Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14355             October 31, 1919

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,

City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.

JOHNSON, J.:

The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts
inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?

That question arose in the following manner:

On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city,
praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:

That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is
necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of
Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court.

The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila], answering the petition of the
plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine
Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it
was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied  that it
was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and
roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation;
that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,
which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of
the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the
defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said
expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a
large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such
new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead,
and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the
graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was
not necessary as a public improvement.

The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and
alleged that said expropriation was not a public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to acquire the
parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as a cemetery in which were the graves
of his ancestors; that monuments and tombstones of great value were found thereon; that the land had
become quasi-public property of a benevolent association, dedicated and used for the burial of the dead and that
many dead were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and still
offers to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the
sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so offered, free of charge, would
answer every public necessity on the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other
defendants, answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de
Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.

The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted in order to show the general
character of the defenses presented by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was
necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in
question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge,
in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities, decided that
there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of
the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.

From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its principal ground of appeal.

The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate
land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain
the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible
purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that
the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of
Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn  private  property
for public use."

The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect. We are
driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised.
From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of eminent domain may be exercised.
Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof,
or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private
property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed."

Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state
with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned together with the
interest of each defendant separately.

Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it
shall then appoint commissioners.

Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248 provides for
an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the
Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on
appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance
with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover whatever
damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find the  right  to
expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate,
then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the
land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question.

Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and that the courts cannot intervene
except for the purpose of determining the value of the land in question, there is much legal legislature. Much has
been written upon both sides of that question. A careful examination of the discussions pro and con will disclose the
fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if the
legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a  certain  or  particular parcel  of land  for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant  general authority  to a municipal corporation to
expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the
provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether
or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. In other words, have no the courts in this
jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No.
190) for final decision, to ask whether or not the law has been complied with? Suppose in a particular case, it should
be denied that the property is not private property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that question? Or,
suppose the defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation is not public but private, or that there exists no public
purpose at all, may not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?

The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private  lands for  public  purposes. Can it be possible that said
authority confers the right to determine for itself that the land is private and that the purpose is public, and that the
people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially those who are directly affected, may not
question one or the other, or both, of these questions? Can it be successfully contended that the phrase used in Act
No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that such  right  exists," means simply that the court shall examine
the statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the right
of eminent domain? Or, when the case arrives in the Supreme Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the
Supreme Court shall determine that no right of expropriation exists," that that simply means that the Supreme Court
shall also examine the enactments of the legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not a law exists
permitting the plaintiff to expropriate?

We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists
for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that
neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law.

Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land
is public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that
the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in
this jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute while his land is being expropriated for a use not public, with the right
simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his land? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities
to expropriate lands, without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of those who happen
for the time being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are called
upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the public necessity?

As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority of the court to question the necessity or
advisability of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon particular
statutory or constitutional provisions.

It has been contended — and many cases are cited in support of that contention, and section 158 of volume 10 of
Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive — that the necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is
not a judicial question. But those who cited said section evidently overlooked the section immediately following (sec.
159), which adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which
it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for
protection by the courts. While many courts have used sweeping expression in the decisions in which they have
disclaimed the power of supervising the power of supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may
be safely said that the courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion
delegated by the legislature, by an attempted appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible necessity of its
use, or when the alleged purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme." (Norwich City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn., 151;
Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St.,
368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)

Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in support of the contention of the appellant,
says:

The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain,  may directly determine the
necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the
 exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement,
the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions
exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own
views for those of the representatives of the people.

Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and we are justified in making the
statement that in each case the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is
presented to the legislative department of the government and that department decides that there exists a necessity
for the exercise of the right in a particular case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of
the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry,
etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the doctrine laid down in
section 158 above quoted, the court said:

But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the necessity of
taking  particular property  is a question for the courts. Where the application to condemn or appropriate is
made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene.

The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to designate the precise property which should
be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general authority to take land for
public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently asserted that, under such statute,
the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to
decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42 Am. St. Rep., 402, 407].)

There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right
of eminent domain, and a decision by the municipality that there exist a necessity for the exercise of that right in a
particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons why the right should be conferred upon
municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the right to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative
declaration relating to the advisability of granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity
exists for its exercise in a particular case, and especially so when, perhaps, the land in question was not within the
territorial authority was granted.

Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the
purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to
hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.

Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a further conclusive authority upon
the question that the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a legislative and not a judicial
question. Cyclopedia, at the page stated, says:

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency  of

The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support of the doctrine quoted. While time has not
permitted an examination of all of said citations, many of them have been examined, and it can be confidently
asserted that said cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity and expediency of exercising
the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial," show clearly and invariably that in
each case the legislature itself usually, by a special law, designated the particular case in which the right of eminent
domain might be exercised by the particular municipal corporation or entity within the state. (Eastern R.
Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass., 125 [15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs vs. Armstrong, 45 N.Y., 234 [6
Am. Rep., 70]; Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S.,
390; U.S.  vs.  Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U.S.  vs.  Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668;
Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U.S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242 U.S.].)

In the case of  Traction Co. vs. Mining Co.  (196 U.S., 239), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It is
erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent
domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. For if the use be not
public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature cannot authorize the taking of private property against the
will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."

In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaña (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we find the Supreme Court of Porto
Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary, quoting approvingly the following, upon the question which we are
discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily determine in the first instance whether the
use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not, their (municipalities, etc.)
determination is not final, but is subject to correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute
unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of private
property is in reality not public but private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.

Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says: "At any rate, the rule is quite well settled
that in the cases under consideration the determination of the necessity of taking a  particular piece  or a certain
amount of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo, etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) .

In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R. A., N. S., 1024]), the Supreme Court
of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all
such cases the necessity of public utility of the proposed work or improvement is a judicial question. In all such
cases, where the authority is to take property necessary for the purpose, the necessity of taking  particular
property  for a particular purpose is a judicial one, upon which the owner is entitled to be heard."
(Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390,
403.)

The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants
of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to
delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc.
Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)

In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the Supreme Court of the State of
Maryland, discussing the question before us, said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain)
where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the
purpose of the incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be
required to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise. Any rule less strict than this, with the
large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the right to corporations, would likely lead to oppression and the
sacrifice of private right to corporate power."

In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court said: "Its right to condemn property is not a
general power of condemnation, but is limited to cases where a necessity for resort to private property is shown to
exist. Such necessity must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If the necessary is denied the burden is
upon the company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland, etc. Co.  vs.  Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856;
Kiney vs. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind., 252, 257 ; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137
Am. St. Rep. 338].)

It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a legislative question, and many
other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or
statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that the question
whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question. The legislative may, it is
true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not
be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly
sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The
decisions must be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any
and every purpose which the legislative might happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be
so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character Blackstone in his Commentaries on
the English Law remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least
violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great necessity therefor.

In the case of  Wilkinson vs. Leland  (2 Pet. [U.S.], 657), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "That
government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely defendant on the legislative
body, without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the rights of personal
liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming that the power to violate and disregard them — a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice
and civil liberty — lurked in any general grant of legislature authority, or ought to be implied from any general
expression of the people. The people ought no to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-
being without very strong and direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 603;
Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20 La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann., 182.)

Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law said that the right to own and possess land — a place to live
separate and apart from others — to retain it as a home for the family in a way not to be molested by others — is one
of the most sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has been written into the organic law of every civilized
nation. The Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29, 1916, which provide that "no law shall be enacted in
the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of his property without due process of law," are but a
restatement of the time-honored protection of the absolute right of the individual to his property. Neither did said Acts
of Congress add anything to the law already existing in the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized the
principle and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the
private property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property
unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of  proven  public utility, and after payment of the proper
compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with, it shall be the duty of
the courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him , as the case
may be."

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily
in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of
property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not
be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am.
Dec., 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of
government authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict
observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and
to protect it from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly conferred
and the use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all constitutional limitation and  directions for its
exercise, must be strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited;
Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)

It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take property for some public use unless some
public necessity existed therefor. The right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the
taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as the legislature has given it
general authority to take private property for public use, that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the
necessity in every case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that question. Can it be
imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711, that it thereby declared that it was necessary
to appropriate the property of Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time the
law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended
that a municipality should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face of the
provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear proof upon the
necessity for the appropriation in a particular case?

