Sigar Report PDF
Sigar Report PDF
Sigar Report PDF
SIGAR
SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JANUARY 30, 2019
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL Special Inspector General for JAN 30
FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Afghanistan Reconstruction 2019
2530 Crystal Drive
Arlington, VA 22202
www.sigar.mil
By phone: Afghanistan
Cell: 0700107300
DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.
By fax: 703-601-4065
By e-mail: sigar.hotline@mail.mil
By Web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx
1
SIGAR
Report Fraud, Waste or Abuse
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-
181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).
SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the
independent and objective
• conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
• leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed
to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the
programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse
in such programs and operations.
• means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and
progress on corrective action.
As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No.
115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No. 115-91,
”National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018,” 12/12/2017.
(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)
Michael Bindell, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate Olivia Paek, Senior Visual Information Specialist
Theodore Burns, Funding Subject Matter Expert Zaba Rashan, Student Trainee
Cover photo:
An Afghan pigeon fancier sits as he feeds his pigeons flying from the rooftop of his home in Daniel Fisher, Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert Heather Robinson, Security Subject Matter Expert
Herat Province. (AFP photo by Hoshang Hashimi) Robert Hill, Student Trainee Deborah Scroggins, Director of Research and Analysis Directorate
Clark Irwin, Lead Writer/Editor Omar Sharif, Project Coordinator
Vong Lim, Visual Information Specialist Solange Toura Gaba, Counternarcotics Subject Matter Expert
PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIGIE QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTION AND EVALUATION.
James Misencik, Security Subject Matter Expert Daniel Weggeland, Governance Subject Matter Expert
JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN
BALKH TAKHAR
SAMANGAN
FARYAB BAGHLAN
SAR-E PUL
PANJSHIR NURISTAN
BADGHIS
PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR
BAMYAN LAGHMAN
HERAT KABUL
WARDAK
NANGARHAR
GHOR LOGAR
DAYKUNDI PAKTIYA
GHAZNI KHOST
URUZGAN
FARAH
PAKTIKA
ZABUL
NIMROZ
HELMAND
KANDAHAR Provinces where SIGAR has conducted
or commissioned audit, inspection,
special project, and/or investigation work
as of December 31, 2018.
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
I am pleased to submit to Congress, and to the Secretaries of State and Defense, SIGAR’s 42nd quarterly
report on the status of reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Like all SIGAR quarterly reports, this report is required by SIGAR’s enabling legislation, which states that
the agency shall keep the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems
relating to the administration of Afghanistan reconstruction programs, and submit a report to Congress on
SIGAR’s oversight work and on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the
end of each fiscal quarter. As some data provided to SIGAR is classified or otherwise restricted from public
release, SIGAR has since January 2015 also produced a classified annex to its public quarterly reports.
As this report went to press, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad
told the New York Times that after six days of talks, U.S. and Taliban officials have agreed in principle to
the framework of a peace deal in which the insurgents would guarantee to prevent Afghan territory from
being used by terrorists and that could lead to a full pullout of U.S. troops in return for larger concessions
from the Taliban. SIGAR will report on these developments in its next quarterly report in April.
In November, SIGAR staff and I joined representatives of 61 national governments and numerous
nongovernmental and civil-society organizations at the Geneva Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan.
The conference, which took place midway between the last donor pledging conference in 2016 and one
scheduled for 2020, presented an opportunity for donors to review Afghanistan’s progress at meeting reform
benchmarks. Section One of this report discusses the conference and its outcomes.
Section Two of this report highlights SIGAR’s work in 2018, including several significant legislative
actions taken by Congress to implement SIGAR’s recommendations from audits and other reports. SIGAR
criminal investigations also resulted in 17 formal charges, 17 convictions, 18 sentencings, criminal fines,
restitutions, and forfeitures totaling $6.6 million, civil settlements totaling $294,800, and savings and
recoveries for the U.S. government totaling $266.8 million. In the past year alone, SIGAR has received three
requests from Congress to examine timely and important reconstruction issues, including a request from the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees to review the Afghan government’s anticorruption efforts.
SIGAR issued a performance audit report this quarter, examining the multibillion dollar effort by the
Department of Defense (DOD) to build the capacity of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) with UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, including helicopter delivery, pilot training, and maintenance programs. SIGAR found that
based on the current UH-60 delivery schedule, it is unlikely that enough pilots will be trained before all of
the UH-60s are received. SIGAR also found that DOD currently has no maintenance training course to train
Afghan personnel to maintain the UH-60s, 159 of which are scheduled to be delivered through 2023.
DOD estimates that the cost of contractor-provided maintenance will be over $2.8 billion and is likely
to grow the longer it takes to develop the AAF and the Special Mission Wing’s maintenance capabilities.
Additionally, having insufficient Afghan maintenance personnel will limit UH-60 operations because DOD
policy bars U.S. contractors from working where there is no U.S. or Coalition control due to security
concerns. According to the department, it is working to establish additional pilot training locations and has
developed a proposed training plan that includes establishing a maintenance development center outside of
Afghanistan that will focus specifically on training entry-level UH-60 maintenance personnel.
During this reporting period, SIGAR investigations resulted in federal indictments of five persons and
one criminal information. Among those indicted were three senior executives at defense contracting firms,
Respectfully,
John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR OVERVIEW
AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS
This quarter, SIGAR issued one perfor- The inspection reports found:
mance audit, six financial audits, and three • Phase III construction and renovation
inspection reports. work at the Afghan National Army
Camp Commando generally met
The performance audit report examined contract requirements, but there
the Department of Defense’s multibillion were several potential safety hazards
dollar effort to build the capacity of the including noncertified doors, counterfeit
Afghan Air Force to field UH-60 Black Hawk fire extinguishers, and obstructed
helicopters, including helicopter delivery, emergency-exit corridors.
pilot training, and maintenance-contractor • All required construction and facilities
programs. SIGAR found that based on at the Zarang border crossing point
the current UH-60 delivery schedule, it is generally met task-order requirements,
unlikely that enough pilots will be trained but 32 fire doors were noncompliant and
before all of the UH-60s are received. several of the buildings constructed were
SIGAR also found that DOD currently has neither used nor maintained.
no maintenance training course to train • Phase III construction of the Marshal
Afghan personnel to maintain the UH-60s, Fahim National Defense University
159 of which are scheduled to be delivered generally met contract requirements and
through 2023. technical specifications, but building
occupants are at risk from noncertified
The financial audit reports identified fire doors, lack of a wastewater treatment
more than $3.6 million in questioned costs plant, and inadequate maintenance.
as a result of internal-control deficiencies
and noncompliance issues.
* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring
after December 31, 2018, up to the publication date of this report. Unless otherwise noted, all
afghani-to-U.S. dollar conversions used in this report are derived by averaging the last six months
of exchange-rate data available through Da Afghanistan Bank (www.dab.gov.af), then rounding to
the nearest afghani. Data as of December 21, 2018.
3. SIGAR 18-19-AR (January 4, 2018): DOD Task Force for Business and
Stability Operations: $675 Million in Spending Led to Mixed Results, Waste,
and Unsustained Projects. Requested by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) and
then-Senator Kelly Ayotte (R-NH)
2. On January 24, 2018, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, requested that SIGAR update
its May 2013 report 13-8-AR, Taxes: Afghan Government Has Levied
Nearly a Billion Dollars in Business Taxes on Contractors Supporting
U.S. Government Efforts in Afghanistan, to determine if unwarranted
tax levies continue to be imposed by the Afghan government on U.S.
government contractors.
SIGNIFICANT AWARDS
On October 17, 2018, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (CIGIE) recognized SIGAR for exceptional work on
three reports:
SECTION 1
1 TALES OF TWO CITIES
3 Geneva and Kabul
4 Reconstruction and Results
6 Recurring Conferences
7 Business Improvements with an Overlooked Caveat
10 Wrestling with the Election Process
12 A Long, Tortuous Search for Peace
13 What Does Geneva Mean for Kabul?
SECTION 2
15 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
18 Audits
22 Inspections
27 Special Projects
30 Lessons Learned
31 Investigations
38 Other SIGAR Oversight Activities
39 SIGAR Budget
39 SIGAR Staff
SECTION 3
41 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE CONTENTS
43 Reconstruction in Brief
44 Status of Funds
64 Security
106 Governance
144 Economic and Social Development
150 Quarterly Highlight: Economic Implications of the Opium Economy
161 Quarterly Highlight: Afghanistan Improves its
Doing Business Ranking
178 Counternarcotics
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 4
205 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT
208 Completed Oversight Activities
211 Ongoing Oversight Activities
Source: Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, keynote address at the Geneva Conference on Afghanistan, 11/28/2018.
1 TALES OF
TWO CITIES
1
TALES OF TWO CITIES
After responding to a bomb explosion in Kabul in April 2018, Afghan security forces
scatter as a second bomb explodes. (Voice of America photo)
A machine gun and rocket-armed MD-530 Cayuse helicopter flies over Kabul. (U.S. Air
Force photo by Capt. Jason Smith)
for women, and other gains. Addressing other important points, the
International Monetary Fund reported in December that “Afghanistan’s
policymakers have continued to make progress implementing reforms
in a highly challenging environment,” with international partners facili-
tating “important reforms in the fiscal, financial, and governance areas,
including strengthening the resilience of the country’s institutions.”10
On the other hand, the IMF notes, “The unrelenting insurgency, com-
pounded by a devastating drought and political uncertainty during the
electoral cycle, is hurting confidence, investment, private sector develop-
ment, and job creation,” and with inflation-adjusted economic growth
running at about the rate of population growth, there is little room for prog-
ress in raising living standards.11
The most recent CIA World Factbook’s assessment released in December
2018 is equally grim: “Despite improvements in life expectancy, incomes,
and literacy since 2001, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and
highly dependent on foreign aid. Much of the population continues to suffer
from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs.
Corruption, insecurity, weak governance, lack of infrastructure, and the
Afghan Government’s difficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of the
country pose challenges to future economic growth.”12
The Congressional Research Service’s December 2018 update of its Afghan-
background report offered similar cautionary notes: “The Afghan government
faces broad public criticism for its inability to combat corruption, deliver secu-
rity, alleviate rising ethnic tensions, and develop the economy.”13
Anthony H. Cordesman, a former official with the Departments of State
and Defense, and now a senior analyst with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, suspects that Afghan gains have been neutralized
RECURRING CONFERENCES
The 2018 Geneva conference marked a key point in Afghanistan’s 2015–2024
“Decade of Transformation” effort to achieve national self-reliance, falling
halfway between the international donor nations’ funding conferences of
2016 and 2020.
Leading up to the Geneva conference, in July 2018, Afghanistan had
agreed to make particular progress on six benchmarks involving conduct of
elections, reducing corruption, reforming the security sector, meeting other
benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund, furthering private-
sector development, and completing plans for implementing the country’s
National Priority Programs for peace, governance, and development.15
As the end-of-conference communiqué from UNAMA noted, “Participants
acknowledged progress in many of the reform areas” undertaken by the
Kabul government. However, they also “expressed concern that the bench-
marks on anti-corruption, and on elections with respect to its [sic] technical
conduct, have not been met fully, and requested a renewed focus on these
important benchmarks.”16
UNAMA’s communiqué also reported that participants “agreed that much
still needs to be done, including: enhancing inclusive economic growth;
reducing poverty; creating employment; fighting corruption; empowering
women; and improving governance, rule of law and human rights.”17
Looking to those desired improvements, the participants issued a Geneva
Mutual Accountability Framework (GMAF) detailing 24 “short-term deliv-
erables” for 2019–2020 grouped into six major areas: security and political
stability; anticorruption, governance, rule of law, and human rights; fiscal
sustainability, public finance, and commercial banking; development plan-
ning and management; private-sector development and inclusive growth;
and development partnerships and aid effectiveness. Specific deliverables
include hiring more female lawyers and judges, adopting performance indi-
cators, establishing 15,000 self-help associations, and setting up a call and
complaint center for government services.18 As with earlier conferences,
expectations and benchmarks were not tied to any explicit financial conse-
quences for nonattainment.
Flags of UN member nations line the approach to its European headquarters in Geneva.
(U.S. Mission Geneva photo)
ahead in April. But a spokesman for the presidential palace said the govern-
ment welcomed the decision by the IEC.33
The Geneva conference hopes and concerns for the 2019 elections are
linked to another overriding issue for Afghanistan and its international pro-
viders of reconstruction funding, troops, and security assistance: peace.
Source: SIGAR, Inspector General John Sopko, Remarks at the Targeting Fraud, Safeguarding Transparency Conference,
11/1/2018.
2 SIGAR
OVERSIGHT
15
SIGAR OVERSIGHT
COMPLETED PERFORMANCE
AUDIT REPORT
• Audit 19-18-AR: Afghan Air Force UH-60
Implementation: DOD Met the Initial
SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES Date for Fielding UH-60 Helicopters,
but Program Is at Risk of Not Having
Enough Trained Pilots or the Capability to
Maintain Future UH-60s
This quarter, SIGAR issued 14 products. SIGAR work to date has identified COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDIT REPORTS
over $2.1 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer. • Financial Audit 19-17-FA: Afghanistan
Ministry of Interior and Afghan National
SIGAR issued one performance audit report this quarter, examining the Police Mentoring, Training, and Logistics
multibillion dollar effort by the Department of Defense (DOD) to build Support Requirement: Audit of Costs
Incurred by IAP Worldwide Services Inc.
the capacity of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to field UH-60 Black Hawk • Financial Audit 19-15-FA: USAID’s
helicopters, including helicopter delivery, pilot training, and maintenance Sheberghan Gas Development Project
(SGDP): Audit of Costs Incurred by
contractor programs. Ministry of Mines and Petroleum
SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts to • Financial Audit 19-12-FA: Department of
rebuild Afghanistan. These financial audits covered a range of topics State’s Support for Corrections System
and National Justice System Programs in
including USAID’s support to the Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity, Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by
USAID’s Afghan Trade and Revenue Project, and the Department of State’s PAE Justice Support
• Financial Audit 19-13-FA: USAID’s
(State) support for corrections and national justice-system programs in Support to the Sheberghan Gas
Afghanistan. These financial audits identified approximately $3.6 million in Generation Activity: Audit of Costs
Incurred by Advanced Engineering
questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompli- Associates International Inc.
ance issues. To date, SIGAR’s financial audits have identified more than • Financial Audit 19-06-FA: Department
$418.5 million in questioned costs, interest, and other amounts payable to of State’s Security Support for Justice
Sector, Corrections System, and
the U.S. government. Counter Narcotics Police Programs in
SIGAR also issued three inspection reports. These reports examined the Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by
PAE Justice Support
construction, use, and maintenance of the Zarang Border Crossing Point, • Financial Audit 19-14-FA: USAID’s Afghan
phase III of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) Camp Commando, and Trade and Revenue Project: Audit of Costs
Incurred by Chemonics International Inc.
phase III of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University.
This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued four products, COMPLETED INSPECTION REPORTS
including two review reports on USAID-funded education facilities in • Inspection Report 19-09-IP: Afghan
National Army Camp Commando Phase
Baghlan Province and CERP-funded bridges in Kabul; as well as two fact III: Facility Construction and Renovation
sheets on USAID’s Stability in Key Areas Program. Generally Met Contract Requirements, but
Three Construction Deficiencies Increased
During the reporting period, SIGAR investigations resulted in federal Safety Risks
indictments of five persons, and one criminal information. One subject • Inspection Report 19-07-IP: Zarang
Border Crossing Point: Facilities
pleaded guilty, three were sentenced, and three were arrested. In addition, Generally Met Contract Requirements,
approximately $2.2 million in savings to the U.S. government were realized, but Construction Deficiencies Pose
Safety Concerns
as well as $140,000 in criminal fines, restitutions and forfeitures. SIGAR • Inspection Report 19-16-IP: Marshal
initiated five new cases and closed 18, bringing the total number of ongoing Fahim National Defense University
investigations to 164. Phase III: Phase III Construction
Generally Met Contract Requirements,
This quarter, SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 10 but Five Deficiencies and Inadequate
individuals and 13 entities for suspension or debarment based on evidence Maintenance Increase Safety Risks for
Building Occupants
developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and
Continued on the next page
the United States. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and
Continued from previous page
companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 928, encompassing 515 indi-
COMPLETED SPECIAL viduals and 413 companies.
PROJECTS REPORTS
• Review 19-10-SP: Schools in Baghlan
Province, Afghanistan: Observations from
Site Visits to 14 Facilities AUDITS
• Review 19-08-SP: Bridges in Kabul, SIGAR conducts performance and financial audits of programs and projects
Afghanistan: Six Bridges Constructed connected to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Since its last report
by DOD in Generally Good Condition;
Funding for Sustained Maintenance Not to Congress, SIGAR has issued one performance audit and six financial
in Budget audits. This quarter, SIGAR has 10 ongoing performance audits and 39 ongo-
• Fact Sheet 19-05-SP: Information on
USAID’s Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) ing financial audits.
Program–Eastern Region, Afghanistan:
USAID Spent $140.1 million
Implementing Stabilization Projects Performance Audit Reports Issued
Between December 2011 and SIGAR issued one performance audit report this quarter. This audit exam-
September 2015 in Eastern Provinces
of Afghanistan ined DOD’s multibillion dollar effort to build the capacity of the Afghan Air
• Fact Sheet 19-11-SP: Information on Force to field UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. A list of completed and ongo-
USAID’s Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) ing performance audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.
Program – Western Region, Afghanistan:
USAID Spent $54 Million Implementing
Stabilization Projects Between December
2011 and September 2015 in Western Performance Audit 19-18-AR:
Provinces of Afghanistan Afghan Air Force UH-60 Implementation
DOD Met the Initial Date for Fielding UH-60 Helicopters, but Program Is at Risk of Not
Having Enough Trained Pilots or the Capability to Maintain Future UH-60s
A key component of the Afghan Air Force’s modernization is the addition
of 159 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, of which 119 will be for the AAF
and 40 for the Special Mission Wing (SMW), at a cost estimated at between
$5.75 billion to $7 billion. The first 16 of 159 UH-60s have been delivered.
DOD has reported to Congress concerns about recruiting, training, and
sustainment challenges facing the AAF. SIGAR found that based on the cur-
rent UH-60 delivery schedule, it is unlikely that there will be enough pilots
trained before all of the UH-60s are received. Despite the fact that pilot
development is not keeping pace with original program assumptions, DOD
has yet to establish benchmarks it can use to determine if it should pause
the deliveries of UH-60s or reduce the number of aircraft delivered to the
Afghan government.
SIGAR also found that DOD does not currently have a maintenance train-
ing course in place to train Afghan personnel to maintain UH-60s. DOD
estimates that the cost of contractor maintenance from 2019 through 2023
COMPLETED PERFORMANCE AUDITS will be over $2.8 billion and is likely to grow the longer it takes to develop
• Audit 19-18-AR: Afghan Air Force UH-60 the AAF’s and SMW’s maintenance capabilities. Additionally, having insuf-
Implementation: DOD Met the Initial
Date for Fielding UH-60 Helicopters, ficient Afghan maintenance personnel limits the locations at which UH-60s
but Program Is at Risk of Not Having can operate because DOD policy bars U.S. contractors from working where
Enough Trained Pilots or the Capability to
Maintain Future UH-60s there is no U.S. or Coalition control due to security concerns.
Finally, SIGAR found that Train Advise Assist Command-Air, Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and the AAF have not
developed a flying-hour program for the UH-60s that limits the hours they
are flown each month. Flying the aircraft more than the 35 hours per month
assumed in the maintenance strategy risks excessive wear that could
require additional maintenance at an increased cost.
SIGAR made six recommendations to DOD and their subordinate com-
mands: take steps to reduce the waiting time between initial pilot training
and the UH-60 qualification course; fully implement the AAF English lan-
guage program; develop and implement a program to train AAF personnel
to maintain the UH-60s; develop and implement a plan for maintaining air-
craft in locations where security conditions prevent U.S. contractors from An Afghan Air Force UH-60 in the
working; work with the AAF to develop a flying-hour program; and link the Kandahar Air Wing. (DOD photo)
deliveries of UH-60s to the training of pilots and maintenance personnel. In
response to a draft of the report, DOD stated that it is working to establish
additional pilot training locations and has developed a proposed training
plan that includes establishing a maintenance development center outside of
Afghanistan that will focus specifically on training entry-level UH-60 mainte-
nance personnel. TABLE 2.1
ment auditing standards. Financial audits are coordinated with the federal Source: SIGAR Audits and Inspections Directorate.
It takes time for funding agencies to carefully consider audit findings and
recommendations. As a result, final disallowed-cost determinations remain
COMPLETED FINANCIAL AUDITS to be made for several of SIGAR’s issued financial audits. SIGAR’s financial
• Financial Audit 19-17-FA: Afghanistan
Ministry of Interior and Afghan National audits have also identified and communicated 435 compliance findings and
Police Mentoring, Training, and Logistics 459 internal-control findings to the auditees and funding agencies.
Support Requirement: Audit of Costs
Incurred by IAP Worldwide Services Inc.
• Financial Audit 19-15-FA: USAID’s Financial Audits Issued
Sheberghan Gas Development Project This quarter, SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded contracts
(SGDP): Audit of Costs Incurred by
Ministry of Mines and Petroleum to rebuild Afghanistan. These audits identified more than $3.6 million in
• Financial Audit 19-12-FA: Department of questioned costs because of internal-control deficiencies and noncompli-
State’s Support for Corrections System ance issues, such as using incorrect foreign currency conversion rates and
and National Justice System Programs in
Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by improperly supporting amounts invoiced.
PAE Justice Support
• Financial Audit 19-13-FA: USAID’s Financial Audit 19-17-FA:
Support to the Sheberghan Gas
Generation Activity: Audit of Costs Afghanistan Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police
Incurred by Advanced Engineering Mentoring, Training, and Logistics Support Requirement
Associates International Inc. Audit of Costs Incurred by IAP Worldwide Services Inc.
• Financial Audit 19-06-FA: Department
of State’s Security Support for Justice On May 12, 2016, the U.S. Army Contracting Command—Rock Island
Sector, Corrections System, and awarded delivery order 3 under contract W52P1J-13-D-0107 to DRS
Counter Narcotics Police Programs in
Afghanistan: Audit of Costs Incurred by Technical Services Inc. (DRS). The $36,250,064 order was intended to sup-
PAE Justice Support port the modernization and expansion of the Afghan Ministry of Interior’s
• Financial Audit 19-14-FA: USAID’s Afghan Network Operation Center and Joint Operations Center project. After 14
Trade and Revenue Project: Audit of Costs
Incurred by Chemonics International Inc. modifications, total funding increased to $50,902,910, and the end date of
the order’s period of performance was extended from November 8, 2016,
to December 3, 2018. IAP Worldwide Services Inc. (IAP) acquired DRS and
became the prime contractor in September 2016.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Conrad LLP (Conrad), reviewed
$49,786,625 charged to the contract from May 12, 2016, through July 31,
2018. Conrad identified one significant deficiency and two deficiencies in
IAP’s internal controls, and three instances of noncompliance with the
terms and conditions of the delivery order and applicable regulations.
Because of these internal-control deficiencies and instances of noncompli-
ance, Conrad identified $2,231,965 in questioned costs.
project. USAID modified the letter 17 times, extending the period of perfor-
mance to August 31, 2016, while leaving the total amount unchanged.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Crowe LLP (Crowe), reviewed
$30 million charged to the grant from May 15, 2012, through August 31,
2016. Crowe identified three material weaknesses and four significant
deficiencies in MOMP’s internal controls, and seven instances of material
noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the grant. Because of these
internal-control deficiencies and instances of noncompliance, Crowe identi-
fied $803,171 in questioned costs.
INSPECTIONS
COMPLETED INSPECTION REPORTS
Inspection Reports Issued • Inspection Report 19-09-IP: Afghan
This quarter, SIGAR issued three inspection reports. These reports exam- National Army Camp Commando Phase
III: Facility Construction and Renovation
ined the construction, use, and maintenance of the Zarang Border Crossing Generally Met Contract Requirements,
Point, phase III of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) Camp Commando, but Three Construction Deficiencies
and phase III of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University. A list of Increased Safety Risks
• Inspection Report 19-07-IP: Zarang
completed and ongoing inspections can be found in Appendix C of this Border Crossing Point: Facilities
quarterly report. Generally Met Contract Requirements,
but Construction Deficiencies Pose
Safety Concerns
Inspection Report 19-09-IP: • Inspection Report 19-16-IP: Marshal
Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III Fahim National Defense University
Phase III: Phase III Construction
Facility Construction and Renovation Generally Met Contract Requirements, Generally Met Contract Requirements,
but Three Construction Deficiencies Increased Safety Risks but Five Deficiencies and Inadequate
On December 27, 2012, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Maintenance Increase Safety Risks for
Building Occupants
awarded a $14.9 million firm-fixed-price contract to ECC CENTCOM
Constructors LLC (ECC) to design, construct, and renovate the phase III
facilities for approximately 1,950 personnel at Camp Commando in Kabul,
Afghanistan. The contract required ECC to construct seven new facili-
ties, such as the dining facility (DFAC) and warehouse, and renovate four
existing buildings to use as training classrooms. After 11 modifications,
the contract’s value increased by $2.5 million to $17.4 million. ECC com-
pleted the phase III construction and renovation work on June 26, 2014.
On July 18, 2014, CSTC-A transferred the phase III facilities to the Afghan
Ministry of Defense (MOD).
SIGAR found that the phase III construction and renovation work gen-
erally met contract requirements. However, SIGAR also identified three
construction deficiencies that raise safety concerns for building occupants
should a fire occur. First, ECC installed 125 certified fire-rated doors in the
four newly constructed barracks, but did not install 40 certified fire-rated
interior doors in the four renovated buildings. Second, ECC installed non-
certified rolling counter doors in the DFAC, instead of the Alpine fire-rated
rolling counter doors USACE approved. Third, SIGAR could not locate six
of the 33 fire extinguishers ECC installed and found that at least 19 of the 27
extinguishers that it could locate were counterfeit. SIGAR determined that
USACE paid ECC more than $51,000 for 33 fire extinguishers that should
have cost less than $2,000 if ECC had purchased and installed the approved
extinguishers. USACE may have also paid ECC more than necessary for
the noncertified fire doors and noncertified rolling counter doors, but these
amounts were not available because the costs are combined with other
contract costs. SIGAR found that USACE did not perform effective quality
assurance or fully adhere to its own three-phase quality-assurance inspec-
tion process, which contributed to these deficiencies going undetected.
Finally, SIGAR found that the Camp Commando phase III facilities are
being used and maintained. However, broken door hardware on the exit
doors in the DFAC has resulted in three of the six exit doors being perma-
nently locked from the outside, and only one of the three exits in the dining
area is available to personnel during an emergency evacuation. In addition,
Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel converted two of the renovated
training classrooms into barracks and obstructed the only exit corridor with
lockers. In one of the new barracks, the ANA constructed a permanent wall
with a door in the only corridor of the building, blocking access to one of
the building’s exits. These conditions could increase safety risks to building
occupants in the event of a fire or other emergency.
SIGAR made one recommendation in the draft report, that the CSTC-A
commander notify the ANA of the following potential safety hazards: non-
certified doors in the renovated buildings and noncertified rolling counter
doors in the DFAC; the counterfeit fire extinguishers installed throughout
the phase III facilities; the blocked exits in the DFAC and one of the new
barracks; and the obstructed exit corridors in the two training classrooms
converted into barracks. Based on the CSTC-A’s response and actions taken,
SIGAR closed the recommendation as implemented and removed it from
the final report.
did not have the required manufacturer’s labels identifying the manufac-
turer and specifying that the doors were fire-rated and certified. These
deficiencies pose safety risks and raise concerns that U.S. taxpayer funds
may have been wasted on noncompliant products and construction. Due
to AFCEC’s incomplete record keeping, SIGAR could not fully assess the
extent to which URS complied with the task order and AFCEC oversaw the
project. As a result, there may be additional deficiencies that SIGAR did
not discover.
SIGAR also found that most of the Zarang Border Crossing Point’s
facilities were being used or partially used, but were not being adequately
maintained. For example, two barracks were not being used, two other bar-
racks were being partially used, and three other buildings have not been
used since they were constructed. These buildings have a combined cost
of $1.1 million. In addition, the sewer line was blocked, and SIGAR found
counterfeit and missing fire extinguishers, nonfunctioning lights and smoke
alarms, broken door hardware, leaking electric water heaters, and missing
and broken electrical panel doors.
SIGAR made one recommendation in the draft report, that the CSTC-A
Commander inform the MOI of the 32 unlabeled doors in the six buildings
that the task order required to be fire-rated and explain the potential safety
hazards in event of a fire if the doors were not fire-rated. Based on CSTC-A’s
response and actions taken, SIGAR closed the recommendation as imple-
mented and removed it from the final report.
State Corps and Assist Consultants installed noncertified fire doors in all 21
phase III buildings instead of certified doors as required by the contracts,
and installed lightning-protection systems in only three of 21 buildings,
even though the systems were required in all buildings. In addition, Assist
Consultants did not install seismic bracing on water heaters that required
this bracing; welded propane gas-supply pipes together instead of using
the required threaded fittings; and installed threaded connectors instead
of the required flexible quick-disconnect connectors on the stoves in the
dining facility. SIGAR also found that the ANA was using all of the MFNDU
phase III buildings and facilities, except for the wastewater-treatment plant,
which has never been operational. Because the MFNDU does not have a
functioning wastewater-treatment plant, the ANA is discharging untreated
wastewater into ditches that flow toward a nearby village, potentially con-
taminating its water supply. In addition, SIGAR found that the phase III
buildings were not being well maintained. SIGAR found broken and miss-
ing door-lock assemblies, nonfunctioning smoke detectors, and empty and
counterfeit fire extinguishers in all 21 buildings.
Because the Afghan government has been responsible for operating
and maintaining the MFNDU’s phase III buildings and facilities since 2015,
the MOD has agreed to address facility maintenance, and CSTC-A has
informed the MOD of the safety risks, SIGAR made no recommendations in
this report.
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects was created to quickly obtain and access COMPLETED SPECIAL PROJECTS REPORTS
information necessary to fulfill SIGAR’s oversight mandates; examine • Review 19-10-SP: Schools in Baghlan
emerging issues; and deliver prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies Province, Afghanistan: Observations from
Site Visits to 14 Facilities
and the Congress. Special Projects reports and letters focus on providing
• Review 19-08-SP: Bridges in Kabul,
timely, credible, and useful information to Congress and the public. The Afghanistan: Six Bridges Constructed
team conducts a variety of assessments, producing reports on all facets of by DOD in Generally Good Condition;
Funding for Sustained Maintenance Not
Afghanistan reconstruction. The directorate is made up of a team of ana- in Budget
lysts supported by investigators, lawyers, subject-matter experts, and other • Fact Sheet 19-05-SP: Information on
specialists who can quickly and jointly apply their expertise to emerging USAID’s Stability in Key Areas (SIKA)
Program–Eastern Region, Afghanistan:
problems and questions. The team conducts a variety of assessments, pro- USAID Spent $140.1 Million
ducing reports on all facets of Afghanistan reconstruction. Implementing Stabilization Projects
Between December 2011 and
This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects issued two review September 2015 in Eastern Provinces
reports on: USAID-funded education facilities in Baghlan Province and of Afghanistan
CERP-funded bridges in Kabul. The Office of Special Projects also issued • Fact Sheet 19-11-SP: Information on
USAID’s Stability in Key Areas (SIKA)
two fact sheets on USAID’s Stability in Key Areas Program in the East Program – Western Region, Afghanistan:
Region and the West Region. The two review reports issued by Special USAID Spent $54 Million Implementing
Projects in accordance with CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Stabilization Projects Between December
2011 and September 2015 in Western
Evaluation had one recommendation. A list of completed and ongoing Provinces of Afghanistan
Special Projects can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.
LESSONS LEARNED
SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program was created to identify lessons and
make recommendations to Congress and executive agencies on ways to
improve current and future reconstruction efforts. To date, the program has
issued five reports. Four projects are currently in development: U.S. and
coalition responsibilities for security-sector assistance; U.S. government
support to elections; monitoring and evaluation of reconstruction contract-
ing; and reintegration of ex-combatants.
FIGURE 2.2
SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: CUMULATIVE REFERRALS FOR SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT, Q2 FY 2011–Q1 FY 2019
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19
Q2–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1–Q4 Q1
Note: For a comprehensive list of finalized suspensions, debarments, and special entity designations, see Appendix D.
Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/4/2019.
Farouki, Mazen Farouki, and Salah Maarouf made multiple material mis-
representations to DLA contracting officers regarding its intent to build
climate-controlled warehouses for frozen and dry-goods in the vicinity of
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. The object of this alleged deception was to
deceive DLA contracting personnel with false assurances that ANHAM
FZCO was capable of successfully performing the SPV-A contract in accor-
dance with the statement of work.
In addition, ANHAM FZCO allegedly utilized ports in Iran to move mate-
rials for the staged warehouse site as well as vehicles and equipment in
order to facilitate its performance of the National Afghan Trucking contract,
a transportation contract that had also been awarded to ANHAM FZCO
by DOD for the movement of fuel and dry cargo in support of operations
within Afghanistan. The use of these Iranian ports constituted a violation of
economic sanctions imposed by the United States prohibiting the shipping
of goods through Iranian ports to locations in Afghanistan and elsewhere
in Asia.
The three defendants allegedly utilized multiple subsidiary companies
and bank accounts in the United States, Turkey, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and
the United Arab Emirates in order to conceal these payments from detec-
tion by law enforcement, including accounts belonging to ANHAM FZCO
and ANHAM USA. Based upon the information in the indictment and the
existence of adequate evidence that the misconduct occurred with the
knowledge, approval, or acquiescence of ANHAM USA and ANHAM FZCO,
the DLA suspension and debarment official determined that the allegations
against the three defendants could be imputed to both companies, provid-
ing a cause for suspension. Furthermore, due to the ownership and control
exhibited by the three defendants over ANHAM USA and ANHAM FZCO,
the companies could also be suspended as their affiliates.
In a separate determination, Abul Huda Farouki, Mazen Farouki, and
Salah Maarouf were all individually suspended by DLA on December 17,
2018, based upon their November 27, 2018, indictment.
SIGAR BUDGET
SIGAR is funded through September 30, 2019, under the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625, which provides the agency full fund-
ing based on the FY 2018 amount of $54.9 million. The budget supports
SIGAR’s oversight activities and products by funding SIGAR’s (1) Audits
and Inspections, (2) Investigations, (3) Management and Support, and
(4) Research and Analysis Directorates, as well as the Office of Special
Projects and the Lessons Learned Program.
SIGAR STAFF
SIGAR’s staff count remained steady since the last report to Congress, with
186 employees on board at the end of the quarter: 25 SIGAR employees
were at the U.S. Embassy Kabul and two others were at Bagram Airfield.
SIGAR employed five Afghan nationals in its Kabul office to support the
Investigations and Audits Directorates. In addition, SIGAR supplements
its resident staff with personnel assigned to short-term temporary duty in
Afghanistan. This quarter, SIGAR had 21 employees on temporary duty in
Afghanistan for a total of 321 days.
41
TITLE OF THE SECTION
JANUARY 30, 2019 | SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION | RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE
STATUS OF FUNDS
STATUS OF FUNDS
To fulfill SIGAR’s legislative mandate, this section details the status of U.S.
funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction activities ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
in Afghanistan. As of December 31, 2018, the United States had appropri- CERP: Commander’s Emergency
ated approximately $132.30 billion for reconstruction and related activities Response Program
in Afghanistan since FY 2002. This amount includes $4.93 billion appropri- DICDA: Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
ated through the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019, enacted Activities
into law on September 28, 2018, and providing funds for FY 2019. Total ESF: Economic Support Fund
Afghanistan reconstruction funding has been allocated as follows: TITLE II: Public Law No. 480 Title II
• $83.14 billion for security ($4.56 billion for counternarcotics initiatives) IDA: International Disaster Assistance
• $33.87 billion for governance and development ($4.31 billion for INCLE: International Narcotics Control and
counternarcotics initiatives) Law Enforcement
• $3.61 billion for humanitarian aid MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance
• $11.69 billion for civilian operations NADR: Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining and Related Programs
Figure 3.1 shows the nine largest active U.S. funds that contribute to
these efforts. SIGAR previously reported on seven major funds, but has
updated its reporting to reflect current appropriations.
FIGURE 3.1
FIGURE 3.2
DOD
CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 ($ BILLIONS)
$150
TITLE II $132.30
$127.36
$121.53
120 $115.20
$109.66
$103.38
USAID & OTHER
$96.57
90 $86.94
60
IDA
30
USAID & OTHER
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Security Governance/Development Humanitarian Civilian Operations Total
INCLE
Note: Numbers have been rounded.
Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.
STATE
DICDA
Fund (ESF), to specific countries including Afghanistan in the quarter end- TABLE 3.1
ing September 30. The congressional appropriation for the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs bill for FY 2019, covering U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO
AFGHANISTAN, SINCE 2002 ($ MILLIONS)
the Department of State and USAID, had not been passed at press time.
After the two continuing resolutions providing funds to these and other Government-to-Government
DOD $8,439
affected agencies expired on December 21, the government operated under
State 85
a partial shutdown through January 25, 2019. Appropriations for FY 2019
USAID 687
are presented in Figure 3.3.
Since 2002, the United States has provided nearly $14.56 billion in Multilateral Trust Funds
LOTFA $1,669
on-budget assistance to the government of Afghanistan. This includes
ARTF 3,528
about $9.21 billion to Afghan government ministries and institutions, and
AITF 154
about $5.35 billion to three multinational trust funds—the World Bank’s
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Note: Numbers have been rounded. Figures reflect amounts
the United States has disbursed in on-budget assistance to
Development Programme’s Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), and the Afghan government entities and multilateral trust funds.
Asian Development Bank’s Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/14/2019;
State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2018; DOD,
Table 3.1 shows U.S. on-budget assistance disbursed to the Afghan govern- response to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2019 and 10/19/2018;
ment and multilateral trust funds. World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status
as of November 21, 2018 (end of 11th month of FY 1397),
accessed 1/21/2019; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2018,
1/17/2019.
FIGURE 3.3
$16
$14.71
12
$9.63
8
$6.81
$6.28 $6.33
$5.54 $5.82
$4.94
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Security Governance/Development Humanitarian Civilian Operations Total
FIGURE 3.4
AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2018 ($ BILLIONS)
$120
97 98
CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS
20 36
20
20 12 14 15.4
12 14.8 13.5
10
9.7 10.3 9.0
4.6 6.1 6.5 6.1 5.5 5.6
2.5 3.3 3.6
1.0 1.1
0
FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18
CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED STATUS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS ($ BILLIONS)
FY 2002–2019 ($ BILLIONS)
Appropriated Obligated Disbursed Remaining
Total Appropriated: $114.52
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
$77.75 $69.09 $68.62 $6.31
(ASFF)
Economic Support Fund (ESF) 20.50 19.23 16.25 3.48
International Narcotics Control & Law
5.25 4.95 4.25 0.86
Enforcement (INCLE)
Commander’s Emergency Response Disbursed
3.70 2.29 2.28 0.01 Remaining $98.42
Program (CERP)
$10.80
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
3.25 3.25 3.25 0.00
Activities (DICDA)
Migration and Refugee Assistance Expired
1.34 1.33 1.31 0.02
(MRA) $5.30
Public Law 480 Title II Emergency
1.10 1.10 1.10 0.00
(TITLE II)
International Disaster Assistance (IDA) 0.82 0.79 0.70 0.10
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
0.80 0.69 0.67 0.03
Demining & Related (NADR)
Total Nine Largest Accounts 114.52 $102.72 $98.42 $10.80
Other Reconstruction Funds 6.09
Civilian Operations 11.69
Total $132.30
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the nine major reconstruction
funds after deducting approximately $5.3 billion that expired without being obligated. Obligated and disbursed DICDA funds
reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan. Figures reflect transfers,
rescissions, and reprogramming activity to date.
Source: SIGAR, analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and
USAID, 1/24/2019.
6 40
INCLE
3 20
STATE
0 0
05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
DICDA
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion of FY
2011, $1 billion of FY 2012, and $178 million of FY 2013 out of the ASFF to fund other DOD requirements. DOD reprogrammed
$230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. Pub. L. No. 115-141 rescinded $100 million from FY 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-31 rescinded $150
DOD million from FY 2016. Pub. L. No. 113-6 rescinded $1 billion from FY 2012. Pub. L. No. 113-235 rescinded $764.38 million from
FY 2014. Pub. L. No. 114-113 rescinded $400 million from FY 2015.
Source: DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts December 2018,” Revised 1/17/2018; DFAS,
“AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts September 2018,” 10/18/2018; Pub. L. Nos. 115-141,
115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, and 113-6; OSD Comptroller, 16-22 PA: Omnibus 2016 Prior Approval Request, 6/30/2016.
ESF
ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP, BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–DECEMBER 31, 2018 ($ BILLIONS) FY 2005–DECEMBER 31, 2018 ($ BILLIONS)
Sustainment Sustainment
$23.03 $9.24
Source: Fiscal Year 2019 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) Financial and Activity Plan dated October 22, 2018
(FAP 19-1), provided by the Department of Defense to the U.S. Congress; DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/17/2018,
1/22/2019, and 1/23/2019.
TABLE 3.11
Source: The Revised FY 2018 Budget is based on BAG, SAG, and budget line items as presented in the FY 2018 ASFF Financial
and Activity Plan dated July 10, 2018 (FAP 18-4) and the FY 2018 ASFF Financial and Activity Plan dated October 22, 2018
FAP-18-5), as submitted by the DOD to the U.S. Congress. The Revised FY 2019 Budget is based on comparable BAG, SAG,
and budget line items as presented in the Justification for FY 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Department of Defense Budget, February 2018, as revised by the FY 2019 ASFF Financial and
Activity Plan dated October 22, 2018 (FAP 19-1), as submitted by DOD to the U.S. Congress. DOD, response to SIGAR data call,
12/17/2018, 1/22/2019, and 1/23/2019.
DOD
USAID & OTHER CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR CERP FUNDING ACTIVITY, FY 2016–2019
($ MILLIONS) ($ MILLIONS)
800 20
STATE
600 15
Obligated
Obligated $13.75
$12.99
0 0
05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
ESF
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers. Analysis includes data from a draft DOD financial
report because the final version had not been completed when this report went to press.
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2019 and 10/15/2018; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2013; Pub.
L. Nos. 115-141, 115-31, 114-113, 113-235, 113-76, 113-6, 112-74, 112-10.
USAID & OTHER
MRA
STATE
NADR
USAID & OTHER
STATUS OF FUNDS
INCLE
STATE
NADR
FIGURE 3.14 FIGURE 3.15
$500 $3.5
Appropriated Appropriated
and and
Transferreda Transferreda
400 2.8 $3.25 $3.25
300 2.1
200 1.4
100 0.7
0 0.0
05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed $125.13 million out of FY 2015 DICDA due to several requirements
for the Afghanistan Special Mission Wing being funded from the ASFF instead of DICDA.
a
DOD reprograms all DICDA funds to the military services and defense agencies for obligation and disbursement.
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/17/2019 and 10/8/2018; OSD Comptroller, 15-23 PA: Omnibus 2015 Prior
Approval Request, 6/30/2015, p. 42.
DOD
$4 $24
Appropriated Appropriated
$20.50 $20.50
3 18 Obligated Obligated
$19.23 $19.23
Disbursed Disbursed
$16.16 $16.25
2 12
1 6
0 0
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects the following transfers from AIF to the ESF: $101 million for FY 2011, $179.5
million for FY 2013, and $55 million for FY 2014. FY 2016 ESF for Afghanistan was reduced by $179 million and put toward
the U.S. commitment to the Green Climate Fund.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/17/2019, 1/14/2019, and 10/15/2018; State, response to SIGAR data call,
10/11/2017, 5/4/2016, 10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, and 4/15/2014.
STATUS OF FUNDS
CERP
DOD
$200 $1.25
ESF
Appropriated Appropriated
and and
160 1.00 Transferreda Transferreda
$1.10 $1.10
USAID & OTHER
120 0.75
80 0.50 MRA
40 0.25 STATE
0 0.00
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
NADR
Note: Numbers have been rounded. No FY 2019 appropriations have yet occurred.
a Title II Emergency account resources are requested and appropriated on a contingency basis to meet unmet
humanitarian needs.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/22/2019 and 10/19/2018. STATE
STATUS OF FUNDS
TITLE II
ESF
IDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR IDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON
($ MILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)
Appropriated Appropriated
$0.82 $0.82
150 0.75 Obligated Obligated
MRA $0.79 $0.79
Disbursed Disbursed
$0.68 $0.70
100 0.50
STATE
50 0.25
NADR
0 0.00
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19a As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
STATE
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
a
FY 2019 figure reflects amount made available for obligation under continuing resolutions.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/14/2019 and 10/15/2018.
STATUS OF FUNDS
IDA
$800 $6 STATE
0 0
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19a As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
a FY 2019 figure reflects amount made available for obligation under continuing resolutions.
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 1/16/2019, 10/19/2018, and 10/10/2017.
STATUS OF FUNDS
ESF
$150 $1.5
Appropriated Appropriated
$1.34 $1.34
120 1.2 Obligated Obligated
$1.33 $1.33
Disbursed Disbursed
90 0.9 $1.28 $1.31
60 0.6
30 0.3
0 0.0
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19a As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
a FY 2019 figure reflects $1.3 million obligated under continuing resolutions.
STATUS OF FUNDS
MRA
STATE
NON-PROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM,
DEMINING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS NADR
The Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
(NADR) account plays a critical role in improving the Afghan government’s
capacity to address terrorist threats, protect its borders, and remove dan- STATE
gerous explosive remnants of war.74 The majority of NADR funding for
Afghanistan is funneled through two sub-accounts, Antiterrorist Assistance NADR FUNDS TERMINOLOGY
(ATA) and Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD), with additional Appropriations: Total monies available
funds going to Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) and for commitments
Counterterrorism Financing (CTF).75
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
The Department of State and the U.S. Congress agree on the country-
by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign assistance Disbursements: Monies that have
accounts, including NADR, through the 653(a) allocation process. The been expended
Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding available
to relevant bureaus and offices that obligate and disburse these funds.76
Figure 3.26 shows the allocation to Afghanistan was $36.60 million in
FY 2018, bringing the total amount of funds appropriated and transferred to
$804.54 million as of December 31, 2018 (Figure 3.27).77
60 600
40 400
20 200
0 0
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 As of Sep 30, 2018 As of Dec 31, 2018
INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN
The international community provides significant funding to support
Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts. Most of the international
funding is administered through trust funds. The three main trust funds are
the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-managed Law and
Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the NATO-managed Afghan
National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATO ANA Trust Fund or NATF).
CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARTF, LOTFA, AND NATO ANA TRUST FUND BY TEN LARGEST DONORS ($ MILLIONS)
$0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 5,500
Note: Does not include the Asian Development Bank’s Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), whose partners, the NATO ANA Trust Fund, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, have committed $841 million as of June 2018.
Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of November 21, 2018 (end of 11th month of FY 1397); UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2018, Updated
January 17, 2019, in response to SIGAR data call 1/18/2019; NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Media Backgrounder, Status of Contributions Made as of
November 26, 2018; Asian Development Bank, “Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund 2018 Fact Sheet.”
according to the World Bank, nearly $5.05 billion of ARTF funds had been FIGURE 3.29
disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window to assist with
ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR, FY 1397
recurrent costs such as civil servants’ salaries.80 To ensure that the RC (PERCENT)
Window receives adequate funding, donors to the ARTF may not “prefer-
ence” (earmark) more than half of their annual contributions.81 Total Paid and Pledged: $1.09 billion
The Investment Window supports development programs. As of
November 21, 2018, according to the World Bank, over $5.40 billion had
been committed through the Investment Window, and more than $4.43 bil-
United States
lion had been disbursed. The Bank reported 42 active projects with a 37%
Others
combined commitment value of more than $4.06 billion, of which nearly Sweden 14%
$3.10 billion had been disbursed.82 5%
EU
Germany 19%
Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 7%
The UNDP administers the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the
Canada United Kingdom
capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).83 Donors have paid in more than 7% 12%
$5.46 billion from 2002 through December 31, 2018. Figure 3.28 shows the
two largest donors have been the United States and Japan. Figure 3.30
shows the largest donors to the LOTFA in 2018. Annual contributions have Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
“Others” includes 13 donors. Donors had paid-in $897.62
been halved since 2016, from nearly $565.02 million to nearly $263.58 mil- million and pledged $189.0 million for their FY 1397
contributions as of the report date.
lion in 2018, the lowest level of support since 2008. The United States Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial
Status as of November 21, 2018 (end of 11th month of
contributed $114.40 million in 2016, but only $1.04 million in 2018.84 FY 1397).
On July 1, 2015, UNDP divided LOTFA support into two projects: the
Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project and the MOI and Police
FIGURE 3.30
Development (MPD) project. The SPM project aims to develop the capacity
of the Afghan government to independently manage all nonfiduciary aspects LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR,
of its pay budget for the ANP and Central Prisons Directorate (CPD) staff. CALENDAR YEAR 2018 (PERCENT)
Almost 99% of SPM project funding goes toward ANP and CPD staff remu-
neration. The MPD project focuses on institutional development of the Total Paid In: $263.6 million
MOI and police professionalization of the ANP. On November 25, 2018, the Others
LOTFA Steering Committee, composed of Afghan ministries, international 1%
donors, and the UNDP, approved restructuring the fund and changing its Norway Japan
31%
scope of operations.85 4%
SECURITY CONTENTS
SECURITY
KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
This quarter, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Select High-Profile Attacks
Dunford, again described the security situation in Afghanistan as a stale- The following high-profile attacks occurred
mate, saying the Taliban “are not losing right now” and “we used the term this quarter (10/1/2018–1/21/2019):
stalemate a year ago and, relatively speaking, it has not changed much.”88 • 10/2/2018: 14 civilians were killed and
NATO Resolute Support’s (RS) district-stability data confirms Chairman 40 wounded by an IS-K suicide bombing
Dunford’s assessment. That data shows that as of October 22, 2018, control at an election rally in Nangarhar Province.
of Afghanistan’s districts, population, and territory became somewhat more • 10/13/2018: 14 civilians were killed
contested, Afghan government control or influence continued to decline, and 35 wounded by a bomb planted
by unidentified armed militants at an
and insurgent control or influence increased slightly since July 2018. The
election rally in Takhar Province.
percentage of the population in districts under Afghan government control
• 10/22/2018: 11 civilians were killed
or influence—largely stagnant from May 2017 through July 2018 at around
by an IED planted by unidentified armed
65%—decreased in October to 63.5%. The Afghan government’s control or militants in Nangarhar Province.
influence of its districts decreased by nearly two percentage points since • 11/20/2018: At least 55 people were
July to 53.8%. This quarter, DOD and RS emphasized that RS’s district-sta- killed and 94 wounded by an unidentified
bility data is “not indicative of effectiveness of the South Asia strategy,” and suicide bomber who attacked a gathering
reiterated that there is some “uncertainty in models that produce [the data]” of Sunni clerics in Kabul City.
and subjectivity in the assessments that underlie it. For their full statements • 1/7/2019: 10 civilians were killed
and more information about RS’s district-stability data, see page 68.89 and 13 wounded by bomb planted
RS also reported that from August 16–October 31, 2018, an average of 1,742 by unidentified armed militants in
enemy-initiated attacks (EIA) occurred per month, a 6% decrease compared Paktika Province.
• 1/21/2019: Over 40 Afghan security
to the average of 1,859 EIA per month reported from January 1–August 15.
personnel were killed during a Taliban
Separately, Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) person-
attack on a National Directorate of
nel strength in October 2018 (308,693) fell to the lowest level it has been since
Security compound in Wardak Province.
the beginning of the RS mission in January 2015. On January 24, 2019, Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani said that about 45,000 Afghan security personnel have IS-K Attacks Decrease
been killed since Ghani became president in September 2014. That number IS-K claimed three attacks this quarter
indicates that in those roughly 53 months, around 849 Afghan security person- (October 2, 2018, to January 15, 2019),
nel have been killed per month on average.90 down from 14 claimed attacks last quarter
For the first time, on December 20, U.S. Special Representative for (July 16 to October 1, 2018). For more
Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, publicly discussed details information see p. 74.
of his team’s talks with the Taliban, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Source: ACLED, South Asia 2016–Present dataset,
United Arab Emirates. According to Ambassador Khalilzad, the United 10/1/2018–1/15/2019, and South Asia 2016–Present data-
set, 8/1/2018–10/31/2018, available online at https://www.
States’s main goal in the talks continues to be an intra-Afghan peace acleddata.com/; SIGAR, analysis of ACLED data, 1/2019; The
New York Times, “After Deadly Assault on Afghan Base, Taliban
agreement that would ensure that international terrorist organizations Sit for Talks With U.S. Diplomats,” 1/21/2019.
“If I do get [troop can never use Afghan territory against the United States and the interna-
drawdown] orders, I think tional community. Khalilzad said at this juncture he doubted the Taliban’s
seriousness about peace due to the group’s insistence on the removal
it’s important for [Afghan of U.S. troops from Afghanistan as well as their continued refusal to
officials] to know that we engage directly with the Afghan government’s negotiation team.91 The
are still with the security latter sentiment was echoed by Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Abdullah
forces. . . . Even if I have to Abdullah at a recent cabinet meeting. As this report went to press, there
has been no reporting that the Taliban have agreed to meet with Afghan
get a little bit smaller, we’ll government representatives.92
be okay. We’ve thought Also in late December, U.S. and international media outlets published
about this before, and we a number of contradictory reports about whether President Donald J.
will be able to do the things Trump was considering drawing down 5,000 to 7,000 U.S. forces from
Afghanistan. General Dunford and the commander of U.S. and NATO forces
that [the Afghans] require
in Afghanistan, General Austin Scott Miller, said subsequently that they had
in terms of support.” received no orders to begin a drawdown.93 DOD told SIGAR on January 11
—General Austin Scott Miller, that they have “nothing to report” about whether the White House ordered
RS and USFOR-A Commander the Pentagon to begin planning a troop drawdown in Afghanistan.94
Afghan government officials responding to the press reports of a possible
U.S. drawdown generally maintained that the departure of a few thousand
Source: Washington Post, “Military Walks a Fine Line in
Discussing Afghanistan After Trump Orders Withdrawal Plans,” American troops would not negatively impact Afghanistan’s security, and
12/27/2018.
noted that the ANDSF have been in the security lead since January 2015.
Afghan media reported that the Taliban’s reaction was to issue a statement
saying if the Afghan government is actually interested in peace talks with
the Taliban, the government should discard its security pact with the United
States, the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement (more commonly
known as the Bilateral Security Agreement), and order all U.S. troops to
leave the country immediately.95
President Ashraf Ghani replaced his ministers of defense and interior in
December with two strongly anti-Taliban former defense officials. Asadullah
Khalid, selected to lead the Ministry of Defense, ran the Afghan intelligence
Taliban Fighter Strength Estimate service in 2012. According to a January Human Rights Watch report, Khalid
In a December Senate hearing, the nominee
has been credibly accused of human-rights abuses and war crimes while
for commander of U.S. Central Command,
serving as governor of Ghazni and Kandahar.96 Ghani chose Amrullah Saleh,
Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie Jr.,
also a former intelligence chief from 2004 to 2010, to be interior minister
estimated active Taliban fighter strength
at 60,000. Estimates of Taliban strength but later announced Saleh would run alongside him as his first vice presi-
vary. DOD OIG estimated in its most recent dent for the upcoming presidential elections in July 2019. As this report
report (September 2018) that the Taliban went to press, Ghani had not yet named a new minister of interior.97
had a maximum of 40,000 fighters, 5,000
of whom were part of the Taliban-allied ANDSF Data Classified or Not Publicly Releasable
Haqqani Network. There were no major changes this quarter to the types of ANDSF data clas-
Source: DOD, “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant
sified or restricted from public release.
General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, Nominee for USFOR-A declassified the following information this quarter:
Commander, United States Central Command,” 12/4/2018;
DOD OIG, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General • Exact strength of female ANDSF personnel
Report to the United States Congress, 11/19/2018, p. 22;
OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019. • General attrition information for the ANA and ANP
The classified annex for this report covers the classified and nonreleas-
able data.
it is not included in the 352,000 authorized ANDSF force level that donor
nations have agreed to fund; only the United States and Afghanistan provide
funding for the ALP.100
Unlike the ANA, a significant share of Afghan National Police (ANP)
personnel costs are paid through the United Nations Development
Programme’s multi-donor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
(LOTFA), to which the United States has historically been (but was not in
FY 2018) the largest contributor.101
A discussion of on-budget (Afghan-managed) and off-budget (U.S.-
managed) expenditures of ASFF is found on page 120–122.
DOD: In response to SIGAR’s analysis of RS’s control data this quarter, DOD said “Measures of
population control are not indicative of effectiveness of the South Asia strategy or of progress
toward security and stability in Afghanistan, particularly in the wake of the appointment of U.S.
Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) Zalmay Khalilzad. According to
DOD, the [population control] percentages have varied little since the implementation of the
South Asia strategy, which over the last 18 months has slowed Taliban gains made during U.S.
drawdowns between 2011 and 2016. Moreover, typical quarter to quarter variations in these
metrics may be due to, among other things, uncertainty in the models that produce them and
the assessments that underlie them are to a degree subjective. DOD considers it more important
to instead focus on the principal goal of the strategy of concluding the war in Afghanistan on
terms favorable to Afghanistan and the United States. More aggressive combat operations by
Afghan forces, increased authorities for U.S. forces to conduct supporting strikes, international
calls for peace, and the new SRAR’s engagements appear to be driving the Taliban to substantive
negotiations. Taliban participation in these talks suggests that the Taliban recognize that they
cannot advance their interests militarily.”
RS: RS also commented that “The [South Asia] strategy aims to set conditions for a political
resolution to the conflict. One necessary condition is the perception by both sides that the
conflict is in a military stalemate. Alternatively, they cannot believe they will attain their goals with
continued fighting. Multiple years with little variation in district stability data support multiple
years of assessments that the conflict is in a stalemate. Taliban participation in various talks
(Russia, U.S. [SRAR], etc.) suggests they have a similar assessment. There is no explanation for
Taliban behavior if they are advancing their interest militarily.”
Source: OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
Population Control
The Afghan government’s control or influence over the population declined
this quarter. According to RS, as of October 22, 2018, 63.5% of the popula-
tion (21.2 million of an estimated 33.3 million total) lived in areas under
Afghan government control or influence, down roughly 500,000 people (and
1.7 percentage points) since the previous quarter. However, this quarter’s
figure represents a slightly smaller decline (0.6 percentage points) in popu-
lation under government control or influence compared to the same period
in 2017.105
The insurgency slightly increased its control or influence over areas
where 10.8% of the population (3.6 million people) lived, a 0.3 percentage-
point increase since last quarter but a decrease from the 12% reported
in October 2017. The population living in contested areas increased to
8.5 million people (25.6% of the population), a nearly two percentage-point
increase compared to the same period in 2017.106
See Figure 3.31 on the next page, for a historical record of population-
control data since SIGAR began receiving it in August 2016.107
District Control
According to RS, as of October 22, 2018, there were 219 districts under
Afghan government control (74) or influence (145), 53.8% of the total num-
ber of districts. This represents a decrease of seven government-controlled
or influenced districts compared to last quarter and eight since the same
period in 2017.108
Insurgent control or influence of Afghanistan’s districts increased mar-
ginally: there were 50 districts under insurgent control (12) or influence
(38) this quarter. This is an increase of one district since last quarter, but a
decrease of eight compared to the same period in 2017. Therefore, 12.3%
of Afghanistan’s districts are now reportedly under insurgent control or
influence.109 The number of contested districts—controlled or influenced by
neither the Afghan government nor the insurgency—increased by six since
last quarter to 138 districts, meaning that 33.9% of Afghanistan’s districts are
now contested.110
FIGURE 3.31
40
29%
25% 25% 26%
23% 24% 24% 23% 23% 24%
20
11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 11% 11%
9% 8% 9%
0
Aug 2016 Nov 2016 Feb 2017 May 2017 Aug 2017 Oct 2017 Jan 2018 May 2018 Jul 2018 Oct 2018
Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. Afghan government and insurgent figures include control and influence.
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018, 6/22/2018, 9/19/2018, and 12/20/2018; RS,
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.
40
34%
33% 32%
29% 29% 30% 30% 30% 29% 30%
25%
23%
21%
20
13% 13% 14% 15% 14%
11% 12% 12%
9% 8% 10%
7% 6%
0
Nov 2015 Jan 2016 May 2016 Aug 2016 Nov 2016 Feb 2017 May 2017 Aug 2017 Oct 2017 Jan 2018 May 2018 Jul 2018 Oct 2018
Note: Component numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. Afghan government and insurgent figures include control and influence.
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 11/27/2015, 1/29/2016, 5/28/2016, 8/28/2016, 11/15/2016, 2/20/2017, 5/15/2017, 8/28/2017, 10/15/2017, 3/22/2018,
6/22/2018, 9/19/2018, and 12/20/2018; RS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018.
FIGURE 3.32
Territorial Control
As seen in Table 3.3 on the next page, RS reported that the Afghan govern-
ment controlled or influenced 360,000 square kilometers (56.1%) of
TABLE 3.3
FIGURE 3.33
1%
1% 94
97
5%
915
13%
2,318 81%
14,871
Total: 18,295
Direct Fire
IED Explosion
Indirect Fire
Surface-to-Air Fire
Mine Strike
FIGURE 3.36
80
30
20
10
0
8/1/15– 12/1/15– 2/16/16– 5/20/16– 8/16/16– 11/18/16– 3/1/17– 6/15/17– 9/15/17– 12/15/17– 2/15/18– 5/15/18– 8/16/18–
10/31/15 2/15/16 5/19/16 8/15/16 11/17/16 2/14/17 5/31/17 8/31/17 11/15/17 2/15/18 5/15/18 8/15/18 11/15/18
2017. The UN also noted that this quarter saw very low levels of violence
around the Eid al-Adha holiday period (August 20–24), but very high levels
on the first day of parliamentary elections on October 20.119
As reflected in Figure 3.36, the reporting period saw an average of
63.6 incidents per day, a slight decrease in average incidents per day com-
pared to roughly the same period in 2017 (64.4). This quarter’s average daily
incidents is the highest of any quarter in 2018, but it remains slightly lower
than the daily average over roughly the last three years (64.2). According to
the UN, armed clashes continued to cause the most security incidents
(63%). The UN also said that suicide attacks this quarter decreased by 37%
compared to the same period 2017, which they said possibly reflects suc-
cessful interdiction efforts in Kabul and Jalalabad. However, the UN
reported that AAF and U.S. air strikes increased by 25% compared with the
same period in 2017. U.S. Air Force figures show an even higher increase in
air strikes this year compared to previous years.120
TABLE 3.4
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided data, 1/2019.
From January 1 through November 16, RS recorded a total of 122 civilian FIGURE 3.37
casualties due to U.S. (47 casualties, 27 killed and 20 wounded) and AAF
(75 casualties, 10 killed and 65 wounded) air strikes.125 Last quarter SIGAR RS: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY INCIDENT TYPE
reported that RS said there had been no civilian casualties due to U.S. or
Afghan air strikes during May or August 2018, when both forces conducted
heavy air operations to counter the Taliban’s assault on Farah in May and on
52%
Ghazni in August. However, this quarter their figures are updated to show 4,296
two civilian casualties in May (one death, one injury, both by U.S. strikes), 1%
five civilian deaths from U.S. strikes in August, and one civilian wounded 122
by an AAF strike in August. When asked about the updated civilian casual-
ties, RS said that USFOR-A operations in Farah or Ghazni during May and
2% 21%
August did not cause those casualties, but RS could not confirm anything 144 5% 1,731
about the AAF air strike casualty in August.126 2% 429 6%
186 7%
462 588
While RS’s overall civilian-casualty data is difficult to compare accurately 4%
with UNAMA’s due to their different reporting periods and methodologies, 302
Total: 8,260
one difference is easily discernible. When examining both data sets’ casu-
alty figures by incident type, particularly air strikes, it is clear that RS’s data IEDs Explosive Remnants
of War
reflects far fewer civilian casualties than UNAMA’s. As of September 30, Direct Fire
Crossfire
UNAMA reported that it verified 210 civilian casualties (69 deaths and 141 Indirect Fire
Other
Complex Attack
injuries) occurring in Ghazni City between August 10–15, the majority of Air Strikes
Assassination
which they attributed to ground fighting between Taliban and pro-govern- and Murder
ment forces, but also from pro-government aerial operations.127 For the
Note: The reporting period for this data is January 1–
breakdown of RS’s civilian-casualty data by incident type, see Figure 3.37. November 16, 2018. Casualties include dead and wounded.
