Atex Applye
Atex Applye
Atex Applye
End of transition period for ATEX Directive 94/9/EC - Draft
Application of the Questions and Answers
Directive:
Commission Guidance to ATEX Directive Table 2, Footnote (a)
Application of ATEX Directive 94/9/EC to assemblies
Place of installation in, out, beside
Interface to potentially explosive atmospheres
"Simple" Valves
Application of the
Directive to specific "Simple Apparatus"
equipment:
Filter Units
Gas Turbines
Paint Spray Booths
Plastic Containers and Tanks
Petrol Pumps
Combination Pump/Electric Motor
Vehicles intended for the transportation of Dangerous Goods
Internal monitoring or other devices attached to or inside a vehicle
such as a Petrol Tanker
Inerting Systems
Cables
Machinery containing an explosive atmosphere
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Rotating Mechanical Seals
Safe Openings
Application of theEquipment intended for use in domestic environments where
Directive in specificleakages of gases, mists etc. are not fuel gas
situations:
Marking and Notified Bodies and Type Examination Certificates
Conformity
Assessment EC Declaration of Conformity
Procedures:
Notified Bodies and Retention of documentation
Retention of Documentation - Quality Assurance
Marking of Components
Different categories within one product, or mixes of equipment and
protective systems
Certificates and CE marking without the name of the original
manufacturer
Atmospheres (ATEX)
At the ATEX Standing Committee held on 29 June 2001 the European Commission made it
absolutely clear that there will be no extension to the transition period over that already
prescribed. As stated, all products falling within scope of Directive 94/9/EC ("the ATEX
Directive") will have to comply from the 1 July 2003.
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It was considered by a number of Member States that further guidance might be required for
those manufacturing spare parts held in stock purchased during the transitional period for use
after this period ends.
On the basis of a number of questions presented, the following interpretations were discussed
by the Committee.
The European Commission has issued guidance, ("the Blue Guide") on the interpretation of
new approach Directives, of which the ATEX Directive is one. This may be helpful in
interpreting the ATEX Directive, although definitive interpretation is for a court, ultimately the
European Court of Justice. The Blue Guide formed the basis for the Standing Committee's
discussions on this issue.
Q1 - What is meant by "Ready for Use", as used in the Blue Guide? The Blue Guide
states that certain products that can be put into service after the end of the transitional
period if ready for use at the time they are placed on the market. However most spare
parts will require some work to install them. (ref. The Blue Guide, p.20)
Each spare part must be considered in its own circumstances and it is difficult to generalize
out of context. However, for spare parts which are not equipment, a protective system, a
component or a device according to Article 1 of the ATEX Directive the answer is provided for
at Chapter 7 of the Commission's Guidance notes to the Directive, the ATEX Guidelines,
2001 Edition. Spare parts that are not equipment, protective systems, components or devices,
as defined in the ATEX Directive, are not subject to the ATEX Directive. Therefore, there is
nothing in the ATEX Directive to prevent them from being placed on the market any time after
the end of the transitional period.
Spare parts which are equipment, a protective system, a component or a device according to
Article 1 of the ATEX Directive will have to comply with the ATEX Directive when placed on
the market after the end of the transitional period.
Generally, repaired products, which are within the scope of the ATEX Directive, need not be
assessed against the requirements of the ATEX Directive after repair, as a repair does not
substantially modify the product.
The Standing Committee considered that, although each case must be assessed on it own
merits, in general terms "Ready for use" means the ability to be incorporated or installed
without a change to the performance or safety characteristics as originally anticipated by the
manufacturer.
Q2 - Can there be some relaxation on the use of safe but non-compliant spares that
may be held by end-users for use during the foreseeable life of the equipment/
assembly?
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In general, equipment, protective systems, components and safety devices, as defined in
Article 1of the ATEX Directive which are spare parts and which are held by the end-user are
likely to have been have been placed on the market already.
If the above spare parts were placed on the market prior to the end of the transition period
and they were ready for use at that time then, according to the Blue Guide, they can be first
used after the end of the transition period. Whether a product is ready for use must be
assessed on a case by case basis and any subsequent alteration of the product would have
to be taken into account in considering whether it was ready for use when placed on the
market.
However, there may be spare parts falling within the scope of the ATEX Directive, which may
be held by an end-user that may not have already been placed on the market. This is the
case for equipment, protective systems or devices that are manufactured by the user for own
use. In these circumstances the spare part will need to comply with the requirements of the
ATEX Directive when it is first put into service.
Q3 - Can the installing of a spare part allow the freedom to ensure the overall
continuing integrity of the system by using non-compliant parts subject only to the
requirement to provide a satisfactory risk assessment under the relevant "Use"
Directive?
The consequences of installing each spare part must be assessed individually. However, in
general, equipment, protective systems, components or devices, as defined in the ATEX
Directive, which are intended to be integrated into an installation will inevitably be placed on
the market and/or put into service and consequently will have to comply with the requirements
of the ATEX Directive at that time.
Q4 - After the end of the transitional period, will manufacturers be able to sell non-
compliant stock to the owners of relevant installations, which are not in scope of the
ATEX Directive? This would mean that these installations would only be subject to the
relevant "Use" Directive (92/91/EEC, 92/104/EC or 1999/92/EC), requiring only an overall
risk assessment?
See answer to Q3 above. If this stock represents equipment, protective systems, components
or devices as defined in the ATEX Directive it must comply with the requirements of the ATEX
Directive when placed on the market.
In respect of the second question installations are not covered by the ATEX Directive but are
covered by the relevant "Use" Directive.