The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public use. Suppose the owner of the
property denies and successfully proves that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be
justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no public purpose was proved? Can it be
denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an
issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire
into the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no
necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question
whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the
necessity.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land.  (Morrison  vs.  Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns  vs.  Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R.
Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The  general power  to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in
a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the
State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general
authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority.  The necessity  for  conferring the authority  upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain  is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain
is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the
exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in a particular case.
(Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs.  City of St. Paul. 48
Minn., 540.)

And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that their exists a
necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly indicate
that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement, thereby
avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead.

Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the defendants further contend that
the street in question should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery
is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public use. The
city of Manila can only expropriate private property.

It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community
or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)

Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses
under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good
faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)

The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. The Spanish Governor-
General, in an order creating the same, used the following language:

The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by the
spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in
consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration, government and
regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China
in order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually effectuated.

It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which
fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of
Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.

But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street,
especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of
great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest
necessity exists therefor.

While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is a matter of public knowledge
that in the process of time sepulchres may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily
trod by the feet of millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead should
not be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries
and sepulchres and the places of the burial of the dead are still within
the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred
regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under
such circumstances, should be violated.

In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at law, for the wounded sensibilities
of the living, in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or
street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too
apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the
sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last
resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that
object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New
Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)

In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record
contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and
adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

The Government of the Philippine Islands is authorized by the Philippine Bill to acquire real estate for public use by
the exercise of the right of eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, sec. 63.) A portion of this power has
been delegated by the Philippine Legislature to the city of Manila, which is permitted to "condemn private property for
public use." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 2429.) The Code of Civil Procedure, in prescribing how the right of
eminent domain may be exercised, also limits the condemnation to "private property for public use." (Sec. 241.) As
under the facts actually presented, there can be no question that a public street constitutes a public use, the only
remaining question is whether or not the Chinese Cemetery and the other property here sought to be taken by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is "private property."

As narrowing our inquiry still further, let it be noted that cemeteries are of two classes, public and private. A public
cemetery is one used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church; while a private cemetery is one used
only by a family, or small portion of a community. (Lay  vs.  State, 12 Ind. App., 362; Cemetery
Association vs. Meninger [1875], 14 Kan., 312.) Our specific question, then, is, whether the Chinese Cemetery in the
city of Manila is a public, or a private graveyard. If it be found to be the former, it is not subject to condemnation by
the city of Manila; if it be found to be the latter, it is subject to condemnation.

The Chinese Cemetery of Manila was established during the Spanish administration in the Philippines by public
spirited Chinese. The order of the Governor-General giving governmental recognition to the cemetery reads as
follows: "The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by the
spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protectors, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in
consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands, its internal administration, government and regime,
must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China in order that
the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually effectuated." Sometimes after the inauguration of
the new regime in the Philippines, a corporation was organized to control the cemetery, and a Torrens title for the
lands in question was obtained.

From the time of its creation until the present the cemetery has been used by the Chinese community for the burial of
their dead. It is said that not less than four hundred graves, many of them with handsome monuments, would be
destroyed by the proposed street. This desecration is attempted as to the las t resting places of the dead of a people
who, because of their peculiar and ingrained ancestral workship, retain more than the usual reverence for the
departed. These facts lead us straight to the conclusion that the Chinese Cemetery is not used by a family or a small
portion of a community but by a particular race long existing in the country and of considerable numbers. The case,
then, is one of where the city of Manila, under a general authority permitting it to condemn private property for public
use, is attempting to convert a property already dedicated to a public use to an entirely different public use; and this,
not directly pursuant to legislative authority, but primarily through the sole advice of the consulting architect.

Two well considered decisions coming from the American state courts on almost identical facts are worthy of our
consideration. The first is the case of The Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven ([1875], 43
Conn., 234), of cited by other courts. Here the City of New Haven, Connecticut, under the general power conferred
upon it to lay out, construct, and maintain all necessary highways within its limits, proceeded to widen and straighten
one of its streets and in so doing took a small piece of land belonging to the Evergreen Cemetery Association. This
association was incorporated under the general statute. The city had no special power to take any part of the
cemetery for such purposes. It was found that the land taken was needed for the purposes of the cemetery and was
not needed for the purpose of widening and straightening the avenue. The court said that it is unquestionable that the
Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land already applied to one public use and devote it to another.
When the power is granted to municipal or private corporations in express words, no question can arise. But, it was
added, "The same land cannot properly be used for burial lots and for a public highway at the same time. . . . Land
therefore applied to one use should not be taken for the other except in cases on necessity. . . . There is no difficulty
in effecting the desired improvement by taking land on the other side of the street. . . . The idea of running a public
street, regardless of graves, monuments, and the feelings of the living, through one of our public cemeteries, would
be shocking to the moral sense of the community, and would not be tolerated except upon the direst necessity." It
was then held that land already devoted to a public use cannot be taken by the public for another use which is
inconsistent with the first, without special authority from the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and
reasonable implication.

