Air Separation Unit QRA

COMAH LAND USE PLANNING
ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED
DEVELOPMENT AT INTEL
IRELAND LTD.
_____________________________________
Technical Report Prepared For
.
se
ru
he
ot
Intel Ireland Ltd.

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
_____________________________________
r r rp
ne pu
Technical Report Prepared By

ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
Maeve McKenna BEng MEngSc CEng MIEI

yr ns
op r i
AMIChemE
f c Fo
to
_____________________________________
en
ns
Our Reference
Co
MMcK/19/10914RR01
____________________________________
Date Of Issue
30 August 2019
_____________________________________
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

MMcK/19/10914RR01 AWN Consulting Limited
Document History
Document Reference Original Issue Date

MMcK/19/10914RR01 30 August 2019
Revision Level Revision Date Description Sections Affected
Record of Approval
Details Written by Approved by
.
se
Signature ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
Name Maeve McKenna

ow ion
ht ct
Title Principal Risk Consultant

ig pe
yr ns
Date 30 August 2019

op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 2
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by Intel Ireland Ltd. to assess the consequences and risk of
fatality arising from Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) associated with proposed developments at
their existing integrated circuit manufacturing campus at Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co.
Kildare.
Planning permission is being sought for additional installations including cryogenic liquid oxygen
tanks, cryogenic liquid hydrogen tanks, waste solvent collection tanks, a truck staging yard, waste
water holding tanks, a wastewater treatment system, an Air Separation Unit (ASU) and a waste
water balancing tank.
A risk based land use planning assessment was completed of major accident hazards associated
with the proposed planning application. The assessment considers the consequences and
individual risk of fatality associated with the proposed development.
The assessment was conducted in accordance with the Policy & Approach of the Health & Safety
Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (19 March 2010) including Detailed
Implementation by Sector (HSA, 2010). The impacts of physical and health effects on workers
and the general public outside of the establishment boundary were determined by modelling
accident scenarios using DNV PHAST Version 8.22 modelling software. Individual risk of fatality
contours were plotted using TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 modelling software. The assessment
.
se
was completed based on available information and knowledge to date which may be subject to
ru
he
change at detailed design stage.
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
The following major accident hazards were identified for the proposed development:
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
Location Installation Major Accident Scenario

yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
Tank rupture, BLEVE with

to
Liquid oxygen Cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks (2 No.

overpressure effects and oxygen
en
compound vertical tanks)

ns
enrichment
Co
Hydrogen tank rupture with BLEVE

Liquid hydrogen Cryogenic liquid hydrogen tank (3 No. and fireball
compound horizontal) Hydrogen tank leak with jet fire or
vapour cloud explosion
Tank release, bund fire
Waste solvent stream A collection tanks Tank rupture with bund overtopping
Waste solvent (2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks) or spill at truck dock and
collection tanks Waste solvent stream B collection tanks uncontained pool fire
(2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks) Confined explosion in waste solvent
collection tank
Air Separation Unit Liquid oxygen tank overpressure effects and oxygen
enrichment
Argon tank rupture and dispersion
Air Separation Unit Liquid argon tank
of asphyxiating gas
Vessel rupture and overpressure
Air Separation Unit Coldbox
consequences
Impacts Off Site
No off site impacts are predicted at any off site receptor location.
Impacts On Site
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 3
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

There is the potential for fatalities to arise on site from the consequences of major accident
scenarios, however areas affected are primarily outdoor areas that are not normally occupied.
Impacts indoors in the ASU Control Building were assessed and there is for a risk for fatalities to
arise as a result of major accident scenarios at the ASU. At detailed design stage, the required
performance of the ASU Control Building will be determined in accordance with the methodology
described by the CIA (CIA, 2010) to ensure the risk of fatal effects is acceptably low.
Risk Based LUP Contours
The individual risk of fatality for the proposed development was determined. Individual risk of
fatality contours that correspond to the boundaries of the inner (1E-05 per year), middle (1E-06
per year) and outer (1E-07 per year) risk based land use planning zones are illustrated as follows:
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
It is concluded that the risk based land use planning zones are confined within the site boundary.
The level of individual risk of fatality on site and off site is acceptable.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 4
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

CONTENTS Page
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 3
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... 7
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 9
1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 10
2.0 BACKGROUND TO RISK ASSESSMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING ............... 11
2.1 Risk Assessment – An Introduction ................................................................. 11
3.0 DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS AND

RECEIVING ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................. 16
3.1 Description of Development ............................................................................ 16

3.2 Identification of Major Accident Hazards .......................................................... 20
3.3 Description of Receiving Environment ............................................................. 25
.
se
4.0 ru
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA ................................................. 27
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
5.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID OXYGEN MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS ................ 37

ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
5.1 Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs .................................................. 37

ne pu
5.2 BLEVE Model Outputs..................................................................................... 37

ow ion
ht ct
5.3 Pool Evaporation Model Outputs ..................................................................... 40

ig pe
yr ns
5.4 Oxygen Dispersion Results ............................................................................. 41

op r i
f c Fo
5.5 Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE ........................................................... 43

5.6 Frequency of Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture ..................................................... 44
to
5.7 Risk Contours at the Liquid Oxygen Tanks ...................................................... 45

en
ns
Co
6.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS 46
6.1 Assessment for Hydrogen Leak through Venting System ................................ 46

6.2 Assessment of Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture ..................................... 54
6.3 Individual Risk of Fatality contours at Liquid Hydrogen Tanks ......................... 61
7.0 ASSESSMENT FOR WASTE SOLVENT MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS .............. 63
7.1 Waste Solvent Storage .................................................................................... 63

7.2 Waste Solvent Pool Fire .................................................................................. 63
7.3 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank ............................................................. 69
7.4 Individual Risk of Fatality Contours at Waste Solvent Tanks ........................... 74
8.0 AIR SEPARATION UNIT MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS ................................... 75
8.1 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen ................................................................................ 75

8.2 Cryogenic Liquid Argon ................................................................................... 85
8.3 Coldbox Rupture ............................................................................................. 88
8.4 Risk Contours at the ASU ................................................................................ 92
9.0 SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS .................................................. 93
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 5
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

10.0 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON OCCUPIED BUILDINGS.................................... 95
10.1 Methodology.................................................................................................... 95
10.2 Occupied Building Risk Assessment ............................................................... 95
11.0 RISK BASED LAND USE PLANNING CONTOURS ................................................ 97
12.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 99
13.0 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 101
APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 103
APPENDIX A Hazard Classifications and Hazard Statements
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 6
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

List of Figures
Figure 1 Site Location ................................................................................................................ 17

Figure 2 Layout of Proposed Development at Mound Area ...................................................... 18
Figure 3 Off Site Receiving Locations ....................................................................................... 26
Figure 4 Chemical Industries Association Overpressure vs. Vulnerability Relationship ........... 32
Figure 5 Wind Rose Casement Aerodrome 1988 - 2018 .......................................................... 35
Figure 6 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance ....... 38
Figure 7 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Blast Damage Contours ......... 39
Figure 8 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability
Contours ...................................................................................................................... 39
Figure 9 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow
Rate vs. Time............................................................................................................... 40
Figure 10 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs.
Time ............................................................................................................................. 41
Figure 11 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum
Concentration vs. Distance Downwind ........................................................................ 42
Concentration Footprint ............................................................................................... 43
Figure 13 Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ............ 44
Figure 14 Liquid Oxygen Compound: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours ................................. 45
Figure 15 Hydrogen Leak Model Outputs: Jet Fire Thermal Radiation Results .......................... 47
Figure 16 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Overpressure vs. Distance ................................. 49
Figure 17 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Blast Damage Contours ..................................... 50
.
se
Figure 18 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Mortality Contours .............................................. 50
ru
he
Figure 19 Hydrogen Jet Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ................................................ 51
ot
Figure 20 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance– Worst Case
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Category F2 ................................................................................................................. 52
re o
ui es
Figure 21 Event Tree for Hydrogen Leak from Relief Valve ........................................................ 53
eq os
r r rp
Figure 22 Hydrogen BLEVE Model Outputs: Overpressure Results ........................................... 55

ne pu
ow ion
Figure 23 Hydrogen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours ................................................................ 56

ht ct
Figure 24 Hydrogen BLEVE: Probability of Fatality Contours for Persons Outdoors and Indoors
ig pe
yr ns
57
op r i
f c Fo
Figure 25 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs: Thermal Dose Results .......................................... 58

Figure 26 Hydrogen Tank Rupture at Hydrogen Tank and Fireball: Fireball Diameter (100%
to
Mortality) and 1% Mortality Contours .......................................................................... 59

en
ns
Figure 27 Rupture of Proposed Hydrogen Tank at Bulk Gas Yard and BLEVE Blast: Probability of
Co
Fatality vs. Distance ..................................................................................................... 60

Figure 28 Hydrogen Tank Rupture and Fireball: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance .................. 61
Figure 29 Liquid Hydrogen Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours ...................................... 62
Figure 30 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance .......... 64
Figure 31 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Threshold of Fatality Contour ............ 65
Figure 32 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Threshold of Fatality Contour ...................... 65
Figure 33 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Persons Indoors Protected Contour
(Worst Case) ................................................................................................................ 66
Figure 34 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Persons Indoors Protected Contour ............ 66
Figure 35 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Equipment Damage Contour ............. 67
Figure 36 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Equipment Damage Contour ....................... 67
Figure 37 Waste Solvent Pool Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ...................................... 68
Figure 38 Confined VCE at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Overpressure vs. Distance ......... 70
Figure 39 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Blast Damage Contours .................................... 71
Figure 40 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Vulnerability Contours ....................................... 72
Figure 41 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ................ 73
Figure 42 Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours ........................ 74
Figure 43 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance ..... 76
Figure 44 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours ................................................ 78
Figure 45 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability Contours ................... 79
Figure 46 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow Rate
vs. Time ....................................................................................................................... 80
Figure 47 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs. Time . 81
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 7
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Figure 48 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration
vs. Distance Downwind................................................................................................ 82
Footprint ....................................................................................................................... 83
Figure 50 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
..................................................................................................................................... 84
Figure 51 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (D5) ................ 85
Figure 52 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (F2) ................ 86
Figure 53 Argon Asphyxiation Contours for ASU Liquid Argon Tank Rupture Scenario ............. 87
Figure 54 Coldbox Rupture: Overpressure vs. Distance ............................................................. 88
Figure 55 Coldbox Rupture: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance ................................................. 90
Figure 56 Coldbox Rupture: 50 mbar Contour ............................................................................. 90
Figure 57 ASU: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours .................................................................... 92
Figure 58 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Proposed Development ....................... 97
Figure 59 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Overall Site .......................................... 98
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 8
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

List of Tables
Table 1 Annual Fatality Rates for a Variety of Activities ........................................................... 12

Table 2 LUP Matrix ................................................................................................................... 14
Table 3 Location of Hazardous Substances ............................................................................. 19
Table 4 Hazardous Substances at Mound Area ....................................................................... 19
Table 5 Physical Properties of Solvent Waste Constituents .................................................... 22
Table 6 Summary of Major Accident Hazards .......................................................................... 24
Table 7 Heat Flux Consequences ............................................................................................ 27
Table 8 Heat Flux Consequences Indoors ............................................................................... 27
Table 9 Conversion from Probits to Percentage ....................................................................... 28
Table 10 Blast Damage .............................................................................................................. 30
Table 11 Process Vessel Blast Damage Criteria ........................................................................ 31
Table 12 Injury Criteria from Explosion Overpressure................................................................ 31
Table 13 Blast Overpressure Consequences Indoors ................................................................ 32
Table 14 Oxygen Enrichment: Hazardous Concentrations ........................................................ 33
Table 15 Oxygen Reductions due to Ambient Concentration of Asphyxiating Gas ................... 34
Table 16 Atmospheric Stability Class ......................................................................................... 34
Table 17 Surface Roughness ..................................................................................................... 36
Table 18 Liquid Oxygen Tank at LOx Compound: Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs ............ 37
Table 19 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast at LOx Compound: Calculated
Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels ............................................................... 38
.
se
Table 20 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound: Dispersion Results ........................ 42
he
ru
Table 21 Hydrogen Leak Model Inputs ...................................................................................... 46
ot
Table 22 Hydrogen Leak and Jet Fire Model Outputs ................................................................ 47

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Table 23 Hydrogen Tank PRV Leak and Jet Fire: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal
re o
ui es
eq os
Radiation Levels at 1.5 m Above Ground Level .......................................................... 48

r r rp
Table 24 Hydrogen VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels .................. 49

ne pu
ow ion
Table 25 Failure Frequency Data Sources ................................................................................. 53

ht ct
Table 26 Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs ................................................... 54

ig pe
yr ns
Table 27 Hydrogen BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels ..... 55
op r i
f c Fo
Table 28 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs ................................................................................ 58

Table 29 Hydrogen Fireball: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal Dose Levels ............. 59
to
Table 30 Waste Solvent Pool Fire Results ................................................................................. 63

en
ns
Table 31 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Distances to Specified Thermal Radiation
Co
Levels........................................................................................................................... 64
Table 32 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Model Inputs ...................................................... 70
Table 33 Waste Solvent Tank VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels .. 71
Table 34 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs ................................... 76
Table 35 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified
Overpressure Levels .................................................................................................... 77
Table 36 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture: Dispersion Results .............................................. 82
Table 37 Argon Model Inputs ...................................................................................................... 85
Table 38 ASU Coldbox Rupture Model Inputs ............................................................................ 88
Table 39 Coldbox Rupture: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels ............... 89
Table 40 Summary of Major Accident Scenario Consequences and Frequencies .................... 94
Table 41 Occupied Building Assessment for ASU Control Building ........................................... 96
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 9
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

1.0 INTRODUCTION
AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by Intel Ireland Ltd. to assess the consequences and
risk of fatality arising from Major Accident Hazards associated with proposed
developments at their existing integrated circuit manufacturing campus at Collinstown
Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare. Operations at Intel Ireland Ltd. are such that the
establishment is an Upper Tier Seveso establishment under the Chemicals Act (Control
of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 209
of 2015). The assessment was completed based on available information and knowledge
to date which may be subject to change at detailed design stage.
This report includes the following:
• Background to risk assessment and land use planning context;

• Description of development, receiving environment and identification of major
accident hazards;
• Assessment methodology and criteria;
• Quantitative Risk Assessment of Major Accident Hazards;
• Assessment of impacts on occupied buildings;
• Risk based Land Use Planning contours;
• Conclusions.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 10
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

2.0 BACKGROUND TO RISK ASSESSMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING
2.1 Risk Assessment – An Introduction
Trevor Kletz (Kletz, 1999) in his seminal work on the subject stated that the essential
elements of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) are (i) how often is a Major Accident
Hazard (MAH) likely to occur and (ii) Consequence Analysis – what is the impact of the
incident:
Kletz also commented that another way of expressing this method of QRA is:
How often?
How big?
So what?
In QRA, the “how often?” question is answered by using Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). FTA was first developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in
1961 for missile control launch reliability and further developed by Haasl at the Boeing
Company (Haasl, 1965) and was first applied to the process industries by Rasmussen in
1975 (Rasmussen, 1975).
.
se
ru
he
The FTA process involves using a combination of simple logic gates (AND and OR gates),
ot
ny
fo y.
to create a failure model for a process or an installation. The frequency or probability of

d nl
ra
re o
the top event is calculated from failure data for more simple events.
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
A fault tree is developed by first defining the top event, in FTA for MAH this may be events
ow ion
such as a release of toxic gas, an explosion, or the loss of containment of a material.

ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
A series of events which lead to the top event are then developed and the relationship
between events is defined, using AND and OR gates. The probability or frequency of
to
occurrence of individual events is then obtained from generic data, or from manufacturers
en
ns
data and the probability or frequency of the top event is then calculated.
Co
Section 2 of the Health and Safety Authority (HSA) Policy and Approach document
(Introduction to Technical Aspects) describes the policy and approach as follows:
“The policy of the HSA is that a simplified application of a risk based approach is the most
appropriate for land use planning. The difficulties associated with the complexity of
analyzing many scenarios can be avoided by considering a small number of carefully
chosen representative events, whose frequency has been estimated conservatively.”
The frequency data for major accident scenarios identified in this assessment is based on
these conservative even frequency values. Where the HSA Policy and Approach
document (HSA, 2010) does not provide suitable frequency values, FTA and ETA is
included and data for failure of pipes, tanks and protection systems has been obtained
from various published sources including, the “Purple Book” (TNO, 2005) and the UK HSE
Planning Case Assessment Guide, Chapter 6K (UK HSE, 2012).
The ‘how big’ element of the QRA was conducted using DNV PHAST and TNO Effects
modelling software.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 11
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Judgement will be applied in the approach taken to major accident consequence

modelling and quantitative risk assessment. Reference is made to the hazard identification
(HAZID) study for the existing Intel Ireland establishment, which has similar hazards to
the proposed development. The HAZID study is detailed in the Safety Report.
The “so what” element is perhaps the most contentious issue associated with QRA, as
one is essentially asking what is an acceptable level of risk, in this case risk of fatality,
posed by a facility.
It is widely accepted that “no risk” scenarios do not exist. The occupier of a house with
gas fired central heating is exposed to the risk posed by the presence of a natural gas
supply in the house. Statistics from the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE Risks
associated with Gas Supply, 1993) show that the annual risk of death from gas supply
events in the UK (risks include explosion, asphyxiation by fumes from poorly vented
heaters, poisoning by gas leaks) is approximately 1.1 in a million. In other words, for every
10 million persons living in houses with a gas supply, 11 will die annually from events
related to the supply.
Table 1 below presents the annual fatality rates, and the risk of fatality, for a number of
activities (from CIRIA Report 152, 1995) in the UK.
Risk Annual Fatality Rate Annual Risk of Fatality
.
se
(per 1,000, 000 people at
risk) ru
he
ot
Motorcycling 20,000 1 in 50
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
Smoking (all causes) 3000 1 in 333

ui es
eq os
Smoking (cancer) 1200 1 in 830

r r rp
ne pu
Fire fighting 800 1 in 1250

ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
Farming 360 1 in 2778

yr ns
op r i
Police work (non-clerical) 220 1 in 4545

f c Fo
Road accidents 100 1 in 10,000

to
en
Fires 28 1 in 35,700
ns
Co
Natural gas supply to house 1.1 1 in 909,090

Lightning strike 0.5 1 in 2,000,000
Table 1 Annual Fatality Rates for a Variety of Activities
Kletz has shown that the average industrial worker is exposed to a risk of accidental death
of somewhere around 1 x 10-3 per year, for all situations (work, home, travel).
Kletz has argued, that a risk of fatality which is 1% of the possible risk of death normally
posed to individuals in their normal day to day activities, which is equal to 1 x 10-5 risk of
death per annum, would be considered acceptable.
However, it has since been more widely accepted by regulatory agencies in Ireland
(Health and Safety Authority), UK (Health and Safety Executive) and the US (US
Environmental Protection Agency) that an individual risk of fatality of 1 x 10–6/annum (1 in
1,000,000 per year), for off-site impacts of Major Accident Hazard Facilities, with respect
to residential development, is considered acceptable and that an acceptable risk of fatality
for employees on-site is 1 x 10 –5/annum.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 12
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Land Use Planning and Risk Assessment
The Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) requires Member States to ensure that the
objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents
for human health and the environment are taken into account in land use planning policies
through controls on the siting of new establishments, modifications to establishments and
certain types of new developments in the vicinity of establishments. Under the 2015
COMAH Regulations, the Central Competent Authority (the Health and Safety Authority)
provides land use planning advice to planning authorities.
A risk-based approach to land use planning near hazardous installations has been
adopted by the HSA and is set out in the HSA’s Policy and Approach to COMAH Risk-
based Land-use Planning (HSA, 2010). This approach involves delineating three zones
for land use planning guidance purposes, based on the potential risk of fatality from major
accident scenarios resulting in damaging levels of thermal radiation (e.g. from pool fires),
overpressure (e.g. from vapour cloud explosions) and toxic gas concentrations (e.g. from
an uncontrolled toxic gas release).
The HSA has defined the boundaries of the Inner, Middle and Outer Land Use Planning
(LUP) zones as:
10-5/year Risk of fatality for Inner Zone (Zone 1) boundary
.
se
10-6/year Risk of fatality for Middle Zone (Zone 2) boundaryru
he
10-7/year Risk of fatality for Outer Zone (Zone 3) boundary
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
The process for determining the distances to the boundaries of the inner, middle and outer
ui es
eq os
zones for a Seveso establishment is outlined as follows:

r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
•
ht ct
Determine the consequences of major accident scenarios using the modelling

ig pe
yr ns
methodologies described in the HSA LUP Policy/Approach Document (HSA,

op r i
f c Fo
2010);
• Determine the severity (probability of fatality) using the probit functions specified
to
by the HSA;
en
ns
• Determine the frequency of the accident (probability of event) using data specified
Co
by the HSA;
• Determine the individual risk of fatality as follows:
Risk = Frequency x Severity (Equation 1)
The HSA’s 2010 Risk-Based LUP Policy/Approach document provides guidance on the
type of development appropriate to the inner, middle and outer LUP zones. The advice for
each zone is based on the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) PADHI (Planning
Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations) methodology. The PADHI
methodology sets four levels of sensitivity, with sensitivity increasing from 1 to 4, to
describe the development types in the vicinity of a COMAH establishment.
The Sensitivity Levels used in PADHI are based on a rationale which allows progressively
more severe restrictions to be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed development
increases. The sensitivity levels are:
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 13
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Level 1 Based on normal working population;

Level 2 Based on the general public – at home and involved in normal
activities;
Level 3 Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those with
mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger);
Level 4 Large examples of Level 3 and large outdoor examples of Level 2 and
Institutional Accommodation.
Table 2 details the matrix that is used by the HSA to advise on suitable development for
technical LUP purposes:
Level of Sensitivity Inner Zone (Zone 1) Middle Zone (Zone 2) Outer Zone (Zone 3)
Level 1 ✓ ✓ ✓
Level 2  ✓ ✓
Level 3   ✓
Level 4   
Table 2 LUP Matrix
Individual Risk Criteria
In the UK, the following annual individual risk of fatality criteria apply to members of the
.
se
public (Trbojevic, 2005): ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
10-4 Intolerable limit for members of the public;

d nl
ra
re o
10-5
ui es
Risk has to be reduced to the level As Low As Reasonably Practicable

eq os
r r rp
(ALARP);
ne pu
3 x 10-6 LUP limit of acceptability;

ow ion
ht ct
10-6 Broadly acceptable level of risk

ig pe
yr ns
10-7 Negligible level of risk

op r i
f c Fo
In relation to tolerability criteria for individual risk of fatality to persons on-site, the HSA
to
en
applies UK HSE criteria published in the guidance document Reducing Risks Protecting
ns
People (2001).
Co
The UK HSE generally uses a three tier framework for risk tolerability:
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 14
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Increasing Level of Risk
.
se
ru
he
The recommended upper risk of fatality bound for employees is set at 1 x 10 -3/year. The
ot
ny
fo y.
Chemical Industries Association (CIA, 2003) suggests that to allow only for the major
d nl
ra
re o
hazard aspects of an employee’s job, the upper bound should be reduced by a factor of
ui es
eq os
10 and thus be set at 1 x 10-4/year.

r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
The lower bound of risk – that at which no further effort needs to be applied to reduce risk
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
- is generally considered to be about 1 x 10-6/year.

op r i
f c Fo
In relation to new establishments, the HSA LUP Policy and Approach document (HSA,
to
2012) states that it will be necessary for them to demonstrate that they do not present a
en
ns
risk of fatality greater than 5E-06 (per year) to their current non-residential type neighbours
Co
or a risk of fatality greater than 1E-06 ( per year) to the nearest residential type property.
This may be relaxed in respect of neighbours where the new development is the
same/similar to the existing neighbours; for example, new oil storage depot being set up
in a location already occupied by tank farms.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 15
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

3.0 DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS AND RECEIVING

ENVIRONMENT
3.1 Description of Development
Site Layout
Intel Ireland Ltd. is located in Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare where
operations comprise the manufacture of integrated circuits on silicon wafers or ‘chips’.
Planning permission is being sought for additional installations including cryogenic liquid
oxygen tanks, cryogenic liquid hydrogen tanks, waste solvent collection tanks, a truck
staging yard, waste water holding tanks, a wastewater treatment system, an air separation
unit and a waste water balancing tank.
Figure 1 illustrates the site location and Figure 2 illustrates the layout of the proposed
development. Table 3 provides details of the hazardous substances at the locations
marked up on Figure 2.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 16
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
o
nt
se
n
Co
Figure 1 Site Location
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 17
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

.
se
6
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
3 7
re o
5
ui es
eq os
r r rp
2
ne pu
4
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
1
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
o
nt
se
n
Co
Figure 2 Layout of Proposed Development at Mound Area

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 18
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Table 3 Location of Hazardous Substances

Location Details
1 Liquid oxygen bulk storage tanks (2 No.)
2 Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks (2 No.)
3 Solvent Waste Stream A collection tanks (2 No.)
4 Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks (future) (2 No.)
5 Solvent Waste Stream A collection tanks (future) (2 No.)
6 Liquid hydrogen tanks (3 No. horizontal tanks)
7 Air Separation Unit including Liquid Oxygen Tanks and Liquid Argon Tank
Hazardous Installations
It is proposed to install liquid oxygen, liquid hydrogen and waste solvent bulk storage tanks
at the mound area.
The proposed Air Separation Unit (ASU) compound will contain associated towers 63
meters high and 45 meters high, tanks and equipment, and ancillary support buildings
housing plant and equipment. The air separation unit will generate liquid oxygen, liquid
argon, gaseous oxygen and gaseous nitrogen in a low temperature distillation process
that follows air compression and purification in molecular sieve adsorbers. Storage of
.
se
liquid oxygen and liquid argon will be provided at the ASU installation. ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Table 4 provides details of hazardous installations that will be installed at the mound area
re o
ui es
and summarises associated hazards.

eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
Table 4 Hazardous Substances at Mound Area

ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
Physical Hazard
Substance Vessel details Classification
op r i
State Statements
f c Fo
Ox. Gas 1
Liquefied 57 m3 vertical bulk tanks H270
Oxygen Refrigerated
to
cryogenic (2 No.) H281

en
liquefied gas
ns
Co
Flam. Gas 1
Liquefied 87.4 m3 horizontal bulk H220
Hydrogen Refrigerated
cryogenic tanks (3 No.) H281
liquefied gas
Flam. Liq. 3, Acute
Solvent Waste 60.6 m3 collection tanks Tox. 2 (oral), Acute
Stream A (2 No. at mound) in a Tox. 1 (dermal), H226, H300,
(dilute (40 – bunded area measuring Skin Corr. 1B, H310, H314,
Liquid
70% water), 8 m x 16 m x 1.3 m high STOT SE 3 Resp. H335, H336,
high flash point Provision for 2 No. future Tract Irr., STOT SE H361
solvent waste) tanks 3 narcotic effects,
Repr. 2
60.6 m3 collection tanks
Flam. Liq. 3, Acute
Solvent Waste (2 No. at mound) in a
Tox. 4 (oral), Acute H226, H302,
Stream B bunded area measuring
Liquid Tox. 4 (inhalation), H332, H318,
(mainly 8 m x 16 m x 1.3 m high
Eye Dam. 1, STOT H335
cyclohexanone) Provision for 2 No. future
SE 3 Resp. Tract irr.
tanks
Ox. Gas 1
Oxygen (at Liquefied 53 tonne vertical bulk H270
Refrigerated
ASU) cryogenic tanks (3 No.) H281
liquefied gas
Liquefied 225 tonne vertical bulk Refrigerated
Argon H281
cryogenic tank (1 No.) liquefied gas
The meaning of hazard classifications and hazard statements is given in Appendix A.
Page 19
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

With the exception of pressurised/refrigerated liquefied gas hazards, argon is not

classified with any health or physical hazards. However, a release has the potential to
cause an oxygen diminished atmosphere and to lead to asphyxiating effects. These
effects are assessed herein.
Occupied Buildings
The control building at the ASU will be occupied by ASU operations personnel.
3.2 Identification of Major Accident Hazards
Major accident scenarios are similar to those previously identified for the existing Intel
Ireland Ltd. integrated circuit manufacturing complex which are assessed in the Safety
Report for the facility. Major accident scenarios assessed within the scope of this study
are identified with reference to the Safety Report (2018) as well as the Policy & Approach
of the Health & Safety Authority to COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (19 March
2010) (HSA, 2010).
Major accident hazards associated with the following buildings/installations are described:
• Liquid oxygen tanks

• Liquid hydrogen tanks
.
se
• Waste solvent collection tanks ru
he
• Air separation unit
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
Liquid Oxygen Tanks

eq os
r r rp
ne pu
Liquid oxygen is classified as an oxidising gas category 1, and has the following hazard
ow ion
ht ct
statements:
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
• H270 Extremely flammable gas

• H281 Contains refrigerated gas, may cause cryogenic burns or injury
to
en
ns
Co
It is proposed to install 2 no. 57 m3 liquid oxygen tanks and associated vaporisers at the
North Mound.
The following major accident scenarios are identified for liquid oxygen tanks and are
assessed in Section 5.0:
• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tanks will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure and
may explode if heated. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank can lead
to a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) with overpressure
consequences.
• In the event of catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank the dispersion of
oxygen following a release has the potential to result in an enriched oxygen
atmosphere resulting in enhanced combustion hazards.
Liquid Hydrogen Tanks
Hydrogen is classified as a flammable gas category 1, and has the following hazard
statements and classification:
• H270 May cause or intensify fire; oxidiser
Page 20
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

• H281 Contains refrigerated gas, may cause cryogenic burns or injury
It is proposed to install 3 No. horizontal 87.4 m3 bulk tanks at the mound area.
The main hazards arising from the use of low-temperature liquefied hydrogen are:
• cold burns, frostbite and hypothermia from the intense cold

• over pressurisation from the large volume expansion of the liquid (Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapour Explosion or BLEVE)
• fireball following ignition of instantaneous release
• jet fire for high pressure release (direct ignition)
• Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) following delayed ignition of a vapour phase leak
Hydrogen has the following flammable properties (DIPPR Database, 2015):
• Lower flammable limit 4% (v/v) (40,000 ppm)

• Upper flammable limit 75% (v/v) (750,000 ppm)
The bulk cryogenic hydrogen tanks will contain liquefied hydrogen under pressure and
may explode if heated. Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic hydrogen tank can lead to a
BLEVE with overpressure consequences as well as a fireball as it is a flammable
substance (following impingement of a significant fire on the tank for a significant length
.
se
ru
of time). A leak from a pressure relief valve could result in a jet fire on direct ignition or a
he
ot
vapour cloud explosion on delayed ignition. These scenarios are assessed in Section 6.0
ny
fo y.
d nl
herein.
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
Waste Solvent Collection Tanks

ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
It is proposed to install 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream A and 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream B
yr ns
collection tanks in bunds at the development area. Solvent Waste Stream A has a flash
op r i
f c Fo
point of approx. 57 oC and Solvent Waste Stream B has a flash point of approx. 37.5 oC
and is mainly comprised of cyclohexanone.
to
en
ns
Co
Solvent Waste Stream A has a flash point of 57 oC and is classified as follows:
• Flam. Liq. 3, H226 Flammable liquid and vapour (flash point 57 oC).
• Acute Tox. 2 (oral), H300 fatal if swallowed.
• Acute Tox. 3 (dermal), H310 Fatal in contact with skin.
• Skin Corr. 1B, H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage
• STOT SE 3 Resp. Tract Irr., H335 May cause respiratory irritation
• STOT SE 3 narcotic effects., H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness
• Repr. 2, H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child
Solvent Waste Stream B has a flash point of 37.5 oC and is classified as follows:
• Flam. Liq. 3, H226 Flammable liquid and vapour (flash point 37.5 oC).
• Acute Tox. 4 (oral), H302 Harmful if swallowed.
• Acute Tox. 4 (inhalation), H332 Harmful if inhaled.
• Eye Dam. 1 H318 Causes serious eye damage.
• STOT SE 3 Resp. Tract Irr., H335 May cause respiratory irritation.
It is noted that the Solvent Waste Stream A and B do not have any inhalation toxicity
classification within the scope of the COMAH Regulations 2015.
Page 21
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Solvent Waste Stream B (mainly cyclohexanone) has a high flash point (37.5 oC) and a
low vapour pressure and is unlikely to ignite in the event of an accidental release meeting
an ignition source. Solvent Waste Stream A has a higher flash point (57 oC) and is dilute
(up to 70 % water). As the lower flash point stream, Solvent Waste Stream B is modelled.
Cyclohexanone is representative of this stream. Cyclohexanone has the following physical
properties:
Table 5 Physical Properties of Solvent Waste Constituents

Property Units Cyclohexanone
oC
Flash point 44
Lower flammable limit % v/v 1.1
Upper flammable limit % v/v 9.4
Vapour pressure kPa 0.2 (10 oC)
0.4 (20 oC)
Vapour density - 3.4
oC
Auto-ignition temperature 420
oC
Boiling point 154 - 156
Immediate Danger to Life and Health concentration (based on ppm 700
30 minute exposure duration)
Heat of combustion J/kg 3.36E07
Data on flash point, lower and upper flammable limits and heat of combustion was
obtained from the DIPPR Database 2015. Data on other physical parameters was
obtained from the European Chemicals Agency chemical substances database (ECHA,
.
se
online). IDLH data is published by the US Centre for Disease Control (US CDC, online).
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
A conservative approach is taken and a fire or explosion hazard is assessed for Solvent
d nl
ra
re o
Waste Stream B as follows:

ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
• Waste solvent collection tank release to bund and bund fire;

ow ion
•
ht ct
Tank rupture with bund overtopping or spill during road tanker filling at truck dock,
ig pe
yr ns
pool formation and pool fire (modelled as cyclohexanone);

op r i
f c Fo
• Confined explosion in waste solvent tank modelled as cyclohexanone.

to
en
Equipment will be ATEX rated in the waste solvent areas.

ns
Co
Section 7.0 contains an assessment of major accident scenarios associated with the
solvent waste streams.
Page 22
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Air Separation Unit
It is proposed to install an Air Separation Unit (ASU) at the mound area. The ASU
comprises an assembly of distillation columns, heat exchangers, adsorbers and
supporting machinery for compression, expansion and control of gases and liquids.
The ASU will contain the following hazardous installations:
• 3 No. 53 tonne cryogenic liquid oxygen bulk storage tanks (159 tonnes in total)
• 225 tonne cryogenic liquid argon bulk storage tank (1 no. total on site)
• Coldbox (at each ASU) – there are 3 No. columns within the coldbox unit, the main
heat exchanger, high pressure column and low pressure column.
The following major accident scenarios were identified for the ASUs and are assessed in
Section 8.0:
Cryogenic liquid oxygen:
• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tank will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure and
consequences;
.
se
• ru
In the event of catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank the dispersion of
he
ot
ny
fo y.

