issued
Hamid Karzai International Airport: Despite Improvements, Controls
SIGAR 21-15-SP 1/2021
to Detect Cash Smuggling Still Need Strengthening

APPENDICES
SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM

Ongoing Lessons-Learned Projects
SIGAR has four ongoing lessons-learned projects this reporting period.
ONGOING SIGAR LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

SIGAR LL-14 Empowering Afghan Women and Girls 10/2019
SIGAR LL-13 Police and Corrections 9/2019
SIGAR LL-11 U.S. Support for Elections 9/2018
SIGAR LL-10 Contracting 8/2018
SIGAR RESEARCH & ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Reports Issued
SIGAR issued one quarterly report during this reporting period.
SIGAR REPORT ISSUED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Product Identifier Report Title Date Issued
SIGAR 2021-QR-1 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress 1/2020

APPENDICES
APPENDIX D
SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE
SIGAR Investigations
This quarter, SIGAR opened two new investigations and closed 24, bringing
the total number of ongoing investigations to 96. Of the closed investiga-
tions, most were closed due to lack of investigative merit, unfounded
allegations, and administrative action, as shown in Figure D.1. The new
investigations were related to procurement and contract fraud, and theft as
shown in Figure D.2.
FIGURE D.1 FIGURE D.2
SIGAR’S CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS, OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2020 SIGAR NEW INVESTIGATIONS,
OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2020
Criminal Conviction Total: 2
Administrative Action
Civil Settlement
Procurement/ Theft
Lack of Investigative Merit Contract Fraud
1 1
Allegations Unfounded
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Total: 24
Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate,
1/4/2021.

APPENDICES
SIGAR Hotline
The SIGAR Hotline (By e-mail: sigar.hotline@mail.mil, web submission:
www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx, phone: 866-329-8893
in the USA, or 0700107300 via cell phone in Afghanistan) received 31 com-
plaints this quarter, as shown in Figure D.3. In addition to working on new
complaints, the Investigations Directorate continued its work this quarter
on complaints received prior to October 1, 2020. This quarter, the direc-
torate processed 73 complaints, most of which are under review or were
closed, as shown in Figure D.4.
FIGURE D.3 FIGURE D.4
SOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2020
OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2020
Complaints Received 31
Total: 31
Complaints (Open) 8
Gen Info File (Closed) 30
Investigation (Open) 0
Investigation (Closed) 4
Referral (Open) 0
Electronic Referral (Closed) 0
31
Suspension & Debarment (Closed) 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Total: 73
SIGAR SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS

Table D.1 is a comprehensive list of finalized suspensions, debarments, and
special-entity designations relating to SIGAR’s work in Afghanistan as of
December 31, 2020.
SIGAR lists its suspensions, debarments, and special-entity designations
for historical purposes only. For the current status of any individual or
entity listed herein as previously suspended, debarred, or listed as a special-
entity designation, please consult the System for Award Management, www.
sam.gov/SAM/.
Entries appearing in both the suspension and debarment sections are
based upon their placement in suspended status following criminal indict-
ment or determination of non-responsibility by an agency suspension
and debarment official. Final debarment was imposed following criminal
conviction in U.S. Federal District Court and/or final determination by an
agency suspension and debarment official regarding term of debarment.

APPENDICES
TABLE D.1
SPECIAL-ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020

Special Entity Designations
Arvin Kam Construction Company Noh-E Safi Mining Company Saadat, Vakil
Arvin Kam Group LLC, d.b.a. “Arvin Kam Group Security,” Noor Rahman Company Triangle Technologies
d.b.a. “Arvin Kam Group Foundation,” d.b.a. “Arvin Global Noor Rahman Construction Company Wasim, Abdul Wakil
Logistics Services Company” Nur Rahman Group, d.b.a. “NUCCL Construction Zaland, Yousef
Ayub, Mohammad Company,” d.b.a. “RUCCL Rahman Umar Construction Zurmat Construction Company
Fruzi, Haji Khalil Company,” d.b.a. “Rahman Trading and General Logistics Zurmat Foundation
Muhammad, Haji Amir Company LLC Zurmat General Trading
Haji Dhost Mohammad Zurmat Construction Company Rahman, Nur, a.k.a. “Noor Rahman, a.k.a. “Noor Zurmat Group of Companies, d.b.a. “Zurmat LLC”
Jan, Nurullah Rahman Safa” Zurmat Material Testing Laboratory
Khan, Haji Mohammad Almas Rhaman, Mohammad
Suspensions
Al-Watan Construction Company Autry, Cleo Brian Farouki, Abul Huda
Basirat Construction Firm Chamberlain, William Todd Farouki, Mazen
Naqibullah, Nadeem Cook, Jeffrey Arthur Maarouf, Salah
Rahman, Obaidur Harper, Deric Tyron ANHAM FZCO
Robinson, Franz Martin Walls, Barry Lee, Jr. ANHAM USA
Aaria Middle East International Contracting and Development Green, George E.
Aaria Middle East Company LLC Sobh, Adeeb Nagib, a.k.a. “Ali Sobh” Tran, Anthony Don
Aftech International Stallion Construction and Engineering Group Vergez, Norbert Eugene
Aftech International Pvt. Ltd. Wazne Group Inc., d.b.a. “Wazne Wholesale” Bunch, Donald P.
Albahar Logistics Wazne, Ayman, a.k.a. “Ayman Ibrahim Wazne” Kline, David A.
American Aaria Company LLC Green, George E. Farouki, Abul Huda*
American Aaria LLC Tran, Anthony Don Farouki, Mazen*
Sharpway Logistics Vergez, Norbert Eugene Maarouf, Salah*
United States California Logistics Company Bunch, Donald P. ANHAM FZCO
Brothers, Richard S. Kline, David A. ANHAM USA
Rivera-Medina, Franklin Delano
Debarments
Farooqi, Hashmatullah Khalid, Mohammad Mahmodi, Padres
Hamid Lais Construction Company Khan, Daro Mahmodi, Shikab
Hamid Lais Group Mariano, April Anne Perez Saber, Mohammed
Lodin, Rohullah Farooqi McCabe, Elton Maurice Watson, Brian Erik
Bennett & Fouch Associates LLC Mihalczo, John Abbasi, Shahpoor
Brandon, Gary Qasimi, Mohammed Indress Amiri, Waheedullah
K5 Global Radhi, Mohammad Khalid Atal, Waheed
Ahmad, Noor Safi, Fazal Ahmed Daud, Abdulilah
Noor Ahmad Yousufzai Construction Company Shin Gul Shaheen, a.k.a. “Sheen Gul Shaheen” Dehati, Abdul Majid
Ayeni, Sheryl Adenike Espinoza-Loor, Pedro Alfredo Fazli, Qais
Cannon, Justin Campbell, Neil Patrick* Hamdard, Mohammad Yousuf
Constantino, April Anne Navarro, Wesley Kunari, Haji Pir Mohammad
Constantino, Dee Hazrati, Arash Mushfiq, Muhammad Jaffar
Constantino, Ramil Palmes Midfield International Mutallib, Abdul
Crilly, Braam Moore, Robert G. Nasrat, Sami
Drotleff, Christopher Noori, Noor Alam, a.k.a. “Noor Alam” National General Construction Company
Fil-Tech Engineering and Construction Company Northern Reconstruction Organization Passerly, Ahmaad Saleem
Handa, Sdiharth Shamal Pamir Building and Road Construction Company Rabi, Fazal
Jabak, Imad Wade, Desi D. Rahman, Atta
Jamally, Rohullah Blue Planet Logistics Services Rahman, Fazal
Continued on the following page
* Indicates that the individual or entity was subject to two final agency actions by an agency suspension and debarment official, resulting in a suspension followed by final debarment following the
resolution of a criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by agency suspension and debarment official. Entries without an asterisk indicate that the individual was subject to a sus-
pension or debarment, but not both.

APPENDICES
TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)
SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2020 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Roshandil, Mohammad Ajmal Isranuddin, Burhanuddin Military Logistic Support LLC
Saber, Mohammed Matun, Navidullah, a.k.a. “Javid Ahmad” Eisner, John
Safi, Azizur Rahman Matun, Wahidullah Taurus Holdings LLC
Safi, Matiullah Navid Basir Construction Company Brophy, Kenneth Michael*
Sahak, Sher Khan Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company Abdul Haq Foundation
Shaheed, Murad NBCC & GBCC JV Adajar, Adonis
Shirzad, Daulet Khan Noori, Navid Calhoun, Josh W.
Uddin, Mehrab Asmatullah, Mahmood, a.k.a. “Mahmood” Clark Logistic Services Company, d.b.a. “Clark Construction
Watson, Brian Erik Khan, Gul Company”
Wooten, Philip Steven* Khan, Solomon Sherdad, a.k.a. “Solomon” Farkas, Janos
Espinoza, Mauricio* Mursalin, Ikramullah, a.k.a. “Ikramullah” Flordeliz, Alex F.
Alam, Ahmed Farzad* Musafer, Naseem, a.k.a. “Naseem” Knight, Michael T. II
Greenlight General Trading* Ali, Esrar Lozado, Gary
Aaria Middle East Company LLC* Gul, Ghanzi Mijares, Armando N. Jr.
Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. – Herat* Luqman Engineering Construction Company, d.b.a. “Luqman Mullakhiel, Wadir Abdullahmatin
Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC* Engineering” Rainbow Construction Company
Aaria Middle East* Safiullah, a.k.a. “Mr. Safiullah” Sardar, Hassan, a.k.a. “Hassan Sardar Inqilab”
Barakzai, Nangialai* Sarfarez, a.k.a.”Mr. Sarfarez” Shah, Mohammad Nadir, a.k.a. “Nader Shah”
Formid Supply and Services* Wazir, Khan Tito, Regor
Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy* Akbar, Ali Brown, Charles Phillip
Kabul Hackle Logistics Company* Crystal Construction Company, d.b.a. “Samitullah Road Sheren, Fasela, a.k.a. “Sheren Fasela”
Yousef, Najeebullah* Construction Company” Anderson, Jesse Montel
Aaria Group* Samitullah (Individual uses only one name) Charboneau, Stephanie, a.k.a. “Stephanie Shankel”
Aaria Group Construction Company* Ashna, Mohammad Ibrahim, a.k.a. “Ibrahim” Hightower, Jonathan
Aaria Supplies Company LTD* Gurvinder, Singh Khan, Noor Zali, a.k.a. “Wali Kahn Noor”
Rahimi, Mohammad Edris* Jahan, Shah Saheed, a.k.a. “Mr. Saheed;” a.k.a. “Sahill;” a.k.a.
All Points International Distributors Inc.* Shahim, Zakirullah a.k.a. “Zakrullah Shahim”, a.k.a. “Zikrullah “Ghazi-Rahman”
Hercules Global Logistics* Shahim” Weaver, Christopher
Schroeder, Robert* Alyas, Maiwand Ansunullah a.k.a. “Engineer Maiwand Alyas” Al Kaheel Oasis Services
Helmand Twinkle Construction Company BMCSC Al Kaheel Technical Service
Waziri, Heward Omar Maiwand Haqmal Construction and Supply Company CLC Construction Company
Zadran, Mohammad New Riders Construction Company, d.b.a. “Riders CLC Consulting LLC
Afghan Mercury Construction Company, d.b.a. “Afghan Construction Company,” d.b.a. “New Riders Construction and Complete Manpower Solutions
Mercury Construction & Logistics Co.” Services Company” Mohammed, Masiuddin, a.k.a. “Masi Mohammed”
Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company Riders Constructions, Services, Logistics and Transportation Rhoden, Bradley L., a.k.a. “Brad L. Rhoden”
Montes, Diyana Company Rhoden, Lorraine Serena
Naseeb, Mirzali Riders Group of Companies Royal Super Jet General Trading LLC
Martino, Roberto F. Domineck, Lavette Kaye* Super Jet Construction Company
Logiotatos, Peter R. Markwith, James* Super Jet Fuel Services
Glass, Calvin Martinez, Rene Super Jet Group
Singleton, Jacy P. Maroof, Abdul Super Jet Tours LLC, d.b.a. “Super Jet Travel and Holidays LLC”
Robinson, Franz Martin Qara, Yousef Super Solutions LLC
Smith, Nancy Royal Palace Construction Company Abdullah, Bilal
Sultani, Abdul Anas a.k.a. “Abdul Anas” Bradshaw, Christopher Chase Farmer, Robert Scott
Faqiri, Shir Zuhra Productions Mudiyanselage, Oliver
Hosmat, Haji Zuhra, Niazai Kelly, Albert III
Jim Black Construction Company Boulware, Candice a.k.a. “Candice Joy Dawkins” Ethridge, James
Arya Ariana Aryayee Logistics, d.b.a. “AAA Logistics,” d.b.a. Dawkins, John Fernridge Strategic Partners
“Somo Logistics” Mesopotamia Group LLC AISC LLC*
Garst, Donald Nordloh, Geoffrey American International Security Corporation*
Mukhtar, Abdul a.k.a. “Abdul Kubar” Kieffer, Jerry David A. Young Construction & Renovation Inc.*
Noori Mahgir Construction Company Johnson, Angela Force Direct Solutions LLC*
Noori, Sherin Agha CNH Development Company LLC Harris, Christopher*
Long, Tonya* Johnson, Keith Hernando County Holdings LLC*