The second decision is that of Memphis State Line Railroad Company  vs.  Forest Hill Cemetery Co. ([1906], 116
Tenn., 400.) Here the purpose of the proceedings was to condemn a right of way for the railway company through the
Forest Hill Cemetery. The railroad proposed to run through the southeast corner of the cemetery where no bodies
were interred. The cemetery had been in use for about eight years, and during this period thirteen hundred bodies
had been buried therein. The cemetery was under the control of a corporation which, by its character, held itself out
as being willing to sell lots to any one who applies therefor and pays the price demanded, except to members of the
Negro race. 1awph!l.net

It was found that there were two other routes along which the railroad might be located without touching the
cemetery, while the present line might be pursued without interfering with Forest Hill Cemetery by making a curve
around it. In the court below the railroad was granted the right of condemnation through the cemetery and damages
were assessed. On appeal, the certiorari applied for was granted, and the supersedeas awarded. The court, in effect,
found that the land of the Cemetery Company was devoted to a public purpose, and that under the general language
of the Tennessee statute of eminent domain it could not be taken for another public purpose. The court said that in
process of time the sepulchres of the dead "are made the seats of cities, and are traversed by streets, and daily
trodden by the feet of man. This is inevitable in the course of ages. But while these places are yet within the memory
and under the active care of the living, while they are still devoted to pious uses, they are sacred, and we cannot
suppose that the legislature intended that they should be violated, in the absence of special provisions upon the
subject authorizing such invasion, and indicating a method for the disinterment, removal, and reinterment of the
bodies buried, and directing how the expense thereof shall be borne." Two members of the court, delivering a
separate concurring opinion, concluded with this significant and eloquent sentence: "The wheels of commerce must
stop at the grave."

For the foregoing reasons, and for others which are stated in the principal decision, I am of the opinion that the
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

STREET, J., dissenting:

It may be admitted that, upon the evidence before us, the projected condemnation of the Chinese Cemetery is
unnecessary and perhaps ill-considered. Nevertheless I concur with Justice Moir in the view that the authorities of
the city of Manila are the proper judges of the propriety of the condemnation and that this Court should have nothing
to do with the question of the necessity of the taking.

MOIR, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority opinion in this case, which has not yet been written, and because of the importance of the
question involved, present my dissent for the record.
This is an action by the city of Manila for the expropriation of land for an extension of Rizal Avenue north. The petition
for condemnation was opposed by the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" and Ildefonso Tambunting and various
other who obtained permission of the trial court to intervene in the case.

All of the defendants allege in their opposition that the proposed extension of Rizal Avenue cuts through a part of the
Chinese Cemetery, North of Manila, and necessitates the destruction of many monuments and the removal of many
graves.

The Court of First Instance of Manila, Honorable S. del Rosario, judge after hearing the parties, decided that there
was no need for constructing the street as and where proposed by the city, and dismissed the petition.

The plaintiff appealed and sets up the following errors:

1. The court erred in deciding that the determination of the necessity and convenience of the expropriation of
the lands of the defendants lies with the court and not with the Municipal Board of the city of Manila.

2. The court erred in permitting the presentation of proofs over the objection and exception of the plaintiff
tending to demonstrate the lack of necessity of the projected street and the need of the lands in question.

3. The court erred in declaring that the plaintiff had no right to expropriate the lands in question.

4. The court erred in dismissing the complaint.

The right of the plaintiff to expropriate property for public use cannot be denied. The "right of eminent domain is
inherent in all sovereignties and therefore would exist without any constitutional recognition . . . . The right of eminent
domain antedates constitutions . . . . The right can only be denied or restricted by  fundamental  law and is right
inherent in society." (15 Cyc., pp. 557-8.) .

This general right was recognized in the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure effective October 1st, 1901, which
prescribed the manner of exercising the right. (Sections 241 et seq.)

