Sustainability 14 06644 v2
Sustainability 14 06644 v2
Sustainability 14 06644 v2
Article
The Role of Sustainability Reporting in Reducing Information
Asymmetry: The Case of Family- and Non-Family-
Controlled Firms
Abdul Rahman Al Natour 1 , Rasmi Meqbel 2, * , Salah Kayed 2 and Hala Zaidan 3
Abstract: This study aims to examine the link between sustainability reporting and information
asymmetry in family- and non-family-controlled firms for a sample of 641 UK firms listed in the
FTSE all-share index during the period 2010–2017. The findings show a negative and significant
relationship between sustainability reporting and IA. The results also show that the sustainability
reporting–information asymmetry nexus is weaker in family-controlled firms. The findings of this
study should improve our understanding of sustainability reporting motivations, particularly in
companies that are controlled by families. Moreover, an explanation of the role of family-controlled
firms in mitigating or exacerbating this relationship will surely help the British regulators improve
corporate governance rules related to various ownership structures. For policy makers, it is important
to confirm that sustainability reporting is representative of actual corporate activities and is not only
Citation: Al Natour, A.R.; Meqbel, R.; used to mislead stakeholders.
Kayed, S.; Zaidan, H. The Role of
Sustainability Reporting in Reducing Keywords: corporate social responsibility disclosures; sustainability reporting; information asymmetry;
Information Asymmetry: The Case of bid–ask spread; family-controlled firms
Family- and Non-Family-Controlled
Firms. Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su14116644
lower liquidity and a higher cost of company capital [13]. Despite the importance of infor-
mation asymmetry (IA) in capital markets and corporate decision making [14], studies of
the association between firms’ disclosures and IA generally focus on the effect of financial
disclosures on IA. However, little is known about whether, and in what way, sustainability
reporting (a type of non-financial disclosure) influences IA [3,6,15,16], an area of business
activity that is becoming increasingly attractive for market participants [15].
Cormier and Ledoux (9) and Dhaliwal and Radhakrishnan (2) were the first to at-
tempt to examine the influence of CSR disclosures on IA. The authors of [17] argue that
environmental and social disclosures substitute for each other in mitigating stock market
asymmetry, while the authors of [3] found that CSR reports were linked to lower forecast
errors by analysts, and that this association was moderated by stakeholder orientation
and financial transparency. Other studies have investigated these concerns in a much
broader way, by considering liquidity [18] or the cost of capital [19] as proxies for IA.
The majority of research, however, focuses on CSR performance rather than the level of
sustainability reporting [15,16,20]. Accordingly, this study aims to investigate the effects
of sustainability reporting on market participants by examining the link between CSR
disclosures and IA, taking into account the influence of each component of sustainability
reporting (such as environmental, social, and governance—hereafter ESG). It also addresses
how family-controlled firms, as an example of informed investors, could moderate the
sustainability reporting–IA nexus.
Overall, this study contributes to the existing literature on sustainability reporting, IA,
and family-controlled firms in several ways. First, unlike most previous studies, which
use a single indicator of CSR (performance and/or disclosure), the current study tests the
relationship between CSR and IA using both as single CSR indicator that combines three
elements (environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score); it then tests the effect of
each element separately. The reason for using separate CSR indicators is that sustainability
reporting is a multidimensional concept that represents the relationship between business
and society [21,22]. Despite its complexity, several studies have dealt with it as a homo-
geneous activity and regressed it as a single indicator without considering its individual
dimensions e.g., [6,15,16,23]. Rationally, considering sustainability reporting dimensions
separately (e.g., environmental, social, and governance scores) could result in a better
understanding of management strategies and their mentality towards CSR activities.
Second, the moderating role of the relationship between sustainability reporting and
IA has been previously studied by considering firm characteristics [6]; equity risk [16]; and
institutional ownership [15]. This study builds on the previous literature by examining the
moderating role of family-controlled firms in the CSR–IA nexus. The reason for choosing
such firms is that they are argued to have unique characteristics that distinguish them
from others [24,25]. Moreover, family ownership is considered to be the most prevalent
type of ownership around the world [26–28]. Third, this study extends the methodological
approaches of previous studies by using the generalised method of moments (GMM) model.