APPENDICES
Hide-A-Wreck LLC* Lakeshore Toltest Corporation, d.b.a. “Lakeshore Group,” Aryana Green Light Support Services
Panthers LLC* d.b.a. “LTC Newco d.b.a. “LTC CORP Michigan,” d.b.a. Mohammad, Sardar, a.k.a. “Sardar Mohammad Barakzai”
Paper Mill Village Inc.* “Lakeshore Toltest KK” Pittman, James C., a.k.a. “Carl Pittman”
Shroud Line LLC* Lakeshore Toltest Guam LLC Poaipuni, Clayton
Spada, Carol* Lakeshore Toltest JV LLC Wiley, Patrick
Welventure LLC* Lakeshore Toltest RRCC JV LLC Crystal Island Construction Company
World Wide Trainers LLC* Lakeshore/Walsh JV LLC Bertolini, Robert L.*
Young, David Andrew* LakeshoreToltest METAG JV LLC Kahn, Haroon Shams, a.k.a. “Haroon Shams”*
Woodruff and Company LTC & Metawater JV LLC Shams Constructions Limited*
Borcata, Raul A.* LTC Holdings Inc. Shams General Services and Logistics Unlimited*
Close, Jarred Lee* LTC Italia SRL Shams Group International, d.b.a. “Shams Group
Logistical Operations Worldwide* LTC Tower General Contractors LLC International FZE”*
Taylor, Zachery Dustin* LTCCORP Commercial LLC Shams London Academy*
Travis, James Edward* LTCCORP E&C Inc. Shams Production*
Khairfullah, Gul Agha LTCCORP Government Services-OH Inc. Shams Welfare Foundation*
Khalil Rahimi Construction Company LTCCORP Government Services Inc. Swim, Alexander*
Momand, Jahanzeb, a.k.a. “Engineer Jahanzeb Momand” LTCCORP Government Services-MI Inc. Norris, James Edward
Yar-Mohammad, Hazrat Nabi LTCCORP O&G LLC Afghan Columbia Constructon Company
Walizada, Abdul Masoud, a.k.a. “Masood Walizada” LTCCORP Renewables LLC Ahmadi, Mohammad Omid
Alizai, Zarghona LTCCORP Inc. Dashti, Jamsheed
Aman, Abdul LTCCORP/Kaya Dijbouti LLC Hamdard, Eraj
Anwari, Laila LTCCORP/Kaya East Africa LLC Hamidi, Mahrokh
Anwari, Mezhgan LTCCORP/Kaya Romania LLC Raising Wall Construction Company
Anwari, Rafi LTCCORP/Kaya Rwanda LLC Artemis Global Inc., d.b.a. “Artemis Global Logistics and
Arghandiwal, Zahra, a.k.a. “Sarah Arghandiwal” LTCORP Technology LLC Solutions,” d.b.a. “Artemis Global Trucking LLC”
Azizi, Farwad, a.k.a. “Farwad Mohammad Azizi” Toltest Inc., d.b.a. “Wolverine Testing and Engineering,” d.b.a. O’Brien, James Michael, a.k.a. “James Michael Wienert”
Bashizada, Razia “Toledo Testing Laboratory,” d.b.a. “LTC,” d.b.a. “LTC Corp,” Tamerlane Global Services Inc., d.b.a. “Tamerlane Global
Coates, Kenneth d.b.a. “LTC Corp Ohio,” d.b.a. “LTC Ohio” LLC,” d.b.a. “Tamerlane LLC,” d.b.a. “Tamerlane Technologies
Gibani, Marika Toltest/Desbuild Germany JV LLC LLC”
Haidari, Mahboob Veterans Construction/Lakeshore JV LLC Sherzai, Akbar Ahmed*
Latifi, Abdul Afghan Royal First Logistics, d.b.a. “Afghan Royal” Jean-Noel, Dimitry
McCammon, Christina American Barriers Hampton, Seneca Darnell*
Mohibzada, Ahmadullah, a.k.a. “Ahmadullah Mohebzada” Arakozia Afghan Advertising Dennis, Jimmy W.
Neghat, Mustafa Dubai Armored Cars Timor, Karim
Qurashi, Abdul Enayatullah, son of Hafizullah Wardak, Khalid
Raouf, Ashmatullah Farhas, Ahmad Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company
Shah, David Inland Holdings Inc. Siddiqi, Rahmat
Touba, Kajim Intermaax, FZE Siddiqi, Sayed Attaullah
Zahir, Khalid Intermaax Inc. Umbrella Insurance Limited Company
Aryubi, Mohammad Raza Samim Karkar, Shah Wali Taylor, Michael
Atlas Sahil Construction Company Sandman Security Services Gardazi, Syed
Bab Al Jazeera LLC Siddiqi, Atta Smarasinghage, Sagara
Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company Specialty Bunkering Security Assistance Group LLC
Muhammad, Pianda Spidle, Chris Calvin Edmondson, Jeffrey B.*
Sambros International, d.b.a. “Sambros International LTD,” Vulcan Amps Inc. Montague, Geoffrey K.*
d.b.a. “Sambros-UK JV” Worldwide Cargomasters Ciampa, Christopher*
Sambros JV Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company, d.b.a. Aziz, Haji Abdul, a.k.a. “Abdul Aziz Shah Jan,” a.k.a. “Aziz” Lugo, Emanuel*
“Sambros JV ESCC” Castillo, Alfredo, Jr. Bailly, Louis Matthew*
Antes, Bradley A. Abbasi, Asim Kumar, Krishan
Lakeshore Engineering & Construction Afghanistan Inc., Muturi, Samuel Marshal Afghan American Construction Company
d.b.a. “Lakeshore General Contractors Inc.” Mwakio, Shannel Marshal, Sayed Abbas Shah
Lakeshore Engineering Services Inc. Ahmad, Jaweed Masraq Engineering and Construction Company
Lakeshore Engineering Services/Toltest JV LLC Ahmad, Masood Miakhil, Azizullah
Lakeshore Toltest – Rentenbach JV LLC A & J Total Landscapes Raj, Janak

APPENDICES
Singh, Roop Hafizullah, Sayed; a.k.a. “Sadat Sayed Hafizullah”; a.k.a. Dixon, Regionald
Stratton, William G “Sayed Hafizullah Delsooz” Emmons, Larry
Umeer Star Construction Company Sadat Zohori Construction and Road Building Company; Epps, Willis*
Zahir, Mohammad Ayub d.b.a. “Sadat Zohori Cons Co.” Etihad Hamidi Group; d.b.a. “Etihad Hamidi Trading,
Peace Thru Business* Abdullah, Son of Lal Gul Transportation, Logistics and Construction Company”
Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julias* Ahmad, Aziz Etihad Hamidi Logistics Company; d.b.a. “Etihad Hamidi
Green, Robert Warren* Ahmad, Zubir Transportation, Logistic Company Corporation”
Mayberry, Teresa* Aimal, Son of Masom Hamidi, Abdul Basit; a.k.a. Basit Hamidi
Addas, James* Ajmal, Son of Mohammad Anwar Kakar, Rohani; a.k.a. “Daro Khan Rohani”
Advanced Ability for U-PVC* Fareed, Son of Shir Mohammad, Abdullah Nazar
Al Bait Al Amer* Fayaz Afghan Logistics Services Nasir, Mohammad
Al Iraq Al Waed* Fayaz, Afghan, a.k.a. “Fayaz Alimi,” a.k.a. “Fayaz, Son of Wali Eshaq Zada Logistics Company; d.b.a. “Wali
Al Quraishi Bureau* Mohammad” Ashqa Zada Logistics Company”; d.b.a. “Nasert Nawazi
Al Zakoura Company* Gul, Khuja Transportation Company”
Al-Amir Group LLC* Habibullah, Son of Ainuddin Ware, Marvin*
Al-Noor Contracting Company* Hamidullah, Son of Abdul Rashid Belgin, Andrew
Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company* Haq, Fazal Afghan Bamdad Construction Company, d.b.a. “Afghan
California for Project Company* Jahangir, Son of Abdul Qadir Bamdad Development Construction Company”
Civilian Technologies Limited Company* Kaka, Son of Ismail Areeb of East Company for Trade & Farzam Construction
Industrial Techniques Engineering Electromechanically Khalil, Son of Mohammad Ajan Company JV
Company* Khan, Mirullah Areeb of East for Engineering and General Trading
Pena, Ramiro* Khan, Mukamal Company Limited, d.b.a. “Areeb of East LLC”
Pulsars Company* Khoshal, Son of Sayed Hasan Areeb-BDCC JV
San Francisco for Housing Company Malang, Son of Qand Areebel Engineering and Logisitcs - Farzam
Sura Al Mustakbal* Masom, Son of Asad Gul Areebel Engineering and Logistics
Top Techno Concrete Batch* Mateen, Abdul Areeb-Rixon Construction Company LLC, d.b.a. “Areeb-
Albright, Timothy H.* Mohammad, Asghar REC JV”
Insurance Group of Afghanistan Mohammad, Baqi Carver, Elizabeth N.
Ratib, Ahmad, a.k.a. “Nazari” Mohammad, Khial Carver, Paul W.
Jamil, Omar K. Mohammad, Sayed RAB JV
Rawat, Ashita Mujahid, Son of Abdul Qadir Ullah, Izat; a.k.a. “Ezatullah”; a.k.a. “Izatullah, son of
Nangiali, Son of Alem Jan Shamsudeen”
Qadery, Abdul Khalil
Nawid, Son of Mashoq Saboor, Baryalai Abdul; a.k.a. “Barry Gafuri”
Casellas, Luis Ramon*
Noorullah, Son of Noor Mohammad Stratex Logistic and Support, d.b.a. “Stratex Logistics”
Saber, Mohammad a.k.a. “Saber,” a.k.a. “Sabir”
Qayoum, Abdul Jahanzeb, Mohammad Nasir
Zahir, Shafiullah Mohammad a.k.a. “Shafiullah,” a.k.a.
“Shafie” Roz, Gul Nasrat, Zaulhaq, a.k.a. “Zia Nasrat”
Achiever’s International Ministries Inc., d.b.a. “Center for Shafiq, Mohammad Blevins, Kenneth Preston*
Achievement and Development LLC” Shah, Ahmad Banks, Michael*
Bickersteth, Diana Shah, Mohammad Afghan Armor Vehicle Rental Company
Bonview Consulting Group Inc. Shah, Rahim Hamdard, Javid
Fagbenro, Oyetayo Ayoola, a.k.a. “Tayo Ayoola Fagbenro” Sharif, Mohammad McAlpine, Nebraska
Global Vision Consulting LLC Waheedullah, Son of Sardar Mohammad Meli Afghanistan Group
HUDA Development Organization Wahid, Abdul Badgett, Michael J.*
Strategic Impact Consulting, d.b.a. “Strategic Impact KarKon Wais, Gul Miller, Mark E.
Afghanistan Material Testing Laboratory” Wali, Khair Anderson, William Paul
Davies, Simon Wali, Sayed Kazemi, Sayed Mustafa, a.k.a. “Said Mustafa Kazemi”
Gannon, Robert, W. Wali, Taj Al Mostahan Construction Company
Gillam, Robert Yaseen, Mohammad Nazary, Nasir Ahmad
Mondial Defence Systems Ltd. Yaseen, Son of Mohammad Aajan Nazanin, a.k.a. “Ms. Nazanin”
Mondial Defense Systems USA LLC Zakir, Mohammad Ahmadzai, Sajid
Mondial Logistics Zamir, Son of Kabir Sajid, Amin Gul
Khan, Adam Rogers, Sean Elham, Yaser, a.k.a. “Najibullah Saadullah”*
Khan, Amir, a.k.a. “Amir Khan Sahel” Slade, Justin Everest Faizy Logistics Services*
Sharq Afghan Logistics Company, d.b.a. “East Afghan Morgan, Sheldon J.* Faizy Elham Brothers Ltd.*
Logistics Company” Continued on the following page

APPENDICES
Faizy, Rohullah*
Hekmat Shadman General Trading LLC*
Hekmat Shadman Ltd., d.b.a. “Hikmat Shadman Ltd.”*
Hikmat Shadman Construction and Supply
Company*
Hikmat Himmat Logistics Services Company*
Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company,
d.b.a. “Hikmat Shadman Commerce Construction
and Supply Company,” d.b.a. “Hikmat Shadman
Commerce Construction Services”*
Saif Hikmat Construction Logistic Services and
Supply Co.*
Shadman, Hikmatullah, a.k.a. “Hikmat Shadman,”
a.k.a. “Haji Hikmatullah Shadman,” a.k.a.
“Hikmatullah Saadulah”*
Omonobi-Newton, Henry
Hele, Paul
Highland Al Hujaz Co. Ltd.
Supreme Ideas – Highland Al Hujaz Ltd. Joint
Venture, d.b.a. SI-HLH-JV
BYA International Inc. d.b.a. BYA Inc.
Harper, Deric Tyrone*
Walls, Barry Lee, Jr.*
Cook, Jeffrey Arthur*
McCray, Christopher
Jones, Antonio
Autry, Cleo Brian*
Chamberlain, William Todd*
JS International Inc.
Perry, Jack
Pugh, James
Hall, Alan
Paton, Lynda Anne
Unitrans International Inc.
Financial Instrument and Investment Corp., d.b.a. “FIIC”
AIS-Unitrans (OBO) Facilities Inc., d.b.a. “American
International Services”

APPENDICES
APPENDIX E
SIGAR DATA CALL QUESTIONS THAT RECEIVED
CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED BUT NOT PUBLICLY
RELEASABLE RESPONSES
Every quarter, SIGAR sends U.S. implementing agencies in Afghanistan a
list of questions about their programs. This quarter, United States Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A) classified or designated unclassified but not
publicly releasable its responses to the bolded portions of these questions
from SIGAR’s data call.
SECURITY
Question ID Question
1. Please provide the following classified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date (month-end):
a. the most recent ANA APPS month-end report with “as of” dates on each.
2. Please provide the following unclassified information on ANA strength as of the latest available date (month-end):
a. the topline strength of the ANA (with “as of” date provided).
b. a description of general ANA attrition trends over the last quarter.
3. On ANA attrition:
Jan-Sec-01
a. Given current attrition trends, does CSTC-A think that the ANA is manned and can be sustained at adequate levels. Please describe what
CSTC-A considers “adequate.” How specifically has attrition affected ANA readiness and performance (for example, are incoming personnel
as well trained, skilled, fit as those they are replacing)?
b. What are the steps MOD took during the quarter to minimize attrition from desertion, AWOL, or refusals to reenlist? Please comment how
effective these have or have not been.
c. Describe any affects COVID-19 has had on MOD elements’ recruitment/attrition this quarter.
1. On the ANDSF’s performance:
a. Please provide a recent unclassified assessment of the ANDSF elements below the ministerial level. The assessment should include
updates on how the ANDSF is performing in each of the Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities (as shown on pages 30–40 of the latest
1225 report).
b. Please provide a description of the sources of information used to determine/track ANDSF performance in each of the Top 10
Challenges and Opportunities.
Jan-Sec-04 c. Please provide the latest, classified NATO Periodic Mission Review (PMR). If there will be no PMR released this quarter, please
indicate.
2. Please provide a recent, unclassified assessment of the ANDSF at the ministerial level.
3. Is ANET functioning yet? Last quarter you said it was not yet producing monthly ANDSF assessment reports due to contract challenges.
If ANET is functioning, please provide the most recent monthly or quarterly reports quantifying ANDSF performance using the new ANET
assessment system. If ANET still has not begun generating these reports, please provide the reasons why, including a description of
ongoing contract challenges, if applicable, and the reports’ expected start date.
1. Please provide the following classified information on ANP strength as of the latest available date (month-end):
a. the most recent ANP APPS month-end report with “as of” dates on each.
2. Please provide the following unclassified information on ANP strength as of the latest available date (month-end):
a. the topline strength of the ANP (with “as of” date provided).
b. a description of general ANP attrition trends over the last quarter.
3. On ANP attrition:
Jan-Sec-08
a. Given current attrition trends, does CSTC-A think that the ANP is manned at adequate and sustainable levels. What does CSTC-A consider
to be “adequate”? How specifically has this affected ANP readiness and performance (for example, are incoming personnel as well trained,
skilled, fit as those they are replacing)?
b. What steps did MOI take during the quarter to minimize attrition from desertion, AWOL, or refusals to reenlist? Please comment how effective
these have or haven’t been.
c. Describe any affects COVID-19 has had on MOI elements’ recruitment/attrition this quarter.