It was further recognized in the Organic Act of July 1st, 1902, which provides in section 74 "that the Government of
the Philippine Islands may grant franchises . . . including the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain for the
construction and operation of works of public utility and service, and may authorize said works to be constructed and
maintained over and across the public property of the United States including . . . reservations." This provisions is
repeated in the Jones Law of August, 1916.

The legislature of the Islands conferred the right on the city of Manila. (Section 2429, Administrative Code of 1917;
section 2402, Administrative Code of 1916.)

Clearly having the right of expropriation, the city of Manila selected the line of its street and asked the court by proper
order to place the plaintiff in possession of the land described in the complaint, and to appoint Commissioners to
inspect the property, appraise the value, and assess the damages. Instead of doing so, the court entered upon the
question of the right of the city to take the property and the necessity for the taking.

The court says:

The controversy relates to whether or not the Chinese Cemetery, where a great majority of this race is buried
and other persons belonging to other nationalities have been formerly inhumed, is private or public; whether or
not said cemetery, in case it is  public, would be susceptible to expropriation for the purpose of public
improvements proposed  by the city of Manila; whether or not the latter is justified of the necessity and
expediency of similar expropriation before its right to the same would be upheld by the courts of justice; and
whether or not the appreciation of said necessity pertains to the legislative or the judicial department before
which the expropriation proceedings have been brought.

Relative to the first point, it is not necessary for the court to pass upon its consideration, in view of the
conclusion it has arrived at the appreciation of the other points connected with each other.

From the testimony of two reputable engineers produced by some of the defendants, it appears that the land
chosen by the plaintiff for the extension of Rizal Avenue to the municipality of Caloocan is not the best or the
less expensive, although upon it there may be constructed a straight road, without curves or winding; but that
in order to construct said road upon said land, the city of Manila would have to remove and transfer to other
places about four hundred graves and monuments, make some grubbings, undergo some leveling and build
 some bridges — the works thereon, together with the construction of the road and the value of the lands
expropriated, would mean an expenditure which will not be less than P180,000.

Beside that considerable amount, the road would have a declivity of 3 per cent which, in order to cover a
distance of one kilometer, would require an energy equivalent to that which would be expanded in covering a
distance of two and one-half kilometers upon a level road.

On the other hand, if the road would be constructed with the deviation proposed by Ildefonso Tambunting, one
of the defendants, who even offered to donate gratuitously to the city of Manila part of the land upon which
said road will have to be constructed, the plaintiff entity would be able to save more than hundreds of thousand
of pesos, which can be invested in other improvements of greater pressure and necessity for the benefit of the
taxpayers; and it will not have to employ more time and incur greater expenditures in the removal and transfer
of the remains buried in the land of the Chinese Community and of Sr. Tambunting, although with the
insignificant disadvantage that the road would be little longer by a still more insignificant extension of 426
meters and 55 centimeters less than one-half kilometer, according to the plan included in the records; but it
would offer a better panorama to those who would use it, and who would not have to traverse in their
necessary or pleasure-making trips or walks any cemetery which, on account of its nature, always deserves
the respect of the travellers. It should be observed that the proposed straight road over the cemetery, which
the city of Manila is proposing to expropriate, does not lead to any commercial, industrial, or agricultural center,
and if with said road it is endeavored to benefit some community or created interest, the same object may be
obtained by the proposed deviation of the road by the defendants. The road traced by the plaintiffs has the
disadvantage that the lands on both sides thereof would not serve for residential purposes, for the reason that
no one has the pleasure to construct buildings upon cemeteries, unless it be in very overcrowded cities, so
exhausted of land that every inch thereof represents a dwelling house.

And it is against the ruling, that it lies with the court to determine the necessity of the proposed street and not with the
municipal board, that the appellant directs its first assignment of error.

It is a right of the city government to determine whether or not it will construct streets and where, and the court's sole
duty was to see that the value of the property was paid the owners after proper legal proceedings ascertaining the
value.

The law gives the city the right to take private property for public use. It is assumed it is unnecessary to argue that a
public road is a public use.

But it is argued that plaintiff must show that it is necessary to take this land for a public improvement. The law does
not so read, and it is believed that the great weight of authority, including the United States Supreme Court, is against
the contention.

