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De Ente et Essentia
by
Thomas Aquinas
translated as
Aquinas on Being and Essence
a translation and interpretation
1965

adapted and html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

Prooemium 1. A small mistake in the beginning is a big

Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in one in the end, according to the Philosopher in
fine, secundum philosophum in I caeli et the first book of On the Heavens and the
mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae Earth. And as Ibn-Sînâ says in the beginning
primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit of his Metaphysics, being and essence are
Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, what is first conceived by the intellect.

ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, 2. Thus, to avoid making mistakes out of
ad horum difficultatem aperiendam ignorance of them, and to become familiar with
dicendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis the difficulties they entail, we must point out
significetur et quomodo in diversis inveniatur what is signified by the words “being” and
et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones “essence,” and how they are found in diverse
logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et things, and how they are related to the logical
differentiam. intentions, genus, species, and difference.

Quia vero ex compositis simplicium 3. Since we ought to acquire knowledge of

cognitionem accipere debemus et ex what is simple from what is composed, and
posterioribus in priora devenire, ut, a come to what is prior from what is posterior, so
facilioribus incipientes, convenientior fiat that, beginning with what is easier, we may
disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad progress more suitably in learning; we ought
significationem essentiae procedendum est. proceed from the meaning of the word “being”
to that of the word “essence.”

Caput 1 4. We should notice, therefore, that the word

Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V “being,” taken without qualifiers, has two uses,
metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per se as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the
dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per Metaphysics. (1) In one way, it is used
decem genera, alio modo quod significat apropos of what is divided into the ten genera;
propositionum veritatem. Horum autem (2) in another way, it is used to signify the truth
differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici of propositions. The difference between the
ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio two is that in the second way everything about
formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. which we can form an affirmative proposition
Per quem modum privationes et negationes can be called a being, even though it posits
entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio nothing in reality. It is in this way that

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est opposita negationi et quod caecitas est in privations and negations are called beings; for
oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens we say that affirmation is opposed to negation,
nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo and that blindness is in the eye. In the first
modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia. way, however, only what posits something in
reality can be called a being. In the first way,
therefore, blindness and the like are not
beings.

Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente 5. So, the word “essence” is not taken from the
secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo word “being” used in the second way; for some
dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, things which do not have an essence are
ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur called beings in this way as is clear in the case
essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde of privations. Rather, the word “essence” is
Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens taken from the word “being” used in the first
primo modo dictum est quod significat way. It is for this reason that the Commentator
essentiam rei. says in the same place that the word “being”
used in the first way is what signifies the
essence of a real thing.

Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum 6. And because the word “being” used in this
dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod way is used apropos of what is divided into the
essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus ten genera, as we have said, the word
naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis “essence” must signify something common to
generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut all natures, by means of which (nature) diverse
humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de beings are placed into diverse genera and
aliis. species; as, for example, humanity is the
essence of man, and so with other things.

Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in 7. And because that by which a real thing is
proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod constituted in its proper genus or species is
significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid what is signified by the definition expressing
est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a what the real thing is, philosophers sometimes
philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et use the word “quiddity” for the word “essence.”
hoc est quod philosophus frequenter This is what the Philosopher often calls what
nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per something was to be, i.e., that by which it
quod aliquid habet esse quid. belongs to something to be what it is.

Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per 8. It is also called form, in the sense in which
formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque the word “form” signifies the full determination
rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II metaphysicae of each real thing, as Ibn-Sînâ says in the
suae. second book of his Metaphysics.

Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur 9. Further, it is given another name, nature,
accipiendo naturam secundum primum taking the word “nature” in the first of the four
modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in ways given by Boethius in his book On the
libro de duabus naturis assignat, secundum Two Natures. In this way, whatever can in any
scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod way be grasped by the intellect is called a
intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non nature. For a real thing is not intelligible except
enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem through its definition and essence.
et essentiam suam.

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Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in V 10. The Philosopher, too, says in the fifth book
metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est of the Metaphysics that every substance is a
natura. Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo nature. But the word “nature” taken in this way
sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, appears to signify the essence of a real thing
secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam according as it has an ordering to the thing’s
operationem rei, cum nulla res propria proper operation; and no real thing lacks a
operatione destituatur. proper operation.

Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod 11. The name “quiddity,” however, is taken
per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia from the fact that what is signified by the
dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens definition is the essence. But it is called
habet esse. essence from the fact that through it and in it a
real being has existence.

Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de 12. Because the word “being” is used
substantiis et per posterius et quasi absolutely and with priority of substances, and
secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est only posteriorly and with qualification of
quod essentia proprie et vere est in accidents, essence is in substances truly and
substantiis, sed in accidentibus est properly, in accidents only in some way with
quodammodo et secundum quid. qualification.

Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices 13. Further, some substances are simple and
et quaedam compositae, et in utrisque est some are composed, and essence is in each.
essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori But essence is in simple substances in a truer
modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius and more noble way, according to which they
habent. Sunt enim causa eorum quae also have a more noble existence; for they ─
composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima at least that simple substance which is first,
simplex, quae Deus est. Sed quia illarum and which is God ─ are the cause of those
substantiarum essentiae sunt nobis magis which are composed. But because the
occultae, ideo ab essentiis substantiarum essences of the simple substances are more
compositarum incipiendum est, ut a hidden from us, we ought to begin with the
facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina. essences of composed substances, so that we
may progress more suitably in learning from
what is easier.

In substantiis igitur compositis forma et 14. In composed substances there are form
materia nota est, ut in homine anima et and matter, for example, in man soul and
corpus. body.

Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum 15. But we cannot say that either one of them
tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim alone may be said to be the essence. That
materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, matter alone is not the essence of a real thing
quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis is clear, since through its essence a real thing
est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed is knowable and assigned to a species or to a
materia neque cognitionis principium est, genus. But matter alone is neither a principle
neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel of knowledge, nor is it that by which something
speciem determinatur, sed secundum id is assigned to a genus or to a species; rather a
quod aliquid actu est. thing is so assigned by reason of its being
something actual.

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Neque etiam forma tantum essentia 16. Neither can the form alone of a composed
substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis substance be said to be its essence, although
hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim some try to assert this. For it is evident from
quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, what has been said that essence is what is
quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. signified by the definition of a real thing. And
Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium the definition of natural substances contains
non tantum formam continet, sed etiam not only form, but matter as well; otherwise
materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales natural definitions and mathematical ones
et mathematicae non differrent. would not differ.

Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione 17. Neither can it be said that matter is placed
substantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum in the definition of a natural substance as
essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, something added to its essence or as
quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est something outside its essence, because this
accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non mode of definition is proper to accidents,
habent. Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua which do not have a perfect essence. This is
subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus why accidents must include in their definition a
eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia subject which is outside their genus. It is clear
comprehendit materiam et formam. therefore that essence includes matter and
form.