Source: RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
Medics from 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade completing pre-hospital life support
training at Fort Hood in November. (DOD photo by Photo by Maj. Jefferson Grimes)
250,000
200,000
190,753
150,000 169,718 168,327 166,344
100,000
50,000
0
315,744 315,962 312,682 308,693
10/2015 11/2016 11/2017 10/2018
ANA including AAF ANP
Note: ANA = Afghan National Army; AAF = Afghan Air Force; ANP = Afghan National Police; ANDSF = Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces. ANA strength numbers include the AAF and trainees, transfers, holdees, and student personnel. No
civilians are included. ANP strength numbers do not include “standby” personnel, generally reservists, personnel not in
service while completing training, or civilians. The change in the individual strengths of the ANA and ANP from 2017 to 2018
is due to the transfer of two force elements from the MOI to MOD, but this change did not impact the overall strength of the
ANDSF. The strength numbers reported here should not be viewed as exact: CSTC-A and SIGAR have long noted many data
consistency issues with ANDSF strength numbers, and CSTC-A always caveats that ANDSF strength numbers are
Afghan-owned and that RS cannot validate the data for accuracy.
Source: CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2018 and 1/12/2019;
SIGAR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, 1/30/2013, 1/30/2014, 1/30/2015, 1/30/2016, 1/30/2017;
SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2019.
TABLE 3.5
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2019; DOD, Enhancing
Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2018, p. 41; SIGAR, analysis of CSTC-A-provided data, 1/2019.
needs. However, neither the ANA nor the ANP have slotted 100% of their
APPS Data-Input Requirements for personnel into APPS. As of December 2018, only 83.6% of ANA personnel
ANDSF Payroll (including civilians) were slotted into the system and met the minimum
There are 20 data points that all ANDSF
data-input requirements to be paid. For the ANP, only 60.9% of the force
personnel must have in their APPS record in
is slotted into APPS and meet the requirements to be paid. Both forces’
order to be paid. These include:
enrollment rates increased when compared to last quarter: the ANA slot-
• ID card number ted nearly 11% more of its personnel, and the ANP about 4% more. CSTC-A
• Date of birth said they calculate the percentage of ANDSF personnel slotted into APPS
• Enrollment date as the number of personnel slotted in APPS divided by the number of
• Gender personnel the Afghans report to be on hand in each force (their assigned
• Biometric verification number strength figures). CSTC-A also said the full transition to APPS for strength
• Actual rank reporting is dependent upon the Afghans’ progress; however, CSTC-A’s
• Military education
estimate is that it will take six more months for the ANA and another year
• Blood type
for the ANP.148
• First/full name
• Tashkil rank
On the effort to continue to physically account for and enroll MOD and
• Bank account number MOI personnel into APPS (the continuous PAI process), CSTC-A said that
• Contract expiration date the MOD reported 82% completion of the latest PAI, which took place from
• Father’s name October 2016 through May 2018 at all corps, brigades, and battalions. MOD
• Date of rank is now staffed with permanent biometric teams to conduct PAI throughout
• AHRIMS ID the ANA. MOI reported 54% completion of its current PAI (up from 44.9%
• Paragraph number last quarter).149
• Grandfather’s name A senior U.S. military official expressed concern to SIGAR in
• Unit identification code October 2018 about whether the APPS was succeeding in rooting out all
• Civilian education “ghost,” or non-existent soldiers, especially from the rolls of the MOI. SIGAR
• Line number
is planning to audit ANP personnel and payroll systems.150
Note: AHRIMS (the Afghan Human Resource Information
System) was the Afghan personnel accountability system prior
to APPS. Where possible, records were migrated for personnel
enrolled in AHRIMS to APPS.
Afghanistan Compact – Not Publicly Releasable
This quarter, RS continued to designate unclassified but not publicly releas-
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018
and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
able much of the detailed security-related data about Afghanistan Compact
progress. SIGAR’s security-related questions about the Compact can be
found in Appendix E of this report.
According to DOD, the security milestones in the Compact are a bilateral
U.S.-Afghan effort designed to commit senior MOD and MOI leadership to
maintain pressure on their respective ministries to track progress toward
and achieve reform goals. The Afghan National Security Council is respon-
sible for monitoring and reporting ministerial progress to President Ghani,
and the Afghan President’s “personal oversight of the Compact provides
his [national security advisor] and ministers with incentive to achieve
positive progress.”151
CTSC-A reported this quarter that the purpose of the tracker that
assesses progress on the Compact’s security milestones will not change,
but that a review is under way of the corresponding RS train, advise, and
assist (TAA) work tracker (which monitors Coalition TAA efforts with the
security ministries). The Compact’s milestone change process will also be
An AAF airman mans a base-perimeter guardhouse in December. (U.S. Air Force photo
by Staff Sgt. Clayton Cupit)
This quarter’s assigned strength puts the ANA at 83.9%, or 36,621 personnel
short, of its goal strength. This is a 1.4 percentage-point drop from the 85.3%
reported last quarter and in 2017.160
ANA Sustainment
As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $23.5 billion and
disbursed $23 billion of ASFF for ANA sustainment.162
CSTC-A reported that the total amount expended for on-budget ANA
sustainment requirements thus far for Afghan FY 1397 (December 2017–
December 2018) was $685.1 million through November 13, 2018. The vast
majority of these funds was spent on ANA salaries and incentive pay
($582.8 million, of which roughly $217.7 million was for incentive pay).163
The United States contribution for ANA salary and incentive pay
has increased substantially over the last two years: this year’s spending
reflects a $73.3 million increase compared to the same period in 2017, and
a $122.1 million increase compared to 2016.164 CSTC-A noted that while it
does not conduct year-on-year salary and incentive-pay comparisons, the
major contributor to this year’s increase in ANA salaries and incentives
was the growth of the ANA due to the transfer of two MOI force elements
(ANCOP and ABP) to MOD.165
Roughly $102.4 million was spent on nonpayroll sustainment require-
ments, the costliest of which were energy-generating equipment
($25.4 million), the construction of building and non-building structures
($17.7 million), and office equipment and computers ($17.6 million). This
amount reflects a $41.1 million increase in nonpayroll expenses compared to
the same period in 2017.166 Previously, fuel was a large, on-budget nonpayroll
sustainment expense, but CSTC-A reported that fuel for ANDSF vehicles is
now part of the off-budget funds that CSTC-A manages for the Afghans.167
CSTC-A said this quarter that the estimated funding required for ANA
base salaries, bonuses, and incentives for FY 2019 is estimated at $743 mil-
lion, but noted that the U.S. contribution to ANA personnel sustainment
over the next few years is contingent on congressional appropriations.168
ANA Equipment Operational Readiness – Data Classified M1151 HMMWVs being issued to the
This quarter, USFOR-A continued to classify data on ANA equipment readi- ANDSF in October. (Contractor photo
ness. SIGAR’s questions about ANA equipment readiness can be found in provided by DOD)
Appendix E of this report. ANA equipment readiness is reported in the clas-
sified annex for this report.
ANA Infrastructure
The United States had obligated and disbursed $5.9 billion of ASFF for ANA
infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2018.171
This quarter, CSTC-A reported an increase in the estimated U.S.-funded
annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANA facility and electrical
TABLE 3.6
generator requirements. CSTC-A said that for FY 2019, these costs will
reach $110.8 million, a roughly $43 million increase from the $68 million
reported last quarter for FY 2018. According to CSTC-A, of the $110.8 mil-
lion, $74.7 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and
$36.1 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government. CSTC-A
said the increase in the annual facility-sustainment costs projected for the
ANA in 2019 is due to the number of new construction projects slated for
completion in 2019.172
As of November 15, 2018, the United States completed 456 ANA infrastruc-
Women’s Participation Program: An ture projects in Afghanistan valued at a total cost of $5.4 billion.173 CSTC-A
initiative that seeks to advance and reported that two projects were completed this quarter, costing $1.7 million.
promote women’s participation in Another 36 projects (valued at $182.5 million) were ongoing, 11 projects were
Afghan security institutions. The program awarded (valued at $28.5 million), and 30 projects (valued at $406 million)
promotes safe and secure facilities, proper were being planned.174 See Table 3.7 for a description of the highest-value
equipment, training, and opportunities for awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANA infrastructure projects.
women to increase their membership in Included in the projects described above are eight ANA Women’s
the ANDSF. Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of $21.9 million,
comprising one completed project ($984,873), four ongoing projects
($16.5 million), and three projects in the planning phase ($4.4 million).175
Source: OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/15/2016. See Table 3.8 on page 88 for a description of these projects.
TABLE 3.7
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
TABLE 3.8
Note: * Projects are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund. All data is as of November 15, 2018.
One key aim of the ANA-TF model is to refocus the ANA and ASSF
on conducting more offensive operations and allow the ANA to even-
tually transition to a smaller, more affordable force. The ANA-TF has
been described as a force similar to the ALP, except that it is recruited,
trained, and operated by the MOD and not the MOI. ANA-TF units are not
equipped or intended to deploy away from their home district to conduct
offensive operations.179
The pilot phase of the ANA-TF implementation plan began in summer
2018, and the first three companies completed training in September and
began serving in their home districts under ANA leadership. DOD OIG
reported that as of September the ANDSF was able to recruit enough
soldiers for six of its eight planned companies in five provinces: Paktika,
Laghman, Kapisa, Kandahar, and Herat. It also established three “emer-
gency” ANA-TF companies in Nangarhar Province to improve the volatile
security situation there.180
According to DOD, RS ordered a pause in ANA-TF recruiting in
September to evaluate the pilot ANA-TF companies and incorporate les-
sons learned into the program before moving forward. DOD said, “specific
emphasis is being placed on determining the conditions that must be
established in a community before an ANA-TF [unit] will be allowed to
thrive.”181 As with the conventional forces, one of the greatest challenges
the ANDSF is currently facing in standing up the ANA-TF is the chronic
inefficiency of the Kabul Military Training Center, (where MOD recruits
are centrally trained) which struggles with infrastructure, manning, and
organizational problems.182
It is unclear what schedule and conditions will permit the future recruit-
ing and deployment of more ANA-TF forces. According to USFOR-A, the
Afghan government intends to expand the ANA-TF program after the assess-
ment of the ANA-TF’s pilot phase. The expansion would occur over two
more phases, with the goal of training 21,000 ANA-TF soldiers by 2020. It
was reported in Afghan media in mid-January that the ANDSF deployed 300
new ANA-TF personnel to serve under the ANA’s 207th Corps in Herat after
they had completed their training. There may be many more ANA-TF person-
nel already in the pipeline for deployment. DOD said in December that more
than 20 companies were in the process of completing their training.183
hours flown by all aircraft, whether the hours flown were for operations,
maintenance, training, or navigation.197
Of the six AAF airframes, only one (the Mi-17) exceeded its recom-
mended flight hours, one fewer than last quarter. The Mi-17’s average of 800
hours per month was 123% over its recommended flying time of 650 hours
per month, an improvement from 176% over its recommended hours per
month recorded over the previous reporting period.198 However, the Mi-17’s
overutilization is improving: the airframe flew 27.3% of the total hours
flown by the AAF from August through November, an 8.5 percentage-point
decrease from the 35.7% of the AAF’s total hours the Mi-17 flew six months
prior. The Mi-17’s average task availability over the reporting period also
met its task availability benchmark.199
Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/3/2018; SIGAR, analysis of
TAAC-Air-provided data, 12/2018.
TABLE 3.10
Note: All personnel listed above are trained and fully mission-capable. The locations on the table refer to AAF airbases. Kand = Kandahar, MeS = Mazar-e Sharif, and Shind = Shindand.
Maintenance Operations = non-mechanical functions like quality assurance, analysis, plans, scheduling, documentation, training, and logistics; Munitions Squadron = a squadron that stores, main-
tains, inspects, assembles, and issues aircraft munitions; Maintenance Staff = staff that handle command, support, and finance; FFF= Fixed Forward Firing.
Source: TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 10/5/2018, 10/11/2018, and 10/22/2018.
DOD characterized ASSF misuse as having “increased to unsustainable levels” over the last
six months. They said that in many cases, ASSF units, especially ANA Special Operations
Corps (ANASOC) commandos, were deployed for extended periods of time after ANA Corps
commanders refused to relieve them with conventional forces. This has caused many ASSF
units to be overused and unable to rest, train, or reequip, lowering the overall readiness of the
force. It has also reduced the number of offensive operations executed by the ASSF over the
summer, which is a key part of this year’s military strategy. DOD said that continued misuse of
ASSF to provide security at static checkpoints or district centers, or as holding forces, will pose a
challenge to future ASSF operations against the Taliban.
To address these issues, NSOCC-A, MOD, and MOI, in coordination with RS, authored “concept
of employment” documents to outline roles, coordination, and responsibilities for employing
ASSF. The concepts have been signed and are currently being implemented, and associated
financial penalty letters based on the type and frequency of ASSF misuse have been issued
through CSTC-A to MOD and MOI. From August through December 2018, seven penalty letters
were executed. The financial penalty for ANASOC misuse is $1 million per week and for SMW
misuse is $150,000 per flight hour for the Mi-17 and $60,000 per flight hour for the PC-12.
DOD said these fines have been effective in dropping ASSF misuse levels since September, with
CSTC-A withholding about $3.6 million from MOD and MOI for ANASOC misuse and $582,306
for SMW misuse.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2018,
pp. 43–45.
30,689 ANCOP and ABP personnel to MOD. When adjusting for that trans-
fer, the ANP actually gained 2,291 personnel since 2017. CSTC-A always
caveats that ANDSF strength numbers are Afghan-owned and that RS can-
not validate the data for accuracy.213
This quarter’s strength puts the ANP at 94.6% (or 6,686 personnel below) of
its authorized strength up about one percentage point since October 2017.214
ANP Sustainment
As of December 31, 2018, the United States had obligated $9.4 billion and
disbursed $9.2 billion of ASFF for ANP sustainment.216
According to CSTC-A, the total estimated annual ANP salary and incen-
tive costs for FY 2019 will be the same as last year at $140.1 million. These
funds will primarily be paid to the ANP via LOTFA, a multilateral fund to
which the United States has recently contributed relatively little funds (only
about $1 million from December 21, 2017, through November 13, 2018). The
United States will pay an estimated $42.2 million through ASFF for ALP
salaries and incentives in FY 2019.217
CSTC-A reported this quarter that the total on-budget ASFF funds
expended for ANP sustainment requirements for Afghan FY 1397 (December
2017–December 2018) through November 13, 2018, was $101.1 million. The
United States contribution for ANP sustainment has decreased by $61.4 mil-
lion since the same period in 2017, which comes from a decrease in funding
given for ALP salaries and ANP services (about $40 million) and the U.S.
contribution to LOTFA for ANP salaries (about $20 million).218
The majority of the $101.7 million of ANP sustainment funds spent this
year was spent on non-payroll-related services and assets such as electric-
ity, fuel, security services, and repairing and maintaining energy-generating
equipment ($47.1 million) as well as ALP salaries and incentives ($44.5 mil-
lion; $28.9 million of which was for incentives). The rest of the funds went
to subsidies and grants ($9.5 million).219
TABLE 3.11
ANP Infrastructure
The United States had obligated $3.2 billion and disbursed $3.1 billion of
ASFF for ANP infrastructure projects as of December 31, 2018.222
This quarter, CSTC-A reported a slight increase in the estimated U.S.-
funded annual facilities-sustainment costs for all ANP facility and electrical
generator requirements. CSTC-A said that for FY 2019, these costs will
be $78.8 million, a roughly $7 million increase from the $71.7 million
reported last quarter for FY 2018. According to CSTC-A, of the $78.8 mil-
lion, $45.4 million will be provided directly to the Afghan government and
$33.4 million will be spent by CSTC-A for the Afghan government.223
As of November 15, 2018, the United States completed 768 ANA infra-
structure projects in Afghanistan valued at $3 billion.224 CSTC-A reported
TABLE 3.12
Note: All data are as of November 15, 2018. All WPP Police Town projects listed above are being funded through the multilateral NATO ANA Trust Fund. The estimated cost of the two WPP Police
Town projects in the planning phase are rough estimates based upon recent contract awards.
Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
that two projects were completed this quarter, costing $1.7 million. Another
21 projects (valued at $78.2 million) were ongoing, eight projects were
awarded (valued at $821,388), and six projects (valued at $113 million)
were being planned.225 See Table 3.12 for a description of the highest-value
awarded, ongoing, completed, and planned ANP infrastructure projects.
Included in the projects described above are 14 ANP Women’s
Participation Program (WPP) projects valued at a total of $144.4 million,
comprising 12 ongoing projects ($74.4 million), and two projects in the
planning phase ($70 million). The vast majority of these ANP WPP projects
are being funded by the NATO ANA Trust Fund.226
TABLE 3.13
Source: RS Gender Integration Advisory Office, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
A female ANP lieutenant colonel delivers remarks at a ceremony in October marking the
rededication of a facility for special forces policewomen in Logar Province.
(NSOCC-A Photo by Martha Schaeffer)
there is no change this quarter to the generally on-hold status of MOD and
MOI recruitment of female personnel as each ministry works to realign or
create positions that allow for female personnel to have career progression.
RS continued to stress that recruitment is not the only factor defining suc-
cess of ANDSF women, and that recruitment as a metric to reflect increased
female integration into the ANDSF is meaningless without a formalized
strategy to recruit and employ women into meaningful roles and safe work-
ing environments. As such, current RS advisory efforts focus on training
and recruiting women to be effectively utilized in positions with a clear
career progression and ensuring they have the necessary skills for those
positions, and are afforded opportunities for career development and pro-
motion. RS pointed out that recruiting women ad hoc could lead to possible
marginalization and even harassment.238
Recent successes for women in the ANDSF include the appointment
of the first female deputy minister within the MOI, Deputy Minister for
Strategy and Policy Hussna Jahil. Another woman who is the director of
the Family Response Units (FRU) was recently appointed to command and
control over 205 FRU offices in all 34 of Afghanistan provinces. MOI also
nominated and sent the first two ANP women to the leadership develop-
ment capstone course, and 23 ANP women were accepted into the four-year
bachelor’s program at the ANP Academy. The first female ANA officer was
sent to train at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, where all officers in the
British Army are trained.239
TABLE 3.14
of war that threatened community safety and security, and helped educate
more than 8,000 people on the risks. From January to September 2018, the
teams visited 188 communities, removing 1,611 ERW, surveying hazardous
areas, and providing risk education.249
USAID’s Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) is a
$40 million, five-year, nationwide program that began in March 2018 and
supports Afghan victims and their families who have suffered losses from
military operations against the Taliban or from insurgent attacks. COMAC
provides assistance to Afghan civilians and their dependent family members
who have experienced loss due to:250
• military operations involving the U.S., Coalition, or ANDSF against
insurgents, criminals, terrorists, or illegal armed groups
• landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED), unexploded ordnances,
suicide attacks
• public mass shootings, or other insurgent or terrorist actions
• cross-border shelling or cross-border fighting
GOVERNANCE CONTENTS
GOVERNANCE
KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
On December 30, 2018, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) In an interview with the New York Times
announced a three-month delay of Afghanistan’s presidential elections published on January 28, 2019, U.S.
from the originally announced date of April 20, 2019, to July 2019. The IEC Special Representative for Afghanistan
said that weather, transportation, security, and budget issues were causing Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad summarized
the delay. According to the IEC’s new election timeline, the elections for six days of talks in Doha, Qatar, with the
the president, provincial councils, district councils, and the lower house Taliban on peace in Afghanistan, saying
the United State and Taliban “have a draft
of parliament for Ghazni Province will all be held on July 20, 2019.253 As of
of the framework that has to be fleshed
January 20, 2019, 18 candidates registered to run for president including
out before it becomes an agreement.”
President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah.254 Further, “the Taliban have committed, to
In December, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation our satisfaction, to do what is necessary
Zalmay Khalilzad confirmed to Afghan media that government delegations that would prevent Afghanistan from ever
from the U.S., Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia had becoming a platform for international
met with a Taliban delegation in Abu Dhabi this quarter. The Taliban, how- terrorist groups or individuals.” However,
ever, refused to meet with an Afghan government delegation.255 he said the “details need to be worked
On November 27 and 28, 2018, delegations from 61 countries and out.” He clarified what the framework
35 international organizations met for the Geneva Conference on does not include, saying “there are a lot of
Afghanistan.256 Participants at the conference noted that progress that has reports that we have discussed an interim
been made on Afghanistan’s path to self-reliance, but recognized serious, government: No, I have not gotten into
any of that discussion.” He also clarified
persistent challenges including insecurity, poverty, and corruption.257
that “I have not entered into what [a final
settlement] could look like with the
Taliban—they would like to talk to me about
it, but I have not.”
Source: Khalilzad, Zalmay. (@US4AfghanPeace), “1/3 After
six days in Doha, I’m headed to #Afghanistan for consulta-
tions. Meetings here were more productive than they have
been in the past. We made significant progress on vital
issues,” 1/26/2019, https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/
status/1089194660218785792; New York Times, “U.S. and
Taliban Agree in Principle to Peace Framework, Envoy Says,”
1/28/2019.
Delegates from 61 countries and 35 international organizations met for the Geneva
Conference on Afghanistan in November 2018. (Afghan government photo)
TABLE 3.15
State says that Afghan self-reporting is the primary means for determin-
ing Afghan government progress in meeting Compact benchmarks. The U.S.
Embassy tries to verify this progress when possible.313
For background information on the Afghanistan Compact, see pages
122–123 of SIGAR’s April 30, 2018, Quarterly Report to the United
States Congress.
3.16
Note:
*USAID had a previous award to the ARTF that concluded in March 2012 and totaled $1,371,991,195 in disbursements. Cumulative disbursements from all ARTF awards is currently
$3,227,677,528.
**USAID formally ended the New Development Partnership on July 11, 2018.
In November, the ARTF Monitoring Agent (MA) assessed the Afghan gov-
ernment’s performance against the three FSF targets. According to the MA,
the Afghan government satisfied all three targets (and was therefore eligible
for $100 million in FSF funds), including:351
• Collect at least 80% of the domestic revenue target for Afghan fiscal
year 1397 (2018) agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The target was 137.6 billion afghani (approximately $1.86 billion) and
the MA reported that the Afghan government collected 147.78 billion
afghani (approximately $2 billion).352
• Maintain an average treasury cash balance not less than the 10 billion
afghani (approximately $135 million) floor agreed to with the IMF.
According to the MA, the average cash balance was 21.46 billion afghani
(approximately $290 million).353
• Ensure there were no civil servant’s salary claims pending with the
treasury for more than 10 working days (as of November 10, 2018). The
MA verified that there were no outstanding salary payments.354
NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Capacity-Building Programs
As shown in Table 3.17, USAID capacity-building programs seek to improve
Afghan government stakeholders’ ability to prepare, manage, and account
for on-budget assistance. These programs also provide general assistance to
support broader human and institutional capacity building of Afghan gov-
ernment entities such as civil-society organizations and the media.371
TABLE 3.17
a religious edict against journalists that did not improve the situation.
However, the efforts of a Rasana-affiliated organization led the cleric to
reverse himself.381
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Provincial and Municipal Programs
USAID has two subnational programs focused on provincial centers and
municipalities: the Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA)
and Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) programs.
Table 3.18 summarizes total program costs and disbursements to date.
USAID now explicitly contributes a portion of its ARTF funds to the
Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP), for the first time since the
program began in 2016.382 In October, USAID requested that $34 million
of its $300 million contribution to the World Bank’s ARTF be spent on
CCAP.383 According to the Afghan government, CCAP is the centerpiece
of the government’s national inclusive-development strategy for rural and
urban areas. As of November 1, 2018, the government reported that CCAP
had been rolled out in 10,000 communities (700 urban and 9,300 rural) in all
34 provinces.384 CCAP works through Community Development Councils
(CDC) to implement community projects. Over 14 years, CCAP’s predeces-
sor—the National Solidarity Program (NSP)—established 35,000 CDCs and
implemented nearly $2 billion of infrastructure projects. USAID contributed
$900 million to NSP. CCAP differs from NSP, however, by defining a suite
of minimum basic services for each community covering health, education,
and a choice of infrastructure investments (such as road access, electricity,
or small-scale irrigation for rural communities).385
According to USAID’s internal justification for contributing funds to
the program, CCAP aims to break the cycle of fragility and violence in
Afghanistan by deepening the legitimacy of the Afghan state and reducing
extreme poverty through the provision of universal access to basic ser-
vices in rural communities.386 (USAID’s language is nearly identical to that
presented by the World Bank in 2016 when the program first launched.)387
When CCAP first began, the World Bank and Afghan government discussed
a number of potential evaluations of CCAP, including one seeking to answer
the question, “What is the relationship between improved service delivery
and citizens’ trust and belief in the state?” Another proposed evaluation
topic sought to examine the relationship between conflict and service deliv-
ery, with questions on the role CDCs could play in addressing conflict in
communities.388 These questions are central to USAID’s recent justification
for providing funds to CCAP.
As of April 2018, the last time SIGAR asked, USAID did not provide
a response for how CCAP would be assessed, particularly regarding its
TABLE 3.18
FIGURE3.39
AFGHANISTAN'S REGIONS
(ACCORDING TO THE MAY 2018 SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE POLICY)
Northeast
North
Capital East
Center
West
Southeast
South
Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Citizen-Centered Governance: A Roadmap for Subnational Reform, 5/2018, p. 5.
between the national and province levels). Figure 3.39 shows the geographic
distribution of the proposed regions. According to the policy, central min-
istries should no longer spend the majority of their time and resources
implementing projects. Instead, the policy envisions creating eight regional
development authorities that will be structured as state-owned corporations
and serve as project owners for the government.395 The new policy makes no
reference to a province role in development planning or PDPs.
In light of the proposed changes in the new subnational governance pol-
icy, USAID says ISLA will continue to support PDPs, but will also support
revising PDP guidelines once a UNDP study on the PDP process is com-
pleted. In addition, ISLA plans to support the Afghan government in revising
the provincial strategic plan structure to focus on regional development
plans instead of provincial plans. Additionally, ISLA will assist the Ministry
of Economy to develop a pilot regional profile for the western region.396
This quarter, SIGAR examined expenditures of the PDP-proposed and
non-PDP-proposed projects ISLA identified as being reflected in the FY 1397
national budget. For FY 1397, PDP-proposed projects had expenditures
equivalent to approximately $29 million. Non-PDP-proposed projects,
however, had expenditures equivalent to approximately $311 million. The
Ministry of Public Works spent the most in these two categories, reportedly
Afghan Perceptions of the Courts State’s Justice Sector Support Program is the largest rule-of-law program
According to The Asia Foundation’s survey, in Afghanistan. JSSP was established in 2005 to provide capacity-building
most respondents (50.08%) reported that support to the Afghan justice system through training, mentoring, and advi-
they had no contacts with the judiciary or sory services. The current JSSP contract began in August 2017 and has an
courts. Of the 7,477 respondents who said estimated cost of $22 million. The previous JSSP contract, which began in
they did contact the judiciary, 8.84% said 2010, cost $280 million.404 JSSP provides technical assistance to the Afghan
they had to give cash, gifts, or perform a justice-sector institutions through (1) building the capacity of justice insti-
favor all of the time, 16.54% said they did tutions to be professional, transparent, and accountable; (2) assisting the
this most of the time, 25.83% said they did development of statutes that are clearly drafted, constitutional, and the
this some of the time, and 46.74% said product of effective, consultative drafting processes; and (3) supporting
they did this none of the time. Of the 1,898
a case-management system so that Afghan justice institutions work in a
respondents who said they had to give cash,
harmonized and interlinked manner and resolve cases in a transparent and
gifts, or perform a favor for members of the
court either all of the time or most of the
legally sufficient manner.405
time, 77% did not express an opinion when In February 2018, State launched the $8 million Continuing Professional
asked whether they agreed or disagreed Development Support (CPDS) program. According to State, CPDS will
with the statement that state courts are fair respond to an urgent need by the Afghan government to train legal pro-
and trusted. fessionals on the newly revised penal code and build the organizational
capacity of the nascent professional training departments of Afghan legal
According to IWA’s survey, 14% of institutions.406 As of September 2018, CPDS reported that it had com-
respondents consider the courts to be
pleted the initial development of databases for the management of training
the most corrupt government institution.
records. The databases automatically produce a report card that outlines
However, only 20% of respondents said
they based their perceptions on personal
the number of training courses disaggregated by subject, number of partici-
experience with the institution. Most pants by gender and geographic location, participants’ level of satisfaction,
perceptions were informed by family and and percentage of knowledge increase.407 CPDS reported this quarter that it
friends (37%) or media (32%). is now seeking commitments from Afghan government counterpart profes-
sional training departments to staff and operate the databases.408
Source: SIGAR analysis of The Asia Foundation’s 2018
Afghan Survey Data (downloaded 12/14/2018); Integrity In April 2016, USAID launched the $68 million Assistance for the
Watch Afghanistan, National Corruption Survey 2018: Afghans’
Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption, 12/10/2018, Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) program.
p. 32.
ADALAT aims to (1) increase the effectiveness and reach of the formal jus-
tice sector, (2) strengthen the linkages between the formal and traditional
justice sectors, and (3) increase citizen demand for quality legal services.409
This quarter, USAID reported that ADALAT assisted the Supreme
Court in processing the recruitment of 160 human resource, administra-
tive, and finance positions, reportedly the first package of the merit-based
recruitments following an agreement between the Supreme Court and
the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission.
ADALAT provides financial support to 26 grantees to increase citizen
demand for quality legal services and strengthen linkages between the for-
mal and traditional justice sectors. These grants funded outreach and public
education, advocacy campaigns, traditional dispute resolution, trainings,
and court observations. Also, ADALAT developed an online-test server data-
base for the Supreme Court’s Inspections Directorate.410
In ADALAT’s work plan for April 2018 to March 2019, ADALAT proposed
to improve judicial inspections and discipline. According to ADALAT, the
TABLE 3.19
Source: State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 12/26/2018; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2019.
Last quarter, State reported to SIGAR that the U.S. Embassy prioritized
the corruption-related Compact benchmarks including targeting drug
kingpins for money laundering prosecutions, high-profile corruption pros-
ecutions, and recovering stolen Kabul Bank funds. According to State, the
Afghan government made progress on all of these priorities this quarter.
State reported that the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) prosecuted three
high-level drug targets for money laundering.429
The one high-profile corruption prosecution that State reported this
quarter involved the former Minister of Communications and Information
According to DOJ, the AGO made some reform progress this quar-
ter, including agreeing to polygraph AGO prosecutors and investigators
who work at the ACJC.436 Further, following U.S. Embassy pressure, DOJ
observed AGO changing its position on use of the State-funded Case
Management System (CMS). CMS is an online database that tracks the
status of criminal cases in Afghanistan, across all criminal justice institu-
tions, from the moment a case is initiated to the end of confinement. Last
quarter, SIGAR reported DOJ’s concern at the attorney general’s resistance
to making CMS functional in the AGO. However, DOJ now reports that AGO
officials are said to have received instructions from the attorney general to
embrace CMS. CMS terminals were installed this quarter at the ACJC.437
Additional details on AGO-related corruption challenges are reported in
the classified annex of this report.
and assist activities. CSTC-A believes these efforts are helpful given the
weaknesses in the Afghan government’s oversight of Afghan security forces
deployed to the geographic periphery.462
While CSTC-A believes that the Afghan security forces are making prog-
ress in their efforts to combat corruption, this progress is usually at the
insistence of foreign officials.463 Further, CSTC-A expects Afghan govern-
ment officials to remain complicit in corruption for both personal benefit
and the benefit of larger patronage networks. CSTC-A observed during the
election season that powerbrokers vying for political power often play a
role in Afghan security force corruption.464
for its monitoring and evaluation requirements and SIGAR has requested
updates each subsequent quarter in the hope that this aspect of the policy
was being implemented. However, as of December 2018, CSTC-A reports
that it has not received any monitoring and evaluation data for the anti- and
countercorruption objective.471 It is unclear, then, how the MOI is track-
ing its anti- and countercorruption progress since it does not appear to be
implementing its own policy on the matter. CSTC-A responded in vetting
that the originally provided MOI strategic plan does articulate indicators
and baselines, and recommended SIGAR review the document again.
