SH 5107

Industrial Ventilation

Mr Tan Kia Tang

Er Veronica Chow
Dr Loh Tzu Yang

1
Ventilation in Confined Spaces

Er Veronica Chow

2
 Scope / Coverage

1. Definition of confined spaces

2. The 3 main killers
3. Accidents cases
4. Precautions for confined space entry & work
5. Gas testing in confined spaces
6. Legal requirements & Singapore Standard
7. Risk assessment for confined space work
8. Confined space programme
9. Ventilation in confined spaces

3
Confined Spaces

– Legal Definition

4
 Confined Space – Legal Definition

Any chamber, tank, manhole, vat, silo, pit, pipe, flue or other enclosed
space in which-

a. dangerous gases, vapours or fumes are liable to be present to such

an extent as to involve a risk of fire or explosion, or persons being
overcome thereby;

b. the supply of air is inadequate, or is likely to be reduced to be

inadequate, for sustaining life;

c. there is a risk of engulfment by material.

a and b are atmospheric hazards; c is physical hazard

5
Confined Space - Characteristics

1. Enclosed space
2. Limited access
3. Poor / no natural ventilation
4. Poor / no lighting
5. Not designed for continuous work

6
 Confined Space - Examples
• tank, vessel
• manhole
• chamber
• pit, bored hole
• sewer
• silo
• covered drain
• tunnel, duct
• culvert
• reactor
• vat / vault
7
 Confined Space : Reasons for Entry

1. Laying cable
2. Cleaning / sludge
removal
3. Checking / inspection /
survey
4. Repair / maintenance
welding / painting
5. Retrieve
6. Rescue

8
Hazards in Confined Spaces

9
 Hazards in Confined Spaces

Physical
hazard
slips, falls and
falling objects
Mechanical
Atmospheric hazard
hazards injury from
machinery

Engulfment Confined Electrical

e.g. by loose hazard
materials Spaces electric shock

Ergonomics Thermal
poor work condition: hot
postures and humid

Biological
agents

10
Physical Hazards

11
Falling into Uncovered Manholes

12
Mother rescues toddler after he falls through broken manhole
cover into sewage drain
(22 May 2022)

Amy Blyth was out walking with her young son (18 months) Theo in
Ashford, Kent, on Sunday (22 May) when the toddler fell through the drain
cover, which then flipped over and closed on top of him.

The 23-year-old yanked off the metal drain cover and hopped down the shaft
into the sewer to rescue little Theo. 13
 3-year-old boy went missing after falling down a manhole
(12 May 2022)

The boy was walking beside his father in the rain when he fell down an
uncovered manhole in northwestern China

The manhole measures 25 cm x 60 cm. It was a dark evening & there

was no lighting nearby.
The manhole was connected to a drainage network. The boy was swept
away by the fast-moving sewage water but could not be found.

14
 Fatal Falling into an Uncovered Manhole @ a Rooftop Bar
Accident happened on 9 Jun 2019 at the 1 Altitude Bar (operator
Synergyinthesky pte ltd). Th owner / occupier of the building is OUB Center (1
Raffles Place)
An employee (security officer) was killed when he fell into an uncovered 4 m
deep manhole.
The manhole is for accessing a switch inside to operate a gondola for building’s
façade cleaning (by A&P Maintenance Services )
Barricades & warning signs had been put up near the opening at an earlier
time. But there was no lighting in the area near the opening
The accident happened when he was running towards 2 unidentified men
entering the cordoned-off area.

15
 3 companies (occupier, employer & contractor) & their
representatives were charged over his death
Stakeholder Prosecution Charge
OUB Centre Occupier of the Failing to ensure that all means of access or egress
rooftop at One from the gondola pit were safe & without risk to
+ Director of OUB Raffles Place health of everyone within the premises. It is also
Centre (Yeo) accused of failing to ensure that the opening was
covered or guarded by effective barriers to prevent a
fall.
Synergyinthesky Employer of the Failing to adequately consider the hazards created by
+ deceased & the opening & implement the relevant risk control
CEO / MD (Ong) Owner of 1- measures.
Altitude cafe-bar
A&P Contractor Failing to conduct an adequate assessment of the risks
Maintenance cleaning the of the manhole, & not promptly implementing a
Services + building's solution to the gondola's obstruction by a structural
Senior operations facade. beam, which then left the opening exposed.
manager (Teo)
If convicted under the Workplace Safety and Health Act, Synergyinthesky, OUB Centre & A&P
Maintenance Services could be fined up to S$500,000 each.
Ong & Yeo could be jailed for up to 2 yrs or fined up to S$200,000, or both. 16

Teo could be jailed for up to 2 yrs or fined up to S$30,000, or both.

Atmospheric Hazards

17
 Atmospheric Hazards / Hazardous Atmosphere

1. Oxygen level below 19.5% or above 23.5% vol

2. Flammable gas or vapor is 10% LEL (lower explosive limit in

%vol) or more

3. Toxic substances levels exceed the PEL (permissible exposure

limit in ppm)

18
Atmospheric Hazards – The 3 Killers
Atmospheric Hazard Consequence

1 Oxygen deficient Suffocation

atmosphere (asphyxiation)

2 Toxic gases & vapours

e.g. H2S, CO Gas poisoning

3 Flammable gases &

vapours Fire / explosion
e.g. CH4

19
 Confined Spaces –
The Number One Killer

20
 Oxygen Deficient Atmosphere

1. Causes sudden death

2. No warning properties whatsoever
3. Only way to detect is through gas testing
4. Minimum level for safe entry 19.5% by
volume

21
 Oxygen Levels & Effects @ 1 atm

O2 % vol Effects

23.5 Oxygen enriched, extreme fire hazard

20.8 Normal oxygen level in fresh air
19.5 Minimum acceptable oxygen level

15 – 19.5 Impair co-ordination, reduced work ability

12 - 14 Poor judgment, respiration increases

10 – 12 Quicken pulse, lips blue

8 – 10 Mental fatigue, nausea, vomiting, fainting,
unconsciousness
6–8 Fatal in 8 min
4-6 Death in 40 s
 Oxygen Deficiency - Causes

1 2 3
Through Through Displacement Through
Consumption Adsorption

Combustion or By inert gas By damped

burning (N2 or Argon used for carbon bed in
purging, gas shielding, water treatment
etc) plant
Rusting or By natural gas
oxidation (methane)
Fermentation
Waste
decomposition
23
 ISO Tank : O2 Deficiency

• An ISO Tank was sent to a

company for inspection
• The last cargo carried was DOP
(di-octyl-phthlate); N2 was used
as an expelling agent to unload
the DOP
• Worker was assigned to inspect
the interior of the tank
• He was found dead inside the
tank

24
Cable Manhole : Oxygen Deficiency (1990)

 The first victim entered the manhole

to lay cables and collapsed
immediately

 His brother and another worker went

in to rescue him also collapsed

 The two brothers died but the other

worker survived as he landed on a
bracket half way

O2 level: 14% vol inside the manhole

O2 level; 9% vol in adjacent manhole

25
Sewer Manhole – O2 Deficiency
Date: 7 Mar 1998
 2 workers were found dead inside a 4 m
water filled sewage manhole
 They were required to remove the cover
of the inspection chamber of an
uncompleted sewer system
 A simulation test with the manhole
covered for 3 weeks showed an O2 level
of 18 vol%
 The O2 level could have been much lower
at the time of the accident, possibly due
to microbial action
 Likely cause of accident: O2 deficiency

26
 Fatal Accident in a Cabling Manhole
on 6 Nov 2010 @ Jurong East

3 workers were laying underground cables inside a

3m-deep manhole in Jurong East Ave 1.