Non autem potest dici quod essentia 18. Further, neither can it be said that essence
significet relationem, quae est inter materiam signifies some relation between matter and
et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, form or something added to them, because
quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et this would of necessity be an accident or
extraneum a re nec per eam res something extraneous to the real thing, and
cognosceretur, quae omnia essentiae the real thing would not be known through it.
conveniunt. Per formam enim, quae est And these are traits of essence. For through
actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et the form, which is the actuality of matter,
hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit matter becomes something actual and
non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed something individual. Whence what
esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, supervenes does not confer on matter actual
ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando existence simply, but such an actual existence;
talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari as accidents in fact do. Whiteness, for
simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Relinquitur example, makes something actually white.
ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis Whence the acquisition of such a form is not
compositis significat id quod ex materia et called generation simply, but generation in a
forma compositum est. certain respect. It remains, therefore, that the
word “essence” in composed substances
signifies that which is composed of matter and
form.

Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in 19. Boethius is in agreement with this in his
commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod commentary on the Predicaments, where he
usia significat compositum. Usia enim apud says that ousia signifies the composite. For
Graecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ousia in Greek is the same as essentia in
ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis. Latin, as he himself says in his book On the
Avicenna etiam dicit quod quiditas Two Natures. Ibn-Sînâ, too, says that the
substantiarum compositarum est ipsa quiddity of composed substances is the
compositio formae et materiae. composition itself of form and matter. And the
Commentator etiam dicit super VII Commentator, likewise, in his considerations
metaphysicae: natura quam habent species on the seventh book of the Metaphysics says:

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in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, “The nature which species have in generable
id est compositum ex materia et forma. things is something in between, i.e., composed
of matter and form.”

Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse 20. Reason, too, is in accord with this,
substantiae compositae non est tantum because the existence of a composed
formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius substance is not the existence of the form
compositi. Essentia autem est secundum alone nor of the matter alone, but of the
quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod composite itself; and essence is that according
essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non to which a real thing is said to be. Whence it is
tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed necessary that the essence, whereby a real
utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo thing is denominated a being, be neither the
modo sola forma sit causa. form alone nor the matter alone, but both,
although the form alone in its own way is the
cause of such existence.

Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus 21. We see the same in other things which are
principiis constituuntur, quod res non constituted of a plurality of principles, namely,
denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum that the real thing is not denominated from one
tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque of these principles alone, but from what
complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex includes both, as is evident in the case of
actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur tastes. Sweetness, for example, is caused by
dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit the action of what is hot dispersing what is
causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur moist; and although heat in this way is the
corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui cause of sweetness, a body is not
calidum et humidum complectitur. denominated sweet from heat, but from the
taste which includes what is hot and what is
moist.

Sed quia individuationis principium materia 22. But matter is the principle of individuation.
est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, From this it might perhaps appear to follow
quae materiam in se complectitur simul et that an essence which includes in itself matter
formam, sit tantum particularis et non along with form is only particular and not
universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universal. And from this it would follow that
universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si universals would not have a definition, if
essentia est id quod per diffinitionem essence is that which is signified by a
significatur. definition.

Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non 23. We should notice, therefore, that the
quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principle of individuation is not matter taken in
principium, sed solum materia signata. Et just any way whatever, but only designated
dico materiam signatam, quae sub matter. And I call that matter designated which
determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. is considered under determined dimensions.
Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in Such matter is not placed in the definition of
quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed man as man, but it would be placed in the
poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si Socrates definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a
diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem definition. Rather, it is non-designated matter
hominis ponitur materia non signata; non which. is placed in the definition of man; for
enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et this bone and this flesh are not placed in the
haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae definition of man, but bone and flesh
sunt materia hominis non signata. absolutely. These latter are man’s

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non-designated matter.

Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et 24. It is clear, therefore, that the essence of
essentia Socratis non differunt nisi man and the essence of Socrates do not differ,
secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde except as the non-designated from the
Commentator dicit super VII metaphysicae: designated. Whence the Commentator says in
Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et his considerations on the seventh book of the
rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius. Metaphysics that “Socrates is nothing other
than animality and rationality, which are his
quiddity.”

Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei 25. The essence of the genus and that of the
secundum signatum et non signatum species also differ in this way, i.e., as the
differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis non-designated from the designated, although
sit utrobique, quia designatio individui the mode of the designation differs in each
respectu speciei est per materiam case. Whereas the designation of the
determinatam dimensionibus, designatio individual with respect to the species is
autem speciei respectu generis est per through matter determined by dimensions, the
differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei designation of the species with respect to the
sumitur. genus is through the constitutive difference
which is taken from the form of the thing.

Haec autem determinatio vel designatio, 26. This designation which is in the species
quae est in specie respectu generis, non est with respect to the genus is not through
per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens, something in the essence of the species which
quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, is in no way in the essence of the genus;
immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in rather, whatever is in the species is also in the
genere ut non determinatum. Si enim animal genus, but as undetermined. For, if animal
non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars were not the whole that man is, but a part of
eius, non praedicaretur de eo, cum nulla man, it would not be predicated of man, since
pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur. no integral part may be predicated of its whole.

Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, 27. We can see how this comes about if we
si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus examine how body taken as part of animal
secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et differs from body taken as genus; for body
secundum quod ponitur genus. Non enim cannot be a genus in the same way in which
potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars body is an integral part.
integralis. Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus
multipliciter accipi potest.

Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere 28. The word “body” can be taken in many
substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem ways. Body according as it is in the genus
naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres substance is so called from the fact that it has
dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones a nature such that three dimensions can be
designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere designated in it; but the three designated
quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod dimensions themselves are a body according
habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem as body is in the genus quantity. Now, it
etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in happens in things that what has one perfection
homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et may also attain to further perfection. This is
ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super clear, for example, in man who has a sensitive
hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem nature, and further an intellectual nature.

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formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones Similarly, another perfection, such as life or

designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut some other such perfection, can be added to
vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc the perfection of having a form such that three
nomen corpus significare rem quandam, dimensions can be designated in it. The word
quae habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in “body,” therefore can signify some real thing
ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum which has a form from which follows the
praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla possibility of designating in it three
ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud dimensions, and signify this in an excluding
superadditur, sit praeter significationem way, i.e., in such a way such that no further
corporis sic dicti. Et hoc modo corpus erit perfection may follow from that form; in a way
integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic such that if anything be added, it is outside the
anima erit praeter id quod significatum est signification of body. Taken in this way, body
nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi will be an integral and material part of animal
corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet because soul will be outside what is signified
anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus by the word “body”; the soul will be something
constituetur animal. over and above the body, in a way such that
animal is constituted out of these two as out of
parts, i.e., out of soul and body.

Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo 29. The word “body” can also be taken in
accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae another way, namely, to signify a thing which
habet talem formam, ex qua tres has a form such that three dimensions can be
dimensiones possunt in ea designari, designated in it, no matter what sort of form it
quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit is, whether some further perfection can come
provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. from it or not. And taken in this way, body will
Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia be a genus of animal, because there is nothing
in animali nihil est accipere quod non in animal which is not implicitly contained in
implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim body. Soul is not a form other than the form
anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re through which three dimensions could be
illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et designated in that thing; thus, when we said
ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod that body is that which has a form such that
habet talem formam, ex qua possunt because of it three dimensions can be
designari tres dimensiones in eo, designated in the body, form meant any form,
intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive whether animality or stoneness, or any other
animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque form. And so the form of animal is implicitly
alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma contained in the form of body, when body is its
corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus genus.
eius.

Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad 30. And such likewise is the relation of animal
hominem. Si enim animal nominaret tantum to man. For, if animal were to name only that
rem quandam, quae habet talem thing which has a perfection such that it can
perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per sense and be moved by a principle within
principium in ipso existens cum praecisione itself, and name this thing as excluding other
alterius perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfection, then any further perfection would
perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad be related to animal as a part, and not as
animal per modum partis et non sicut implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and
implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic so, animal would not be a genus. Animal is a
animal non esset genus; sed est genus genus according as it signifies a thing from
secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex whose form the senses and movement can
cuius forma potest provenire sensus et come forth, no matter what sort of form it is,
motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit whether a sensible soul only or a soul which is

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anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et both sensible and rational.

rationalis simul.

Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum 31. The genus, thus, signifies indeterminately
id quod est in specie, non enim significat everything that is in the species; it does not
tantum materiam; similiter etiam differentia signify the matter alone. Similarly, the
significat totum et non significat tantum difference, too, signifies everything in the
formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et species, and not the form alone; the definition,
etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode, too, signifies the whole, and so does the
species, but in diverse ways.

quia genus significat totum ut quaedam 32. The genus signifies the whole as a name
denominatio determinans id quod est determining what is material in the real thing
materiale in re sine determinatione propriae without the determination of the proper form.
formae. Unde genus sumitur ex materia, Whence the genus is taken from the matter,
quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod although it is not the matter. And from this it is
corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem clear that a body is called a body from the fact
perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres that it has a perfection such that three
dimensiones; quae quidem perfectio est dimensions can be designated in the body,
materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem and that this perfection is related materially to
perfectionem. further perfection.

Differentia vero e converso est sicut 33. The difference, on the contrary, is a name
quaedam denominatio a forma determinate taken from a determinate form, and taken in a
sumpta praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu determinate way, i.e. as not including a
eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum determinate matter in its meaning. This is
dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet clear, for example, when we say animated,
animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, i.e., that which has a soul; for what it is,
utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit whether a body or something other, is not
Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in expressed. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the
differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed genus is not understood in the difference as a
solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam part of its essence, but only as something
subiectum est de intellectu passionum. Et outside its essence, as the subject also is
ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de understood in its properties. And this is why
differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit the genus is not predicated essentially of the
philosophus in III metaphysicae et in IV difference, as the Philosopher says in the third
topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum book of the Metaphysics and in the fourth book
praedicatur de passione. of the Topics, but only in the way in which a
subject is predicated of its property.

Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit 34. The definition, lastly, and the species
utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, include both, namely the determinate matter
quam designat nomen generis, et which the name of the genus designates, and
determinatam formam, quam designat the determinate form which the name of the
nomen differentiae. difference designates.

Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et 35. From this it is clear why the genus, the
differentia se habent proportionaliter ad difference, and the species are related
materiam et formam et compositum in proportionately to the matter, to the form, and
natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, to the composite in the real world, although
they are not identical with them.

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quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia 36. The genus is not the matter, but taken from
sumptum ut significans totum, neque the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the
differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut difference the form, but taken from the form as
significans totum. signifying the whole.

Unde dicimus hominem esse animal 37. Whence we say that man is a rational
rationale et non ex animali et rationali, sicut animal, and not that man is made up of animal
dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex and rational as we say that man is made up of
anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, soul and body. Man is said to be composed of
sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res tertia soul and body as some third thing constituted
constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo of two other things, and which is neither of
enim neque est anima neque corpus. Sed si them. For man is neither soul nor body. But if
homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali man may be said in some way to be
esse dicatur, non erit sicut res tertia ex composed of animal and rational, it will not be
duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex as a third thing out of two other things, but as
duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim a third concept out of two other concepts. For
animalis est sine determinatione specialis the concept “animal” is without the
formae, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod determination of the form of the species, and it
est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. expresses the nature of a thing from that
Intellectus autem huius differentiae rationalis which is material in relation to the ultimate
consistit in determinatione formae specialis. perfection. But the concept of the difference
Ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur “rational” consists in the determination of the
intellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo form of the species. And from these two
sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit concepts the concept of the species or of the
praedicationem earum rerum, ex quibus definition is constituted. And thus just as the
constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit constituents of a real thing are not predicated
praedicationem eorum intellectuum, ex of that real thing, so too the concepts which
quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus quod are constituents of another concept are not
diffinitio sit genus aut differentia. predicated of that concept; for we do not say
that the definition is the genus or the
difference.

Quamvis autem genus significet totam 38. Although the genus signifies the whole
essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut essence of the species, it is not necessary that
diversarum specierum, quarum est idem the diverse species in a same genus have one
genus, sit una essentia, essence.

quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione 39. For the oneness of the genus proceeds
vel indifferentia procedit, non autem ita, quod from its very indetermination or indifference;
illud quod significatur per genus sit una not however in such a way that what is
natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui signified by the genus is some numerically one
superveniat res alia, quae sit differentia nature found in diverse species, and to which
determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat another thing supervenes, namely the
materiam, quae est una numero, sed quia difference, determining the genus as form
genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determines matter which is numerically one. It
determinate hanc vel illam, quam is rather because the genus signifies some
determinate differentia exprimit, quae non form, not determinately this form or that form,
est alia quam illa, quae indeterminate which the difference expresses determinately,
significabatur per genus. but which is not other than the form which was
indeterminately signified by the genus.

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Et ideo dicit Commentator in XI 40. This is why the Commentator says in his
metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una considerations on the eleventh book of the
per remotionem omnium formarum, sed Metaphysics that prime matter is said to be
genus dicitur unum per communitatem one by reason of the removal of all forms,
formae significatae. whereas the genus is said to be one by reason
of the commonness of the designated form.

Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae 41. Whence, it is clear that when one adds the
remota illa indeterminatione, quae erat difference and removes that indetermination
causa unitatis generis, remanent species per which was the cause of the oneness of the
essentiam diversae. genus, there remain species which are diverse
in essence.

Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est 42. The nature of the species, as we have
indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura said, is indeterminate in relation to the
generis respectu speciei, individual, as the nature of the genus is
indeterminate in relation to the species.

inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout 43. Because of this, just as that which is a
praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua genus, as predicated of the species, implies in
significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum its signification, though indistinctly, everything
quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et that is determinately in the species; so too that
id quod est species, secundum quod which is a species, according as it is
praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod predicated of the individual, must signify,
significet totum id quod est essentialiter in though indistinctly, everything which is
individuo, licet indistincte. essentially in the individual.

Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur 44. And it is in this way that the essence of the
nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate species is signified by the word “man”; whence
praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura man is predicated of Socrates. But if the
speciei cum praecisione materiae nature of the species is signified as excluding
designatae, quae est principium designated matter, which is the principle of
individuationis, sic se habebit per modum individuation, it will be as a part; and in this
partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine way it is signified by the word “humanity,” for
humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id humanity signifies that by which man is man;
unde homo est homo. Materia autem and it is not the case that man is man by
designata non est id unde homo est homo; reason of designated matter. And so
et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex designated matter is in no way included
quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum among the things by which man is man. Since,
ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat therefore, humanity includes in its concept
tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit only those things by which man is man, it is
homo, patet quod a significatione eius clear that designated matter is excluded from
excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata. or is cut out of its signification. And because a
Et quia pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est part is not predicated of its whole, humanity is
quod humanitas nec de homine nec de not predicated of man, nor is it predicated of
Socrate praedicatur. Socrates.

Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi 45. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the quiddity of
non est ipsum compositum, cuius est a composite is not the composite itself whose
quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit quiddity it is, even though the quiddity too is
composita, sicut humanitas, licet sit composed. Humanity, for example, though

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composita, non est homo, immo oportet composed, is not man; it must be received into
quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia something which is designated matter.
designata.

Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei 46. As we have said, the designation of the
respectu generis est per formam, designatio species with respect to the genus is through
autem individui respectu speciei est per forms, whereas the designation of the
materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans individual with respect to the species is
id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum through matter. This is why the word which
praecisione formae determinatae perficientis signifies that from which the nature of the
speciem significet partem materialem totius, genus is taken, and signifies it as excluding
sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. the determinate form which perfects the
Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur species, must signify a material part of the
natura speciei cum praecisione materiae whole, as, for example, body is a material part
designatae, significat partem formalem. of man. But the word which signifies that from
which the nature of the species is taken, and
signifies it as excluding designated matter,
signifies a formal part.

Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma 47. And thus humanity is signified as a certain
quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, form, and it is said to be the form of the whole,
non quidem quasi superaddita partibus not indeed as something added to the
essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, essential parts, namely to form and matter, as
sicut forma domus superadditur partibus the form of a house is added to its integral
integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae parts; rather, it is a form which is a whole, that
est totum scilicet formam complectens et is, a form which includes both form and matter,
materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, but which excludes those things by reason of
per quae nata est materia designari. which matter can be designated.

Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis 48. It is clear, therefore, that the word “man”
significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen and the word “humanity” signify the essence of
humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, man, but diversely, as we have said; the word
quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut “man” signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it
totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit does not exclude designation by matter, but
designationem materiae, sed implicite, contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as we
continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est have said before that the genus contains the
quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo difference. And this is why the word “man” is
praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. predicated of individuals. But the word
Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut “humanity” signifies it as a part, because it
partem, quia non continet in significatione contains in its signification only what belongs
sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est to man as man, and it excludes all designation
homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. by matter. Whence it is not predicated of
Unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur. individual men.

Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae 49. And this is why the word “essence” is
quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, sometimes found predicated of a real thing, for
dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and
quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut sometimes it is denied, as when we say that
dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.
Socrates.

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Caput 2 50. Having seen what is signified by the word

Viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae “essence” in composed substances, we must
in substantiis compositis videndum est see how a composed essence is related to the
quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis, notion of the genus, of the species, and of the
speciei et differentiae. difference.

Quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel 51. Because that to which the notion of the
speciei vel differentiae, praedicatur de hoc genus, or of the species, or of the difference,
singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio belongs is predicated of this designated
universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, singular, it is impossible that the notion of a
conveniat essentiae secundum quod per universal ─ e.g., of the genus or of the species
modum partis significatur, ut nomine ─ belong to an essence according as it is
humanitatis vel animalitatis. Et ideo dicit signified a part, as by the word “humanity” or
Avicenna quod rationalitas non est “animality.” And this is why Ibn-Sînâ says that
differentia, sed differentiae principium; et rationality is not a difference, but the principle
eadem ratione humanitas non est species of a difference. And for the same reason
nec animalitas genus. humanity is not a species, and animality not a
genus.

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio 52. Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion
generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, of the genus, or of the species, belongs to an
secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens essence as to some real thing existing outside
extra singularia, ut Platonici ponebant, quia singular things, as the Platonists held,
sic genus et species non praedicarentur de because in this way the genus and the species
hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod would not be predicated of this individual; for it
Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est; cannot be said that Socrates is what is
nec iterum illud separatum proficeret in separated from him. Nor, further, would this
cognitionem huius singularis. separated something be of any use in knowing
this singular.

Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel 53. Whence it remains that the notion of the
speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod genus, or of the species, belongs to an
significatur per modum totius, ut nomine essence according as it is signified as a whole,
hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et as by the word “man” or “animal” according as
indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in it contains implicitly and indistinctly everything
individuo est. that is in the individual.

Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest 54. Now, a nature or essence signified as a
dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum whole can be considered in two ways. In one
rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta way it can be considered according to its
consideratio ipsius. Et hoc modo nihil est proper content, and this is an absolute
verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi consideration of it. And in this way nothing is
secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde quicquid true of it except what belongs to it as such;
aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. whence if anything else is attributed to it, the
Verbi gratia, homini in eo quod est homo attribution is false. For example, to man as
convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in man belong rational and animal, and whatever
diffinitione eius cadunt. Album vero aut else falls in his definition. But white or black, or
nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est anything of this sort, which is not of the
de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini content of humanity, does not belong to man
in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum as man. Whence, if one should ask whether
ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel the nature so considered can be said to be

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plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia one or many, neither should be allowed,
utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et because each is outside the content of
utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim humanity and either can be added to it. For if
pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam plurality were of its content, it could never be
posset esse una, cum tamen una sit one, as it is in Socrates. Similarly, if oneness
secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter si were of its content, then the nature of Socrates
unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una and Plato would be one and the same, and it
et eadem Socratis et Platonis nec posset in could not be plurified into many individuals.
pluribus plurificari.

Alio modo consideratur secundum esse 55. In the other way an essence is considered
quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de ipsa according to the existence it has in this or that.
aliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius, When the essence is so considered,
in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, something is predicated of it accidentally, by
quia Socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non reason of that in which it is; for example, it is
conveniat homini in eo quod homo. said that man is white because Socrates is
white, although to be white does not belong to
man as man.

Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum 56. This nature has a twofold existence, one in
in singularibus et aliud in anima, et singular things, the other in the soul; and
secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam accidents follow upon the nature according to
naturam accidentia. Et in singularibus etiam either existence. In singular things it has a
habet multiplex esse secundum singularium multiple existence in accord with the diversity
diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum of these singular things; yet the existence of
suam primam considerationem, scilicet none of these things belongs to the nature
absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. considered in itself, i.e., absolutely. For it is
Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia false to say that the nature of man, as such,
hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse has existence in this singular thing; because if
in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari existence in this singular thing belonged to
conveniret homini in quantum est homo, man as man, man would never exist outside
nunquam esset extra hoc singulare. Similiter this singular thing. Similarly, if it belonged to
etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est man as man not to exist in this singular thing,
homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam man would never exist in it. But it is true to say
esset in eo. Sed verum est dicere quod that it does not belong to man as man to exist
homo non in quantum est homo habet quod in this or that singular thing, or in the soul. It is
sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima. clear, therefore, that the nature of man,
Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute absolutely considered, abstracts from any of
considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita these existences, but in a way such that it
tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius excludes no one of them.
eorum.

Et haec natura sic considerata est quae 57. And it is the nature so considered which is
praedicatur de individuis omnibus. Non predicated of all individuals. Yet it cannot be
tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis said that the notion of a universal belongs to
conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de the nature so considered, because oneness
ratione universalis est unitas et communitas. and commonness are of the notion of a
Naturae autem humanae neutrum horum universal. Neither of these belongs to human
convenit secundum suam absolutam nature considered absolutely, for if
considerationem. Si enim communitas esset commonness were of the content of man,
de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque commonness would be found in whatever
inveniretur humanitas inveniretur thing humanity is found. And this is false,

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communitas. Et hoc falsum est, quia in because in Socrates there is no commonness,

Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, but whatever is in him is individuated.
sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum.