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
Cryogenic liquid argon:

ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
• In the event of catastrophic failure of the proposed 225 tonne cryogenic bulk argon
ig pe
yr ns
storage tank, the dispersion of argon following a release has the potential to
op r i
f c Fo
displace ambient oxygen resulting in asphyxiating effects.

to
en
Coldbox:
ns
Co
• Liquid leak from pipe/instrument line failure within the coldbox LP/HP column
leading to column failure with overpressure consequences;
• Reboiler explosion with overpressure consequences.
Page 23
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Summary of Major Accident Scenarios
Table 6 summarises the major accident scenarios that have been identified for the
proposed development.
Table 6 Summary of Major Accident Hazards

Major Accident
Substance Installation Location Scenario
Hazard
Tank rupture, rapid BLEVE
evaporation and overpressure
Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks LOx compound
expansion of oxygen
Oxygen enrichment
vapour
Venting system leak,
Jet fire
direct ignition
Venting system leak, Vapour cloud
Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank LH2 compound delayed ignition explosion
BLEVE
Tank rupture
overpressure
Tank rupture Fireball
Tank rupture with bund
Uncontained pool
overtopping or spill at
Waste solvent fire
Collection truck dock, ignition
Waste solvent collection tank
tanks Spill to bund, ignition Bund fire
bunds
Ignition of vapour within Vapour cloud
vapour space of tank explosion
.
se
Tank rupture, rapid
ru
he BLEVE
ot
Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks ASU

expansion of oxygen
ny
fo y.
Oxygen enrichment
d nl
ra
vapour
re o
ui es
Tank rupture, rapid BLEVE

eq os
r r rp

ne pu
Liquid argon Bulk tank ASU

expansion of argon
ow ion
Oxygen depletion
vapour
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 24
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

3.3 Description of Receiving Environment
The Intel Ireland Ltd. site location and surrounding environment is illustrated on Figure 1
(see Section 3.1.1).
Intel Ireland Ltd. is located at Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip, Co. Kildare. The site is
located north of the M4 motorway on the R148 Leixlip-Maynooth road, and is accessed
from M4 Junction 6. The site is served by railway and bus services, which provide frequent
connections to Dublin City and west to Maynooth.
The Rye River flows to the north of the existing Intel Leixlip site. Approximately 2.2 km of
the Rye River are located within the Intel land ownership boundary. Lands (within the
ownership of Intel) to the north of the Rye River are zoned for open space and amenity
and agricultural uses. The Rye Water Valley (including the Rye River) is designated as a
Proposed Natural Heritage Area under the Wildlife (Amendment) Act, 2000 and as a
Special Area of Conservation under the EU Habitats Directive (Site Code 001398).
Confey Road is located to the north of the site. Land use in this area is for residential and
agricultural purposes. There are a number of residential dwellings north of Intel that are
accessed by Confey Road, the nearest is approximately 400 m from the footprint of the
existing facility.
.
se
The western site boundary is bounded by Kellystown Road. There is a residential dwelling
ru
he
along Kellystown Lane, approximately 290 m north of the footprint of the Intel facility.
ot
ny
fo y.
There are 2 No. residential dwellings to the west of the Intel site, south of the Rye River,
d nl
ra
re o
accessed south from Kellystown Lane. These dwellings are 65 m and 142 m west of the
ui es
eq os
footprint of the Intel facility. There is an additional residential dwelling approximately 310
r r rp
ne pu
m west of the footprint of the Intel facility. Lands west of the Kellystown Road (Blakestown
ow ion
townland) are used for agricultural uses. Carton Demesne lies further west/northwest. The
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
estate contains a residential development, hotel, spa resort and golf club. Blakestown
op r i
f c Fo
conference centre is located within the Intel site ownership boundary in the south western
corner of the site at the Kellystown Road/R148 Maynooth-Leixlip Road junction.
to
en
ns
The southern site boundary is bounded by the R148 Leixlip/Maynooth Road. Access
Co
points to the Intel facility are via the R148. There are a number of occupied residential
dwellings along the southern side of the R148. Land use south of the R148 is summarised
as follows:
• Agricultural use (including Collinstown Study);

• Commercial use and retail (Lidl outlet) (zoned general development);
• Amenity use: Leixlip Amenity Centre, Leixlip United F.C. and sports grounds
(zoned open space and amenity).
These lands are bounded to the south by the Royal Canal and the railway line. The Royal
Canal is designated as a Proposed Natural Heritage Area (Site Code 002103). Intel
applied for planning permission to construct a car park on agricultural lands south of the
R148 (Kildare County Council planning reference 11-846).
The eastern site boundary is bounded by an agricultural/greenfield area and also the
railway line/Royal Canal. Louisa bridge crosses the railway line and Royal Canal at the
south eastern corner of the site. Louisa Bridge Railway Station is located to the east of
the railway line. There is an apartment development (Louisa Park) east of the Railway
Station on Station Road.
Page 25
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

The nearest off site receiving locations are illustrated on
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
Figure
ne pu
3.
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 26
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

1
5
.
se
ru
he
ot
3 4
ny
fo y.
d nl
Figure
ra
re o
ui es
3 Off Site Receiving Locations

eq os
r r rp
ne pu
The ground level at these locations is as follows:

ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
•
yr ns
Location 1: 43 m O.D.
op r i
f c Fo
• Location 2: 49 m O.D.
• Location 3: 58 m O.D.
to
•
en
ns
•
Co
Consequence modelling takes account of the ground level at off-site receiving locations.
Page 27
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

4.0 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA
Physical Effects Modelling
The impacts of physical and health effects on workers and the general public outside of
the establishment boundary were determined by modelling accident scenarios using DNV
PHAST Version 8.22 modelling software.
Thermal radiation, overpressure and toxic exposure criteria are based on the concept of
a ‘dangerous dose’.
A ‘dangerous dose’ is defined by the UK Health and Safety Executive as a dose where
there is extreme distress to almost everyone, with a substantial proportion of affected
persons requiring medical attention and some highly susceptible people might be killed
(about 1% fatalities).
Thermal Radiation Criteria
Fire scenarios have the potential to create hazardous heat fluxes. Therefore, thermal
radiation on exposed skin poses a risk of fatality. Potential consequences of damaging
radiant heat flux and direct flame impingement are categorised in Table 7 (HSA, 2010,
CCPS, 2000, EI, 2007 and McGrattan et al, 2000).
.
se
ru
he
Thermal Flux
ot
Consequences
ny
fo y.
(kW/m2)
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
1 – 1.5
eq os
Sunburn
r r rp
ne pu
5–6 Personnel injured (burns) if they are wearing normal clothing and do not escape quickly
ow ion
ht ct
8 – 12 Fire escalation if long exposure and no protection

ig pe
yr ns
op r i
32 – 37.5 Fire escalation if no protection (consider flame impingement)

f c Fo
31.5 US DHUD, limit value to which buildings can be exposed

to
en
37.5 Process equipment can be impacted, AIChE/CCPS

ns
Co
Up to 350 In flame. Steel structures can fail within several minutes if unprotected or not cooled.
Table 7 Heat Flux Consequences
In relation to persons indoors, the HSA have specified the thermal radiation consequence
criteria (from an outdoor fire) detailed in Table 8 (HSA, 2010).
Thermal Flux Consequences

(kW/m2)
> 25.6 Building conservatively assumed to catch fire quickly and so 100% fatality probability
12.7 – 25.6 People are assumed to escape outdoors, and so have a risk of fatality corresponding to
that outdoors
< 12.7 People are assumed to be protected, so 0% fatality probability
Table 8 Heat Flux Consequences Indoors
Thermal Dose Unit (TDU) is used to measure exposure to thermal radiation. It is a function
of intensity (power per unit area) and exposure time:
Thermal Dose = I1.33 t (Equation 2)
Page 28
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

where the Thermal Dose Units (TDUs) are (kW/m2)4/3.s, I is thermal radiation intensity
(kW/m2) and t is exposure duration (s).
The HSA recommends that the Eisenberg probit function (HSA, 2010) is used to determine
probability of fatality to persons outdoors from thermal radiation as follows:
Probit = -14.9 + 2.56 ln (I1.33 t) (Equation 3)
I Thermal radiation intensity (kW/m2)

t exposure duration (s)
Probit (Probability Unit) functions are used to convert the probability of an event occurring
to percentage certainty that an event will occur. The probit variable is related to probability
as follows (CCPS, 2000):
Y −5
1  u2 
P=
2 −  − 2 du
exp
(Equation 4)
where P is the probability of percentage, Y is the probit variable, and u is an integration

variable. The probit variable is normally distributed and has a mean value of 5 and a
standard deviation of 1.
.
se
ru
he
ot
The Probit to percentage conversion equation is (CCPS, 2000):

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
 Y − 5  Y − 5 
eq os
r r rp
P = 501 + erf  
ne pu
−  (Equation 5)
 
ow ion
Y 5  2
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
The relationship between Probit and percentage certainty is presented in Table 9 (CCPS,
f c Fo
2000).
to
en
ns
Co
Table 9 Conversion from Probits to Percentage
Page 29
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

For long duration fires, such as pool fires, it is generally reasonable to assume an effective
exposure duration of 75 seconds to take account of the time required to escape. With
respect to exposure to thermal radiation outdoors, the Eisenberg probit relationship
implies:
• 1% fatality – 966 TDUs (6.8 kW/m2 for 75 s exposure duration) (Dangerous Dose)
• 10% fatality – 1452 TDUs (9.23 kW/m2 for 75 s exposure duration)
• 50% fatality – 2387 TDUs (13.4 kW/m2 for 75 s exposure duration)
Flammable Effects
A Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) may be observed during major accidents.

Combustion of a flammable gas-air mixture will occur if the composition of the mixture
lies in the flammable range and if an ignition source is available. When ignition occurs in
a flammable region of the cloud, the flame will start to propagate away from the ignition
source. The combustion products expand causing flow ahead of the flame. Initially
this flow will be laminar. Under laminar or near laminar conditions the flame speeds
for normal hydrocarbons are in the order of 5 to 30 m/s which is too low to produce any
significant blast over-pressure. Under these conditions, the vapour cloud will simply
burn, causing a flash fire. In order for a vapour cloud explosion to occur, the vapour
cloud must be in a turbulent condition.
.
se
Turbulence may arise in a vapour cloud in various ways: ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
• By the release of the flammable material itself, for instance a jet release from a
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
high pressure vessel.

eq os
•
r r rp
By the interaction of the expansion flow ahead of the flame with obstacles present
ne pu
in a congested area.
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
Factors affecting the probability, magnitude and effect of a vapour cloud explosion include
op r i
f c Fo
(CCPS, 2012):
to
•
en
Amount of flammable material in the cloud, within an area where there are objects
ns
Co
that will induce turbulence and create a degree of confinement;

• Degree of cloud mixing (cloud composition);
• Reactivity of flammable material (highly reactive materials increase the likelihood
of a fireball transition to a VCE);
• Fundamental burning velocity;
• Energy of ignition source;
• Release conditions (high pressure releases generate greater turbulence than do
low pressure releases);
• Presence of obstacles, or confinement, or other turbulence enhancing
mechanisms;
• Cloud configuration (some incidents have exhibited directional blast effects);
• Wind speed and direction.
Overpressure Criteria
Explosions scenarios can result in damaging overpressures, especially when flammable

vapour/air mixtures are ignited in a congested area. Table 10 describes blast damage for
various overpressure levels (Mannan, 2012).
Page 30
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Side-on Description of Damage

Overpressure,
mbar
1.5 Annoying noise
2 Occasional breaking of large window panes already under strain
3 Loud noise; sonic boom glass failure
7 Breakage of small windows under strain
10 Threshold for glass breakage
20 “Safe distance”, probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some
damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken
30 Limited minor structural damage
35 – 70 Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames
>35 Damage level for “Light Damage”
50 Minor damage to house structures
80 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
70 - 150 Corrugated asbestos shattered. Corrugated steel or aluminium panels fastenings fail,
followed by buckling; wood panel (standard housing) fastenings fail; panels blown in
.
se
100 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
ru
he
150 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
150-200 Concrete or cinderblock walls, not reinforced, shattered

re o
ui es
eq os
>170 Damage level for “Moderate Damage”

r r rp
ne pu
180 Lower limit of serious structural damage 50% destruction of brickwork of houses
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
200 Heavy machines in industrial buildings suffered little damage; steel frame building
yr ns
distorted and pulled away from foundations

op r i
f c Fo
200 – 280 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks
to
300 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured

en
ns
Co
350 Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press in building slightly damaged
350 – 500 Nearly complete destruction of houses
>350 Damage level for “Severe Damage”
500 Loaded tank car overturned
500 – 550 Unreinforced brick panels, 25 - 35 cm thick, fail by shearing or flexure
600 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
700 Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools moved and badly damaged
Table 10 Blast Damage
Page 31
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Lees’ Loss Prevention also gives the following damage criteria for process vessels
(Mannan, 2012):
Peak Overpressure Description of Damage

(mbar)
Steel floating roof petroleum tank
240 20% damage
1,380 99% damage
Vertical cylindrical steel pressure vessel
830 20% damage
965 99% damage
Spherical steel petroleum tank
550 20% damage
1100 99% damage
Table 11 Process Vessel Blast Damage Criteria
There are a number of modes of explosion injury including eardrum rupture, lung
haemorrhage, whole body displacement injury, missile injury, burns and toxic exposure.
.
Table 12 describes injury criteria from blast overpressure including probability of eardrum
se
rupture and probability of fatality due to lung haemorrhage. ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
Probability of Eardrum Rupture (%) Peak overpressure (mbar)

r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
1 (threshold) 165
ht ct
ig pe
10 194
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
50 435
90 840
to
en
ns
Probability of Fatality due to Lung Haemorrhage (%) Peak overpressure (mbar)

Co
1 (threshold) 1000
10 1200
50 1400
90 1750
Table 12 Injury Criteria from Explosion Overpressure
The HSA recommends that the Hurst, Nussey and Pape probit function (HSA, 2010) is
used to determine probability of fatality to persons outdoors from overpressure as follows:
Probit = 1.47 + 1.35ln P (Equation 6)
P Blast overpressure (psi)
The Hurst, Nussey and Pape probit relationship implies:
• 1% fatality – 168 mbar (Dangerous Dose)

• 10% fatality – 365 mbar
• 50% fatality – 942 mbar
Page 32
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

The HSA uses relationships published by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) to
determine the probability of fatality for building occupants exposed to blast overpressure.
The CIA has developed relationships for 4 categories of buildings (CIA, 2010):
• category 1: hardened structure building (special construction, now windows);

• category 2: typical office block (four storey, concrete frame and roof, brick block
wall panels);
• category 3: typical domestic dwelling (two storey, brick walls, timber floors); and
• category 4: ‘portacabin’ type timber construction, single storey.
The overpressure vulnerability relationships for persons indoors are illustrated on Figure
A2.1 of the CIA Guidance for the location and design of occupied buildings on chemical
manufacturing sites (CIA, 2010) which is reproduced as follows:
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Figure 4 Chemical Industries Association Overpressure vs. Vulnerability Relationship
The CIA relationships imply the overpressure levels corresponding to probabilities of

fatality of 1%, 10% and 50% detailed in Table 13.
Overpressure Level, mbar

Probability of fatality
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
1% fatality (dangerous
435 100 50 50
dose)
10% fatality 519 183 139 115
50% fatality 590 284 300 242
Table 13 Blast Overpressure Consequences Indoors
Page 33
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Oxygen Enrichment Criteria
The European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA) describes the following criteria to be
used for limits of oxygen enrichment (EIGA, 2006):
• The maximum safe oxygen concentration for entry into a confined space that is
being controlled or measured because of the risk is 23.5 % total O2. The space
should be ventilated sufficiently to obtain a value approaching 21% O2 (i.e.
indistinguishable from atmospheric air).
• For cases of leakage, venting or uncontrolled release of oxygen into the outdoor
atmosphere, there is no risk of harm in clouds containing up to 25% O 2. At
anticipated level above 25% O2 it may be possible by means of risk assessments
to determine that such atmospheres can be safely entered with appropriate
control: e.g. there is no permitted smoking in an area where venting is possible, or
hot work is controlled by permit because of the risks of venting.
• For purposes of quantification, or for cases of reporting boundary conditions from

predicted release cases calculated by dispersion, there is an anticipated lethal
risk from atmospheres with concentrations of 35% O2 and higher.
• Care has to be taken with regard to special circumstances such as definition of
.
se
ru
safety from releases involving cold oxygen clouds that may accumulate in
he
depressions or pits, or from atmospheric concentrations that might enter air intakes
ot
ny
fo y.
to compressors, blowers or Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) units,

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
where the machinery design anticipates that only atmospheric air (i.e. 21% O2)
eq os
r r rp
could be present.
ne pu
ow ion
•
ht ct
These criteria are only designed to cover cases of excess O2 concentration in

ig pe
yr ns
anticipated atmospheric air, they cannot be justified in any other cases e.g. oxygen
op r i
f c Fo
– flammable gas mixtures or gases used for medical purposes.

