[ G.R. No. 210612.

October 09, 2017 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS. ERVIN Y. MATEO, EVELYN E. MATEO, CARMELITA

B. GALVEZ, ROMEO L. ESTEBAN, GALILEO J.

SAPORSANTOS AND NENITA S. SAPORSANTOS,

ACCUSED, ERVIN Y. MATEO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant

Ervin Y. Mateo (Mateo) assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated July 16, 012, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04001, which
affirmed with modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati Cty, Branch 132, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2936
and 03-2987, finding Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of syndicated estafa, as defined and penalized under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code ( RPC) in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 1689[3] (PD 1689), and imposing upon him the penalty of
life imprisonment for each count and to pay actual damages to the
private complainants.

The antecedents are as follows:

In March 2001, private complainant Herminio Alcid, Jr. (Herminio,

Jr.) met a certain Geraldine Alejandro (Geraldine) who introduced
herself as the head of the Business Center of MMG International
Holdings Co., Ltd. (MMG). Geraldine was then soliciting investments
and has shown a brochure showcasing the investments and businesses of
the said entity. Herminio, Jr. was also shown Articles of Partnership
to prove that MMG is registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The Articles of Partnership showed accused-
appellant as a general partner who has contributed P49,750,000.00 to
MMG. The other accused were shown to be limited partners who have
contributed P50,000.00 each. Convinced by the representations of
Geraldine, Herminio, Jr. invested P50,000.00 with MMG on April 20,
2002. Subsequently, all the interests and principal were promptly
paid, which induced him to make a bigger investment. On May 2, 2002,
Herminio, Jr. and his father, Herminio, Sr., made a joint investment
of P200,000.00. Later, Geraldine was also able to convince Herminio,
Jr.'s sister, Melanie, who made an investment of P50,000.00 with MMG.
The private complainants' investments were covered by a notarized
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), signed by accused-appellant, which
stipulated, among others, that MMG was being represented by its
President, herein accused-appellant, and that the investors will be
earning 2.5% monthly interest income from the capital they have
invested. Subsequently, the complainants received several post-dated
checks covering their investments. However, when they tried to
deposit the checks, their banks informed them that these were
dishonored because MMG's accounts in the bank from which the checks
were drawn were already closed. The complainants then demanded from
the accused the return of their money, but their demands were
unheeded. The private complainants and other investors then went to
the SEC to file a complaint, where they discovered that MMG was not a
registered issuer of securities. The SEC forwarded their complaint to
the City Prosecutor of Makati.

Subsequently, on April 11, 2003, the Assistant City Prosecutor of

Makati City filed two separate Informations[4] with the RTC of Makati
City charging accused-appellant, together with Evelyn E. Mateo,
Carmelita B. Galvez, Romeo L. Esteban, Galileo J. Saporsantos and
Nenita S. Saporsantos with the crime of syndicated estafa. The
Informations were similarly worded, except as to the dates of the
commission of the crime, the names of the complainants, and the
amounts obtained from them, as follows:
x x x x

That on or about the 2nd day of May (09th day of July)

2002 prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Philippines,
 said accused, being officers, employees and/or agents of
Mateo Management Group Holding Company, a corporation
operating on funds solicited from the public, conspiring,
or confederating with, and mutually helping one another,
and operating as a syndicate, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainants
HERMINIO ALCID, SR. and HERMINIO ALCID, JR. (MELANIE
ALCID) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud to the effect that they have the business,
property and power to solicit and accept investments and
deposits from the general public and the capacity to pay
the complainants guaranteed monthly returns (interest) on
investment from two point five percent (2.5%) and
lucrative commissions, and by means of other deceits of
similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing
complainants to invest, deposit, give and deliver as in
fact the latter gave and delivered to said accused the
total amount of P200,000.00 (P50,000.00) as investment or
deposit, accused knowing fully well that said pretenses
and representations are a fraudulent scheme to enable
them to obtain said amount, and thereafter, having in
their possession said amount, with intent to gain and to
defraud, misappropriated and converted the same to their
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of said complainants in the said amount.

Contrary to law.

x x x[5]
On motion of the prosecution, and without objection on the part of
the defense, the Informations were subsequently amended where the
third and fourth lines of the Informations, as quoted above, were
made to read as follows: "... being partners, officers, employees
and/or agents of MMG, International Holdings Company, Ltd."[6]

The above cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 03-2936 and 03-
2987.

Similar cases for estafa and syndicated estafa, totalling 209, were
also filed against the accused.