After a while, one collapsed inside the manhole.

Another worker also fainted.

While fellow workers managed to rescue one of

them, Singapore Civil Defence Force officers had to
use a pulley to evacuate the other two.

The collapsed worker was pronounced dead at

6.55pm at the scene, about 1 hr after he had passed
out.
The other two were taken to hospital for breathing
problems.
27
 Bore Pile Hole : O2 Deficiency
a) One worker was asphyxiated when he dipped his head into a
bore hole to remove a shackle. The O2 level was found to be very
low inside the confined space.

Bore Hole at the bank of

Sungei Ponggol

60 cm diameter

37 m depth

b) In another accident, a supervisor in a petrochemical plant was almos

suffocated when he dipped his head into the space between the two
walls of a double jacketed tank inerted with nitrogen.
28
Ballast Tank on a Hopper Barge – O2 Deficiency
• 3 workers died in a ballast
tank
• barge was tilted and ballast
was flooded
• One worker entered into the
tank to pump water & repair
leak
• He lost consciousness & fell
into water in < 1 min
• Two co-workers entered to
rescue; both collapsed

29
 Findings
• Gas Testing in Adjacent Ballast Tank
 oxygen - 11.5 %
 flammable gases - 5 % LEL
 carbon monoxide - 121 ppm
• Manhole cover closed for 4 years
• Severe rusting found in the interior surfaces
of the tank

Probable Cause of Death

•Asphyxiation due to lack of oxygen
• Oxygen was likely to be depleted due to rusting

30
 Oxygen-enriched Atmosphere

 A confined space with oxygen above 23.5% is considered

“oxygen-enriched”.
 The source of extra oxygen is typically from leaking oxygen
cylinders used for oxy-acetylene torches.
 Oxygen above 23.5% is a fire or explosion hazard (increase
combustion rate & widen the flammability range).

31
 Confined Spaces –
The Number Two Killer

32
 Toxic Atmosphere - Sources

1 Substances already present

• residual gases /vapours (e.g. petroleum vapours)

2 Substances introduced
• cleaning / degreasing (e.g. perchloroethylene,
trichloroethylene)
• painting (e.g. toluene, xylene)

3 Gases or vapours released

• removing sludge / waste (H2S)
• Internal combustion engine (CO)
33
 Toxic Gases and Vapours

• Usually have acute effects at high concentrations

e.g. H2S, CO.

• Some have chronic effects at low concentrations

e.g. benzene, vinyl chloride

• Some toxic HC vapours are also flammable.

However, their PEL << LEL
e.g. xylene, toluene

34
Hydrogen Sulphur (H2S)

35
 Characteristics of H2S

• Colourless & toxic

• Heavier than air
• can accumulate in ‘open’ pits & tanks
• Smell of ‘rotten air’
• sense of smell gets paralysed at high concentration
• not a reliable indicator
• Leading cause of death following entry into sewers
with decaying organic matters
• Paralyses nerve centre in the brain resulting in
asphyxiation

36
 Hydrogen Sulfide – Health Effects

H2S ppm Effects

10 Permissible exposure limits (8 hrs)

100 Cough, eye irritation, loss of sense of smell

200 Conjunctivitis (eye inflammation), irritation
500 Loss of consciousness & possible death
700 Rapid loss of consciousness & death
1,000 Immediate loss of consciousness & death

37
 Sewer Manhole – H2S Poisoning

Date: 10 Mar 1998

Location: 5.5 m sewer manhole in an army camp
Accident happened when workers were trying to remove a
chock in a connecting pipe between two sewer manholes;
one person died from H2S poisoning.
sewer lateral connection

Sewer line
blockage

Hydrogen sulfide was detected inside the manhole after the accident
38
Findings
1. Supervisor instructed a worker to dislodge a choke in the
interconnecting piping between 2 sewer manholes.
2. Worker entered the 5.5 m depth manhole, but unable to
remove the choke.
3. Supervisor instructed another worker to remove the
choke.
4. 2nd worker was overcome by H2S released from the
material in the pipe.
5. Supervisor & an NS-man tried to rescue; both collapsed
inside.
6. Supervisor died, the other 2 were rescued & recovered.

39
 Cable Manhole : Hydrogen Sulfide Poisoning

1 worker and 2 rescuers died in a cable manhole along

Chulia Street in year 2000.

 High levels of H2S were detected in the manhole

 High levels of sulfide were found in their blood
40
Food Flavor Reactor : H2S Poisoning

Reactor
opening
Char layer
blacken the
bottom of
reactor

Electric
stirrer

Top view

1 worker died inside a 1.2 m reactor

1 rescuer (supervisor) injured
41
 Findings
1. Amino acid & ingredients are used to make food flavor in a
1.2 m reactor; H2S is produced in the process
2. It is a batch process & cleaning is required after each batch
3. One worker entered the empty reactor (containing residual
H2S) & was overcome by the gas H2S
4. Supervisor tried to rescue him but failed
5. Autopsy report: 2.2 mg/l of sulfur in blood was found in the
deceased
6. 33 ppm of sulfur was found in the food sample

42
Carbon Monoxide (CO)

43
 Carbon Monoxide

• Toxic at high concentration

• common cause of death in confined spaces
• No good warning properties
• colorless and odorless
• Sources of CO
• exhaust of internal combustion engines
• fires, welding, burning
• PEL 25 ppm
• Enters bloodstream readily through the lungs
• Combines with blood hemoglobin (Hb) to form COHb, displacing
oxygen and causes asphyxiation at high concentration
• May cause irreversible brain damage

44
 CO from Internal Combustion Engines
Carbon monoxide comes from operating internal combustion
engines.
Propane-powered engines also emit carbon monoxide.
Fatal levels of CO are quickly reached in confined spaces.
The PEL for CO is 25 ppm
.

Petrol driven water pump Propane-powered manlift in a

inside a manhole large tank 45
 Carbon Monoxide - Dangers

• Colourless
• Odourless
• High affinity (210) with blood hemoglobin (Hb)
(0.1 % or 1,000 ppm of CO can compete with
21% vol O2)
• Cause asphyxiation & irreversible brain damage

O2 + Hb ↔ HbO2
CO + Hb ↔ COHb
CO + HbO2 ↔ COHb + O2

46
 Effects of Carbon Monoxide
CO, ppm Effects

25 Permissible exposure level (8 hr)

200 Headache after 1 - 2 hrs

500 Headache after 30 - 45 min

1,000 Headache, giddiness, impaired judgment,

(0.1% vol ) followed by unconsciousness & death

10,000 Immediate loss of consciousness & death

(1% vol)
47
 Sewer Manhole : CO Poisoning
Square manhole
opening Wooden
Ground level  600 x 600 mm ladder
Date: 10 May 1998
Location: Sewer manhole
at a road junction

3.4 m
Petrol-
driven
A worker was found
pump
dead in a 6.6 m manhole
where a diesel operated
 6.65 m
pump was used to pump
Intermediate
platform level

 0.65 m Water
level
the water accumulated
inside.