to
en
The following criteria are used in the assessment of oxygen enrichment following an
ns
Co
accidental release:
Oxygen concentration of
Consequences atmosphere
% ppm
Normal ambient concentration 21 210,000
Safe limit (outdoors) 25 250,000
Dangerous dose LOx spill (lethal) 35 350,000
Table 14 Oxygen Enrichment: Hazardous Concentrations
Criteria for Exposure to Asphyxiating Gases
The criteria for asphyxiation effects described below are based on European Industrial
Gases Association (EIGA) criteria (EIGA, IGC Document 44/09/E).
Elevated concentrations of asphyxiating gases can lead to an oxygen diminished

atmosphere (<19.5% oxygen in air) which can lead to dizziness, drowsiness, nausea,
vomiting, excess salivation, diminished mental alertness, loss of consciousness and
death.
Page 34
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Exposure to atmospheres of 8 – 10% oxygen or less will quickly bring about

unconsciousness without warning, leaving individuals unable to protect themselves. The
ambient oxygen concentration in air at sea level is 20.947%, so a reduction in oxygen
concentrations of greater than 1.447% is likely to bring on symptoms of asphyxia.
A reduction of approximately twice this level (2.894% oxygen) is likely to lead to significant
symptoms of asphyxia in most affected persons and a reduction to 10% or less ambient
air oxygen concentrations, a reduction in oxygen concentration of 10.947% oxygen is
likely to lead to rapid unconsciousness and death.
The concentrations of asphyxiating gas resulting from an accidental release which are
required to achieve these oxygen reductions in ambient air were calculated and are shown
in Table 15. These concentrations were calculated based on the assumption that oxygen
makes up approximately 1/5th of the atmosphere at sea level and that the dilution of
oxygen in the atmosphere by another gas is in the ratio of just over 1/5th to 4/5th.
Released gas
Resulting O2
Consequences Gas conc. (%) of Gas conc. (ppm) of conc.(%)
atmosphere atmosphere
Onset of symptoms of
6.91 69,100 19.50
asphyxia
Significant symptoms of
13.83 138,300 18.05
asphyxia
.
se
Rapid unconsciousness and ru
he
52.26 522,600 10.95
death
ot
ny
fo y.
Table 15 Oxygen Reductions due to Ambient Concentration of Asphyxiating Gas

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
Breathing an oxygen deficient atmosphere can have serious and immediate effects,
r r rp
ne pu
including unconsciousness after only one or two breaths. The exposed person has no
ow ion
warning and cannot sense that the oxygen level is too low.
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
Weather Conditions
to
Weather conditions at the time of a major-accident have a significant impact on the

en
ns
consequences of the event. Typically, high wind speeds increase the impact of fires,
Co
particularly pool fires, while the associated turbulence dilutes vapour clouds, reducing the
impact of toxic and flammable gas releases.
Atmospheric Stability Class and Wind Speed
Atmospheric stability describes the amount of turbulence in the atmosphere. The stability
depends on the windspeed, time of day, and other conditions. Atmospheric stability
classes are described in Table 16 (DNV, PHAST supporting documentation).
Day: Solar Radiation Night: Cloud Cover

Wind speed
(m/s) Thin, Overcast,
Strong Moderate Slight Moderate
<40% >80%
2 A A-B B - - D
2–3 A-B B C E F D
3–5 B B-C C D E D
5–6 C C-D D D D D
6 C D D D D D
Table 16 Atmospheric Stability Class
Page 35
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Stability classes are described as follows:
• A very unstable (sunny with light winds)

• B unstable (moderately sunny, stronger winds than class A)
• C slightly unstable – very windy/sunny or overcast/light wind
• D neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast night
• E stable – moderately stable – less overcast and windy than class D
• F very stable – night with moderate clouds and light/moderate winds
The following Pasquill stability/wind speed pairs are specified by the HSA in Ireland for
consequence modelling:
• Average weather conditions are represented by stability category D and a wind

speed of 5 m/s, i.e. Category D5;
• Worst case conditions for toxic dispersion are represented by stability category F
and a wind speed of 2 m/s, i.e. Category F2;
• A wind speed of 10 m/s represents the worst case condition for fire scenarios, with
stability category D, i.e. Category D10.
Wind Direction and Ambient Temperature
Figure 5 illustrates a wind rose for Casement Aerodrome (1988 – 2018). It can be seen
.
se
that the prevailing wind direction is from the south west. ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
Wind Rose for Casement Aerodrome

ui es
1988-2018
eq os
r r rp
0
ne pu
350 10% 10
ow ion
340 20
ht ct
330 9% 30
ig pe
yr ns
320 8% 40
op r i
f c Fo
7%
310 50
6%
300 60
to
5%
en
4%
ns
290 70
Co
3% <=1.54 m/s
2% <=3.09 m/s
280 80
1% <=5.14 m/s
270 0% 90 <=8.23 m/s
<=10.8 m/s
260 100
<=10.8 m/s
Total
250 110
240 120
230 130
220 140
210 150
200 160
190 170
180
Figure 5 Wind Rose Casement Aerodrome 1988 - 2018
Ambient Temperature
The ambient and surface temperature conditions significantly impact the results of the
consequence modelling. Atmospheric temperatures in the Kildare area may range from -
16°C to 31°C through the year.
Page 36
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

According to the weather data recorded between 1981 and 2010 at Casement
Aerodrome, the average atmospheric temperature observed is 9.7°C. A representative
temperature of 10 oC has been selected to represent typical temperature conditions at
the site.
Ambient Humidity
Weather data for Casement Aerodrome, monthly and annual mean and extreme values
datasheet (recorded between 1981 and 2010) supplied by Met Éireann, indicates a
mean morning (09:00 UTC) relative humidity of 83.6% and a mean afternoon (15:00
UTC) humidity of 73.8%. Therefore, for this assessment, a representative ambient
humidity of 80% has been assumed.
Surface Roughness
Surface roughness describes the roughness of the surface over which the cloud is
dispersing. Typical values for the surface roughness are as follows (DNV, PHAST
supporting documentation):
Roughness length Description
.
0.0002 m Open water, at least 5 km
se
ru
he
0.005 m Mud flats, snow, no vegetation
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
0.03 m Open flat terrain, grass, few isolated objects

ra
re o
ui es
eq os
0.1 m Low crops, occasional large obstacles, x/h > 20

r r rp
ne pu
0.25 m High crops, scattered large objects, 15 < x/h < 20

ow ion
ht ct
0.5 m Parkland, bushes, numerous obstacles, x/h < 15

ig pe
yr ns
op r i
1.0 m Regular large obstacles coverage (suburb, forest)

f c Fo
3.0 m City centre with high and low rise buildings

to
Table 17 Surface Roughness

en
ns
Co
Intel is i n an industrial site with adjoining agricultural and commercial activities. A

surface roughness length of 1.0 m has been selected for this study.
Page 37
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

5.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID OXYGEN MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
It is proposed to install 2 no. 57 m3 liquid oxygen tanks and associated vaporisers at the
proposed development area.
The following major accident scenarios were identified for the liquid oxygen tanks:
• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tanks will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure.
Catastrophic rupture of a cryogenic oxygen tank can lead to a Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) with overpressure consequences.
5.1 Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs
The PHAST Version 8.22 BLEVE blast, catastrophic rupture and unified dispersion model
were used to model overpressure effects and the dispersion of oxygen following rupture
of a bulk oxygen tank. Model inputs are as detailed inTable 18.
Parameter Details Source/Assumption

Scenario BLEVE BLAST -
.
se
Material Oxygen -ru
he
Storage conditions Cryogenic oxygen stored as Intel
ot
ny
fo y.
liquid at low temperature under

d nl
ra
re o
pressurised conditions
ui es
eq os
Operating pressure 12 barg Intel

r r rp
ne pu
Burst Pressure 3 x operating pressure Recommended by HSA

ow ion
Table 18 Liquid Oxygen Tank at LOx Compound: Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
Following rupture of a liquid oxygen storage tank, a pool of liquid oxygen will form on the
f c Fo
ground. Oxygen will evaporate from the surface of the liquid and disperse with the potential
to
to form an oxygen enriched atmosphere.

en
ns
Co
Model inputs are as detailed in Table 18. In the absence of detailed drainage design, it is
conservatively estimated that the maximum LOx pool size that could form at the
development area measures 2,500 m2.
5.2 BLEVE Model Outputs
Figure 6 illustrates the level of overpressure with distance following rupture of the
cryogenic liquid oxygen tank.
Table 19 presents distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of

probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors in Category 2 (office type
buildings) buildings, Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) and Category 4 buildings
(Portacabins).
Page 38
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

LOx Tank Catastophic Failure and BLEVE

Overpressure vs. Distance
40
35
30
Overpressure (mbar)
25
20
15
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance (m)
.
Figure 6 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance
se
ru
he
ot
Peak Consequences Distance (m)

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
overpressure
re o
ui es
(mbar)
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
20 Safe distance - probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this 37

ow ion
value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken

ht ct
ig pe
35 Light damage 23
yr ns
op r i
170 Moderate damage 8

f c Fo
350 Severe damage 5

to
168 1% mortality outdoors 8

en
ns
Co

100 1% mortality indoors in Category 2 Structures 11
Table 19 Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast at LOx Compound: Calculated Distances
at Specified Overpressure Levels
The overpressure damage contours from a LOx BLEVE are illustrated on Figure 7.
The overpressure contours corresponding to 1%, probability of fatality (vulnerability)

outdoors and indoors in category 2 structures (representative of buildings on site) and at
category 3 structures (residential dwellings and assumed to be representative of the
proposed ASU control building) from a LOx BLEVE illustrated on Figure 8.
Page 39
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

LEGEND
.
se
0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar ru 0.35 bar
he
ot
Safe distance Light damage Moderate damage Severe damage

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Figure 7 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Blast Damage Contours
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Overpressure 0.05 bar, 1% mortality 0.100 bar, 1% mortality 0.168 bar, 1% mortality
level indoors in Category 3 indoors in Category 2 outdoors
structures (residential) structures
Shape/Effect
Zone
Figure 8 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen BLEVE at LOx Compound: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability Contours
Page 40
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

In the event of a BLEVE involving a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank the following is
concluded:
• The overpressure levels corresponding to a safe distance, light, moderate and

severe damage do not extend outside of the site boundary;
• The overpressure level at the solvent waste collection tanks is predicted to be 50
mbar. This is not sufficient to cause damage (for steel petroleum vessels (floating
roof), 240 mbar would cause 20% damage, see Section 4.1.4);
• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors is confined to the
LOx compound and does not extend to any normally occupied areas or outside of
the site boundary;
• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality indoors does not extend to
any occupied buildings on site and persons indoors are protected;
• There are no impacts anticipated off site, including at residential dwellings.
5.3 Pool Evaporation Model Outputs
The pool evaporation model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model evaporation
of oxygen vapour from the surface of a liquid pool following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank.
Figure 9 illustrates the mass evaporation rate of liquid oxygen versus time and Figure 10
.
se
illustrates mass evaporated versus time. ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
LOx Tank Rupture

re o
ui es
Evaporation Mass Flow Rate vs. Time

eq os
r r rp
ne pu
1200
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
Evaporation Mass Flow Rate (kg/s)
op r i
1000
f c Fo
to
800
en
ns
Co
600
5 m/s
2 m/s
400
200
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
Time (s)
Figure 9 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow Rate
vs. Time
Page 41
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

LOx Tank Rupture

Evaporated Mass vs. Time
140000
120000
100000
Evaporated Mass (kg)
80000
5 m/s
60000
2 m/s
40000
20000
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Time (s)
Figure 10 Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs. Time
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
5.4 Oxygen Dispersion Results

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
The unified dispersion model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model dispersion of
r r rp
ne pu
oxygen vapour following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank.

ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
The normal ambient concentration of oxygen is 21% volume or 210,000 ppm. The safe
op r i
f c Fo
limit outdoors is 25% volume or 250,000 ppm, at this concentration the probability of
fatality or serious injury is 0.17% (BCGA, 2013). The dangerous dose level at which lethal
to
effects may occur is 35% volume or 350,000 ppm which corresponds to a probability of
en
ns
fatality or serious injury of 0.53%.

Co
The maximum concentration of oxygen (above background ambient levels) following

catastrophic rupture of a liquid oxygen tank with distance downwind is illustrated on Figure
11. Results are summarised in Table 20. The worst case contours are illustrated on Figure
12. These results are at 1.5 m above ground level. The shape of the area impacted is
shown for the prevailing wind direction as well as the total effect area taking account of all
wind directions.
Page 42
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

LOx Tank Rupture

Maximum Concentration vs. Distance Downwind
1200000
1000000
Maximum Concentration (ppm)
800000
600000
D5
F2
400000
200000
0
-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Distance Downwind (m)
.
se
Concentration vs. Distance Downwind ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Oxygen concentration
re o
Distance (m) Distance (m)

ui es
Consequences of atmosphere
eq os
r r rp
% ppm D5 F2
ne pu
ow ion
Safe Limit (outdoors) (0.018%

ht ct
ig pe
probability of fatality or serious 25 250,000 170 265

yr ns
injury)
op r i
f c Fo
0.27% probability of fatality or

30 300,000 100 135
serious injury
to
Dangerous Dose (lethal) (0.53 %

en
ns

Co
injury)
40 400,000 54 21
serious injury
Table 20 Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture at LOx Compound: Dispersion Results
Page 43
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru Maximum Contour
he
Legend O2 Concentration Consequences
ot
Distance dimensions
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
Shape Safe Distance (0.018%

ui es
390 m
eq os
250,000 ppm probability of fatality or 265 m

r r rp
diameter
ne pu
Effect zone serious injury)

ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
Concentration Footprint
op r i
f c Fo
There is the potential for an oxygen enriched atmosphere to arise in the area within the
to
contour illustrated on Figure 12. There are no receptors in the area off site within the
en
ns
250,000 ppm contour.

Co
5.5 Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE
The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast
following rupture of a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank is calculated using the Hurst Nussey
Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4). The probability of fatality indoors from the
overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships
(CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4).
The probability of fatality with distance outdoors and indoors for the BLEVE blast scenario
is illustrated on Figure 13.
Page 44
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Liquid Oxygen Catastophic Failure and BLEVE

Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
100
Outdoors
90 Indoors Category 2
Indoors Cateogry 3
Indoors Category 4
80
Probability of Fatality (%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance (m)
Figure 13 Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
.
se
ru
he
5.6 Frequency of Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
The HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) recommends frequencies for BLEVE
eq os
r r rp
and fireballs from LPG tank rupture scenarios. The frequencies apply to sites with multiple
ne pu
LPG vessels, and are not reflective of individual cryogenic oxygen tanks on manufacturing
ow ion
ht ct
sites. LPG vessels are single skinned. LOx vessels are double skinned, vacuum insulated
ig pe
yr ns
vessels providing additional protection from the effects of a fire engulfing the vessel.
op r i
f c Fo
However, a conservative frequency of 1E-05 per year for a BLEVE following rupture of the
bulk liquid oxygen tank is taken for the purposes of this assessment.
to
en
ns
Co
There are 2 no. oxygen tanks at the LOx compound. Therefore, it is concluded that a tank
rupture frequency of 2E-05 per year is a conservative figure and is appropriate for use in
a land use planning study.
Page 45
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

5.7 Risk Contours at the Liquid Oxygen Tanks
TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling software was used to model individual risk
of fatality contours at the liquid oxygen compound. The model inputs include consequence
modelling results as described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8)
and event frequencies.
Individual risk of fatality contours are illustrated on Figure 14.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
LAND USE PLANNING ZONES

Inner Middle Outer
1 x 10-5 /year 1 x 10-6 /year 1 x 10-7 /year
Figure 14 Liquid Oxygen Compound: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours
Page 46
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

6.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
As outlined in Section 3.0, it is proposed to store cryogenic liquid hydrogen in 3 No. bulk
horizontal storage tanks (87.4 m3 each) in a hydrogen compound at the proposed
development area illustrated on Figure 2 in Section 3.1.
Hydrogen tank leak and rupture scenarios were identified as follows:
• Leak of hydrogen vapour through venting system, direct ignition and jet fire;
• Leak of hydrogen vapour through venting system, delayed ignition and VCE;
• Engulfment of bulk hydrogen tank in fire, failure of venting system and catastrophic
release of hydrogen accompanied by BLEVE and fireball.
6.1 Assessment for Hydrogen Leak through Venting System
It is assumed that an event occurs which causes hydrogen to be released through a

pressure relief device leading to the release of hydrogen through the venting system
(release point 5 m above ground level). The maximum flow capacity for the pressure safety
valve is set at 490 kg/hr.
Hydrogen Leak Model Inputs
.
se
The PHAST Version 8.22 leak model was used to model the discharge of hydrogen vapour
ru
he
following this accident scenario. Model inputs for the scenario are detailed in Table 21.
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es

eq os
r r rp
Scenario Line rupture Release of hydrogen through vent system

ne pu
Material Hydrogen -
ow ion
ht ct
Storage conditions Liquefied pressurised gas -

ig pe
yr ns
(cryogenic)
op r i
f c Fo
Release rate 490 kg/hr Pressure safety valve capacity from tank
specification sheet
to
Release height 5m Estimated venting system release height

en
ns
Direction Horizontal Assumed – worst case for flame

Co
impingement on equipment
Averaging time Flammable – 18.75 s DNV PHAST default value
Table 21 Hydrogen Leak Model Inputs
Hydrogen Jet Fire Thermal Radiation Consequences
The leak model predicts a jet fire hazard following direct ignition of a hydrogen leak through
the bulk storage tank venting system.
Table 22 presents the jet fire model outputs. Figure 15 illustrates thermal radiation levels
with distance. Thermal radiation results are shown at 1.5 m above ground level to
represent exposure to persons in the vicinity of the hydrogen tanks.
Page 47
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Parameter Units Category F2 Category D5