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio 58. Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion
generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae of the genus or of the species attaches to
secundum esse quod habet in individuis, human nature according as it has existence in
quia non invenitur in individuis natura individuals, because human nature is not
humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum found in individuals with a oneness such that it
quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio would be some one thing belonging to all,
universalis exigit. which the notion of a universal requires.

Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat 59. It remains, therefore, that the notion of the
naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod species attaches to human nature according to
habet in intellectu. the existence it has in the intellect.

Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet 60. For human nature exists in the intellect in
esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus, abstraction from all that individuates; and this
et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia is why it has a content which is the same in
individua, quae sunt extra animam, prout relation to all individual men outside the soul; it
aequaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in is equally the likeness of all of them, and leads
omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt to a knowledge of all insofar as they are men.
homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem And it is from the fact that the nature has such
habet ad omnia individua intellectus a relation to all individuals that the intellect
adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. discovers and attributes the notion of the
Unde dicit Commentator in principio de species to it. Whence the Commentator says
anima quod intellectus est qui agit in his considerations on the first book of On
universalitatem in rebus. Hoc etiam the Soul that “it is the intellect which causes
Avicenna dicit in sua metaphysica. universality in things.” Ibn-Sînâ, too, says this
in his Metaphysics.

Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat 61. And although the intellectually grasped
rationem universalis secundum quod nature has the character of a universal
comparatur ad res extra animam, quia est according as it is compared to things outside
una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum the soul, because it is one likeness of all of
quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo them; still according as it exists in this intellect
est quaedam species intellecta particularis. or in that one, it is something particular ─ a
Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris in III particular species grasped by a particular
de anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellect. From this one can see the weakness
intellectae unitatem intellectus in omnibus of what the Commentator says in his
hominibus concludere, quia non est considerations of the third book of On the
universalitas illius formae secundum hoc Soul; from the universality of the intellectually
esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum grasped form he wanted to conclude that there
quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum, is one intellect in all men. This falls short of the
truth because the intellectually grasped form
has its universality not according to the
existence which it has in an intellect, but
according as it is related to real things as a
likeness of them.

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sicut etiam, si esset una statua corporalis 62. What is true here is like what would be true
repraesentans multos homines, constat quod of a corporeal statue representing many men:
illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse the image or form of the statue would have its
singulare et proprium secundum quod esset own and individual existence according as it
in hac materia, sed haberet rationem exists in this matter, and it would have the
communitatis secundum quod esset character of commonness according as it is
commune repraesentativum plurium. the common representation of many.

Et quia naturae humanae secundum suam 63. Further, because it belongs to human
absolutam considerationem convenit quod nature absolutely considered to be predicated
praedicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non of Socrates, and because the notion of the
convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam species does not belong to it absolutely
considerationem, sed est de accidentibus, considered but is among the accidents which
quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, follow upon it according to the existence it has
quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei in the intellect, one can see why the word
non praedicatur de Socrate, ut dicatur: “species” is not predicated of Socrates, i.e.,
Socrates est species, quod de necessitate why it is not said that “Socrates is a species.”
accideret, si ratio speciei conveniret homini This would of necessity be said if the notion of
secundum esse, quod habet in Socrate vel the species belonged to man according to the
secundum suam considerationem existence which man has in Socrates; or, if the
absolutam, scilicet in quantum est homo. notion of the species belonged to man
Quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum absolutely considered, i.e., to man as man, for
est homo praedicatur de Socrate. whatever belongs to man as man is predicated
of Socrates.

Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, 64. Still, to be predicated belongs to the genus
cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. Praedicatio in virtue of what it is, since this is placed in its
enim est quiddam, quod completur per definition. For predication is something which
actionem intellectus componentis et is achieved by the combining and dividing
dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa activity of the intellect, and which has for its
unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero foundation in the real thing the union of those
dicitur. Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest things, one of which is said of another.
claudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est Whence the notion of predicability can be
genus, quae similiter per actum intellectus included in the notion of that intention which is
completur. Nihilominus tamen id, cui the genus, which (intention) is similarly
intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis achieved by the activity of the intellect.
attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non est Nonetheless, that to which the intellect,
ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, cui combining one thing with another, attributes
intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut the intention of predicability is not the intention
quod significatur hoc nomine animal. of the genus itself; rather it is that to which the
intellect attributes the intention of the genus,
for example, that which is signified by the word
“animal.”

Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se 65. It is clear, therefore, how an essence or
habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei nature is related to the notion of the species.
non est de his, quae conveniunt ei The notion of the species is not among the
secundum suam absolutam things which belong to the nature absolutely
considerationem, neque est de accidentibus, considered, nor is it among the accidents
quae consequuntur ipsam secundum esse, which follow upon the nature according to the
quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et existence it has outside the soul, as whiteness
nigredo, sed est de accidentibus, quae or blackness. Rather the notion of the species

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consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod is among the accidents which follow upon the
habet in intellectu, et per hunc modum nature according to the existence it has in the
convenit etiam sibi ratio generis vel intellect; and it is in this way, too, that the
differentiae. notion of the genus and of the difference
belong to it.

Caput 3 66. It remains, now, for us to see in what way

Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essence is in separated substances, namely,
essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in in the soul, in the intelligences, and in the First
anima, intelligentia et causa prima. Cause.

Quamvis autem simplicitatem causae primae 67. Although everyone admits the simplicity of
omnes concedant, tamen compositionem the First Cause, some try to introduce a
formae et materiae quidam nituntur inducere composition of matter and form in the
in intelligentias et in animam, cuius positionis intelligences and in souls. The originator of
auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri this position appears to have been Ibn-Gabirol,
fontis vitae. author of the book Fountain of Life.

Hoc autem dictis philosophorum communiter 68. But this is not in agreement with what
repugnat, qui eas substantias a materia philosophers commonly say, because they call
separatas nominant et absque omni materia them substances separated from matter, and
esse probant. Cuius demonstratio potissima prove them to be without all matter. The
est ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est. strongest demonstration of this is from the
Videmus enim formas non esse intelligibiles power of understanding which is in them. For
in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a we see that forms are not actually intelligible
materia et a condicionibus eius; nec except according as they are separated from
efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu, nisi per matter and from its conditions; nor are they
virtutem substantiae intelligentis secundum made actually intelligible except by the power
quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum quod of a substance understanding them, according
aguntur per eam. as they are received into, and are affected by,
that substance.

Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantia 69. Whence it is necessary that there be in
intelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, any intelligent substance a total freedom from
ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui matter, such that the substance does not have
neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in matter as a part of itself, such too that the
materia, ut est de formis materialibus. substance is not a form impressed on matter,
as is the case with material forms.