SIGAR reviewed the document again and saw only the requirement to
develop anti- and countercorruption indicators and baselines, but could not
locate any defined indicators and baselines.472
Instead of providing the requested monitoring and evaluation data,
CSTC-A highlighted how the MOI inspector general held a seminar dur-
ing the quarter that covered, among various topics, the MOI strategic plan
and revised anti- and countercorruption policy. Further, CSTC-A pointed
to the MOI inspector general hosting a meeting chaired by the minister
of interior.473
CSTC-A said it tracks a number of conditions for the MOD and MOI to
demonstrate progress in meeting their anti- and countercorruption-related
high priority performance requirements. These conditions include holding
and attending high-level meetings to discuss corruption issues, imple-
menting annual MOD IG and MOI IG inspection plans, issuing inspection
and investigation reports, collecting asset declarations from senior MOD
and MOI personnel, and developing trainings. CSTC-A reported that both
the MOD IG and MOI IG are on track to implement the annual inspection
plans, with the MOI IG having completed 160 of the planned 227 inspec-
tion reports. Further, CSTC-A noted that a number of high-level meetings
were either canceled outright or missed. Asset declarations have also been
collected for 178 of 182 senior MOI officials. For MOD asset declarations,
CSTC-A reported that a committee established for asset declarations is no
longer functioning and responsibility has been transferred back to the MOD
IG. Of the 3,774 required MOD asset declarations due in FY 1398 (December
2018–December 2019), 867 have reportedly been submitted.474
that 96% of the Afghan returnees from Iran are unskilled or semiskilled
single male laborers under age 30, a population that could be vulnerable to
recruitment into extremist groups or the illicit economy.488
State, however, disagreed with DOD’s conclusion, saying “there is no
basis to assert that [the Afghan returnee population] is more vulnerable to
[extremist] recruitment than other populations.”489
FIGURE 3.40
NUMBER OF AFGHAN REFUGEES RETURNING TO AFGHANISTAN (2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 25, 2018)
150,000
Country of Asylum
120,000 Iran
Pakistan
90,000
60,000
30,000
0
2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary Repatriation 2015,” 1/1/2018; SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary Repatriation 2016,” 11/8/2017; SIGAR analysis of
UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary Repatriation 2017,” 9/12/2018; SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary Repatriation 2018,” 12/25/2018.
FIGURE 3.41
80,000
60,000
40,000
Returns from Pakistan
Returns from Iran
20,000
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Internal Displacement
As shown in Figure 3.42, there has been less conflict-induced internal
displacement this year than in 2017. According to the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of December 14, the
conflicts of 2018 had induced 343,341 people to flee. The office recorded
437,907 persons in the same period last year.490
Of the conflict-induced internally displaced persons recorded up to
October 20, 2018, 18.92% reported being displaced from districts Resolute
Support recorded as under Afghan government influence (as of October 22,
2018), 46.72% were from districts that are contested, and 32.65% were from
districts with insurgent activity.491
GENDER
USAID’s Promote program aims to strengthen women’s participation
in civil society, boost female participation in the economy, increase
the number of women in decision-making positions within the Afghan
FIGURE 3.42
FIGURE 3.43
FIRST-TIME AFGHAN ASYLUM APPLICANTS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (2013 THROUGH DECEMBER 2018, BY MONTH)
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: EUROSTAT, “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex monthly data (rounded),” 12/30/2018.
TABLE 3.20
more on Afghanistan’s jump in the Doing Business rankings, see the quar-
terly highlight on pages 161–163.
According to the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network
(FEWS NET), food insecurity persisted across large swathes of Afghanistan
this quarter, due in part to the ongoing drought.516 The Integrated Food
Security Phase Classification (IPC), on whose food-security analyses USAID
relies, anticipated that 10.6 million people would face severe food insecu-
rity—meaning they would face food consumption gaps leading to acute
malnutrition or would be forced to deplete household assets in order to meet
minimum needs—between November 2018 and February 2019.517 Although
this figure was attributed to a variety of factors, including poverty and con-
flict, the IPC said that Afghanistan was experiencing a “major livelihood
crisis,” primarily due to the drought (the agricultural sector directly employs
approximately two out of every five Afghans in the labor force, according to
the World Bank).518 In September 2018, USAID contributed approximately
$44 million to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to support the provision
of critical food assistance to people affected by drought in Afghanistan.519
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) released its latest macroeco-
nomic appraisal of Afghanistan this quarter. The IMF said the outlook
for near-term licit economic growth had deteriorated due to the ongoing
drought that cut into farm output. As a result, the IMF lowered its real eco-
nomic-growth forecast for 2018 by 20 basis points (100 basis points equal
one percentage point), to 2.3%.520 This figure was 40 basis points lower than
Sustainable Domestic Revenues: the IMF’s 2017 growth estimate of 2.7%.521
According to Afghanistan Ministry of According to press reporting, the U.S. may withdraw approximately
Finance (MOF) officials, these are revenues half—or more than 7,000—of about 14,000 U.S. troops currently deployed
like customs, taxes, and non-tax fees. to Afghanistan in coming months.522 However, the commander of U.S. and
Multilateral institutions such as the World
NATO forces in Afghanistan said he had received no orders regarding a pos-
Bank and the IMF use reports of these
sible withdrawal, and DOD said there had been no announcement.523 While
revenues to judge the Afghan government’s
fiscal performance.
this development is not overtly related to the Afghan economy, uncertainty
surrounding the timing and implications of a material withdrawal of forces
One-Off Domestic Revenues: These are could increase investor uncertainty and dampen economic activity.
nonrecurring revenues arising from one- SIGAR analysis showed that the Afghan government’s aggregate
time transfers of funds, such as central domestic revenues grew by approximately 9.3%, year-on-year, from Fiscal
bank profits, to the Afghan government. The Year (FY) 1396 (December 21, 2016–December 21, 2017) to FY 1397
IMF excludes central bank transfers from (December 22, 2017–December 21, 2018).524 Afghanistan’s Ministry of
its definition of domestic revenues for the Finance (MOF) classifies domestic revenues into sustainable and one-off
purpose of monitoring Afghanistan’s fiscal categories.525 In FY 1397, several large transfers of funds to Afghanistan’s
performance under its Extended Credit central bank, totaling AFN 7.9 billion (approximately $106.8 million), were
Facility arrangement with the government.
classified as one-off transfers.526 These transfers corresponded to domestic
debt obligations incurred by the MOF during the resolution of the Kabul
Bank crisis and are scheduled to be repaid in full by the end of 2019, accord-
Source: SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, ing to the MOF (for more on the Kabul Bank crisis, see pages 156–157 of
8/21/2017; SIGAR, communications with IMF officials,
9/7/2017. this section).527 The transfers reduced aggregate revenues.528 It is not clear
why the MOF accounts for such transfers as revenues given that they
appear to be essentially expenditures.
Because the transfers were categorized as one-offs, sustainable domestic
revenues (which do not include one-off transactions) grew by the higher
rate of 14.0%, year-on-year, from FY 1396–FY 1397.529 Both the aggregate and
sustainable domestic revenue growth rates appear to have recovered from
nadirs in Month 8 of FY 1397.530 Expenditures, meanwhile, grew by 8.2%.531
Infrastructure 4,318
Governance 2,692
Stabilization 2,432
Agriculture 2,215
Unpreferenced* 1,273
Health 1,233
Economic Growth 1,216
Education 1,036
Program Support 426
Gender 150
$0 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000
Note: USAID Mission-managed funds. Numbers are rounded. USAID gender programs presented as a separate category. Agriculture
programs include Alternative Development. Infrastructure programs include power, roads, extractives, and other programs that build
health and education facilities. OFM activities (e.g. audits and pre-award assessments) included under Program Support funds. In
line with last quarter, additional OFM activities added due to increased data coverage.
*Unpreferenced funds are U.S. contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives.
Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator’s
Report on Financial Status, as of 10/22/2018.
The CDCS links to the updated U.S. Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for
Afghanistan released in late September 2018. According to the ICS, the U.S.
policy goal in Afghanistan is to prevent any further attacks on the United
States by terrorist groups that enjoy support or safe haven in Afghanistan.
Accomplishing this policy objective, the ICS said, will not be possible with-
out a growing Afghan economy. One goal of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan,
therefore, is to create economic prosperity in Afghanistan by advancing
private-sector-led export growth and job creation, and by bolstering social
gains in health, education, and women’s empowerment.537 Whether this is
achievable without a peace agreement and with a deteriorating security
situation is unclear.
ECONOMIC PROFILE
Bolstered by high levels of donor spending, a large international military
presence, and initial post-conflict economic recovery, Afghanistan’s licit
economic growth rate averaged close to double digits for the first decade
of reconstruction. Since the 2014 security transition and drawdown of
most foreign combat troops, however, growth has been substantially more
subdued, despite continuing high levels of foreign assistance.538 While
Afghanistan is in the midst of a modest, post-security-transition recov-
ery, with growth rising to 2.7% in 2017 following 1.3% growth 2014 and
1.5% growth in 2015, the World Bank said in August 2017 that momentum
appeared to be at risk, with growth projected to slip to 2.4% in 2018.539
Neither the Bank’s analysis, nor the IMF’s (described in the next paragraph)
account for the opium economy to any real extent. Pages 150–152 explain
why that is significant.
In November 2018, the IMF offered a similar appraisal, describing the
near-term growth outlook as “weakened” due to the combined impact of the
ongoing drought, political uncertainty surrounding the upcoming presiden-
tial elections (initially slated for April 2019, but now delayed by at least three
months), and continued violence.540 Accordingly, the IMF projected modest
2.3% growth in 2018, down 20 basis points from its previous projection of
2.5%.541 While the IMF expected a recovery in 2019 due to rebounding agri-
cultural output (with growth expected to jump to 3%), the IMF’s growth-rate
projections have been consistently revised downward, possibly reflecting
overly optimistic views of Afghanistan’s expected near-term economic per-
formance.542 Figure 3.45 presents IMF growth scenarios since early 2017.
FIGURE 3.45
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
July 2016 May 2017 November 2017 May 2018 November 2018
Note: The IMF conducts periodic reviews of Afghanistan's macroeconomic situation through its Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program. The figure above displays the IMF's real economic growth
projections for Afghanistan, as presented in five sequential reviews for, or under, its ECF arrangement. The ECF provides modest amounts of financing to the Afghan government in exchange
for implementing various reforms. The IMF generally enters into ECF arrangements with countries experiencing protracted balance of payment problems. Some ECF real growth projections
stopped short of 2022 or 2023. In those cases, the lines above terminate in the final year for which a projection was provided. For example, the ECF Request
(July 2016) projections terminated in 2021, with a projection of 6% real growth for that year. Growth rates for 2015–2017 are from the IMF’s fourth review under the ECF.
Source: IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The Arrangement,
11/20/2018, p. 24; IMF, Third Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement And Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, 5/9/2018, p. 24; IMF, Staff Report For The 2017
Article IV Consultation And Second Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, And Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, 11/21/2017, p. 36; IMF, First Review Under
The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement And Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, 5/8/2017, p. 26; IMF, Request For A Three-Year Arrangement Under The Extended Credit Facility,
7/1/2016, p. 27.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
THE OPIUM ECONOMY
Any presentation or analysis of Afghanistan’s economic output (and by
Balance of Payments (BOP): a record of extension its growth rate) without accounting for the opium trade pro-
transactions carrying economic value between vides an incomplete picture of the Afghan economy. By value, opium
the residents of one country and the rest of poppy is the most important crop in Afghanistan, generating between
the world. $4–6.5 billion of potential exports in 2017—the equivalent of 20–32% of
Afghanistan’s licit GDP—according to the United Nations Office on Drugs
Aggregate Demand: the total demand and Crime (UNODC).549
for all goods and services within an The drug trade’s impact on the political economy of Afghanistan has
individual economy. been deeply corrosive. Corruption associated with the opium economy
undermines state legitimacy and public institutions, particularly in the
Multiplier Effect: a phenomenon whereby
security and justice sectors.550 Opium production has also directly worked
a change or increase in a single economic
against security goals by financing insurgent groups.551
variable results in changes or increases to
numerous other variables. Nevertheless, from a purely economic perspective, it has also brought
significant benefits, supporting Afghanistan’s balance of payments and
Farm-Gate Price: the unit price of opium bolstering aggregate demand (although it does not directly contribute to
product available at farms at the time of Afghan government revenues).552 Additionally, from a livelihoods perspec-
harvest, which excludes value added by tive, opium-poppy cultivation can substantially impact rural households
transport and delivery. The total farm-gate through both employment and increased purchasing power.553 According to
value of opium is equal to national potential the UNODC, opium-poppy weeding and harvesting provided up to 354,000
production multiplied by the weighted average jobs in rural areas in 2017.554 In poppy-growing areas, opium has a strong
of farm-gate prices. multiplier effect, creating secondary jobs as farmers accrue capital to spend
on food, medical care, and other consumer products.555
Setting aside the various ways in which it undermines the Afghan state,
Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017 Cultivation the opium economy’s sheer size renders it highly relevant to assessments
and Production, 11/2017, p. 8; OECD, Glossary of Statistical
Terms, “Farm Gate Price,” 7/8/2005, https://stats.oecd.org/ of Afghanistan’s economic performance. However, the World Bank, IMF,
glossary/detail.asp?ID=940, accessed 1/24/2019; OECD,
Glossary of Statistical Terms, “Balance of Payments,” n.d., and others exclude the value of opium production from their reported GDP
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=940, accessed
1/24/2019; Investopedia, “Aggregate Demand,” 4/4/2018,
estimates, as SIGAR has reported previously.556 In contrast to these multi-
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/aggregatedemand.
asp, accessed 1/24/2019; Investopedia, “Multiplier,”
lateral institutions, since 2015–2016, Afghanistan’s National Statistics and
7/13/2018, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/multi- Information Authority (NSIA) has reported the country’s GDP and GDP
plier.asp, accessed 1/24/2019.
growth rates with two figures: one that includes, and one that excludes the
opium economy.557 Due to what the UNODC described as “record-high”
opium production in 2017, Afghanistan’s total economy, including the opium
sector, grew by a robust 7.2% in 2017, according to the NSIA, compared to
2.9% excluding opium.558 More or less in line with the NSIA’s licit growth
estimate for 2017, the IMF and the Bank reported that Afghanistan’s growth
rate in 2017 was 2.7%.559
With limited visibility into the opium sector, the NSIA appears to account
only for the farm-gate value of opium and therefore does not include the
The sun rises over a poppy field in Maywand District, Kandahar Province. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Daniel P. Shook)
TABLE 3.21
Source: IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The Arrangement,
11/20/2018, p. 23; NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2017–2018, p. 110; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security, 5/2018,
p. 14; NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2016–17, 5/10/2017, p. 163; NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2015–16, 5/31/2016, p. 139; SIGAR analysis.
SIGAR analysis showed that, despite these concerns, the Afghan gov-
ernment’s revenue performance remained strong in Fiscal Year (FY) 1397
(December 22, 2017–December 21, 2018). Aggregate domestic revenues
grew by approximately 9.3%, year-on-year, from FY 1396 (December 21,
2016–December 21, 2017) to FY 1397.569 Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance
(MOF) classifies domestic revenues into sustainable and one-off catego-
ries (see page 146 for definitions).570 In FY 1397, several large transfers of
funds to Afghanistan’s central bank, totaling AFN 7.9 billion (approximately
$106.8 million), were classified as one-off transfers.571
These transfers corresponded to domestic debt obligations incurred by
the MOF during the resolution of the Kabul Bank crisis and are scheduled
to be repaid in full by the end of 2019, according to the MOF.572 Following
the near-collapse of Kabul Bank and the withdrawal of approximately
$500 million from nervous depositors within the span of just a few days, the
Afghan government organized an $825 million bailout financed by central
bank reserves (for more on the Kabul Bank crisis, see pages 156–157 of this
section).573 The bailout was underwritten by the MOF, which incurred asso-
ciated repayment obligations to the central bank.574 The transfers reduced
aggregate revenues.575 It is not clear why the MOF accounts for such trans-
fers as revenues given that they appear to be essentially expenditures.
Because the transfers were categorized as one-offs, sustainable domestic
revenues (which do not include one-off transactions) grew by the higher
rate of 14.0%, year-on-year, from FY 1396–FY 1397.576
Both the aggregate and sustainable domestic revenue growth rates appear
to have recovered from nadirs in Month 8 of FY 1397.577 At this juncture,
aggregate revenue growth stood at just 2.6%, while sustainable revenue
growth was 6.5%.578 Total sustainable revenues through month 12 were 74.5%
higher than total sustainable revenues through Month 8.579 Improvements
to revenue gains in Months 9–12 of FY 1397 were driven primarily by a
substantial increase in unspecified “Other revenue” (also referred to as
“Miscellaneous” revenue), which accounted for 25.4% of the overall increase
in revenues in Months 9–12, compared to the total at the end of Month 8.
According to MOF officials, the “Miscellaneous” category is sometimes
used as a catch-all category for uncategorized revenues prior to the MOF’s
reconciliation.580 Other revenue categories with significant contributions
to the year-end sustainable revenue total, compared to the total at the end
of Month 8, were income taxes (which accounted for 14.9% of sustainable
revenue growth over the final four months of the year), customs duties and
import taxes (14.9%), sales taxes (13.3%), and administrative fees (11.2%).581
Expenditures, meanwhile, grew by 8.2%, driven primarily by increased
costs for the purchase and improvement of government assets, which
increased by 33.4%, year-on-year.582 Outlays for wages and salaries, which
rose by 5.3% year-on-year and were nearly 48% of total expenditures for
FY 1397 (consistent with recent trends), also contributed to the overall
TABLE 3.22
Note:
a Compensation of government employees.
b Includes: (1) payments to private firms in return for goods and/or services, and (2) payments to other government units or agencies in return for services performed.
c Includes: (1) expenditures made to entities in return for development assistance and promotional aid, or reimbursement for losses caused by equalization of commodity tariffs, price controls,
and other similar purposes that are not repayable; (2) grants to other government units for which unequal value is provided in return; and (3) social assistance benefits not covered by
social security.
d Expenditures related to the purchase, improvement, or construction of assets.
e Interest, principal payments, and fees related to government debt.
Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 1/8/2018; Government of Afghanistan, MOF, Chart of Account
Guide Fiscal Year: 1397, Version 1, “Object Exp Long Des,” 1/7/2018.
FIGURE 3.46 rise.583 Table 3.22 shows a comparison of expenditures for FY 1397, com-
pared to FY 1396.
AFGHANISTAN’S 2017/2018 YEAR-ON-YEAR
MERCHANDISE-EXPORT GROWTH Trade: Exports Have Grown but Air Exports
Have Been Subsidized
50% Afghanistan maintains a large licit merchandise-trade deficit, equivalent to
49.9
more than 30% of GDP, according to the IMF.584 Nonetheless, air exports
have been growing at a rapid rate. As SIGAR reported last quarter, exports
40%
by air rose from $230 million in 2015 to $391 million in 2017, according to
USAID—an increase of over 70%.585 USAID has heavily emphasized its sup-
port to Afghanistan’s recent surge in air exports: in January 2018, USAID
said exports were “set to soar” as a result of that support.586 Speaking at the
30%
inauguration of a new customs center at Hamid Karzai International Airport
in Kabul, Ambassador John Bass said the new infrastructure would help to
boost air exports and “give the world a different vision of Afghanistan and
20% its future.”587 Despite this promotion, however, the IMF said Afghanistan’s
18.2 trade deficit remained “very large,” noting that recent efforts to increase
exports did not yet appear to have had a material effect.588 In fact, the IMF
10% projected the trade deficit to rise substantially in 2018, from the equivalent
of 31.2% of GDP to 39.7% of GDP.589
Moreover, overall gains in Afghanistan’s exports appear to be slowing.
4.2
While SIGAR analysis of recent data from Afghanistan’s National Statistics
0%
Q1 Q2 Q3 and Information Authority showed that overall export growth over the first
nine months of 2018, year-on-year, stood at 18.5%, quarter-to-quarter growth
has slowed significantly, as Figure 3.46 shows.590 The total value of exports
Source: SIGAR analysis of NSIA quarterly and annual export
data, 2017–2018, accessed 9/25/2018 and 12/20/2018. through the first three quarters of 2018 was $581.2 million, while the total
TABLE 3.23
value of imports over the period was $5.5 billion, putting Afghanistan’s run-
ning nine-month 2018 trade deficit at $4.9 billion.591
Furthermore, based on discussions with both Afghan and USAID officials
in Kabul this quarter, Afghanistan’s air exports have been, and are currently
being, subsidized.592 According to State, those subsidies are substantial:
up to 90% for flights to India, 75% for flights to Europe, and up to 80% for
flights to other destinations.593 This means that seemingly encouraging
air export gains could be unsustainable and the net income to Afghans is
lower than export income would suggest. Table 3.23 shows an Afghanistan
Customs Department (ACD)-provided breakdown of air exports by destina- U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John
tion through October 2018. There appeared to be discrepancies between air Bass and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah
export figures provided by the ACD and those provided by USAID. SIGAR attend a January 2018 ribbon-cutting
aims to resolve these discrepancies in future quarters. ceremony for a one-stop customs facility at
Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.
(USAID photo)
Iran Sanctions Have been Fully Reimposed
but Afghanistan Granted Waivers
In May, President Donald J. Trump announced that the United States was
withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—more
commonly known as the “Iran nuclear deal” of 2015—that lifted sanctions
on Iran in return for Iran’s limiting its nuclear-power activity to ensure that
it is unable to produce nuclear weapons. According to Secretary of State
Michael R. Pompeo, the President withdrew from the Iran deal because it
failed to guarantee the safety of the American people.594
This quarter, the U.S. fully reimposed sanctions on Iran, targeting
more than 700 Iranian-linked individuals, entities, aircraft, and vessels.595
However, under a sanctions waiver granted under the Iran Freedom and
Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA), Afghanistan is permitted to
continue to import petroleum from Iran. A separate waiver granted under
IFCA provided an exemption for the development of the Chabahar Port in
southeastern Iran, including the construction of an associated railway.596
The Chabahar Port has been used to ship humanitarian goods, such as
approximately 5–6% of the country’s GDP at the time) rendered the scam
one of the largest banking catastrophes in the world, relative to GDP.610
The scandal involved an elaborate fraud and money-laundering scheme
orchestrated by Kabul Bank founder Sherkhan Farnood (who recently died
while serving time in Bagram Prison), chief executive officer Khalilullah
Ferozi, and other key shareholders and administrators. Years later, the
legacy of Kabul Bank remains a striking symbol of the extensive corrup-
tion and criminality that undermines the Afghan government’s legitimacy,
according to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).611 Every quar-
ter, SIGAR requests an update from relevant agencies on Kabul Bank
Receivership (KBR) efforts to recover funds stolen from the Kabul Bank.
The KBR was established to manage Kabul Bank’s bad assets.612
According to State, based on information provided by the KBR, some
progress on recoveries has been made since November 2018. Specifically,
as of December 15, $4 million had been collected since last quarter, includ-
ing $1.8 million in cash and $2.2 million in properties seized.613 However,
as of September 23, 2018, the KBR appeared to have already counted the
majority of these funds as recoveries in the form of collateralized loans.
Rather than adding to total recoveries, the “recoveries” reported by State
(which relies on the KBR for its figures) this quarter appear to simply
represent shifts of funds between recovery categories, as collateralized
assets already counted as “recovered” by the KBR were either sold or
seized by the Afghan government.614 Reflecting otherwise stagnant prog-
ress, total recoveries reported by the KBR increased by only $170,000 from
September 23, 2018–January 6, 2019.615 More than $535 million in missing
funds remain outstanding.616
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Given the centrality of USAID’s current objective to accelerate private-
sector driven, export-led growth, the agency’s Office of Economic Growth
(OEG) will play an important role in the agency’s Country Development
Cooperation Strategy (CDCS).617 Within the context of the new strategy,
OEG’s efforts will focus on:618
• supporting export-ready Afghan firms
• improving airport infrastructure to facilitate exports by air
• linking Afghan traders to new markets
As described on page 148, accelerating Afghanistan’s economic growth U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John
rate amid heightened uncertainty and ongoing conflict is likely to be Bass and Chief Executive Abdullah
Abdullah, among others, participate in
difficult. USAID has cumulatively disbursed over $1.2 billion for economic-
a lamp-lighting ceremony to kick off the
growth programs in Afghanistan.619 USAID’s active economic-growth USAID-sponsored Passage to Prosperity 2
programs have a total estimated cost of $119 million and can be found in trade show held in Mumbai, India, on
Table 3.24. September 12–15, 2018. (USAID photo)
TABLE 3.24
current regulatory regime took effect, the Taliban and various criminal net-
works control other sites.623
sample of 41 indicators that collectively cover the 10 results of the business-regulation reforms captured by
topics presented above.656 An economy’s aggregate the report is mixed and suggestive at best. Correlations
score is referred to as the “distance to the frontier” between the report’s topics and developmental out-
score.657 Each indicator is normalized using the “worst” comes often do point to a negative association between
and “best” performance for a five-year period.658 the regulatory burden and economic development and
Assuming that no measures or indicators are added, this growth. However, such correlations do not justify a
helps ensure some degree of data consistency across causal interpretation.”664
time. This is why the World Bank considers score This is because, by the World Bank’s own admission,
changes to be absolute, rather than relative, measures the rankings do not capture a variety of measures that
of reform. significantly affect the business climate. According to
the Bank, one of the most common misconceptions
What the Doing Business Report doesn’t measure. about the Doing Business report is that the rankings
The Doing Business report assesses and bench- reflect a comprehensive measure of the business cli-
marks domestic regulatory environments against one mate. However, the rankings overtly omit a wide range
another.659 While the report assumes that effective and of factors relevant to firms—particularly those operat-
efficient business regulation is an important input to ing in frontier markets like Afghanistan. For example,
economic prosperity, it does not measure actual busi- the report does not address macroeconomic stability,
ness activity.660 Consequently, improvements in the security, corruption, human capital, the strength of an
rankings may not necessarily reflect the expectation of economy’s financial system, or the underlying quality of
improved economic performance, particularly in the infrastructure or institutions.665 In other words, the rank-
short and mid-term. ings represent only one, arguably small, lens through
China and India—both “top-improvers” according to which to analyze the business environment in many, if
the 2019 Doing Business report—are good examples of not most, of the compared economies.
this phenomenon. According to the most recent report,
China increased the efficiency of its business processes. Which reforms drove Afghanistan’s improved per-
However, by the Bank’s own analysis, the country’s formance in the latest report? Some of the reforms
real economic growth rate is expected to continue to listed on the previous page appear to have had an out-
slow over the course of the next few years.661 Likewise, sized effect on Afghanistan’s aggregate Doing Business
India is listed as a top improver by the Bank. Yet, again ranking. For example, Afghanistan’s score on the pro-
according to the Bank’s own analysis, India’s real eco- tecting minority investors measure jumped by nearly 62
nomic growth rate is expected to remain more or less points—or more than six times its 2018 score—due to
unchanged through 2020.662 passage of the new limited liability company law. This
Even significant improvements in the rankings, resulted in a ranking bump of 163 places on the measure
therefore, are not necessarily correlated with growth (economies are ranked against one another for each
expectations. A country can simultaneously improve in individual measure in addition to the aggregate score).666
the rankings and be expected to underperform economi- Reforms related to the new insolvency law, meanwhile,
cally, relative to prior years. The regulatory environment resulted in a nearly 30-point—or 119%—increase in
measured by the report is but one factor among many Afghanistan’s score on the resolving insolvency mea-
that determines the performance of an economy’s pri- sure, shifting Afghanistan up 87 places in the rankings.667
vate sector. Finally, by lowering the cost of starting a business from
Along these lines, a 2013 external panel review of 82.3% of income per capita to 6.4% of income per capita,
the Doing Business report expressed concerns that Afghanistan increased its score for starting a business
the report had “the potential to be misinterpreted.”663 by nearly eight points—or 9%—resulting in a ranking
According to the review, “Empirical evidence on the bump for the measure of 58 places.668
TABLE 3.25
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform, 10/31/2018, p. 152; World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs, 10/31/2017, p. 142.
Changes on other measures were less significant: performance. By the World Bank’s own admission,
while Afghanistan did notch a 12-point—or 53%— the report does not address a variety of factors that
score increase on the dealing with construction have substantial effects on the business environ-
permits measure by, among other changes, dramati- ment in Afghanistan, such as security, corruption,
cally decreasing the amount of time required to obtain and the underlying quality of the country’s institu-
a construction permit, this improvement was insuffi- tions.670 Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s jump in the
cient to offset advances made across other economies rankings is not without at least some significance. In
for the measure’s rankings.669 Table 3.25 presents the past, SIGAR has used Afghanistan’s performance
a comparison of Afghanistan’s performance on the on the Doing Business measures to underscore
Doing Business measures in 2018 and 2019. the challenges of the country’s business climate.671
Afghanistan’s improvement is a positive develop-
Conclusion. The numerous limitations of the Doing ment. However, it seems unlikely that the jump in
Business rankings render them an incomplete mea- the rankings will spur much, if any, near- or mid-term
sure for Afghanistan’s current and future economic economic growth.
based in Guernsey in the Channel Islands of the UK, owns 24.5% of the
Badakhshan concession and 49.9% of the Balkhab project.672 The October 5,
2018, signing ceremony for the contracts, at which representatives from
Centar Ltd. were present, occurred in the United States at the Afghan
embassy in Washington, DC.673 Nevertheless, while there is a Delaware-
registered limited liability company doing business under the name “Centar
American LLC Mining Services Company,” without further information,
SIGAR cannot confirm that this company is related to Centar Ltd.674
At this stage, SIGAR has drawn no conclusions regarding the legality or
ownership of these two contracts. SIGAR will examine the contracts and
other matters through an ongoing audit assessing the Afghan government’s
progress in implementing its anticorruption strategy.
TABLE 3.26
TABLE 3.27
EDUCATION
Decades of intermittent conflict had devastated Afghanistan’s education The Taliban periodically disrupt the
system prior to the U.S.-led military intervention of 2001. While the war education system in Afghanistan. However,
continues, donors have generally highlighted Afghanistan’s progress in the unverified reports paint a more complicated
education sector as a significant success story.715 However, given poor data portrait of negotiation and compromise
quality, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of that success. Figures for between the Afghan government and its
adversary. For example, according to the
the number of children and youth in school vary widely.716 Afghanistan’s
Afghanistan Analysts Network, a district
Ministry of Education counts students who have been absent for up to
education director in Obeh District, Herat
three years as enrolled because, it says, they might return to school.717
Province, was able to keep his job even
This treatment limits the usefulness of government data to determine after alleged involvement in corruption
attendance rates. because he was seen as a key official able
Numerous challenges plague the education sector. They include insecu- to work and deal with the Taliban to keep
rity, shortages of school buildings and textbooks, rural access issues, poor schools running.
data reliability, and the alleged appointment of teachers on the basis of cro- Source: Pajhwok Afghan News, “Taliban shut 39 schools in
nyism and bribery.718 Logar,” 7/7/2018; UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for international peace and security, report of the
USAID, which aims to improve access to and quality of education in Secretary-General, 9/10/2018, p. 8; Afghanistan Analysts
Network, “One Land, Two Rules (2): Delivering public ser-
Afghanistan, as well as build capacity at the MOE, has disbursed more than vices in insurgency-affected Obeh District of Herat Province,”
12/9/2018.
$1 billion for education programs in Afghanistan, as of January 12, 2019.719
USAID’s active education programs have a total estimated cost of $500 mil-
lion and can be found in Table 3.28.
TABLE 3.28
TABLE 3.29
Source: SIGAR analysis of Government of Afghanistan, NSIA, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016–17, 8/29/2018,
p. 144; SIGAR analysis of Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Number of Deaths: Afghanistan,” http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/700,
downloaded 12/23/2018.
FIGURE 3.47
15.0–29.9
30.0–44.9
45.0–59.9
60.0–74.9
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
AVERAGE VIOLENCE RANK FOR PROVINCES WITHIN EACH NAR RANGE (OUT OF 34 PROVINCES)
Note: Figure displays the average rank for level of violence (measured by deaths per 1,000 people, with provinces ranked
from highest to lowest) for provinces with a girls' primary-school net attendance rate (NAR) falling within a specified range.
The NAR expresses the number of students attending school within a given age cohort as a percentage of the estimated
total number of children in the same age cohort. Provinces ranked using population estimates from Afghanistan's National
Statistics and Information Authority and the number of deaths due to violence recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) during the 2016–2017 Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey period (April 2016–March 2017). To capture
violence concentration, provinces were ranked by the number of deaths per 1,000 people rather than the total number of
deaths. UCDP collects and aggregates data on organized violence. It is housed in Sweden's Uppsala University.
Source: SIGAR analysis of Government of Afghanistan, NSIA, Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey 2016-17, 8/29/2018,
pp. 142, 144; SIGAR analysis of Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Number of Deaths: Afghanistan,”
http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/700, downloaded 12/23/2018.
in Afghanistan.745 USAID told SIGAR this quarter that it only tracks girls’
education and other outcomes within the context of its own programming
in Afghanistan.746
Although USAID does contribute to the World Bank-administered
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which provides substan-
tial assistance to Afghanistan’s education sector, even the ARTF’s recently
ended $408 million flagship education project—the Second Education
Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP II)—failed to meet every one of
its grade-level targets for the ratio of girls to boys in school, as well as its
target for overall girls’ enrollment.747 Although overall girls’ enrollment did
increase by 1.5 million students from 2008–2017, this was achieved over the
course of about a decade, the first part of which coincided with an increas-
ing U.S. foreign policy focus on Afghanistan that saw international troop
levels in the country rise considerably.748
EQUIP II’s completion and results report, published by the Bank in
July 2018, noted, “by 2011, economic and social progress began to slow
down with the withdrawal of international security forces.”749 Consequently,
it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the increased troop presence from
effects attributable to EQUIP II alone. Deteriorating (or statistically stagnat-
ing) enrollment ratios for girls reflected in the 2016–2017 ALCS, compared
to the results of the 2013–2014 survey that was conducted in the midst of
the international troop drawdown, could be interpreted to mean that secu-
rity is a prerequisite for effective girls’ education programming. Another
possible explanation, advanced by the NSIA, is that improvements to edu-
cation have increasingly marginal impact given rapid improvement from a
very low base.750 The NSIA also hypothesized that it may be “difficult—if
not impossible with available resources” for the education system to keep
pace with the “ever-increasing” number of children entering school age.751
USAID’s recent assistance agreement with the Afghan government, signed
in September 2018, said the agency’s education activities would aim to build
on gains in the sector and to decrease the number of out-of-school children,
especially girls.752 Recent trends raise questions about the agency’s capacity
to achieve this aspiration.
USAID told SIGAR this quarter that it does not operate in areas con-
trolled by the Taliban and that its implementing partners deal with the
Taliban only “on the margins.”753 Given the strength of the insurgency, ris-
ing numbers of school-age children, and stagnant improvement to Afghan
government district and population control over the last year and a half, the
future of girls’ education in Afghanistan is very much uncertain.754
HEALTH
Despite Afghanistan’s lack of security, the country’s health outcomes have
improved since 2001. Nevertheless, due to fairly serious data limitations,
TABLE 3.30
COUNTERNARCOTICS CONTENTS
COUNTERNARCOTICS
KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) will likely be disbanded,
according to the State Department. President Ashraf Ghani announced his
intention in November 2018 to consolidate several ministries. State pre-
dicted that consolidating MCN’s responsibilities into the other ministries
should have minimal effect on programs.776
After years developing a stand-alone counternarcotics strategy, the
U.S. government has abandoned that endeavor. State informed SIGAR
last quarter that U.S. counternarcotics efforts are now interwoven into
the Administration’s South Asia strategy.777 SIGAR is concerned about the
impact of MCN’s dissolution on counternarcotics programs and the lack of
a stand-alone U.S. government counternarcotics strategy.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released
its annual Afghanistan opium survey in November 2018. The area under
poppy cultivation decreased 20% from 2017 levels to 263,000 hectares due
to a prolonged drought and significantly lower market prices following
2017’s record crop. The 2018 result was still the second-highest measure-
ment since UNODC began monitoring the country’s opium poppy in 1994.
Potential opium production decreased 29% in 2018 to 6,400 tons as a result
of decreases in area under poppy cultivation and opium yield per hectare.778
Opium-poppy cultivation and production decreases do not stem from
law-enforcement activity. Despite interdictions, arrests, prosecutions and
narcotic seizures, the cumulative opium seizures for the past decade are
equivalent to merely 7.5% of 2018’s total opium production as reported by
UNODC.779 While the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC)’s convic-
tion rate exceeds 90%, the CNJC has not prosecuted high-level individuals;
the majority of its cases focus on poor, low-level offenders who are caught
transporting drugs.780
Precursor chemical: a substance that may
Between October 1 and December 20, 2018, DOD reported seizures of be used in the production, manufacture,
626 kilograms (kg) of opium, 7 kg of morphine, 1,442 kg of heroin, 2,742 kg and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and
of hashish, and 1,040 kg of precursor chemicals. A kilogram is about psychotropic substances.
2.2 pounds. Afghan specialized units conducted 20 operations, compared to
24 operations reported last quarter.781
USFOR-A carries out interdiction missions against drug-trade-related
Source: UNODC, Multilingual Dictionary of Precursors and
targets as part of a broader counterthreat finance (CTF) campaign targeting Chemicals, 2008, viii.
insurgents’ revenue generation.782 DOD does not consider its CTF cam-
paign part of the counternarcotics mission in the country.783 Between July 1
and September 30, Coalition forces struck 62 targets, including 34 narcot-
ics production facilities. The bombing campaign against those revenue
streams seems to have abated this quarter. Only two targets were struck
by Coalition forces between October 1 and December 20.784 According
to USFOR-A, the campaign remains effective at destroying the enemy’s
resources, causing it to make tactical changes to avoid strikes.785
According to DOD, operations targeting narcotics have denied an
estimated $200 million to those involved in the illegal drug trade in
Afghanistan, including more than $42 million to the Taliban specifically.786
DOD uses estimated amounts because, as DOD officials have stated in
multiple press briefings, no ground verification takes place to weigh and
assess the amounts of the precursors or products actually destroyed
by a strike. According to DOD, the numbers represent a sufficient and
consistent measure of performance (not effect, which is measured in intel-
ligence reports).787 Prior quarterly reports have raised SIGAR’s concerns
about DOD’s methodology regarding the campaign’s financial impact
on drug trafficking organizations resources and the potential risk to
civilian populations.788
FIGURE 3.48
25%
20
15
10
0
Afghan Afghan Contested Insurgent High
government government activity insurgent
control influence activity
FIGURE 3.49
planted with opium poppy during the 2018 opium-poppy season. In contrast,
only about 1% of the agricultural area in government-controlled districts
was sown with opium poppy during the same time period. The remaining
control types (insurgent activity, 9%; contested, 4%; and government-influ-
enced, 4%) fall between these two extremes.819
In short, the agricultural economy in high insurgent activity districts is
about 21 times more specialized in opium-poppy cultivation than in govern-
ment-controlled districts. The cause of this difference is unknown, but likely
factors may include security or governance tactics used on all sides, the more
rural character of insurgent districts, and varying types of control along the
opium-supply chain (opium-poppy cultivation versus opium export).820
The map in Figure 3.49 on page 185, illustrates the intensity of opium-
poppy cultivation overlaid on RS’s district control assessment as of
October 22, 2018. Among the 60 districts in the highest-intensity category, 21
are assessed as being under government control or influence (for instance
Chahar Burjak, Tirin Kot, Zharey, Darah-ye-Nur, and Shinwar), 21 are con-
tested districts, and 17 are under insurgent activity or high-activity (for
instance Dishu, Musa Qalah, Kajaki, Sangin, and Now Zad).821
The medium-intensity category includes 59 districts with 32 under gov-
ernment control or influence, 20 contested, and seven under insurgent
activity or high-activity. Districts in the low-intensity grouping include 33
under government control or influence, 19 contested, and seven under
insurgent activity or high-activity. The final category of poppy-free districts
includes 230 districts, of which 133 are under government control or influ-
ence, 19 under insurgent activity or high-activity, and 78 are contested.822
CT missions have dominated.835 DOD reported last year that the majority
of SMW missions were counterterrorism operations between December 1,
2017, and May 31, 2018.836 Of the 1,202 SMW missions flown between June 1
and November 30, 2018, DOD reported that 3.7% supported counternarcotics
operations while 77.2% supported CT efforts.837 The reported mismanage-
ment of SMW assets has also been a continuing problem. According to RS’
concept of employment, SMW misuse occurs when officials do not follow
the approval process or use assets without appropriate execution planning
time, use assets for civilian movements, or evacuate other forces than the
Afghan special security forces. CSTC-A began enforcing penalties for mis-
use in August. Fines increased to $150,000 per Mi-17 flight hour and $60,000
per PC-12 flight hour in September 2018. According to DOD, the penalties
were effective in the near term since SMW misuse decreased in September.
CSTC-A fines totaled $582,306 from June 1 through November 30, 2018.838
More information on the SMW is available in the Security section on page 95.
Interdiction Results
During the first quarter of FY 2019, most interdiction activities took place
in the capital and eastern regions of the country. These activities include
routine patrols, vehicle searches, and arrests. Afghan forces performed
operations between October 1 and December 20 resulting in 34 detentions
and the following seizures:842
• 626 kg of opium
• 7 kg of morphine
• 1,442 kg of heroin
• 2,742 kg of hashish
• 1,040 kg of chemicals
Both INL and DOD said the poor security situation in Afghanistan hin-
ders the access of government forces to extensive areas where opium is
TABLE 3.31
Note: The significant difference in precursor chemicals total seizures between 2014 and 2015 is due to a 12/22/2014 seizure of 135,000 kg of precursor chemicals.
1 Results for period 10/1/2018–12/20/2018.
2 The following FY 2008 results included in the total are not indicated in the table: 136 operations; 49 detainees; 241,353 kg of hash; 277 kg of heroin; 409 kg of morphine; 15,361 kg of
opium; 4,709 kg of precursor chemicals.
Source: DOD CD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/29/2015, 7/20/2017, and 12/21/2018.
Eradication Results
Governor-Led Eradication
Under the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program, INL reimburses
provincial governors $250 toward the eradication costs of every UNODC-
verified hectare of eradicated poppy.854 INL has obligated and disbursed
$6.9 million since the program’s inception in 2008.855
UNODC reported the eradication of 406 hectares during 2018, a 46%
decrease from 2017. Eradication took place in Kunar, Nangarhar, Kandahar,
and Badakhshan Provinces. No eradication has taken place in Helmand, the
highest poppy-cultivating province, since 2016.856
INL informed SIGAR last quarter it had provided $75,000 in advance
payments to MCN in support of eradication activities in Kunar, Nangarhar,
Laghman, Kabul, Kapisa, Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, Badakhshan,
Herat, and Badghis Provinces. INL will provide funding for the verified hect-
ares of poppy eradicated in 2018, net of advance payments.
According to INL, the MCN has not produced a final eradication strategy
containing provincial targets for 2019.857
As Figure 3.50 illustrates, eradication efforts have had minimal impact on
curbing opium-poppy cultivation. Since 2008, on average, annual eradica-
tion results represent 2% of the total yearly opium-cultivation total.858
FIGURE 3.50
HECTARES TONS
350,000 10,000
280,000 8,000
210,000 6,000
140,000 4,000
70,000 2,000
0 0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, 5/2016, Annex, vii, ix, xii; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, pp. 5, 61–68.
INL also provided $355,271 to UNODC’s Preventing Illicit Drug Use and
Treating Drug Use Disorders for Children and Adolescents program.880
INL has developed a software tool to monitor inventory and procurement
at INL-funded drug treatment centers (DTC). In September, INL used the
tool to monitor DTCs in Kabul. According to INL, no significant issues have
been revealed to date.881
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Afghanistan experienced a nationwide drought which impacted not only
opium-cultivation yields but some alternative livelihood programs as
well.882 According to the UN, the drought affected 229 of 401 districts as of
October 31 and displaced over a quarter-million people from rural to urban
areas.883 U.S.-funded programs are listed in the following Table 3.32 on
page 194.
TABLE 3.32
Source: USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019; State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP), Quarterly
Report, January–March 2018, 2018, p. 1; USAID, Promoting Value Chains—Western Afghanistan, Semi-Annual Progress Report, September 20, 2017 to March 31, 2018, 5/29/2018, i; USAID, Regional
Agricultural Development Program—East (RADP-E), Quarterly Report FY 2018, Quarter 3 (April−June, 2018), 7/30/2018, p. 3; USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program—East (RADP-E), Activity
Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, FY 2018, 1/20/2018, p. 1; USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)—North , FY 2018, Quarter 3 (April−June, 2018), 7/31/2018, p. 8.
TABLE 3.33
To mitigate the effects of this year’s drought, UNDP has prioritized water-
conservation trainings and increased projects related to irrigation primarily
in drought-affected provinces such as Badghis. CBARD projects will irrigate
approximately 4,000 hectares of land.892 Table 3.33 provides the funding
amounts and project duration dates. All funds have been disbursed.
CBARD-West
Value chain: the range of goods and CBARD-West introduces and strengthens community-based local pro-
services necessary for an agricultural duction and marketing of traditional high-value crops in 70 communities
product to move from the farm to the final of Farah and Badghis Provinces. The project aims to directly benefit an
customer or consumer. It encompasses estimated 33,240 households. In addition to supporting local farmers with
the provision of inputs, actual on-farm field schools, CBARD-West will develop and strengthen existing public and
production, post-harvest storage and private agribusiness infrastructure in the areas of irrigation, transportation,
processing, marketing, transportation, and and agricultural value-chain facilities.893
wholesale and retail sales.
As of September 2018, CBARD-West achieved the following in Badghis
and Farah Provinces: 20 raisin houses, 165 greenhouses, 110 micro green-
Micro greenhouses: 60 square meters
and given primarily to women for houses, 24 irrigation projects, and 10 cold-storage facilities.894
income diversification and production
at the household level. They are often CBARD-East
close to the homes to allow access CBARD-East introduces and strengthens community-based local produc-
for women and produce seedlings for tion and marketing of traditional high-value crops in 100 communities of
commercial greenhouses. Nangarhar Province. The program started in January 2018 and will assess
alternative livelihoods in communities with high rates of opium cultivation.
It aims to directly benefit an estimated 28,500 households. CBARD-East sup-
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2015; State,
ports local farmers with field schools, and strengthens public and private
INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019. agribusiness infrastructures such as value-chain facilities, irrigation, and
transportation. As of June 2018, CBARD-East has established 46 hectares of
orchards, begun construction of 195 greenhouses, trained women in kitchen
gardening, and identified 16 additional crop-irrigation projects. An esti-
mated 1,900 hectares will be irrigated; approximately 13,450 households are
expected to benefit from these infrastructures.895
The program prioritized recruiting female staff and highly encouraged
female applicants to apply for positions. However, due to the remoteness
The first year of the project, which launched in January 2018, targeted
Herat Province. The project will expand to Badghis, Farah, and Nimroz
Provinces in 2019. Sixteen project districts were identified based on the
presence of production and processing facilities for targeted crops, acces-
sibility, and security. Nearly 120 beneficiaries such as suppliers, service
providers, and associations were selected during the first year.909
Private-sector beneficiaries participate in a project innovation fund
(PIF). The PIF is a source of co-financing for selected agribusinesses and
enterprises. USAID hopes to stimulate investments in private agribusinesses
that develop and promote new markets and sales for agricultural inputs,
wheat, high-value crops, and dairy products. The PIF intends to improve
business performance by addressing some of the key barriers to produc-
tion and marketing, as well as support farmer and producer groups in
adopting and using new technologies and equipment.910 The initial group of
companies were approved for the first round of PIF implementation during
the second half of 2018. Proposals from another group were conditionally
approved and will likely be accepted for the second round.911
As of January 12, 2019, USAID has disbursed $3.6 million.912
chain, marketing, and export promotion of Afghan fruits and nuts. CHAMP
supports traders through its trade offices in India, United Arab Emirates, and
Kazakhstan to boost Afghan agricultural exports.913 USAID increased the pro-
gram’s contract from $56.3 million to $71.3 million in May 2018.914
As of September 2018, CHAMP has exported 92,000 tons of produce val-
ued at $125 million to markets in Pakistan, India, the United Arab Emirates,
Canada, and Russia. The program has trained 113,000 farmers, constructed
230 storage facilities, such as cool rooms and raisin drying facilities, and
planted 2.85 million saplings. During the last quarter of FY 2018, CHAMP’s
support of agribusinesses attending the Passage to Prosperity in Mumbai
and the Indian Trade Mission event in New Delhi resulted in $152 million in
signed and potential contracts. The Almaty Trade Office facilitated the ship-
ment of fruits to the Kazakh market and hosted the minister of Agriculture,
Irrigation, and Livestock, resulting in the permanent lowering of the cus-
toms tax from 10–15% to 5%.915
USAID has disbursed $59.7 million to date as of January 12, 2019.916
TABLE 3.35
Note: * Denotes inactive programs. Afghanistan Value Chains—Crops and Afghanistan Value Chains—Livestock target the
regions previously served by the inactive RADP programs.
RADP-East
The five-year, $28.1 million RADP-East program seeks to expand sustain-
able economic growth through the agriculture sector in eight provinces:
Ghazni, Kapisa, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Wardak, and Kabul.
Its goal is to increase the sale of agricultural goods by at least $57 million by
the end of the program in July 2021.919 Some of the program’s achievements
to date are:920
• national sales of targeted commodities valued at $8.5 million
• over 5,600 individuals receiving short-term agriculture sector
productivity or food security training
• 232 agro-enterprises and new businesses created and/or benefitting
from the project
• 22% of the program participants were female, a result of a U.S.
government-assisted program designed to increase access to productive
economic resources (assets, credit, income or employment)
USAID has spent $10.4 million as of January 12, 2019.921
RADP-North
RADP-North extends food and economic security for rural Afghans of six
provinces: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Kunduz, and Samangan.
Activities strengthen farmers’ capacity through improved production in the
wheat, high-value crop, and livestock value chains.922 The $78.4 million five-
year program is in its final year.923
In October, laser-land-leveling (LLL) operators conducted 25 demonstra-
tion field days to 721 farmers in Balkh and Jowzjan Provinces. Three of the
project’s LLL operators leveled 69.4 jeribs (one hectare equals five jeribs)
for seven farmers generating AFN 209,500 ($2,831) in revenue.924
In November, RADP-North cultivated plots in 70 villages and distributed
and sold wheat seeds to farmers. The program also conducted hygiene and
nutrition training for 500 women in Balkh, Jowzjan, and Samangan. Laser-
land-leveling operators levelled 305 jeribs of land which generated AFN
847,600 ($12,465) in revenue. RADP-North supported nine agribusinesses
at the WorldFood India trade show. Their attendance generated signed
contracts valued at $1.6 million.925 Paravets trained 200 women and 400
men on livestock deworming in five provinces. Additional urea treatment
Paraveterinarian or paravet: a training for 950 beneficiaries (800 men and 150 women) took place in Balkh,
community-based animal health worker Jowzjan, and Samangan.926
who provides initial diagnosis and basic At the Kabul Ag-Fair, held October 3–5, 2018, the program supported
treatment of animals. the participation of 11 agribusinesses. The companies reported confirmed
sales of $8,570, with additional deals for subsequent delivery of $27,255. The
11 companies also reported potential deals worth $296,232.
RADP-N provided support to four agribusinesses to participate at the
Source: A. Catley, T. Leyland, et al., “Para-veterinary profes-
sionals and the development of quality, self-sustaining WorldFood Kazakhstan trade show held October 31 through November 2,
community-based services,” Revue scientifique et technique
(International Office of Epizootics), 2004, p. 225. 2018. The participating companies generated confirmed sales of $2,963,100
for dried fruit and nut products. The trade show also helped the agribusi-
nesses establish networks with other international buyers and conduct 28
business-to-business meetings.927 SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDIT
As of January 12, 2019, USAID has disbursed $61.5 million.928 SIGAR announced a financial audit
of USAID’s RADP-South program in
Kandahar Food Zone October 2018. SIGAR will examine
The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) concluded August 30, 2018. The five-year, the $63.2 million-contract with
$45.4 million program sought to address the drivers of poppy cultivation. Chemonics International Inc. for costs
In the early years of the program, KFZ collaborated closely with the MCN incurred during the January 1, 2016 to
and conducted capacity building trainings for the ministry in its Kabul and November 20, 2017.
Kandahar offices. The program also conducted assessments, planned canal
rehabilitations to increase access to affordable irrigation water, and imple-
mented vocational trainings tied to alternative development.
Seven districts were targeted at the start of the program in 2013, but in
the final year activities were limited to Panjwai and Zharey Districts.929 A
mid-term evaluation of the program recommended changing KFZ’s scope,
timeframe (it was initially a two-year program), and funding. The evalua-
tion found that KFZ was not adequately funded to address the drivers of
poppy cultivation in each district and recommended concentrating on two
FIGURE 3.51
KANDAHAR FOOD ZONE YEARLY TARGETED-DISTRICT OPIUM-CULTIVATION RESULTS KANDAHAR FOOD ZONE YEARLY SPENDING
(HECTARES) ($ MILLIONS)
18,000 $15
6,000
0
13 14 15 16 17 18
3,000
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019; USAID, Kandahar Food Zone Mid-term Performance Evaluation,
3/2015, pp. 1–4; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production, 11/2018, Annex I, p. 65.
TABLE 3.36
Agriculture Development
Number of hectares of improved high-value crops 542 349 1.4 893 850
Number of farmers receiving public/private-sector training 2,583 715 1,585 5,660 4,364
Number of farmers and others who have applied new technologies or
management practices as a result of 2,583 1,023 1,988 6,392 5,373
U.S. government assistance
Number of AD projects designed/implemented for women 2 6 4 19 14
Number of hectares of perennial crops rehabilitated 542 349 1.4 893 850
Source: USAID, KFZ Annual Report—Year 1, 31 July 2013–30 September 2014, 9/30/2014, pp. 3, 9–10; USAID, KFZ Annual Report—Year 2, 1 August 2014–31 August 2015, 9/30/2015, pp.
12–13; USAID, KFZ Quarterly Progress Report, Q4 FY2017, July 1–September 30, 2017, 10/31/2017, pp. 10–11; USAID, KFZ, Annual Report—Year 2, 1 August 2014–31 August 2015, 9/30/2015;
USAID, KFZ Quarterly Progress Report, Q4 FY 2018, July 1–August 30, 2018, 2018, pp. 6–8; USAID, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) Program, Year 3 Annual Report (31 August 2015–30 September 2016),
10/30/2016, pp. 8–13; USAID, Kandahar Food Zone Mid-term Performance Evaluation, 3/2015, pp. 1–3.
districts annually for the KFZ model to produce higher returns.930 According
to USAID, canal rehabilitation and improvements had significant impact
on the cultivation of previously unproductive farmland in Panjwai. In
Zharey, which has more water, the program increased the number of new
farm households.931
KFZ’s office in Kandahar closed on May 30, 2018. During July and August
2018, KFZ conducted the final inspections of the Salihan canal rehabilitation
in Panjwai and monitored the rising sales of high-value crops it attributed to
its interventions.932
As of August 30, 2018, KFZ had met, nearly met, or exceeded all but one
of available program indicators. Some indicators are shown in Table 3.36.
Nearly 6,400 households benefitted from program interventions in the
targeted areas, exceeding the 5,373 target. Approximately 900 hectares of
perennial crops were rehabilitated and 400 hectares are under cultivation
of high-value crops because of U.S. government assistance. KFZ completed
34 irrigation-canal and drainage-ditch rehabilitations. According to USAID,
the value of agricultural goods shipped for exports is $7.4 million, and KFZ
enabled the creation of 1,500 full-time jobs.933
Though all but one of its performance metrics have been met, the five-
year program delivered mixed results in curbing opium-poppy cultivation
in the targeted districts. As shown in Figure 3.51 on page 201, cultivation
levels in Zharey and Panjwai decreased significantly in 2015 from the 2014
levels: Panjwai experienced a 48% decrease from its 2014 total and Zharey
a 4% decrease. Poppy cultivation levels continued to fall in 2016 but levels
increased once more in 2017—a 37% increase for Panjwai and a 44% rise
for Zharey. Levels fell again in 2018. USAID spent more than $45.2 million
for the program. At its conclusion, poppy cultivation levels are 72% higher
in 2018 for Panjwai than its initial 2013 benchmark (984 hectares) and 27%
higher for Zharey (7,017 hectares).934
KFZ did not meet the $1.3 million value goal of national sales for targeted
commodities: over the life of the program, national sales totaled $273,972.
USAID did not approve a cold-storage promotion program proposed by the
implementing partner to help increase sales in national markets.935
As of December 31, 2018, USAID has disbursed $45.2 million.936
205
OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT
TABLE 4.1
RECENTLY COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018
Agency Report Number Date Issued Report Title
State OIG ISP-I-19-11 10/25/2018 Inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Foreign Assistance Program
State OIG ISP-I-19-12 10/30/2018
Management
Afghanistan Security: Some Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces’ Capabilities, but Actions
GAO GAO-19-116 10/15/2018
Needed to Enhance DOD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment
Security Force Assistance: U.S. Advising of Afghan National Army Has Expanded since 2015, and the
GAO GAO-19-251R 12/19/2018
U.S. Army Has Deployed a New Advising Unit
GAO GAO-19-39C 12/20/2018 DOD Vendor Vetting
Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; USAID OIG, response to
SIGAR data call, 12/19/2018; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/18/2018.
and timely. The report also reviews the appeals processes available to ven-
dors and discusses the challenges DOD faces regarding vendor vetting.
TABLE 4.2
Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; USAID OIG, response to
SIGAR data call, 12/19/2018; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/18/2018.
training contracts awarded under ASFF, citing recent reports from both
SIGAR and other auditing agencies that found deficiencies that resulted in
tens of millions of dollars potentially lost to fraud, waste, and abuse.
GAO will review DOD’s Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF)
Training Contracts to include researchable questions on the budgets, fund-
ing sources and transactions for all ASFF Training Contracts during FY
2017–2019 and the extent to which DOD has processes and procedures to
ensure that ASFF training contracts’ pricing and costs are reasonable.
Appendix A 218
Appendix B 224
Appendix C 226
Appendix D 231
Appendix E 237
Appendix F 240
Appendix G 251
Appendix H 252
Endnotes 259
217
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
This appendix cross-references the sections of this report to the quarterly
reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), and to the semiannual reporting requirements
prescribed for inspectors general more generally under the Inspector
General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2) and the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91,
§1521. (Table A.3)
TABLE A.1
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Purpose
Section 1229(a)(3) To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping Ongoing; quarterly report Full report
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations and the necessity
for and progress on corrective action
Supervision
Section 1229(e)(1) The Inspector General shall report directly Report to the Secretary of State Full report
to, and be under the general supervision and the Secretary of Defense
of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
Duties
Section 1229(f)(1) OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION — Review appropriated/ Full report
It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, available funds
and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment,
handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise Review programs, operations,
made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and of the contracts using appropriated/
programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such available funds
funds, including subsections (A) through (G) below
Section 1229(f)(1)(A) The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of Review obligations and SIGAR Oversight
such funds expenditures of appropriated/ Funding
available funds
Section 1229(f)(1)(B) The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by Review reconstruction activities SIGAR Oversight
such funds funded by appropriations and
donations
Section 1229(f)(1)(C) The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds Review contracts using Note
appropriated and available
funds
Section 1229(f)(1)(D) The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and Review internal and external Appendix B
associated information between and among departments, transfers of appropriated/
agencies, and entities of the United States, and private and available funds
nongovernmental entities
Continued on the next page
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Section 1229(f)(1)(E) The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate Maintain audit records SIGAR Oversight
future audits and investigations of the use of such fund[s] Appendix C
Appendix D
Section 1229(f)(1)(F) The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States Monitoring and review Audits
coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor as described
countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and
the Afghanistan National Development Strategy
Section 1229(f)(1)(G) The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments Conduct and reporting of Investigations
or duplicate billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions investigations as described
of Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated entities, and the
referral of such reports, as necessary, to the Department of Justice
to ensure further investigations, prosecutions, recovery of further
funds, or other remedies
Section 1229(f)(2) OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT — Establish, maintain, and Full report
The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee oversee systems, procedures,
such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General and controls
considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph (1)
Section 1229(f)(3) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT Duties as specified in Inspector Full report
OF 1978 — General Act
In addition, … the Inspector General shall also have the duties and
responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General
Act of 1978
Section 1229(f)(4) COORDINATION OF EFFORTS — Coordination with the Other Agency
The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the inspectors general of Oversight
cooperation of, each of the following: (A) the Inspector General DOD, State, and USAID
of the Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector General of the
Department of State, and (C) the Inspector General of the United
States Agency for International Development
Federal Support and Other Resources
Section 1229(h)(5)(A) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES — Expect support as Full report
Upon request of the Inspector General for information or requested
assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the
Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is
practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish
such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an
authorized designee
Section 1229(h)(5)(B) REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE — Monitor cooperation N/A
Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector
General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably
refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the
circumstances to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
Defense, as appropriate, and to the appropriate congressional
committees without delay
Continued on the next page
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Reports
Section 1229(i)(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS — Report – 30 days after the Full report
Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year end of each calendar quarter Appendix B
quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report summarizing, for the period of Summarize activities of the
that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end Inspector General
of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the
activities during such period of the Inspector General and the Detailed statement of all
activities under programs and operations funded with amounts obligations, expenditures,
appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of and revenues
Afghanistan. Each report shall include, for the period covered by
such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures,
and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation
activities in Afghanistan, including the following –
Section 1229(i)(1)(A) Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds Obligations and expenditures Appendix B
of appropriated/donated
funds
Section 1229(i)(1)(B) A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the Project-by-project and Funding
costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, program-by-program Note
together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, accounting of costs. List
the Department of State, and the United States Agency for unexpended funds for each
International Development, as applicable, of the costs to project or program
complete each project and each program
Section 1229(i)(1)(C) Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by Revenues, obligations, and Funding
foreign nations or international organizations to programs and expenditures of donor funds
projects funded by any department or agency of the United States
Government, and any obligations or expenditures of
such revenues
Section 1229(i)(1)(D) Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or Revenues, obligations, and Funding
frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any expenditures of funds from
U.S. government department or agency, and any obligations or seized or frozen assets
expenditures of such revenues
Section 1229(i)(1)(E) Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts Operating expenses of Funding
appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction agencies or any organization Appendix B
of Afghanistan receiving appropriated funds
Section 1229(i)(1)(F) In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding Describe contract details Note
mechanism described in paragraph (2)*—
(i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism;
(ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding
mechanism;
(iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United
States Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement,
or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from
potential contractors to perform the contract, grant, agreement,
or other funding mechanism, together with a list of the potential
individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers;
and
(iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based
the determination to use procedures other than procedures that
provide for full and open competition
Continued on the next page
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Section 1229(i)(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY — Publish report as directed at Full report
The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available www.sigar.mil
Internet website each report under paragraph (1) of this
Dari and Pashto translation
subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector
in process
General determines are widely used and understood in
Afghanistan
Section 1229(i)(4) FORM — Publish report as directed Full report
Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the
Inspector General considers it necessary
Section 1229(j)(1) Inspector General shall also submit each report required under Submit quarterly report Full report
subsection (i) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense
Note: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR’s website (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed,
and organized for future SIGAR use and publication.
* Covered “contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms” are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of Pub. L. No. 110-181 as being—
“any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:
To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.
To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.
To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan.”
TABLE A.2
TABLE A.3
CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 115-91, §1521
Public Law Section NDAA Language SIGAR Action Report Section
Section 1521(e)(1) (1) QUALITY STANDARDS FOR IG PRODUCTS—Except as Prepare quarterly report in accordance Section 1
provided in paragraph (3), each product published or issued with the Quality Standards for Reconstruction Update
by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs Inspection and Evaluation, issued by Funding
and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces the Council of the Inspectors General
Fund shall be prepared— on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE),
(A) in accordance with the Generally Accepted Government commonly referred to as the “CIGIE
Auditing Standards/Government Auditing Standards Blue Book,” for activities funded under
(GAGAS/GAS), as issued and updated by the Government the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
Accountability Office; or
(B) if not prepared in accordance with the standards referred
to in subparagraph (A), in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (commonly referred to as the ‘‘CIGIE Blue Book’’)
Section 1521(e)(2) (2) SPECIFICATION OF QUALITY STANDARDS FOLLOWED— Cite within the quarterly report Inside front cover
Each product published or issued by an Inspector General the quality standards followed in Appendix A
relating to the oversight of programs and activities funded conducting and reporting the work
under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall cite within concerned. The required quality
such product the quality standards followed in conducting standards are quality control, planning,
and reporting the work concerned data collection and analysis, evidence,
records maintenance, reporting, and
follow-up
APPENDIX B
U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Table B.1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by agency
and fund per year; Table B.2 lists funds appropriated for counternarcotics
initiatives, as of December 31, 2018.