Among the accused, only accused-appellant was arrested and when

arraigned on February 19, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to all the
charges.[7]

Pre-trial[8] was then conducted. Thereafter, Criminal Case Nos. 03-

2936 and 03-2987 were jointly tried.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense, represented by

private counsel, failed to present its evidence despite several re-
settings made by the RTC.[9] Thus, upon motion of the prosecution,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.[10]

On October 22,2008, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused--

appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 03-2936, the Court finds

the accused, Ervin Y. Mateo, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa penalized under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Likewise, Ervin
Y. Mateo is held solidarily liable with MMG International
Holdings Company, Ltd. to pay private
complainant[s] Herminio Alcid, Jr. and Herminio Alcid,
Sr. P206,000.00 as actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. 03-2987, the Court finds the

accused, Ervin Y. Mateo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Syndicated Estafa penalized under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Likewise, Ervin
Y. Mateo is held solidarily liable with MMG International
Holdings Company, Ltd. to pay private
complainant Melanie Alcid P59,702.61 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The RTC found that all the elements of the crime of syndicated estafa
are present, to wit: (1) MMG was formed by accused-appellant,
together with five (5) other persons; (2) accused-appellant, together
with his co accused, committed fraud in inducing private complainants
to part with their money; and (3) the fraud resulted in the
misappropriation of the money contributed by the private
complainants.

Accused-appellant appealed the RTC Decision with the CA.[12]

On July 16, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision affirming

the judgment of the RTC in toto.

The CA held, among others, that, contrary to accused-appellant's

position, PD 1689 contemplates estafa as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. The CA also held that all the
elements of syndicated estafa are present in the instant case.

On August 8, 2013, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice

of Appeal[13] manifesting his intention to appeal the CA Decision to
this Court.

In its Resolution dated August 29, 2013, the CA gave due course to
accused-appellant's Notice of Appeal and ordered the elevation of the
records of the case to this Court.[14]

Hence, this appeal was instituted.

In a Resolution[15] dated March 5, 2014, this Court, among others,

notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire.

In its Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief)[16] dated May 6,

2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court
that it will no longer file a supplemental brief because it had
already exhaustively addressed in its brief filed before the CA all
the issues and arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief.

On the other hand, accused-appellant filed a Supplemental

Brief[17] on June 30, 2014, raising the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MAY BE CONVICTED WITH

ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 2(A) IN RELATION TO
P.D. 1689.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENT OF DEFRAUDATION WAS PROVEN

 BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE PROSECUTION.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUFFICIENT QUANTUM OF PROOF TO

WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE CHALLENGED
DECISION.

D. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-[APPELLANT] MAY BE

CONVICTED IN THE ABOVEMENTIONED CASES DESPITE THE STAY
ORDER ISSUED BY THE COMMERCIAL COURT, RTC, BRANCH 256,
MUNTINLUPA CITY, FOR THE CORPORATE REHABILITATION OF MMG
GROUP INCLUDING MMG HOLDINGS.

E. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION.[18]
The appeal lacks merit.

Anent the first issue raised, the Court does not agree with accused-
appellant's contention that he may not be found guilty of violating
PD 1689 in relation to estafa under Article 315 (2)(a)[19] of the RPC
on the ground that the only kind of estafa contemplated under PD 1689
is that .defined under Article 315 (1)(b)[20] of the RPC and not the
kind of estafa falling under Article 315 (2)(a) of the same Code.

Section 1 of PD 1689 provides as follows:

Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa

or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five
or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out
the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)",
or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
 When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the
penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud
exceeds 100,000 pesos.
Suffice it to say that it has been settled in a number of
cases[21] that estafa, as defined under Article 315 (2)(a) of the
RPC, is one of the kinds of swindling contemplated under PD 1689.

Under the second and third issues raised by accused-appellant, he

argues that, insofar as he is concerned, the element of defraudation
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed
to prove that he personally transacted or dealt with the private
complainants. The Court is not persuaded.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of

the RPC are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b)
that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.[22]

In addition, fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise

anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by
which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
[23]
 It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which
human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.[24] On
the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury.[25]

In relation to the above, the elements of syndicated estafa as

defined under Section 1 of PD 1689 are: (a) estafa or other forms
of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal
Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in
the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or
farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.[26]

With respect to the presence of the elements of fraud and deceit, the
Court agrees with the arguments and conclusions of the OSG, to wit:

In pursuit of their fraudulent investment scheme,

appellant and his partners formed a partnership which, by
its Amended Article of Partnership, had the end in view
"to acquire, manage, own, hold, buy, sell, and/or
encumber securities or equity participation of other
persons, partnership, corporation, or any other entities,
as permitted or may be authorized by law as well as to
[purchase] or otherwise acquire the whole or any [part]
of the property, assests, business and goodwill of any
other persons, firm, corporation or association and to
conduct in any lawful measures the business so acquired
and to express all the powers necessary or [convenient]
in and about the conduct, management and carrying on of
such business. However, the [partnership] shall not
engage in stock brokerage or dealership of securities.

In violation thereof, the people behind the partnership

were effectively engaging in the sale of securities by
enticing the public to "invest" funds with MMG
International Holdings Co., Ltd. offering a promise of a
two point five percent (2.5%) monthly compensation out of
the capital on their investment. These investment
activities were clearly ultra vires acts or acts beyond
the partnership's authority.

In fact, Atty. Justine Callangan, Director of the

Corporate Finance Division of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, issued on February 10, 2003 a Certification
that based on the records of the Commission, MMG
International Holdings Co. Ltd. is not a registered
issuer of securities. She explained in her testimony that
the partnership has not been issued a permit or a
secondary license or franchise to go to the public and
offer to sell any form of securities which means that the
partnership cannot offer or sell shares of stocks or
equity, securities, investment contracts, debt
instruments like short-term or long-term commercial
papers to more than nineteen (19) people without any
prior licensing from the Commission. In plain language,
Atty. Callangan stated that soliciting funds from the
public is a form of issuing securities, which MMG
International Holdings Co. Ltd. was not authorized to do
so.

Apparently, registration with the Securities and Exchange

Commission was procured by MMG International Holdings Co.
Ltd. only for the purpose of giving a semblance of
legitimacy to the partnership; that the partnership's
business was sanctioned by the government and that it was
allowed by law to accept investments.

In carrying out the nefarious transactions, MMG

International Holdings Co. Ltd. even published its own
brochure entitled "Alliance" which was shown to potential
investors showcasing that it had the following businesses
to finance the promised earnings: a condotel (MMG
Condotel), a realty company (Mateo Realty and Development
Corporation), schools (MMG Academy, Mateo College and
Technical Foundation, Inc., MMG Computer Learning Center,
Mateo Institute of Computer Studies), consumer products
manufacturing businesses (M Power Enterprises, Inc.), an
insurance firm (Mateo Pre-Need Plans), retail
establishments (MMG International Trading Corporation),
movie outfit (MMG Films International) and a shipping
line (Mateo Maritime Management), among others. Be that
as it may, there was no evidence presented by the
partnership to bolster their representations of being
engaged in these so-called bustling business endeavors.

Evidently, the testimonial evidence presented by the

prosecution more than amply proved that appellant,
together with his partners, employed fraud and deceit
upon trusting individuals in order to convince them to
invest in MMG International Holdings Co. Ltd. It may even
 be observed that there was a uniform pattern employed in
selling their proposition as shown by how potential
investors are ensnared by appellant and his partners,
through MMG International Holdings Co. Ltd. Business
Center Head Geralding Alejandro. First, they would make a
presentation of the "Alliance" brochure featuring the
businesses the company professes to own and combine with
the misrepresentation that they had the technical know-
how and false promise of two point five percent (2.5%)
monthly compensation out of the capital on their
investment.[27]
Thus, in the present case, it is clear that all the elements of
syndicated estafa, are present, considering that: (a) the
incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5) people,
including herein accused-appellant, made false. pretenses and
representations to the investing public - in this case, the private
complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity
with MMG in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false
pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of MMG ended up running away with the private
complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove the

element of defraudation because no sufficient evidence was presented
to prove that he "personally, physically and actually performed any
'false pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent representations' against the
private complainants."[28] The Court does not agree. Accused-
appellant should be reminded that he is being accused of syndicated
estafa in conspiracy with the other co-accused. In this regard, the
Court finds no error in the finding of the CA that herein appellant
and his co-accused are guilty of conspiracy, to wit:

x x x x

The evidence adduced by the prosecution established the

existence of conspiracy among the accused in committing
the crime charged. They started by formi11g the
partnership. All of them had access to MMG Holding's bank
accounts. They composed the Members of the Board of
 Directors that manage and control the business
transactions of MMG Holdings. Without the participation
of each of the accused, MMG Holdings could not have
solicited funds from the general public and succeeded to
perpetrate their fraudulent scheme. Hence, each of them
is a co-conspirator by virtue of indispensable
cooperation in the fraudulent acts of the partnership.