Nec potest aliquis dicere quod 70. Nor can it be said that it is only corporeal
intelligibilitatem non impediat materia matter that impedes intelligibility, and not any
quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si matter whatsoever. For if this were so by
enim hoc esset ratione materiae corporalis reason of corporeal matter alone, then it would
tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis have to be that matter impedes intelligibility by
nisi secundum quod stat sub forma corporali, reason of the corporeal form, since matter is
tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, called corporeal only according as it is found
scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma under the corporeal form. But this cannot be ─
corporali. Et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa namely, that matter impedes intelligibility by
etiam forma corporalis actu intelligibilis est, reason of the corporeal form ─ because the
sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a corporeal form itself, just as other forms, is
materia abstrahitur. Unde in anima vel in actually intelligible according as it is abstracted

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intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex from matter. Whence there is in no way a
materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur composition of matter and form in the soul or
essentia in eis sicut in substantiis in an intelligence if matter in them is taken in
corporalibus, the sense in which matter is taken in corporeal
substances.

sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. Unde 71. But there is in them a composition of form
in commento IX propositionis libri de causis and existence. Whence it is said, in the
dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam commentary on the ninth proposition of the
et esse, et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa Book on Causes, that “an intelligence is
quiditate vel natura simplici. something having form and existence,” and
form is taken there for the simple quiddity or
nature itself.

Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre. 72. It is easy to see how this may be so.
Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem Whatever things are so related to one another
quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud that one is a cause of the other’s existence,
quod habet rationem causae potest habere the one which is the cause can have existence
esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis without the other, but not conversely. Now the
autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, relation of matter and form is such that form
quia forma dat esse materiae. Et ideo gives existence to matter. It is impossible,
impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua therefore, that matter exist without some form.
forma. Tamen non est impossibile esse But it is not impossible that some form exist
aliquam formam sine materia. Forma enim without matter, for form, to the extent that it is
non habet in eo quod est forma form, does not depend on matter. But if some
dependentiam ad materiam, sed si forms are found which cannot exist except in
inveniantur aliquae formae, quae non matter, this happens to them because of their
possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis distance from the first principle, which is first
secundum quod sunt distantes a primo and pure act. Whence those forms which are
principio, quod est actus primus et purus. nearest to the first principle are forms
Unde illae formae, quae sunt subsisting of themselves, that is without
propinquissimae primo principio, sunt formae matter. For not every sort of form needs
per se sine materia subsistentes (non enim matter, as has been said; and the intelligences
forma secundum totum genus suum materia are forms of this sort. And therefore it is not
indiget, ut dictum est) et huiusmodi formae necessary that the essences or quiddities of
sunt intelligentiae. Et ideo non oportet ut these substances be other than form itself.
essentiae vel quiditates harum
substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma.

In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae 73. Thus the essence of a composed
compositae et substantiae simplicis quod substance and that of a simple substance
essentia substantiae compositae non est differ in this: the essence of a composed
tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et substance is not form alone, but includes form
materiam, essentia autem substantiae and matter; the essence of a simple substance
simplicis est forma tantum. is form alone.

Et ex hoc causantur duae aliae differentiae: 74. And from this follow two other differences.
una est quod essentia substantiae One difference is that the essence of a
compositae potest significari ut totum vel ut composed substance can be signified as a
pars, quod accidit propter materiae whole or as a part. This happens on account
designationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non of the designation of matter, as has been said.

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quolibet modo praedicatur essentia rei And therefore the essence of a composed
compositae de ipsa re composita; non enim thing is not predicated of the composed thing
potest dici quod homo sit quiditas sua. Sed itself in just any way, for it cannot be said that
essentia rei simplicis, quae est sua forma, man is his quiddity. But the essence of a
non potest significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil simple thing, which (essence) is its form,
sit ibi praeter formam quasi formam cannot be signified except as a whole, since
recipiens; et ideo quocumque modo sumatur nothing is there besides the form as receiving
essentia substantiae simplicis de ea the form. Thus, no matter what way the
praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod essence of a simple substance is taken, it is
quiditas simplicis est ipsummet simplex, quia predicated of the simple substance. Whence
non est aliquid aliud recipiens ipsam. Ibn-Sînâ says that the quiddity of a simple
thing is the simple thing itself, because there is
nothing other receiving the quiddity.

Secunda differentia est quod essentiae 75; The second difference is that the essences
rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur of composed things, because they are
in materia designata multiplicantur received into designated matter, are multiplied
secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit according to its division. And this is why it
quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa happens that certain things are the same in
numero. Sed cum essentia simplicis non sit species and diverse in number. But since the
recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis essence of a simple thing is not received into
multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non matter, such a multiplication is impossible
inveniantur in illis substantiis plura individua here. And this is why, of necessity, many
eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua, individuals of a same species are not found
tot sunt ibi species, ut Avicenna expresse among these substances; rather, as Ibn-Sînâ
dicit. expressly says, there are among them as
many species as there are individuals.

Huiusmodi ergo substantiae quamvis sint 76. Although substances of this sort are forms
formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in alone without matter, they are not utterly
eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus simple so as to be pure act. They have an
purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae. admixture of potency, which becomes clear in
Et hoc sic patet. the following consideration.

Quicquid enim non est de intellectu 77. Whatever is not of the understood content
essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens of an essence or quality is something which
extra et faciens compositionem cum comes from without and makes a composition
essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae with the essence, because no essence can be
sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis understood without the things which are parts
autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi of it. Now, every essence or quiddity can be
sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse understood without anything being understood
suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo about its existence. For I can understand what
vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse a man is, or what a phoenix is, and yet not
habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod know whether they have existence in the real
esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, nisi world. It is clear, therefore, that existence is
forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps
suum esse; there exists a thing whose quiddity is its
existence.

et haec res non potest esse nisi una et 78. And there can be but one such thing, the
prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio First Thing, because it is impossible to plurify a

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alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius thing except: (1) by the addition of some
differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis difference, as the nature of the genus is
in species, vel per hoc quod forma recipitur multiplied in its species, or (2) by the reception
in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura of a form into diverse matters, as the nature of
speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc the species is multiplied in diverse individuals,
quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo or (3) by this: that one is absolute and the
receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor other is received into something; for example,
separatus, esset alius a calore non separato if there were a separated heat, it would by
ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur virtue of its very separation be other than heat
aliqua res, quae sit esse tantum, ita ut ipsum which is not separated. Now, if we posit a thing
esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet which is existence alone, such that this
additionem differentiae, quia iam non esset existence is subsistent, this existence will not
esse tantum, sed esse et praeter hoc forma receive the addition of a difference because it
aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem would no longer be existence alone, but
materiae, quia iam esset esse non existence plus some form. And much less will
subsistens sed materiale. it receive the addition of matter because it
would no longer be a subsistent existence, but
a material existence. Whence it remains that
such a thing, which is its own existence,
cannot be but one.

Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit 79. Whence it is necessary, that in every thing
suum esse, non potest esse nisi una. Unde other than this one its existence be other than
oportet quod in qualibet alia re praeter eam its quiddity, or its nature, or its form. Whence it
aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel is necessary that existence in the intelligences
natura seu forma sua. Unde oportet quod in be something besides the form, and this is
intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam; et ideo why it was said that an intelligence is form and
dictum est quod intelligentia est forma et existence.
esse.

Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est 80. Now, whatever belongs to a thing is either
causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut caused by the principles of its nature, as the
risibile in homine, vel advenit ab aliquo ability to laugh in man, or comes to it from
principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from
influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod the influence of the sun. But it cannot be that
ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel the existence of a thing is caused by the form
quiditate rei (dico sicut a causa efficiente) or quiddity of that thing ─ I say caused as by
quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et an efficient cause ─ because then something
aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod would be its own cause, and would bring itself
est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis into existence, which is impossible. It is
talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura therefore necessary that every such thing, the
sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne, quod existence of which is other than its nature,
est per aliud, reducitur ad illud quod est per have its existence from some other thing. And
se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit because every thing which exists by virtue of
aliqua res, quae sit causa essendi omnibus another is led back, as to its first cause, to that
rebus, eo quod ipsa est esse tantum. Alias which exists by virtue of itself, it is necessary
iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res, that there be some thing which is the cause of
quae non est esse tantum, habeat causam the existence of all things because it is
sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod existence alone. Otherwise, there would be an
intelligentia est forma et esse et quod esse infinite regress among causes, since every
habet a primo ente, quod est esse tantum. Et thing which is not existence alone has a cause
hoc est causa prima, quae Deus est. of its existence, as has been said. It is clear,

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therefore, that an intelligence is form and

existence, and that it has existence from the
First Being, which is existence alone. And this
is the First Cause, which is God.

Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est 81. Now everything which receives something
in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod from another is in potency with respect to what
receptum est in eo est actus eius. Oportet it receives, and what is received into it is its
ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma, quae est act. It is necessary therefore that the quiddity
intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse, itself or the form, which is the intelligence, be
quod a Deo recipit; et illud esse receptum in potency with respect to the existence which
est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur it receives from God; and this existence is
potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen received as an act. It is in this way that
forma et materia nisi aequivoce. potency and act are found in the intelligences,
but not form and matter, unless equivocally.

Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et 82. Whence, to suffer, and to receive, and to
omnia huiusmodi, quae videntur rebus be a subject, and all things of this sort, which
ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce are observed to belong to things by reason of
conveniunt substantiis intellectualibus et matter, also belong equivocally to intellectual
corporalibus, ut in III de anima Commentator and to corporeal substances, as the
dicit. Commentator says in his considerations on
the third book of On The Soul.

Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas 83. And because the quiddity of an intelligence
est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel is, as has been said, the intelligence itself, its
essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, et quiddity or essence is identically that which it
esse suum receptum a Deo est id, quo itself is; and its existence received from God is
subsistit in rerum natura. Et propter hoc a that whereby it subsists in reality. And this is
quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae why substances of this sort are said by some
componi ex quo est et quod est vel ex quod to be composed of “that by which it is” and
est et esse, ut Boethius dicit. “that which is,” or as Boethius says, of “that
which is” and “existence.”

Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et 84. And because there is potency in the
actus, non erit difficile invenire multitudinem intelligences as well as act, it will not be
intelligentiarum; quod esset impossibile, si difficult to find a multitude of intelligences,
nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde which would be impossible if there were no
Commentator dicit in III de anima quod, si potency in them. Whence the Commentator
natura intellectus possibilis esset ignorata, says, in his considerations on the third book of
non possemus invenire multitudinem in On The Soul, that if the nature of the possible
substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio intellect were not known, we would not be able
earum ad invicem secundum gradum to find multitude among the separated
potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia substances. The separated substances,
superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, therefore, are distinct from one another
habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et according to their grade of potency and act, in
sic de aliis. such a way that a superior intelligence which
is nearer to the First Being has more act and
less potency, and so with the others.

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Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae 85. This grading has its termination in the
tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis human soul, which holds the lowest grade
intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis among intellectual substances. Whence its
eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut possible intellect is related to intelligible forms
materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in in the way in which prime matter, which holds
esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut the lowest grade in sensible existence, is
Commentator in III de anima dicit. Et ideo related to sensible forms, as the Commentator
philosophus comparat eam tabulae, in qua remarks in his considerations on the third book
nihil est scriptum. of On The Soul. And this is why the
Philosopher compares it to a blank tablet on
which nothing has been written.

Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias 86. And because it has more potency than
intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo other intelligible substances, the human soul is
efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus so close to material things that a material thing
materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad is drawn to it to share its existence, but in such
participandum esse suum, ita scilicet quod a way that from soul and body results one
ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in existence in one composed thing; and yet this
uno composito, quamvis illud esse, prout est existence is not dependent on the body
animae, non sit dependens a corpore. inasmuch as it is the soul’s existence.

Et ideo post istam formam, quae est anima, 87. And posterior to this form which is the soul
inveniuntur aliae formae plus de potentia are found other forms which have more
habentes et magis propinquae materiae in potency, and which are still closer to matter, so
tantum quod esse earum sine materia non close that they do not exist without matter.
est. In quibus etiam invenitur ordo et gradus Among these forms, too, is found an order and
usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae a grading, down to the first forms of the
sunt propinquissimae materiae. Unde nec elements, which are the closest to matter.
aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum These last are so close to matter that they
exigentiam qualitatum activarum et operate only according to the active and
passivarum et aliarum, quibus materia ad passive qualities, and the other sorts of things,
formam disponitur. which are required as the means by which
matter is disposed for the receiving of form.

Caput 4 88. From the preceding it is clear how essence

His igitur visis patet quomodo essentia in is found in diverse substances. For we find
diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex that they have essence in three different ways.
modus habendi essentiam in substantiis.

Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius essentia 89. There is a thing, God, whose essence is
est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur his existence itself. And this is why we find
aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non some philosophers who say that God does not
habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia have a quiddity or essence, because his
essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. essence is not other than his existence. And
Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in from this it follows that he is not in a genus,
genere, quia omne quod est in genere because everything which is in a genus must
oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse have a quiddity which is other than its
suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut existence. And this is so since the quiddity or
speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem nature of a genus or species, in the case of
naturae in illis, quorum est genus vel those things which have a genus or species, is
species, sed esse est diversum in diversis. not multiplied according to the intelligible

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content of the nature; rather, it is the existence

in these diverse things which is diverse.

Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse 90. Nor is it necessary, if we say that God is
tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus, qui existence alone, for us to fall into the error of
Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale, those who say that God is universal existence
quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim whereby each and every thing formally exists.
esse, quod Deus est, huius condicionis est, For the existence which God is, is such that no
ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit; unde per addition can be made to it. Whence by virtue
ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum of its purity it is an existence distinct from
ab omni esse. Propter quod in commento IX every existence. This is why, in the
propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod commentary on the ninth proposition of the
individuatio primae causae, quae est esse Book on Causes, it is said that the
tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse individuation of the First Cause, which is
autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non existence alone, is through its pure goodness.
includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit But as regards that universal existence, just as
in intellectu suo praecisionem additionis; it does not include in its intelligible content any
quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse, addition, so too neither does it include in its
in quo super esse aliquid adderetur. intelligible content any exclusion of addition,
because if this were the case, nothing in which
something is added over and above its
existence could be understood to be.

Similiter etiam, quamvis sit esse tantum, non 91. Similarly, although God is existence alone,
oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae it is not necessary that the other perfections or
perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet excellences be wanting in him. Rather he has
omnes perfectiones, quae sunt in omnibus all the perfections which are in every genus.
generibus. Propter quod perfectum This is why he is called simply perfect, as the
simpliciter dicitur, ut philosophus et Philosopher and the Commentator say in book
Commentator in V metaphysicae dicunt. Sed five of the Metaphysics. But he has these
habet eas modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, perfections in a more excellent way than all
quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis things because in him they are one, whereas
diversitatem habent. Et hoc est, quia omnes in other things they have diversity. And this is
illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum so because all these perfections belong to him
esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam according to his simple existence. If some one
qualitatem posset efficere operationes could perform the operations of all the qualities
omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate through some one quality, he would have
omnes qualitates haberet, ita Deus in ipso every quality in that one quality; so too God
esse suo omnes perfectiones habet. has all these perfections in his existence itself.