Q5.1 - Distributors are those in the distribution chain who are neither manufacturers
nor end-users. At the end of June 2003 they may be holding stock which has been
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"placed on the market" but is not in the hands of end-users. This equipment may
already meet national health and safety requirements applicable at the relevant date.
However, such stock would already have been placed on the market before end of the
transitional period and would have complied with the relevant national health and safety
provisions at that time, therefore such stock did not need to comply with the requirements of
the ATEX Directive at that time. As regards putting into service the following approach could
be considered:
- For spare parts see A2;
- In other cases (e.g. where the safety characteristics are altered through the nature of the
installation) the obligation for compliance with the requirements of the ATEX Directive is
unavoidable.
Q5.2 - Distributors who are part of the commercial chain of the manufacturer
It is clear from 5.1 that, on a case-by-case basis, equipment sold down the distribution chain
may be considered to be placed on the market. However, there are cases when the
distribution chain is part of the commercial chain of the manufacturer rather than a separate
organisation. Footnote 31 of the Commission's "Guide to the New and Global Approach"
recognises this situation and makes it clear that equipment moving down this type of
distribution chain could also be considered as having been placed on the market. However,
market surveillance authorities would need to ensure that a "transaction" had taken place
even if the equipment was not as such "sold".
This evidently needs to be considered by the market surveillance authorities of the Member
States on a case-by-case basis. In effect, there is a general burden of proof on the
manufacturer to show that the equipment has been given to the authorised representative
distributor with the real intention of distribution and use rather than a mechanism of treatment
of stocks.
Q6 - Who will become responsible for the purpose of the assessment of remaining
stock against the requirements of the ATEX Directive after 1 July 2003, the distributor
or the end-user?
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Q7 - Products manufactured for "Own Use" are subject to the ATEX Directive, but will
they be required to CE mark them and hold a signed DOC, in addition to the technical
construction file?
Generally, though each case must be examined individually, persons manufacturing for own
use will be putting the equipment, protective systems or devices into service and will be
subject to those requirements of the ATEX Directive, which are placed on any other
manufacturer.
First, it is clear that the vast majority of cases can be looked at with reference to the
guidance provided at 3.7.1 of the Commission guidance notes.
The only area which requires further clarification is the obligation of the assembler where
ATEX CE compliant products (such as equipment and autonomous protective systems)
are being used, as in all other cases the relevant conformity assessment procedure
needs to be applied to the whole of the assembly.
In such cases it is clear that the assembler needs to undertake an ignition risk
assessment to ensure that the nature of the incorporation and assembly has not altered
the explosion characteristics of the products with respect to the Essential Health and
Safety Requirements.
It has been agreed by member States that in such cases, if the assembler is in any way
uncertain as to how to undertake such an assessment, technical advice should be
sought and taken into account! This might be the case, for example, if a
manufacturer of mechanical equipment needs to connect different pieces of ATEX
electrical equipment together as part of the assembly.
Once the assembler has successfully undertaken such an assessment and no additional
ignition risk has been identified, the general agreement is that they then draw up a
technical file, affix to the assembly, according to Annex II 1.0.5 of the Directive, the CE
marking and Ex marking indicating intended use, sign the EC Declaration of Conformity
covering the whole of the assembly indicating the technical specifications/ standards that
have been applied (for example, for electrical inter-connection) and provide instructions
for safe use. The assembler therefore takes complete responsibility for the assembly.
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Manufacturers of explosion protected equipment (e.g. in cases where
explosive atmospheres are conveyed) sometimes feel unsure whether and to
what extent their products are covered by Directive 94/9/EC. This applies
especially to cases where only parts of the equipment are in contact with the
explosive atmosphere.
The Directive 94/9/EC deals with the special risk of explosion and has one
major aim to prevent "own potential sources of ignition" (Art. 1 (3)a) of
equipment and protective systems (as far as an own potential source of
ignition exists) from becoming active. Beside Art. 1 (4) no restrictions are
made with regard to local and technical conditions.
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This paper seeks to provide guidance on the application of ATEX Directive
94/9/EC to equipment(1) intended to operate with interfaces to different
potentially explosive atmospheres.
For example, the inside or process side of a pump for flammable liquid which
normally runs full but occasionally contains an explosive atmosphere may be
considered Zone 1(3) if no other measures have been taken to prevent the
pump running dry. If it has been decided that the surroundings or external
explosive atmosphere is Zone 2 then the pump must be categorised as
Category 2 inside and Category 3 outside to meet the Essential Health and
Safety Requirements.
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The category assigned to a piece of equipment intended to contain a
potentially explosive atmosphere not connected to the outside of that
equipment is determined by the ignition risk associated with the outside parts
of the equipment, not by its internal atmosphere i.e. only the part of the
equipment which is intended to come into contact with a Zone is relevant for
the assignment of the appropriate category.
Similarly Directive 94/9/EC does not require that the pressure resistance of a
vessel or container protected against the effects of an explosion by an
autonomous protective system be tested, if it has been demonstrated that the
APS successfully detects and suppresses an explosion and if the vessel can
withstand the residual pressure peak of the suppressed explosion.
Example
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NOTE: The following is one of many examples that can be used to illustrate
the above points. The assumptions made in this example should not be taken
as the only possible situation. The categorisation of a particular piece of
equipment will depend on the specific ignition hazard assessment that is
made of the equipment and its intended use together with any ignition
protection measures applied. The example only considers the inside and
connecting explosive atmospheres, i.e. the process side. A separate ignition
hazard assessment and categorisation must be made of the outside if the
equipment is to be used in potentially explosive atmosphere.
The ignition hazard assessment carried out by the manufacturer has identified
that in this case:
- there is no ignition source inside the mill which can become effective in
normal operation(5);
- there is an ignition source inside the mill which can become effective during
expected malfunctions.