2
Flame Emissive Power kW/m 47 69
Fraction of Emissivity fraction 0.16 0.16
Expanded Diameter m 0.015 0.015
Jet Velocity m/s 453.6 453.6
Flame Length m 10.34 8.0
Frustrum Lift Off Distance m 0.155 0.121
Frustrum Length m 10.2 7.9
Frustrum Base Width m 0.024 0.033
Frustrum Tip Width m 2.93 2.52
Table 22 Hydrogen Leak and Jet Fire Model Outputs
Hydrogen Leak from Bulk Tank through Venting System

Jet Fire Thermal Radiation vs. Distance
16
1.5 m AGL, D5
1.5 m AGL, F2
14
Thermal Radiation (kW/m2)
12
10
.
se
ru
he
8
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
6
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
4
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
2
op r i
f c Fo
0
to
0 5 10 15 20 25
en
ns

Co
Figure 15 Hydrogen Leak Model Outputs: Jet Fire Thermal Radiation Results
The jet flame is at 5 m above ground level, and is 8 m in length. The waste solvent tanks
are approximately 7 m high and located over 20 m from the liquid hydrogen tanks. The
maximum thermal radiation level at the tanks (at the jet flame height of 5 m) is 1.5 kW/m2
and is not sufficient to damage the waste solvent collection tanks.
In addition, it is noted that a jet fire at the bulk hydrogen tank would not impinge on any
cryogenic liquid tanks at the development area, and cannot contribute to a BLEVE event
elsewhere on site.
The effect height in Figure 15 above (1.5 m above ground level) is 3.5 m lower than the
release height/height at which the jet fire would occur.
Table 23 details the distances to thermal radiation levels associated with specified levels
of probability of fatality.
Page 48
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Thermal
Thermal
Radiation Distance (m) Distance (m)
Criterion Dose Level
Level
kW/m2 TDUs D5 F2
Threshold of fatality 4.1 500 11 13
1% fatality (Dangerous dose) 6.8 960 10 11
10% fatality 9.23 1441 8 10
50% fatality 13.4 2367 6 Not reached
Building protected below this
12.7 2222 7 Not reached
level, 0% fatality probability
Building will catch fire quickly,
25.6 5659 Not reached Not reached
100% fatality probability
Damage to process equipment 37.5 9414 Not reached Not reached
Table 23 Hydrogen Tank PRV Leak and Jet Fire: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal
Radiation Levels at 1.5 m Above Ground Level
It is concluded that thermal radiation effects from a jet fire following a PRV release at the
hydrogen tank compound are confined to the immediate vicinity of the compound and the
adjoining vehicle unloading area.
.
se
No off site consequences are expected to arise. Persons indoors at the Intel establishment
ru
he
are protected.
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
VCE Overpressure Consequences

r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
The leak and unified dispersion models predict a VCE hazard for both Pasquill
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
stability/wind speed categories (F2 and D5) following delayed ignition of a hydrogen
op r i
f c Fo
release through the bulk storage tank venting system.

to
The dispersion model predicts a flammable mass of 0.15 kg for the F2 stability/windspeed
en
ns
category and 0.09 kg for the D5 category. The TNO multi-energy model was used to
Co
predict overpressure consequences. A conservative ignition strength of 7 was selected.
Figure 16 illustrate the overpressure with distance for the hydrogen VCE scenario for F2
and D5 categories. The explosion is centred 10 m from the release point.
Page 49
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23


Vapour Cloud Explosion Overpressure vs. Distance
25
20
Overpressure (bar)
15
F2
10 D5
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Distance (m)
.
se
Figure 16 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Overpressure vs. Distance
ru
he
ot

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
probability of fatality to persons outdoors and indoors in various categories of buildings.

re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
Peak Consequences Distance (m) Distance (m)

ow ion
overpressure Category F2 Category D5

ht ct
ig pe
(mbar)
yr ns
op r i
20 Safe distance - probability of 0.95 of no serious 76 63

f c Fo
damage beyond this value; some damage to house

ceilings; 10% window glass broken
to
en
35 Light damage 50 42
ns
Co
170 Moderate damage 21 19

350 Severe damage 17 15
168 1% mortality outdoors 21 19
100 1% mortality indoors in Category 2 Structures 26 23
Table 24 Hydrogen VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels
Figure 17 illustrates blast damage contours. Figure 18 illustrates the worst case
overpressure contours corresponding to 1% mortality for persons indoors in category 3
structures, indoors in category 2 structures and outdoors. The shape of the area impacted
is shown for the prevailing wind direction as well as the total effect area taking account of
all wind directions.
Page 50
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Overpressure 0.02 bar, safe 0.035 bar, light 0.17 bar, moderate 0.35 bar, severe
level distance damage damage damage
.
se
Effect Zone ru
he
ot
Shape
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Figure 17 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Blast Damage Contours

re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Effect Zone
Shape
Figure 18 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Mortality Contours
Page 51
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

There is the potential for a vapour cloud explosion to damage the liquid hydrogen tanks.
The worst case scenario (catastrophic rupture) is assessed in Section 6.2.
Overpressure levels exceeding 1%, mortality outdoors extend to 21 m from the proposed
hydrogen tanks. These contours are extend to road tanker offload areas and site
roadways.
Overpressure levels corresponding to 1%, mortality for persons indoors in Category 2 type
buildings (typical office buildings) extend to 26 m from the proposed bulk hydrogen tanks.
This category of buildings represents the on-site buildings at Intel. There are no occupied
buildings within this distance of the proposed bulk hydrogen tanks.
No offsite consequences are expected to arise.
Probability of Fatality from Jet Fire or VCE
Jet Fire
The probability of fatality outdoors from the thermal radiation consequences of a jet fire
was calculated using the Eisenberg Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.2), and assuming an
exposure duration of 75 seconds. The probability of fatality indoors from thermal radiation
.
se
effects are based on the HSA’s criteria described in Section 4.1.2 (see Table 8). ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
The probability of fatality vs distance for the hydrogen jet fire scenario is illustrated on the
d nl
ra
re o
following figure.
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
Hydrogen Tank Leak through Venting System

ow ion
ht ct
Jet Fire Probability of Fatality vs. Distance

ig pe
yr ns
op r i
60
f c Fo
to
en
50
ns
Co
40
D5, Outdoors
30
F2, Outdoors
D5, Indoors
20 F2, Indoors
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Figure 19 Hydrogen Jet Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
Vapour Cloud Explosion
The probability of fatality outdoors with distance from a vapour cloud explosion following
a vapour leak through the proposed bulk hydrogen tank venting system has been
Page 52
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

calculated using the Hurst Nussey and Pape probit function described in Section 4.1.4
herein. The level of probability of fatality with distance is illustrated on Figure 20.

Probability of Fatality vs. Distance Category F2
100
Outdoors
Indoors Cateogry 3
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
.
se
0
ru
he
0 20 40 60 80 100
ot
ny
fo y.
Distance (m)
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
Figure 20 Hydrogen Vapour Cloud Explosion: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance– Worst Case
eq os
r r rp
Category F2
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
Jet Fire or VCE Frequency

yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
The current approach of the HSA to the assessment of major accident hazards is
to
described in Section 4.0 herein. Risk is the product of frequency and severity.
en
ns
Co
The probability of fatality outdoors with distance from a jet fire or from a VCE following a
leak of hydrogen vapour through the bulk hydrogen tank venting system was calculated
above (see Figure 20). No injuries or fatalities are expected to arise from a jet fire therefore
the frequency of this scenario is not relevant.
The HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) does not recommend frequency
values for vapour cloud explosions following a release of flammable gas from a bulk
storage tank. Therefore, reference is made to fault tree analysis conducted for this
scenario following an accidental release from the existing bulk hydrogen tanks at the Intel
establishment as part of the HAZID study contained in the Safety Report (2018). Figure
21 illustrates a fault tree for a vapour cloud explosion scenario.
Page 53
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Initiating Event Direct ignition Delayed ignition Consequence Frequnecy
Yes
P= 0.2
Jet fire 4.00E-06 /year
Liquid hydrogen tank
vent system release F= 2.00E-05 /year
Yes
No P= 0.9
VCE 1.44E-05 /year
P= 0.8
No
P= 0.1
No consequences
Figure 21 Event Tree for Hydrogen Leak from Relief Valve
Frequency values and failure rates were obtained from the sources detailed in Table 25.
Failure frequency value Reference

Pressure relief device failure Purple Book (Committee for Prevention of Disasters, 2005), Table
3.13, discharge of a pressure relief device with maximum discharge
rate
Direct ignition Purple Book (Committee for Prevention of Disasters, 2005), Table 4.5,
probability of direct ignition for stationary installations, continuous
release of a highly reactive gas at a rate of < 10 kg/s
Delayed ignition Purple Book (Committee for Prevention of Disasters, 2005), Table
.
se
4.A1, probability of ignition for a time interval of one minute for a
ru
he
chemical plant
ot
ny
fo y.
Table 25 Failure Frequency Data Sources

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
The frequency of a jet fire is estimated as 4 x 10-6 per year.

r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
The frequency of a vapour cloud explosion is estimated as 1.44 x 10-5 per year.
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
This frequency assumes that all liquid hydrogen vessels will have one common vent
release point, as is currently the case.
to
en
ns
Co
Page 54
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

6.2 Assessment of Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture
The worst case major accident scenario associated with the storage of bulk liquefied
hydrogen is the catastrophic loss of containment followed by a hydrogen BLEVE and
fireball. The consequences and risk of fatality arising from this scenario are considered
herein.
It is assumed that bulk hydrogen tank is engulfed in an external fire, eventually leading to
a sudden release of the liquid hydrogen contained therein overpressure effects as the
release liquid boils and expands and thermal radiation effects from a fireball as the
released material is ignited.
BLEVE Blast and Fireball Model Inputs
The PHAST Version 8.22 BLEVE model was used to model the impacts of a BLEVE
following this accident scenario. The PHAST Version 8.22 Fireball model was used to
model the impact of a fireball following this accident scenario. The BLEVE model and
Fireball model inputs are detailed in Table 26.

Scenario BLEVE BLAST and Fireball -
model
.
se
Material Hydrogen -
ru
he
Storage conditions Cryogenic hydrogen stored as Intel
ot
ny
fo y.

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os

r r rp
ne pu
Fireball vapour mass fraction 0.3 (tanks) Calculated by PHAST Vessel

ow ion
Rupture Model
ht ct
ig pe
Averaging Time 18 seconds DNV recommended averaging

yr ns
op r i
time for flammable effects

f c Fo
Table 26 Hydrogen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs

to
en
BLEVE Blast Outputs

ns
Co
Figure 22 presents overpressure levels with distance downwind from a BLEVE.

probability of fatality to persons outdoors and indoors in various categories of buildings.
Page 55
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Bulk Hydrogen Tank Catastophic Failure and BLEVE

35
30
25
Overpressure (bar)
20
15
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Distance (m)
.
se
Figure 22 Hydrogen BLEVE Model Outputs: Overpressure Results ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o

ui es
eq os
overpressure
r r rp
ne pu
(mbar)
ow ion

ht ct
ig pe

yr ns
op r i
35 Light damage 111

f c Fo

to
en
350 Severe damage 24

ns
Co

Table 27 Hydrogen BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels
Page 56
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Figure 23 illustrates the worst case blast damage overpressure contours.
Figure 24 illustrates the worst case overpressure contours corresponding to 1% probability

of fatality for persons outdoors, indoors in category 2 buildings and indoors in category 3
buildings.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
LEGEND
en
ns
0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar

Co

Figure 23 Hydrogen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours
Page 57
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
LEGEND
ne pu
ow ion
0.05 bar 0.100 bar 0.168 bar

ht ct
ig pe
1% mortality indoors in Cateogry 3 1% mortality indoors in Category 2

1% mortality outdoors
yr ns
structures structures
op r i
f c Fo
Figure 24 Hydrogen BLEVE: Probability of Fatality Contours for Persons Outdoors and Indoors
to
The following is concluded regarding the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE

en
ns
following rupture of a bulk hydrogen tank:

Co
• The overpressure level corresponding to a safe distance (probability of 0.95 of no

serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window
glass broken) extends outside of the site boundary to the north but does not extend
to any receptor;
• The proposed waste solvent tanks are approx. 20 m from the liquid hydrogen tanks
and in the event of a BLEVE, the overpressure level at the waste solvent tanks is
predicted to be 500 mbar. This is sufficient to cause damage to the waste solvent
tanks and the worst case consequences are estimated as an uncontained pool fire
following a tank rupture and major release scenario. This scenario is assessed in
Section 7.0 herein.
• The proposed liquid oxygen tanks are approx. 60 m from the liquid hydrogen tanks
and in the event of a BLEVE, the overpressure level at the liquid oxygen tanks is
predicted to be 80 mbar. This is not sufficient to cause damage to the liquid oxygen
tanks (as outlined in Section 4.1.4, 830 mbar is expected to cause 20% damage
to a vertical steel pressure vessel). No knock on effects are predicted to arise at
the liquid oxygen tanks.
• The overpressure levels corresponding to 1% vulnerability outdoors and indoors
do not extend outside of the site boundary and off-site consequences are
negligible.
Page 58
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% vulnerability outdoors extends to the

road tanker offloading area for the hydrogen tanks.
• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% vulnerability indoors in category 2
buildings (representative of buildings on site) arising from a BLEVE following
rupture of the tank does not extend to any normally occupied building on site.
Hydrogen Fireball Outputs
The DNV recommended Fireball model in PHAST Version 8.22 calculates the following
fireball diameter and durations:
Tank / Trailer Storage Capacity Fireball Radius Fireball Duration

Proposed hydrogen tank at 47 m 7.31 s
mound area
Table 28 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs
Figure 25 illustrates the level of thermal dose with distance from a fireball following rupture
of the hydrogen tank.
Bulk Hydrogen Tank Catastophic Failure and Fireball

Thermal Dose vs. Distance
.
se
25,000 ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
20,000
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
Thermal Dose (TDUs)
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
15,000
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
10,000
en
ns
Co
5,000
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Distance (m)
Figure 25 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs: Thermal Dose Results
The fireball is of short duration (7.31 s) and it is assumed that 100% fatalities will occur
within the fireball radius. However the fireball is confined to the hydrogen tank compound
which is not normally occupied and no fatalities are expected to arise. There are no
occupied buildings within this radius and therefore no impacts will arise to persons indoors
in occupied buildings at the proposed development. The distance to end point thermal
dose levels associated with specified levels of mortality outdoors and damage to process
equipment are summarised as follows.
Page 59
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Thermal Dose Distance

Criterion Level
TDUs m
1% fatality (Dangerous dose) 960 122 m
100% fatality (fireball radius) 47 m
Damage to process equipment 9414 37 m
Table 29 Hydrogen Fireball: Calculated Distances at Specified Thermal Dose Levels
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Figure 26 Hydrogen Tank Rupture at Hydrogen Tank and Fireball: Fireball Diameter (100% Mortality)
Co
and 1% Mortality Contours
A fireball at the hydrogen tank would impinge on other hydrogen tanks and the waste
solvent collection tanks. There is the potential for a confined explosion in the waste solvent
tanks followed by a waste solvent pool fire. It would also extend to the road tanker offload
areas and site roadway. However the duration is short.
The following is concluded:
• The thermal dose levels corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors does not extend
outside of the site ownership boundary and no off-site consequences are expected
to arise;
• Significant thermal effects would be experienced in the bulk gas yard area and
fatal impacts may arise at the tanker offloading area if personnel are present;
• The thermal dose level corresponding to the threshold of fatality extends to the
yard area to the west of the Water Treatment Building, however this area is not
normally occupied and it is concluded that persons indoors are protected.
Probability of Fatality from Hydrogen Tank Rupture
Page 60
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

following rupture of a hydrogen tank is calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit
Equation (see Section 4.1.4). The probability of fatality indoors from the overpressure
consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships (CIA, 2010)
for different building types (see Figure 4).
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
Figure 27 Rupture of Proposed Hydrogen Tank at Bulk Gas Yard and BLEVE Blast: Probability of
to
Fatality vs. Distance

en
ns
Co
The probability of fatality outdoors from the thermal radiation and dose of a fireball
following rupture of a hydrogen tank is calculated using the Eisenberg Probit Equation
(see Section 4.1.2.). The probability of fatality with distance outdoors for the fireball
scenario is illustrated on Figure 28.
Page 61
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Figure 28 Hydrogen Tank Rupture and Fireball: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
.
se
Frequency of Hydrogen Tank Rupture, BLEVE and Fireball ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
LPG vessels, and are not reflective of individual cryogenic hydrogen tanks on
ne pu
ow ion
manufacturing sites. However, a conservative frequency of 1E-05 per year per vessel for
ht ct
a BLEVE and fireball following rupture of the bulk hydrogen tank is taken for the purposes
ig pe
yr ns
of this assessment. For 3 No. vessels the total tank rupture frequency is 3E-05 per year.
op r i
f c Fo
6.3 Individual Risk of Fatality contours at Liquid Hydrogen Tanks

to
en
ns
Co
Individual risk of fatality contours for major accident hazards associated with the bulk liquid
hydrogen tanks were calculated using TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling
software. The model inputs include consequence modelling results as described herein,
wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8) and event frequencies.
Page 62
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp

ne pu
Inner Middle Outer

ow ion

ht ct
ig pe
Figure 29 Liquid Hydrogen Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours

yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 63
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

7.0 ASSESSMENT FOR WASTE SOLVENT MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
7.1 Waste Solvent Storage
It is proposed to install 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream A and 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream B
collection tanks in bunds at the development area. As outlined in Section 3.2.3 Solvent
Waste Stream B has a lower flash point (approx. 37.5 oC) than Stream A (approx. 57 oC).
Solvent Waste Stream B is mainly comprised of cyclohexanone. Provision is also made
for future solvent waste collection tanks, 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream A collection tanks
in a bunded area and 2 No. Solvent Waste Stream B collection tanks in a bunded area.
A conservative approach is taken and a fire or explosion hazard is assessed for Solvent
Waste Stream B as follows:
• Bund fire (modelled as cyclohexanone);

• Tank rupture with bund overtopping or spill during road tanker filling at truck dock,
pool formation and pool fire (direct ignition) (modelled as cyclohexanone) or flash
fire/vapour cloud explosion (delayed ignition) (modelled as cyclohexanone).
• Confined explosion in waste solvent tank modelled as cyclohexanone.
7.2 Waste Solvent Pool Fire
.
se
Model Inputs ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
The solvent waste bunds measure 12 m x 15 m. A bund fire is conservatively assumed to

d nl
ra
re o
measure 180 m2 (no allowance is made for area occupied by tanks).

ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
In relation to an uncontained pool fire, it is assumed that a pool of 150 m2 in size could
ow ion
ht ct
form at the truck loading area in the event of an accidental release. This is similar to the
ig pe
yr ns
maximum pool size that is estimated to form at the truck dock at the existing Waste solvent
op r i
f c Fo
tanks at the Intel establishment. The pool would form at local ground level which is taken
as 1.5 m below receptor height. A conservative approach is taken and the consequences
to
of a 180 m2 pool fire are assessed at the truck loading area.

en
ns
Co
Cyclohexanone is taken as the representative substance for pool fire modelling purposes
(see Section 3.2.3).
The pool fire scenario is modelled at a wind speed of 5 m/s as per the HSA’s land use
planning policy and approach document (HSA, 2010).
Thermal Radiation Consequences
The pool fire model predicts the following results.
Bund Fire or Uncontained

Criterion
Pool Fire
Combustion rate (kg/s) 7.307

Surface emissive power
102.4
flame (kW/m2)
Flame tilt (deg) 49.43
Length of the flame (m) 17.61
Table 30 Waste Solvent Pool Fire Results
Page 64
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Pool fire consequence results are presented on the following figures:
• Figure 30 illustrates Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Thermal

Radiation vs. Distance
Table 31 presents distances to thermal radiation levels associated with specified levels of
probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors and to equipment
damage.
Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks

Thermal Radiation vs. Distance
120
100
Thermal Radiation (kW/m 2)
80
60
.
se
5 m/s
ru
he
ot
40
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
20
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
0
yr ns
op r i
0 50 100 150 200

f c Fo

to
Figure 30 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance
en
ns
Co
Uncontained Pool Fire at

Thermal
Manufacturing Support Building
Radiation
Criterion Waste Solvent Truck Dock
Level
Kw/m2 Distance (m)
Threshold of fatality 4.1 48

1% fatality (Dangerous dose) 6.8 39
10% fatality 9.23 35
50% fatality 13.4 30
Building protected below this
12.6 31
level, 0% fatality probability
Building will catch fire quickly,
25.6 23
100% fatality probability
Damage to process
37.5 18
equipment
Table 31 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Distances to Specified Thermal Radiation
Levels
The following figures illustrate thermal radiation contours arising from a bund fire or truck
dock fire at the waste solvent collection tanks. The shape of the area impacted is illustrated
Page 65
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

for the prevailing wind direction as well as the full extent of the effect zone which takes
account of all possible wind directions.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Figure 31 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Threshold of Fatality Contour
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Figure 32 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Threshold of Fatality Contour
Page 66
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
Figure 33 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Persons Indoors Protected Contour (Worst
Case) ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Figure 34 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Persons Indoors Protected Contour
Page 67
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Figure 35 Bund Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Equipment Damage Contour
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Figure 36 Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Truck Dock: Equipment Damage Contour
The following is concluded regarding the thermal radiation consequences following a

waste solvent pool fire:
• The threshold of fatality contour does not extend outside of the site boundary and
no off site consequences are anticipated to arise;
Page 68
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

• The threshold of fatality contour extends to the waste solvent collection tank truck
dock and adjacent roadway
• The thermal radiation level below which persons indoors does not reach any
building on site and persons indoors are protected.
• The thermal radiation level resulting in equipment damage extends to the adjacent
waste solvent collection tank and the consequences are expected to include
damage to the tank, release of additional waste solvent and prolonging of the bund
fire (assuming no action is taken to extinguish the fire).
Probability of Fatality from Waste Solvent Bund Fire or Truck Dock Fire
The probability of fatality outdoors from the thermal radiation consequences of a pool fire
was calculated using the Eisenberg Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.2), and assuming an
exposure duration of 75 seconds. The probability of fatality indoors from thermal radiation
effects are based on the HSA’s criteria described in Section 4.1.2 (see Table 8).
The probability of fatality vs distance for the waste solvent pool fire scenarios is illustrated
on the following figure.
Pool Fire at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks

.
se
ru
he
ot
100.00
ny
fo y.
Outdoor vulnerability
d nl
ra
re o
90.00
ui es
Indoor vulnerability
eq os
r r rp
80.00
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
70.00
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
60.00
f c Fo
50.00
to
en
ns
40.00
Co
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Figure 37 Waste Solvent Pool Fire: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
Frequency of Waste Solvent Pool Fire
For pool fire scenarios, the HSA Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010) recommends
a frequency of 1E-04 for an uncontained event and 1E-03 per year for a pool fire covering
the surface of the bund.
Page 69
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

7.3 Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank
Model Inputs
The TNO Effects Multi-Energy Explosion model was used to model the overpressure
consequences of a confined vapour cloud explosion within a solvent tank.
It is assumed that the vessel contains 10% waste solvent and 90% vapour.
The flammable mass within the tank is calculated as follows:
Volume m3 22.7
Assume 10% full
90% vapour space m3 20.43
Assume vapour space contains a stoichiometric mixture of cyclohexanone and air
Complete combustion equation for cyclohexanone
C6H10O + 8O2 = 6CO2 + 5H2O
Molecular
.
se
Mol weight ru Mass
he
Compound Mol fraction (kg/kmol) Mass (kg) fraction
ot
ny
fo y.
Cyclohexanone 1 0.026 60.100 1.55 0.052

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
O2 8 0.206 31.999 6.60 0.223

eq os
r r rp
N2 29.76 0.768 28.014 21.51 0.725

ne pu
ow ion
38.76 1 29.66 1
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
Volume of
op r i
f c Fo
stoichiometric
mixture (model
to
input) m3 54.5
en
ns
Co
Density of
flammable vapour
mixture (calculated
in PHAST) kg/m3 1.29
Mass of flammable
mixture kg 70.57
Mass of solvent, O2 and N2 in flammable mixture:
Compound Mass (kg)

Cyclohexanone 3.69
O2 15.71
N2 51.17
Mass of flammable mixture 70.57
The flammable mass within the tank is 3.69 kg.
Page 70
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Vapour cloud explosion model inputs are detailed in Table 32.
Parameter Manufacturing Source/Assumption

Support building
tank area
Scenario Vapour Cloud -
Explosion
Material Cyclohexanone -
Tank Volume 60.6 m3 Intel
Flammable mass 3.69 kg See above
Ignition strength 7 HSA Policy and Approach to COMAH Risk-
based Land Use Planning (HSA, 2010)
Table 32 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Model Inputs
Overpressure Consequences
Figure 38 illustrates the level of overpressure with distance following a confined VCE in a
solvent waste tank.

(Portacabins).
.
se
ru
he
Confined VCE at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks
ot
Peak Overpressure vs Distance

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
1
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
0.9
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
0.8
op r i
f c Fo
Peak Overpressure (bar)
0.7
to
en
0.6
ns
Co
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Distance (m)
Figure 38 Confined VCE at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Overpressure vs. Distance
Page 71
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23


overpressure
(mbar)
35 Light damage 76
Table 33 Waste Solvent Tank VCE: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels
.
se
Figure 39 illustrates blast damage contours at the waste solvent collection tanks. Figure
ru
he
40 illustrates the 1% vulnerability contours outdoors and indoors in Category 2 buildings
ot
(typical office block – representative of on-site buildings) and Category 3 buildings

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
(residential dwellings) arising from a confined VCE in a waste solvent tank.

ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
LEGEND
0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar
Figure 39 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Blast Damage Contours
Page 72
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.

d nl
ra
re o
ui es

eq os
r r rp
Shape/Effect
ne pu
Zone
ow ion
ht ct
Figure 40 Waste Solvent Tank Confined VCE: Vulnerability Contours

ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
In the event of a confined VCE in a waste solvent tank at the Manufacturing Support
building tank area the following is concluded:
to
en
ns
• It is likely that adjacent waste solvent tanks would be damaged leading to a release
Co
of waste solvent to the bund and a pool fire within the bund. The consequences of
this scenario are assessed in Section 7.2 herein;
• The overpressure levels corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors and indoors do
not extend outside of the site boundary and off-site consequences are negligible;`
• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors extends to the
truck dock and roadway adjacent to the waste collection tanks;
• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality indoors in category 2
buildings (representative of buildings on site) does not extend to any building on
site and persons indoors on site are protected;
Probability of Fatality from Solvent Tank Confined VCE
The probability of fatality outdoors from the overpressure consequences of a confined

VCE in a waste solvent tank was calculated using the Hurst Nussey Pape Probit Equation
described in Section 4.1.4.
Figure 41 illustrates the probability of fatality vs distance from a confined vapour cloud
explosion at the Manufacturing Support building tank area.
Page 73
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Confined VCE at Waste Solvent Collection Tanks

Probability of Fatality vs Distance
100.00
Outdoors
90.00 Indoors Cat 2
Indoors Cat 3
80.00 Indoors Cat 4
70.00
60.00
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Distance (m)
.
se
Figure 41 ru
Confined VCE in Waste Solvent Tank: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Frequency of Solvent Tank Confined VCE

re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
The most likely scenario by which a confined VCE would occur in a waste solvent tank is
ow ion
through the build-up of a static electric charge during a tank unloading event due to failure
ht ct
ig pe
of the operator to follow the standard tank unloading procedure and to earth the tanker
yr ns
op r i
before commencement of the event. The safe guards that are currently in place at the Intel
f c Fo
establishment will also be put in place for the proposed development as follows:
to
en
• The tanker driver will be accompanied from arrival on site by a technician and both
ns
Co
are present throughout the waste solvent tank offload event;

• On arrival of the tanker at the loading area, the technician will inspect the general
condition of the area (including solvent truck, tanker and hoses) ensuring
appropriate safety equipment (including PPE) and protection is in place and in
good condition;
• Personal protective equipment is worn;
• Checks will be carried out to ensure the tanker has adequate capacity to receive
the contents of the waste solvent tank;
• The rear wheels of the truck are chocked;
• The tanker is earthed;
• Checks will be carried out to ensure that no naked flames are present throughout
the transfer.
With reference to the HSA’s Land Use Planning document (HSA, 2010), given that there
will be many protective layers in place and that the likelihood of a confined VCE in a tank
containing a high flash point solvent with a low vapour pressure is low, the likelihood of a
confined VCE in the waste solvent tanks at the proposed development is taken as 1E-05
per year per tank or 8E-05 per year for 4 No. waste solvent collection tanks plus 4 No.
future waste solvent collection tanks at the development area.
Page 74
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

7.4 Individual Risk of Fatality Contours at Waste Solvent Tanks
Individual risk of fatality contours for major accident hazards associated with the waste
solvent collection tanks were calculated using TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk
modelling software. The model inputs include consequence modelling results as
described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8) and event
frequencies.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co

Inner Middle Outer
Figure 42 Waste Solvent Collection Tanks: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours
Page 75
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

8.0 AIR SEPARATION UNIT MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
It is proposed to install an Air Separation Unit (ASU) at the mound area. The ASU
comprises an assembly of distillation columns, heat exchangers, adsorbers and
supporting machinery for compression, expansion and control of gases and liquids.
The ASU will contain the following hazardous installations:
• 3 No. 53 tonne cryogenic liquid oxygen bulk storage tanks (159 tonnes in total)
• 225 tonne cryogenic liquid argon bulk storage tank (1 no. tank on site)
• Coldbox (at each ASU) – there are 3 No. columns within the coldbox unit, the main
heat exchanger, high pressure column and low pressure column.
The following major accident scenarios were identified for the ASUs:
Cryogenic liquid oxygen:
• The bulk cryogenic oxygen tank will contain liquefied oxygen under pressure and
consequences.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
Cryogenic liquid argon:

eq os
r r rp
ne pu
•
ow ion
In the event of catastrophic failure of the proposed 225 tonne cryogenic bulk argon
ht ct
storage tank, the dispersion of argon following a release has the potential to
ig pe
yr ns
displace ambient oxygen resulting in asphyxiating effects.

op r i
f c Fo
Coldbox:
to
en
ns
•
Co
Liquid leak from pipe/instrument line failure within the coldbox LP/HP column
leading to column failure with overpressure consequences;
• Reboiler explosion with overpressure consequences.
8.1 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen
Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs
The PHAST Version 8.22 catastrophic rupture model and unified dispersion model were
used to model the dispersion of oxygen following rupture of a bulk oxygen tanks. Model
inputs are as detailed in Table 34.
Page 76
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23


Scenario BLEVE BLAST -
Material Oxygen -
Operating pressure 14 barg Intel
Table 34 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Catastrophic Rupture Model Inputs
Following rupture of a liquid oxygen storage tank, a pool of liquid oxygen will form on the
ground. Oxygen will evaporate from the surface of the liquid and disperse with the potential
to form an oxygen enriched atmosphere.
Model inputs are as detailed in Table 18.In addition, the following model inputs were used:
• Maximum LOx pool size at ASU (conservative estimation) 2,500 m2
BLEVE Model Outputs
.
se
cryogenic liquid oxygen tank.
ru
he
ot

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os

r r rp
ne pu
(Portacabins).
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
ASU LOx Tank Catastophic Failure and BLEVE

op r i
f c Fo

50000
to
en
ns
45000
Co
40000
Overpressure (mbar)
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Distance (m)
Figure 43 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Overpressure vs. Distance
Page 77
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23


overpressure
(mbar)
35 Light damage 124
Table 35 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Ruptre and BLEVE Blast: Calculated Distances at Specified
Overpressure Levels
.
se
The overpressure damage contours from a LOx BLEVE at the ASU are illustrated on
ru
Figure 44.
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
The overpressure contours corresponding to 1%, probability of fatality (vulnerability)

re o
ui es
eq os
outdoors and indoors in category 2 structures (representative of buildings on site) and at

r r rp
ne pu
category 3 structures (residential dwellings) from a LOx BLEVE at the ASU are illustrated
ow ion
on Figure 45.
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 78
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
LEGEND
r r rp
ne pu
0.02 bar 0.035 bar 0.17 bar 0.35 bar

ow ion
ht ct

ig pe
yr ns
Figure 44 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours

op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 79
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu

ow ion

ht ct
ig pe
Shape/Effect
yr ns
op r i
Zone
f c Fo
Figure 45 ASU Liquid Oxygen BLEVE: Outdoor and Indoor Vulnerability Contours
to
en
In the event of a BLEVE involving a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank at the proposed ASU the
ns
Co
following is concluded:
Damage and knock-on effects:
• The overpressure levels corresponding to a safe distance, light, moderate and

severe damage do not extend outside of the site boundary and off-site
consequences are negligible;
• The overpressure level at the gas compound is predicted to be 55 mbar which is
not sufficient to cause damage (see Section 4.1.4);
• The overpressure level at the silane pad is predicted to be 30 mbar which is not
sufficient to cause damage;
• The overpressure level at the ASU to the south (future) from a LOX BLEVE is
predicted to be 55 mbar at the cold box units and 45 mbar at the liquid oxygen and
liquid argon tanks. This is not sufficient to cause damage
• No knock on effects are expected to arise;
Consequences to personnel outdoors and indoors:
• The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors extends to the area

surrounding the proposed ASU and the proposed waste water balancing tank
which are not normally occupied;
Page 80
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

• The ASU control building is approx. 7 m from the nearest LOX vessel and the
maximum overpressure level is estimated as up to 9 bar which is sufficient to
demolish the building and result in fatal consequences for occupants. An
assessment of this building is included in Section 10.0. No other occupied buildings
on site are expected to be impacted;
Pool Evaporation Model Outputs
The pool evaporation model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model evaporation
of oxygen vapour from the surface of a liquid pool following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank.
Figure 46 illustrates the mass evaporation rate versus time and Figure 47 illustrates mass
evaporated versus time.
LOx Tank Rupture

Evaporation Mass Flow Rate vs. Time
700
600
Evaporation Mass Flow Rate (kg/s)
.
se
ru
he
ot
500
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
400
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
5 m/s
300
ht ct
2 m/s
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
200
to
en
100
ns
Co
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Time (s)
Figure 46 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Evaporation Mass Flow Rate vs.
Time
Page 81
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

LOx Tank Rupture

Evaporated Mass vs. Time
40000
35000
30000
Evaporated Mass (kg)
25000
20000
5 m/s
15000 2 m/s
10000
5000
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Time (s)
.
se
Figure 47 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and Pool Formation: Mass Evaporated vs. Time
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
Oxygen Dispersion Results

ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
The unified dispersion model in DNV Phast Version 8.22 was used to model dispersion of
ow ion
oxygen vapour following rupture of a liquid oxygen tank.

ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
The normal ambient concentration of oxygen is 21% volume or 210,000 ppm. The safe
f c Fo
limit outdoors is 25% volume or 250,000 ppm, at this concentration the probability of
to
fatality or serious injury is 0.17% (BCGA, 2013). The dangerous dose level at which lethal
en
ns
effects may occur is 35% volume or 350,000 ppm which corresponds to a probability of
Co
fatality or serious injury of 0.53%.
The maximum concentration of oxygen (above background ambient levels) with distance
downwind following catastrophic rupture of a liquid oxygen tank at the proposed ASU is
illustrated on Figure 48. Results are summarised in Table 36. The worst case contours
are illustrated on Figure 49. These results are at 1.5 m above ground level. The shape of
the area impacted is shown as well as the total effect area taking account of all wind
directions.
Page 82
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

LOx Tank Rupture

Maximum Concentration vs. Distance Downwind
1400000
1200000
Maximum Concentration (ppm)
1000000
800000
D5
600000
F2
400000
200000
0
0 100 200 300 400 500
.
se
Figure 48 ru
ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration vs.
he
Distance Downwind
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
Oxygen concentration
ne pu
Distance (m) Distance (m)

of atmosphere
ow ion
Consequences
ht ct
% ppm D5 F2
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
ASU
f c Fo
Safe Limit (outdoors) (0.018%

to

en
injury)
ns
Co

30 300,000 140 120
serious injury
Dangerous Dose (lethal) (0.53 %
injury)
40 400,000 73 64
serious injury
Table 36 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture: Dispersion Results
Page 83
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
Maximum Contour
ne pu
Legend O2 Concentration Consequences

Distance dimensions
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
Shape Safe Distance (0.018%

yr ns
361 m
op r i
250,000 ppm probability of fatality or 234 m

f c Fo
diameter
Effect zone serious injury)
to
en
ns
Footprint
Co
An oxygen enriched atmosphere will arise in the areas within the contour illustrated on
Figure 49. There are no receptors in the area off site within the 250,000 ppm contour.
Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE
following rupture of a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank is calculated using the Hurst Nussey
Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4). The probability of fatality indoors from the
overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA relationships
(CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4).
Page 84
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Liquid Oxygen Catastophic Failure and BLEVE

100
Outdoors
Indoors Cateogry 3
Indoors Category 4
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Distance (m)
.
se
ru
Figure 50 ASU Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture and BLEVE Blast: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
he
ot
ny
fo y.
Frequency of Liquid Oxygen Tank Rupture

d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
LPG vessels, and are not reflective of individual cryogenic oxygen tanks on manufacturing
ig pe
yr ns
sites. However, a conservative frequency of 1E-05 per year for a BLEVE following rupture
op r i
f c Fo
of the bulk liquid oxygen tank is taken for the purposes of this assessment.
to
There are 3 no. oxygen tanks at each location therefore, it is concluded that a value of 3E-
en
ns
05 per year is a conservative figure and is appropriate for use in a land use planning study.
Co
Page 85
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

8.2 Cryogenic Liquid Argon
Argon Dispersion Model Inputs
In the event of catastrophic failure of the proposed 225 tonne cryogenic bulk argon storage
tank, the dispersion of argon following a release has the potential to displace ambient
oxygen resulting in asphyxiating effects.
The PHAST Version 8.22 unified dispersion model was used to model the dispersion of
argon following catastrophic failure of the proposed bulk argon tank.
The model inputs are detailed in Table 37.

Scenario Catastrophic Rupture -
Material Argon -
Storage conditions Cryogenic argon stored as liquid Intel
at low temperature under
Operating pressure 12.7 bara Intel
Averaging Time 18 seconds DNV recommended averaging
.
time for flammable effects
se
Table 37 Argon Model Inputs ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Argon Dispersion Consequences

re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
The maximum concentration footprint of argon following catastrophic rupture of the

ne pu
ow ion
proposed bulk argon tank at the ASU is illustrated on Figure 51 for weather category D5
ht ct
ig pe
and on Figure 52 for weather category F2.

yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
69,100 ppm Onset of symptoms of asphyxia 166 m (max. distance)

138,300 ppm Significant symptoms of asphyxia 101 m
522,600 ppm Rapid unconsciousness and 32 m
death
Figure 51 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (D5)
Page 86
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
69,100 ppm Onset of symptoms of asphyxia 126 m (max. distance)

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
138,300 ppm Significant symptoms of asphyxia 64 m

re o
ui es
522,600 ppm Rapid unconsciousness and death 15 m

eq os
r r rp
Figure 52 Argon Dispersion Model Outputs: Maximum Concentration Footprint (F2)

ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
Figure 53 illustrates the worst case asphyxiation end point contours for the argon release
op r i
f c Fo
scenario.
to
en
ns
Co
Page 87
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
Figure 53 Argon Asphyxiation Contours for ASU Liquid Argon Tank Rupture Scenario
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
It is concluded that in the event of rupture of the bulk cryogenic liquid argon tank, the worst
ow ion
ht ct
case hazard range for rapid unconsciousness and death are confined to the ASU area.
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
The worst case hazard range for significant symptoms of asphyxiation extend to the Fab
14 yard area and the north road. These areas may be occasionally occupied and there is
to
the possibility of fatalities in the event of rupture of the argon tank.

en
ns
Co
It is noted that there are no probit equations available to estimate the individual risk of
fatality due to exposure to asphyxiating gases such as argon. Therefore, model outputs
are assessed in terms of consequences only for this scenario.
Frequency of Liquid Argon Tank Rupture
The UK HSE cites catastrophic failure rates of 2E-06 per year to 6E-06 per year for
pressure vessels (UK HSE, 2012).
The Dutch Committee for the Prevention of Disasters recommends a catastrophic failure
rate for pressure vessels of 5E-07 per year per vessel (Purple Book, 2005).
Therefore, it is concluded that a value of 6E-06 per year is a conservative figure and is
appropriate for use in a land use planning study.
Page 88
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

8.3 Coldbox Rupture
Vessel Rupture Model Inputs
The TNO Effects Version 10.1 pressure vessel rupture model was used to model the
overpressure consequences of rupture of the coldbox at the proposed ASU. Model inputs
are detailed in Table 38.

Scenario Vessel rupture -
Material Oxygen -
Table 38 ASU Coldbox Rupture Model Inputs
Vessel Rupture Overpressure Consequences
Coldbox high pressure column.
.
se
probability of fatality to persons outdoors and to persons indoors in Category 2 (office type)
ru
he
buildings, Category 3 buildings (residential dwellings) and Category 4 buildings
ot
ny
(Portacabins).
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ASU01/02 Coldbox Rupture

ui es
eq os

r r rp
ne pu
35,000
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
30,000
op r i
f c Fo
25,000
Overpressure (mbar)
to
en
ns
Co
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance (m)
Figure 54 Coldbox Rupture: Overpressure vs. Distance
Page 89
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Persons outdoors
Probability
Overpressure level Distance
of fatality
mbar (m)
1% 168 8
10% 365 6
50% 942 3
Persons indoors: Category 2 (typical office block)
Probability
of fatality
mbar (m)
1% 100 11
10% 183 8
50% 284 7
Persons indoors: Category 3 (residential dwellings)
Probability
of fatality
mbar (m)
1% 50 20
10% 139 10
50% 300 7
Persons indoors: Category 4 (Portacabins)
Probability
of fatality
mbar (m)
1% 50 20
10% 115 11
50% 242 7
.
se
Table 39 Coldbox Rupture: Calculated Distances at Specified Overpressure Levels
ru
he
ot
Probability of Fatality from Coldbox High Pressure Column Rupture

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
following rupture of the Coldbox high pressure column is calculated using the Hurst
ow ion
Nussey Pape Probit Equation (see Section 4.1.4 herein). The probability of fatality indoors
ht ct
ig pe
from the overpressure consequences of a BLEVE blast was determined using the CIA
yr ns
op r i
relationships (CIA, 2010) for different building types (see Figure 4).
f c Fo
to
The probability of fatality with distance outdoors and indoors for the coldbox high pressure
en
ns
column rupture scenario is illustrated on Figure 55.

Co
Page 90
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Coldbox Rupture
100
Outdoors
Indoors Category 2
90
Indoors Cateogry 3
Indoors Category 4
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance (m)
.
se
Figure 55 Coldbox Rupture: Probability of Fatality vs. Distance
ru
he
ot
The distance to the overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality in vulnerable

ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
structures is 20 m. This contour is illustrated on Figure 56.

re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Figure 56 Coldbox Rupture: 50 mbar Contour
It is concluded that the overpressure effects of a Coldbox rupture at the ASU are confined
to the ASU area. There are no impacts off site. There is the potential for damage to the
ASU control building and for injuries or fatalities of personnel within the building. Personnel
Page 91
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

may be occasionally present at the ASU plant areas for maintenance purposes, otherwise
it is not normally occupied.
Frequency of Coldbox High Pressure Column Rupture
The initiating event for the Coldbox high pressure column rupture scenario is a liquid leak
leading to column overpressurisation. There are multiple safeguards that would prevent
this from occurring including the following:
• Pipework within the coldbox is pressure tested before service;

• Pressure monitoring on the interspace to detect a leak and automatic Plant
shutdown on high;
• Written scheme of examination and annual examination of the coldbox
• Weekly checks for ice patches and on the purge rate
The HSA recommends a frequency of 1E-04 per year for pressure vessel burst scenarios
for land use planning purposes (HSA, 2010).
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 92
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

8.4 Risk Contours at the ASU
TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 risk modelling software was used to model individual risk
of fatality contours at the proposed ASU. The model inputs include consequence
modelling results as described herein, wind speed and direction data (see Section 4.1.8)
and event frequencies.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co

Inner Middle Outer
Figure 57 ASU: Individual Risk of Fatality Contours
It is concluded that the individual risk contours are confined to the ASU area and do not
extend outside of the site boundary or to any other building or installation at the proposed
development or at the existing manufacturing site.
Page 93
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

9.0 SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Table 40 (overleaf) summarises the consequences, impacts outdoors, impacts indoors

and frequency of each major accident scenario.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 94
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

Table 40 Summary of Major Accident Scenario Consequences and Frequencies

Substance Installation Location Scenario Hazard Consequences Impacts outdoors Impacts indoors in occupied buildings Frequency
37 m to 20 mbar (safe distance)
Lethal effects confined to LOx
BLEVE 8 m to 1% lethality outdoors
compound, not to any normally
Liquid oxygen overpressure 11 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2
Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks Tank rupture occupied areas. No damage to Persons indoors are protected. 2E-05 per year
compound and oxygen structures
equipment or buildings. No off site
enrichment Enriched oxygen atmosphere within
effects.
265 m.
Release is at 5 m above ground level and
flame is 8 m in length. Personnel outdoors are protected on
Liquid 13 m to 4.1 kW/2 (threshold of fatality) at a site No impacts off site No buildings on site within 1% lethality
Venting system leak, direct
Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank hydrogen Jet fire receptor height of 1.5 m. No damage to waste solvent contour in Category 2 structures, persons 4E-06 per year
ignition
compound Max. thermal radiation level incident on collection tanks or knock on effects indoors are protected
waste solvent collection tanks is 1.5 predicted
kW/m2, not sufficient to cause damage
76 m (F2) / 63 m (D5) to 20 mbar (safe Potential for damage to the liquid
distance) hydrogen tanks.
Liquid No buildings on site within 1% lethality
Venting system leak, Vapour cloud 21 m (F2) / 19 m (D5) to 1% lethality Lethal effects extend to the truck dock 1.44 E-05 per year
Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank hydrogen contour in Category 2 structures, persons
delayed ignition explosion outdoors and roadways in the vicinity of the per vessel
compound indoors are protected
26 m (F2) / 23 m (D5) to 1% lethality liquid hydrogen compound.
indoors in Category 2 structures No impacts outside of site boundary
Potential for damage to waste solvent
164 m to 20 mbar (safe distance) collection tanks with knock-on effects
Liquid No buildings on site within 1% lethality in
BLEVE 38 m to 1% lethality outdoors Lethal effects extend to truck offload
Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank hydrogen Tank rupture Category 2 structures contour, persons
overpressure 53 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 areas and roadways
compound indoors are protected
.
structures No impacts outside of the site
se
ru
boundary
he
ot
Potential for knock on effects at the 3E-05 per year
ny
fo y.
d nl
waste solvent collection tanks
ra
re o
ui es
Liquid 47 m fireball radius, 7.31 s duration including a confined tank explosion
Fireball duration is short and persons
eq os
Liquid hydrogen Bulk tank hydrogen Tank rupture Fireball 122 m to 1% lethality outdoors thermal and waste solvent pool fire.
r r rp
indoors are protected
ne pu
compound dose Lethal effects are confined within the
ow ion
site boundary
ht ct
ig pe
No impacts outside of site boundary
yr ns
op r i
Potential for damage to adjacent
f c Fo
39 m (5 m/s wind speed) to thermal
Waste solvent waste solvent collection tanks.
radiation level corresponding to 1% The thermal radiation level below which
stream A and B Lethal effects extend to the waste
lethality outdoors persons indoors does not reach any 1E-03 per year at
to
Waste solvent Bulk tanks collection tank Tank release Bund fire solvent collection tank truck dock and
en
31 m (5 /s wind speed) to thermal radiation building on site and persons indoors are each bund
ns
bunds and adjacent roadway
Co
level below which persons indoors are protected.
future tanks No impacts outside of the site
protected
boundary
Potential for damage to adjacent
39 m (5 m/s wind speed) to thermal
waste solvent collection tanks.
Waste solvent radiation level corresponding to 1% The thermal radiation level below which
Tank rupture with bund Lethal effects extend to the waste
stream A and B Uncontained lethality outdoors persons indoors does not reach any 1E-04 per year per
Waste solvent Bulk tanks overtopping or spill at truck solvent collection tank truck dock and
collection tank pool fire 31 m (5 /s wind speed) to thermal radiation building on site and persons indoors are tank
dock adjacent roadway
bunds level below which persons indoors are protected.
No impacts outside of the site
protected
boundary
Waste solvent 125 m to 20 mbar (safe distance) Lethal effects extend to the vicinity of
No buildings on site within 1% lethality in
stream A and B Vapour cloud 21 m to 1% lethality outdoors the tanks and adjacent truck docks 1E-05 per year per
Waste solvent Bulk tanks Tank explosion Category 2 structures contour, persons
collection tank explosion 26 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 No impacts outside of the site tank
indoors are protected
bunds structures boundary
201m to 20 mbar (safe distance)
BLEVE 43 m to 1% lethality outdoors Lethal effects extend to the ASU area
Air Separation overpressure 56 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 and proposed waste water balancing Potential for fatalities in the ASU control
Liquid oxygen Bulk tanks Tank rupture 3E-05 per year
Unit and oxygen structures tank. No damage to equipment or to building
enrichment Enriched oxygen atmosphere within buildings outside of site boundary
234 m.
Air Separation Oxygen 166 m (D5) / 126 m (F2) to onset of Potential for fatalities in the vicinity of
Liquid argon Bulk tank Tank rupture None 1E-05 per year
Unit displacement symptoms of asphyxia the ASU
8 m to 1% lethality outdoors
Air Separation Lethal effects are confined to the ASU
Liquid oxygen Coldbox Coldbox rupture Overpressure 11 m to 1% lethality indoors in Category 2 None 1E-04 per year
Unit 1/2 area
structures
Page 95
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:23

10.0 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON OCCUPIED BUILDINGS
10.1 Methodology
The assessment of impacts on occupied buildings is completed in accordance with the

CIA Guidance Document (CIA, 2010) which recommends the following assessment
methodology:
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
The risk based approach is adopted herein. The CIA recommends that for a range of
events a risk assessment is carried out and compared with established criteria.
10.2 Occupied Building Risk Assessment
The following occupied buildings are included within the proposed development:
• ASU control building
The impacts of major accident hazards associated with the proposed development and
the existing establishment (including the new facility in the western area of the site for
which planning permission has been sought) the ASU control building are summarised in
Table 41. A screening approach has been taken and only those scenarios resulting in
consequences with > 1% probability of fatality indoors at the ASU are included.
Page 96
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

Risk of fatality
Distance to
indoors in ASU
ASU
Installation Hazard Consequences Frequency Control Building Comments
Control
from MAH
Building
scenario
0.365 bar (55% Based on
ASU LOx tank Tank rupture and mortality assuming conservative
rupture and 7 m to 27 m BLEVE leading category 3 strength) 3E-05 per year 3E-05 per year land use
BLEVE to overpressure to 9 bar (100% planning
mortality) frequency
Based on
Coldbox rupture 300 mbar (50 % conservative
ASU Coldbox 7m leading to mortality, assuming 1E-04 per year 5E-05 per year land use
overpressure category 3 strength) planning
frequency
Event
frequency from
Silane ISO Tube rupture and 200 mbar (21 %
5.28E-08 per 1.11E-08 per silane QRA in
tube trailer at 110 m delayed vapour mortality, assuming
year year safety report
silane pad cloud explosion category 3 strength)
for
establishment
Total Risk of Fatality 8E-05 /year Negligible
.
se
ru
he
Table 41 Occupied Building Assessment for ASU Control Building
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
It is concluded that the total individual risk of fatality at the ASU control building is 8E-05
re o
ui es
eq os
per year which is assessed as Tolerable if As Low as Reasonably Practicable when

r r rp
ne pu
compared to the individual risk criteria outlined in Section 2.1.2 herein. It is noted that this
ow ion
is based on conservative land use planning frequencies that do not take into account
ht ct
ig pe
safety and risk reduction measures on vessels such as pressure relief valves, burst discs
yr ns
op r i
etc.
f c Fo
to
At detailed design stage, the required performance of the ASU Control Building will be
en
ns
determined in accordance with the methodology described by the CIA.