TABLE B.2 TABLE B.1
FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019
2,750.00 5,606.94 9,166.77 10,619.28 9,200.00 4,946.20 3,962.34 3,939.33 3,502.26 4,162.72 4,666.82 4,920.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.66 1.40 1.76 1.56 1.18 1.42 1.50 1.05 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
192.81 230.06 392.27 379.83 472.99 255.81 238.96 0.00 138.76 135.61 118.01 0.00
2,944.47 5,838.40 9,560.80 11,000.67 9,674.16 5,203.44 4,202.80 3,940.38 3,641.88 4,299.12 4,785.62 4,920.00
488.33 550.67 1,000.00 400.00 400.00 200.00 30.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 299.00 400.00 145.50 144.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 14.44 59.26 239.24 245.76 138.20 122.24 3.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1,399.51 2,077.48 3,346.00 2,168.51 1,836.76 1,802.65 907.00 831.90 633.27 767.17 500.00 0.00
149.43 0.40 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
63.04 58.23 92.30 69.91 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10.77 4.22 4.22 3.09 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.95 1.52 0.00
21.96 2.81 3.45 6.25 7.10 1.84 0.80 0.82 2.91 0.29 0.00 0.00
29.72 59.92 70.74 69.30 65.32 52.60 43.20 43.50 37.96 37.00 36.60 0.00
0.00 5.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.75 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
307.56 493.90 589.00 400.00 357.92 593.81 225.00 250.00 210.00 184.50 160.00 9.17
40.59 18.88 19.20 18.70 18.70 17.00 18.70 9.05 3.31 11.03 11.11 0.00
2,511.66 3,287.12 5,184.47 3,673.99 3,331.93 2,952.39 1,490.96 1,149.99 892.44 1,006.95 714.23 19.17
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
154.73 73.01 58.13 112.55 59.20 46.15 65.97 53.73 26.65 4.69 4.22 0.00
16.84 27.13 29.61 66.23 56.00 21.50 28.13 24.50 39.78 93.84 119.64 2.96
0.00 0.75 0.84 1.08 0.62 0.32 0.82 0.49 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
44.25 76.79 80.93 65.00 99.56 76.07 107.89 129.27 84.27 89.24 76.25 1.31
0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20.55 12.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
258.77 189.97 169.51 244.85 215.38 144.04 202.82 207.99 150.74 187.76 200.11 4.27
14.30 25.20 34.40 37.20 59.00 58.70 62.65 68.60 62.37 55.74 55.65 0.22
435.51 1,065.86 1,761.70 905.10 1,424.75 1,272.24 852.45 909.50 795.20 782.07 69.12 0.18
449.81 1,091.06 1,796.10 942.30 1,483.75 1,330.94 915.10 978.10 857.57 837.80 124.76 0.40
6,164.70 10,406.55 16,710.87 15,861.81 14,705.22 9,630.81 6,811.67 6,276.46 5,542.63 6,331.64 5,824.72 4,943.83
APPENDIX C
SIGAR WRITTEN PRODUCTS*
SIGAR Audits
Completed Performance Audit Reports
SIGAR completed one performance audit report during this reporting period.
* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and
events occurring after December 31, 2018, up to the publication date of this report.
SIGAR Inspections
Completed Inspection Reports
SIGAR completed three inspection reports during this reporting period.
Ongoing Inspections
SIGAR had 14 ongoing inspections during this reporting period.
APPENDIX D
SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE
SIGAR Investigations
This quarter, SIGAR opened five new investigations and closed 18, bringing
the total number of ongoing investigations to 164. Of the closed investiga-
tions, most were closed due to criminal declination, administrative action, or
lack of investigative merit, as shown in Figure D.1. Of the new investigations,
most were related to corruption and bribery or procurement or contract
fraud, as shown in Figure D.2.
SIGAR'S CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS, OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2018 SIGAR NEW INVESTIGATIONS,
OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2018
Administrative
SIGAR Hotline
The SIGAR Hotline (866-329-8893 in the USA, 0700107300 via cell phone in
Afghanistan) received 68 complaints this quarter, as shown in Figure D.3. In
addition to working on new complaints, the Investigations Directorate con-
tinued its work this quarter on complaints received prior to October 1, 2018.
This quarter, the directorate processed 157 complaints, most of which are
under review or were closed, as shown in Figure D.4.
SOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2018
OCTOBER 1–DECEMBER 31, 2018
Complaints Received 47 68
Total: 68
Complaints (Open) 22
Gen Info File (Closed) 64
Investigation (Open) 1
Electronic Investigation (Closed) 0
64 Referral (Open) 0
Referral (Closed) 2
Suspension & Debarment (Closed) 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Total: 157
Written Walk-in
1 3 Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/11/19.
TABLE D.1
* Indicate that the individual or entity was subject to two final agency actions by an agency suspension and debarment official, resulting in a suspension followed by final debarment following the
resolution of a criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by agency suspension and debarment official.
SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Shirzad, Daulet Khan Sarfarez, a.k.a. “Mr. Sarfarez” Khan, Noor Zali, a.k.a. “Wali Kahn Noor”
Uddin, Mehrab Wazir, Khan Saheed, a.k.a. “Mr. Saheed;” a.k.a. “Sahill;” a.k.a.
Watson, Brian Erik Akbar, Ali “Ghazi-Rahman”
Wooten, Philip Steven* Crystal Construction Company, d.b.a. “Samitullah Road Weaver, Christopher
Espinoza, Mauricio* Construction Company” Al Kaheel Oasis Services
Alam, Ahmed Farzad* Samitullah (Individual uses only one name) Al Kaheel Technical Service
Greenlight General Trading* Ashna, Mohammad Ibrahim, a.k.a. “Ibrahim” CLC Construction Company
Aaria Middle East Company LLC* Gurvinder, Singh CLC Consulting LLC
Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. – Herat* Jahan, Shah Complete Manpower Solutions
Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC* Shahim, Zakirullah a.k.a. “Zakrullah Shahim”, a.k.a. Mohammed, Masiuddin, a.k.a. “Masi Mohammed”
Aaria Middle East* “Zikrullah Shahim” Rhoden, Bradley L., a.k.a. “Brad L. Rhoden”
Barakzai, Nangialai* Alyas, Maiwand Ansunullah a.k.a. “Engineer Maiwand Alyas” Rhoden, Lorraine Serena
Formid Supply and Services* BMCSC Royal Super Jet General Trading LLC
Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy* Maiwand Haqmal Construction and Supply Company Super Jet Construction Company
Kabul Hackle Logistics Company* New Riders Construction Company, d.b.a. “Riders Super Jet Fuel Services
Yousef, Najeebullah* Construction Company,” d.b.a. “New Riders Construction and Super Jet Group
Aaria Group* Services Company” Super Jet Tours LLC, d.b.a. “Super Jet Travel and Holidays LLC”
Aaria Group Construction Company* Riders Constructions, Services, Logistics and Transportation Super Solutions LLC
Aaria Supplies Company Ltd.* Company Abdullah, Bilal
Rahimi, Mohammad Edris* Riders Group of Companies Farmer, Robert Scott
All Points International Distributors Inc.* Domineck, Lavette Kaye* Mudiyanselage, Oliver
Hercules Global Logistics* Markwith, James* Kelly, Albert, III
Schroeder, Robert* Martinez, Rene Ethridge, James
Helmand Twinkle Construction Company Maroof, Abdul Fernridge Strategic Partners
Waziri, Heward Omar Qara, Yousef AISC LLC*
Zadran, Mohammad Royal Palace Construction Company American International Security Corporation*
Afghan Mercury Construction Company, d.b.a. “Afghan Bradshaw, Christopher Chase David A. Young Construction & Renovation Inc.*
Mercury Construction & Logistics Company” Zuhra Productions Force Direct Solutions LLC*
Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company Zuhra, Niazai Harris, Christopher*
Montes, Diyana Boulware, Candice a.k.a. “Candice Joy Dawkins” Hernando County Holdings LLC*
Naseeb, Mirzali Dawkins, John Hide-A-Wreck LLC*
Robinson, Franz Martin Mesopotamia Group LLC Panthers LLC*
Smith, Nancy Nordloh, Geoffrey Paper Mill Village Inc.*
Sultani, Abdul Anas a.k.a. “Abdul Anas” Kieffer, Jerry Shroud Line LLC*
Faqiri, Shir Johnson, Angela Spada, Carol*
Hosmat, Haji CNH Development Company LLC Welventure LLC*
Jim Black Construction Company Johnson, Keith World Wide Trainers LLC*
Arya Ariana Aryayee Logistics, d.b.a. “AAA Logistics,” d.b.a. Military Logistic Support LLC Young, David Andrew*
“Somo Logistics” Eisner, John Woodruff and Company
Garst, Donald Taurus Holdings LLC Borcata, Raul A.*
Mukhtar, Abdul a.k.a. “Abdul Kubar” Brophy, Kenneth Michael* Close, Jarred Lee*
Noori Mahgir Construction Company Abdul Haq Foundation Logistical Operations Worldwide*
Noori, Sherin Agha Adajar, Adonis Taylor, Zachery Dustin*
Long, Tonya* Calhoun, Josh W. Travis, James Edward*
Isranuddin, Burhanuddin Clark Logistic Services Company, d.b.a. “Clark Construction Khairfullah, Gul Agha
Matun, Navidullah, a.k.a. “Javid Ahmad” Company” Khalil Rahimi Construction Company
Matun, Wahidullah Farkas, Janos Momand, Jahanzeb, a.k.a. “Engineer Jahanzeb Momand”
Navid Basir Construction Company Flordeliz, Alex F. Yar-Mohammad, Hazrat Nabi
Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company Knight, Michael T., II Walizada, Abdul Masoud, a.k.a. “Masood Walizada”
NBCC & GBCC JV Lozado, Gary Alizai, Zarghona
Noori, Navid Mijares, Armando N., Jr. Aman, Abdul
Asmatullah, Mahmood, a.k.a. “Mahmood” Mullakhiel, Wadir Abdullahmatin Anwari, Laila
Khan, Gul Rainbow Construction Company Anwari, Mezhgan
Khan, Solomon Sherdad, a.k.a. “Solomon” Sardar, Hassan, a.k.a. “Hassan Sardar Inqilab” Anwari, Rafi
Mursalin, Ikramullah, a.k.a. “Ikramullah” Shah, Mohammad Nadir, a.k.a. “Nader Shah” Arghandiwal, Zahra, a.k.a. “Sarah Arghandiwal”
Musafer, Naseem, a.k.a. “Naseem” Tito, Regor Azizi, Farwad, a.k.a. “Farwad Mohammad Azizi”
Ali, Esrar Brown, Charles Phillip Bashizada, Razia
Gul, Ghanzi Sheren, Fasela, a.k.a. “Sheren Fasela” Coates, Kenneth
Luqman Engineering Construction Company, d.b.a. “Luqman Anderson, Jesse Montel Gibani, Marika
Engineering” Charboneau, Stephanie, a.k.a. “Stephanie Shankel” Haidari, Mahboob
Safiullah, a.k.a. “Mr. Safiullah” Hightower, Jonathan Latifi, Abdul
SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
McCammon, Christina Intermaax Inc. Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company
Mohibzada, Ahmadullah, a.k.a. “Ahmadullah Mohebzada” Karkar, Shah Wali Siddiqi, Rahmat
Neghat, Mustafa Sandman Security Services
Qurashi, Abdul Siddiqi, Atta Siddiqi, Sayed Attaullah
Raouf, Ashmatullah Specialty Bunkering Umbrella Insurance Limited Company
Shah, David Spidle, Chris Calvin Taylor, Michael
Touba, Kajim Vulcan Amps Inc.
Zahir, Khalid Worldwide Cargomasters Gardazi, Syed
Aryubi, Mohammad Raza Samim Aziz, Haji Abdul, a.k.a. “Abdul Aziz Shah Jan,” a.k.a. “Aziz” Smarasinghage, Sagara
Atlas Sahil Construction Company Castillo, Alfredo, Jr. Security Assistance Group LLC
Bab Al Jazeera LLC Abbasi, Asim
Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company Muturi, Samuel Edmondson, Jeffrey B.*
Muhammad, Pianda Mwakio, Shannel Montague, Geoffrey K.*
Sambros International, d.b.a. “Sambros International Ltd.” Ahmad, Jaweed
Ciampa, Christopher*
d.b.a. “Sambros-UK JV” Ahmad, Masood
Sambros JV Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company, d.b.a. A & J Total Landscapes Lugo, Emanuel*
“Sambros JV ESCC” Aryana Green Light Support Services Bailly, Louis Matthew*
Antes, Bradley A. Mohammad, Sardar, a.k.a. “Sardar Mohammad Barakzai” Kumar, Krishan
Lakeshore Engineering & Construction Afghanistan Inc.,
Pittman, James C., a.k.a. “Carl Pittman” Marshal Afghan American Construction Company
d.b.a. “Lakeshore General Contractors Inc.”
Lakeshore Engineering Services Inc. Poaipuni, Clayton Marshal, Sayed Abbas Shah
Lakeshore Engineering Services/Toltest JV LLC Wiley, Patrick Masraq Engineering and Construction Company
Lakeshore Toltest – Rentenbach JV LLC
Crystal Island Construction Company Miakhil, Azizullah
Lakeshore Toltest Corporation, d.b.a. “Lakeshore Group,”
d.b.a. “LTC Newco d.b.a. “LTC CORP Michigan,” d.b.a. Bertolini, Robert L.* Raj, Janak
“Lakeshore Toltest KK” Kahn, Haroon Shams, a.k.a. “Haroon Shams”* Singh, Roop
Lakeshore Toltest Guam LLC
Shams Constructions Limited* Stratton, William G
Lakeshore Toltest JV LLC
Lakeshore Toltest RRCC JV LLC Shams General Services and Logistics Unlimited* Umeer Star Construction Company
Lakeshore/Walsh JV LLC Shams Group International, d.b.a. “Shams Group Zahir, Mohammad Ayub
LakeshoreToltest METAG JV LLC International FZE”* Peace Thru Business*
LTC & Metawater JV LLC Shams London Academy*
LTC Holdings Inc. Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julias*
Shams Production*
LTC Italia SRL Green, Robert Warren*
LTC Tower General Contractors LLC Shams Welfare Foundation*
Mayberry, Teresa*
LTCCORP Commercial LLC Swim, Alexander*
LTCCORP E&C Inc. Addas, James*
Norris, James Edward
LTCCORP Government Services - OH Inc. Advanced Ability for U-PVC*
LTCCORP Government Services Inc. Afghan Columbia Constructon Company
Al Bait Al Amer*
LTCCORP Government Services-MI Inc. Ahmadi, Mohammad Omid
LTCCORP O&G LLC Al Iraq Al Waed*
Dashti, Jamsheed
LTCCORP Renewables LLC
Al Quraishi Bureau*
LTCCORP Inc. Hamdard, Eraj
LTCCORP/Kaya Dijbouti LLC Al Zakoura Company*
Hamidi, Mahrokh
LTCCORP/Kaya East Africa LLC Al-Amir Group LLC*
Raising Wall Construction Company
LTCCORP/Kaya Romania LLC
Al-Noor Contracting Company*
LTCCORP/Kaya Rwanda LLC Artemis Global Inc., d.b.a. “Artemis Global Logistics and
LTCORP Technology LLC Solutions,” d.b.a. “Artemis Global Trucking LLC” Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company*
Toltest Inc., d.b.a. “Wolverine Testing and Engineering,” d.b.a. O’Brien, James Michael, a.k.a. “James Michael Wienert” California for Project Company*
"Toledo Testing Laboratory,” d.b.a. “LTC,” d.b.a. “LTC Corp,” Tamerlane Global Services Inc., d.b.a. “Tamerlane Global Civilian Technologies Limited Company*
d.b.a. “LTC Corp Ohio,” d.b.a. “LTC Ohio” LLC,” d.b.a. “Tamerlane LLC,” d.b.a. “Tamerlane Technologies
Toltest/Desbuild Germany JV LLC Industrial Techniques Engineering Electromechanically
LLC”
Veterans Construction/Lakeshore JV LLC Company*
Sherzai, Akbar Ahmed*
Afghan Royal First Logistics, d.b.a. “Afghan Royal” Pena, Ramiro*
American Barriers Jean-Noel, Dimitry
Pulsars Company*
Arakozia Afghan Advertising Hampton, Seneca Darnell*
San Francisco for Housing Company
Dubai Armored Cars Dennis, Jimmy W.
Enayatullah, son of Hafizullah Sura Al Mustakbal*
Farhas, Ahmad Timor, Karim
Top Techno Concrete Batch*
Inland Holdings Inc. Wardak, Khalid
Albright, Timothy H.*
Intermaax, FZE
SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Insurance Group of Afghanistan Khan, Mirullah Wali Eshaq Zada Logistics Company; d.b.a. “Wali
Ratib, Ahmad, a.k.a. “Nazari” Khan, Mukamal Ashqa Zada Logistics Company”; d.b.a. “Nasert Nawazi
Transportation Company”
Jamil, Omar K. Khoshal, Son of Sayed Hasan
Ware, Marvin*
Rawat, Ashita Malang, Son of Qand
Belgin, Andrew
Qadery, Abdul Khalil Masom, Son of Asad Gul
Afghan Bamdad Construction Company, d.b.a. “Afghan
Casellas, Luis Ramon* Mateen, Abdul Bamdad Development Construction Company”
Saber, Mohammad a.k.a. “Saber,” a.k.a. “Sabir” Mohammad, Asghar Areeb of East Company for Trade & Farzam Construction
Company JV
Zahir, Shafiullah Mohammad a.k.a. “Shafiullah,” a.k.a. Mohammad, Baqi
Areeb of East for Engineering and General Trading
“Shafie” Mohammad, Khial Company, Limited, d.b.a. “Areeb of East LLC”
Achiever’s International Ministries Inc., d.b.a. “Center for
Mohammad, Sayed Areeb-BDCC JV
Achievement and Development LLC”
Bickersteth, Diana Mujahid, Son of Abdul Qadir Areebel Engineering and Logisitcs - Farzam
Bonview Consulting Group Inc. Nangiali, Son of Alem Jan Areebel Engineering and Logistics
Fagbenro, Oyetayo Ayoola, a.k.a. “Tayo Ayoola Fagbenro” Nawid, Son of Mashoq Areeb-Rixon Construction Company LLC, d.b.a. “Areeb-
Noorullah, Son of Noor Mohammad REC JV”
Global Vision Consulting LLC
Carver, Elizabeth N.
HUDA Development Organization Qayoum, Abdul
Carver, Paul W.
Strategic Impact Consulting, d.b.a. “Strategic Impact KarKon Roz, Gul
RAB JV
Afghanistan Material Testing Laboratory” Shafiq, Mohammad
Davies, Simon Ullah, Izat; a.k.a. “Ezatullah”; a.k.a. “Izatullah, son of
Shah, Ahmad Shamsudeen”
Gannon, Robert, W.
Shah, Mohammad Saboor, Baryalai Abdul; a.k.a. “Barry Gafuri”
Gillam, Robert
Shah, Rahim Stratex Logistic and Support, d.b.a. “Stratex Logistics”
Mondial Defence Systems Ltd.
Sharif, Mohammad Jahanzeb, Mohammad Nasir
Mondial Defense Systems USA LLC
Waheedullah, Son of Sardar Mohammad Nasrat, Zaulhaq, a.k.a. “Zia Nasrat”
Mondial Logistics
Wahid, Abdul Blevins, Kenneth Preston*
Khan, Adam
Wais, Gul Banks, Michael*
Khan, Amir, a.k.a. “Amir Khan Sahel”
Wali, Khair Afghan Armor Vehicle Rental Company
Sharq Afghan Logistics Company, d.b.a. “East Afghan
Wali, Sayed Hamdard, Javid
Logistics Company”
Hafizullah, Sayed; a.k.a. “Sadat Sayed Hafizullah”; a.k.a. Wali, Taj McAlpine, Nebraska
“Sayed Hafizullah Delsooz” Yaseen, Mohammad Meli Afghanistan Group
Sadat Zohori Construction and Road Building Company;
Yaseen, Son of Mohammad Aajan Badgett, Michael J.*
d.b.a. “Sadat Zohori Cons Co.”
Abdullah, Son of Lal Gul Zakir, Mohammad Miller, Mark E.
Ahmad, Zubir Rogers, Sean Kazemi, Sayed Mustafa, a.k.a. “Said Mustafa Kazemi”
Ajmal, Son of Mohammad Anwar Morgan, Sheldon J.* Nazary, Nasir Ahmad
Fayaz, Afghan, a.k.a. “Fayaz Alimi,” a.k.a. “Fayaz, Son of Epps, Willis* Sajid, Amin Gul
Mohammad” Etihad Hamidi Group; d.b.a. “Etihad Hamidi Trading, Martino, Roberto F.
Gul, Khuja Transportation, Logistics and Construction Company” Logiotatos, Peter R.
Habibullah, Son of Ainuddin Etihad Hamidi Logistics Company; d.b.a. “Etihad Hamidi
Transportation, Logistic Company Corporation”
Glass, Calvin
Hamidullah, Son of Abdul Rashid Singleton, Jacy P.
Hamidi, Abdul Basit; a.k.a. Basit Hamidi
Haq, Fazal
Kakar, Rohani; a.k.a. “Daro Khan Rohani”
Jahangir, Son of Abdul Qadir
Mohammad, Abdullah Nazar
Kaka, Son of Ismail
Nasir, Mohammad
Khalil, Son of Mohammad Ajan
APPENDIX E
SIGAR DATA CALL QUESTIONS THAT RECEIVED
CLASSIFIED OR UNCLASSIFIED BUT NOT PUBLICLY
RELEASABLE RESPONSES
Every quarter, SIGAR sends U.S. implementing agencies in Afghanistan a
list of questions about their programs. This quarter, United States Forces-
Afghanistan (USFOR-A) classified, or designated unclassified, but not
publicly releasable, its responses to the bolded portions of 13 questions (the
same as last quarter) from SIGAR’s data call (below). As authorized by its
enabling statute, SIGAR will publish a classified annex containing the classi-
fied and publicly unreleasable data.
SECURITY
Question ID Question
Jan-Sec-01 1. Please provide the following information on ANA strength as of the latest available date:
a. the most recent three ANA APPS month-end reports with "as of” dates on each.
b. please complete the attached ANA Strength spreadsheets. There are two, one for unclassified strength data (e.g. authorized strength broken out
separately from assigned strength if authorized is unclassified by itself) and one for classified. (Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, Sec-01
and Sec-01a)
c. total number of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel within the ANA.
d. monthly attrition rates for the last three months for the ANA by Corps, Division, SOF, and AAF with “as of” dates provided.
2. Please provide an unclassified description of general ANA attrition trends over the last quarter.
3. Please detail any changes to the Afghan Program of Record that have been approved during the quarter, along with the estimated costs associated
with acquisition, training, and sustainment.
Jan-Sec-04 a. Please provide a recent unclassified assessment of the ANDSF elements at the Corps and Zone level as well as below if possible. The assessment can
be general or anecdotal, but please cover key performance areas such as reporting, training, planning, operational readiness, and leadership.
b. Please provide a detailed, classified comprehensive assessment of the ANDSF Corps and Zones via SIPR.
c. Please provide the latest “ANDSF Operational Overview” PowerPoint slides (given to us via SIPR last quarter in response to Jul-Sec-04c)
d. Please provide an unclassified narrative detailing the status of ANDSF's operational readiness cycle implementation over the reporting
period. Please provide this information by ANA Corps and ANP Zone, if possible.
Jan-Sec-08 1. Please provide the following information on ANP strength as of the latest available date:
a. the most recent three ANP PERSTAT month-end reports with "as of” dates on each.
b. please complete the attached ANA Strength spreadsheets. There are two, one for unclassified strength data (e.g. authorized strength broken out separately
from assigned strength if authorized is unclassified by itself) and one for classified. (Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, Sec-08 and Sec-08a)
c. total number of officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel within the ANP.
d. monthly attrition rates for the last three months for the entire ANP and by ANP component with "as of dates" included. (see example
attached for how we would like the data presented)
2. Please provide an unclassified description of general ANP attrition trends over the last quarter.
Continued on the next page
SECURITY
Question ID Question
Jan-Sec-14 Please provide an update on the Afghan Local Police program, including:
a. the current number of ALP members and current number of ALP members that are fully trained (include "as of" date)
b. estimate of likely Fiscal Year 2019 costs to support and sustain the ALP at target strength (30,000) and capability
c. retention and attrition for ALP members.
d. ALP casualty figures from the last quarter.
e. an update to the ALP reform status and district assessment findings
f. What percentage of the ALP force is registered in: APPS, EFT, and Mobile Money. What is currently being done to ensure ALP enrollment in these
programs increases?
g. Please provide all the quarterly ALP Powerbroker Reports from the ALP SD, as described in last quarter's data call response, for this year from
January 1, 2018, to the latest available date.
h. Please describe how the ALP functions/will function separately from the ANATF and ways in which the two force elements coordinate/will
coordinate operationally.
i. What is the anticipated date for the full roll-out of the ANATF? What is the status of the recruiting effort for the ANATF companies?
Jan-Sec-18 Please provide the following information on the Ministry assessment system and processes:
a. Please provide a recent, unclassified assessment of the MOD and MOI as well as the date of the assessments. Please generally
characterize how the MOD and MOI are progressing toward their benchmarks for the new PMR.
b. Please provide a copy of the most recent classified, comprehensive MOD/MOI assessments via SIPR with an 'as of' date. If there is more
detailed classified information about how each ministry is progressing toward its PMR benchmarks, please provide it.
Jan-Sec-23 Please provide information on insider attacks against Coalition Forces, including:
a. the number of insider attacks against U.S. military personnel from January 1, 2018 to the latest possible date.
b. the number of U.S. military personnel wounded or killed from insider attacks from January 1, 2018 to the latest possible date.
c. the number of insider attacks against ANDSF from January 1, 2018 to the latest possible date.
d. the number of ANDSF personnel wounded or killed as a result of insider attacks from January 1, 2018 to the latest possible date.
Please provide information on ANDSF casualties, including:
a. the number of ANDSF personnel killed and wounded, broken out monthly, from January 1, 2018 to the latest possible date.
b. Please provide a CIDNE Excel file export of all ANDSF casualties from January 1, 2015 through the latest available date. It is not necessary
to filter the CIDNE export, but, at a minimum, these data should include the unit (lowest level available), location (highest fidelity
possible), and date for all casualties.
Jan-Sec-26 Regarding USG support to the Special Mission Wing (SMW):
a. Please provide a recent comprehensive unclassified update of the SMW as of the latest possible date.
b. Please identify each type of aircraft in the SMW inventory and the number of each.
c. Please provide the number of aircraft purchased but not yet fielded.
d. Please complete the attached ANDSF spreadsheet/SMW tab, or provide the applicable data. (Sec-26 tab Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet)
e. What percentage of the SMW sorties are in support of counternarcotics? of counterterrorism? or, counternexus (CN & CT)?
f. How many aircrew members does the SMW currently have, by crew position and airframe? Please break out their level of mission
qualification (e.g. Certified Mission Ready (night-vision qualified), the daytime equivalent, etc.):
1) Mi-17 Pilots and Pilot Trainers
2) Mi-17 Flight Engineers
3) Mi-17 Crew Chiefs
4) PC-12 Pilots
5) PC-12 Mission System Operators
g. Please provide the operational readiness rate of the SMW and what the achievement benchmarks are in this area.
h. How many and what type of aircraft maintainers are currently assigned / authorized?
i. Provide the cost of aircraft maintenance being paid with ASFF or money from other countries.
Jan-Sec-40 a. Please provide the ANA Corps' equipment operational readiness (OR) rates.
b Please provide the goal OR rate for each ANA corps, and the reasoning for that OR benchmark.
c. If the OR rate is below the benchmark for some corps, please explain why for each corps and what actions are being taken to support the
ANDSF to increase the OR rate.
d. Please provide the OR rate or similar metric for the ANP by zone, including the benchmark OR rates by zone. If the rates are below
benchmark,please explain why by zone.
e. Please provide a general, unclassified assessment of equipment readiness for both the ANA and the ANP.
Continued on the next page
SECURITY
Question ID Question
Jan-Sec-55 1. Please provide all of the ISAF/RS Periodic Mission Reviews (or equivalent earlier products) from the earliest available date through Spring
2018 (Fall 2018 is already in SIGAR's possession). Please provide the full reports, not just the Commander's Assessments.
Jan-Sec-56 Regarding the security benchmarks matrix for the Afghanistan Compact:
1. Please provide in an unclassified and publicly releasable format:
a. a description of those milestones expected to be completed over the quarter by both MOD and MOI
b. which of those milestones were completed or not
c. a number of total completed milestones versus the number expected to be completed over the quarter.
2. Please provide the most recent version of the security benchmarks matrix for the Afghanistan Compact (previously Gov-16)
Jan-Sec-61 1. Provide a spreadsheet documenting all concluded ANDSF offensive operations conducted during the quarter (each concluded operation
should be its own row). For our purposes, an operation involves (1) at least one ANA kandak or (2) a combination of units from at least two
Afghan security entities (MOI, MOD, and/or NDS). For each operation, we request the following information:
a. the district in which the operation primarily occurred (District name)
b. the province in which the operation primarily occurred (Province name)
c. any additional districts in which the operation occurred (District name(s))
d. the start date of the operation (YYYY-MM-DD)
e. the end date of the operation (YYYY-MM-DD)
f. whether AAF A-29s or AC-208 provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)
g. whether AAF MD-530s, UH-60, or Mi-17 provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)
h. whether ANASOC MSFVs provided direct support during the operation (Yes/No)
i. whether the operation involved ANA units (Yes/No)
j. whether the operation involved MOI units (Yes/No)
k. whether the operation involved NDS units (Yes/No)
l. whether the operation involved ANASOC units (Yes/No)
m. whether the operation involved elements from an outside MOD geographically defined command (i.e. 201, 203, 205, 207, 209, or 215
Corps or 111 Division). For example, in 2015, 215th Corps received support from the neighboring 205th and 207th Corps for their
operations in northern Helmand Province. Since 205th and 207th Corps did not normally have responsibilities in Helmand Province, this
instance would be coded “Yes”. (Yes/No)
n. whether the operation involved elements from an outside MOI geographically defined command (i.e. 101, 202, 303, 404, 505, 606, 707, or
808 Zones) (Yes/No)
o. whether the operation was enabled by U.S. or Coalition air support (Yes/No)
p. whether the operation was enabled by U.S. or Coalition ground support (Yes/No)
q. whether any U.S. or Coalition military aircraft provided medical evacuation support (Yes/No)
Jan-Sec-63 1. Please provide the following information on the total number of enemy-initiated attacks from January 1, 2018 to the latest available date in an
unclassified and publicly releasable format (as provided to us last quarter) in the Data Call Attachment Spreadsheet, tabs Sec-63 and Sec-63a:
a. the total number of enemy initiated attacks by month
b. the attacks broken out by types of attacks, to include direct fire, IED/mine strikes, indirect fire, SAFIRE, etc.
c. the attacks broken out by province
d. the attacks broken down by target type (ANA, ANP, Coalition forces, etc.)
Jan-AC-05 1. Please describe the methods and data CSTC-A uses to asses the current state of ANDSF corruption and patronage networks.
a. What is CSTC-A's assessment of the current state of ANDSF corruption and patronage networks?
2. Please describe how CSTC-A assess the effectiveness of MOI IG, MOD IG, and GS IG efforts:
a. (For MOI-MAG and MOD-MAG) Describe specific actions taken during the quarter by senior MOD and MOI officials in response to MOD IG- and
MOI IG-identified issues. Past responses have described the process by which such an action could be taken. However, the objective of this
question is to identify and describe actual actions that were taken during the quarter. (In light of the SVTC discussion on 11/21/2018, we do not
care whether these actions from the quarter are the result of any particular MOD IG or MOI IG report or the result of a pattern across a number
of reports. Rather, we are simply interested in examples of actions or decisions by senior MOD or MOI officials in response to MOD IG- or MOI
IG-identified problems.)
b. (TAO) Describe the quality of MOD IG, GS IG, and MOI IG inspections reports, including the statements of assurance.