The causal association between sustainability reporting and IA could be endogenous as
a result of managerial policies and other factors that result in simultaneity and reversed
causality. Therefore, if sustainability reporting and IA are simultaneously determined, the
ordinary least squares (OLS) method will not be accurate. Consequently, based on the work
of Arellano and Bond [29], the GMM model is considered useful in addressing these issues
and controlling for heterogeneity.
Based on a sample of UK firms listed on the FTSE All-Share Index during the pe-
riod 2010–2017, our findings show that the relationship between sustainability reporting
and IA is negative and significant, suggesting that sustainability reporting can play a
complementary role in reducing the information gap that exists between firms and their
stakeholders. The results also show that the relationship between sustainability reporting
and IA is weaker in family-controlled firms, as it tends to be positive. This means that
family-controlled firms, with their information advantage, may disguise their trading
through small transactions in order to maximise their profit by buying at lower asking
Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644 3 of 17
prices and selling at higher prices. Moreover, the authors of [30] suggest that informed
investors can adjust their portfolios due to the private information they possess, whereas
less-informed investors are not able to adjust their portfolios effectively due to their lack of
private information, which exacerbates IA by increasing the risks faced by less-informed
investors and consequently widens the bid–ask spread. Finally, by independently examin-
ing the influence of the environmental, social, and governance elements on IA, we found
that the negative relationship remained similar to our previous findings. However, an
investigation of the interaction between family-controlled firms and each of these pillars
(environmental, social, and governance) revealed different tendencies. For example, we
found that family-controlled firms weaken the negative influence of environmental and
governance disclosure scores on IA but strengthen the negative influence of social dis-
closures on IA. Generally, this outcome indicates that family-controlled firms tend to be
selective in sustainability reporting, as there are certain governance and environmental
issues that they tend to hide, which creates an adverse selection problem.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review
and hypothesis development with regard to the sustainability reporting–IA relationship,
before moving on to further discuss the influence of family-controlled firms on the above
relationship. We then discuss the sample and measurement of the main study variables,
together with our research design. The final two sections present the empirical outcomes
and discuss the findings.
Verrecchia [8] argue that company disclosures can help reduce information differences
between managers and shareholders, thus increasing liquidity in the market, reducing the
volatility of stock prices, and decreasing companies’ equity capital costs e.g., [9–12].
Information disclosures by firms can be issued using a set of communication reports,
which may be mandatory, in the form of regulated reports and other periodic regulatory fil-
ings, or voluntary, meaning that they are not required by law or other regulatory bodies [14].
Another essential distinction which may be involved within mandatory and voluntary
disclosures is the distinction between financial and non-financial disclosures, with the latter
referring to social and environmental disclosures. Generally, financial disclosures are more
likely to be mandatory, whereas non-financial disclosures tend to be less disciplined. In
this vein, the theoretical literature shows that both voluntary and mandatory disclosures
reduce information asymmetry [37]. However, there is little empirical evidence that proves
whether, and in what way, sustainability reporting (an example of a non-financial disclo-
sure) influences IA [3,6,15,16]. While the theoretical literature shows that both types of
disclosure could help in reducing IA, this study emphasises information related to sustain-
ability reporting, an area of business activity that is becoming increasingly attractive for
market participants [15,38,39].
Theoretically, the relationship between sustainability reporting and information asym-
metry can be explained from the perspective of stakeholder theory, according to which
managers have a fiduciary duty towards all stakeholders instead of maintaining exclusive
relationships with them [40] (stakeholders are any identifiable individual or group who
can affect or be affected by the achievements of a firm’s objectives (Freeman and Reed,
1983)). Meeting the expectations of different stakeholder groups by actively committing
to CSR can help to improve a company’s reputation [41]. Therefore, it has been argued
that reputation building is linked with higher-quality earnings reporting [42], which ulti-
mately reduces IA [43]. Previous studies argue that CSR is positively related to earnings
reporting quality, suggesting that it creates an atmosphere that inspires managers to adopt
a public-responsibility-oriented mentality, which subsequently encourages the issuance of
more transparent financial reporting and meets stakeholder expectations [44–46]. Clark-
son, Li [47] found that socially responsible firms tend to disclose more information to
the public in order to build their reputation and inform stakeholders about their social
responsibility [3,48]. In the same vein, when a company has built up a certain reputation
(via sustainability reporting), it can improve its financial performance by attracting more
qualified employees, boosting customer loyalty, and gaining considerable attention from
analysts [49]—the so-called business case for sustainability [50].