x x x[29]
In the instant case, it was not necessary for the prosecution to
still prove that accused-appellant himself "personally, physically
and actually performed any 'false pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent
representations' against the private complainants," given the
findings of both the RTC and the CA of the existence of conspiracy
among appellant and his co-accused. When there is conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of all.[30] It is not essential that there be
actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every
act.[31] It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.[32] In any case, appellant's direct participation in
the conspiracy is evidenced by the findings of the CA that: (1) the
Articles of Partnership of MMG named appellant as the sole general
partner with a capital contribution of P49,750,000.00; (2) his
signatures appear in the MOA entered into by the complainants and
facilitated by his co-accused Geraldine Alejandro; (3) his signatures
also appear in the Secretary's Certificate and Signature Cards which
were submitted to Allied Bank when the partnership opened an account;
(4) the MOA are notarized and it was only on appeal that he denied
his signatures appearing therein or questioned the authenticity and
due execution of the said documents. Indeed, it cannot be denied that
accused-appellant, together with the rest of his co-accused,
participated in a network of deception. The active involvement of
each in the scheme of soliciting investments was directed at one
single purpose - which is to divest complainants of their money on
the pretext of guaranteed high return of investment. Without a doubt,
the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as
with the other persons in MMG show unity of action towards a common
undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.

As to accused-appellant's contention that his signatures appearing in

the questioned documents are mere facsimile signatures, this Court
has held that a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature
produced by mechanical means, is recognized as valid in banking,
financial, and business transactions.[33] Besides, as earlier
mentioned, the MOA where accused-appellant's signature appears, was
notarized and that it was only on appeal that he denied authenticity
of such signatures and questioned the due execution of the concerned
documents. Also, the same facsimile signature, together with the
other facsimile and stamped signatures of appellant's co-accused,
were used in opening a bank account in the name of MMG where accused-
appellant was one of the authorized signatories. As found by the CA,
the bank used and recognized these facsimile and stamped signatures
in transacting with appellant and his co-accused without any
complaints from them. Thus, accused-appellant cannot deny the binding
effect of the subject signatures.

With respect to the fourth issue raised, the matter to be resolved is

whether the suspension of all claims as an incident to MMG Group of
Companies' corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the suspension
of criminal charges filed against herein accused-appellant as an
officer of the distressed corporation.

This Court rules in the negative.

Citing the case of Rosario v. Co,[34] the ruling of this Court

in Panlilio, et al. v. RTC, Branch 51, City of Manila, et al.,
[35]
 to wit:

x x x x

x x x There is no reason why criminal proceedings should

be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so,
since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to
punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general,
to maintain social order. As correctly observed
in Rosario, it would be absurd for one who has engaged
in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere
filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the
corporation of which he is an officer.

The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no

bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation,
especially since they are charged in their individual
capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law
 for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised,
since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still
fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It
bears to stress that the rehabilitation receiver is not
charged to defend the officers of the corporation. If
there is anything that the rehabilitation receiver might
be remotely interested in is whether the court also rules
that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario,
however, is not a reason to suspend the criminal
proceedings, because as aptly discussed in Rosario,
should the court prosecuting the officers of the
corporation find that an award or indemnification is
warranted, such award would fall under the category of
claims, the execution of which would be subject to the
stay order issued by the rehabilitation court. x x x

x x x.[36]
As to the last issue raised, accused-appellant insists that his
acquittal of the same offense charged in several other cases only
proves that he never committed the said crime of syndicated estafa.
Accused-appellant's logic is skewed. The fact that he was acquitted
in several other cases for the same offense charged does not
necessarily follow that he should also be found innocent in the
present case. His acquittal in the cases he mentioned was due to the
prosecution's failure to present sufficient evidence to convict him
of the offense charged. These cases involved different parties,
factual millieu and sets of evidence. In the present case, both the
RTC and the CA found that the evidence presented by the prosecution
is enough to prove that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of syndicated estafa. After a review of the
evidence presented, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from
the findings of the RTC and the CA.

Finally, the Court notes the recent passage into law of Republic Act
No. 10951 (RA 10951), otherwise known as "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT
OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY IS BASED, AND
THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE REVISED PENAL CODE", AS
AMENDED. Consistent with the settled principle that an appeal in
criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, the Court finds
it proper to look into the applicability or non-applicability of the
amendatory provisions of RA 10951 to the present case.

The amendments under RA 10951 were passed with the primary objective
of adjusting the amounts or the values of the property and damage on
which a penalty is based for various crimes committed under the RPC,
including estafa. Section 85 of RA 10951 makes mention of PD 1689 as
one of the laws which amends Article 315 of the RPC.