The highest category that can be assigned to the mill is therefore Category 3
when it is placed on the market as shown. The outlet from the mill in this case
produces fine dust in the form of a potentially explosive dust cloud which is
continuously present in normal operation, i.e. Zone 20. The manufacturer's
instructions must therefore make clear that the mill can only be used with
additional explosion prevention or protection measures.
Analysis:
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Equipment
- intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres;
- and/or for the processing of material;
- capable of causing an explosion through their own potential sources of
ignition.
According to the risk assessment the grinding installation should fulfil the
requirements for category 1, but in the best case it will meet category 3.
Despite all construction measures to prevent ignition sources, the occurrence
of dust explosions can not be excluded definitely. Therefore, connections
must be equipped with construction measures, which reduce the effect of a
dust explosion for people and goods to below a dangerous level.
These measures are essential for the grinding system to fulfil the
requirements of Directive 94/9/EC.
Consequently
- all requirements on the construction of the grinding assembly
(e.g. suitable selection of material and bearings, minimum distances between
rotating and fixed parts)
on certain equipment of the mill
(e.g. foreign particles separator, overload protection, temperature detector at
the bearings)
and
- all construction measures of the mill
(explosion pressure resistant design for the maximum explosion pressure, or
explosion pressure resistant design for the reduced explosion pressure in
combination with explosion pressure relief or explosion suppression, and in
most cases additional explosion decoupling for connected installations)
are necessary to make the grinding operation safe.
Answer:
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to make grinding operations of mills safe for combustible materials of the food
and fodder industry. In principle the certificate(s) should explain all aspects of
the Notified Body’s assessment and the scope of the certificate(s).
(1) Equipment here is taken to mean all products within scope of Directive 94/9/EC.
(2) The category classification is performed by the person responsible for making the EC Declaration of
Conformity according to directive 94/9/EC. The ignition risk assessment is referred to as the ignition
hazard assessment in EN 13463-1.
(3) “Zoning” is not a concept to be found in Directive 94/9/EC but in Directive 1999/92/EC dealing with
employer’s obligations with respect to employees operating in hazardous atmospheres. It is not the
responsibility of the manufacturer to “zone” but evidently this it is helpful to give an example of the area
of intended use.
(4) Additional measures to cover expected malfunctions may provide Category 2; if two faults or one
rare fault are dealt with, Category 1 can be reached.
(5) It is clear that for some milling technologies an ignition source may be unavoidable.
At the ATEX Standing Committee held on the 4th December 2003 the above
subject was discussed. The following is a result of that discussion.
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This paper will deal with valves for which the only ignition source originates
from a static charge build-up arising from the throughput of the media
concerned, therefore requiring earthing (e.g. no springs, special bonding etc.).
It was judged that an analogy for such "simple" valves could be made with
pipes, with no own source of ignition intended for use in potentially explosive
atmospheres where earthing is also required. Given that it is clear that the
latter is outside of the scope of ATEX Directive 94/9/EC it was accepted by
the majority of members that such valves do not fall within scope.
This does not preclude the need for types of protection to avoid an effective
ignition source given that these "simple" valves are intended for use in
hazardous environments, and will therefore have to be safe for use as
determined by the employer's risk assessment under the relevant "use"
Directive.
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee held on the 6th & 7th February
2003. The following is as a result of that discussion.
"Simple Apparatus" is a term defined in the European harmonised standards for electrical
equipment intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres EN 50014 and EN 50020.
There is no such definition for simple non-electrical equipment.
Such apparatus are excluded from the Directive, as they have no own source of ignition.
Therefore, they do not have to meet the relevant Essential Health and Safety Requirements
or be subject to the conformity assessment procedures under Directive 94/9/EC.
This equipment shall not be marked in conformity with the ATEX directive.
The identification of such equipment is part of the manufacturer's ignition risk assessment.
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee held on the 6th & 7th February
2003. The following is as a result of that discussion and further comments received.
Most filters will have an explosive dust cloud inside at some point during normal operation.
The inside may be designated zone 20 or 21, depending on the operating conditions. Many
filters are located in the open air, or in a room in a building which does not need to be
classified as hazardous. The description below of different cases assumes that filters
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themselves will not be a source of dust release that would make it necessary to zone the
surrounding area.
This description also considers that many apparatuses with filters inside are fitted with
explosion protection devices, such as vent panels, doors or suppression equipment.
1) The filter has no moving parts or electrical equipment on the inside, and is located in
a non hazardous area.
2) The filter has moving parts inside, that can be considered as mechanical equipment,
such as a bag shaking mechanism, or a screw feeder to remove collected dust. The
whole filter is located in a non-hazardous area.
3) The complete filter has electrical equipment inside, such as a pressure switch, or
level switch on the container that collects the dust.
4) The complete apparatus with the filter is fitted by the manufacturer with explosion
vent panels or doors, supplied by another manufacturer.
5) The complete apparatus with the filter is fitted with explosion vent panels or doors
produced and integrated into the filter by the filter manufacturer themselves.
6) A - normally small - apparatus with only a filter sock, plastic collection bag and fan,
but no metal enclosure.
7) An apparatus with a filter is intended to be installed in an area that the user has
classified as zone 22.
1) The filter has no moving parts or electrical equipment on the inside, and is located in
a non hazardous area.
Conclusion:
Electrostatic hazards may exist from insulating surfaces inside the filter, or from the filter
elements. This risk depends for example on the properties of the dust being collected, and
other operating conditions. But any electrostatic risks are not considered as giving the filter its
own potential source of ignition, so these filters do not fulfil the definition of equipment in
Article 1(3)a.