APPENDICES
1. Please provide information on insider attacks against Coalition Forces from October 1, 2020, through the latest available date (month end):
a. the number of insider attacks against U.S. and Coalition military personnel
b. the number of U.S. and Coalition military personnel wounded or killed from insider attacks
c. the number of insider attacks against the ANDSF
d. the number of ANDSF personnel wounded or killed as a result of insider attacks
Jan-Sec-23 2. Please provide the classified CIDNE Excel file export of all ANDSF casualties from October 1, 2020, through the latest available
date (month end). It is not necessary to filter the CIDNE export, but, at a minimum, these data should include the unit (lowest level
available), location (highest fidelity possible), and date for all casualties.
3. Please provide us a response to the following: In an unclassified, publicly releasable format, describe how ANDSF casualty rates during
the quarter compare to casualty rates during the same quarter one year ago. Differentiate between casualties that occurred during
offensive operations and those that occurred during defensive operations.
1. Regarding USG support to the Special Mission Wing (SMW):
a. Please provide a recent, comprehensive update of the SMW as of the latest possible date.
b. Please identify each type of aircraft in the SMW inventory and the number of each. If aircraft became unusable during this reporting
period, please indicate when and the reason for each.
c. Please provide the number of aircraft purchased but not yet fielded and what the anticipated dates are for fielding.
d. Please complete the attached ANDSF spreadsheet/SMW tab, or provide the applicable data. (Sec-26 tab Data Call Attachment
Spreadsheet)
e. What percentage of the SMW sorties are in support of counternarcotics? Of counterterrorism? or counternexus (CN & CT)?
f. How many aircrew members does the SMW currently have, by crew position and airframe? Please break out their level of mission
qualification (e.g. Certified Mission Ready (night-vision qualified), the daytime equivalent, etc.):
Jan-Sec-26
1) Mi-17 Pilots and Pilot Trainers
2) Mi-17 Flight Engineers
3) Mi-17 Crew Chiefs
4) PC-12 Pilots
5) PC-12 Mission System Operators
g. Please provide an update on the operational readiness rate of the SMW and its achievement benchmarks this quarter, if one is
available.
h. How many and what type of aircraft maintainers are currently assigned / authorized? Are these SMW personnel or contractors? If
contractors, are they Afghan or international contractors?
i. Provide the cost of aircraft maintenance being paid with ASFF or money from other countries.
1. On U.S. and Afghan air strikes in Afghanistan, please provide any updates necessary for the following totals from last quarter, as well as this
quarter’s data (October 1, 2020, through the latest available month-end date):
a. How many air strikes have been carried out monthly by U.S. forces? If classified, please provide some unclassified statements on data trends
(like with EIA/EEIA data in Sec-63).
b. How many civilian casualties have been incurred from these air strikes monthly?
c. How many civilian casualties resulted from AAF air strikes monthly?
2. Please provide any updates necessary for the overall RS/USFOR-A tracked Afghan civilian casualty figures from last quarter, as well as this
Jan-Sec-58 quarter’s data from October 1, 2020, through the latest available month-end date (in the Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, Tabs Sec-58)
and include:
a. the monthly breakout of the data
b. the breakout of civilian casualties by each province
c. the percentage breakdown of the top causes of the total civilian casualties
d. the breakout of civilian casualties by responsible party (i.e. ANDSF, U.S. and Coalition forces, insurgents, unknown). In RS’s civilian casualty
collection methodology, if an enemy initiated attack occurs, and the Coalition or Afghan response (e.g., ground operation or air strike) kills or
injures Afghan civilians, to whom are civilian casualties attributed?

APPENDICES
1. Provide a spreadsheet documenting all concluded ANDSF CONOPs for offensive operations conducted from October 1, 2020, through
the latest available date (month-end date). Each concluded operation should be on its own row. For our purposes, an operation involves
(1) at least one ANA kandak or (2) a combination of units from at least two Afghan security entities (MOI, MOD, and/or NDS). For each
operation, we request the following information:
a. the district in which the operation primarily occurred (District name)
b. the province in which the operation primarily occurred (Province name)
c. the start date of the operation (YYYY-MM-DD)
d. the end date of the operation (YYYY-MM-DD)
e. whether AAF A-29s or AC-208s provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)
Jan-Sec-61 f. whether AAF MD-530s, UH-60s, or Mi-17s provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)
g. whether ANASOC MSFVs provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)
h. whether the operation involved ANA units (Yes/No)
i. whether the operation involved MOI units (Yes/No)
j. whether the operation involved NDS units (Yes/No)
k. whether the operation involved ANASOC units (Yes/No)
l. whether the operation was enabled by U.S. or Coalition air support (Yes/No)
m. whether the operation was enabled by U.S. or Coalition ground support (Yes/No)
n. whether any U.S. or Coalition military aircraft provided medical evacuation support (Yes/No)
o. did the operation achieve its objective (Yes/No)
1. Please provide data on the total number of enemy-initiated attacks monthly from January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020, in the
Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, tab Sec-63, and include the following for the last two quarters separately (July–September and
October–December):
a. the total number of enemy initiated attacks by month
b. the attacks broken out by categories, to include direct fire, IED/mine strikes, indirect fire, SAFIRE, etc.
c. the attacks broken out by province
2. Please provide data on the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks monthly from January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2020,
in the Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, tab Sec-63, and include the following for the last two quarters separately (July–September
Jan-Sec-63 and October–December):
a. the attacks broken out by types of attacks, to include direct fire, IED/mine strikes, indirect fire, SAFIRE, etc.
b. the attacks broken out by province
3. Please also provide any updates to the 2019 data given to us, using the Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, tab Sec-63:
a. Any updates to 2019 EIA and/or EEIA monthly totals.
b. Please provide the monthly and provincial breakdowns of both EIA and EEIA that occurred from (October 1–December 31 2019).
4. If there has been any change in margin of error or time period lag in the data, please explain what the change is and why it occurred.
5. If questions 1–3 remain U//FOUO this quarter, please provide the same level of unclassified description of EIA trends provided to us in your
vetting response last quarter.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX F
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
AABIS Afghan Automated Biometric Information System
AAF Afghan Air Force
ABP Afghan Border Police
ACJC Anti-Corruption Justice Center
ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
ADALAT Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFMIS Afghan Financial Management Information System
AFN afghani (currency)
AGO Attorney General’s Office
AIC Access to Information Commission
AITF Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
ALP Afghan Local Police
AMANAT Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability and Transparency
ANA Afghan National Army
ANASOC ANA Special Operations Corps
ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP Afghan National Police
ANDPF II Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
AO abandoned ordnance
APF Afghanistan Partnership Framework
APPS Afghan Personnel and Pay System
AROC Afghan Resources Oversight Council
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASSF Afghan Special Security Forces
AUP Afghan Uniform Police
AUAF American University of Afghanistan
AWOL Absent Without Leave
BAG Budget Activity Group
BHA Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance

APPENDICES
ACRONYM OR
CCAP Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project
CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CERP Commanders’ Emergency Response Program
CID U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIO Contributions to International Organizations
CJ-ENG Combined Joint Engineers
CMS Case Management System
CN counternarcotics
CNHC Counternarcotics High Commission
CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
COIN counterinsurgency
COMAC Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians
COR contracting officer’s representative
CoreIMS Core Inventory Management System
CPRBD Checkpoint Reduction and Base Development Plan
CPD Central Prisons Directorate
CPDS Continuing Professional Development Support
CSSP Corrections System Support Program
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTF Counterterrorism Financing
CWC Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
DAB Da Afghanistan Bank
DABS Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
DFC Development Finance Corporation
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DICDA Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (U.S.)
DOD Department of Defense (U.S.)
DOD OIG Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOJ Department of Justice (U.S.)
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ECC Eradication Coordination Committee
EEIA effective enemy initiated attacks
EIA enemy-initiated attacks

APPENDICES
ACRONYM OR
ERW explosive remnants of war
ESF Economic Support Fund
EU European Union
EUM end-use monitoring
EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FAP Financial and Activity Plan
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEFA Free and Fair Elections Forum of Afghanistan Organization
FFP Food for Peace
FOB Forward Operating Base

FMS Foreign Military Sales
FHI Family Health International
FY fiscal year
GAO Government Accountability Office (U.S.)
GCPSU General Command of Police Special Units
GDP gross domestic product
GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GLE Governor-Led Eradication
GMAF Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework
HAZMAT hazardous materials
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (commonly known as a Humvee)
HQ headquarters
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS Integrated Country Strategy
IDA International Development Association
IDP internally displaced persons
IEC Independent Election Commission (Afghan)
IED improvised explosive device
IFC International Finance Corporation
IG inspector general
IHSAN Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition
IIU Intelligence and Investigation Unit (Afghan)
IMF International Monetary Fund
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S.)
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)

APPENDICES
ACRONYM OR
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPC infection prevention and control
IPP independent power producers
IS-K Islamic State-Khorasan
ISLA Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations Program
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan
JAF Joint Air Force
JSSP Justice Sector Support Program (State)
JWIP judicial wire intercept program
kg kilogram
KCEC Kabul Carpet Export Center
KIA killed in action
LAMP Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Population
LLP Lessons Learned Program
LOA Letters of authorization
LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (Afghan)
MAG ministerial advisory group
MAPA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
MCN Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (Afghan)
MCTF Major Crimes Task Force
MELRA Multi-Dimensional Legal Economic Reform Assistance
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MOCI Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Afghan)
MOD Ministry of Defense (Afghan)
MOD CID MOD Criminal Investigation Directorate
MOD IG Ministry of Defense Inspector General
MOE Minister of Education (Afghan)
MOEc Ministry of Economy (Afghan)
MOF Ministry of Finance (Afghan)
MOHE Ministry of Higher Education (Afghan)
MOI Ministry of Interior (Afghan)
MOIC Ministry of Industry and Commerce
MOI CID Ministry of Interior (Afghan) Criminal Investigation Directorate
MOI IG Ministry of Interior (Afghan) Inspector General

APPENDICES
ACRONYM OR
MOJ Ministry of Justice (Afghan)
MOMP Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan)
MOPH Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)
MOU memorandum of understanding
MOWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs
MPTF Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MPD Ministry of Interior Affairs and Police Development Project
MRA Migration and Refugee Assistance
MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Afghan)
MW megawatt
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command
NADR Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
NATF NATO ANA Trust Fund
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO Noncommissioned officers
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NDAP National Drug Action Plan
NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghan)
NEPS Northeast Power System
NGO nongovernmental organization
NSA National Security Advisor
NSC National Security Council
NSIA National Statistics and Information Authority (Afghan)
NSOCC-A NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
NSPA NATO Support and Procurement Agency
O&M operations and maintenance
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCO Overseas Contingency Operations
OEG Office of Economic Growth (USAID)
OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
OIG Office of the Inspector General
OPA Office of Prison Affairs
OUSD-P Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
OTA Office of Technical Assistance (U.S. Treasury)
OTI Office of Transition Initiatives

APPENDICES
ACRONYM OR
PDPs provincial development plans
PM/WRA Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
(State)
PPA power-purchase agreement
PPE personal protective equipment
PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (U.S. State)
PMO Program Mangement Office
PTEC Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
PSI Peace Stabilization Initiative
RADP Regional Agriculture Development Program
RC Recurrent Cost
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
RIV reduction in violence
RC recurrent cost
RS Resolute Support
SAG Subactivity Group
SCIP Security Cooperation Information Portal
SEPS Southeast Power System
SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigade
SHAHAR Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience
SIGACT significant act (violence against coalition troops)
SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit (Afghan)
SME subject-matter expert
SMW Special Mission Wing (Afghan)
SOF Special Operations Forces (U.S.)
SRAR Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconcilation
State OIG Department of State Office of the Inspector General
SWIM Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management
TAA train, advise, and assist
TAAC train, advise, and assist command
TAAC-Air train, advise, and assist command-air
TAF The Asia Foundation
TF task force
TIU Technical Investigative Unit
TPDC Transferring Professional Development Capacity
UN United Nations

APPENDICES
ACRONYM OR
UN WFP United Nations World Food Programme
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAAA U.S. Army Audit Agency
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG USAID Office of the Inspector General
USD U.S. dollar
USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
USIP United States Institute of Peace
UXO unexploded ordnance
WASH water, sanitation and hygiene
WHO World Health Organization
WIA wounded in action
WTO World Trade Organization

ENDNOTES
1. DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, Data as of September 30, 29. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status
2020, provided in response to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2021. as of November 20, 2020 (end of 11th month of FY 1399) at
2. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Afghanistan Resources Oversight www.artf.af, accessed 1/13/2021, p. 2.
Council (AROC) memorandum,” 8/3/2011; Pub. L. No. 116-260, 30. The World Bank Group in Afghanistan, Country Update,
12/27/2020. 10/2020, p. 45, at www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan,
3. Pub. L. No. 116-260, 12/27/2020. accessed 1/26/2021.
4. DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program 31. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status
and Subaccounts December 2020,” 1/19/2021; DFAS, “AR(M) as of November 20, 2020 (end of 11th month of FY 1399) at
1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts www.artf.af, accessed 1/13/2021, p. 10.
September 2020,” 10/17/2020. 32. EC, “Afghanistan: State of Play, January 2011,” 3/31/2011, p. 7.
5. Pub. L. No. 116-93, 12/20/2019. 33. UNDP, “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, Terms of
6. DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program Reference, 22 November 2018,” and “Trust Fund Factsheet, Law
and Subaccounts December 2020,” 1/19/2021; “AR(M) 1002 and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan,” http://mptf.undp.org/fact-
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts sheet/fund/LTF00, accessed 1/9/2020.
September 2020,” 10/17/2020. 34. UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts
7. DOD, response to SIGAR data call on 1/8/2021; and AR(M) 2002–2020, updated 12/31/2020, in response to SIGAR data call,
1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts 1/8/2021.
(Cumulative) September 2020, accessed at www.dfas.mil/dod- 35. UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, https://fts.unocha.org,
budgetaccountreports/ on 10/20/2020. accessed 12/31/2020.
8. Pub. L. No. 116-260, 12/27/2020. 36. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2018.
9. H.Rept. 116-453, 12/27/2020. 37. NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status of
10. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2021. Contributions Made as of 16 November 2020, www.nato.int,
11. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019. accessed 1/23/2021; and NATO Member Countries, Last Updated
12. Pub. L. No. 116-260, 12/27/2020. 31 Aug 2020, www.nato.int, accessed 1/23/2021.
13. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2021. 38. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019.
14. USAID, U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide, 1/2005, p. 6. 39. The World Bank Group, response to SIGAR data call,
15. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/19/2021 and 10/12/2020; 10/14/2020.
State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021, 7/13/2020, 40. The World Bank Group, United States, Shares and Voting
1/3/2020, and 10/5/2018. Power, https://www.worldbank.org/, accessed on 4/21/2020.
16. USAID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 41. Asian Development Bank, response to SIGAR data call,
“Afghanistan-Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #4, FY 2017,” at 1/10/2021.
www.usaid.gov, accessed 4/9/2020. 42. Asian Development Bank, AITF Quarterly Report (April–June
17. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/19/2021. 2020), response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021.
18. State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009. 43. State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2020 and 7/13/2020.
19. State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, and 44. DOD, “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels
10/5/2018. in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 11/17/2020; DOD, “Sec. Esper
20. State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021, 1/7/2021, and Interview With Fox News’ ‘Justice with Judge Jeanine,’
7/13/2020. 8/8/2020; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021; DOD,
21. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, “Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on
Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February Force Levels in Afghanistan,” 1/15/2021.
12, 2018, pp. 44–52; and State, response to SIGAR data call, 45. General Mark Milley, remarks at webinar for the Brookings
4/17/2019. Institution, “A Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
22. State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/14/2021 and 10/15/2020. of Staff General Mark Milley,” 12/2/2020; Defense One, “Milley
23. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Meets with Taliban in Fragile Peace Negotiations,” 12/17/2020;
Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February Stars and Stripes, “Gen. McKenzie: Troop drawdowns in Iraq,
12, 2018, p. 423. Afghanistan will limit how US assists future operations,”
24. State, response to SIGAR data call 3/29/2013. 12/10/2020.
25. State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2021, 7/13/2020, 46. Reuters, “Afghan government, Taliban to resume peace talks in
1/3/2020, and 10/5/2018. January,” 12/14/2020; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call,
26. “Janus-Faced Pledges: A Review of the 2020 Geneva Conference 1/5/2021.
in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, at www. 47. State, Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between
afghanistan-analysts.org, accessed 1/4/2021, and State, response the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by
to SIGAR data call, 1/26/2021. the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the
27. Ministry of Finance, GIROA, in response to SIGAR information United States of America, 2/29/2020, p. 2.
request, 1/20/2021. 48. State, Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between
28. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by
as of November 20, 2020 (end of 11th month of FY 1399) at the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and
www.artf.af, accessed 1/13/2021, p. 4. the United States of America, 2/29/2020, p. 2; DOD, Enhancing