Studies that have empirically examined the relationship between sustainability re-
porting and IA have generally found evidence of a negative relationship. For example,
Cho, Lee [15] investigated the link between CSR performance and information asymmetry,
relying on a bid–ask spread (the amount by which the ask price exceeds the bid price for
an asset in the market) as a proxy for IA and considering a sample of the US stock market
over the period 2003–2009. Their main finding was that both negative and positive CSR
performance are negatively related to the bid–ask spread. More specifically, a negative CSR
performance tends to be more effective than a positive performance in mitigating IA. This
negative relationship was also observed by the authors of [6], who tested whether sustain-
ability reporting reduced the bid–ask spread in a sample of 391 Australian non-financial
companies during the period 2004–2014. This negative association was reported to be
more prominent in larger companies and those that possessed stronger market power. Cui,
Jo [16] recently provided evidence for the relationship between sustainability reporting
and IA using a sample of US non-financial companies during the period 1991–2010. IA
was measured using three different proxies: the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, the price
impact measure, and the bid–ask spread. After employing two-stage least squares (2SLS)
and generalised method of moments (GMM) models, they found that CSR was negatively
related to IA. Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan [3] further examined the impact of CSR on analysts’
forecast accuracy. They found that issuing stand-alone CSR reports was positively related
Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644 5 of 17
Additionally, several previous studies have argued that the adverse selection of
informed investors could increase information differences between informed and less-
informed investors and thus widen the bid–ask spread [15]. Informed investors, with their
information advantage, may disguise their trading through small transactions in order to
maximise their profit by buying at lower ask prices and selling at higher bid prices. This
method of trading can be sustained until any private information is fully disclosed to the
public, or as long as the profit from trading against less-informed investors is adequate to
cover any cost of information acquisition [61]. Moreover, Easley and O’hara [30] suggest
that informed investors can adjust their portfolios using the private information they pos-
sess, whereas less-informed investors cannot, due to their lack of private information; this
will increase the IA by raising the risks faced by less-informed investors, and, consequently,
the bid–ask spread will be widened. Accordingly, a higher proportion of family ownership
is expected to attenuate any reduction in IA attributed to sustainability reporting.
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources
The study sample consisted of UK companies listed on the FTSE All-Share Index over
the period 2010 to 2017. This is a capitalisation-weighted index, representing around 98%
of the market capitalisation of listed shares in the UK, combining the FTSE Small Cap, FTSE
100, and FTSE 250 indices. We chose the FTSE All-Share Index to capture a larger number
of family firms from different industries and at different levels. Financial institutions were
excluded from the sample due to their different nature and associated regulations related
to social and environmental disclosures [62–65].
Data on the IA index, sustainability reporting, and financial variables were mainly
collected from the Bloomberg database, while ownership data for family firms were col-
lected from the FAME database. We dealt with missing data, especially ownership data, by
examining firms’ annual reports and their websites.
addition, Chrisman and Patel [81] define a family firm as one in which family ownership
exceeds 5% of the capital, and in which at least one family member serves as a member of
top management.
This study relies on the definition of Anderson and Reeb [76] and Martin, Camp-
bell [79], who classify a firm as a family-controlled entity when family ownership exceeds
5% and/or there are two or more board members from the family (these entities are recog-
nised as family firms even if they are not totally owned by one family). A dummy variable
equal to 1 was applied to family-controlled firms, and 0 otherwise.
where SPREAD is the annual average percentage of the daily bid–ask spread to the closing
price; ESG_SCORE is the total CSR score of the three pillars (environment, social, and
governance); SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is a leverage ratio measured
as long-term debt scaled by total assets; ROA is the return on assets ratio, measured as
income before extraordinary items and scaled by lagged total assets; GROWTH is the sales
growth rate; and ANALYSTS is the number of analysts following the company.