Co
Page 97
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

11.0 RISK BASED LAND USE PLANNING CONTOURS
TNO Riskcurves Version 10.1.9 software was used to plot the individual risk of fatality
contours corresponding to the boundaries of the inner (1E-05 per year), middle (1E-06 per
year) and outer (1E-07 per year) risk based land use planning zones.
Figure 58 and Figure 59 present the risk based land use planning zone for the proposed
development and the risk based land use planning zones for the overall site (including the
proposed development) respectively.
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Figure 58 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Proposed Development
Page 98
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
Figure 59 Risk Based Land Use Planning Contours for Overall Site
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
It is concluded that the risk based land use planning zones are confined within the site
ne pu
boundary. The level of individual risk of fatality on site and off site is acceptable.
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 99
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

12.0 CONCLUSION
A risk based land use planning assessment was completed of major accident hazards
associated with proposed development including liquid oxygen tanks, liquid hydrogen
tanks, waste solvent collection tanks and an Air Separation Unit at Intel Ireland,
Collinstown Industrial Park, Leixlip Co. Kildare.
The following major accident hazards were identified for the proposed development:
Location Installation Major Accident Scenario

Liquid oxygen Cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks (2 No.
overpressure effects and oxygen
compound vertical tanks)
enrichment
Hydrogen tank rupture with BLEVE
Liquid hydrogen Cryogenic liquid hydrogen tank (3 No. and fireball
compound horizontal) Hydrogen tank leak with jet fire or
vapour cloud explosion
Tank release, bund fire
Waste solvent stream A collection tanks Tank rupture with bund overtopping
Waste solvent (2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks) or spill at truck dock and
.
collection tanks Waste solvent stream B collection tanks uncontained pool fire
se
(2 No. plus 2 No. future tanks) ru Confined explosion in waste solvent
he
collection tank
ot
ny
fo y.

d nl
ra
re o
Air Separation Unit Liquid oxygen tank overpressure effects and oxygen
ui es
eq os
enrichment
r r rp
Argon tank rupture and dispersion

ne pu
Air Separation Unit Liquid argon tank

ow ion
of asphyxiating gas
ht ct
Vessel rupture and overpressure

ig pe
Air Separation Unit Coldbox

yr ns
consequences
op r i
f c Fo
Impacts Off Site

to
en
ns
No off site impacts are predicted at any off site receptor location.
Co
Impacts On Site
There is the potential for fatalities to arise on site from the consequences of major accident
scenarios, however areas affected are primarily outdoor areas that are not normally
occupied.
Impacts indoors in the ASU Control Building were assessed and there is the potential for
fatalities to arise as a result of major accident scenarios at the ASU. At detailed design
stage, the required performance of the ASU Control Building will be determined in
accordance with the methodology described by the CIA (CIA, 2010) to ensure the risk of
fatality is minimised.
Risk Based LUP Contours
The individual risk of fatality for the proposed development was determined. Individual risk
of fatality contours that correspond to the boundaries of the inner (1E-05 per year), middle
(1E-06 per year) and outer (1E-07 per year) risk based land use planning zones are
illustrated as follows:
Page 100
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
It is concluded that the risk based land use planning zones are confined within the site
ow ion
boundary. The level of individual risk of fatality on site and off site is acceptable.
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 101
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

13.0 REFERENCES
Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
(1989), Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability Data, AIChE, New York, USA
Centre for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
(2000), Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd Edition,
AIChemE, New York, USA
Chemical Industries Association (2003), Guidance for the location and design of occupied
buildings on chemical manufacturing sites, revised 2nd Edition November 2003
Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment,
CPR 18E, Second Edition, 2005 (“Purple Book”)
European Chemicals Agency, Online: https://echa.europa.eu/information-on-chemicals

(accessed 1st December 2018)
Energy Institute (2007), Model Code of Safe Practice Part 19 Fire Precautions at
Petroleum Refineries and Bulk Storage Installations, 2nd Edition, London, UK
European Industrial Gases Association (2006), Position Paper PP-14, Definitions of
.
se
Oxygen Enrichment/Deficiency Safety Criteria, Available
ru
he from:
https://www.eiga.eu/index.php?id=180 (accessed December 2018)
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
Haasl, D.F. (1965), Advanced Concepts in Fault Tree Analysis, System Safety
ui es
eq os
Symposium, June 8-9 1965, Seattle, The Boeing Company

r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
Harper P. (2011), Assessment of the Major Hazard Potential of Carbon Dioxide, UK Health
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
and Safety Executive

op r i
f c Fo
Health and Safety Authority (2010), Policy & Approach of the Health & Safety Authority to
to
COMAH Risk-based Land-use Planning (19 March 2010) Including Detailed

en
ns
Implementation by Sector
Co
Kletz, T. A., 1999, Hazop and Hazan– Identifying and Assessing Process Industry
Hazards, 4th edition, Chapter 2 (Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, UK)
Mannan S. (2012), Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries Hazard Identification,
Assessment and Control, 4th Edition, Elsevier
McGrattan K.B., Baum H.R., Hamins A. (2000), National Institute for Standards and
Technology (US Department of Commerce), NISTIR 6546, Thermal Radiation from Large
Pool Fires, November 2000
O'Riordan, N.J. and Milloy, C.J. (1995) Risk assessment for methane and other gases in
the ground, London, GB, Construction Industry Research & Information Association
(CIRIA) (CIRIA Reports R152)
Rasmussen, N.C., Reactor Safety Study, An assessment of accident risk in US nuclear

power plants, WASH 1400, NUREG 75/014, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington DC, 1975
Page 102
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

TNO (1999), Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (First Edition), the Purple Book.
CPR 18E, the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, Committee for
the Prevention of Disasters, the Hague, Netherlands, 1999
Trbojevic V.M., Risk criteria in EU, European Safety and Reliability Conference, 2005
UK Health and Safety Executive (2001), Reducing Risks Protecting People HSE’s
Decision Making Process, HSE Books, R2P2
UK Health and Safety Executive (2005), An Experimental Investigation of Bund Wall

Overtopping and Dynamic Pressures on the Bund Wall following Catastrophic Failure of
a Storage Vessel (prepared by Liverpool John Moores University for the HSE), Research
Report 333, 2005
UK Health and Safety Executive (2009), Comparison of risks from carbon dioxide and
natural gas pipelines, Research Report 749
(Online: http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr749.pdf)
UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (2012), Planning Case Assessment Guide,
Chapter 6K, Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Land Use Planning Risk
Assessments (http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/failure-rates.pdf)
.
se
UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Toxicity levels of chemicals, Assessment of the
ru
he
Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) for Specified Level of Toxicity (SLOT) and Significant
ot
ny
fo y.
Likelihood of Death (SLOD)

d nl
ra
re o
Online: http://www.hse.gov.uk/chemicals/haztox.htm (Accessed 1st December 2018)

ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
US American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) ERPG Values (2013)

ow ion
https://www.aiha.org/get-
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
involved/AIHAGuidelineFoundation/EmergencyResponsePlanningGuidelines/Document
op r i
f c Fo
s/2013ERPGValues.pdf
to
US Centre for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/idlhintr.html (accessed 1st

en
ns
December 2018)
Co
UK Health and Safety Executive, An Experimental Investigation of Bund Wall Overtopping

and Dynamic Pressures on the Bund Wall following Catastrophic Failure of a Storage
Vessel (prepared by Liverpool John Moores University for the HSE), Research Report
333, 2005
Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Ministry of Health, Welfare
and Support (2017), Dichlorosilane Probit Function Technical Support Document (Interim)
Online: https://www.rivm.nl/sites/default/files/2018-11/20170606-dichlorosilane-
interim.pdf
Page 103
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

APPENDIX A
HAZARD STATEMENTS AND CLP CHEMICAL CLASSIFICATIONS
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 104
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

Code Hazard Statement Hazard Class Category Abbreviation

H200 Explosives, Unstable explosives Unstable explosives Unst. Expl.
H201 Explosives, Division 1.1 Division 1.1 Expl. 1.1
Explosives
H220 Extremely flammable gas Category 1 Flam. Gas. 1
.
Flammable gases
se
ru
H221 Flammable gases Category 2 Flam. Gas. 2
he
ot
ny
H222 Extremely flammable aerosol Category 1 Aerosol 1
fo y.
d nl
ra
Aerosol
re o
ui es
H223 Flammable aerosols Category 2 Aerosol 2
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
H224 Extremely flammable liquid and vapour Category 1 Flam. Liq. 1
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
H225 Highly flammable liquid and vapour Category 2 Flam. Liq. 2
yr ns
Flammable liquids
op r i
f c Fo
H226 Flammable liquid and vapour Category 3 Flam. Liq. 3
H228 Flammable solid Category 1, Category 2 Flam. Sol. 1, Flam. Sol. 2
o
nt
se
n
Type A Self React. A, Organic

Co
H240 Heating may cause and explosion

Perox. A
Self-Reactive Type B Self React. B, Organic
H241 Heating may cause a fire or explosion
Substances and Perox. B
Mixtures,
Types C, D, E, F Self React. C&D, Organic
Organic peroxides
Perox. C&D
H242 Heating may cause a fire
Self React. E&F, Organic
Perox. E&F
Pyrophoric Liquids Category 1 Pyr. Liq. 1
H250 Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air
Pyorphoric Solids Pyr. Sol. 1
Page 105
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24


H251 Self-heating; may catch fire Self-heating Category 1 Self-heat 1
substances and
H252 Self-heating in large quantities; may catch fire Category 2 Self-heat 2
mixtures
In contact with water releases flammable gases which may Substances and Category 1 Water-react. 1
H260
ignite spontaneously Mixtures which, in
contact with water,
Category 2 Water-react. 2
H261 In contact with water releases flammable gases emit flammable
Category 3 Water-react. 3
gases
H270 May cause or intensify fire; oxidiser Oxidising Gases Category 1 Ox. Gas 1
.
se
ru
he
H271 May cause fire or explosion; strong oxidiser Category 1 Ox. Liq. 1, Ox. Sol. 1
ot
Oxidising Liquids
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
Category 2 Ox. Liq. 2, Ox. Sol. 2
re o
H272 May intensify fire; oxidiser Oxidising Solids
ui es
eq os
Category 3 Ox. Liq. 3, Ox. Sol. 3
r r rp
ne pu
Compressed gas Press. Gas
ow ion
ht ct
H280 Contains gas under pressure; may explode if heated Liquefied gas
ig pe
yr ns
Gases under
op r i
Dissolved gas
f c Fo
pressure
Contains refrigerated gas; may cause cryogenic burns or Refrigerated gas Press. Gas
H281
o
injury nt
se
n
Co
H290 Corrosive to metals, Hazard Category 1 Corrosive to metals Category 1 Met. Corr. 1
Category 1 Acute Tox. 1
H300 Fatal if swallowed
Acute toxicity
H301 Toxic if swallowed Category 3 Acute Tox. 3
H302 Harmful if swallowed Category 4 Acute Tox. 4
H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways Aspiration toxicity Category 1 Asp. Tox. 1
H310 Fatal in contact with skin
Acute toxicity Category 2 Acute Tox. 2
H311 Toxic in contact with skin Category 3 Acute Tox. 3
Page 106
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24


H312 Harmful in contact with skin Category 4 Acute Tox. 4
H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage Skin corrosion / Category 1A, 1B, 1C Skin Corr. 1A, 1B, 1C
H315 Causes skin irritation irritation Category 2 Skin Irr. 2
Sensitisation of the Category 1 and Sub- Skin. Sens. 1, 1A or 1B
H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction respiratory tract or Categories 1A and 1B
the skin
H318 Causes serious eye damage Serious eye damage Category 1 Eye Dam. 1
H319 Causes serious eye irritation / eye irritation Category 2 Eye Irr. 2
.
se
ru
he
ot
H330 Fatal if inhaled
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
Acute toxicity
eq os
H331 Toxic if inhaled Category 3 Acute Tox. 3
r r rp
ne pu
H332 Harmful if inhaled Category 4 Acute Tox. 4
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
Sensitisation of the Category 1 and Sub- Resp. Sens. 1, 1A or 1B
yr ns
May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing
op r i
f c Fo
H334 respiratory tract or Categories 1A and 1B
difficulties if inhaled
the skin
o
nt
se
H335 May cause respiratory irritation Specific target organ Category 3 STOT SE 3
n
Co
toxicity (single
H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness Category 3 STOT SE 3
exposure)
Category 1 and Sub- Muta. 1, 1A or 1B
H340 May cause genetic defects Germ cell Categories 1A and 1B
mutagenicity
H341 Suspected of causing genetic defects Category 2 Muta. 2
H350 May cause cancer Category 1 and Sub- Carc. 1, 1A or 1B
Categories 1A and 1B
H350i May cause cancer when inhaled Carcinogenicity
H351 Suspected of causing cancer Category 2 Carc. 2
Page 107
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24


Category 1 and Sub- Repr. 1, 1A or 1B
H360 May damage fertility or the unborn child.
Reproductive toxicity Categories 1A and 1B
H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child Category 2 Repr. 2
Additional category for Lact.
H362 May cause harm to breast-fed children Reproductive toxicity effects on or via
lactation
H370 Causes damage to organs Specific target organ Category 1 STOT SE 1
toxicity (single
H371 May cause damage to organs Category 2 STOT SE 2
.
se
exposure)
ru
he
ot
Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated Category 1 STOT RE 1
ny
fo y.
H372 Specific target organ
d nl
ra
exposure
re o
ui es
toxicity (repeated
eq os
May cause damage to organs through prolonged or repeated Category 2 STOT RE 2
r r rp
exposure)
ne pu
H373
exposure
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
H400 Very toxic to aquatic life Acute Category 1 Aquatic Acute 1
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects Chronic Category 1 Aquatic Chronic 1
Hazardous to the
o
H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects nt Chronic Category 2 Aquatic Chronic 2
aquatic environment
se
n
Co
H412 Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects Chronic Category 3 Aquatic Chronic 3
H413 May cause long lasting harmful effects to aquatic life Chronic Category 4 Aquatic Chronic 4
Page 108
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

END OF REPORT
.
se
ru
he
ot
ny
fo y.
d nl
ra
re o
ui es
eq os
r r rp
ne pu
ow ion
ht ct
ig pe
yr ns
op r i
f c Fo
to
en
ns
Co
Page 109
EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:24

Air Separation Unit QRA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Air Separation Unit QRA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Air Separation Unit QRA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

COMAH LAND USE PLANNING

Intel Ireland Ltd.

Technical Report Prepared By

Maeve McKenna BEng MEngSc CEng MIEI

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Document Reference Original Issue Date

Details Written by Approved by

Name Maeve McKenna

Title Principal Risk Consultant

Date 30 August 2019

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Location Installation Major Accident Scenario

Tank rupture, BLEVE with

Liquid oxygen Cryogenic liquid oxygen tanks (2 No.

compound vertical tanks)

Hydrogen tank rupture with BLEVE

Impacts Off Site

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Risk Based LUP Contours

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 3

List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... 7

List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 9

1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 10

2.0 BACKGROUND TO RISK ASSESSMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING ............... 11

2.1 Risk Assessment – An Introduction ................................................................. 11

3.0 DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS AND

3.1 Description of Development ............................................................................ 16

5.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID OXYGEN MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS ................ 37

5.1 Oxygen BLEVE and Dispersion Model Inputs .................................................. 37

5.2 BLEVE Model Outputs..................................................................................... 37

5.3 Pool Evaporation Model Outputs ..................................................................... 40

5.4 Oxygen Dispersion Results ............................................................................. 41

5.5 Probability of Fatality from LOx BLEVE ........................................................... 43

5.7 Risk Contours at the Liquid Oxygen Tanks ...................................................... 45

6.0 ASSESSMENT FOR LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS 46

6.1 Assessment for Hydrogen Leak through Venting System ................................ 46

7.0 ASSESSMENT FOR WASTE SOLVENT MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS .............. 63

7.1 Waste Solvent Storage .................................................................................... 63

8.0 AIR SEPARATION UNIT MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS ................................... 75

8.1 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen ................................................................................ 75

9.0 SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS .................................................. 93

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

10.0 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON OCCUPIED BUILDINGS.................................... 95

11.0 RISK BASED LAND USE PLANNING CONTOURS ................................................ 97

12.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 99

13.0 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 101

APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 103

APPENDIX A Hazard Classifications and Hazard Statements

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Figure 1 Site Location ................................................................................................................ 17

Figure 22 Hydrogen BLEVE Model Outputs: Overpressure Results ........................................... 55

Figure 23 Hydrogen BLEVE: Blast Damage Contours ................................................................ 56

Figure 25 Hydrogen Fireball Model Outputs: Thermal Dose Results .......................................... 58

Mortality) and 1% Mortality Contours .......................................................................... 59

Fatality vs. Distance ..................................................................................................... 60

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

EPA Export 25-04-2020:06:13:22

Table 1 Annual Fatality Rates for a Variety of Activities ........................................................... 12