ENDNOTES
Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 6/2020, p. 18; OUSD-P, Rise,” 10/13/2020; USFOR-A Spokesman COL Sonny Leggett.
response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020; AP, “After years fighting (@USFOR_A), “Resolute Support Cdr. Gen. Scott Miller visited
them, Milley talks peace with Taliban,” 12/17/2020; DOD OIG, #Helmand on Thursday to assess the security situation & meet
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Lead Inspector General Report with provincial leaders. He congrat’d Brig. Gen. Sami Sadat
to the United States Congress, July 1, 2020–September 30, 2020, on his appointment as 215th Maiwand Corps CDR, overseeing
11/2020, p. 17. #Afghan Army operations in Helmand & #Nimroz,” 12/19/2020,
49. AP, “After years fighting them, Milley talks peace with Taliban,” https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1340234337720086536;
12/17/2020. Defense One, “Milley Meets with Taliban in Fragile Peace
50. RS, response to SIGAR vetting, “Transcript: COMRS, CJCS, US Negotiations,” 12/17/2020; RS, response to SIGAR vetting,
EMB On-Record Interview 16 December 2020,” 1/6/2021. “Transcript: COMRS, CJCS, US EMB On-Record Interview 16
51. TOLOnews, “Afghan President Invites Taliban to Kandahar to December 2020,” 1/6/2021.
Discuss Peace,” 12/17/2020. 67. Long War Journal, “Afghan Air Force kills 15 Al Qaeda opera-
52. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019. tives in Helmand,” 12/29/2020.
53. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 68. AFP, “Scores of Taliban fighters killed as fighting rocks insur-
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts gent bastion,” 12/13/2020; Defense Post, “Thousands of Afghan
December 2020,” 1/19/2021. Families Flee Fighting in Insurgent Bastion Kandahar,” 1/7/2021;
54. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 NPR, “Tens Of Thousands Flee Latest Taliban Offensive, And
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts Afghan Civilian Casualties Rise,” 10/13/2020.
December 2020,” 1/19/2021. 69. USFOR-A Spokesman COL Sonny Leggett. (@USFOR_A)
55. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OUSD-P, “USFOR-A conducted a strike against armed Taliban fighters
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018, 1/12/2019, and 10/10/2019; attacking an ANDSF checkpoint in Zhari district Kandahar on
SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Dec 10. This strike in defense of the ANDSF is IAW with the
4/30/2018, p. 75; OUSD-P, email to SIGAR, 1/13/2017. US-Taliban agreement. The Taliban’s claim of civilian casu-
56. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OUSD-P, alties are false.” 12/11/2020, https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018 and 10/11/2020; SIGAR, status/1337398380981575681.
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75; 70. AFP, “Afghan Troops, Police Abandon Nearly 200 Checkpoints
UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts To Taliban,” 12/30/2020; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting,
2002–2020, updated 4/4/2020, in response to SIGAR data call 1/16/2021.
4/5/2020. 71. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021.
57. UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts 72. USFOR-A Spokesman COL Sonny Leggett. (@USFOR_A) “1/3
2002–2020, updated 12/31/2020, in response to SIGAR data call, We categorically reject the Taliban’s claim the United States
1/8/2021. has violated the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. U.S. airstrikes in
58. USFOR-A Spokesman COL Sonny Leggett. (@USFOR_A) “The Helmand and Farah have been and continue to be solely
Taliban’s accusations the US violated the US-TB agreement in defense of the ANDSF as they are being attacked by the
are false. US Forces have been clear & consistent: We will Taliban. 2/3 These strikes are consistent with both the U.S.-
defend Afghan forces against TB attacks. We renew our call Taliban Agreement and the Joint Declaration between the
for all sides to reduce violence. @Zabehulah_M 1/2,” 1/4/2021, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the
https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1334108215735365 United States,” 10/18/2020, https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/sta-
632?s=20; TOLOnews, “Miller says he has orders to reduce US tus/1317811660523032576; USFOR-A Spokesman COL Sonny
troop levels,” 12/13/2020; State, Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting Leggett. (@USFOR_A) “USFOR-A conducted a targeted strike
with the Taliban, 11/21/2020. in Nerkh, Wardak last night- in defense of the ANDSF and in
59. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021; USFOR-A, accordance with the U.S.-TB Agreement- killing 5 Taliban fight-
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021. ers. We reject the allegations of violating the agreement and
60. RS, response to SIGAR vetting, “Transcript: COMRS, CJCS, US of killing innocent Afghans.” 10/26/2020, https://twitter.com/
EMB On-Record Interview 16 December 2020,” 1/6/2021. USFOR_A/status/1320646914895958019; USFOR-A Spokesman
61. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. COL Sonny Leggett. (@USFOR_A) “The Taliban’s accusations
62. RFE/RL, “Afghan Forces Foil IS Plan To Assassinate Top U.S. the US violated the US-TB agreement are false. US Forces have
Envoy,” 1/12/2020. been clear & consistent: We will defend Afghan forces against
63. Reuters, “Gunmen kill two female Supreme Court judges in TB attacks. We renew our call for all sides to reduce violence.
Afghanistan: police,” 1/18/2021. @Zabehulah_M33 1/2.” 1/4/2021, https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/
64. NPR, “‘Our Houses Are Not Safe’: Residents Fear Taliban in status/1345984998860533760.
Afghanistan’s Capital,” 12/18/2020. 73. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021.
65. Washington Post, “Targeted killings of journalists are on the 74. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021; SIGAR, analysis of
rise,” 12/27/2020; “‘Sticky Bombs’ Sow Terror and Chaos in a RS-provided data, 1/2021.
City on Edge,” 12/16/2020. 75. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021; SIGAR, analysis of
66. Foreign Policy, “The U.S. Once Surged into Helmand Province. RS-provided data, 1/2021.
Now the Taliban Is, Too,” 10/20/2020; NPR, “Tens Of Thousands 76. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/21/2020 and 1/6/2020;
Flee Latest Taliban Offensive, And Afghan Civilian Casualties SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 10/2020.

ENDNOTES
77. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021; SIGAR, analysis of 95. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
RS-provided data, 1/2021. 10/30/2017, pp. 107–110.
78. UNAMA, “Afghanistan - Protection of Civilians in Armed 96. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
Conflict Third Quarter Report: 1 January to 30 September 2020,” 10/30/2019, p. 76; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, “Transcript:
p. 1; Costs of War, “Afghanistan’s Rising Civilian Death Toll Due COMRS, CJCS, US EMB On-Record Interview 16 December
to Airstrikes, 2017-2020, 12/7/2020. 2020,” 1/6/2021.
79. NBC News, “Airstrike in Afghanistan Bombs Taliban Target. 97. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
Now 18 Members of One Family Feared Dead,” 1/16/2021. 98. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
80. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021; SIGAR, analysis of 99. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020; CSTC-A,
RS-provided data, 1/2021. response to SIGAR vetting, 7/8/2020 and 10/11/2020.
81. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021; SIGAR, analysis of 100. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and 9/22/2020;
RS-provided data, 1/2021. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020.
82. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/21/2020 and 1/6/2021; 101. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; NSOCC-A,
USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021; SIGAR, analy- response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
sis of RS-provided data, 1/2021. 102. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
83. DOD, “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels 103. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and CSTC-A,
in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 11/17/2020; DOD, “Sec. Esper response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
Interview With Fox News’ ‘Justice with Judge Jeanine,’ 104. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response
8/8/2020; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021; DOD, to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
“Statement by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on 105. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
Force Levels in Afghanistan,” 1/15/2021. 106. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response
84. DOD, “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
Afghanistan and Iraq,” 11/17/2020; DOD, “Sec. Esper Interview 107. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
With Fox News’ ‘Justice with Judge Jeanine,’ 8/8/2020. 108. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response
85. DOD, “Acting Secretary Miller Announces Troop Levels in to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. S
Afghanistan and Iraq,” 11/17/2020; NATO Secretary General Jens 109. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 1/16/2021.
Stoltenberg, remarks at Halifax Security Forum, 11/22/2020. 110. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021 and response
86. NATO, “Online press conference by NATO Secretary General to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021.
Jens Stoltenberg following the first day of the meetings of 111. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020, 9/22/2020,
NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs,” 12/1/2020. 6/18/2020, 3/17/2020, 12/19/2019, and 9/20/2019; SIGAR, analysis
87. General Mark Milley, remarks at webinar for the Brookings of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020.
Institution, “A Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 112. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and 9/22/2020;
of Staff General Mark Milley,” 12/2/2020; State, Agreement for SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020; CSTC-A,
Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021; DOD, Enhancing Security
Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 33.
a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of 113. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020; SIGAR, analy-
America, 2/29/2020, p. 2. sis of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2021; CSTC-A, response to
88. U.S. Congress, H.R. 6395, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 1/6/2021.
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021; AP, “After years 114. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; DOD,
fighting them, Milley talks peace with Taliban,” 12/17/2020. Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 33;
89. Washington Post, “U.S. forces in Afghanistan cut to 2,500, low- SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A and DOD data, 1/2021; SIGAR, meet-
est level since 2001,” 1/15/2021. ing record with CSTC-A, 3/2020; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR
90. General Mark Milley, remarks at webinar for the Brookings vetting, 1/6/2021 and 1/15/2021.
Institution, “A Conversation with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 115. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; DOD,
of Staff General Mark Milley,” 12/2/2020; DOD, “Contractor Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 33;
Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of SIGAR, meeting record with CSTC-A, 3/2020; CSTC-A, response
Responsibility,” 1/2021 and 10/2020. to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021 and 1/15/2021.
91. TOLOnews, “Miller says he has orders to reduce US troop lev- 116. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting 1/6/2021; OUSD-P, response
els,” 12/13/2020. to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021; DOD, Enhancing Security and
92. DOD, “Sec. Esper Interview With Fox News’ ‘Justice with Judge Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, p. 2; DOD OIG, Audit of the
Jeanine,’ 8/8/2020; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. Planning for and Implementation of the Afghan Personnel and
93. Defense One, “Milley Meets with Taliban in Fragile Peace Pay System, 8/15/2019, i.
Negotiations,” 12/17/2020; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 117. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and response to
“Transcript: COMRS, CJCS, US EMB On-Record Interview 16 SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 10/19/2020.
December 2020,” 1/6/2021. 118. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/18/2020 and 12/16/2020;
94. Stars and Stripes, “Gen. McKenzie: Troop drawdowns in Iraq, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 10/19/2020.
Afghanistan will limit how US assists future operations,” 119. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
12/10/2020. 120. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call 12/16/2020.

ENDNOTES
121. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/18/2020 and 12/16/2020; 152. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and 12/16/2020;
CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 10/19/2020. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/19/2020.
122. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 10/19/2020. 153. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and response to
123. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response SIGAR vetting, 10/19/2020; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting,
to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 1/6/2021.
124. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019. 154. CSTC-A, response to DOD OIG data call, 4/7/2020; CSTC-A,
125. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2020.
to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 155. DOD OIG, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: April 1, 2020–June 30,
126. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 2020, p. 19.
127. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019. 156. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2020; CSTC-A,
128. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021. response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021.
129. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021. 157. AFP, “Afghan Troops, Police Abandon Nearly 200 Checkpoints
130. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, To Taliban,” 12/30/2020.
pp. 1–2, 5. 158. AFP, “Afghan Troops, Police Abandon Nearly 200 Checkpoints
131. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, To Taliban,” 12/30/2020.
p. 46. 159. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2021.
132. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021 and 1/15/2021. 160. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2021.
133. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021 and 10/19/2020; 161. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021.
SIGAR, analysis of NSOCC-A-provided data, 1/2021. 162. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020, 9/22/2020,
134. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021 and 10/19/2020; 10/6/2020, 1/6/2021; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data,
SIGAR, analysis of NSOCC-A-provided data, 1/2021. 12/2020; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021; DOD,
135. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2019, p. 33.
10/7/2020. 163. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2021.
136. NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 164. DOD OIG, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: April 1, 2020–June 30,
137. DOD OIG, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Lead Inspector 2020, pp. 23–24.
General’s Report to the United States Congress, 11/15/2019, 165. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2020.
p. 26; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 166. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/18/2020.
7/2019, p. 53. 167. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021 and 10/6/2020;
138. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/17/2020 and CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/19/2020.
12/19/2019; USFOR-A, response to DOD OIG data call, 4/6/2020; 168. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021.
DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 7/2019, 169. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002
p. 53. Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts
139. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 7/2019, December 2020,” 1/19/2021.
p. 53; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2020 and 170. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002
12/16/2020; USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/13/2020. Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts
140. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 7/2019, December 2020,” 1/19/2021.
pp. 52–53; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2020 and 171. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/19/2020.
12/16/2020. 172. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
141. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/6/2020. 173. See Appendix B of this report.
142. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response 174. SIGAR, meeting record with CSTC-A, 12/9/2019; CSTC-A,
to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020.
143. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 175. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and 12/16/2020;
144. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 1/6/2021;
145. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
146. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 176. See Appendix B of this report.
147. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/10/2019. 177. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response
148. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
pp. 33–34; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/18/2020. 178. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response
149. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
pp. 33–34; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/18/2020. 179. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response
150. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and response to to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
SIGAR vetting, 10/19/2020. 180. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020, and response
151. Last quarter, CSTC-A reported 109 sites active in CoreIMS. This to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
quarter they amended that number to 99, thus accounting for 181. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
the increase of 25 sites from 99 last quarter to 124 this quarter. 182. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; CSTC-A,
CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and 12/16/2020; response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting 1/6/2021. 183. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and 12/16/2020;
CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.