3. Please provide any minutes, handouts, slides, or additional materials provided to participants of the any anti-corruption forums/meetings with
the MOD and/or MOI in which CSTC-A participates. The 1397/1398 MOD and MOI commitment letters mention counter and anti-corruption
meetings. If these forums do not exist, but another forum exists that carries out a similar function, please provide the requested materials
that relate to the alternative forums.
4. Please provide copies of any MOI IG, MOD IG, and GS IG inspection or audit reports (or summaries if the reports are not available) that have
been made available to CSTC-A this quarter.
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JAN 30, 2019 239 Continued on the next page
APPENDICES
APPENDIX F
RESOLUTE SUPPORT-DEFINED STABILITY DATA
FOR AFGHANISTAN’S 407 DISTRICTS AS OF
OCTOBER 22, 2018
For more information on how Resolute Support defines district stability, see
the February 2018 Addendum of the January 30, 2018, quarterly report at
www.sigar.mil.
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Badakhshan Arghanj Khwah 730.8649666 20492 Contested
Badakhshan Argo 1054.050221 110991 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Baharak 323.5157809 36413 Contested
Badakhshan Darayim 560.5687714 75718 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Darwaz-e Bala 1335.155196 27926 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Darwaz-e Pa'in 1223.829567 33696 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Faizabad 493.8264949 73334 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Ishkashim 1133.495707 16925 Contested
Badakhshan Jurm 1227.048677 47141 Insurgent Activity
Badakhshan Khash 255.1930332 46438 Contested
Badakhshan Khwahan 735.3085483 21415 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Kiran wa Munjan 5218.800728 12245 Contested
Badakhshan Kishim 769.773524 102022 Contested
Badakhshan Kohistan 492.2157325 20597 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Kuf Ab 1418.282551 28214 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Raghistan 1297.303489 49750 Contested
Badakhshan Shahr-e Buzurg 977.123685 65393 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Shighnan 3529.400272 35084 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Shiki 620.0436148 31670 Contested
Badakhshan Shuhada 1557.608554 43300 Contested
Badakhshan Tagab 1399.879148 35260 Contested
Badakhshan Tashkan 843.003169 36945 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Wakhan 10946.03473 19402 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Warduj 886.780863 27332 High Insurgent Activity
Badakhshan Yaftal-e Sufla 602.8933582 66118 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Yamgan 1761.045483 31831 High Insurgent Activity
Badakhshan Yawan 441.5107492 40294 GIROA Influence
Badakhshan Zaybak 1620.461766 10014 Contested
Badghis Ab-e Kamari 1804.510765 91537 GIROA Influence
Badghis Ghormach 1952.171972 67762 High Insurgent Activity
Badghis Jawand 7130.51097 99794 GIROA Influence
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Badghis Muqur 1258.521656 33260 Contested
Badghis Murghab 4455.948009 120964 Contested
Badghis Qadis 3451.026597 116589 Contested
Badghis Qal'ah-ye Now 656.7886533 77919 GIROA Control
Baghlan Andarab 1019.878829 33013 GIROA Influence
Baghlan Baghlan-e Jadid 2596.440695 217377 Contested
Baghlan Burkah 835.7212731 65778 Contested
Baghlan Dahanah-ye Ghori 1453.441132 73690 High Insurgent Activity
Baghlan Deh-e Salah 453.1589292 38395 Contested
Baghlan Doshi 1942.486025 88384 Contested
Baghlan Firing wa Gharu 240.4847747 20731 Contested
Baghlan Gozargah-e Nur 417.1501459 12664 Contested
Baghlan Khinjan 1016.584034 33771 Contested
Baghlan Khost wa Firing 1890.102458 79035 Contested
Baghlan Khwajah Hijran 653.22453 30106 Contested
Baghlan Nahrin 983.8258059 87001 Contested
Baghlan Pul-e Hisar 888.6381888 35112 Contested
Baghlan Pul-e Khumri 532.6344867 266998 Contested
Baghlan Talah wa Barfak 2879.53657 38456 Contested
Balkh Balkh 540.5877556 152743 GIROA Control
Balkh Chahar Bolak 515.7267309 101866 Contested
Balkh Chahar Kent 1076.449944 54531 GIROA Control
Balkh Chimtal 1809.529346 116238 Contested
Balkh Dehdadi 258.7336513 83940 GIROA Control
Balkh Dowlatabad 1642.994188 130488 GIROA Influence
Balkh Kaldar 831.0931193 14088 GIROA Control
Balkh Khulm 3009.35196 89532 GIROA Control
Balkh Kishindeh 1181.704305 60419 GIROA Control
Balkh Marmul 560.8551742 14086 GIROA Control
Balkh Mazar-e Sharif 28.07304628 458987 GIROA Control
Balkh Nahr-e Shahi 1144.597813 97873 GIROA Control
Balkh Shahrak-e Hairatan 82.08322622 10646 GIROA Control
Balkh Sholgarah 1790.836021 144102 GIROA Control
Balkh Shor Tepah 1457.943564 49394 GIROA Control
Balkh Zari 833.4779002 54115 GIROA Control
Bamyan Bamyan 1797.314762 101519 GIROA Control
Bamyan Kahmard 1407.333114 45291 GIROA Control
Bamyan Panjab 1888.734011 85939 GIROA Control
Bamyan Sayghan 1732.132858 30258 GIROA Control
Bamyan Shaybar 1298.387643 36712 GIROA Control
Bamyan Waras 2975.845372 136654 GIROA Control
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Bamyan Yakawlang 6778.582551 112870 GIROA Control
Daykundi Gayti 1461.559592 43803 GIROA Control
Daykundi Gizab 3672.193918 83470 GIROA Control
Daykundi Ishtarlay 1349.785572 60117 GIROA Control
Daykundi Kajran 1840.216111 43004 GIROA Control
Daykundi Khedir 1551.030205 56032 GIROA Control
Daykundi Mir Amor 2382.758217 77982 GIROA Control
Daykundi Nili 549.2416842 51027 GIROA Control
Daykundi Sang-e Takht 1923.103762 63336 GIROA Control
Daykundi Shahristan 1954.078092 82880 GIROA Control
Farah Anar Darah 10618.73112 34876 GIROA Influence
Farah Bakwah 2435.705025 44327 Contested
Farah Bala Boluk 5531.625833 89478 Contested
Farah Farah 3443.798195 142134 GIROA Influence
Farah Gulistan 7051.599075 54002 Contested
Farah Khak-e Safed 1841.974978 37477 Contested
Farah Lash-e Juwayn 5422.217659 35022 GIROA Control
Farah Pur Chaman 6441.233336 65649 Contested
Farah Pusht-e Rod 433.3434245 51271 Contested
Farah Qal'ah-ye Kah 3549.68777 38539 GIROA Influence
Farah Shayb Koh 2794.123538 27777 GIROA Control
Faryab Almar 1589.215235 91080 Insurgent Activity
Faryab Andkhoy 376.8222058 49754 GIROA Influence
Faryab Bal Chiragh 1126.385059 62592 High Insurgent Activity
Faryab Dowlatabad 2728.703339 61554 Contested
Faryab Gurziwan 1868.273232 94558 Insurgent Activity
Faryab Khan-e Chahar Bagh 942.3385282 28408 GIROA Influence
Faryab Khwajah Sabz Posh 556.4941001 68113 Contested
Faryab Kohistan 2308.772667 68924 Insurgent Activity
Faryab Maimanah 147.4985239 105495 GIROA Influence
Faryab Pashtun Kot 2689.422477 229639 Insurgent Activity
Faryab Qaisar 2545.043554 179682 Insurgent Activity
Faryab Qaram Qol 1068.876806 21522 GIROA Influence
Faryab Qurghan 811.2682742 63624 GIROA Influence
Faryab Shirin Tagab 1961.356691 101530 Insurgent Activity
Ghazni Ab Band 1005.390036 34496 GIROA Influence
Ghazni Ajristan 1602.130883 37127 Contested
Ghazni Andar 708.7452209 156449 Contested
Bahram-e Shahid
Ghazni 653.7524936 45049 GIROA Influence
(Jaghatu)
Ghazni Deh Yak 723.5658496 61282 GIROA Influence
Ghazni Gelan 1110.754256 72312 Contested
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Ghazni Ghazni 359.6262375 203282 Contested
Ghazni Giro 885.080601 45977 GIROA Influence
Ghazni Jaghuri 2092.741057 213819 Contested
Ghazni Khwajah 'Omari 209.061968 23865 Contested
Ghazni Malistan 1780.159667 102279 GIROA Influence
Ghazni Muqer 866.4124271 62853 Contested
Ghazni Nawah 1665.615791 37200 Insurgent Activity
Ghazni Nawur 5219.107696 118818 GIROA Influence
Ghazni Qarah Bagh 1646.432417 185049 Contested
Ghazni Rashidan 387.9394678 22441 Contested
Ghazni Waghaz 391.6599773 46844 Contested
Wali Muhammad
Ghazni 140.7795288 22296 GIROA Influence
Shahid Khugyani
Ghazni Zanakhan 301.7272188 15824 Contested
Ghor Chaghcharan 7715.682986 169835 GIROA Influence
Ghor Chahar Sadah 1296.829685 32450 Contested
Ghor Do Lainah 4597.097876 45123 GIROA Influence
Ghor Dowlatyar 1701.111143 43073 GIROA Influence
Ghor La'l wa Sar Jangal 3877.950451 139412 GIROA Control
Ghor Pasaband 4550.090521 118507 GIROA Influence
Ghor Saghar 2657.644262 43264 GIROA Control
Ghor Shahrak 4340.721463 74517 GIROA Influence
Ghor Taywarah 3667.388895 114694 GIROA Influence
Ghor Tulak 2708.074013 64143 GIROA Influence
Helmand Baghran 3156.305592 80844 High Insurgent Activity
Helmand Dishu 9118.476266 23989 High Insurgent Activity
Helmand Garm Ser 16654.62654 111611 Insurgent Activity
Helmand Kajaki 1957.025588 90479 Insurgent Activity
Helmand Lashkar Gah 1999.98759 136760 GIROA Influence
Helmand Marjah 2718.188337 75272 Insurgent Activity
Helmand Musa Qal'ah 1719.571098 74458 High Insurgent Activity
Helmand Nad 'Ali 3167.984412 71271 GIROA Influence
Helmand Nahr-e Saraj 1535.750346 143591 Contested
Helmand Nawah-ye Barakzai 625.1896116 121479 GIROA Influence
Helmand Now Zad 4072.599658 63368 High Insurgent Activity
Helmand Reg-e Khan Neshin 7361.029477 25447 High Insurgent Activity
Helmand Sangin 516.8316804 73926 Insurgent Activity
Helmand Washer 4617.16409 19657 Contested
Herat Adraskan 9978.995648 67627 GIROA Influence
Herat Chisht-e Sharif 2506.374694 29463 GIROA Influence
Herat Farsi 2040.182341 38391 GIROA Influence
Herat Ghorian 7328.097581 111316 GIROA Influence
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Herat Gulran 6099.56 118089 GIROA Influence
Herat Guzarah 2656.868483 181985 GIROA Control
Herat Herat 83.32219099 507284 GIROA Control
Herat Injil 1392.623509 389267 GIROA Control
Herat Karukh 1994.536312 82446 GIROA Control
Herat Kohsan 2234.66451 67707 GIROA Control
Herat Kushk 2885.346982 155666 GIROA Influence
Herat Kushk-e Kuhnah 1660.841715 56876 GIROA Influence
Herat Obeh 2623.393732 94805 GIROA Influence
Herat Pashtun Zarghun 1898.031956 125058 GIROA Influence
Herat Shindand 6995.789924 225454 Contested
Herat Zindah Jan 2524.734333 74827 GIROA Control
Jowzjan Khamyab 869.8402112 17002 Insurgent Activity
Jowzjan Darzab 478.3861375 61471 Insurgent Activity
Jowzjan Faizabad 1180.649312 51171 Contested
Jowzjan Aqchah 155.6826761 96004 Contested
Jowzjan Khanaqa 487.9977143 30117 GIROA Influence
Jowzjan Khwajah Do Koh 2076.920169 32809 GIROA Influence
Jowzjan Mardian 707.3045673 47475 GIROA Influence
Jowzjan Mingajik 882.0662951 53406 GIROA Influence
Jowzjan Qarqin 1234.559993 31213 Contested
Jowzjan Qush Tepah 881.4220674 30444 Insurgent Activity
Jowzjan Shibirghan 2165.191175 205075 GIROA Influence
Kabul Bagrami 279.4715078 77652 GIROA Control
Kabul Chahar Asyab 257.3613358 47078 GIROA Influence
Kabul Deh-e Sabz 461.5333353 63317 GIROA Influence
Kabul Farzah 89.62213815 30074 GIROA Control
Kabul Gul Darah 75.72425195 26670 GIROA Control
Kabul Istalif 109.4213637 38810 GIROA Control
Kabul Kabul 349.8709383 4592173 GIROA Control
Kabul Kalakan 74.90850888 43220 GIROA Control
Kabul Khak-e Jabar 584.6965595 18139 GIROA Influence
Kabul Mir Bachah Kot 65.76213363 62461 GIROA Control
Kabul Musahi 110.4295435 29089 GIROA Influence
Kabul Paghman 361.2086078 156639 GIROA Influence
Kabul Qarah Bagh 208.6170276 91409 GIROA Influence
Kabul Sarobi 1309.08204 70235 GIROA Influence
Kabul Shakar Darah 317.5690406 105686 GIROA Control
Kandahar Arghandab 547.1909973 60187 GIROA Control
Kandahar Arghistan 3899.406667 43493 GIROA Influence
Kandahar Daman 4109.397911 40979 GIROA Control
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Kandahar Dand 288.9973104 241354 GIROA Control
Kandahar Ghorak 1485.657492 12174 Insurgent Activity
Kandahar Kandahar 482.0407007 492757 GIROA Control
Kandahar Khakrez 1647.505746 28520 Contested
Kandahar Maiwand 2852.096487 73291 Insurgent Activity
Kandahar Ma'ruf 3184.576308 40952 Insurgent Activity
Kandahar Mya Neshin 894.6259998 18651 Insurgent Activity
Kandahar Nesh 1281.007984 17702 Contested
Kandahar Panjwa'i 5962.078482 109824 GIROA Control
Kandahar Registan 13562.28959 8547 GIROA Influence
Kandahar Shah Wali Kot 3279.355572 55032 Contested
Kandahar Shorabak 4173.727381 17105 GIROA Influence
Kandahar Spin Boldak 5688.052039 142728 GIROA Control
Kandahar Zharey 673.8540432 108997 GIROA Influence
Kapisa Alah Say 302.5219946 48021 Contested
Hisah-e Awal-e
Kapisa 87.98060498 84120 GIROA Influence
Kohistan
Hisah-e Dowum-e
Kapisa 53.0105992 56842 GIROA Influence
Kohistan
Kapisa Koh Band 150.0760992 28839 GIROA Control
Kapisa Mahmud-e Raqi 184.37607 92443 GIROA Influence
Kapisa Nejrab 581.3169373 130625 GIROA Influence
Kapisa Tagab 522.2360912 99161 Contested
Khost Bak 170.4777255 27925 GIROA Influence
Khost Gurbuz 358.5439963 35033 Contested
Khost Jaji Maidan 328.1960222 29902 GIROA Influence
Khost Khost 491.2305176 175829 GIROA Influence
Khost Manduzai 114.377008 68017 GIROA Influence
Khost Musa Khel 426.7283463 50003 Contested
Khost Nadir Shah Kot 333.5926532 41578 Contested
Khost Qalandar 156.9881635 12285 GIROA Influence
Khost Sabari 413.451134 88747 Contested
Khost Shamul 171.5877579 18452 GIROA Influence
Khost Sperah 491.7155036 29056 Contested
Khost Tanai 428.6926057 71664 GIROA Influence
Khost Terayzai 397.362786 55658 Contested
Kunar Asadabad 84.68386195 42155 GIROA Control
Kunar Bar Kunar 168.7806423 25262 Contested
Kunar Chapah Darah 600.4207671 39792 Contested
Kunar Dangam 203.1917335 22584 Contested
Kunar Darah-ye Pech 549.2727533 67116 Contested
Kunar Ghaziabad 561.0653219 23773 GIROA Influence
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Kunar Khas Kunar 365.2032465 44139 GIROA Influence
Kunar Marawarah 147.1646025 25251 Contested
Kunar Narang 189.3361134 36668 GIROA Influence
Kunar Nari 537.0948877 34076 GIROA Influence
Kunar Nurgal 307.9331995 38956 GIROA Influence
Kunar Sar Kani 198.3479191 34213 GIROA Influence
Kunar Shigal wa Sheltan 439.1184636 37218 Contested
Kunar Tsowkey 245.2152675 45679 Contested
Kunar Watahpur 252.3765212 34587 Contested
Kunduz Aliabad 416.1544027 61133 Contested
Kunduz Chahar Darah 1213.813086 91207 Insurgent Activity
Kunduz Dasht-e Archi 861.2901269 103049 Insurgent Activity
Kunduz Imam Sahib 1598.886365 293481 Insurgent Activity
Kunduz Khanabad 1074.949344 194035 Insurgent Activity
Kunduz Kunduz 616.2715592 406014 Contested
Kunduz Qal'ah-ye Zal 2120.27526 88082 Insurgent Activity
Laghman Alingar 818.0447403 129639 GIROA Influence
Laghman Alisheng 670.0905713 89307 GIROA Influence
Laghman Bad Pash 288.9199643 8738 Contested
Laghman Dowlat Shah 741.852983 41568 Contested
Laghman Mehtar Lam 429.974148 164073 GIROA Control
Laghman Qarghah'i 886.6213198 119369 GIROA Influence
Logar Azrah 760.7412562 25367 GIROA Influence
Logar Baraki Barak 272.93885 109638 Contested
Logar Charkh 286.2565863 55409 Contested
Logar Kharwar 467.2526098 32796 Contested
Logar Khoshi 436.3078827 30289 GIROA Influence
Logar Muhammad Aghah 1050.276731 95555 Contested
Logar Pul-e 'Alam 1121.22422 132217 Contested
Nangarhar Achin 466.5720716 128557 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Kamah 229.5329454 96101 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Behsud 311.0287958 123831 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Chaparhar 231.1817594 77068 Contested
Nangarhar Darah-ye Nur 258.5077676 49816 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Deh Bala 384.8410565 50366 Contested
Nangarhar Dur Baba 279.2352932 29125 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Goshtah 521.3376994 34054 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Hisarak 669.2340064 38772 Insurgent Activity
Nangarhar Jalalabad 23.61115329 274929 GIROA Control
Nangarhar Bati Kot 152.6017137 96936 GIROA Control
Nangarhar Khugyani 675.826806 164212 Contested
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Nangarhar Kot 173.1038289 61498 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Kuz Kunar 290.1769832 70180 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar La'lpur 463.0302503 23912 Contested
Nangarhar Mohmand Darah 259.0630278 61243 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Naziyan 215.3890321 21818 Contested
Nangarhar Pachir wa Agam 466.894177 53125 Contested
Nangarhar Rodat 356.3604219 84921 Contested
Nangarhar Sherzad 465.9622459 82113 Insurgent Activity
Nangarhar Shinwar 87.58932625 67817 GIROA Influence
Nangarhar Surkh Rod 384.5914144 174188 GIROA Influence
Nimroz Chahar Burjak 20879.5916 32223 GIROA Influence
Nimroz Chakhansur 9877.824746 29648 GIROA Influence
Nimroz Delaram 2064.057038 8310 Contested
Nimroz Kang 1160.044229 25478 GIROA Influence
Nimroz Khash Rod 5782.467784 31852 Contested
Nimroz Zaranj 1191.398174 74977 GIROA Control
Nuristan Barg-e Matal 1717.27361 19327 GIROA Influence
Nuristan Do Ab 564.2187081 9471 Contested
Nuristan Kamdesh 1222.818597 31580 GIROA Influence
Nuristan Mandol 2040.636945 24876 Contested
Nuristan Nurgaram 978.3260073 32887 GIROA Influence
Nuristan Parun 1426.839177 16916 GIROA Influence
Nuristan Wama 281.4516212 13859 Contested
Nuristan Waygal 755.8417507 24306 Insurgent Activity
Paktika Bermal 1297.269293 44818 Contested
Paktika Dilah 1531.34552 31725 Contested
Paktika Giyan 224.499075 42287 Contested
Paktika Gomal 4069.085788 9809 Contested
Paktika Jani Khel 988.5883777 30217 Contested
Paktika Mota Khan 422.9356463 31296 GIROA Influence
Paktika Nikeh 122.0053137 15574 Contested
Paktika Omnah 461.6319887 15079 Contested
Paktika Sar Rowzah 671.7276907 28634 GIROA Influence
Paktika Sarobi 301.7250423 15439 GIROA Influence
Paktika Sharan 536.8539048 62800 GIROA Control
Paktika Terwo 1423.022074 2678 Contested
Paktika Urgun 511.2202897 69437 GIROA Influence
Paktika Wazah Khwah 1759.011201 28701 Contested
Paktika Wur Mamay 3183.412599 4414 Contested
Paktika Yahya Khel 348.0590462 21673 Contested
Paktika Yosuf Khel 522.468638 17432 GIROA Influence
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Paktika Zarghun Shahr 473.6279075 37218 GIROA Influence
Paktika Ziruk 213.8366313 23722 Contested
Paktiya Ahmadabad 416.2732895 34283 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Dand Patan 205.6007746 32458 Contested
Paktiya Dzadran 503.1216557 44786 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Gardez 707.8830781 105981 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Jaji 602.5440359 78903 Contested
Paktiya Jani Khel 144.980545 43632 Contested
Paktiya Lajah Ahmad Khel 197.4552968 37049 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Lajah Mangal 225.279411 15026 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Mirzakah 201.6193683 22020 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Sayyid Karam 249.7821973 58468 Contested
Paktiya Shwak 106.9869399 6915 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Tsamkani 301.2416823 63520 GIROA Influence
Paktiya Zurmat 1413.80529 134424 Contested
Panjshir Abshar 516.4473353 16394 GIROA Control
Panjshir Bazarak 344.5785204 22285 GIROA Control
Panjshir Darah 195.7127186 15398 GIROA Control
Panjshir Khinj 684.3122402 49100 GIROA Control
Panjshir Parian 1420.816616 18519 GIROA Control
Panjshir Rukhah 163.5143907 28876 GIROA Control
Panjshir Shutul 226.0897925 13704 GIROA Control
Panjshir Unabah 178.395021 23580 GIROA Control
Parwan Bagram 360.2850538 130678 GIROA Control
Parwan Charikar 267.3609233 227236 GIROA Influence
Parwan Jabal us Saraj 116.4564711 78784 GIROA Influence
Parwan Koh-e Safi 579.7555353 38407 Contested
Parwan Salang 520.0425218 31761 GIROA Control
Parwan Sayyid Khayl 45.88401402 56652 Contested
Parwan Shaykh 'Ali 920.2033201 31342 GIROA Influence
Parwan Shinwari 721.2732747 51960 GIROA Influence
Parwan Siahgird Ghorband 894.6264472 120519 GIROA Influence
Parwan Surkh-e Parsa 1163.825298 50616 Contested
Samangan Aibak 1489.232117 128943 GIROA Influence
Samangan Darah-ye Suf-e Bala 2890.319937 79077 GIROA Influence
Samangan Darah-ye Suf-e Pa'in 1341.362478 71742 Contested
Samangan Fayroz Nakhchir 1185.303799 16617 GIROA Control
Samangan Hazrat-e Sultan 1485.965423 72670 GIROA Influence
Samangan Khuram wa Sar Bagh 2135.017651 49538 GIROA Control
Samangan Ruy Do Ab 2385.388263 57068 GIROA Influence
Sar-e Pul Balkhab 2977.688095 63437 GIROA Influence
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Sar-e Pul Gosfandi 1092.331645 70542 Contested
Sar-e Pul Kohistanat 6164.638832 101170 High Insurgent Activity
Sar-e Pul Sangcharak 1060.733844 126005 Contested
Sar-e Pul Sar-e Pul 2053.169717 196543 GIROA Influence
Sar-e Pul Sayad 1335.200843 68628 Contested
Sar-e Pul Sozmah Qal'ah 583.9190662 64241 Contested
Takhar Baharak 243.2939974 47249 Contested
Takhar Bangi 602.9870461 45833 Contested
Takhar Chah Ab 759.2096805 98569 Contested
Takhar Chal 326.1366817 32622 GIROA Influence
Takhar Darqad 366.4695674 33461 Insurgent Activity
Takhar Dasht-e Qal'ah 328.7608127 41659 Contested
Takhar Farkhar 1255.406328 58899 GIROA Influence
Takhar Hazar Sumuch 345.7075707 25019 GIROA Influence
Takhar Ishkamish 798.7503748 75778 Insurgent Activity
Takhar Kalafgan 473.6879824 43567 GIROA Influence
Takhar Khwajah Bahawuddin 212.6680712 29338 Contested
Takhar Khwajah Ghar 387.1592286 83599 Insurgent Activity
Takhar Namak Ab 547.4204217 14862 GIROA Influence
Takhar Rustaq 1862.417686 198752 GIROA Influence
Takhar Taloqan 847.8350074 275579 GIROA Influence
Takhar Warsaj 2697.949686 47444 GIROA Influence
Takhar Yangi Qal'ah 261.4780663 56515 Insurgent Activity
Uruzgan Chinartu 1013.719676 32993 Insurgent Activity
Uruzgan Chorah 2020.1969 47551 Insurgent Activity
Uruzgan Deh Rawud 1642.647834 76291 Contested
Uruzgan Khas Uruzgan 2599.305665 70781 Insurgent Activity
Uruzgan Shahid-e Hasas 1858.355367 74174 Insurgent Activity
Uruzgan Tarin Kot 1762.099592 127625 GIROA Influence
Wardak Chak-e Wardak 1110.5423 105641 Contested
Wardak Daymirdad 956.3612707 38655 Contested
Hisah-e Awal-e
Wardak 1573.385983 46777 GIROA Influence
Behsud
Wardak Jaghatu 599.0929179 57041 Contested
Wardak Jalrayz 1092.450383 66474 Contested
Wardak Maidan Shahr 246.3551784 49827 GIROA Influence
Wardak Markaz-e Behsud 3344.896395 148585 GIROA Influence
Wardak Nerkh 561.9206959 73717 Contested
Wardak Sayyidabad 1094.842154 143266 Contested
Zabul Arghandab 1507.001607 41240 Insurgent Activity
Zabul Atghar 502.1749876 10986 Contested
Zabul Daychopan 1640.448217 49159 Insurgent Activity
Continued on the next page
UNCLASSIFIED
October 2018 Area [km2] Population
Province District
Assessment (Landscan) (Landscan 2016)
Zabul Kakar 1081.713865 30837 High Insurgent Activity
Zabul Mizan 1118.406424 17234 Contested
Zabul Now Bahar 1264.129181 23674 Insurgent Activity
Zabul Qalat 1836.152387 44477 GIROA Control
Zabul Shah Joy 1718.577832 73158 Contested
Zabul Shamulzai 2889.29118 32256 Contested
Zabul Shinkai 2289.190157 29227 Contested
Zabul Tarnek wa Jaldak 1502.651364 22192 Contested
Note: GIROA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
APPENDIX G
ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS BY PROVINCE
This quarter, RS provided SIGAR data on enemy-initiated attacks at the pro-
vincial level. See pages 73–74 for the data in map form and a corresponding
analysis. The data below covers the period of January 1–October 2018.
APPENDIX H
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
AABIS Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System
AAEP Afghanistan Agriculture Extension Project
AAF Afghan Air Force
AAM ANDSF Aviation Modernization Program
ABADE Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises
ABP Afghan Border Police
ACAP Afghan Civilian Assistance Program
ACAS Afghanistan Court Administration System
ACEP Afghan Civic Engagement Program
ACE Agricultural Credit Enhancement
ACEP Afghan Civic Engagement Program
ACJC Anti-Corruption Justice Center
ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AD alternative-development
ADALAT Assistance for Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency
ADF Agricultural Development Fund
AEAI Advanced Engineering Associates International Inc
AETF-A Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan
AFCEC Air Force Civil Engineer Center
AFMIS Afghan Financial Management Information System
AFN afghani (currency)
AGO Attorney General’s Office
AHRIMS Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
AIF Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund
AITF Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
ALBA Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan
ALCS Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
ALP Afghan Local Police
AMANAT Afghanistan's Measure for Accountability and Transparency
ANA Afghan National Army
ANASOC ANA Special Operations Command
ANATF ANA Territorial Force
ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
Continued on the next page
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
ANP Afghan National Police
AO abandoned ordnance
APPS Afghan Personnel Pay System
APRP Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program
ARD Afghanistan Revenue Department
AROC Afghan Resources Oversight Council
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASSF Afghan Special Security Forces
ATAR Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project
AUP Afghan Uniformed Police
AUW Asian University for Women
AWDP Afghanistan Workforce Development Program
BADILL Boost Alternative Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods
BAG Budget Activity Group
BVV Biometric Voter Verification
CAT Combat Advisor Team
CBARD Community-Based Agricultre and Rural Development Project
CBCMP Capacity Building and Change Management Program
CCAG Counter Corruption Advisory Group
CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program
CHAMP Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program
CHX chlorhexidine
CID U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CMR certified mission ready
CMS Case Management System
CN Counternarcotics
CNCE Counter Narcotics Community Engagement
CNJC Counter Narcotics Justice Center
CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
COIN counterinsurgency
COMAC Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians
CoreIMS Core Information Management System
CPD Central Prisons Directorate
CPDS Continuing Professional Development Support
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index
CRIP Community Recovery Intensification and Prioritization
Continued on the next page
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
CSO civil-society organization
CSO Central Statistics Organization
CSSP Corrections System Support Program
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CTA Counter-narcotics Central Transfer Account
DABS Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DCA Development Credit Authority
DCAR Delegated Cooperation Agreement
DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
DEWS Plus Disease Early Warning System Plus
DFID Department for International Development
DICDA Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund (U.S.)
DIG Deputy Inspector General
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DLA-E Defense Logistics Agency-Energy
DOD Department of Defense (U.S.)
DOD OIG Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOJ Department of Justice (U.S.)
EIA Enemy-Initiated Attacks
EITI Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative
ECC-A Expeditionary Contracting Command-Afghanistan
ECF Extended Credit Facility
EF essential function
EFT electronic funds-transfer
EPZ export-processing zone
ERW explosive remnants of war
ESF Economic Support Fund
EU European Union
EVAW elimination of violence against women
FAP Financial and Activity Plan
FAUAF Friends of the American Univeristy of Afghanistan
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFP Food for Peace
FL-PTWG Family Law-Parliamentary Technical Working Group
FRU Family Response Unit
FY fiscal year
GAO Government Accountability Office (U.S.)