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Remark: This filters even do not fulfil the other criteria of the definition.
The electrostatic risks can be covered by other directives, for example the machinery directive
when the filter is part of a machine. In this case the manufacturer of the machine is
responsible to avoid this risk according to the regulations of the machinery directive. In all
cases these risks must be controlled by the user under directive 1999/92.
2) The filter has moving parts inside, that can be considered as mechanical equipment,
such as a bag shaking mechanism, or a screw feeder to remove collected dust. The
whole filter is located in a non-hazardous area.
Conclusion:
The manufacturer must assess whether the moving parts create its own potential source of
ignition. If the moving parts do not create any potential source of ignition, perhaps because
they have low power, or move very slowly, the situation is the same as case 1, and the filter is
not in scope of the Directive.
Remark: Low power in this sense is not given, when for example the power source is strong
and only the power inside the equipment is reduced by protection methods in order to avoid
an ignition risk. There is a similar situation in case of the electrical type of protection the
"intrinsic safety".
If the mechanical equipment on the inside does create an ignition risk, this equipment must
comply with the directive 94/9/EC.
When the filter is classified as zone 20 inside and protected from an explosion by vents, doors
or suppression equipment, according to Annex I conformity of the mechanical equipment to
category 1 should be reached. But this will in respect of the state of the art not always be
possible. In this cases according to
- annex II A technological knowledge must be taken into account
and
- annex II 1.0.1 the principles of integrated explosion safety must be applied.
That means when it is not possible to prevent the ignition source sufficiently - according to the
"state of the art" - to reach category 1, category 2 can be sufficient when the manufacturer
takes additionally measures "to halt it immediately and/or to limit the range of explosion
flames and explosion pressures to a sufficient level of safety" (see annex II 1.0.1 indent 3). It
is in the responsibility of the manufacturer to take this decision.
The explosion vent can be seen as one means of protection as described under annex II
2.1.2.1.
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3) The complete filter has electrical equipment inside, such as a pressure switch, or
level switch on the container that collects the dust.
Conclusion:
This electrical equipment is equipment in the sense of Article 1.1 of the directive 94/9/EC and
therefore must comply with this directive.
4) The complete apparatus with the filter is fitted by the manufacturer with explosion
vent panels or doors, supplied by another manufacturer.
Conclusion:
These panels or doors are 'protective systems' in the sense of the directive 94/9/EC and the
manufacturer of these systems has to apply the directive when placing this as an autonomous
system on the market. That means the procedure set out in article 8.2 has to be applied and
they must be CE and Ex marked. Selecting the correct panel or door (for example: size,
quality, function) depends on the application and has to be done by the manufacturer of the
apparatus.
5) The complete apparatus with the filter is fitted with explosion vent panels or doors
produced and integrated into the filter by the filter manufacturer themselves.
Conclusion:
Case a)
These are not autonomous protective systems according to article 1.3 b because they are
placed on the marked as a part of an equipment in the sense of article 1(1) and not
separately. and Therefore article 8.2 has not to be applied. The protective system alone
complete filter is not in the scope of the directive but the whole equipment. That means the
conformity procedure of the equipment includes the protective system.
Case b)
These are autonomous protective systems according to article 1.3 b because they are
separately placed on the marked in the sense of the directive and therefore article 8.2 has to
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be applied. That is because they are not placed on the market as a part of an equipment in
the sense of article 1(1).
However, if the manufacturer sells complete replacement vent panels or doors as spare parts,
these are autonomous protective systems, separately placed on the market and then he must
apply the directive 94/9/EC. That means they must for example be tested, CE and Ex marked
in the same way as complete panels or doors separately placed on the market from other
manufacturers.
In case 4 or 5, the manufacturer in any case carries responsibility for ensuring that the body
of the filter will not fail in the event of an explosion, even though it is not covered by specific
EU legislation. Users should ask the manufacturers how they can be sure that the filter
complies with the safety requirements of the Work Equipment Directive 89/655/EC amended
by 95/63/EC and 2001/45/EC; especially annex I, 2.7.
6) A - normally small - apparatus with only a filter sock, plastic collection bag and fan,
but no metal enclosure.
Conclusion:
If during the intended use a dangerous explosion pressures can not be formed in such a small
apparatus when a dust cloud inside the filter is ignited, the inside is not to be classified as a
hazardous area and these apparatus is not in the scope of the directive 94/9/EC.
This is the case with some filters used for collecting wood dust and wood-waste.
7) An apparatus with a filter is intended to be installed in an area that the user has
classified as zone 22.
Conclusion:
In respect of the complete apparatus the directive 94/9/EC is only relevant for the
manufacturer, if it is equipment in the sense of this directive. To find out if the whole
apparatus is such an equipment, the manufacturer of this apparatus for example must
examine if it creates any possible sources of ignition, which can ignite an explosive
atmosphere on the outside. When this can happen, he has to apply the directive 94/9/EC.
The apparatus may in this case only be installed in zone 22, when the manufacturer of the
apparatus declares it being conform to category 3.
Remark: Equipment of this type may be needed if there are for example sources of dust
release from other equipment nearby.
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On the basis of a proposal arising from a meeting held with interested parties the above
subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee held on the 8 December 2000. The
objective of the discussion was to provide clarification regarding the application of both ATEX
Directives - those related to the design and manufacture of such equipment and the health
and safety of workers potentially at risk of explosive atmospheres - to gas turbines.
- After 30 June 2003, gas turbines will need to comply as appropriate with the requirements of
both ATEX Directives 94/9/EC and 1999/92/EC.
- Gas Turbine fuel supplies are likely to give rise to zoned areas in the vicinity of the turbine.