The question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and former question is exclusively for the
legislature, except that if the constitution or statute authorizes the taking of property only in cases of necessity,
then the necessity becomes a judicial question. (McQuillen Municipal Corporations, Vol. IV, pp. 3090-3091.)

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of
exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. The
determination of those questions belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative determination is final and
conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it. It rests with the legislature not only to determine when
the power of eminent domain may be exercised, but also the character, quality, method, and extent of such
exercise. And this power is unqualified, other than by the necessity of providing that compensation shall be
made. Nevertheless, under the express provisions of the constitution of some states the question of necessity
is made a judicial one, to be determined by the courts and not by the legislature.

While the legislature may itself exercise the right of determining the necessity for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, it may, unless prohibited by the constitution, delegate this power to public officers or to private
corporations established to carry on enterprises in which the public are interested, and their determination that
a necessity for the exercise of the power exists is conclusive. There is no restraint upon the power except that
requiring compensation to be made. And when the power has been so delegated it is a subject of legislative
discretion to determine what prudential regulations shall be established to secure a discreet and judicious
exercise of the authority. It has been held that in the absence of any statutory provision submitting the matter
to a court or jury the decision of the question of necessity lies with the body of individuals to whom the state
has delegated the authority to take, and the legislature may be express provision confer this power on a
corporation to whom the power of eminent domain is delegated unless prohibited by the constitution. It is of
 course competent for the legislature to declare that the question shall be a judicial one, in which case the court
and not the corporation determines the question of necessity. (15 Cyc., pp. 629-632.)

To the same effect is Lewis on Eminen Domain (3d Edition, section 597).

I quote from the notes to Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports, p. 762, as follows:

Neither can it be said that there is any fundamental right secured by the constitution of the United States to
have the questions of compensation and necessity both passed upon by one and the same jury. In many
states the question of necessity is never submitted to the jury which passes upon the question of
compensation. It is either settled affirmatively by the legislature, or left to the judgment of the corporation
invested with the right to take property by condemnation. The question of necessity is not one of a judicial
character, but rather one for determination by the lawmaking branch of the government. (Boom
Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403, 406 [25 L. ed., 206]; United States vs. Jones, 109 U.S., 513 [27 L. ed., 1015];
Backus vs. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S., 557, 568 [42 L. ed., 853].)

Speaking generally, it is for the state primarily and exclusively, to declare for what local public purposes private
property, within its limits may be taken upon compensation to the owner, as well as to prescribe a mode in
which it may be condemned and taken. (Madisonville Tract. Co. vs. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S., 239, 252
[49 L. ed., 462].)

Courts have no power to control the legislative authority in the exercise of their right to determine when it is
necessary or expedient to condemn a specific piece of property for public purposes. (Adirondack R.
Co. vs. New York States, 176 U.S., 335 [44 L. ed., 492].)

10 R. C. L. (p. 183), states the law as follows:

158. Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question. — The legislature, in providing for the exercise the
power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement or public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case,
it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine,
and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for these of the representatives of
the people. Similarly, when the legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to municipal or public
service corporation or other tribunals or bodies, and has given them discretion as to when the power is to be
called into exercise and to what extent, the court will not inquire into the necessity or propriety of the taking.

The United States Supreme Court recently said:

The uses to which this land are to be put are undeniably public uses. When that is the case the propriety or
expediency of the appropriation cannot be called in question by any other authority. (Cinnati vs. S. & N. R. R.
Co., 223 U.S., 390, quoting U.S. vs. Jones, 109, U.S., 519.)

And in Sears vs. City of Akron (246 U.S., 242), decided March 4th, 1918, it said:

Plaintiff contends that the ordinance is void because the general statute which authorized the appropriation
violates both Article 1, paragraph 10, of the Federal Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it
authorizes the municipality to determine the necessity for the taking of private property  without the owners
having an opportunity to be hear as to such necessity; that in fact no necessity existed for any taking which
would interfere with the company's project; since the city might have taken water from the Little Cuyahoga or
the Tuscarawas rivers; and furthermore, that it has taken ten times as much water as it can legitimately use. It
is well settled that while the question whether the purpose of a taking is a public one is judicial
(Hairston vs. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 [52 L. ed., 637; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 331; 13 Ann. Cas., 1008]),
the necessity and the proper extent of a taking is a legislative question. (Shoemaker  vs.  United States, 147
U.S., 282, 298 [57 L. ed., 170, 184; 13 Supt. Ct. Rep., 361]; United States vs. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160
U.S. 668, 685 [40 L. ed., 576, 582; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 427]; United States vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., 229 U.S., 53, 65 [57 L. ed., 1063, 1076; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 667].)