GCPSU General Command of Police Special Units
Continued on the next page
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
GDP gross domestic product
GDPDC General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers
GEC Girls' Education Challenge Program
GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GIS Geographic Information Systems
GLE Governor-Led Eradication
GMAF Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework
GPI Good Performer's Initiative
GRAIN Grain Research and Innovation
GVHR gross violations of human rights
HEMAYAT Helping Mothers and Children Thrive
HIG Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin
HOB High Oversight Board
HPC High Peace Council
HQ headquarters
HRW Human Rights Watch
HSR Health Sector Resiliency
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA International Disaster Assistance
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IEC Independent Election Commission (Afghan)
IED improvised explosive device
IFCA Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
IG Inspector General
IHSAN Initiative for Hygiene, Sanitation, and Nutrition
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S)
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)
IOM International Organization for Migration
IR Intermediate Result
IS-K Islamic State-Khorasan
ISLA Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations Program
IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JRD Juvenile Rehabilitation Directorate
JSCC Joint Security Compact Committee
JSSP Justice Sector Support Program (State)
JTTP Justice Training Transition Program (State)
KBR Kabul Bank Receivership
Continued on the next page
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
KFZ Kandahar Food Zone
kg kilograms
kWh kilowatt-hours
LLP Lessons Learned Program
LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
LTC Lakeshore Toltest Corporation
MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (Afghan)
MCN Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (Afghan)
MCTF Major Crimes Task Force
MEC Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (Afghan)
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MFNDU Marshal Fahim National Defense University
MOCI Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MOD Ministry of Defense (Afghan)
MOE Minister of Education (Afghan)
MOEc Ministry of Economy (Afghan)
MOF Ministry of Finance (Afghan)
MOHE Ministry of Higher Education (Afghan)
MOI Ministry of Interior (Afghan)
MOJ Ministry of Justice (Afghan)
MOMP Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan)
MOPH Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)
MOPW Ministry of Public Works
MOU memorandum of understanding
MOWA Ministry of Women's Affairs
MPD MOI and Police Development project
MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Afghan)
NADR Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
NAR net attendance rates
NATF NATO ANA Trust Fund
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NDAP National Drug Action Plan
NDP New Development Partnership
NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghan)
NEF National Elections forum
NEI Northern Electrical Interconnect
NEPS Northeast Power System
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIMS National Information Management System
Continued on the next page
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
NIU National Interdiction Unit (Afghan)
NSA National Security Advisor
NSIA National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA)
NSOCC-A NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
NSP National Solidarity Program
NSPA NATO Support and Procurement Agency
O&M operations and maintenance
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OFS Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG Office of the Inspector General
OR operational readiness
OTA Office of Technical Assistance (U.S. Treasury)
PAI Personnel Asset Inventory
PDP Provincial Development Plans
PCASS Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System
PIAT Police Institutional Advisory Team
PM/WRA Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
(State)
POR proof of registration
PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State)
PTEC Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
RADP Regional Agriculture Development Program
RC Recurrent Cost
RMTC Regional Military Training Center
RS Resolute Support
SAG Subactivity Group
SEPS Southeast Power System
SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigade
SGDP Sheberghan Gas Development Project
SGGA Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity
SHAHAR Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience
SIKA Stability in Key Areas
SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit (Afghan)
SMAF Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework
SME subject-matter expert
SMW Special Mission Wing (Afghan)
SOF Special Operations Forces
SPM Support to Payroll Management
SPRA Support for Peace and Reconciliation in Afghanistan project
Continued on the next page
ACRONYM OR
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
State OIG Department of State Office of the Inspector General
SWIM Strengthening Watershed and Irrigation Management
TAA train, advise, and assist
TAAC Train, Advise, and Assist Command
TEFA Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan
TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
TIU Technical Investigative Unit
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCAC United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNMAS UN Mine Action Service
UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime
USAAA U.S. Army Audit Agency
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG USAID Office of the Inspector General
USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
USIP United States Institute of Peace
USGS United States Geological Survey
UXO unexploded ordnance
VFU Veterinary Field Unit
VSO Village Stability Operations
WIE Women in the Economy Project
WLD Women's Leadership Development
WPP Women's Participation Projects
WTO World Trade Organization
VSO Village Stability Operations
WIA Wounded in Action
WIE Women in the Economy Project
WLD Women's Leadership Development
WPP Women's Participation Projects
WTO World Trade Organization
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43. Department of Defense, Cost of War Monthly Report, Data as 74. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign
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44. Pub. L. No. 111-32, 6/24/2009. 75. State, response to SIGAR data call 3/29/2013.
45. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2009. 76. State, response to SIGAR data call 3/29/2013.
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Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts March 81. World Bank, “Quarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,” 4/2011,
2016,” 4/15/2016. p. 16.
49. DOD OIG, Distribution of Funds and the Validity of Obligations 82. World Bank, “ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as
for the Management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund - of November 21, 2018 (end of 11th month of FY 1397),” p. 8.
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50. Pub. L. No. 112-74, Section 9009 and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 84. UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002-2018, Updated January 17, 2019, in
Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) memorandum, response to SIGAR data call on 1/18/2019.
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12/17/2019. 87. NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Media
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55. DOD, “Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP),” analysis of RS-provided data, 12/2018.
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p. 27-3. to SIGAR vetting, 1/22/2019 and 1/25/2019; SIGAR, analysis of
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57. DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2019. Republic of Afghanistan, “CNN Anchor, Fareed Zakaria’s
58. DOD response to SIGAR data call 1/18/2019. Conversation With President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani During
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70. State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009. 96. New York Times, “To Curb Taliban, Afghan President Replaces
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100. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OSD-P, response 120. The UN’s reporting periods are not always consistent. The “same
to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018 and 1/12/2019; SIGAR, Quarterly period” covered by the December 2017 report was September
Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75; OSD-P, 15–November 15, 2017. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and
email to SIGAR, 1/13/2017. its implications for international peace and security, report of
101. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 8/27/2016; OSD-P, response the Secretary-General, 12/10/2015, p. 5; 3/7/2016, p. 6; 6/10/2016,
to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the p. 4; 9/7/2016, p. 5; 12/13/2016, p. 4; 3/3/2017, p. 4; 6/15/2017, p. 4;
United States Congress, 4/30/2018, p. 75. 9/15/2017, p. 4; 12/15/2017, p. 5; 2/27/2018, p. 5; 6/6/2018, p. 5;
102. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, 9/10/2018, p. 5; 12/7/2018, p. 5; SIGAR, analysis of UN data, 1/2019.
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105. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30
analysis of RS-provided data, 12/2018. September 2018, 10/10/2018.
106. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, 123. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
analysis of RS-provided data, 12/2018. 124. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; SIGAR, analy-
107. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018, 9/19/2018, 6/22/2018, sis of USFOR-A provided data, 12/2018.
3/22/2018, 10/15/2018, 8/24/2017, 5/15/2017, 2/20/2017, 11/26/2016, 125. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; SIGAR, analy-
8/28/2016, 5/28/2016, 2/27/2016, and 11/27/2015; SIGAR analysis of sis of USFOR-A-provided data, 12/2018.
RS- provided data, 12/2018. 126. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/19/2018;
108. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, RS, “Afghan Security Forces Defeat Taliban Offensive in Ghazni,”
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109. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, USFOR-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
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110. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September 2018, 10/10/2018,
analysis of RS-provided data, 12/2018. p. 7.
111. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018, 9/19/2018, 6/22/2018, 128. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
3/22/2018, 10/15/2018, 8/24/2017, 5/15/2017, 2/20/2017, 11/26/2016, 129. NATO, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,”
8/28/2016, 5/28/2016, 2/27/2016, and 11/27/2015; SIGAR analysis of 12/2018.
RS-A provided data, 12/2018. 130. OUSD-P, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
112. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of 131. NATO, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,”
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1/12/2019. 132. DOD, “U.S. Military Casualties–Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
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115. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/19/2018; 133. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018, 9/19/2018, and
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1/2019. SIGAR vetting, 1/16/2019.
116. RS, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; RS, response to 136. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/19/2018;
SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2018, 1/22/2019, and 1/25/2019; SIGAR, analy- CSTC-A, response to vetting, 1/16/2019; SIGAR, analysis of
sis of RS-provided data, 1/2019. RS-provided data, 12/2018.
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Mohammad Ashraf Ghani During World Economic Forum’s 168. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
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141. BBC, “What lies behind Afghanistan’s Insider Attacks?” 3/11/2013. Subaccounts December 2018,” 1/20/2019.
142. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2017, 9/19/2018, and 172. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/19/2018
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143. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2017, 9/19/2018, and 173. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
12/20/2018 and response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019. 174. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
144. OSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/14/2017 and 1/15/2018. 175. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
145. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 3/4/2016; USFOR-A, 176. DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and
response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2016. Subaccounts December 2018,” 1/20/2019.
146. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 11/28/2017. 177. DOD, correspondence with SIGAR, 1/19/2019.
147. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 11/26/2016; USFOR-A, 178. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,
response to SIGAR vetting, 7/15/2016 and 1/12/2019; OSD-P, 12/2018, pp. 26, 70.
response to SIGAR vetting, 4/14/2018. 179. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,
148. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2018; CSTC-A, 12/2018, pp. 26, 70.
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of Defense (MoD),” 1/10/2018, p. 1; DOD, “CSTC-A Funding Framework (SMAF), 11/2018, p. 9.
Authorization Letter for the Ministry of Interior (MoI),” 1/10/2018, 385. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Citizens’
p. 1. Charter,” n.d.; World Bank, Project Appraisal Document:
361. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. Afghanistan–Citizens Charter Afghanistan Project (English),
362. DOD, CSTC-A, RM, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 10/6/2016, p. 12.
363. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 386. USAID, “Action Memorandum: Request to Prepare and Execute
10/30/2018, p. 117. a Modification to USAID Grant Agreement No. 306-G-00-12-
364. CSTC-A, “Third Quarter Assessment of 1397 MOD–CSTC-A 00016 to Make an Additional $300,000,000 to the Afghanistan
1397/1398 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter,” 11/11/2018, Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) No. TF050576,” 9/27/2018, p. 3;
p. 1. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019.
365. CSTC-A, “Third Quarter Assessment of 1397 MOD–CSTC-A 387. World Bank, “Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan (CCAP),” 9/7/2018,
1397/1398 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter,” 11/11/2018, p. 2.
p. 1. 388. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document: Afghanistan–Citizens
366. CSTC-A, “Third Quarter Assessment of 1397 MOD–CSTC-A Charter Afghanistan Project (English), 10/6/2016, pp. 117–118.
1397/1398 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter,” 11/11/2018, 389. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
pp. 1–2. 7/30/2018, p. 119.
367. CSTC-A, “Third Quarter Assessment of 1397 MOD–CSTC-A 390. World Bank, Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP)
1397/1398 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter,” 11/11/2018, (IDA D1390-AF and ARTF Grant TF0A3287) Implementation
pp. 2–3. Support Mission (ISM) Aide Memoire September 23–28, 2018,
368. CSTC-A, “Third Quarter Assessment of 1397 MOI–CSTC-A 2018, p. 2.
1397/1398 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter,” 11/11/2018, 391. Conflict and Fragility Study: The Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan
p. 1. Project (CCAP) Terms of Reference, 3/14/2017.
369. CSTC-A, “Third Quarter Assessment of 1397 MOI–CSTC-A 392. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document: Afghanistan–Citizens
1397/1398 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter,” 11/11/2018, Charter Afghanistan Project (English), 10/6/2016, p. 117.
pp. 1–2. 393. Tetra Tech ARD, Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations
in Afghanistan (ISLA) Project) Monthly Report, February
2015, 3/15/2015, ii; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 417. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure for
12/22/2016; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2019. Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): MEC Support
394. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. Planning Report, 9/25/2018, pp. 4, 10–11.
395. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Citizen-Centered Governance: A 418. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019.
Roadmap for Subnational Reform, 5/2018, pp. 3–5, 16. 419. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
396. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. 420. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
397. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data explored 421. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided “PDP projects 422. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018.
Budgeted in NBP,” n.d. 423. DOJ, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/25/2019.
398. Development Alternatives Inc., Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope 424. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney
and Resilience (SHAHAR): Monthly Report February 2015, General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016)
3/15/2015, p. 4; USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter-
1/12/2017; USAID, “Modification 07/REQM-306-1 7-000434,” narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution
11/28/2017, p. 1; DAI, Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018
Resilience (SHAHAR) Monthly Report # 38, 2/15/2018, p. 6; (July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, p. 12; DOJ, response to
USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019. SIGAR vetting, 1/25/2019.
399. DAI, Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (AMEP): USAID 425. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney
Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience(SHAHAR), General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016)
1/31/2018, p. 7. Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter-
400. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution
401. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018
402. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. (July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, p. 13.
403. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 6/25/2015; USAID, 426. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney
ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/12/2015. General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016)
404. Pacific Architects and Engineers Inc., Quarterly Progress Report Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter-
March–May 2017, 5/2017, p. 1; State, INL, response to SIGAR data narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution
call, 12/26/2018. Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018
405. Tetra Tech, Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP): (July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, p. 13.
Task Order #: SAQMMAF171220 Work Plan Year One, 2/27/2018, 427. United Nations/Government of the Islamic Republic of
p. 5. Afghanistan, “Geneva Conference on Afghanistan Deliverables,”
406. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 3/23/2018 and 12/26/2018. 11/28/2018.
407. IDLO, Quarterly Reporting for US/INL Funded Projects, 428. United Nations/Government of the Islamic Republic of
10/30/2018, p. 2. Afghanistan, “Geneva Conference Anti-Corruption Side Meeting
408. IDLO, Continuing Professional Development Support–CPDS: Concept Note,” 11/28/2018, pp. 1–3.
Program Report, 11/9/2018, p. 8. 429. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2019.
409. USAID, Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034/AID-306-TO-16-00007, 430. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2019; SIGAR,
4/16/2016, pp. 1, 8; USAID, Contract AID-OAA-I-13-0034/AID- Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2018,
306-TO-16-00007: Modification 01, 7/31/2016, p. 3; USAID, p. 113.
response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2019. 431. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2019; SIGAR,
410. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018; USAID, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2018,
ODG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019. p. 113.
411. Checchi & Company Consulting, Assistance for the Development 432. TOLOnews, “Former MoCIT Minister’s Case Handed To Supreme
of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency (ADALAT) Annual Court,” 1/14/2019.
Work Plan–April 2018–March 2019, 7/1/2018, pp. 17, 19. 433. State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2019.
412. USAID, ODG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. 434. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney
413. Checchi and Company Consulting, USAID/Assistance for General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016)
the Development of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter-
(ADALAT) Annual Report: October 2017–September 2018, narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution
11/7/2018, p. 6. Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018
414. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure (July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, pp. 12–13.
for Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): Quarterly 435. Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation
Performance Report: FY 2018, Quarter 3, 7/31/2018, pp. 1–2. Committee, “25 of MEC’s Recommendations Have Been Fully
415. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure for Implemented in the Afghan Justice Sector,” 1/6/2019, p. 1.
Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): Annual Report: 436. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney
Year 1, 10/30/2018, p. 2. General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016)
416. Management Systems International, Afghanistan’s Measure for Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter-
Accountability and Transparency (AMANAT): MEC Support narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution
Planning Report, 9/25/2018, p. 9.
Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018 468. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
(July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, pp. 9–10. 7/30/2018, p. 140; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States
437. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Congress, 10/30/2018, p. 126; DOD, CSTC-A, MAG-D, response to
10/30/2018, p. 124. SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; DOD, CSTC-A, MAG-I, response to
438. UN, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
international peace and security, report of the Secretary- 469. DOD, CSTC-A, Audits, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
General, 6/10/2016, p. 11. 470. MOI, MoIA Strategic Plan (MISP) 1397–1400, 12/2017, pp. 19, 57,
439. CSTC-A, “Briefing for Mr. John Sopko,” 6/10/2016. 67.
440. UN, report of the Secretary-General, The situation in 471. DOD, CSTC-A, TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and 472. DOD, CSTC-A, Audits, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019.
security, 9/7/2016, p. 10. 473. DOD, CSTC-A, TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
441. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 474. DOD, CSTC-A, TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
442. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 475. DOD, CSTC-A, EF3, response to SIGAR data call, 12/1/2017 and
443. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney 3/22/2018.
General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016) 476. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter- 477. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution 478. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018 479. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
(July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, p. 13. 480. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
444. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; 481. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 482. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
10/30/2018, pp. 35–36; DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR vetting, 483. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
1/12/2019. 484. State, PRM, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
445. DOJ, Department of Justice/Office of the Deputy Attorney 485. SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Number of Afghan refugees returning
General–INL Inter-Agency Agreement (December 30, 2016) to Afghanistan (1 Jan to 25 December 2018),” 12/25/2018.
Amendment One Counter-Corruption, Major Crimes, Counter- 486. SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary Repatriation
narcotics, and National Security Investigation and Prosecution 2015,” 1/1/2018; SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary
Program Quarterly Progress Report Fourth Quarter, FY 2018 Repatriation 2016,” 11/8/2017; SIGAR analysis of UNHCR, “Afghan
(July 2018–September 2018), 1/16/2019, p. 14. Voluntary Repatriation 2017,” 9/12/2018; SIGAR analysis of
446. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, UNHCR, “Afghan Voluntary Repatriation 2018,” 10/3/2018.
12/20/2018, p. 91. 487. IOM, “Return of Undocumented Afghans Weekly Situation
447. “WAG Warrant List Handout,” 11/19/2018. Report,” 12/22/2018, p. 2.
448. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 488. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,
449. “WAG Warrant List Handout,” 11/19/2018. 12/20/2018, p. 28.
450. “WAG Warrant List Handout,” 11/19/2018. 489. State, PRM, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019.
451. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 490. SIGAR analysis of UN, OCHA, “Afghanistan–Conflict Induced
452. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. Displacements in 2018,” 12/30/2018; SIGAR analysis of UN, OCHA,
453. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. “Summary of conflict induced displacements (1 Jan to 19 Dec
454. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 2017),” 12/24/2017.
455. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 491. SIGAR analysis of UN, OCHA, “Afghanistan–Conflict Induced
456. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. Displacements in 2018,” 12/24/2018 and RS, DCOS-OPS, AAG,
457. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; “District_Stability_Assessment_Unclassified,” 12/29/2018.
DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019. 492. SIGAR analysis of EUROSTAT, “First time asylum applicants in
458. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. the EU-28 by citizenship,” 12/30/2018.
459. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 493. Afghanistan Analysts Network, “Afghan refugees and Europe in
4/30/2018, p. 142. 2017,” 12/30/2017.
460. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018; 494. USAID, “Promote,” 12/17/2018.
DOD, CSTC-A, ROL response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019. 495. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2016.
461. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 496. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018.
4/30/2018, p. 142. 497. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019.
462. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 498. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018.
463. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 499. RSI Consulting, Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Promote:
464. DOD, CSTC-A, ROL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. Women in Government (WIG) Task Order, 9/2018, pp. 5, 14.
465. DOD, CSTC-A, TAO, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 500. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018.
466. DOD, CSTC-A, Audits, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019. 501. RSI Consulting, Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Promote:
467. CSTC-A EF 2, discussion with SIGAR Research and Analysis staff, Women in Government (WIG) Task Order, 9/2018, pp. 6–7.
Kabul, 3/2018. 502. RSI Consulting, Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Promote:
Women in Government (WIG) Task Order, 9/2018, pp. 6–7.
503. USAID, OG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018. Arrangement—Debt Sustainability Analysis, 11/20/2018,
504. Treasury, “U.S. Government Fully Re-Imposes Sanctions on the p. 2; IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
Iranian Regime,” 11/5/2018. Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
505. State, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
506. The Hill, “Pompeo approves sanctions exception for development Arrangement, 11/20/2018, pp. 35, 37; SIGAR analysis of USAID-
of Iranian port to help Afghan economy,” 11/6/2018. provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; MOF, “Chart of
507. Hindustan Times, “US Exempts India from sanctions at Accounts 1397 V3.1,” n.d.
Chabahar port in Iran,” 11/7/2018; Reuters, “Pompeo allows sanc- 528. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
tions exception for Iran port development, 11/6/2018. 1/12/2019.
508. State, response to SIGAR data call, 9/21/2018. 529. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
509. IOM, “Return of Undocumented Afghans: Weekly Situation 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
Report, 25 NOV–01 DEC 2018,” 12/6/2018, p. 1. exported 1/8/2018.
510. IOM, “Return of Undocumented Afghans: Weekly Situation 530. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
Report, 25 NOV–01 DEC 2018,” 12/6/2018, p. 1. 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
511. State, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018 and 9/21/2018. exported 1/8/2018.
512. World Bank, “Afghanistan eases doing business,” 10/31/2018. 531. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
513. World Bank, Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform, 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
10/31/2018, p. 12. exported 1/8/2018.
514. World Bank, Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform, 532. See Appendix B for a breakdown of U.S. reconstruction funding
10/31/2018, p. 12; World Bank, Doing Business 2018: Reforming since 2002.
to Create Jobs, 10/31/2017, p. 142; SIGAR analysis. 533. USAID, OAPA, Grant Agreement 306-AA-18, 9/6/2018, pp. 1–2.
515. World Bank, “Common Misconceptions about Doing Business,” 534. USAID, OPPD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019.
n.d., accessed 12/27/2018. 535. USAID, “Country Strategies (CDCS),” 2/22/2018.
516. FEWS NET, “Afghanistan–Key Message Update: Fri, 2018-11-30,” 536. USAID, OAPA, Grant Agreement 306-AA-18, 9/6/2018, pp. 3–5.
11/30/2018, http://fews.net/central-asia/afghanistan/key-message- 537. State, Integrated Country Strategy–Afghanistan, 9/27/2018,
update/november-2018, accessed 12/21/2018. pp. 2–4.
517. USAID, OHA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018; FEWS 538. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth:
NET, “Integrated Phase Classification,” n.d., accessed 12/21/2018. Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-
518. USAID, OHA, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018; Integrated 18-38-LL, 4/2018, p. 7; USIP, What Can Be Done to Revive
Food Security Phase Classification, IPC Acute Food Insecurity Afghanistan’s Economy?, 2/2016, p. 2; World Bank, Afghanistan
Analysis August 2018–Projection until February 2019, 10/2018, Development Update, 8/2018, p. 7.
p. 1; World Bank, Jobs from Agriculture in Afghanistan, 2/2018, 539. USIP, What Can Be Done to Revive Afghanistan’s Economy?,
p. 9. 2/2016, p. 2; World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update,
519. USAID, “USAID Provides $43.8 million to WFP to Boost Food 8/2018, i, p. 38.
Assistance for Drought Affected Afghans,” 9/23/2018. 540. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
520. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 8.
Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 8. 541. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
521. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 8.
Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 23. 542. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
522. Wall Street Journal, “Trump Orders Big Troop Reduction in Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
Afghanistan,” 12/20/2018. Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
523. Wall Street Journal, “Military walks a fine line in discussing Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 8.
Afghanistan after Trump orders withdrawal plans,” 12/27/2018; 543. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2019. 7/30/2018, p. 150.
524. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 544. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 8/2018, pp. 9–10.
1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data 545. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 8/2018, p. 9.
exported 1/8/2018. 546. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 8/2018, p. 10.
525. SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, 8/21/2017; SIGAR, 547. SIGAR, interview with Afghanistan Customs Department official,
communications with IMF officials, 9/7/2017. 11/13/2018.
526. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported 548. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, 8/2018, p. 10.
1/12/2019. 549. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth:
527. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-
Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance 38-LL, 4/2018, p. 26; UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2017
Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security, 569. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
5/2018, p. 14. 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
550. SIGAR, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in exported 1/8/2018.
Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-52-LL, 6/2018, p. 5. 570. SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, 8/21/2017; SIGAR,
551. SIGAR, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in communications with IMF officials, 9/7/2017.
Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-52-LL, 6/2018, vii. 571. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
552. World Bank, Responding to Afghanistan’s Opium Economy 1/12/2019.
Challenge: Lessons and Policy Implications from a Development 572. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
Perspective, Policy Research Working Paper 4545, 3/2008, pp. 4–5; Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
SIGAR, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-52-LL, 6/2018, p. 5. Arrangement—Debt Sustainability Analysis, 11/20/2018,
553. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: p. 2; IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18- Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
38-LL, 4/2018, pp. 26–27. Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
554. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Arrangement, 11/20/2018, pp. 35, 37; SIGAR analysis of USAID-
Production, 11/2018, p. 8. provided AFMIS data exported 1/12/2019; MOF, “Chart of
555. SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: Accounts 1397 V3.1,” n.d.
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18- 573. USIP, Responding to Corruption and the Kabul Bank Collapse,
38-LL, 4/2018, p. 27. 12/2016, p. 2.
556. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 574. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility
7/30/2018, p. 149. Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance
557. NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2017–2018, p. 110. Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The
558. UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2017 Challenges to sus- Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 52.
tainable development, peace and security, 5/2018, p. 13; NSIA, 575. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2017–2018, p. 110. 1/12/2019.
559. IMF, Fourth Review Under The Extended Credit Facility 576. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
Arrangement, Request For Modification Of Performance 1/12/2018; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
Criteria, And Request For Extension And Rephasing Of The exported 1/8/2018.
Arrangement, 11/20/2018, p. 24; World Bank, Afghanistan 577. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
Development Update, 8/2018, p. 38. 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
560. NSIA, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2017–2018, pp. 110, exported 1/8/2018.
114; UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2017 Challenges to 578. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
sustainable development, peace and security, 5/2018, p. 14; 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
World Bank, Responding to Afghanistan’s Opium Economy exported 1/8/2018. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data
Challenge: Lessons and Policy Implications from a Development exported 1/12/2019; SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS
Perspective, Policy Research Working Paper 4545, 3/2008, p. 4; data exported 1/8/2018.
SIGAR, Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: 579. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18- 1/12/2019.
38-LL, 4/2018, p. 26. 580. SIGAR, communications with MOF officials, 8/21/2017.
561. UNODC, Afghanistan opium survey 2017 Challenges to sus- 581. SIGAR analysis of USAID-provided AFMIS data exported
tainable development, peace and security, 5/2018, p. 14; SIGAR 1/12/2019.
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call, 12/20/2018 and 9/20/2018; SIGAR, analysis of RS-provided Counternarcotics Ministry May Be on Chopping Block,
data, 12/2018. 12/11/2018; State INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019.
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Unreliable Data Presents Challenges in Assessing Program 778. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and
Performance and the Extent of Progress, SIGAR 17-22-AR, 1/2017, Production, 11/2018, pp. 5–6; State, INL, response to SIGAR vet-
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Comparison: Population,” n.d., https://www.cia.gov/library/pub- 781. DOD CD, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018; NIST, The
lications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html, accessed United States and the Metric System: A Capsule in History,
3/25/2018; SIGAR analysis. 1997, p. 8, https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pml/
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government, 6/2018, p. 17. response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
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Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Obeh district of 10/30/2018, p. 86; 9 AETF, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018;
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761. SIGAR analysis of USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2019; 784. 9 AETF, response to SIGAR data call, 12/2018.
SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator’s Report on 785. TAAC-Air, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
Financial Status, as of October 22, 2018. 786. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,
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Nutrition (IHSAN),” 9/14/2017, p. 1; USAID, response to SIGAR 787. 9 AETF, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018; DOD, response to
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(IHSAN) Fiscal Year 2018–Annual Report, 10/30/2018, p. 1. 10/30/2018, p. 86; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States
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OHN, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2019. United States C ongress, 1/30/2018, p. 195.
765. WHO, Poliomyelitis, Report by the Secretariat A70/14, 4/24/2017, 789. See Appendix B of this report.
p. 1; The Guardian, “Pakistan and Afghanistan Join Forces to 790. DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2016.
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ting, 10/10/2017; CDC, Principles of Epidemiology in Public Counternarcotics Ministry May Be on Chopping Block,
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Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police, Criminal 886. UNODC, Quarterly Report, INL Funded Alternative Development
Justice, and Counternarcotics Support Programs of March 9, Project Boost Alternative Development Intervention through
2006 between the Government of the United States of America Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), Period Covered: April to June
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Initiative Awards for Provincial Counternarcotics Achievements,” 891. SIGAR, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in
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864. State Department Cable, 18 Kabul 5446, Afghanistan: 895. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded
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12/11/2018. 2018), n.d, pp. 1–2.
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Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2018, pp. 18, 74. 897. UNDP, Quarterly Reporting Template for US/INL Funded
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868. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019; State, INL, 898. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018.
response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 899. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/9/2018.
869. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019. 900. USAID, Contract 72030618C00013 between USAID/Afghanistan
870. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, and DAI Global, LLC, 8/2/2018, pp. 5, 12, 15, 18; USAID, Contract
Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2018, p. 18. 72030618C00013 between USAID/Afghanistan and DAI Global,
871. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, LLC, Modification P00001, 9/12/2018, p. 1.
Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2018, p. 92. 901. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018.
872. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2018. 902. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chain-High Value Crops, Quarterly
873. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019. Performance Report, Fourth Quarter, FY2018, 11/10/2018, p. 5;
874. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chain-Crops, Monthly Performance
875. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019. Report, October 2018, 11/07/2018, p. 5.
876. State, INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/15/2019. 903. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019.
877. State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2018. 904. USAID, Contract 72030618C00011 between USAID/Afghanistan
878. State, INL, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, and DAI Global, LLC, 6/9/2018, pp. 5, 11.
Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control, 3/2018, pp. 94–95.
905. USAID, Afghanistan Value Chains-Livestock, Quarterly 921. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019.
Performance Report, July–September 2018, 10/30/2018, pp. 1, 4; 922. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)—
USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2018. North, Contract No. AID-306-C-14-00002, FY2018, Quarter 3
906. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019. (April–June 2018), 7/31/2018, p. 8.
907. USAID, Grant and Cooperative Agreement AID-306-IO-17-00005 923. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
with Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 7/30/2018, p. 194.
10/20/2018, p. 1. 924. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)—
908. USAID, Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan, Semi- North, Contract No. AID-306-C-14-00002, FY2018, October
annual Progress Report, September 20, 2017 to March 31, 2018, Monthly Report, 11/29/2018, pp. 7–8.
5/29/2018, i, p. 1. 925. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)—
909. USAID, Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan, Annual North, Contract No. AID-306-C-14-00002, FY2018, November
Progress Report, September 20, 2017 to September 19, 2018, Monthly Report, 12/31/2018, pp. 7–8.
9/30/2018, pp. 6–7. 926. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program (RADP)—
910. USAID, Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan, Semi- North, Contract No. AID-306-C-14-00002, FY2018, November
Annual Progress Report, September 20, 2017 to March 31, Monthly Report, 12/31/2018, p. 8.
2018, 5/29/2018, pp. 5, 19–20; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 927. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018.
10/11/2018. 928. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019.
911. USAID, Promoting Value Chains-Western Afghanistan, Annual 929. USAID, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) Program, Year 4, KFZ
Progress Report, September 20, 2017 to September 19, 2018, Quarterly Progress Report, Q4 FY2017, July 1–September
9/30/2018, pp. 9–10. 30, 2017, 10/31/2017, p. 6; USAID, response to SIGAR data call,
912. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019. 10/09/2014.
913. USAID, Factsheet, “Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural 930. USAID, Kandahar Food Zone Mid-term Performance
Marketing Program (CHAMP),” 7/2017, https://www.usaid.gov/ Evaluation, 3/2015, pp. 1, 3.
sites/default/files/documents/1871/Commercial_Horticulture_ 931. USAID, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) Program, Year 5, KFZ
and_Agricultural_Marketing_Project_CHAMP_-_July_2017.pdf, Quarterly Progress Report, Q3 FY2018, April 1–June 30, 2018,
accessed 9/28/2018. 2018, p. 9.
914. USAID, Modification No. 25 to Cooperative Agreement 306-A-00- 932. USAID, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) Program, Year 5, KFZ
10-00512-00 with Roots of Peace, 5/30/2018. Quarterly Progress Report, Q4 FY2018, July 1–August 30, 2018,
915. USAID, Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing 2018, p. 4.
Program (CHAMP), Quarterly Progress Report, July–September 933. USAID, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) Program, Year 5, KFZ
2018, 10/30/2018, pp. 4–5; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, Quarterly Progress Report, Q4 FY2018, July 1–August 30, 2018,
1/10/2019. 2018, pp. 6–8.
916. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019. 934. SIGAR analysis of UNODC opium survey cultivation data,
917. USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2016. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and
918. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019. Production, 11/2018, pp. 63, 65.
919. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program—East 935. USAID, Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) Program, Year 5, KFZ
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2018, 1/20/2018; USAID, Regional Agricultural Development 2018, p. 7; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 12/23/2018.
Program—East (RADP-E), Quarterly Report FY 2018, Quarter 936. USAID, Quarterly Pipeline Report, as of 1/12/2019.
3 (April–June, 2018), 7/30/2018, p. 2.
920. USAID, Regional Agricultural Development Program—East
(RADP-E), Factsheet, 9/2018.
As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No.
115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No. 115-91,
”National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018,” 12/12/2017.
(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)
Michael Bindell, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate Olivia Paek, Senior Visual Information Specialist
Theodore Burns, Funding Subject Matter Expert Zaba Rashan, Student Trainee
Cover photo:
An Afghan pigeon fancier sits as he feeds his pigeons flying from the rooftop of his home in Daniel Fisher, Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert Heather Robinson, Security Subject Matter Expert
Herat Province. (AFP photo by Hoshang Hashimi) Robert Hill, Student Trainee Deborah Scroggins, Director of Research and Analysis Directorate
Clark Irwin, Lead Writer/Editor Omar Sharif, Project Coordinator
Vong Lim, Visual Information Specialist Solange Toura Gaba, Counternarcotics Subject Matter Expert
PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIGIE QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTION AND EVALUATION.
James Misencik, Security Subject Matter Expert Daniel Weggeland, Governance Subject Matter Expert
SIGAR
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SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JANUARY 30, 2019
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL Special Inspector General for JAN 30
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