ENDNOTES
184. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and response to 210. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call 9/22/2020 and 12/16/2020;
SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. CSTC-A response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020, 10/19/2020,
185. See Appendix B of this report. 1/6/2021; OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/18/2020.
186. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and 9/22/2020; 211. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call 9/22/2020 and 12/16/2020
CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020, 1/6/2021, and and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020 and 1/6/2021.
1/15/2021. 212. OUSD-P. response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
187. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; CSTC-A, 213. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020,
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021. pp. 81, 83.
188. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2020. 214. Fondation Suisse de Déminage website, “Afghanistan,” https://
189. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and 9/22/2020; fsd.ch/en/project/afghanistan/, accessed 3/25/2020.
SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020; OUSD-P, 215. E-Mine/UN Mine Action website, “Portfolio on Mine Action,”
response to SIGAR vetting, 10/18/2020. Afghanistan Country Portfolio, 2018, https://mineaction.org/en/
190. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and 9/22/2020; portfolio-of-mine-action-projects, accessed 7/1/2019.
SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020. 216. New York Times, Mujib Mashal, “Left-Behind Explosives Taking
191. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and 9/22/2020; Deadlier Toll on Afghan Children, U.N. Says, 2/6/2017, https://
SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020. www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/world/asia/afghanistan-war-
192. The SMW was funded beginning in FY 2012. Not included here civilian-casualties-un-report.html, accessed 1/23/2021; Stuff
is an additional $794.8 million of obligated SMW funds from the Circuit, Paula Penfold and Eugene Bingham, “New Zealand doc-
Office of the Secretary of Defense-Counternarcotics (OSD-CN) umentary forces clean-up of deadly Afghanistan firing ranges,”
fund from FY 2012 to FY 2020. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/stuff-circuit/300099027/
data call, 12/16/2020; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, new-zealand-documentary-forces-cleanup-of-deadly-afghani-
12/2020. stan-firing-ranges, 9/3/2020.
193. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; SIGAR, analy- 217. UNOCHA, “AFGHANISTAN Weekly Humanitarian Update
sis of CSTC-A-provided data, 12/2020; OUSD-P, response to (9 March – 15 March 2020),” https://reliefweb.int/report/
SIGAR vetting, 4/17/2020. afghanistan/afghanistan-weekly-humanitarian-update-9-march-
194. TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2021. 15-march-2020, accessed 3/25/2020, p. 2.
195. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021; SIGAR, analysis 218. DMAC, “MAPA Annual Report for 1398 – April 2019-March
of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2021. 2020,” pp. 5–6.
196. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021; SIGAR, analysis 219. State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021.
of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2021. 220. State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021.
197. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2021; SIGAR, analysis 221. State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2021; https://
of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2021. www.theunitconverter.com/area-conversion/?
198. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 222. State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2020; NIST,
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts The United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History,
December 2020,” 1/19/2021. 1997, p. 8; https://www.theunitconverter.com/area-conversion/?
199. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OUSD-P, 223. E-Mine/UN Mine Action website, “Portfolio on Mine Action,”
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report Afghanistan Country Portfolio, 2018; State, PM/WRA, response
to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75; See Appendix B to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2019.
of this report. 224. DMAC, “MAPA Annual Report for 1398 – April 2019–March
200. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/19/2020. 2020,” p. 5.
201. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020 and 225. PM/WRA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2019; DMAC, “MAPA
12/16/2020. Annual Report for 1398 - April 2019-March 2020,” p. 6.
202. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 226. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC),
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts Implementation Plan—Year 3, FY2020: October 1, 2019 to
December 2020,” 1/19/2021. September 30, 2019, 10/9/2019, pp. 1–2; USAID, OAPA–17–
203. SIGAR, SIGAR meeting record with CSTC-A, 12/9/2019. JULY–AFG–0037, Initial Environmental Examination, 7/5/2017.
204. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020 and response 227. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC),
to SIGAR vetting, 1/9/2021. Annual Report, FY2020: October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020,
205. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 p. 5.
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts 228. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC),
December 2020,” 1/19/2021. Annual Report, FY2020: October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020,
206. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; CSTC-A, pp. 24, 44.
response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2020, 1/6/2021, and 1/15/2021. 229. USAID, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC),
207. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. Annual Report, FY2020: October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020,
208. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. p. 42.
209. See Appendix B of this report and DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 230. See Appendix B.
Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts 231. State, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at Intra-Afghan
December 2020,” 1/19/2021. Negotiations Opening Ceremony, 9/12/2020; Reuters, “Afghan

ENDNOTES
peace talks open with calls for ceasefire, women’s rights,” status/1337781275709542406?s=20; Khalilzad, Zalmay. (@
9/12/2020. US4AfghanPeace) “1/3 The two Afghan negotiating teams
232. Pompeo, Michael. (@SecPompeo) “Met with both Taliban and announced in Doha they will take 20 days off to “consult on the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s negotiating teams in Doha. agenda items,’” 12/14/2020, https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/
I commend both sides for continuing to negotiate and for the status/1334108215735365632?s=20; State, response to SIGAR
progress they have made. I encourage expedited discussions on vetting, 1/6/2021.
a political roadmap and a permanent and comprehensive cease- 244. TOLOnews, “Republic Team: Taliban’s Islamic Political System
fire,” 11/21/2020, https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1330234 Unclear,” 12/24/2020.
557396901888?s=20. 245. Radio Free Europe, “After Talks With Taliban, Pakistani Leader
233. State, Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with the Taliban, 11/21/2020. Calls For Reduction of Violence,” 12/18/2020.
234. TOLOnews, “Ghani Opposes Agreement on Doha Talks’ 246. Reuters, “Taliban delegation visits Islamabad, plans for leader-
Procedural Rules: Sources,” 11/23/2020. ship meeting in Pakistan,” 12/16/2020.
235. Sediqqi, Sediq. (@SediqSediqqi) “Not true, and misleading 247. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
sources. The negotiating team of the Islamic Republic of 248. Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Intra-Afghan Talks (1): Rules of
Afghanistan will officially comment when there is any break- procedure agreed, but still no agenda as talks resume,” 1/3/2021.
through/progress in the talks,” 11/23/2020, https://twitter.com/ 249. Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Intra-Afghan Talks (1): Rules of
SediqSediqqi/status/1330937620533309443?s=20. procedure agreed, but still no agenda as talks resume,” 1/3/2021.
236. State, Remarks at 2020 Afghanistan Conference, 11/24/2020. 250. Reuters, “Afghan peace talks to begin on Saturday in Doha,”
237. State, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; State, response 1/6/2021; Peace Negotiation Team of the I.R. of Afghanistan. (@
to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. PeaceIRAfg) “As decided in Wednesday’s meeting, the desig-
238. Nadery, Nader. (@N_Nadery) “1/2 The negotiation teams of nated teams met this evening to develop a joint agenda. In the
both sides have ONLY agreed in principle to the 21 articles meeting which took place in a positive atmosphere, mutual
of the rules and procedures, with the exception of the agendas were discussed and it was decided that such meetings
introduction because it requires further discussion & clari- should continue,” 1/9/2021, https://twitter.com/PeaceIRAfg/
fication. Therefore in the joint meeting on Nov 17, 2020 in status/1347963302136184832.
the presence...” 11/28/2020, https://twitter.com/N_Nadery/ 251. TOLOnews, “US Envoy Discussed Interim Govt with Afghan
status/1332716630804148229; State, response to SIGAR vetting, Politicians: Sources,” 1/12/2021.
1/6/2021. 252. Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson. (@USAmbKabul) (1/4) The
239. New York Times, “Afghan Leader Digs In on Peace Talks United States is committed to bringing about an end to conflict
Despite Progress, Officials Say,” 11/29/2020. in Afghanistan through a political settlement that ensures this
240. Office of Public and Strategic Affairs of the President, country remains sovereign, unified & democratic, is at peace
“Statement attributable to the Spokesperson of the President with itself and its neighbors & can preserve gains made over the
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the New York times last 19 years, 1/13/2021, https://twitter.com/USAmbKabul/status/
story titled ‘Afghan leader digs in on peace talks despite prog- 1349282327583666177?s=20.
ress, officials say’ dated 29 November 2020,” 11/30/2020, https:// 253. TOLOnews, “Constitution Needs No Amending for Peace: VP
twitter.com/SediqSediqqi/status/1333321456969768962?s=20. Danish,” 1/13/2021.
241. Omer, Waheed. (@Waheed_Omer) “We haven’t stalled the nego- 254. TOLOnews, “Afghan MPs: No System Acceptable Except
tiations. On the contrary, we have given concessions that no Republic,” 1/13/2021.
gov in the world would give to a group who isn’t even ready to 255. USFOR-A Spokesman COL Sonny Leggett. (@USFOR_A) “The
recognize us as a gov; relies on killing people to ask for more Taliban’s accusations the US violated the US-TB agreement are
concessions and thinks violence and terror works in their false. US Forces have been clear & consistent: We will defend
favor.” 12/1/2020, https://twitter.com/Waheed_Omer/status/1333 Afghan forces against TB attacks. We renew our call for all
691895244087297?s=20. sides to reduce violence. @Zabehulah_M 1/2,” 1/4/2021, https://
242. Peace Negotiation Team of the I.R. of Afghanistan. (@ twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/133410821573536563
PeaceIRAfg) “The procedure including its preamble of the nego- 2?s=20; Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson. (@USAmbKabul) “(1/2)
tiation has been finalized and from now on, the negotiation will The United States condemns today’s assassinations of female
begin on the agenda,” 12/2/2020, https://twitter.com/PeaceIRAfg/ supreme court judges and calls for a prompt investigation. My
status/1334102563134861315?s=20; Khalilzad, Zalmay. (@ condolences to the families of the victims and wishes for a
US4AfghanPeace) “1/4 I welcome the news from #Doha that speedy recovery to those injured,” 1/17/2021, https://twitter.
the two Afghan sides have reached a significant milestone: A com/USAmbKabul/status/1350757811165163521?s=20.
three-page agreement codifing rules and procedures for their 256. Washington Post, “Targeted killings of journalists are on the rise
negotiations on a political roadmap and a comprehensive cease- across Afghanistan,” 12/27/2020; New York Times, “Targeted
fire,” 12/2/2020, https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1334 Killings Are Terrorizing Afghans. And No One Is Claiming
108215735365632?s=20. Them,” 1/2/2020.
243. Peace Negotiation Team of the I.R. of Afghanistan. (@ 257. TOLOnews, “‘Taliban Is Behind Targeted Killings’: Andarabi,”
PeaceIRAfg) “Both sides of the Intra-Afghan Negotiation teams 12/29/2020.
shared initial lists of agenda items & conducted preliminary dis- 258. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2021.
cussions on the list.,” 12/12/2020, https://twitter.com/N_Nadery/

ENDNOTES
259. TOLOnews, “Moby Group Signs Contract on Insurance 282. “Notes to File: Working Level - Election Support Group,”
Coverage For Its Employees,” 6/24/2019; Social Impact, USAID/ 11/26/2020.
OTI Afghanistan Program: Final Evaluation, 8/15/2005, pp. 58, 283. TOLOnews, “Taliban Lost Opportunity to Attend Geneva
78; New York Times, “An Afghan Media Mogual, Pushing Conference: EU Envoy,” 11/17/2020.
Boundaries,” 7/27/2013. 284. According to UNICEF, 680 informal classes were already oper-
260. William Hammink, USAID in Afghanistan: Challenges and ating in these provinces. UNICEF said the Taliban accepted
Successes, 12/2017, pp. 1, 3. girls’ education until the end of primary school. Voice of
261. Washington Post, “Targeted killings of journalists are on the rise America, “Rare UN-Taliban Agreement to Set Up 4,000 Schools
across Afghanistan,” 12/27/2020. in Insurgent-Held Afghan Territory,” 12/19/2020; The Telegraph,
262. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan: Journalists “UN strikes agreement with Taliban leaders to set up thousands
Killed between 1992 and 2020,” 12/30/2020. of schools in insurgent areas,” 12/17/2020.
263. Nai Supporting Open Media in Afghanistan, “Violence Against 285. Voice of America, “Rare UN-Taliban Agreement to Set Up 4,000
Journalists in Afghanistan (2001 - Present),” 12/30/2020. Schools in Insurgent-Held Afghan Territory,” 12/19/2020; The
264. Washington Post, “Targeted killings of journalists are on the rise Telegraph, “UN strikes agreement with Taliban leaders to set up
across Afghanistan,” 12/27/2020. thousands of schools in insurgent areas,” 12/17/2020.
265. Reuters, “Head of election monitoring group gunned down in 286. Khalilzad, Zalmay, Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Afghan capital,” 12/23/2020. National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government
266. TOLOnews, “Targeted Killings are Attack on New Generation: Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, “Hearing On
Ghani,” 12/28/2020. Afghanistan Strategy,” 9/22/2020.
267. TOLOnews, “Targeted Killings to Be Discussed in Talks: 287. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
Stanekzai,” 1/1/2021. 288. World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: FY1400–
268. State, Briefing with Special Representative for Afghanistan FY1403 (2021–2024) Partnership Framework and Financing
Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad on the Program, 10/20/2020, p. 30.
Afghanistan Peace Negotiations, 9/11/2020. 289. World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: FY1400–
269. “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the FY1403 (2021–2024) Partnership Framework and Financing
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the Program, 10/20/2020, p. 30.
United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the 290. World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: FY1400–
United States of America,” 2/29/2020, p. 2; State, response to FY1403 (2021–2024) Partnership Framework and Financing
SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. Program, 10/20/2020, p. 30.
270. TOLOnews, “Taliban Expect Release of Their Prisoners by Mid- 291. Due to COVID-19 pandemic, the Asia Foundation was unable
December: Wilson,” 12/8/2020. to conduct its annual in-person Survey of the Afghan People in
271. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 2020. Instead, the Asia Foundation gathered the views of over
272. The National, “Taliban expecting release of 7,000 prisoners 4,300 Afghans aged 18 and above by telephonic interview using
additional to US deal,” 12/9/2020. random digit dialing. According to the CIA, there are 21 million
273. TOLOnews, “Afghan President Invites Taliban to Kandahar to cellular phone subscribers in Afghanistan. Asia Foundation,
Discuss Peace,” 12/17/2020. Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions of Peace, Covid-19,
274. TOLOnews, “Mastermind Behind Kabul University Attack and the Economy: Wave 1 Findings, 11/23/2020, ii, pp. 70–71;
Arrested: Saleh,” 11/14/2020. Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan
275. Khalilzad, Zalmay. (@US4AfghanPeace) “1/4 The attack today in 2019, pp. 142–143; CIA, World Factbook: Afghanistan,
on Kabul University claimed by ISIS was horrendous. I con- 12/17/2020.
demn it and offer my heartfelt condolences to the families of 292. USAID, OTI, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020; USAID,
the victims,” 11/2/2020, https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/stat response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2020.
us/1323479637842944000?s=20. 293. USAID, OTI, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
276. State, “U.S. Welcomes First Meeting of the Afghanistan High 294. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
Council for National Reconciliation Leadership Committee,” national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General,
12/5/2020. 12/10/2020, p. 10.
277. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 295. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
10/30/2020, p. 108. national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General,
278. TOLOnews, “Ghani Officially Approves 46 Reconciliation 12/10/2020, p. 10.
Council Members,” 8/30/2020; Afghanistan Analysts Network, 296. Reuters, “Foreign aid to Afghanistan could reach $12 billion
“End of the Post-Election Impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new over four years, some with conditions,” 11/24/2020; UN, The
power-sharing formula,” 5/20/2020. situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international
279. TOLOnews, “Negotiators Leave for Qatar to Resume Talks,” peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, 12/10/2020,
1/5/2021. p. 10.
280. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 297. Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, “Communiqué,” 10/5/2016,
1/30/2019, p. 108. p. 5.
281. “Notes to File: Working Level - Election Support Group,” 298. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
11/26/2020. 299. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.