High level of
carboxyhemoglobin
COHb was found in his
blood
 1.4 m
48
 Findings

1. A petrol-driven pump was placed on a platform inside the manhole

2. Worker turned on the engine and left the manhole
3. After sometime, the pump stopped when the available oxygen is
used up
4. The worker entered the manhole to check and was overcome by
the CO generated by the engine
5. Simulated test carried out inside the manhole indicating 11,700
ppm of CO after 18 minutes of operation; oxygen level was 17.5
%vol
6. High carboxy-haemoglobin level (>50% COHb) was found in
deceased blood
7. Cause of death: carbon monoxide poisoning

Never place a diesel or petrol-driven pump in a manhole

49
Solvent Vapors

50
Poisoning by Methylene Chloride in an ISO Tank (10 Mar 1998)

• A supervisor used a pail of methylene chloride (MC 70%

vol) to mop clean the ISO tank. 20 m3; 6 m X 2.2 m
(diameter)
• Convention cleaning was by grinding
• He was overcome by the MC vapors & died a few days
later
• No ventilation; no buddy
51
 Box Culvert : Toluene Poisoning

4 workers were tasked to spray paint the walls and ceiling of a

box culvert under a carriageway (along Chua Choo Kang
Expressway).
3 were killed due to acute toluene poisoning

52
 Findings
1. A foreman brought 4 workers to the site to spray paint the walls of
box culvert. He left them to work on their own.
2. Working in pairs, workers 1 & 2 sprayed painted the cell for almost 1
hr until they could no longer endure the smell & climbed out.
3. Worker 3 & 4 then went into cell to continue the work.
4. Worker 1 heard cries for help from both workers 3 & 4. Together with
worker 2, they entered the cell to render assistance.
5. However, worker 1 felt nauseous & he climbed out of the cell &
passed out.
6. When worker 1 regained consciousness, he went across the
carriageway to the exit end of the cell to locate his coworkers. When
he reached the exit end, he passed out again.
7. Foreman returned and began searching. He found his 3 workers
collapsed in the cell.
8. SCDF arrived and extricated the 3 workers. They were pronounced
dead on site.
53
 Findings
1. Samples of paint/thinner mixture contained toluene, naphtha &
other solvents.
2. No PPE provided for rest of workers.
3. Only spray painter provided with a particulate respirator (offers no
protection against spray paint solvents).
4. Toxicology report showed very high levels of toluene in the blood of
all the deceased – ranging from 6.6 μg/ml to 13.2 μg/ml. These
levels can cause loss of consciousness and death.
5. The pathologist report confirmed the cause of death as cardiac and
respiratory failure due to toluene toxicity from the inhalation of paint
and thinner fumes in an enclosed space

54
 Confined Spaces –
The Number Three Killer

55
 Flammable Gases –
Fire & Explosion Hazards

56
Flammable Gas - Sources

• Natural gas (methane)

• Cylinder gas
e.g. acetylene, LPG, LNG, H2
• Organic solvents
e.g. paint (toluene, xylene, acetone,…)

Hazard : fire & explosion

57
 Physical Hazards of Flammable Chemicals
Fire Explosion
(occurs in open (sudden build up of temperature & pressure; often occurs
spaces) in enclosed or confined spaces)
Fire Triangle Explosion Pentagon

1. Flash fire 1. Over-pressure explosion (e.g. chemical storage tank)

2. Pool / tank fire 2. Vapor cloud explosion (VCE e.g. LPG pipeline rupture)
3. Jet fire 3. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE e.g.
4. Fire ball rupture of propane tank)
4. Dust or mist explosion (e.g. diesel fogging)
Fire releases heat & smoke
Explosion releases heat, force / pressure & fragments
58
 Hazardous Atmospheres – Flammable Gases,
Vapors and Dusts

Flammable gases, vapors or dusts will ignite from a spark or flame if

above a level in the air called the “lower explosive limit” (LEL).
Gas or vapor levels higher than 10% of the LEL are considered
hazardous and the confined space cannot be entered until levels
are reduced.
Concentrations above 10% of the LEL are usually toxic as well.

LEL is sometimes called “LFL” – “lower flammable limit”

59
 Physical Hazards of Flammable Chemicals
- Fire & Explosion

Flammable
Swiss Cheese Model
chemical (fuel) Oxidant
(oxygen at
least 10 %vol
in air) Event
Ignition source
(heat energy) (fire or explosion)

Fire & explosion do not occur by chance

60
 Flammable or Explosive Limits

LEL/UEL is the lowest/highest concentration of a gas or vapor that will burn in air.
For a fire/explosion to occur, the gas or vapor & air mixture must be within the
LEL & UEL
Ease of ignition

Too Explosive
lean Too rich
range
LEL UEL 100%
0% Flammable gas / vapor concentration (%vol)

Gas or vapor levels higher than 10% of the LEL are considered hazardous and
the confined space cannot be entered until levels are reduced.
Amounts above 10% of the LEL are usually toxic as well. 61
 Flammability Limits of Common Gases & Vapours

Gas or vapour LEL %vol UEL %vol

ethylene oxide 3.0 100
acetylene 2.5 82
hydrogen 4.0 75.0
methyl alcohol 6.7 36.0
ethyl alcohol 3.3 19.0
methane 5.0 15.0
acetone 2.6 12.8
ethane 3.0 12.5
propane 2.2 9.5
butane 1.9 8.5
benzene 1.2 8.0
gasoline 1.4 7.4
toluene 1.2 7.1
xylene 0.9 7.0

Most flammable chemicals have a flammability range of about 1 to 10 %vol; those with
a wider range are more likely to ignite
62
 Sources of Ignition

1. Open flames
a welding torches
b matches / cigarette lighters
2. Electric arcing
3. Frictional sparks
4. Hot surfaces
5. Static electricity
6. Chemical reaction
glycerine & potassium permanganate

63
 Control of Ignition Hazards

1. Non-sparking tools
2. Approved electrical equipment
3. Intrinsically safe equipment
4. Purged equipment
5. Vessel inerting
6. Control of torches and control valves
7. Special hot-work precautions
8. Separation of compressed gas cylinders from heat

In many cases, control of ignition sources may be the only way to

prevent a fire or explosion
64
 Incident : Manhole Explosion due to Lightning Strike
(outside a multi-story car park at Bukit Batok West on Aug 24, 2021)

A in-car camera captured a flash of light (lightning strike) followed by an

exploding manhole.
The fuel is likely from underground natural gas (methane) or from
decomposing material (sewage) inside the manhole.
Fuel – methane
LEL 5 %vol - UEL 15 %vol
Ignition source – lightning
Oxidant – oxygen-in-air 65
Incident : Manhole Explosion due to Lightning Strike
(outside a multi-story car park at Bukit Batok West on Aug 24,
2021)