In normal cases, Zone 2 areas would be expected to arise from gaseous fuels, but lubricating
oils and liquid fuels may also be considered as potential sources of such hazards. Equipment
in category 3 of equipment-group II would be required in such areas.
- In normal circumstances, a gas turbine will have hot surfaces, which may be above the auto
ignition temperature of the fluids used. The size, shape, orientation and roughness of such
surfaces may reduce auto ignition temperature significantly, whilst operation under fault
conditions may increase surface temperatures. Relevant fluids include gaseous and liquid
fuels, and lubricating oils.
- Although manufacturers must, to the state of the art, eliminate or control sources of ignition,
it is not usually technically possible to reduce the temperature of these hot surfaces to comply
with the Essential Health and Safety Requirements of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC(1).
Given the above, the obligations of the manufacturer and user of such equipment need to be
considered.
Gas turbines on their own are not normally placed on the market as a single functional unit
but are generally incorporated into other equipment by professional workers before they can
function, and will only function as intended once they are properly installed.
A number of alternatives e.g. dilution ventilation, explosion relief, explosion suppression, are
available for selection as a basis for safety. Dilution ventilation is the normal and preferred
basis for safety for gaseous fuel explosion hazards. A gas turbine itself cannot normally be
considered to be equipment-group II. Only when installed within the constraints of a basis for
safety can it be regarded as compliant with relevant EHSRs and suitable for CE marking
under ATEX. The chosen basis of safety would need justification by risk assessment by the
end user under the ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC. The basis for safety for liquid fuels and the
associated explosion hazards from mist should be justified by risk assessment in the same
way.
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It is clear that the responsibility for compliance with all the relevant requirements of the ATEX
Directive 94/9/EC, and CE marking to indicate compliance, would normally rest with the final
assembler. As a consequence, the responsibility rests on the final supplier to ensure that an
appropriate level of information is provided to the installer and end user so that, in the first
instance, the equipment is safely installed and, in relation to the end user, safely operated
and maintained. In parallel, this information must ensure that a sound basis for safety is
available for incorporation into risk assessment by the end user in compliance with ATEX
Directive 1999/92/EC(2).
Interested parties should consider Chapter 3.7.1 of the Commission guidance on the ATEX
directive 94/9/EC, which provides further information on the relevant responsibilities.
EN 60079-10 states:
"The most important factor is that the degree or amount of ventilation is directly related to the
types of sources of release and their corresponding release rates…thus optimal ventilation
conditions in the hazardous area can be achieved and the higher the amount of ventilation in
respect of the possible release rates, the smaller will be the extent of the zones (hazardous
areas), in some cases reducing them to a negligible extent (non-hazardous area)".
It follows that dilution ventilation is the preferred option for gas turbines as it provides for the
possibility of ensuring a non-explosive atmosphere, eliminating direct hazards to personnel,
and whenever practicable is required for compliance with section 2.1 of Annex II of ATEX
Directive 1999/92/EC(3). It can prevent the formation of explosive atmospheres, in
compliance with the principle of integrated explosion safety, as given at section 1.0.1 of
Annex II to ATEX Directive 94/9/EC. This is achieved by reducing the size of any flammable
atmosphere to below that which would result in an explosion if ignited. In order that the
dilution ventilation ensures a negligible risk of an explosive atmosphere at all times, the
ventilation system should have safety features such as: a 100% standby fan; or an
uninterruptible power supply to the ventilation fans; interlocks so that the gas turbines cannot
start without sufficient ventilation; plus proven automatic isolation of fuel supply if ventilation
fails. As there is the potential for a flammable, but not explosive, volume of gas/air mixture to
arise near the turbine, proper consideration should be given to minimising the risk of ignition.
This may require the use of equipment-group II where appropriate within the overall
installation as a further ignition risk reduction measure.
(1) Annex II, EHSR 1.3.1 "Potential ignition sources such as …, high surface temperatures, ..must not
occur".
(2) The final supplier may be the turbine manufacturer, or an intermediary company, which supplies
packaged turbines.
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(3) Any escape and/or release, whether or not intentional, of flammable gases, vapours, mists or
combustible dusts which may give rise to explosion hazards must be suitably diverted or removed to a
safe place or, if that is not practicable, safely contained or rendered safe by some other method.
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion.
These products are an enclosed area, where an operator may work inside or
outside, and may be described as a ''simple box''. The ''box'', with no ignition
source and not intended for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere, does
not fall within the scope of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC.
In summary, paint spray booths, as an integral whole, do not fall under scope
of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC and as such cannot be affixed with the special
marking for explosion protection and other marking detailed at Annex II,
EHSR 1.0.5. of the Directive.
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion.
It was agreed that, as a general rule, such products did not fall under the
scope of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC.
However, it was considered that they might fall within the definition of
"component" as defined at Article 1 of the ATEX Directive:
Petrol pumps
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion:
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It was recalled that, whilst Categorisation of equipment was always the sole
responsibility of the manufacturer, the view of the majority of the Members of
the ATEX Standing Committee considered that, under normal circumstances,
petrol pumps may be suitably categorised as Category 2.
Given this, and the fact that the assembly is sufficiently complicated and
includes an electrical motor, the majority of the Members concluded that
Notified Body intervention with respect to the completed assembly was
required, in line with the conformity assessment procedures outlined in the
ATEX Directive 94/9/EC
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion.
1. For the purposes of Directive 94/9/EC, a pump and electric motor constitute
a "safety-related" device, i.e. the pump and electric motor cannot be
considered separately for the purposes of assessing explosion risks. In this
case, the unit as a whole is to be considered an item of electrical equipment.