ENDNOTES
300. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 2. 334. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 4/4/2014.
301. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, pp. 3–4. 335. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/19/2020.
302. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 3. 336. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/19/2020; DOD, response
303. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 3. to SIGAR vetting, 1/8/2021.
304. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 337. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
305. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 338. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020;
306. World Bank, “Partnership Framework and Financing Program: UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2020 and LOTFA MPTF Receipts
Key Messages and Indicative Outline,” 9/24/2020. 2002–2020, updated 12/31/2020, in response to SIGAR data call,
307. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 1/8/2021.
308. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 6. 339. Tetra Tech ARD, Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations
309. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 8. in Afghanistan (ISLA) Project) Monthly Report, February
310. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 10. 2015, 3/15/2015, ii; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call,
311. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter- 12/22/2016; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2020.
national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, 340. SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: Initiative to Strengthen Local
12/10/2020, p. 11. Administrations, SIGAR-17-45-SP, 6/5/2017, p. 1.
312. SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Efforts Alert Letter, 341. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local
SIGAR 21-09-AL, 11/6/2020, p. 2. Administrations (ISLA) Quarterly Report, 7/30/2020, p. 5.
313. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, pp. 2–4. 342. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local
314. State, “Remarks at 2020 Afghanistan Conference,” 11/24/2020. Administrations (ISLA) FY 2020 Annual Report: October 2019 –
315. Ross Wilson, remarks delivered to the Afghanistan 2020 September 2020, 10/2020, p. 27.
Conference Side Event on Institutional and Societal Methods 343. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local
for Fighting Corruption, 11/23/2020. Administrations (ISLA) FY 2020 Annual Report: October 2019 –
316. Deborah Lyons, remarks delivered by Ramiz Alakbarov on September 2020, 10/2020, pp. 30–31.
behalf of Deborah Lyons to the Afghanistan 2020 Conference 344. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local
Side Event on Institutional and Societal Methods for Fighting Administrations (ISLA) FY 2020 Annual Report: October 2019 –
Corruption, 11/23/2020. September 2020, 10/2020, p. 116.
317. NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration,” 7/11/2018. 345. Tetra Tech, USAID Initiative to Strengthen Local
318. “Afghanistan Conference: Communiqué,” 11/24/2020; Administrations (ISLA) FY 2020 Annual Report: October 2019 –
Afghanistan Partnership Framework, 11/24/2020. September 2020, 10/2020, pp. 47–48.
319. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2020. 346. Development Alternatives Inc., Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope
320. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013. and Resilience (SHAHAR): Monthly Report February 2015,
321. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2014. 3/15/2015, p. 4; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2020.
322. USAID, “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),” 347. Development Alternatives Inc., Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope
8/26/2013. and Resilience (SHAHAR): Monthly Report September 2020,
323. USAID, “U.S. government contributed $105 million to Asian 10/15/2015, p. 10.
Development Bank Infrastructure Fund for Afghanistan,” 348. Development Alternatives Inc., Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope
3/18/2014. and Resilience (SHAHAR): Monthly Report September 2020,
324. World Bank, “Administrator’s Report on Financial Status,” 10/15/2015, p. 12.
11/20/2020, p. 4. 349. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
325. World Bank, “Recurrent Cost Window,” 2019. 1/30/2019, p. 124.
326. World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: FY1400– 350. World Bank, Post-Settlement Economic Initiatives to Support
FY1403 (2021–2024) Partnership Framework and Financing Peace and Inclusive Growth in Afghanistan, 3/26/2019, pp. 10,
Program, 10/20/2020, p. 5. 28; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan; Day After
327. World Bank, “Partnership Framework and Financing Program: Peace Program-Towards an Inclusive, Sustainable & Equitable
Key Messages and Indicative Outline,” 9/24/2020. Peace, 7/2019, pp. 8–10.
328. World Bank, “Administrator’s Report on Financial Status,” 351. World Bank, Project Paper on a Restructuring and Proposed
11/20/2020, p. 2. Additional Grant in the Amount of (SDR24.8) Million (US$35
329. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Million Equivalent) and a Proposed Additional Grant from
7/30/2020, p. 43. the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in the Amount of
330. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2017; DOD, response to US$158 Million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a
SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018. Second Additional Financing For Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan
331. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/17/2020; DOD, CSTC-A, Project, n.d., p. 60.
RM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020; DOD, Overseas 352. World Bank, Project Paper on a Restructuring and Proposed
Contingency Operations (OCO) Afghanistan Security Forces Additional Grant in the Amount of (SDR24.8) Million (US$35
Fund (ASFF), 2020, p. 52. Million Equivalent) and a Proposed Additional Grant from
332. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data calls, 7/1/2014. the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in the Amount of
333. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2017; DOD, response to US$158 Million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a
SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.

ENDNOTES
Second Additional Financing For Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan 374. International Development Law Organization, Continuing
Project, n.d., pp. 13, 61. Professional Development Support (CPDS): IDLO Final Report,
353. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 6. 12/3/2020, p. 7.
354. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure 375. National Statistics and Information Authority, Afghanistan
for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): Quarterly Statistical Yearbook 2019, 5/13/2019, pp. 37, 39.
Performance Report: FY 2018, Quarter 3, 7/31/2018, p. 1. 376. International Development Law Organization, Continuing
355. USAID, “Fact Sheet: Afghanistan’s Measure for Accountability Professional Development Support (CPDS): IDLO Final Report,
and Transparency (AMANAT),” 3/11/2019. 12/3/2020, p. 29.
356. USAID, Modification No. 7 to Contract AID- 306-H-17-00003, 377. PAE, CSSP Baseline Needs Assessment, 6/16/2019, p. 8.
9/16/2020, p. 2. 378. PAE, CSSP Monthly Program Performance Report [LN DCT],
357. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure for 11/13/2020, p. 3.
Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): Weekly Report, 379. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; State, INL,
12/19/2020. response to SIGAR data call, 9/17/2020.
358. USAID, Modification No. 7 to Contract AID-306-H-17-00003, 380. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
9/16/2020, p. 2. national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General,
359. Management Systems International, VCA Reports for Selected 12/10/2020, p. 9.
Institutions: Ministry of Higher Education and Ministry of 381. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
Public Health, 9/30/2020, p. 11. national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General,
360. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure for 12/10/2020, p. 9.
Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): Annual Report 382. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
Year 3, 10/30/2020, pp. 7–8. 383. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
361. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General,
4/30/2019, pp. 124–125; State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/10/2020, p. 9.
12/16/2020. 384. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
362. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 385. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
4/30/2019, pp. 124–125. 386. PAE, CSSP Monthly Program Performance Report [AN DCT],
363. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/13/2020, pp. 16–17; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting,
1/30/2018, p. 142. 1/6/2021.
364. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/28/2020; State, INL, 387. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2020; “JSSP Deliverables Gantt 388. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter-
Chart (PRO-PLAN),” 9/2020. national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General,
365. Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program, Bi-Weekly Report 12/10/2020, p. 9.
# 5 (Option Year Three), 11/15/2020, p. 4. 389. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; State, INL,
366. Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program, Bi-Weekly Report response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
# 5 (Option Year Three), 11/15/2020, p. 5. 390. In 2019, the Asia Foundation reported that 67.9% of those
367. Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program, Bi-Weekly Report surveyed said corruption was a major problem in their daily
# 3 (Option Year Three), 10/15/2020, p. 1; State, INL, response to life and 85.1% of those survey said corruption was a major
SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. problem in Afghanistan as a whole. Due to COVID-19 pan-
368. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. demic, the Asia Foundation was unable to conduct its annual
369. USAID, Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034/AID-306-TO-16-00007, in-person Survey of the Afghan People in 2020. Instead, the Asia
4/16/2016, pp. 1, 8; USAID, Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034/AID- Foundation gathered the views of over 4,300 Afghans aged 18
306-TO-16-00007: Modification 01, 7/31/2016, p. 3; USAID, and above by telephonic interview using random digit dialing.
response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2020. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions of
370. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Peace, Covid-19, and the Economy: Wave 1 Findings, 11/23/2020,
1/30/2017, p. 138. ii, pp. 70–71; Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People:
371. Checchi and Company Consulting Inc., Assistance for the Afghanistan in 2019, pp. 142–143.
Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency 391. UN, Afghanistan’s Fight against Corruption: Crucial for Peace
(ADALAT) Annual Work Plan April 2019–March 2020, 4/8/2019, and Prosperity, 6/18/2020, pp. 5, 9.
pp. 14–15. 392. “International partners’ comments on the draft Anti-Corruption
372. Checchi and Company Consulting Inc., Assistance for the Strategy,” 9/28/2020, p. 2.
Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency 393. “International partners’ comments on the draft Anti-Corruption
(ADALAT) Annual Report October 2019 – September 2020, Strategy,” 9/28/2020, p. 2.
11/20/2020, pp. 4, 31–32. 394. “International partners’ comments on the draft Anti-Corruption
373. International Development Law Organization, Continuing Strategy,” 9/28/2020, p. 3.
Professional Development Support (CPDS): IDLO Final Report, 395. “International partners’ comments on the draft Anti-Corruption
12/3/2020, pp. 4–5. Strategy,” 9/28/2020, p. 5.
396. UN, Afghanistan’s Fight against Corruption: Crucial for Peace
and Prosperity, 6/18/2020, pp. 5, 9.

ENDNOTES
397. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter- 433. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, 434. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020.
12/10/2020, p. 11. 435. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
398. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for inter- 436. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020.
national peace and security, report of the Secretary-General, 437. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
12/10/2020, p. 11. 438. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/2017 and 12/16/2020.
399. “Afghanistan Partnership Framework,” 11/24/2020, p. 8. 439. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
400. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 440. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
4/30/2019, pp. 126–127. 441. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
401. DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 12/29/2020. 442. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/2017.
402. DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 12/29/2020. 443. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
403. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 444. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
404. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 445. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
405. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 446. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/18/2020, 6/17/2020,
406. DOJ, response to SIGAR data call, 12/29/2020. and 9/21/2020.
407. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 447. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
408. SIGAR, “Meeting Record: Asadullah Khalid, Afghan Minister of 448. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
Defense,” 10/16/2019. 449. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
409. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; DOD, 450. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/8/2021. 451. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020.
410. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 452. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020 and
411. DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 12/16/2020.
412. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and 453. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control 454. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/18/2020; DOD,
Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2020, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, p. 89.
p. 92. 455. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020.
413. UNODC, “World Drug Report 2020, booklet 1,” 6/2020, pp. 40, 456. SIGAR, Interview with MOI Official from Deputy Directorate
42; SIGAR analysis of UNODC data, 6/2020. of Counter Narcotics, 9/1/2019; DOD, Enhancing Security and
414. UNODC, “World Drug Report 2020, booklet 3” 6/2020, p. 20. Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, p. 89.
415. See, for example, Department of State, Bureau for International 457. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics 458. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019; DOD,
Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020, p. 89;
3/2020, pp. 91–92. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2020; DEA, response
416. State Department, “U.S. Reinforces Commitment to Secure, to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
Stable, Democratic, and Self-Reliant Afghanistan at 2020 459. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019.
Conference,” 11/24/2020. 460. DEA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2018.
417. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 461. DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
418. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 462. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/20/2019 and 6/17/2020;
419. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020; UNODC, DEA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/11/2018.
“Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Challenges to sustainable 463. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020,
development, peace and security,” 7/2019, p. 2. p. 90.
420. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020 and 464. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020,
12/16/2020. pp. 88–89.
421. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 465. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2021.
422. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020. 466. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2020,
423. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. p. 75; NSOCC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020.
424. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 467. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2021.
425. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 468. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020 and
1/30/2020, p. 116. 12/16/2020.
426. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020; State, INL, 469. DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020, 9/21/2020, and
response to SIGAR vetting, 7/7/2020. 12/16/2020; State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020
427. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. and 12/16/2020.
428. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 470. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2019, 12/18/2019,
429. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; State, INL, 3/18/2020, 6/17/2020, 9/21/2020, and 12/16/2020; State, INL,
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2019; DEA, response to SIGAR
430. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. vetting, 10/11/2019; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting,
431. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 10/9/2020.
432. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.

ENDNOTES
471. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2017; State, INL, 502. The Lancet, Sophie Cousins, “Afghanistan braced for second
response to SIGAR data call, 6/17/2020. wave of COVID-19,” 11/28/2020.
472. DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 503. The Lancet, Sophie Cousins, “Afghanistan braced for second
473. DEA, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/5/2021. wave of COVID-19,” 11/28/2020.
474. DEA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 504. Asian Development Bank, “ADB Approves $100 Million Grant to
475. UNODC, “World Drug Report 2020, booklet 1” 6/2020, p. 42; Support Afghanistan’s COVID-19 Response,” 12/2/2020.
OUSD-P, DOD(CN), response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2020; 505. Reuters, Rupam Jaim, “Afghanistan’s poverty rate rises as econ-
SIGAR analysis of DOD data, 7/2020. omy suffers,” 5/7/2018; State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call,
476. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 12/16/2020.
477. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 506. Voice of America, Lisa Schlein, “Afghanistan Battered by
478. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; State, INL, COVID, Conflict, Climate Change,” 12/13/2020.
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 507. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions
479. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020 and of Peace, COVID-19, and the Economy: Wave 1 Finding,
12/16/2020; State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/8/2020 and 11/23/2020, pp. 80, 83.
7/7/2020. 508. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
480. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 509. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC),
481. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2020. “Afghanistan: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
482. State, INL, Governor Led Eradication Amended Implementing Snapshot, August 2020–March 2021,” 11/9/2020.
Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police, Criminal 510. Reporterly, “More Than 20,000 Families Benefited From Afghan
Justice, and Counternarcotics Support Programs of March National Relief Program,” 12/21/2020.
9, 2006 between the Government of the United States of 511. TOLOnews, Mir Haidar Shah Omid, “‘Afghan Economy Needs 4
America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 4/23/2014; Years to Return to Pre-COVID Situation,’” 11/11/2020.
GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, 512. UNDP, “COVID-19 Socio Economic Impact Assessment: Fiscal
Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, GAO Options in Response to Coronavirus Crisis,” 11/11/2020, pp. 7, 9.
07-78, 11/2006, pp. 16, 19. 513. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2020
483. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. Update, 9/2020, p. 187.
484. UNHCR, “Border Monitoring Update (06 - 12 December 2020),” 514. UNDP, “COVID-19 Socio Economic Impact Assessment: Fiscal
12/12/2020. Options in Response to Coronavirus Crisis,” 11/11/2020, p. 9.
485. State, PRM, response to SIGAR data call, 9/18/2020; State, PRM, 515. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported
response to SIGAR vetting, 10/6/2020. 1/10/2021 and 1/18/2020.
486. IOM, “Return of Undocumented Afghans Weekly Situation 516. Associated Press of Pakistan, “Pakistan’s exports to
Report,” 12/31/2020, p. 2. Afghanistan decrease 43.61pc during July 2020,” 9/8/2020.
487. IOM, “Return of Undocumented Afghans Weekly Situation 517. SIGAR analysis of Afghanistan Revenue Department data, pub-
Report,” 12/28/2019, p. 1; IOM, “Return of Undocumented lished 12/26/2020.
Afghans Weekly Situation Report,” 12/29/2018, p. 1. 518. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported
488. SIGAR analysis of UN, OCHA, “Summary of conflict induced 1/10/2021 and 1/18/2020.
displacements (1 Jan to 22 Mar 2019),” 9/30/2020; SIGAR analy- 519. State, Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan, 9/27/2018, p. 4.
sis of UN, OCHA, “Summary of conflict induced displacements 520. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019,
(1 Jan to 31 Dec 2019),” 3/3/2020. p. 26.
489. USAID, “Promote,” 12/17/2018; USAID, OG, response to SIGAR 521. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019,
data call, 12/16/2020. pp. 9–10.
490. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 522. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
491. DAI, USAID Musharikat Annual Report, 10/30/2020, pp. 8–9. 523. SIGAR communication with DFC officials, 9/3/2020; State,
492. DAI, USAID Musharikat Annual Report, 10/30/2020, p. 11. response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020; State Department,
493. DAI, USAID Musharikat Annual Report, 10/30/2020, p. 13. “Statement by Secretary Pompeo on the Loya Jirga,” Press
494. DAI, USAID Musharikat Annual Report, 10/30/2020, p. 13. Release, 8/7/2020.
495. DAI, USAID Musharikat Annual Report, 10/30/2020, p. 14. 524. Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson, (@USAmbKabul),
496. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. “#PeaceForAfghanistan will bring economic opportunities for
497. Reuters, “Foreign donors pledge $12 billion over four-years for displaced people and all Afghan citizens,” 12/17/2020, https://
Afghanistan with tougher conditions,” 12/24/2020. twitter.com/USAmbKabul/status/1339761465402793985.
498. Reuters, “Foreign donors pledge $12 billion over four-years for 525. State Department, “Special Representative Khalilzad Travels to
Afghanistan with tougher conditions,” 12/24/2020. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar and Turkmenistan,” press release,
499. UN OCHA, “Afghanistan: COVID-19 Multi-Sectoral Response 1/4/2021.
Operational Situation Report,” 1/14/2021, p. 1. 526. Gandhara, Nilly Kohzad, “Even If It Achieves Peace, Can
500. The Lancet, Sophie Cousins, “Afghanistan braced for second Afghanistan Ever Be Financially Independent?,” 12/1/2020.
wave of COVID-19,” 11/28/2020. 527. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
501. Voice of America, Ayaz Gul, “10 Million Afghans Likely Infected 528. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
From COVID-19: Survey,” 8/5/2020. 10/30/2020, pp. 163–165; United Nations Development