66
 Accident - Flash Fire in a Glue Mixer
• A flash fire / overpressure occurred in a glue mixing tank.
• The mixer contained resin & toluene.
• A fixed non-sparking stirrer was used for mixing.
• On the day of the accident, the stirrer was not working and a portable electrical
stirrer was used.
• The electric motor ignited the vapor resulting in the accident.
• 3 workers injured.
Toluene:
Highly flammable liquid (Cat. 2)
Flash point : 4.4 ºC
LEL – UEL : 1.2 %vol – 7.1 %vol
VP : 3.8 kPa;
Saturation concentration = (VP/101) x 100
= 3.8 %vol

Fuel – toluene vapor

Ignition source – electric motor
Oxidant – oxygen-in-air

Lesson Learned : RA must consider non-routine work

67
 Accident - Explosion in a Hydrogen Buffer Tank
• The explosion occurred in a 15 m3 buffer tank in a gas plant.
• The tank had previously contained H2 and was being surveyed for its
worthiness.
• The accident happened when the plant engineer was taking a photo of the
interior of the tank through an opening.
• The flash ignited the gas.
• He died from burns several days later.
• The deceased had warned other workers nearby to stay away when he was
about to take the photo.
Hydrogen:
Extremely flammable gas (Cat 1)
Flammability range
LEL 4 %vol - UEL 75 %vol
MIE (min ignition energy): 0.02 mJ
HOC (heat of combustion): 141,584 kJ/kg

Fuel - hydrogen gas

Ignition source – camera flash
Oxidant – oxygen-in-air

Lesson learned : RA must consider human factors 68

 Accident : Explosion on Board a Barge

Fuel – solvent vapor from spray painting

LEL ̴1 %vol - UEL ̴ 0 %vol

Ignition source – Arc welding

(hot work)

Oxidant : oxygen-in-air

• Hot-work was carried out on compartment containing paint vapours

• 4 compartments were ruptured
• Barge split into 2
• 2 workers died
69
 Accident - Simultaneous Explosion in 2 Xylene Storage Tanks

• 2 newly fabricated xylene storage tanks were each cleaned with 400 kg liquid
xylene.
• Flashback from hot work at a downstream pipe caused both tanks to explode.
• One worker died.

Xylene : Flammable liquid (Cat 3)

Flash point : 25ºC
LEL – UEL : 0.9 – 7.0 %vol
VP : 1.1 kPa;
Saturation concentration
= (VP/101) x 100
= 1.1 %vol
Fuel- xylene vapor
Ignition source – hot work causing
flashback
Oxidant – oxygen-in-air

Lesson learned : Flashback must be considered in RA of hot work on piping

70
 Flashback or Backfire

An ignited flame moving rapidly back through a

flammable gas / vapor or a pipe containing
flammable gas / vapor and to the source of the
flammables.

Pipeline containing
container flammable vapor
containing
flammable
vapor Flashback Ignition
source

71
 Accident : Drum Explosion – Hot Work
Accident happened in a motor repair workshop (Jun
The exploded drum 2006)

Worker used a gas torch to cut open an oil drum

which contained some petroleum liquid

The drum exploded with the lid flying away, killing

the worker

Top lid of the drum

Fuel – petroleum vapor
LEL 1 %vol - UEL 10 %vol

Ignition source – gas torch

Oxidant : oxygen-in-air
72
 Confined Spaces –
Engulfment & Entrapment

73
 Engulfment
What are the Hazards of Engulfing Material?

Engulfing materials include liquids or loose

solids such as grain, sand or other granular
material.

People cannot escape when caught in

moving loose solids and usually
suffocate.

Workers often get engulfed when in-feed

or out-feed lines are inadvertently
opened or activated.
74
 Entrapment
The space is configured in a way that can trap a worker, for
example, sides sloping towards the center

Gravel hopper Sawdust Cyclone

75
Confined Spaces
– Other Hazards

76
Electrical, Mechanical & Flood Hazards

Mechanical hazard Hazard caused by the work

(moving parts) (e.g. welding, painting)

Flood Hazard
77
Hazards Caused by Work
- Spray Painting & Welding

78
 Spray Painting – Types & Compositions
Types of Paint – alkyd, vinyl, epoxy, polyurethane, antifouling,
chlorinated rubber.

Solvent based Paint Composition

• Pigments usually metal compounds
• Binders –adhesive & resins
• Thinners – solvents or hydrocarbons
• Additives e.g. drier, fungicides, plasticizers, anti-skinning agents,
surfactants

Pigments (inorganic)
• Low toxicity pigments e.g. Al, Ca, Ba, Zn & Titanium compounds
• High toxicity pigments e.g. Pb, Hg, Cr and Silica compounds
79
 Spray Painting – Solvents & Hazards
Types of Solvents
• xylene, toluene
• acetone, MEK, MIBK
• butyl alcohol, cyclohexanone, white spirit, methylated spirit
• butyl acetate, cellosolve acetate, ethyl glycol acetate
• turpentine, naphtha

Hazards of Solvents
• Flammable - fire and explosion
• Toxic
Irritation to the eyes & respiratory tract
Narcotic effects e.g. headache, dizziness, unconsciousness &
death at high concentrations
Dermatitis or skin diseases
80
 Spray Painting – Effects of Solvents
Alcohols
Ethanol, n-butanol and isopropanol are the alcohols commonly used in paint. Their principal
physiological effect is irritation of the mucous membranes of the eyes and upper respiratory tract.
Methanol receives limited use as a paint solvent. It is a poison to the central nervous system and
to the optic nerve.

Ketones
Acetone, methyl ethyl ketone, and methyl isobutyl ketone are the ketones most used as paint
solvents. On contact with the skin, these solvents may produce a dermatitis after repeated
exposure. High vapour concentrations are irritating to the conjunctiva and mucous membranes of
the nose and throat and can produce narcosis. No chronic systemic effects are known to exist.

Aromatic hydrocarbons
Toluene and xylene are the most important aromatic hydrocarbons used as paint solvents. Both
compounds may cause irritation of the eyes, respiratory tract and skin, and high concentrations
produce depression of the central nervous system. Commercial grades of toluene may contain
benzene. High concentrations of xylene may cause pulmonary edema, anorexia, nausea,
vomiting and abdominal pain.

81
 Welding – Types & Hazards
Types of Welding – shielded metal arc (SMA), gas tungsten arc
(GTA), gas metal arc (GMA), submerged Arc, gas welding, plasma
arc.

Potential Hazards
• Hot work – source of ignition
• Fuel hazards e.g. acetylene gas, methane, oxygen
• Inert gas e.g. argon, nitrogen
• Metal fumes and toxic gases
• Electric shock and burn
• Radiations – intense visible, UV and IR

82
 Welding Fumes - Sources

Metal Fumes Source

Iron Parent iron or steel, welding electrode
Zinc Galvanized or zinc primed steel
Copper Non-ferrous alloys, filler wire coating
Fluorides Flux on electrodes
Lead Lead paint, electrode coating
Manganese Welding rods, alloys in steel
Chromium Stainless steel, electrode, plating
Nickel Stainless steel, nickel-clad steel
Cadmium Plating

83
Welding Fumes – Metal Fume Fever

Inhalation of welding fumes containing zinc,

aluminium, copper and cadmium may
produce a flue-like illness known as metal
fume fever.