To test H2, we altered our study model to include the moderating effect of family
ownership on the association between SPREAD and ESG_SCORE, as follows:
where Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 for family-controlled firms and 0 otherwise
(see family-firm criteria in the variable measurement section) and ESG_Family is the in-
teraction between family-controlled firms and ESG score. The causal association between
sustainability reporting and IA could be endogenous as a result of managerial policies and
Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644 8 of 17
other factors that result in simultaneity and reversed causality. Therefore, if sustainability
reporting and IA are simultaneously determined, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method
will not be accurate. Consequently, based on Arellano and Bond [29], the GMM model was
considered useful in addressing these issues and controlling for heterogeneity.
family-controlled firms (−0.00947; p < 0.05). From this, we can observe that the negative
relationship was weakened by introducing family-controlled firms and became positive
(FAMILY_ESG + FAMILY) (0.352 – 0.00947 = 0.34253). This finding supports the adverse
selection effect theory [15], which argues that family owners are involved in day-to-day
operations and usually hold higher managerial positions, so they have better access to
information than minor shareholders. In this case, family owners, who are more informed
investors, tend to exploit this information for private purposes. Accordingly, the moder-
ating role of family-controlled firms weakens and decreases the IA caused by corporate
social and environmental disclosures.
Moreover, this finding suggests that family-controlled firms, with their information
advantage, may disguise their trading through small transactions to maximise their profits
by buying at low ask prices and selling at high bid prices [61]. This manner of trading can be
continued until any private information is fully revealed to the public, or for as long as the
profit from this trading against less-informed investors is sufficient to cover any information
acquisition costs [61]. Easley and O’hara [30] suggest that informed investors can adjust
their portfolios because of the private information they possess, whereas less-informed
investors cannot adjust their portfolios effectively due to a lack of such information, which
increases IA by raising the risks faced by less-informed investors and consequently widens
the bid–ask spread. Accordingly, family ownership tends to weaken any reduction in IA
that is linked to sustainability reporting.
5. Additional Tests
5.1. Additional Test—Sustainability Reporting Components
Considering sustainability reporting dimensions independently (i.e., environmental,
governance, and social scores) could result in a better understanding of management
strategies and their mentality towards sustainability reporting activities. For instance, some
studies argue that managers tend to target outsiders by focusing only on issues related
to the environment and community. This targeted approach is known as the “cherry-
picking strategy”, as it does not apply a holistic CSR strategy. Accordingly, considering
sustainability reporting as an aggregate score would not be sufficient to interpret managers’
behaviours related to its application [83]. Therefore, we furthered our analysis by exploring
the impact of each sustainability reporting component on IA in family- and non-family-
controlled firms.
Models 1, 3, and 5 presented in Table 4 show the results for each ESG component
for the full sample, indicating that ENV_SCORE, SOC_SCORE, and GOV_SCORE all
contributed to reducing IA (coef. −0.00581, p < 0.05; coef. −0.00399, p < 0.1; coef. −0.0119,
p < 0.1, respectively). Their contributions, however, were not similarly consistent for family-
controlled firms. Models 2, 4, and 6 integrated family-controlled firms with each ESG
component, showing that not all the pillars contributed to mitigating IA. Model 2 shows
a positive and significant relationship between ENV_SCORE and SPREAD (coef. 0.0399;
p < 0.01), while in Model 4, the social pillar negatively affected SPREAD (coef. –0.00399;
p < 0.1). Finally, GOV_SCORE was positively related to SPREAD.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
ENV_SCORE −0.006 ** 0.040 **
(0.003) (0.020)
SOC_SCORE −0.004 * −0.041 ***
(0.002) (0.014)
GOV_SCORE −0.012 * 0.001
(0.006) (0.004)
FAMILY 2.875 ** −5.059 *** 0.628 **
(1.349) (1.798) (0.305)
FAMILY_ENV −0.145 **
(0.069)
FAMIY_SOC 0.151***
(0.054)
Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644 11 of 17
Table 4. Cont.