2. The pump and electric motor may form part of the same functional unit, but
they do not constitute a "safety-related" unit for the purposes of explosion
protection, i.e. no new explosion risks arise as a result of their being
combined. They do not therefore constitute an item of equipment which, as an
integral whole, falls within the scope of Directive 94/9/EC, but rather a
combination of "individual items of equipment" in terms of explosion
protection. In this case, therefore, pump and electrical motor must be
considered separately in terms of the application of this Directive.
See Chapters 3.7.1 and 3.7.3 of the Commission's ATEX Guidance notes.
The above subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee held on 29 th June 2001.
This paper summarises that discussion and previous correspondence.
21
At Chapter 6 of the Commission's guidance notes to the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC it is clear
that the requirements of both Directives can, under the necessary intended working
environments, apply.
The criteria for application of Directive 94/9/EC are that the vehicle would need to:
- be defined as an equipment, a protective system or safety device according to Article 1(2) of
the Directive;
- have its own potential source of ignition;
- be intended for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere(2).
In order to determine under which intended conditions both Directives will apply the exclusion
at Article 1(4) of Directive 94/9/EC needs to be considered.
This exclusion explicitly determines that "means of transport" except those "intended for use
in a potentially explosive atmosphere shall not be excluded".
The definition of "means of transport" is given further detail at Article 2 of Directive 98/91/EC
and, in broad terms, is interpreted to be an activity on a public highway or space including
unloading and loading operations.
The ATEX Standing Committee therefore considered that, as described in the Commission
guidance, a vehicle under the scope of Directive 98/91/EC might also be covered by the
ATEX Directive 94/9/EC.
Where such a vehicle is intended for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere both
Directives will apply. However, this does not include where such environments are likely to
occur solely as a result of loading and unloading operations as described in 98/91/EC. An
example of this is a road tanker transporting petrol when the loading/unloading site is such
that it is not initially considered to have a potentially explosive atmosphere because of its
location with respect to the storage facility. As noted above, if this environment becomes
potentially explosive because of the loading/unloading operation, only the requirements of
Directive 98/91/EC need be applied.
In addition, it was agreed that the conformity assessment and technical requirements of
94/55/EC as further defined by 98/91/EC may not fully align with those required for
compliance to Directive 94/9/EC.
(2) Unless it is a safety device as defined under Article 1(2) of Directive 94/9/EC.
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1. The parallel application of directive 94/9/EC and regulations for the transport of dangerous
goods, as defined for example in the European Agreement Concerning the International
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) and the directives 94/55/EC, 98/91/EC and
70/156/EEC was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee held on 29th June 2001
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/atex/vehicles.htm).
2. Based on article 75 of the EC treaty and transposing the ADR, directive 94/55/EC fully
harmonises rules for the safe transport of dangerous goods by road.
3. Additionally, based on article 95 of the EC treaty, directive 98/91/EC provides for full
harmonisation regarding technical requirements for the following categories of vehicles
intended for the transport of dangerous goods by road as follows:
- Category N: Motor vehicles having at least four wheels when the maximum weight exceeds
3.75 metric tons, or having three wheels when the maximum weight exceeds 1 metric ton,
and used for the carriage of goods.
- Category O: Trailers (including semi-trailers).
According to article 4, if the requirements of the Annexes of this directive are fulfilled for the
completed vehicle, Member States may not refuse to grant EC type approval or to grant
national type approval, or prohibit the registration, sale or entry into service of those vehicles
on grounds relating to the transport of dangerous goods.
5. Provided that:
- Such vehicles are not intended for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere other than that
caused temporarily by loading or unloading.
- The goods, which shall be transported, are substances and articles as defined in Article 2 of
directive 94/55/EC.
- The exemptions of Annex A, paragraph 1.1.3, of directive 94/55/EC and the ADR agreement
are not pertinent.
Under these circumstances the exclusion at article 1(4) of directive 94/9/EC applies to the
WHOLE of the vehicle including ALL associated equipment necessary for the carriage of
dangerous goods (e.g. “breather valves” of manhole covers, vehicle tracking systems).
Note 1: At some sites tankers may have to access a zone (e.g. zone 1). In this case users
responsible for that site may demand the supplier to use tankers with ATEX compliant
products.
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Note 2: Even if the vehicle or parts of it are intended to be permanently used in a potentially
explosive atmosphere, devices like “breather valves” of manhole covers normally would not
fall within the scope of directive 94/9/EC. Normally these devices have no own ignition
source, are no safety devices in the sense of ATEX and are normally not provided with a
protective system, such as a flame arrester.
When looking for the application of the directive 94/9/EC to inerting systems one has to
consider three different cases:
Inerting systems are aimed at reducing or completely preventing the existence of an explosive
atmosphere in specific areas. Inerting systems are not, however, intended to stop or restrain
starting explosions. This is why they are not protective systems within the meaning of
Directive 94/9/EC. The tasks of inerting systems are different from those of explosion
suppression systems, which may sometimes have similar parts, but are aimed at restraining a
starting explosion.
Roughly speaking: Inerting systems used during operation of plants etc. are normally not
in scope of Directive 94/9/EC.
Example:
The intended effect of an inerting system applied to inert a tank can only be assessed after
knowing all operational parameters of the volume to be inerted. This assessment and the
functional aspects of such systems are not covered by directive 94/9/EEC but a duty to be
considered by the user and has to be laid down in the explosion protection document under
the scope of the Directive 1999/92/EC and its national transpositions.
An inerting system may, however, (in part) also consist of parts which are intended for use
within an explosive atmosphere and which have a potential ignition source of their own.