The victim may complain of fever, chills,

headache, muscle aches and chest discomfort
several hours after the exposure.

84
 Welding Fumes – Acute & Chronic Effects
Acute exposure to welding fumes and gases e.g. in a confined
space may cause an inflammation in the airways on the lungs.
The victim may complain of chest tightness and breathlessness.
The inflammation may result in bronchitis, asthma, pneumonitis
or pulmonary edema.

Chronic exposure to certain toxic fumes e.g. lead and cadmium

may result in metal poisoning.

The intense light generated arc welding contains a high

proportion of ultraviolet radiation exposure to UV light may
produce an inflammation of the eyes known as "arc-eye". The
eyes are red and watery with painful sensation.

85
 Welding Gases – Sources & Effects

Welding Gases Source Health Effects

Carbon monoxide GMA, SMS, Oxy-gas, Carbon Headache, dullness,
arc gouging poisoning
Ozone GMA, GTA, carbon arc Headache, dryness of
gouging throat, chest pain
Nitrogen dioxide GMA, GTA, flame cutting Eye irritation, coughing,
chest pain

Exposure to high concentration of welding gases may produce:

 Inflammation of the lungs
 Pulmonary edema (swelling & accumulation of fluid)
 Emphysema (loss of elasticity of the lungs)
 Chronic bronchitis
 Suffocation of asphyxiation 86
Prevention and Control

87
Precautions for Confined Space Entry / Work

1. Isolation of space
2. Gas testing
1. oxygen deficiency
2. flammable gases
3. toxic gases
3. Forced ventilation
1. local exhaust ventilation
2. dilution / general ventilation
4. Permit to work system
5. Standby person

88
Isolation of Space
By blanking

By lock-out & tag-out

89
 Ventilation
1. Provide fresh air
2. Dilute toxic gases
3. Dilute flammable gases

90
Confined Spaces – Ventilation
See Last Segment

91
Confined Spaces
– Gas Testing

92
 Gas Testing - Sequence

1 2 3
Oxygen content Flammable Toxic gases &
19.5% - gas & vapor vapor
23.5%vol <10% LEL < PEL

93
 Gas Testing – Objectives

1 Oxygen content
• Prevent asphyxiation or suffocation
• 19.5% - 23.5%vol
2 Flammable atmosphere
• Prevent fire and explosion
• 10% LEL if non toxic
• 1% LEL if toxic
3 Toxic gases and vapours
• Prevent acute poisoning and/or chronic effects
• < Permissible Exposure Level (Long term)

94
 Quiz
The LEL of xylene is 0.9 % vol.
Its PEL is 100 ppm.

What is 10% LEL (prevent fire and explosion)?

What is 1% LEL (prevent toxic effects)?

95
 Gas Testing - Locations

1. From the outside

2. Top to bottom

Hydrogen, methane Lighter than air Methane

(Lighter than air) Vapour Density<1 Hydrogen

Same as air
Carbon monoxide Vapour Density=1 Carbon monoxide
(same as air) MW 28/29

Heavier than air Carbon dioxide

Solvent vapours Hydrogen sulphide
Vapour Density
(heavier than air) >1 Butane
Petroleum vapour

96
 Gas Testing - Instruments

Detector Flammable
tubes gas meter

Electrochemical sensors e.g. O2 meter, CO meter, H2S meter

97
Confined Spaces
– Entry Permit

98
Confined Space Entry Permit
1) Location / description
2) Purpose of entry
3) Results of gas testing
4) Period of validity

99
Entry Permit Application - 4 Stages

Stage 1
Application by Supervisor

Stage 2
Endorsement by Safety Assessor

Stage 3
Approval by Authorized Manager

Stage 4
Review / revocation / removal of permit
100
 Confined Space Attendant

1. Remain outside
2. Monitor personnel entering / working inside
3. Maintain regular contact with the persons inside
4. Assist them to evacuate if needed
5. Alert persons to carry out rescue in emergency

101
 Posting of Entry Permit &
Identification Badges

Electronic
Entry Permit Badges
System

102
Other Safety Measures

1. Barricade
2. Warning signs
3. Safe means of access
4. Safety equipment / appliances
5. Rescue equipment

103
Barricade & Warning Sign

104
Safe Means of Access

105
Safety Equipment / Appliances
1. Head Protection
- safety helmet
2. Foot & Leg Protection
- safety boots
3. Hand Protection
- hand gloves
4. Eye Protection
- face shield
5. Body Protection
- aprons, overalls
6. Freefall Hazard Protection
- lifeline & harness
7. Hearing Protection
- ear plugs, ear muffs
8. Respiratory Protection
- air purifying respirators
- supplied-air respirators
106
 Emergency Equipment

1. Retrieve

2. Rescue

3. Revive

107
 Risk Assessment
in Confined Space Work

108
 ISO 31000 Risk Management
– Principles, Framework & Process

ISO 31000– the Motherhood Standard of all RM

109
 WSH Risk Management Process
Step 1: Hazard Identification

Risk Analysis
Risk Assessment

Step 3: Likelihood / Step 2: Consequences /

Probability Severity
Risk Management

Step 4: Risk Characterization or

Evaluation

Step 5: Risk Control

Step 6: Documentation
& Communication
RA = Hazard identification + Risk Analysis + Risk Characterization
RM = RA + Risk Control + Risk Communication 110
Step 1 : Hazard Identification – Physical Hazards

1. How large is the manhole or entry portal?

2. How big and how deep is the space?
3.Is the space adequately illuminated by natural light?
4.Is there a potential for falling e.g. from entering a
vertical tank or ladder climbing?
5.Are interior surfaces slippery?
6.Are there any projections that could cause cuts, bumps
or abrasions?
7. Does the configuration and adjacent structure pose any
hazards?

111
Hazard Identification – Physical Hazards
1. Are there any mechanical equipment used in the
space & what are these equipment?
2. Are there any electrical equipment used in the space
& what are these equipment?
3.Will any hazards be posed by portable equipment
taken into the space?
4. Is there a potential for engulfment?
5. Is there a potential for drowning?

112
Hazard Identification – Atmospheric Hazards

1.What has the space contained?

2.What did the space last contain?
3.Are there any residue substances and what are these
substances?
4. Could the space be deficient or enriched in oxygen?
5. Could the space be flammable or does it have the
potential to becoming flammable?
6. What air contaminants might the space contain?
7.Are there any pipelines attached & what do the pipes
carry?
8.Will air contaminants be introduced into the space by
work or processes e.g. welding, solvent cleaning and
painting?

113
 Hazard Identification – other Health Hazards

1. Will any noise-producing work be carried out in the

space e.g. hacking or grinding?