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
FAMIY_GOV −0.0105 *
(0.005)
SIZE −0.004 ** −0.093 −0.021 0.057 0.001 −0.019
(0.026) (0.107) (0.024) (0.068) (0.043) (0.093)
LEV 0.170 0.388 0.623 2.015 *** 0.799 1.731 ***
(0.383) (0.372) (0.523) (0.511) (0.492) (0.646)
ROA −0.731 *** −1.214 *** −0.793 ** −0.781 *** −0.839 ** −0.979 **
(0.275) (0.372) (0.349) (0.294) (0.397) (0.463)
GROWTH −0.007 0.012 −0.011 0.049 ** −0.019 −0.124
(0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.204)
ANALYSTS −0.005 −0.026 −0.004 −0.018 −0.004 −0.007
(0.006) (0.020) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
Constant 0.186 ** 0.251 * 0.269 * 0.474 ** 0.613 * −0.094 *
(0.153) (0.687) (0.147) (0.5) (0.358) (0.642)
Arellano–
Bond test for z = 0.62 Pr > z z = 0.37 Pr > z z = 0.61 Pr > z z = −0.05 Pr > z = 0.45 Pr > z z = 0.33 Pr > z
AR(2) in first = 0.535 = 0.714 = 0.542 z = 0.962 = 0.654 = 0.743
differences:
Hansen test of chi2(8) = 11.68 chi2(5) = 2.90 chi2(8) = 12.13 chi2(5) = 7.46 chi2(8) = 11.51 chi2(8) = 12.05
overid. Prob > chi2 = Prob > chi2 = Prob > chi2 = Prob > chi2 = Prob > chi2 = Prob > chi2 =
restrictions: 0.166 0.716 0.146 0.189 0.175 0.149
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The table shows the
results of the GMM regressions for each ESG component separately in family- and non-family-controlled firms.
The study sample consisted of 641 UK firms listed on the FTSE All-Share Index during the period 2010–2017 and
included 2058 firm-year observations. The dependent variable was bid–ask spread, whereas the independent
variables were ENV_SCORE, SOC_SCORE, and GOV_SCORE. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
6. Conclusions
Despite the growing importance of sustainability reporting for investors and other
stakeholders, the majority of studies have focused more on financial disclosures and their
influence on IA, whereas there is little empirical evidence [3,6,15,16] to show whether, and
in what way, sustainability reporting (an example of non-financial disclosure) can com-
plement financial disclosures in reducing IA problems [3]. Therefore, this study examines
the influence of sustainability reporting on IA, taking into account the influence of each
sustainability reporting component (environmental, social, and governance) independently.
It also addresses how family-controlled firms, as informed investors, can moderate the
sustainability reporting–IA nexus, since the key owners exert significant influence over a
firm’s investment decisions by suggesting and voting on strategic plans for the firm [85].
The findings show that sustainability reporting, as an aggregate score, reduces IA.
This finding supports hypothesis H1, which proposed that managers have a fiduciary duty
towards all stakeholders and, therefore, meeting the expectations of different stakeholder
groups by actively committing to sustainability reporting can help improve a company’s
reputation [41]. Consequently, reputation building is argued to be linked to higher-quality
earnings reporting [42], which ultimately reduces IA [43]. Kim, Park [44] and Scholtens and
Kang [45] add that CSR creates a general atmosphere that inspires managers to develop
a public-responsibility-oriented mentality, which subsequently encourages the issuance
of more transparent financial reporting and the meeting of stakeholder expectations. The
second main finding was that the negative relationship between sustainability reporting
and IA weakens and even becomes positive in family-controlled firms. This supports the
adverse selection perspective of Hypothesis H2, in which family-controlled firms take
advantage of the information they have access to at the cost of less-informed investors.
Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644 13 of 17
Finally, in the models investigating the direct impact of each ESG pillar (environmental,
social, and governance scores) on IA, all components still showed a negative influence
on the bid–ask spread. More specifically, disclosures about environmental issues tended
to have a slightly stronger influence on IA compared to social and governance scores.