I think the case should be decided in accordance with foregoing citations, but one other point has been argued so
extensively that it ought to be considered.
It is contended for the defense that this Chinese Cemetery is a public cemetery and that it cannot therefore be taken
for public use. In its answer the "Comunidad de Chinos de Manila" says it is "a corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands," and that it owns the land which plaintiff seeks to acquire.
The facts that it is private corporation owning land would seem of necessity to make the land it owns private land.
The fact that it belongs to the Chinese community deprives it of any public character.

But admitting that it is a public cemetery, although limited in its use to the Chinese Community of the city of Manila,
can it not be taken for public use? Must we let the reverence we feel for the dead and the sanctity of their final
resting-place obstruct the progress of the living? It will be instructive to inquire what other jurisdictions have held on
that point.

On the Application of Board of Street Openings of New York City to acquire St. Johns Cemetery (133 N.Y., 329) the
court of appeal said:

. . . The board instituted this proceeding under the act to acquire for park purposes the title to land below One
Hundred and Fifty-fifth street known as St. John's cemetery which belonged to a religious corporation in the
city of New York, commonly called Trinity Church. It was established as a cemetery as early as 1801, and used
for that purpose until 1839, during which time about ten thousand human bodies had been buried therein. In
1839 an ordinance was passed by the city of New York forbidding interments south of Eighty-sixth street, and
since that time no interments have been made in the cemetery, but Trinity Church has preserved and kept it in
order and prevented any disturbance thereof.

It is contended on behalf of Trinity Church that under the general authority given by statute of 1887, this land
which had been devoted to cemetery purposes could not be taken for a park. The authority conferred upon the
board by the act is broad and general. It is authorized to take for park purposes any land south of One
Hundred and Fifty-fifth street. . . . .

The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery purposes does not place them beyond the reach
of the power of eminent domain. That is an absolute transcendent power belonging to the sovereign which can
be exercised for the public welfare whenever the sovereign authority shall determine that a necessity for its
exercise exists. By its existence the homes and the dwellings of the living, and the resting-places of the dead
may be alike condemned.

It seems always to have been recognized in the laws of this state, that under the general laws streets and
highways could be laid out through cemeteries, in the absence of special limitation or prohibition. . . .

In Re Opening of Twenty-second Street (102 Penn. State Reports, 108) the Supreme Court of the State said:

This was an action for the opening of a street through a cemetery in the City of Philadelphia. It was contended
for the United American Mechanics and United Daughters of America Cemetery Association that by an act of
the legislature of the State approved March 20th, 1849, they were forever exempt from the taking of any their
property for streets, roads or alleys and this Act was formally accepted by the Cemetery Company on April 9th,
1849, and there was, therefore, a contract between the Cemetery Company and the State of Pennsylvania,
which would be violated by the taking of any part of their property for street purposes. It was further contended
that there were 11,000 persons buried in the cemetery.

The court held that property and contracts of all kinds must yield to the demand of the sovereign and that
under the power of eminent domain all properties could be taken, and that if there was a contract between the
State of Pennsylvania and the Cemetery Association, the contract itself could be taken for public use, and
ordered the opening of the street through the cemetery.

In Vol. 5, Encyclopedia of United States Supreme Court Reports (p. 759), it is said:

Although it has been held, that where a state has delegated the power of eminent domain to a person or
corporation and where by its exercise lands have been subject to a public use, they cannot be applied to
another public use without specific authority expressed or implied to that effect, yet, the general rule seems to
be that the fact that property is already devoted to a public use, does not exempt it from being appropriated
under the right of eminent domain but it may be so taken for a use which is clearly superior or paramount to
the one to which it is already devoted. (Citing many United States Supreme Court decisions.)

A few cases have been cited where the courts refused to allow the opening of streets through cemeteries, but in my
opinion they are not as well considered as the cases and authorities relied upon herein.
The holding of this court in this case reverses well settled principles of law of long standing and almost universal
acceptance.

The other assignments of error need not be considered as they are involved in the foregoing.

The decision should be reversed and the record returned to the Court of First Instance with instructions to proceed
with the case in accordance with this decision.