These parts come – individually or possibly combined – under the scope of Directive 94/9/EC
as "equipment". But also in this case their function of preventing an explosive atmosphere by
inerting is not to be assessed within the meaning of this Directive.
In some cases, such systems may be part of the ignition protection concept of "explosion
protected" equipment to fulfil the requirements of annex II of the directive 94/9/EC, i.e. if they
work as a means to protect potential ignition sources of the equipment from getting into
contact with an existing potentially explosive atmosphere. Then this equipment including its
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inerting system comes as part of the equipment under the scope of Directive 94/9/EC. This
inerting system is not a protective system according to article 1(1). In this case its parts may
be safety, controlling and regulating devices according to article 1(2) of Directive 94/9/EC
when separately placed on the market.
Example:
Where the manufacturer of equipment for use in potentially explosive atmosphere wants to
protect the ignition sources of this equipment, he may use the type of protection
"pressurization" according to EN 50016. This type of protection may include the use of inert
gases as protective gases. In this case the inerting system is part of the equipment and as
such within the scope of Directive 94/9/EC. The following case may occur in praxis:
Equipment according to article 1 of Directive 94/9/EC contains an enclosure or a vessel
containing sources of ignition. In order to prevent an explosive atmosphere from getting into
contact with the ignition sources, an inerting system, which has been assessed in accordance
with the 94/9/EC directive as a safety device, can be applied to this equipment.
25
described in “Interface to potentially explosive atmospheres” applies to the
following explanations.
The issue dealt with here concerns machinery having under operating
conditions a potentially explosive atmosphere inside, but having no interface
to external potentially explosive atmospheres. Such machines, as an integral
whole, do not fall under scope of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC.
26
zone concept as it is defined in Directive 1999/92/EC. Instead, the
manufacturer should:
• Carry out the risk assessment;
• Define the requirements of the equipment to be used inside the potentially
explosive atmosphere – and of safety and controlling devices outside, but
contributing to their safe functioning – in order to ensure full compliance of the
machinery with the requirements of the Machinery Directive;
• Purchase or produce the equipment having those requirements, i.e. intended
to be used under the conditions defined during the risk analysis, and in
conformity to Directive 94/9/EC.
ATEX-Component
DEFINITION:
MACHINERY ELEMENT:
Most mechanical seals are machinery elements. Typically these seals are:
• Catalogue mechanical seals and their parts, selected by the equipment
manufacturer alone or with assistance from the mechanical seal
manufacturer.
• mechanical seals stocked by the equipment manufacturer or end user for
27
general applications
• mechanical seals used for applications where the service conditions are not
closely specified
• non cartridge-seals and parts
• standard cartridge-seals.
ATEX COMPONENT:
RESPONSIBILITIES:
28
Machinery Element provides complete documentation for safe use of his
product i.e.:
instruction manual for incorporation into equipment, which shall include safety
aspects and limits of operation.
B) Equipment Manufacturer:
In all cases the equipment manufacturer is responsible for the entire package
within his scope of supply and therefore it will be required to comply with
article 8.1 of 94/9/EC ATEX Directive.
If equipment and protective systems are in a housing or a locked container forming part of the explosion
protection itself, it must be possible to open such housing or container only with a special tool or by
means of appropriate protection measures.
Even though there is now only “special fastenings”, the three historic levels of
"safe opening" are not precluded by the essential requirement 1.2.6 and it is
not the intention of directive 94/9/EC to require a level of safety higher than
that required by the third editions of EN 50014 series of standards for the
equivalent zone of risk.
Level 1, the use of "Special Tools" e.g. on fasteners with hexagonal socket
heads can still be used as specifically described by 1.2.6.
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Level 2, the use of fasteners which require some form of tool to open the door
e.g. a simple screwdriver, an adjustable spanner, or a key, are allowed in
1.2.6 where the additional "appropriate protection measure" would be the
presence of a warning label requiring the operator to "De-energise before
opening" or similar text.
Note: To qualify for Level 2 a "key" operated fastener (if used) should be used
in conjunction with a lock mechanism that automatically locks the door in the
closed position when the door is closed. The use of a lock which requires the
use of a key to lock it in the closed position is not allowed for Level 2 since the
operator may choose not to lock the door again when the door is closed and
the additional protection required is no longer provided.
Level 3, the use of a door fastener which would allow the operator to open the
door of the enclosure without the use of any tool i.e. with the "bare hands", is
also not prevented by 1.2.6. However because of the increased personal and
explosion risk additional measures have to be applied e.g. the use of an
electrical or mechanical interlock to de-energise automatically the interior of
the enclosure as well as the conspicuous presence of the warning label used
in Level 2 above.
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion:
The question was raised at the ATEX Standing Committee on 6-7th February
2003 as to whether this implicitly conveys the meaning that such equipment,
where the leakage is not fuel gas, are included in the scope of ATEX Directive
94/9/EC.
30
It was agreed that, as a general rule, such types of equipment are excluded
from the Directive as they are not intended for use in a potentially explosive
atmosphere.
At the ATEX Standing Committee held on 4th December 2003 the above subject was
discussed, in particular with respect to the responsibilities of a Notified Body and the
treatment of Type Examination Certificates issued.
It is issued to the manufacturer but remains the property of the Notified Body.
The question arises as to the actions that need to be taken by the Body when the "generally
acknowledged state of the art" has developed.
It is clear that the original specifications applied may continue to show fulfilment of the EHSRs
and the Type Examination Certificate then remains valid.
However, over time the "generally acknowledged state of the art" can develop substantively
such that the specifications originally applied no longer ensure the type examined complies
with the EHSRs. It should be noted that the question of whether there has been substantive
development of the state of the art is not left to discretionary interpretation by the Notified
31
Body, but has equally to be generally acknowledged. In such cases further action is required
as the Type Examination Certificate has become incorrect and the Notified Body must inform
the manufacturer that the Certificate is no longer valid.
