LAZARO VS AGUSTIN

Facts:

 Petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint for partition alleging that
the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late Simeon C.
Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land
situated in Laoag.
 That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from whom the parcel of
land originated as owner, his children, consented that the parcel of land be titled
in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so Original Certificate of
Title in the name of Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was agreed among
them that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the
sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land.
 That there is a residential house constructed on the lot and in the construction of
which plaintiff Alejandra Santos, then still single, spent the amount of
₱68,308.60, while Basilisa Santos and her children spent the amount of
₱3,495.00.
 Alejandra Santos got married to Isauro M. Lazaro who was employed in a private
company and when he retired from the service, some additional constructions
were made on the residential house and lot such as a bedroom, azotea, two (2)
toilets, two (2) kitchens, a car garage, the money spent for these additional
constructions came from the earnings of the spouses Alejandra Santos-Lazaro
and Isauro M. Lazaro. The said residential house is now covered by Tax
Declaration No. 010-00225 in the names of Basilio Agustin (should be Basilisa
Agustin) and Alejandra Santos for the year 1994 with a market value of
₱93,920.00 and an assessed value of zero.
 That without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot was
transferred into another title which is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
20695 in the names of Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-
Agustin who are herein named as defendants with Monica Agustin now
deceased represented by her children Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo as
defendants;
 ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Facts:

 Petitioner Anna Lerima Patula was charged with estafa under information filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. That the said accused, being
then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having
collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of
the said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying with
her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands
therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, fail to deliver the said
collection to the said company but instead, feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.
 The Prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Lamberto Go and Karen
Guivencan.
 The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the
branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. in Dumaguete City since
October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a
saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales
representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale customers
coming from different towns and to collect payments from them;
 That she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments,
which she would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the
payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite
high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded that
business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the
accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he
decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he
learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance
had already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid in
Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her parents went
to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and to
plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her
account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped
reporting to work.
 The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whom
Footluckers employed as its store auditor from November 16, 1995, until her
resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
the petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their
accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for them;
that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from
Mabinay to Zamboanguita in Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; that she
discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original
 copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the
amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the
office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report
denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA
w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked
as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the
total amount of P131,286.92.
 In the course of Guivencan’s direct examination, petitioners’ counsel interposed a
continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY
and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had
made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
 Nevertheless, the Prosecution offered the ledgers of petitioner’s various
customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
(like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued
by petitioner), the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called Summary (Final
Report) of Discrepancies, inclusive. After the Prosecution rested its case, the
Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested
the intention to do so, and instead rested its case. The Court then finds ANNA
LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) were admissible as evidence of the petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged despite
their not being duly authenticated
Ruling:
No. Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, r of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of
private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing,
deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient
one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness
and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party;(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted,
or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or
use. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not
be presented and admitted as evidence against the petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully
seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of the petitioner in
various receipts. Go’s an attempt at the authentication of the signature of the petitioner on the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while
the purported signature of the petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled
out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a mere machine copy, not the
original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to
produce at a later date the originals of the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and
other receipts. But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the
Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of the petitioner on the receipts through a
different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have
Go authenticate both the machine copy of the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441
and the signature of the petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was
inexplicably forgotten and was no longer even included in the Prosecution’s Offer of
Documentary Evidence.
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or
signing of the documents, the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives conformably with the afore quoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. The Court has to
acquit the petitioner for the failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State’s
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility
before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence.