PoliRev Case Doctrines Midterms

PoliRev Case Doctrines
I. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. General Principles
1. Definition and Elements
1 Laurel vs. Desierto ▪ The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or
employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
▪ A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: A
public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
▪ The characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract,
an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
▪ A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is
a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or
honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.
2 Serana vs. Sandiganbayan ▪ It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees,
based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
▪ Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that
(a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
▪ The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
▪ A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public.
▪ It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan—the Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
▪ It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.
3 Javier vs. Sandiganbayan ▪ The fact that the accused was appointed as member of the National Book Development Board (NBDB) from the public
sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a
public office; The purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also
properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry.
▪ The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a public
officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government; Under the Anti-Graft Law, the
nature of one’s appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only nominal, is
immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.
▪ The Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent,
or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
▪
B. Modes of Acquiring Title to Public Office

a) Appointment; b) Election;
C. Modes and Kinds of Appointment
a) Permanent and Temporary; and b) Regular and Ad Interim
4 Achacoso vs. Macaraig ▪ A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed.
▪ Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
▪ When required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his security of tenure
because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. This is allowed by the
Constitution only when it is for cause as provided by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has
expired.
5 Cuevas vs. Bacal ▪ It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
▪ The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment,
which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the
position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent
even if it may be so designated.
▪ The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the Career Executive Service (CES) does not extend to the particular
positions to which they may be appointed but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President; Respondent did
not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney.
▪ The rule is that unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station he can claim no security of tenure in
respect of any office.
6 Matibag vs. Benipayo ▪ An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office—the fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
▪ The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
▪ The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment
takes effect immediately; In case of an appointment made by the President when Congress is in session, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office,
while with reference to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect at once, and the individual chosen may thus qualify and
perform his function without loss of time.
▪ The term “ad interim appointment,” as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent
appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.
▪ An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office, and the
withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the
moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.
▪ An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and
therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”
▪ An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution—first, by the disapproval of his
ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the adjournment of Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.
▪ While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation
in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or
acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the
Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC.
▪ To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
▪ An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new
appointment—the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power
on the appointing authority of the President.
▪ A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at
the close of the session of Congress.
▪ An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of
office—the period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an
unexpired term.
▪ The framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons—first, to prevent a second
appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years,
and, second, to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of
seven years.
▪ One who has been given an ad interim appointment as COMELEC Chairman is a de jure officer, and consequently, he has
full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective; The
Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority, without having to secure
the approval of the COMELEC en banc, to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with Civil Service Law.
D. Eligibility and Qualification Requirements
7 Flores vs. Drilon ▪ The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely
adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
▪ The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
▪ Respondent Gordon’s appointment pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. His
acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void, he may be considered a de facto officer.
E. Disabilities and Inhibitions of Public Officers
8 Funa vs. Agra ▪ To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
▪ The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as
Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.
▪ A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
▪ The Supreme Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his
later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the
office.
9 Funa vs. Duque III ▪ The term ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from official character merely,
not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.”
▪ Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as the central personnel
agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and
rewards system; to integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability.
▪ The Supreme Court (SC) also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional
compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
▪ Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing
Boards of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH),
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) impairs the independence of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
▪ The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the
President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
▪ In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly
hold office as Director or Trustee of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHILHEALTH), Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)
concurrently with his position of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a
de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these government-owned and -controlled corporations
(GOCCs).
▪ A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an
appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
F. Powers and Duties of Public Officers
10 Pollo vs. David ▪ The Civil Service Commission (CSC) had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.
▪ A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
G. Rights of Public Offices
H. Liabilities of Public Officers

1. Preventive Suspension and Back Salaries; and 2. Illegal Dismissal, Reinstatement and Back Salaries
I. Immunity of Public Officers
J. Distinguish De Facto and De Jure Officers
11 PPA vs. Monserate ▪ Once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right to the position which is protected not only by statute, but also
by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for
cause, and with previous notice and hearing. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as
Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights security of tenure and due process.
▪ The moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of
the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead,
except for cause.
▪ A rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time
of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title.
▪ A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its functions under color of an
appointment or election, even though such appointment or election may be irregular. A de facto officer, not having a good
title, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during
the period of his wrongful tenure.
12 Monroy vs. CA ▪ Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy does not restore candidate to former position.
▪ An elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, is
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The forfeiture is automatic
and irrevocably effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the 'moment and act of filing
are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the position is forever forfeited and nothing, save a new election or
appointment, can restore the ousted official. The forfeiture is not dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen or
unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
▪ The de facto doctrine was formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection
of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.
K. Termination of Official Relation

1. Involuntary Retirement
13 Re: Letter of Mrs. Maria Cristina Roco ▪ The effects of a judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than to removal from office and
Corona disqualification from holding any public office.
▪ Impeachment does not imply immunity from court processes, nor does it preclude other forms of discipline.
▪ An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established may be
considered involuntarily retired from service.
▪ Retirement is the termination of one's own employment or career, especially upon reaching a certain age or for health
reasons. To retire is to withdraw from one's position or occupation, or to conclude one's active working life or professional
career.
▪ An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established is entitled to the
retirement benefits provided under RAs 9946 and 8291.
▪ Section 1 of RA 9964 yields two instances of retirement available to a magistrate - first, a compulsory retirement at 70
years old; and second, an optional retirement upon reaching 60 years of age. The following legal requisites must concur for
the optional retirement of a magistrate and the consequent entitlement to the benefits under RA 9946:
(1)That the retiree be a magistrate, i.e., a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a judge of the trial courts, shari 'a court, or of any other judicial court;
(2)That the retiring magistrate has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the judiciary, in any other
branch of the government, or in both;
(3)That the retiring magistrate be at least sixty (60) years of age at the time of retirement; and
(4)That the last three (3) years of public service by the retiring magistrate be continuously rendered in the
Judiciary.
▪ Mrs. Corona is entitled to the payment of Chief Justice Corona's survivorship benefits and other allowances under RA 9964.
14 Collantes vs. CA ▪ While there is indeed a distinction between position and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred or reassigned from one
position to another without losing his rank, there can be no distinction between resigning from a position and resigning
from a rank. The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation from the government service, which includes the
resignation of a CESO from his position.
▪ Likewise, it would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from his position can compel the President to
appoint him to another position.
15 Office of the Ombudsman vs. Andutan ▪ The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public
servant at the time the case was filed.
▪ A public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation.
▪ Under the “threefold liability rule,” the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability.
▪ Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or
retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutan’s alleged transgressions.
L. The Civil Service

1. Scope
2. Appointments to the Civil Service
3. Personnel Actions
16 Liban et. al vs. Gordon ▪ The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; Not being a government official or employee,
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.
▪ The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
▪ The PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government
ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be
considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and
control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation.
17 LRTA vs. Venus ▪ The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
▪ this Court ruled that labor law claims against government-owned and controlled corporations without original charter fall
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment and not the Civil Service Commission.
18 Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural ▪ Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the Commission on Audit (COA) was vested with the “power,
Office authority and duty” to “examine, audit and settle” the “accounts” of the government, Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporation (GOCCs) with or without charter, constitutional commissions with fiscal autonomy, and non-governmental
entities receiving subsidy from or through the government.
▪ Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, grants the Commission on Audit (COA) visitorial authority over the following non-
governmental entities: those subsidized by the government, those required to pay levy or government share, those that
received counterpart funds from the government, and those partly funded by donations through the government.
▪ The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national
government that, by reason of some “special function or jurisdiction” they perform or exercise, are allotted “operational
autonomy” and are “not integrated within the department framework.” Subsumed under the rubric “government
instrumentality” are the following entities: 1. regulatory agencies, 2. chartered institutions, 3. government corporate
entities or government instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP), and 4. GOCCs.
▪ The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) was correct in postulating that, as a corporation organized under the
Corporation Code, it is governed by the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its by-
laws.
▪ Despite its private origins, and perhaps deliberately so, the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) was “entrusted”
by the government with the “delicate and precarious” responsibility of pursuing “unofficial” relations with the people of a
foreign land whose government the Philippines is bound not to recognize; From its overreaching corporate objectives, its
special duty and authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to the oversight by the executive department over its
operations — all the while maintaining its legal status as a non-governmental entity — the Manila Economic and Cultural
Office (MECO) is, for all intents and purposes, sui generis.
▪ The accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) pertaining to the fees it was authorized to collect under
Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA).
19 Montecillo vs. Civil Service Commission ▪ The Civil Service Commission was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be
classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 which signifies
that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree 807), which defines the
non-career service, is not an exclusive list.
▪
20 Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission ▪ it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional
Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a
career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government.
▪ Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all
members of the civil service, including public school teachers.
▪ Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
M. Accountability of Public Office

1. Types of Accountability
a) Administrative; b) Criminal
2. Discipline
a) Grounds b) Jurisdiction c) Dismissal, Preventive Suspension, Reinstatement and Back Salaries
21 Gloria vs. CA ▪ There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2) preventive suspension pending
appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is
exonerated (§47[4]).
▪ Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty—it is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority
to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses
against him.
▪ An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office pending investigation is not entitled to compensation for the
period during which he was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was
suspended was insufficient.
▪ The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot, therefore, be considered “unjustified” as it is one of those
sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good.
▪ Employees who are considered preventively suspended pending appeal are entitled to payment of their salaries if they are
subsequently found innocent.
▪ Though an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal, in the event he wins,
his suspension is unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90
days—beyond that period the suspension is illegal.
22 Constantino-David vs. CA ▪ An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary
benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.
▪ If the illegal dismissal is found to have been made in bad faith by the superior officers then they will be held personally
accountable for the employees back salaries.
d) Condonation Doctrine
23 Carpio-Morales vs. CA ▪ A preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure.
▪ its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office
to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
▪ Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different
ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of
the case against him.
▪ The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist
with the first requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondent’s continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
▪ Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially]
by treating the offender as if there had been no offense.”
▪ The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the condonation doctrine
would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
▪ Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
▪ The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term
of office, or even another elective post.
▪ In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to
administrative offenses.
▪ An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: (a)
Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or
an offense punishable by at least prisión mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15)
consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or
the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
▪ The Supreme Court (SC) deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive
suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment
of the condonation doctrine.
▪ It would be a violation of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to
abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent.
▪ The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape
administrative liability.
▪ In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.
▪ The Condonation Doctrine abandonment is effective starting April 12, 2016. It applies to recall elections held on or after
April 12, 2016.
3. Impeachment vs. Quo Warranto
24 Re: Letter of Mrs. Maria Cristina Roco ▪ Impeachment is a constitutional process that takes place within the political departments of our government.
Corona ▪ The effects of a judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than to removal from office and
disqualification from holding any public office.
▪ No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of impeachment against him or her, and
thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.
▪ Suffice it to state that a first jeopardy finds no opportunity to arise at that point, as the essence of impeachment is not
criminal in nature.
▪ An action for quo warranto will likewise proceed independently of the impeachment proceedings.
▪ Impeachment and Quo Warranto differ as to nature, jurisdiction, grounds, the applicable procedural rules, and
limitations.30 Impeachment is political; quo warranto is judicial. In impeachment, the Congress is the prosecutor, the trier,
and the judge, whereas quo warranto petitions are instituted either by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines or by an individual claiming the public office in issue, both of which petitions are cognizable only by the
Supreme Court. Impeachment proceedings seek to confirm and vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the Filipino
people upon the impeachable official, but quo warranto determines the legal right, title, eligibility, or qualifications of the
incumbent to the contested public office. The 1987 Constitution, as supplemented by the internal rules of procedure of the
Congress, directs the course of impeachment proceedings. Quo warranto cases, on the other hand, are dictated by the
Rules of Court. The end result of an impeachment proceeding is the removal of the public officer, and his or her perpetual
political disqualification from holding public office. On the other hand, when a quo warranto petition is granted, ouster
from office is likewise meted, but the Court can likewise impose upon the public officer additional penalties such as
reimbursement of costs pertaining to the rightful holder of the public office and such further judgment determining the
respective rights in and to the public office, position, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
25 Lastimosa-Dalawampu vs. Mojica
4. The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor

(Secs. 5-14, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to RA 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989)
a) Functions b) Judicial Review in Administrative Proceedings c) Judicial Review in Penal Proceedings
26 Carpio-Morales vs. CA ▪ Act; The first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme
Court [SC]) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
▪ Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains
pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind,
consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief. The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office’s jurisdiction.
▪ The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission
of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
▪ The second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be
heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court (SC) on pure questions
of law.
▪ This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its
decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for remedy” or the word
“findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same
be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to
resolve the ambiguity.
▪ As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 bans the whole range of remedies
against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and
(b) “any application of remedy” (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase “application for
remedy,” being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term “appeal” by the disjunctive “or,” refers to
any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense.
▪ The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is
not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only
allowable remedy against “the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,” a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only
remedy taken to the Supreme Court on “pure questions of law,” whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
▪ Doctrine of Non-Interference; Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a
Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings” issued by the Ombudsman.
▪ Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts.
▪ Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court (SC) and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the
“totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.”
▪ Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case
conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court.
▪
27 Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of ▪ While Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all
the Philippines government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
▪ The Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon
them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the
President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
albeit under specified conditions.
▪ As a general rule, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him except when the law expressly
provides otherwise—that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—that is, when the power to remove
is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President’s power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However,
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article
XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision
over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on
Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President
(Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
▪ Paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same
grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”
▪ Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds of
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes.
▪ A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for
purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this
should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the
fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal
of public trust could not suddenly “overreach” to cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the
other grounds for impeachment.
5. The Sandiganbayan
28 Carpio-Morales vs. CA ▪ The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense.
▪ The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on
May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as
shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of
the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides
that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph
(a) of the said two provisions states:
“Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A.”
▪ The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses,
the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions.
▪ A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their
office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation
to the public official or employee’s office.
29 Rodriguez vs. Sandiganbayan ▪ Where the accused public officials are charged not for violation of P.D.705 (Revised Forestry Code) but of P.D. 1829, their
argument that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office in order to take the case out of the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, does not lie.
▪ For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether the accused mayor, who
holds a position of “Grade27” under the Local Government Code of 1991, committed the offense charged in relation to her
office.
▪ While public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under Sec. 1(b) of P.D.1829, the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to have been committed by accused official in the instant
case are such, however, that the offense may not have been committed had said accused not held the office of mayor.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. General Principles
B. Administrative Agencies
1) Definition 2) Creation 3) Kinds
C. Powers of Administrative Agencies
1) Quasi-Legislative (Rule-Making) Power
a) Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations b) Requisites for Validity
1 Republic vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, ▪ Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which delegates
Inc. these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must
involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement
of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.
▪ An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. Legislative
rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.
Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the
administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being administered and purport
to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or
party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said rules. Finally,
contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon
which the enforcement of the law depends.
▪ When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
2 Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. ▪ Power granted to the education department to regulate the educational system of the country includes the power to
Secretary of Education, Culture and prescribe school fees; Authority to fix school fees considered lodged with the Department of Education.
Sports ▪ The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it
were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process.
As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and
hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where
the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is
quasi-judicial in character.
▪ Absence of showing of clear and convincing evidence of arbitrariness by DECS in issuing the department order; The Task
Force report created by the DECS as the basis for its decision to allow an increase in tuition fees was made judiciously.
▪ Presumption that official duty has been regularly performed; Burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of
official proceedings which was not successfully disputed.
3 Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. ▪ Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.
vs. Board of Transportation ▪ Municipal corporations allowed with discretion in determining the rates of improbable license fees including police power
measures.
4 Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. ▪ Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
vs. Defensor powers.
▪ Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
▪ The principle of exhaustion of administrative agencies applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned
was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.
▪ Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
▪ The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative
agencies, and in case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe
for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
▪ In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due
process requirement is deemed complied with.
5 Public Schools District Supervisors ▪ The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what
Association (PSDSA) vs. De Jesus is provided for in the legislative enactment; The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.
▪ Administrative supervision means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.
6 Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission ▪ Administrative regulations cannot amend an act of Congress.
7 People vs. Maceren ▪ Fishery Adm. Order No. 84 penalizing electro fishing is null and void because the Fishery Laws under which it was issued
(Act 4003 and R.A. 3512) did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
▪ Lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare what act constitute a criminal offense.
▪ An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not amend an act of the legislature.
▪ In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls within the scope of the
authority conferred by law.
8 Republic vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum ▪ The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of National Administrative Register (ONAR) were put in place as
Corporation safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.
▪ Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified
of the existence of the implementing rules concerned.
2) Quasi-Judicial (Adjudicatory) Power
a) Administrative Due Process b) Administrative Appeal and Review c) Administrative Res Judicata
9 Vivo vs. Philippine Amusement and ▪ The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
10 Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas ▪ A person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.
▪ Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations and hearings.
11 Magcamit vs. Internal Affairs Service- ▪ As a rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings in order “to assist the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.”
▪ For as long as the parties were given fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the
demands of due process were sufficiently met.
12 Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. National ▪ Every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations
Telecommunications Commission promulgated by the agency, of the objective standards that have to be met, a rule integral to due process, as it protects
substantive rights.
▪ While the Court usually accords great respect to the technical findings of administrative agencies in the fields of their
expertise, even if they are infelicitously worded, such rule finds no application where the “finding” is nothing more than
bare assertions, unsupported by substantial evidence.
▪ Judicial fact-finding of the de novo kind is generally abhorred and the shift of decisional responsibility to the judiciary is
not favored as against the substantiated and specialized determination of administrative agencies.
▪ Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must
be respected even in administrative proceedings.
▪ It is essential to emphasize the need for a hearing before a fine may be imposed, as it is clearly a punitive measure
undertaken by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
13 Pascual, Jr. vs. Board of Medical ▪ Rights against self-incrimination; Applies to administrative proceedings.
Examiners ▪ In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, x x x the x x x Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent.
▪ The right against self-incrimination extends not only to the right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on
the witness stand, but also to forego testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called as a
witness by the prosecution.
▪ The reason is that, the right against self-incrimination, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
D. Judicial Recourse and Review

1. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction 2. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 3. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action
14 Peñafrancia Shipping Corporation vs. ▪ The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of the President (OP) to review any
168 Shipping Lines, Inc. determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an administrative decision to
first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for
review.
▪ The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the
administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are
both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and
more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and
provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts — for reasons of law, comity, and convenience
— will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
▪ Under Section 38, Chapter VII, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, there are three kinds of administrative
relationship: (1) supervision and control; (2) administrative supervision; and (3) attachment. Among the three, the
relationship of supervision and control between a department and a subordinate agency is the most stringent since the
department has the power to review the decisions of the subordinate agency. This power is not available in administrative
supervision as Section 38 expressly states that the department shall have no power to review the decisions of regulatory
agencies in the exercise of their regulatory or quasi-judicial functions. As to the relationship of attachment, while the law is
silent on the presence or absence of such power to review by the department, Section 38(3) would indicate that the
Legislature did not intend that the decisions of an attached agency be subject to review by the department prior to
appealing before the proper court. Section 38(3) indicates the most lenient kind of administrative relationship since the
lateral relationship is limited to policy and program coordination.
▪ Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the
President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.
15 Catipon, Jr. vs. Japson ▪ The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charters.
▪ The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
▪ The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
16 National Irrigation Administration vs. ▪ COA, as one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority and
Enciso duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property owned or held in trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. To ensure
the effective discharge of its functions, COA has been empowered, subject to the limitations imposed by Article IX(D) of the
1987 Constitution, to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government
funds and properties.
▪ Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of long standing and courts have clear guidelines on the matter. This
Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
▪ This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is
no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative
one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel
on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7)
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
17 Association of Philippine Coconut ▪ Only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject
Desiccators vs. Philippine Coconut to the exhaustion doctrine.
Authority ▪ It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle a policy made by the legislative department.
18 Star Special Corporate Security ▪ Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision, once final, can no longer be altered.
Management, Inc. vs. Commission On ▪ Under the doctrine of finality [or] immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
Audit unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
▪ The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the
court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.
19 COA vs. Ferrer ▪ COA has primary jurisdiction over issues involving disallowances.
▪ The principle of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. Courts cannot or
will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by that administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound discretion
requiring its special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The objective
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in
the proceeding before the court.
▪ The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law. The matter of allowing
or disallowing the requests for payment is within the primary power of COA to decide.
▪ Verily, the Constitution and law bestow primary jurisdiction on the examination and audit of government accounts to the
COA. As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has the power to define the scope of its audit
and examination, and to establish the techniques and methods required therefor. It also has the power to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
ELECTION LAW
A. Suffrage
1. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Voters 2. Registration and Deactivation of Voters 3. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings 4. Local and Overseas Absentee Voting 5.
Detainee Voting
1 Makalintal vs. COMELEC ▪ Members to the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin.
▪ he execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act; The affidavit is not only proof of the intention of
the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves
as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
▪ Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that
they have not applied for citizenship in another country.
▪ Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his
right of suffrage.
▪ Court does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
▪ The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire
nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
2 Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on ▪ Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.
Elections ▪ One must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen;
second, he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and
in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
▪ Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice,
photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.
▪ RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines “registration” as “the act of accomplishing and filing of a
sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he
resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB].”
▪ 3 and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves for
biometrics validation.
▪ The consequence of noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the registration record of the
registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation process as
required by [Republic Act (RA) No. 10367].”
3 Velasco vs. Commission on Elections ▪ Court will not interfere with a COMELEC decision unless the latter is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion;
Meaning of grave abuse of discretion.
▪ Any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the Certificate of Candidacy’s (COC’s) cancellation or the
withholding of due course.
▪ The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous
mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot
run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate’s qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and
residence. The candidate’s status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by
law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she
wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he is running.
▪ A false representation must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s
qualifications for public office.
▪ By law, the right of dual citizens who vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials, specifically:
the president, the vice-president, the senators and party-list representatives.
▪ A Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.
▪ If the disqualification or Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cancellation/denial case is not resolved before election day, the
proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner.
▪ Certificate of Candidacy (COC) defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail
of the benefit of our ruling that Certificate of Candidacy (COC) mandatory requirements before elections are considered
merely directory after the people shall have spoken.
B. Candidacy
1. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Candidates
1 Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections ▪ The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material
fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
▪ If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public
office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
▪ A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
▪ The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of “deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office.”
▪ The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction
becomes final; Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality
of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.
▪ A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
▪ Decisions of the Supreme Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is
disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was
valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
2 Villaber vs. Commission on Elections ▪ As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.”In In re Vinzon, theterm“moral turpitude” is considered as encompassing “everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”
▪ Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to
determine; The determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
3 Labao, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections ▪ A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.
▪ The grounds to file a petition for disqualification are provided for in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC).
4 Fernandez vs. HRET ▪ A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
and cannot be considered forum shopping even if the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives
while the latter was still a candidate.
▪ The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven days a week, in order to fulfill the
residency requirement.
▪ There is nothing in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning property and exercising
their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the address they had indicated as their place of residence in
their Certificate of Candidacy.
▪ The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run
but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day—to use ownership of property in the district
as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement, and the Supreme Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement
to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
▪ It is the burden of the petitioner in a quo warranto case to first prove the very fact of disqualification before the candidate
should even be called upon to defend himself with countervailing evidence.
5 Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections ▪ While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.
▪ The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.
▪ While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
▪ When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
▪ When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in
rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
▪ Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
▪ he disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when
he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code; The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.
6 Arnado vs. Commission on Elections ▪ Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification
should be filed “any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy (CoCs) but not later than the date of
proclamation.”
▪ Under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It
is not mandatory.
▪ Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999), it was clarified that the phrase “dual citizenship” in
said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the
law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their
CoC.
▪ Arnado’s use of his United States (US) passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification
to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.
7 Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on ▪ The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
Elections thereof of the candidate.
▪ As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that
the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.”
▪ If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification “provided by
law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy (CoC) be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of
false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
▪ The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
▪ That a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%) chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.
▪ As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
▪ Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’ determination.
▪ It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy (CoC) which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.
▪ The candidate’s misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility
and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
8 Diambrang vs. Commission on Elections ▪ The second placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to
situations where the certificate of candidacy (CoC) of the first placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to
be cancelled because of a violation of law that took effect, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the CoC.
▪ The prevailing ruling is that if the certificate of candidacy (CoC) is void ab initio, the candidate is not considered a
candidate from the very beginning even if his CoC was cancelled after the elections.
9 Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections ▪ The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of
the OEC, which states: SEC. 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
▪ The present rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses in the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), which requires preliminary investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386.
▪ The “exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of
the election laws” stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification
case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. While its criminal
aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to
ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that
is summary in character.
▪ Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient; The electoral aspect of a disqualification case is done
through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character.
▪ The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may properly take and act on the advertising contracts without further proof
from the parties herein.
▪ Republic Act (RA) No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be
broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall
be submitted to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by
the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the political party.

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PoliRev Case Doctrines

I. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

B. Modes of Acquiring Title to Public Office

D. Eligibility and Qualification Requirements

E. Disabilities and Inhibitions of Public Officers

F. Powers and Duties of Public Officers

G. Rights of Public Offices

H. Liabilities of Public Officers

I. Immunity of Public Officers

J. Distinguish De Facto and De Jure Officers

K. Termination of Official Relation

L. The Civil Service

M. Accountability of Public Office

4. The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor

D. Judicial Recourse and Review

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