ENDNOTES
Programme, Pitfalls and Promise: Minerals Extraction in poverty levels can be compared over time. NSIA, Afghanistan
Afghanistan, 8/2020, p. 38. Living Conditions Survey 2016–17, 8/2018, p. 330; World Bank,
529. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: Afghanistan Development Update January 2020: Navigating a
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 18-38- Sea of Uncertainty, 1/2020, pp. 4, 25.
LL, 4/2018, ix; Arab News, Naimat Khan, “Afghan refugees hope 547. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions
peace talks will finally take them ‘home,’” 9/15/2020; USAID, of Peace, COVID-19, and the Economy: Wave 1 Finding,
Country Development Cooperation Strategy FY2019–2023, 11/23/2020, pp. 62, 64–65.
11/27/2018, p. 13. 548. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan Flash Surveys on Perceptions
530. See Appendix B for a breakdown of U.S. reconstruction funding of Peace, COVID-19, and the Economy: Wave 1 Finding,
since 2002. 11/23/2020, pp. 70–71.
531. Reuters, “Foreign donors pledge $12 billion over four-years for 549. United Nations Development Programme, “Afghanistan:
Afghanistan with tougher conditions,” 12/24/2020. Coronavirus Socio-Economic Impact Assessment,” 7/22/2020,
532. ODI, Tobias Haque and Nigel Roberts, Afghanistan’s Aid p. 14.
Requirements: How much aid is required to maintain a stable 550. SIGAR analysis of UN OCHA, “Afghanistan: COVID-19 Multi-
state?, 10/2020, p. 8. Sectoral Response Operational Situation Report,” 10/15/2020,
533. Associated Press, Jamey Keaton, “EU, other donors step up p. 1; UN OCHA, “Afghanistan: COVID-19 Multi-Sectoral
with funds to help Afghanistan,” 11/24/2020. Response Operational Situation Report,” 1/14/2021, p. 1.
534. U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, Office 551. New York Times, David Zucchino and Fahim Abed, “‘Covid
of the Spokesperson, “U.S. Reinforces Commitment to Secure, Can’t Compete.’ In a Place Mired by War, the Virus Is an
Stable, Democratic, and Self-Reliant Afghanistan at 2020 Afterthought,” 12/20/2020.
Conference,” 11/24/2020. 552. NPR, Jason Beaubien, “The Campaign To Wipe Out Polio Was
535. State Department, “U.S. Reinforces Commitment to Secure, Going Really Well…Until It Wasn’t,” 10/30/2020.
Stable, Democratic, and Self-Reliant Afghanistan at 2020 553. Global Polio Eradication Initiative, “Afghanistan: Polio this
Conference,” 11/24/2020. week in Afghanistan,” 1/14/2021.
536. 2020 Afghanistan Conference, Afghanistan Partnership 554. The Lancet, Sophie Cousins, “Afghanistan braced for second
Framework, 11/2020, p. 2. wave of COVID-19,” 11/28/2020.
537. 2020 Afghanistan Conference, Afghanistan Partnership 555. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
Framework, 11/2020, p. 10. 10/30/2020, pp. 146–149; SIGAR communication with MSF offi-
538. 2020 Afghanistan Conference, Afghanistan Partnership cials, 9/9/2020.
Framework, 11/2020, pp. 10–11. 556. New York Times, David Zucchino and Fahim Abed, “‘Covid
539. State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan, Can’t Compete.’ In a Place Mired by War, the Virus Is an
9/27/2018, p. 7. Afterthought,” 12/20/2020.
540. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update January 2020: 557. Al Jazeera English, Ali M. Latifi, “The Afghan herbalist who
Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty, 1/2020, pp. 1, 25, 30. claims to have a ‘cure’ for COVID-19,” 9/3/2020; Pajhwok Afghan
541. World Bank, Financing Peace: Fiscal Challenges and News, Storai Karimi, “Most women treat Covid-19 patients with
Implications for a Post-Settlement Afghanistan, 12/5/2019, i, p. 3; herbs,” 12/15/2020.
World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update January 2020: 558. Khaama Press, Mohammad Haroon Alim, “Wedding Halls,
Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty, 1/2020, p. 30. Public Places Face Shutdown as Second COVID-19 Wave Hits
542. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Surviving the Afghanistan,” 11/18/2020.
Storm, 7/2020, iii. 559. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
543. SIGAR analysis of World Trade Organization, Afghanistan Trade 560. Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
Profile, 2020, p. 1. “President Ashraf Ghani’s Keynote Speech at the Special
544. Afghan Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Strategy Paper: Medium Session of the UNGA in Response to the Coronavirus Disease
Term Fiscal Framework, 1399 (2020), pp. 38–39; World Bank, COVID-19 Pandemic,” 12/3/2020.
Afghanistan Development Update: Surviving the Storm, 7/2020, 561. Pajhwok Afghan News, Ajmal Kakar, “Ghost workers hired in
iii. Kunduz Covid-19 hospital,” 12/2/2020.
545. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update January 2020: 562. Pajhwok Afghan News, Azizullah Hamdard, “Private hospitals
Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty, 1/2020, p. 32; SIGAR, Private issue fake Covid test certificates,” 10/15/2020.
Sector Development and Economic Growth: Lessons from the 563. Reporterly, “Herat Governor Among 21 Charged for Embezzling
U.S. Afghanistan Experience, SIGAR-18-38-LL, 4/2018, p. 7. COVID-19 Relief Budget,” 10/26/2020; Reporterly, “After
546. The poverty line reflects 2017 prices, as the last household Herat, Former Wardak Governor And 16 Others Charged For
survey was completed in March 2017. Afghanistan’s statistical Embezzling COVID-19 Funds,” 10/29/2020.
authority sets the poverty line by estimating, and subsequently 564. TOLOnews, Fariba Sadat, “Health Minister Says He is Resisting
summing, estimates of the amount of money required for Ghani Order to Resign,” 12/31/2020.
Afghans to meet basic food and non-food needs. The food pov- 565. UNDP, “COVID-19 Socio Economic Impact Assessment: Fiscal
erty line is calculated by estimating the cost of obtaining 2,100 Options in Response to Coronavirus Crisis,” 11/11/2020, p. 5.
calories per person, per day. While prices change from year 566. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
to year, when the criteria for basic needs are held constant, 567. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.

ENDNOTES
568. Asian Development Bank, “ADB Approved $100 Million Grant to 592. Pajhwok Afghan News, Abdul Raqeeb Sail, “Covid-19: Afghan
Support Afghanistan’s COVID-19 Response,” 12/2/2020. airlines incur millions of dollars loss,” 10/22/2020.
569. Reporterly, “Afghanistan to Get $18M From ADB for Panj-Amu 593. Pajhwok Afghan News, Abdul Raqeeb Sail, “Covid-19: Afghan
River Project,” 10/31/2020. airlines incur millions of dollars loss,” 10/22/2020; SIGAR
570. International Monetary Fund, “IMF Executive Board Approves analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported 1/10/2021 and
A US$370 Million Extended Credit Facility Arrangement to 1/18/2020.
Support the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” 11/6/2020. 594. State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2020.
571. Khaama Press, Mohammad Haroon Alim, “World Bank Halts 595. SIGAR, Civil Aviation: U.S. Efforts Improved Afghan
$200 Million Aid Over Lack of Access To Afghanistan Banking Capabilities, but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume
Data,” 12/2/2020. Airspace Management as Planned, SIGAR-15-58-AR, 5/2015,
572. SIGAR, communication with USAID, 1/22/2021. pp. 6–7.
573. Khaama Press, Mohammad Haroon Alim, “First COVID- 596. SIGAR, Civil Aviation: U.S. Efforts Improved Afghan
19 Vaccine Shipment to Arrive in 7 Months: Afghanistan,” Capabilities, but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume
12/10/2020; TOLOnews, Anisa Shaheed, “World Bank Pledged Airspace Management as Planned, SIGAR-15-58-AR, 5/2015, p. 9.
$100M for COVID-19 Vaccine for Afghans: Ghani,” 12/8/2020. 597. SIGAR, Civil Aviation: U.S. Efforts Improved Afghan
574. Nature, Asher Mullard, “How COVID vaccines are being divvied Capabilities, but the Afghan Government Did Not Assume
up around the world,” 11/30/2020. Airspace Management as Planned, SIGAR-15-58-AR, 5/2015, p. 9.
575. Dawn, Ibrahim Shinwari, “Shortage of trackers impede onion 598. SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation: Capacity Has Improved But
import from Afghanistan,” 10/22/2020. Challenges Remain, Including Reliance on Donor Support For
576. Dawn, Mubarak Zeb Khan, “Exports to region down 24.4pcin Operations, SIGAR-19-46-SP, 7/2019, pp. 10–11.
Q1,” 11/15/2020. 599. SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Civil Aviation: Capacity Has Improved But
577. Dawn, Ibrahim Shinwari, “Exports to Afghanistan suspended as Challenges Remain, Including Reliance on Donor Support For
clearing agents go on strike,” 12/15/2020. Operations, SIGAR-19-46-SP, 7/2019, p. 12.
578. The News, “US State Dept lauds PM Imran Khan’s visit to 600. Stars and Stripes, J.P. Lawrence, “With locals untrained on key
Afghanistan,” 11/21/2020; Pajhwok Afghan News, “Imran Khan’s functions, US departure could mean trouble for Afghanistan’s
Kabul visit triggers protests,” 11/20/2020. airport,” 11/6/2020.
579. TOLOnews, “Pakistan to Open 12 Markets on Durand Line,” 601. Stars and Stripes, J.P. Lawrence, “With locals untrained on key
12/1/2020. functions, US departure could mean trouble for Afghanistan’s
580. Dawn, “Border trade to boost country’s economy: minister,” airport,” 11/6/2020.
12/6/2020; Gulf News, Sana Jamal, “Pakistan to launch train 602. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported
service with Afghanistan,” 12/5/2020. 1/10/2021 and 1/18/2020.
581. Pajhwok Afghan News, S. Muddasir Ali Shah, “Af-Pak PTA to be 603. SIGAR analysis of Afghanistan Revenue Department data, pub-
finalised next month,” 12/29/2020. lished 12/26/2020.
582. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 604. SIGAR analysis of Afghanistan Revenue Department data, pub-
583. Afghan Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Strategy Paper: Medium lished 12/26/2020.
Term Fiscal Framework, 1399 (2020), p. 40. 605. TOLOnews, Zabihullah Jahanmal, “Finance Ministry Falls Short
584. Reuters, James Mackenzie, “Afghan businesses feel squeeze of Tax Revenue Target,” 12/22/2020.
from government tax drive,” 1/9/2017. 606. SIGAR analysis of MOF-provided AFMIS data exported
585. Afghan Ministry of Finance, Value-Added Tax (VAT) 1/10/2021 and 1/18/2020.
Implementation Plan, November 2017, p. 6; World Bank, 607. Cash Management Committee, Afghan Ministry of Finance,
Afghanistan Development Update: Surviving the Storm, 7/2020, “Treasury Daily Cash Position Report,” 9/2/2020; United Nations
p. 26. Development Programme, “COVID-19 Socio Economic Impact
586. Afghan Ministry of Finance, Value-Added Tax (VAT) Assessment: Fiscal Options in Response to Coronavirus Crisis,”
Implementation Plan, November 2017, pp. 6, 40. 11/11/2020, p. 5.
587. Afghan Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Strategy Paper: Medium 608. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019,
Term Fiscal Framework, 1399 (2020), pp. 22–23. p. 2.
588. Afghan Ministry of Finance, Value-Added Tax (VAT) 609. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 3/21/2019; SIGAR,
Implementation Plan, November 2017, ii. interview with USAID/OEG official, 11/8/2018.
589. William Byrd and M. Khalid Payenda, Afghanistan’s Revenue 610. Reuters, “Afghanistan faces ‘grim’ economic outlook as
Turnaround in 2015, Peace Brief 201, February 2016; World pandemic wipes out growth: World Bank,” 7/15/2020; UNDP,
Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Surviving the Storm, “COVID-19 Socio Economic Impact Assessment: Fiscal Options
7/2020, p. 28. in Response to Coronavirus Crisis,” 11/11/2020, p. 9.
590. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update: Surviving the 611. World Bank, Financing Peace: Fiscal Challenges and
Storm, 7/2020, p. 29. Implications for a Post-Settlement Afghanistan, 12/5/2019, p. 9.
591. Pajhwok Afghan News, Abdul Raqeeb Sail, “Covid-19: Afghan 612. IMF, Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility
airlines incur millions of dollars loss,” 10/22/2020; State, Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. Criteria, 5/15/2019, p. 6; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United
States Congress, 7/30/2020, p. 140.