However, the moderating role of family-controlled firms in the three models weakened the
negative influence of environmental and governance scores and strengthened the negative
impact of social scores on IA. This outcome indicates that family-controlled firms follow a
cherry-picking CSR strategy rather than applying a holistic approach and focus more on
information related to social activities.
Generally, these findings provide a meaningful insight into the CSR strategies followed
by family-controlled firms; thus, they could help British regulators improve corporate
governance rules related to ownership structure, since family-controlled firms can exploit
their private-information access privileges. For investors, our findings provide evidence
of the importance of CSR information in improving a firm’s reputation and increasing its
value. The findings also reveal to investors that the role of family-controlled firms is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, family-controlled firms can minimise the first type
of agency problem, the principal–agent problem. On the other hand, family-controlled
firms can exacerbate the second type of agency conflict, which exists between the majority
and minority shareholders.
In terms of theoretical and academic implications, as mentioned in the previous para-
graph, our investigation of the interaction between family-controlled firms and each CSR
element provided evidence of the CSR disclosure strategies employed by such companies.
Accordingly, studies of family-controlled firms should consider their heterogeneity and
should not implicitly assume that family-controlled firms are ethically driven.
Overall, this study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, while
previous studies have tested the moderating role of firm characteristics [6], equity risk [16],
and institutional ownership [15] on the sustainability reporting–IA relationship, other
ownership types have been overlooked. Therefore, this study contributes to the body
of knowledge by addressing the moderating role of family-controlled firms in the rela-
tionship between sustainability reporting and IA. The reason for choosing family firms
was that they are argued to have unique characteristics that distinguish them from other
companies [24,25]. Moreover, family ownership is considered to be the most prevalent
ownership type around the world [26–28].
Second, the study extends the methodological approaches of previous studies by
using the generalised method of moments (GMM) model. The causal association between
sustainability reporting and IA could be endogenous because of managerial policies and
other factors that result in simultaneity and reverse causality. Therefore, if sustainabil-
ity reporting and IA are simultaneously determined, ordinary least squares (OLS) will
not be accurate. Consequently, based on Arellano and Bond [29], the GMM model was
useful in addressing these issues and controlling for heterogeneity. Third, in addition to
using aggregate ESG scores, this study also individually tested the influence of each ESG
element (environmental, social, and governance). We thus provide a clearer explanation
of management strategies and behaviour related to undertaking different sustainability
reporting activities.
The study has some limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, the
variable that represented family-controlled firms was a dummy variable, taking a value of
1 if family ownership exceeded 5% and/or there were two or more board members from
the family, and a value of 0 otherwise. Relying only on a categorical variable (with one
cut-off point/threshold) e.g., [53,86,87] may be insufficient to draw a clear conclusion about
family ownership behaviour. Therefore, future studies could use continuous variables
with different cut-off points, which would better reflect the level of family influence and
involvement e.g., [81,88,89]. Second, the study used bid–ask spread as a proxy for IA,
which is one of the common measures used in previous studies. It would be interesting if
future studies verified the findings of this research by using different proxies (e.g., stock
Sustainability 2022, 14, 6644 14 of 17
liquidity (trading volume), price volatility, market-to-book ratio, the accuracy of analysts’
forecasts, and the price impact measure). Third, in spite of the fact that the study duration
of 2010–2017 was split between the period when sustainability reporting was voluntary
(that is, prior to 2013) and the period when it became mandatory (after 2013) it tested ESG
disclosures without differentiating between voluntary and mandatory ones. Studying the
effect of voluntary and mandatory disclosures separately could provide further explanation
of management behaviour. Therefore, future studies could investigate the relationship
between sustainability reporting and EM before and after the mandating of ESG disclosures
in the UK.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.R.A.N. and R.M.; Formal analysis, A.R.A.N. and H.Z.;
Investigation, S.K. and H.Z.; Methodology, R.M.; Project administration, A.R.A.N. and R.M.; Software,
R.M.; Supervision, H.Z.; Validation, S.K. and R.M.; Visualization, S.K.; Writing—original draft, R.M.;
Writing—review & editing, A.R.A.N. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of
the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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