It should be noted, however, that this action will have no retroactive effect and, therefore, will
not affect products placed on the market and/or put into service whilst the manufacturer was
in possession, where appropriate, of a valid Certificate.
It should also be re-affirmed that the overall responsibility for compliance of the product rests
with the manufacturer who, where required, must ensure that a valid Certificate is in his
possession. There are therefore parallel responsibilities for ensuring that validity is assured -
the manufacturer to have a valid Certificate (if relevant) and the Notified Body that the existing
Certificate is correct in its evaluation that the type continues to meet the EHSRs.
Readers of this Consideration Paper will need to be aware that this paper is to be discussed
with Member States in relation to ongoing work in response to the recent Council Resolution
on "Enhancing the Implementation of the New Approach Directives"(2).
(1) Cf. Annex III paragraph 1 to Directive 94/9/EC (ATEX); Annex II ("Modules for Conformity
Assessment") to Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993
EC Declaration of Conformity
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion.
32
At the ATEX Standing Committee held on 4th December 2003 the above
subject was discussed. The following is a result of that discussion.
Under Article 8.1 (b)(ii) of the ATEX Directive 94/9/EC the manufacturer is
required to undertake the conformity procedure at Annex VIII and then:
It was agreed that Bodies notified for this procedure should be so according to
Article 8.1 (b)(ii) and not to Annex VIII are this latter procedure does not
involve a Notified Body.
It was also clarified that this dossier is not returned to the manufacturer on
request (but may be added to), and that in general it is retained for a period of
ten years following the last placing of the product onto the market.
With respect to the media used, it was accepted that, to reduce "red tape",
this dossier may be in electronic format so long as it is legible and "readable"
over the period concerned.
This subject was discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee on the 6th & 7th
February 2003. The following is a summary of that discussion.
33
- audit reports and certificates of the ISO 9000 certifier. This will be one or two
audit reports per year that include the actual state at that moment of the
quality system with changes;
- audit reports and notifications of the notified body that issued the Production
Quality Assurance Notification.
Marking of components
For components having an own potential ignition source or which are clearly
correlated (with respect to the properties of the component) to equipment with
a given category, it has been considered that without the definition of group
and category, the necessary conformity procedure of the equipment, which
the component will be incorporated to, cannot be performed.
34
Therefore, the it is recommended to mark components, which can be
assessed with respect to a certain category and group of equipment,
indicating this category and group in the marking.
The Notified Body should inform the manufacturer about the possibilities of
separate conformity assessment procedures for each part of the assembly as
pointed out by the Guidelines to Directive 94/9/EC.
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Any certificate issued by the Notified Body should make clear which
aspects of the product have been assessed by the NB, and which have
been assessed by the manufacturer alone.
(a) The pump is sucking the petrol vapour-air mixture from the atmosphere
and is conveying it in pipe-work attributed to zone 0. Accordingly it is
connected at its inlet and outlet to a potentially explosive atmosphere
classified as zone 0.
The pump itself is placed in a one 1 environment.
With regard to the inlet and outlet connection the pump then has to comply
with the requirements for category 1 equipment. The corresponding EC-type
examination (equipment) has to be carried out by a Notified Body.
With regard to the remaining (outer) body and integrated parts of the pump
the Notified Body includes the necessary category 2 assessment into the
certification, even if there are only non-electrical ignition sources to be
considered.
Both categories shall be indicated in the EC-type examination certificate,
making however clear which aspects of the product have been assessed by
the NB, and which have been assessed by the manufacturer alone, and in the
marking.
For those category 2 parts of the pump, which show only non-electrical
ignition sources and which are placed separately on the market, and for which
the technical documentation has been communicated to a Notified Body, an
EC declaration of conformity (for equipment) or a written attestation of
conformity ( for components) of the manufacturer are sufficient.
(b) Often the pump is expected to prevent the passage of a deflagration flame
from the inlet to the outlet connection, as typical vapour recovery pumps
contain flame arresters in the inlet and outlet pipe. In this case the pump
simultaneously may qualify as protective system (in-line deflagration arrester).
A Notified Body – after having carried out a corresponding assessment of the
flame arresting capability – may then issue a separate EC-type examination
certificate for the pump as protective system.
In case that both aspects (equipment and protective system) have been
assessed by the same Notified Body, only one EC-type examination
certificate may be released.
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Case 1: Authorised Representative
Any person who is not the manufacturer may apply for assessment and, if
successful, have the certificate granted in his name and puts his name on the
rating plate provided he can satisfy the chosen notified body that he is fully
responsible and has control over the design of the saleable product.
In this case, he is the "de facto" manufacturer of the product. He can show full
responsibility by, for example, placing a sub-contract for production with the
actual manufacturer. The ”de facto” manufacturer, in this case, is also
responsible for engaging a notified body to approve and carry out periodic
surveillance of the quality management system used in production, whether in
the EU or elsewhere in the world.
The number to be applied after the CE marking is that of the notified body
appointed by the “de facto” manufacturer to assess the quality management
system.
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which he holds an EC-Type examination certificate issued in his own name. A
manufacturer B, whose quality management system is approved according to
directive 94/9/EC by another notified body y, applies for an EC-Type
certificate in his name, B, based on the certificate previously granted to
manufacturer A. On receipt of the certificate he then manufactures the
product, issues his own declaration of conformity, affixes the CE-mark with
the identification number of the notified body y and sells the equipment in his
own name.
The line of quality management could then be followed back to the original
CE-type assessment.
38