On the other hand, it should be considered that PD 1689 is a special

law which was enacted for the specific purpose of defining syndicated
estafa and imposing a specific penalty for the commission of the said
offense. Thus, the law emphatically states its intent in its
"WHEREAS" clauses, to wit:

x x x x

WHEREAS, there is an upsurge in the commission of

swindling and other forms of frauds in rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", and farmers'
associations or corporations/associations operating on
funds solicited from the general public;

WHEREAS, such defraudation or misappropriation of funds

contributed by stockholders or members of such rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers'
associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public, erodes
the confidence of the public in the banking and
cooperative system, contravenes the public interest, and
constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the
stability of e nation;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that the resurgence of said

crimes be checked, or at least minimized, by imposing
capital punishment on certain forms of swindling and
other frauds involving rural banks, cooperatives,
"samahang nayon(s)", farmers' associations or
corporations/associations operating on funds solicited
from the general public;

x x x."
Notably, the first paragraph of PD 1689 penalizes offenders with life
imprisonment to death regardless of the amount or value of the
property or damage involved, provided that a syndicate committed the
crime.[37]

Moreover, from the provisions of RA 10951, there appears no manifest

intent to repeal or alter the penalty for syndicated estafa. If there
was such an intent, then the amending law should have clearly so
indicated because implied repeals are not favored.[38] Thus, unlike
the specific amendments introduced by RA 10951 to the penalties on
estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, as defined under
Article 315 (2)(d) and amended by Republic Act No. 4885[39] and
Presidential Decree No. 818,[40] nowhere in RA 10951 was it clearly
shown that the legislature intended to repeal or amend the provisions
of PD 1689. As much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature.[41] A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
[42]
 Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be
found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new
and prior laws.[43] Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot
be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of.the new and old
laws.[44] The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible.
[45]
 In the instant case, the Court finds neither inconsistency nor
absolute incompatibility in the existing provisions of PD 1689 and
the amendatory provisions of RA 10951. As such, the amendatory
provisions under RA 10951 are not applicable to the present case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated July 16, 2012 and

Resolution dated July 1, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 04001.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, with Associate
Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Socorro B. Inting,
concurring; rollo, pp. 2-19.

[2]
 Penned by Judge Rommel O. Baybay; records, pp. 330-340.

[3]
 A Decree Increasing the Penalty for Certain Forms of Swindling or
Estafa.
[4]
 Records, pp. 1-2; 15-16.

[5]
 Id. at 1 and 15.

[6]
 See RTC Order dated September 3, 2008, id. at 301.

[7]
 See RTC Order dated February 19, 2004, id. at 24-25.

[8]
 See Pre-Trial Order, id. at 32-34.

[9]
 See RTC Orders dated March 26, 2008, April 23, 2008 and September
17, 2008, id. at 283, 287 and 304, respectively.

[10]
 See RTC Order dated September 17, 2008, id. at 304.

[11]
 Records, p. 340.

[12]
 See Notice of Appeal, id. at 375.

[13]
 CA rollo, pp. 812-813.

[14]
 Id. at 818.

[15]
 Rollo, p. 23.

[16]
 Id. at 24-28.

[17]
 Id. at 32-70.

[18]
 Id. at 38-39.

[19]
 By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

[20]
 By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property;
  People v. Balasa, 356 Phil. 362, 382 (1998); People v. Menil,
[21]

394 Phil. 433, 450 (2000); Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et

al., 704 Phil. 463, 469 (2013); People v. Tibayan, et al., 750 Phil.
910, 919 (2015).

 Id.
[22]

 People v. Menil, supra, note 21, at 452.

[23]

 Id.
[24]

 Id.
[25]

 Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 21, at

[26]

472.

 CA rollo, pp. 162-165.

[27]

 Id. at 51.
[28]

 Id. at 18.
[29]

 People v. Daud, et al., 734 Phil. 698, 717 (2014).

[30]

 Id. at 717-718.
[31]

 Id. at 718.
[32]

 Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 170

[33]

(2003).

[34]
 585 Phil. 236 (2008).

[35]
 656 Phil. 453 (2011).

 Panlilio, et al. v. RTC. Branch 51, City of Manila, et al.,

[36]

supra, at 461-462.

 Catiis v. Court of Appeals (17th Division), 517 Phil. 294, 303

[37]

(2006); People v. Menil, supra note 21, at 458; People v. Balasa,

supra note 21, at 397.

 Manzano v. Hon. Valera, 354 Phil. 66, 75 (1998).

[38]
[39]
 AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION TWO, PARAGRAPH (d), ARTICLE THREE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE. (re: issuance of
checks.)

[40]
 AMENDING ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BY INCREASING THE
PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA COMMITTED BY MEANS OF BOUNCING CHECKS

 Manzano v. Hon. Valera, supra note 38, at 75-76.

[41]

 Id. at 76.
[42]

 Id.
[43]

 Id.
[44]

 Id.
[45]