ENDNOTES
613. USAID, OEG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020. 634. Gandhara, Mohammad Sadiq Rashtinai and Abubakar Siddique,
614. CARE International, “Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized “Afghan Farmers Return to Poppy Fields Amid Coronavirus
Population–LAMP: Annual Report FY2020,” 11/3/2020, iv. Pandemic,” 5/7/2020; Agence France-Presse, Noorullah Shirzada and
615. UNHCR, Returnee and Internally Displaced Persons Monitoring Rasheed Durrani, “Crushed by virus and war, jobless Afghans turn to
Report, 5/2018, p. 4; World Bank and UNHCR, Living Conditions opium for cash,” 8/28/2020.
and Settlement Decisions of Recent Afghan Returnees: Findings 635. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
from a 2018 Phone Survey of Afghan Returnees and UNHCR 636. SIGAR, analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call,
data, 6/2019, pp. 5–6, 25. 1/10/2021.
616. CARE International, “Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized 637. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly
Population–LAMP: Annual Report FY2020,” 11/3/2020, p. 21. Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, p. 4.
617. CARE International, “Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized 638. USAID, OAG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
Population–LAMP: Annual Report FY2020,” 11/3/2020, p. 28. 639. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly
618. CARE International, “Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, pp. 7, 14.
Population–LAMP: Annual Report FY2020,” 11/3/2020, p. 21. 640. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly
619. FHI 360, The Goldozi Project: Annual Performance Report FY Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, p. 40; USAID, OAG,
2020, 11/2020, pp. 3, 17. response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
620. Turquoise Mountain, ACJP Fourth Quarter and Annual 641. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly
Performance Report, 11/2020, pp. 1, 4, 7–8. Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, pp. 7–8, 12–13.
621. SIGAR, Kabul Center Export Center: Progress Made Toward 642. USAID, “Afghanistan: Infrastructure,” n.d., https://www.usaid.
Self Sufficiency But Critical Sales, Revenue and Job Creation gov/afghanistan/infrastructure#:~:text=Water%20and%20
Targets Have Not Been Met, SIGAR-20-50-SP, 8/2020, p. 4. Sanitation,prevent%20the%20spread%20of%20disease, accessed
622. SIGAR, Kabul Center Export Center: Progress Made Toward 12/31/2020; USAID, Afghanistan Energy Sector Technical
Self Sufficiency But Critical Sales, Revenue and Job Creation Assessment Final Report, 2/28/2018, p. 1; USAID, “Afghanistan:
Targets Have Not Been Met, SIGAR-20-50-SP, 8/2020, pp. 7, 11. Our Work,” n.d., https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/our-work,
623. USAID, correspondence with SIGAR, 12/30/2020. accessed 7/8/2018.
624. Impact Carpet Associates, Quarterly Performance Report, 643. SIGAR conclusion based on USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data
Reporting Period: Fiscal Year 2020 Quarter 4: July 01– call, 6/19/2020.
September 30, 2020, 10/2020, pp. 7–8. 644. TOLOnews, Nasir Ahmad Salehi, “Pylon Destroyed, 50% of
625. Impact Carpet Associates, Quarterly Performance Report, Herat Without Power,” 10/22/2020.
Reporting Period: Fiscal Year 2020 Quarter 4: July 01– 645. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly
September 30, 2020, 10/2020, p. 10; USAID, OEG, response to Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, p. 38.
SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 646. USAID, 25 MW Herat Wind Farm, Factsheet, 11/2019, p. 1.
626. Christian Science Monitor, Scott Peterson, “In Afghanistan, 647. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update January 2020:
weaving ancient industry back into global market,” 08/21/2019; Navigating a Sea of Uncertainty, 1/2020, p. 30.
Kabul Carpet Export Center, Report on Mid-Project, COVID-19 648. Completed percentages represent the proportion of projects
Response to the Afghan Carpet Business, 9/15/2020, p. 1. constructed (rather than proportion of contracts invoiced), as
627. World Bank, Jobs from Agriculture in Afghanistan, 2/2018, p. 9; reported by Tetra Tech, with whom USAID contracts for qual-
DAI, Afghanistan Value Chains High Value Crops Quarterly ity assurance support. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call,
Performance Report Quarter One, FY2020, 1/30/2020, p. 4; 6/19/2020, 9/21/2020, 12/16/2020.
SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: 649. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 6/20/2019; SIGAR,
Lessons from the U.S. Afghanistan Experience, SIGAR-18-38-LL, Afghanistan’s Energy Sector: USAID and DOD Did Not
4/2018, p. 7. Consistently Collect and Report Performance Data on Projects
628. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: Related to Kajaki Dam, and Concerns Exist Regarding
Lessons from the U.S. Afghanistan Experience, SIGAR-18-38-LL, Sustainability, SIGAR 19-37-AR, 5/2019, p. 6; USAID, Afghanistan
4/2018, p. 7. Energy Sector Technical Assessment: Final Report, 2/28/2018,
629. Action on Armed Violence, Jake Hussona, “The reverberating p. 6.
effects of explosive violence on agriculture in Afghanistan,” 650. SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Energy Sector: USAID and DOD Did
11/13/2019; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Wheat Not Consistently Collect and Report Performance Data on
Flours in Afghanistan,” 2019; United Nations Environment Projects Related to Kajaki Dam, and Concerns Exist Regarding
Programme, “Climate Change in Afghanistan: What Does it Sustainability, 5/2019, pp. 26, 31–32.
Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Insecurity,” 11/2016, p. 8. 651. SIGAR, USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion and
630. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly Connectivity Project: The Project is Behind Schedule, and
Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, p. 38. Questions Remain about the Afghan Government’s Ability to
631. Wolesi Jirga, “Wolesi Jirga questioned acting minister of agricul- Use and Maintain the New Power Infrastructure, SIGAR 19-57-
ture and livestock,” 10/26/2020. AR, 9/2019, p. 34.
632. Roots for Peace, Agricultural Marketing Program Quarterly 652. Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, Annual Performance
Report July–September 2020, 11/2020, pp. 21–22. Indicator Progress Report For NEPS-SEPS Connector Ghazni to
633. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.

ENDNOTES
Kandahar Transmission Line October, 2019 to September, 2020, with MOE, IL-20-11-01, 8/27/2018; USAID, correspondence with
11/2020, pp. 1–3. MOE, IL-20-11-08, 11/21/2019.
653. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020; USAID, OI, 679. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 4/30/2020, p. 146; USAID, correspondence with MOE, 1/16/2020.
654. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. 680. USAID, correspondence with MOE, 9/24/2020.
655. USAID, 25 MW Herat Wind Farm Fact Sheet, 11/2019, p. 1. 681. USAID, correspondence with MOE, 1/16/2020.
656. USAID, 10 MW Kandahar Solar Power Plant, 11/2019, p. 1. 682. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.
657. USAID, OI, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 683. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
658. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, “Four 1/30/2020, p. 124.
Energy Projects signed to increase national grid capacity,” 684. Government of Afghanistan, MOE, “MoE update to donors on
9/23/2020. Logar,” 6/11/2020.
659. Daily Outlook, “Ghani Tells Summit Afghanistan Extremely 685. Government of Afghanistan, MOE, “MoE update to donors on
Vulnerable to Climate Change,” 12/14/2020; Siemens Energy, Logar,” 6/11/2020.
“Siemens Energy signs agreement to develop Afghanistan as an 686. Government of Afghanistan, MOE, “MoE update to donors on
energy hub,” 11/16/2020. Logar,” 6/11/2020.
660. World Bank, “Solar Power Provides a Lifeline to Afghanistan’s 687. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/18/2020; State, SCA,
Hospitals,” 12/6/2020. response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020; State, SCA, response to
661. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019, SIGAR vetting, 10/13/2020; State, SCA, response to SIGAR data
pp. 9–10. call, 12/16/2020.
662. SIGAR, analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call, 688. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/22/2020.
1/10/2021. 689. USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 3/31/2019,
663. UN, OCHA, Afghanistan Brief: COVID-19 No. 16 (20 March pp. 9–10.
2020), 3/20/2020, p. 1; UN, OCHA, Afghanistan Brief: COVID-19 690. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2017.
No. 54 (18 June 2020), 6/18/2020, p. 3. 691. Infectious Hazard Preparedness/WHE/WHO, Disease Early
664. Afghan Voice Agency, “Cabinet Approves Reopening Of Schools Warning System-Plus (DEWS-Plus) Afghanistan 3rd Quarter (1st
From Next Week,” 9/29/2020. July–30 SEP) 2020, 11/5/2020, p. 5.
665. 1TVNews, “Ghor University shut down after dozens of students 692. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021.
test positive for coronavirus,” 9/14/2020. 693. World Bank, International Development Association Project
666. Pajhwok Afghan News, Storai Karimi, “50pc of Herat students Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of
contract Covid-19: official,” 10/19/2020. SDR 96.1 Million (US$ 140 Million Equivalent) and Proposed
667. Pajhwok Afghan News, Storai Karimi, “50pc of Herat students Grant from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund in the
contract Covid-19: official,” 10/19/2020. Amount of US$425 Million and a Proposed Grant from the
668. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020. Global Financing Facility in the Amount of US$35 Million to the
669. Voice of America, Ayaz Gul, “Rare UN-Taliban Agreement to Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan for a Afghanistan Sehatmandi
Set Up 4,000 Schools in Insurgent-Held Afghan Territory,” Project, 3/12/2018, p. 8; World Bank, Progress in the Face
12/19/2020. of Insecurity: Improving Health Outcomes in Afghanistan,
670. The Telegraph, Ben Farmer, “UN strikes agreement with Taliban 3/6/2018, i, p. 10.
leaders to set up thousands of schools in insurgent areas,” 694. SIGAR, analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call,
12/17/2020. 1/10/2021.
671. Arab News, Sayed Salahuddin, “UNICEF to run school classes 695. Infectious Hazard Preparedness/WHE/WHO, Disease Early
for boys and girls in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan,” Warning System-Plus (DEWS-Plus) Afghanistan 3rd Quarter (1st
12/19/2020. July–30 SEP) 2020, 11/5/2020, pp. 3, 5.
672. Ariana News, “Taliban calls on foreign community to distribute 696. Infectious Hazard Preparedness/WHE/WHO, Disease Early
aid through the group,” 11/19/2020. Warning System-Plus (DEWS-Plus) Afghanistan 3rd Quarter (1st
673. Arab News, Sayed Salahuddin, “UNICEF to run school classes July–30 SEP) 2020, 11/5/2020, p. 3.
for boys and girls in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan,” 697. Infectious Hazard Preparedness/WHE/WHO, Disease Early
12/19/2020; USAID, Increasing Access to Basic Education and Warning System-Plus (DEWS-Plus) Afghanistan 3rd Quarter (1st
Gender Equality (CBE) Fact Sheet, 3/2019, p. 1. July–30 SEP) 2020, 11/5/2020, p. 6.
674. Pajhwok Afghan News, “CBE successful approach to reach out- 698. Infectious Hazard Preparedness/WHE/WHO, Disease Early
of-school children,” 12/22/2020. Warning System-Plus (DEWS-Plus) Afghanistan 3rd Quarter (1st
675. USAID, OED, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. July–30 SEP) 2020, 11/5/2020, pp. 4, 11.
676. USAID, OED, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/6/2021. 699. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
677. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2020, p. 179.
4/30/2020, p. 146. 700. Management Sciences for Health, Assistance for Families and
678. MOE, correspondence with USAID, 8/15/2018; Pajhwok Afghan Indigent Afghans to Thrive (AFIAT) Fiscal Year 2020–Annual
News, Navid Ahmad Barakzai, “MoE begins distributing 12.2m Report, 11/18/2020, p. 1.
locally printed textbooks,” 8/29/2019; USAID, correspondence 701. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020; USAID,
OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/9/2020.

ENDNOTES
702. Management Sciences for Health, Assistance for Families and

Indigent Afghans to Thrive (AFIAT) Fiscal Year 2020–Annual
Report, 11/18/2020, pp. 6–7; USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR
data call, 12/16/2020.
703. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2020; USAID,
Urban Health Initiatives (UHI) Fact Sheet, 12/16/2020.
704. USAID, OHN, response to SIGAR data call, 12/16/2020.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-
181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).
SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the
independent and objective
• conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
• leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed
to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the
programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse
in such programs and operations.
• means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and
progress on corrective action.
Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement,

or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the
U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made
available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Tasbih—beads used for prayer and meditation—await buyers in the Mandavi marketplace in Kabul.
(UNAMA photo by M. Akram Darwish)
As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No.
115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008: Pub. L. No. 115-91,
”National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018,” 12/12/2017.
(For a list of the Congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)
Quarterly Report Staff
Atif Ahmad, Research Assistant Vong Lim, Senior Visual Information Specialist
Harrison Akins, Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert James Misencik, Security Subject Matter Expert
Cover photo: Michael Bindell, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate Heather Robinson, Security Subject Matter Expert
Afghan security-force members walk past a bombed truck in Kabul. (AFP photo by Zakeria Hashimi) Theodore Burns, Funding Subject Matter Expert Deborah Scroggins, Director of Research and Analysis Directorate
Craig Collier, Security Subject Matter Expert Omar Sharif, Project Coordinator
Jason Davis, Visual Information Specialist Daniel Weggeland, Governance Subject Matter Expert
PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIGIE QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTION AND EVALUATION.
Clark Irwin, Lead Writer/Editor
SIGAR
SIGAR
SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JANUARY 30, 2021
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL Special Inspector General for JAN 30
FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Afghanistan Reconstruction 2021
2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202
www.sigar.mil
SIGAR 2021-QR-1
QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
WASTE, FRAUD, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE
By phone: Afghanistan
Cell: 0700107300
DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.
By phone: United States

Toll-free: 866-329-8893
DSN: 312-664-0378
All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.
By fax: 703-601-4065
By e-mail: sigar.hotline@mail.mil
By Web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx
1
SIGAR
Report Waste, Fraud, or Abuse

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SIGAR

QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

WASTE, FRAUD, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE

By phone: United States

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement,

Quarterly Report Staff

I am pleased to submit to Congress, and to the Secretaries of State and Defense,

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

This report summarizes SIGAR’s oversight work and updates developments

AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

The performance-audit reports included:

The alert letter highlighted key challenges to ongoing anticorruption efforts in

The five financial-audit reports identified $26,993,829 in questioned costs as a result

iv SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Investigations highlights include:

RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 v

JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

Photo on previous page

2 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 3

Performance Audit 21-14-C-AR: [Classified] Afghan Air Forces:

4 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

a mitigation plan to ensure the continuation of essential maintenance,

Performance Audit 21-11-AR: Military Equipment Transferred

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 5

to be in the ANDSF’s possession. As a result, it may be difficult for CSTC-A

Alert Letter 21-09-AL: Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Efforts

6 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

comprehensive reform agenda and renamed the Self-Reliance through

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 7

SIGAR issues each financial-audit report to the funding agency that

Financial Audit 21-10-FA: USAID’s Power Transmission Expansion

8 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Financial Audit 21-12-FA: Department of the Air Force’s Support

Financial Audit 21-08-FA: Department of Defense’s Cooperative

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 9

Financial Audit 21-07-FA: Department of State’s Demining

10 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Status of SIGAR Recommendations

Review 21-15-SP: Hamid Karzai International Airport

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 11

12 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

INVESTIGATIONS SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS:

nine-count indictment was filed charging Woolford’s co-conspirator, Paul

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 13

it incorporated inflated hourly rates for nonqualifying labor, and contained a

Afghan National Arrested in Connection with Money

U.S. Contractor Pleads Guilty to Submitting False Claims to

14 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

accounts funded by the State Department to people he knew and by entities

Former Employees of U.S. Contractor Prosecuted for

Suspensions and Debarments

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2021 15

government in lieu of exclusion from contracting since the initiation of