2. Are there any radiation hazards posed by ionization

radiation e.g. from non-destructive testing?

3. Are there any biological hazards posed by rodents,

insects, and animal’s waste in the space?

4. What is the temperature and humidity inside the

space?

114
 Step 2 : Hazard Severity

Confined spaces may present an array of hazards

Each has a different degree of severity
The inventoried hazards may be classified into four
categories depending on their severity.

1. Catastrophic hazards
2. Critical hazards
3. Marginal hazards
4. Negligible hazards

115
 Hazard Severity or Consequences
Hazard Severity or Consequences

1. may cause death or even multiple fatalities, severe occupational

Catastrophic illness, or loss of entire operating process or production operation.
hazards
2. Critical may also result in death, but additionally include situations that
hazards may cause serious injuries such as loss of a limb, illness requiring
medical treatment, or extensive property damage, including
significant damage to process or operating equipment
3. Marginal may cause injury such as cuts and contusions, illness such as
hazards headache, nausea or mild eye, skin or respiratory irritation, or
slight damage to property or equipment.
4 . Negligible will not result in serious injury or illness and will cause little to no
hazards property or equipment damage.

116
 Step 3: Likelihood of Occurrence
 The identified hazards have a different chance of occurrence.
 The likelihood or probability that a hazard will result in adverse
consequence may be classified as:
A. Frequent
B. Probable
C. Occasional
D. Remote
E. Improbable
This qualitative method of classification should be based on
practical / field experience & sound professional judgement.

117
 Likelihood of Occurrence

Classification Likelihood of Occurrence

A. Frequent likely to occur virtually every time

B. Probable likely to occur most of the time
C. Occasional likely to occur sometimes
D. Remote very unlikely to occur
E. Improbable negligible chance of occurring

RA should consider personal risk factors and organizational

culture which can affect the likelihood of occurrence.
118
 Step 4 : Risk Characterization or Evaluation
4 X 5 Risk Assessment Matrix
Likelihood of Occurrence
Hazard
Category A B C D E
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable

1
Catastrophic 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E

2
Critical 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E

3
Marginal 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E

4
Negligible 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E

119
 Risk Level Ranking & Criteria
The level of risk may be ranked or classified according to the following criteria
in descending order

Risk code Suggested Criteria

1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 3A Unacceptable

1D, 2C, 2D, 3B, 3C Tolerable (management attention

is required)
1E, 2E, 3D, 3E, 4A, 4B Acceptable with review by
management

4C, 4D, 4E Acceptable without review

120
 Acceptability of Risk & Recommended Actions

Risk Risk
Level Acceptability Recommended Actions

 High Risk level must be reduced to at least Medium Risk before

work commences.
High Risk Unacceptable  There should not be any interim risk control measures & risk
Or Intolerable control measures should not be overly dependent on PPE. If need
be, the hazard should be eliminated before work commences.
 Immediate management intervention is required before work
commences.

 A careful evaluation of the hazards should be carried out to

ensure that the risk level is reduced to as low as reasonably
Medium Tolerable practicable (ALARP) within a defined time period.
Risk  Interim risk control measures, such as administrative controls,
may be implemented.
 Management attention is required. e
 No additional risk control measures may be needed. However,
Low Risk Acceptable frequent review may be needd to ensure that the risk does not
increase over time.

WSH risks should be reduced to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
121
 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)
The ALARP region lies between unacceptable & acceptable levels.
Fatal Risk per Annum

Unacceptable > 1 in 1,000

Risk

Between
ALARP Tolerable 1 in 1,000 &
region Risk 1 in 1,000,000

Acceptable
< 1 in 1,000,000
Risk

Even if a level of risk has been judged to be in the ALARP region, it is still necessary
to consider introducing further risk reduction measures to drive the remaining or
"residual" risk downwards
122
 Step 5: Risk Control

• The scope and direction of correction action is dictated by a

particular hazard’s position on the matrix.
• Those that present the greatest risk should be addressed first,
followed in decreasing order by those which pose less of a threat.

• The technical approach to hazard control should be logical,

systematic and thorough.

• Each of the rank listed hazards or items should be reviewed and

possible controls identified.

• If there is more than one way or method of controlling a hazard,

consider all the options and choose the most practical approach.

123
Hierarchy of Hazard Control

 Elimination of hazard e.g. by removing the

source of hazard or avoiding the risk.

 Substitution of hazardous process, operation or

work with a less hazardous one.

 Engineering control by applying any scientific

principle for the control of any workplace
hazard including dilution ventilation system.

 Administrative measures by implementing any

administrative requirement such as a permit-to-
work system.
 Personal protective appliances – this should be
the last resort or an interim measure.

124
 Step 6 : Documentation
 Risk Assessment Form
 Safe work procedures
 Action plan on risk control measures

Risk Assessment Form

125
 Roles of WSH Professionals in RM

1. Conduct or facilitate risk assessment

2. Train risk assessment team members in risk assessment
3. Advise on risk control measures
4. Assist in risk communication
5. Assist in preparing safe work procedures
6. Assist in implementing and monitoring risk control measures

The duties of WSHO are spelt out in the WSH (WSHO) Regulations

126
Confined Spaces –
Accidents Statistics

127
 Confined Space Accident Statistics
in Singapore (1995 to 2005)

30 cases involving atmospheric hazards

About 1/3 of the victims

63 victims; 25 died
were rescuers

Do not attempt rescue unless you are protected

or…
128
 Confined Spaces Fatalities (2007 to 2010)

2007 5 Cases (2 oxygen deficiency + 3 fire & explosion)

2008 7 Cases (4 oxygen deficiency + 3 fire & explosion)

0 case
2009 WSH (Confined Spaces) Regulations 2009 enacted

2010 1 case (oxygen deficiency)

129
Confined Space Accidents - Common Characteristics

1. Sudden death without

warning

2. Accident happened without

people knowing

3. Multiple fatalities involving

rescuers

4. Difficulty in rescue

Key preventive measures : forced ventilation & gas testing

130
 Confined Space
- Regulations
& Singapore Standard

131
 WSH (Confined Spaces) Regulations 2009
• PART I PRELIMINARY
1 Citation and commencement
2 Definitions
3 Application

• PART II GENERAL PROVISIONS

4 Record of confined spaces in factory
5 Access to and egress from confined space
6 Opening of entrance cover of confined space
7 Lighting in confined space
8 Ventilation in confined space

• PART III CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO CONFINED SPACE

9 Implementation of confined space entry permit
10 No entry into or work in confined space without evaluation and confined space entry permit
11 Application for confined space entry permit
12 Evaluation of confined space entry permit
13 Issue of confined space entry permit
14 Posting of confined space entry permit
15 Monitoring to ensure safety and health of worker during entry into or work in confined space
16 Periodic testing of atmosphere
17 Duty to report incompatible work
18 Review and revocation of confined space entry permit

• PART IV MISCELLANEOUS
19 Warning sign
20 Display of name or identification badge
21 Training of workers and supervisors
22 Appointment and duties of confined space attendant
23 Rescue operation
24 Offences

132
 Offences & Penalty
WSH Act

For a person A fine not exceeding $200,000;

or imprisonment not exceeding 2 yrs
or both
For a company A fine not exceeding $500,000

WSH (CS) Regulations

Max $20,000 ; or max 2 yr jail or both
Reg 9 (apt of persons & implement CS permit ) - Max $20,000
Reg 10 (1) (unauthorised entry) – Max $20,000
Reg 20 (display of name badge) - Max $2,000
Reg 22(2) (duties of attendant) - max $2,000
Reg 23(2) (duties of competent person) - max $1,000

133
 Quiz
As per WSH (Confined Spaces) Regulations, at what point is a person
considered to have entered a confined space?

a) When his legs are inside

b) When any part of his body enters

c) When his whole body is inside

d) When his head passes into it

134
Confined Space Programme

135
 Confined Space Programme (In-Plant)

CSP Policy

Identification of CS and
evaluation of need to
enter

Appointment of Evaluation Confined Training and Emergency

Responsible of risks of space entry Information Preparedness
Personnel entering/w permit and rescue
orking in system
CS

Record Keeping

Plan evaluation

136
 Confined Space Programme (CSP)
Six Components

1. Identification of confined spaces & evaluation of need to

enter confined spaces
2. Appointment of responsible personnel
3. Evaluation of risks of entry/work in confined space
4. Confined Space Entry Permit System (CSEPS)
5. Training & Education
6. Emergency Preparedness and Rescue

137
1. Identification of confined spaces & evaluation of
need to enter confined spaces
1. Identify fixed confined spaces (CS)
e.g. storage tank, chamber, manhole
2. Determine whether entry is needed
3. Label the confined spaces
4. Keep an inventory list of CS

138
2. Appointment of responsible personnel

Appoint persons to carry out duties of

1 Authorised manager
2 Confined space safety assessor
3 Confined space attendant
4 Rescue work
5 Examining the rescue equipment

Keep and update records

139
3. Evaluation of risks of entry/work in CS

1 Identify the hazards

2 Evaluate the severity / consequences
3 Determine the risk level
4 Develop Safe Work Procedures
5 Implement control measures
6 Keep records

140
4. Confined Space Entry Permit System

1 Application
2 Evaluation
- gas testing & taking safety measures
3 Issuance
- approval & display of permit
4 Periodic monitoring
5 Termination or Revocation
- work completed or unsafe conditions
arise
6 Record keeping
141
5. Training & Education

1. Relevant legal requirements

2. Hazards of CS entry & work

3. Entry Permit System

4. Control & preventive measures

5. Emergency response & rescue

142
 6. Emergency Preparedness and Rescue

A written rescue plan specific to the CS:

1. Names of rescue personnel

2. Type of rescue / retrieval equipment

3. Means of communication

4. Breathing & reviving apparatus

5. Rescue drills

143
Confined Spaces
– Checklist

144
 Confined Space Work Checklist
1. Is there a need to enter a confined space?
2. Is there a written procedure for confined space work?
3. Is there a permit-to-enter system?
4. Is the space tested for oxygen level, flammable and/or toxic gases or
vapours before entry and during work?
5. Are records for every test kept available for inspection?
6. Are the instruments used for testing suitable and properly calibrated
before use?
7. Has the person carrying out the test received any training on gas
testing?
8. Is the space ventilated before and during work?
9. Is the ventilation rate adequate?
10. Is the space isolated (to prevent any ingress of dangerous substances)
before entry?

145
 Confined Space Work Checklist

1. Are internal combustion engines e.g. diesel or petrol driven pumps

placed outside the confined space?
2. Are safe means of access to and egress e.g. ladders from the
confined space provided?
3. Are safety harness and lifelines provided and used?
4. Is there a standby person to render help during an emergency?
5. Are there any means of communication between the standby
person and the person(s) inside the confined space?
6. Is the space adequately lit? If not, are torchlights provided?
7. Are safety appliances and equipment e.g. gloves, safety
shoes/boots and helmets provided?
8. What type of respiratory protection equipment if any, is available?
9. Are the supervisors and workers trained in confined space work?
10. Are emergency rescue procedures available?

146
Confined Spaces
- Ventilation

147
 Confined Spaces - Types of atmospheric Hazards

Atmospheric Hazard Example Ventilation System

Stagnant toxic airborne CO and H2S Dilution ventilation
contaminants (Purging with air)
Stagnant flammable gases or Hydrogen, Dilution ventilation
vapours Acetylene, (Purging with inert gas or
Methane steam, followed by air)

Continuous release of solvent Solvent-based LEV for localized sources

vapours paint
Dilution ventilation for
wide spread release
Continuous release of fumes Arc welding LEV for localized sources

Dilution ventilation for

wide spread release

148
 Ventilation - Airflow Rate Requirements
Airflow Rate
Atmospheric Condition
LEV System Dilution Ventilation
No toxic or flammable General ventilation
gases or vapours Q = 1.4 m3/min / person (50 cfm/person)
Stagnant pool of gases or Purging equation
vapours (toxic or 2.303 kV C1
flammable) Q = ------------- log -----
t2-t1 C2
Continuous release of Min 10 Min 30 m3/min per welder
welding fumes m3/min
/welding pt
Steady state

Continuous release of Q (cms) = k G (cms) / C

gases or vapours (toxic or 24 x SG
flammable) 24.1 x SG x E (litre per hr) x k
Q (m /h) = ---------------------------------------
3
MW x C (ppm) x 10-6 x d
149
 Dilution Ventilation
Principles & Formulas

150
 Dilution Ventilation - Principles
Principle of Material Balance

GENERATION

INFLOW Source of contaminant X OUTFLOW

Rate of Rate of generation

= Rate of inflow of _ Rate of outflow of
accumulation of
contaminant X contaminant X + of contaminant X
contaminant X

Assume clean air, inflow of

contaminant = 0

151
 Dilution Ventilation – Scenarios
Rate of accumulation = Rate of generation – Rate of removal

• Contaminants build up stage:

Rate of generation > Rate of removal
Rate of accumulation > 0
Concentration of contaminant increases overtime

• Steady state:
Rate of generation = Rate of removal
Rate of accumulation = 0
Concentration of contaminant constant (does not mean = 0)

• Purging of contaminants stage:

Rate of generation = 0
Rate of accumulation = Rate of removal
Concentration of contaminant decreases overtime
152
DV- Build Up Stage, Steady State, Purging

Steady state

Build up stage

Purging stage

153
 Dilution Ventilation - Principles

Accumulation = Generation - Removal

∆M = (G x ∆t) – (Q x C x ∆t)
V x ∆C = G x ∆t – Q x C x ∆t
V x (∆C / ∆t) = G – Q x C
V x (dC / dt) = G – Q x C

Where
M = mass of contaminant
G = rate of contaminant generation
Q = dilution air flow
V = volume of space
C = concentration of contaminant
154
 Dilution Ventilation - Formula Derivation
Accumulation rate = Generation rate - Removal rate
V x (dC / dt) = G – Q x C

dC = (G/V) x dt – (Q x C/ V) x dt

dC = {(G – Q x C)/V} x dt

{V/(G – Q x C)} x dC = dt

V x ∫ 1/(G – Q x C) = ∫ dt integrate from C1 to C2 and t1 to t2

-(V/Q) [ln (G - QxC)] =C2t2 – t1
ln(G – Q x C2) - ln(G – QCx1 C1) = - (Q/V) x (t2 – t1)

ln {(G – Q x C2) / (G – Q x C1)} = - (Q/V) x (t2 – t1)

log {(G – Q x C2) / (G – Q x C1)} = - {Q/(2.303 V)} x (t2 – t1)

G - QC2 -Q
log ------------ = ------------- (t2-t1) k is the mixing factor
G - QC1 2.303 k V 155
 Dilution Ventilation – General Equation

G - QC2 -Q
log ------------ = ------------- (t2-t1)
G - QC1 2.303 k V
G rate of generation, cfm or cms
Q rate of ventilation, cfm or cms
V volume of room, ft3 or m3
C concentration in ppm (parts per 106)
k mixing factor to account for imperfect mixing

k depends on the dilution air distribution and toxicity of the contaminants.

k ranges from 1 to >10 (1 is ideal, fully well mixed)
The higher the k factor, the less perfect the mixing, the larger the dilution air Q
required.
156
Mixing Factor k – Dilution Air Distribution

157
Mixing Factor k – Dilution Air Distribution

158
 Mixing Factor k -
Toxicity & Dilution Air Distribution

Toxicity Dilution Air Distribution

Poor Average Good Excellent
Slight 7 4 3 2

Moderate 8 5 4 3

High 11 8 7 6

159
 Mixing Factor k – Toxicity

Toxicity vs PEL

TOXICITY PELs

Highly toxic <= 100 ppm (0.1 mg/m3)

Moderately > 100 ppm , <= 500 ppm

toxic

Slightly toxic > 500 ppm (0.5 mg/m3)

PEL is not an indicator of toxicity

160
Dilution Ventilation – Build Up Stage

161
 Build up Stage - Time Taken to Build Up Concentration

G - QC2 -Q
log ------------ = -------------- (t2 - t1)
G - QC1 2.303 kV

V G - QC2
t2 – t1 = - 2.303 k ------ log ------------
Q G - QC1

If at t1 = 0 and C1 = 0

V G – QC2
t2 – t1 = - 2.303 k ----- log --------------
Q G

162
 Built Up Stage - Concentration at Time t

V G - QC2
t2 – t1 = - 2.303 k ------ log ------------
Q G - QC1

Assuming at t1 = 0, C1 = 0
V G - QC2
t2 = - k ------ ln ------------
Q G
G – QC2
ln ------------ = - Q t2 / k V
G

(G – QC2) / G = e (- Q t2 / kV)
G- QC2 = G e (-Q t2 / kV)
QC2 = G - G e (-Q t2 / kV)

G
C2 x 10-6 = ---- (1 - e (-Q t / kV)
Q

C2 is in ppm 163
Dilution Ventilation – Steady State

164
 Steady State – Dilution Q
Accumulation rate = Generation rate - Removal rate = 0
V dC/dt = G – Q x C = 0 Steady state
C concentration
Accumulation rate (V dC/dt) = 0 (constant)
Generation rate = Removal rate
G=QxC

Q = k x G / (C x 10-6)
t
Q is the dilution air in cfm or cms
G is the contaminant generation in cfm or cms
C is steady state concentration in ppm
k is the mixing factor to account for imperfect mixing
Note: Q is independent of the room dimensions V 165
Dilution Ventilation - Purging Stage

166
 Purging of Contaminants

Accumulation rate = Generation rate - Removal rate

Generation rate (G) = 0
Accumulation rate = Removal rate

G - QC2 -Q
log ------------- = ------------ (t2-t1)
G - QC1 2.303 kV

C2 -Q
log ----- = -------------- (t2-t1) C1
C1 2.303 kV
Purging stage
2.303 kV C1
t2-t1 = ------------- log ----- C2
Q C2
t1 t2
167
Purging: Concentration at Time t

2.303 k V C1
t2-t1 = --------------- log -----
Q C2

168
 Dilution for Confined Spaces
1. Always use the blowing end for dilution (use exhaust or suction end
only for localized source release i.e. as LEV hood).
2. If there are 2 or more openings, use one for blowing or supplying
outdoor air into the space and use the other for exhausting the
diluted air.
3. Locate the blower and the exhaust fan so that there is no short
circuiting and recirculation.
4. For big confined space, use air mover(s) inside the space to improve
air circulation or mixing.
5. For long confined spaces, use relay fans to move the air through.
6. For deep confined spaces with lighter than air contaminants, supply
dilution air to the bottom and exhaust the diluted air from the top.
7. For deep confined spaces with heavier than air contaminants,
supply dilution air from the top and exhaust the diluted air from the
bottom.
169
 Concentrated Exhaust - Poor Mixing

One opening; exhaust ventilation only.

Capture velocity drops to 10% of the hood face velocity;
short range of influence.
Large mixing factor k
170
 Concentrated Supply - Better Mixing

One opening only; blowing air only, no exhaust.

Capture velocity drops to 10% at 30 diameter away;
long range of influence.

171
 Recirculation and Short-circuiting

Discharged air Supply air

should not be should not be
too near to the too near to
air intake Recirculation Short-circuiting the outlet
and and opening
Poor mixing Poor mixing

To prevent re-circulating of exhaust air in a confined space that has only one opening, use
a ducting to direct fresh air to the inlet of the blower.

To prevent short-circuiting in a confined space that has only one opening, use a powerful
blower to blow clean air into the entire space through a ducting.
172
Prevention of Short-circuiting in a Confined Space
with one Opening
Short-circuiting in a Short-circuiting corrected by
Manhole adding a length of duct

No mixing poor mixing

With one opening, blowing is better than exhaust

173
 Prevention of Short-circuiting in a
Confined Space with two Openings
With two openings, both blowing and exhaust should be
provided to improve the mixing i.e. to lower the k factor.

Poor mixing
Better mixing
Poor mixing

Short-circuiting in a Tank Short-circuiting Corrected by

using a different air inlet
174
 Heavier-than-air Contaminants

Gases & vapours that are heavier than air can be drawn off from
the bottom with make up or supply air from the top.

175
 Lighter-than-air Contaminants

Gases that are lighter than air should be drawn off from the top with
make up or supply air provided from the bottom

176
 Deep Confined Space

For a deep confined space, blow the fresh air into the
bottom, and exhaust the contaminated air near the top.

177
 Long Confined Space

For a long confined space (e.g. tunnel), blow fresh air at one
end of the space and exhaust the contaminated air at the
other end.

178
Use a Series of Fans for very Long Distances or Large Areas

For a very long confined space, blow fresh air at one end of
the space and exhaust the contaminated air at the other end.
If necessary, use a series of fans to move air through long
distances.

These 2 air movers do not provide dilution air

Dilution air Q is provided by the 1st air blower, the others air
movers are merely circulating the dilution air i.e. improve the
mixing or lower the mixing factor k 179
The End

180