Secundo modo invenitur essentia in 92. Essence is found in a second way in

substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus created intellectual substances. Existence in
est aliud esse quam essentia earum, them is other than their essence, although
quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde essence is without matter. Whence their
esse earum non est absolutum, sed existence is not absolute, but received, and
receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum ad therefore limited and confined to the capacity
capacitatem naturae recipientis, sed natura of the recipient nature. But their nature or
vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta quiddity is absolute, not received in any
in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de matter. And this is why it is said in the Book on
causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae Causes that the intelligences are unlimited
inferius et finitae superius. Sunt enim finitae from below and limited from above, for they
quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori are limited as regards their existence, which

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recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius, quia they receive from above; but they are not
earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem limited from below because their forms are not
alicuius materiae recipientis eas. limited to the capacity of a matter receiving
them.

Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur 93. And this is why, as has been said, there is
multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut not found among such substances a multitude
dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter of individuals in one species, with the
corpus, cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex exception of the human soul on account of the
corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum body to which it is united. And although its
ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi individuation depends on the body as upon the
esse individuatum nisi in corpore, cuius est occasion for its beginning because it does not
actus, non tamen oportet ut subtracto acquire its individuated existence except in the
corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat body of which it is the actuality, it is not
esse absolutum, ex quo acquisitum est sibi necessary that its individuation be lost when
esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est the body is taken away because that
forma huius corporis, illud esse semper existence, since it is absolute, always remains
remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna individuated once the soul acquires it by being
quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio made the form of this individual body. And this
dependet ex corpore quantum ad sui is why Ibn-Sînâ says that the individuation and
principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem. multiplication of souls depends on the body as
regards its beginning, but not as regards its
termination.

Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est 94. And because quiddity in these substances
idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in is not the same as existence, they are
praedicamento, et propter hoc invenitur in orderable within a predicament. And this is
eis genus et species et differentia, quamvis why they have a genus, a species, and a
earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae difference, although their proper differences
sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae are hidden from us. For even in the case of
differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt, unde sensible things, the essential differences
significantur per differentias accidentales, themselves are not known; whence they are
quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa signified through accidental differences which
significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes rise out of the essential ones, as a cause is
ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem signified through its effect; this is what is done
propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis when biped, for example, is given as the
ignota sunt; unde differentiae earum nec per difference of man. But the proper accidents of
se nec per accidentales differentias a nobis immaterial substances are unknown to us;
significari possunt. whence their differences cannot be signified
by us either through themselves or through
accidental differences.

Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem 95. But we must notice that the genus and the
modo sumitur genus et differentia in illis difference of these substances are not taken in
substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia the same way in which the genus and the
in sensibilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est difference of sensible substances are taken. In
materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod the case of sensible substances the genus is
est formale in ipsa. Unde dicit Avicenna in taken from that which is material in the thing,
principio libri sui de anima quod forma in whereas the difference is taken from that
rebus compositis ex materia et forma est which is formal in it. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says at
differentia simplex eius, quod constituitur ex the beginning of his book On the Soul that
illa, non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit form in things composed of matter and form is

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differentia, sed quia est principium the simple difference of that which is
differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua metaphysica. constituted by it; but not in such a way that the
Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia form is the difference, but because the form is
simplex, quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars the principle of the difference, as the same
quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem writer says in his Metaphysics. And this sort of
substantiae immateriales sint simplices difference is called a simple difference
quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi because it is taken from what is part of the
ab eo quod est pars quiditatis, sed a tota quiddity of the thing, namely, from the form.
quiditate; et ideo in principio de anima dicit But since immaterial substances are simple
Avicenna quod differentiam simplicem non quiddities, their difference cannot be taken
habent nisi species, quarum essentiae sunt from what is part of the quiddity, but from the
compositae ex materia et forma. whole quiddity. This is why Ibn-Sînâ says, at
the beginning of On the Soul, that only those
species have a simple difference whose
essences are composed of matter and form.

Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur 96. Similarly, their genus too is taken from the
genus, modo tamen differenti. Una enim whole essence, but in a different way, for
substantia separata convenit cum alia in separated substances agree with each other in
immaterialitate et differunt ab invicem in immateriality, and differ from each other in
gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a grade of perfection, according as they
potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. withdraw from potentiality and approach pure
Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in actuality. The genus is taken from that in them
quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis which follows upon their being immaterial; for
genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid example, intellectuality or something of this
huiusmodi. Ab eo autem quod consequitur in sort. But the difference, which is unknown to
eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis us, is taken from that in them which follows
differentia, nobis tamen ignota. upon their grade of perfection.

Nec oportet has differentias esse 97. And it is not necessary that these
accidentales, quia sunt secundum maiorem differences be accidental because they are
et minorem perfectionem, quae non determined by greater and lesser perfection
diversificant speciem. Gradus enim which does not diversify a species. For grades
perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam of perfection in the reception of a same form
non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et do not diversify a species, as whiter and less
minus album in participando eiusdem white in participating whiteness which is of the
rationis albedinem. Sed diversus gradus same nature. But a diverse grade in the forms
perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis or natures themselves which are participated
participatis speciem diversificat, sicut natura does diversify a species. For example, nature
procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia proceeds by grades from plants to animals by
per quaedam, quae sunt media inter way of certain things which are midway
animalia et plantas, secundum philosophum between animals and plants, according to the
in VII de animalibus. Nec iterum est Philosopher in book seven of On Animals. Nor,
necessarium, ut divisio intellectualium similarly, is it necessary that intellectual
substantiarum sit semper per duas substances be divided always by two true
differentias veras, quia hoc est impossibile in differences, because this cannot come about
omnibus rebus accidere, ut philosophus dicit in the case of all things, as the Philosopher
in XI de animalibus. says in book eleven of On Animals.

Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis 98. Essence is found in a third way in
compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et substances composed of matter and form.
esse est receptum et finitum, propter hoc Here it is both the case that existence is

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quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura received and limited because they have
vel quiditas earum est recepta in materia existence from another; and that their nature
signata. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et or quiddity is received in designated matter.
inferius, et in eis iam propter divisionem And so, they are limited both from above and
materiae signatae possibilis est multiplicatio from below. And because of the division of
individuorum in una specie. Et in his qualiter designated matter, the multiplication of
se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas, individuals in one species is here possible. As
supra dictum est. regards the question how the essence of these
substances is related to the logical intentions,
we have explained that above.

Caput 5 99. What remains now is to see how essence

Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in is in accidents; how it is in all substances has
accidentibus. been discussed.

Qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis, 100. And because essence, as has been said,
dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essentia is that which is signified by the definition, it is
est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, necessary that accidents have essence in the
oportet ut eo modo habeant essentiam quo way in which they have definition. They have
habent diffinitionem. Diffinitionem autem an incomplete definition because they cannot
habent incompletam, quia non possunt be defined unless a subject is placed in their
diffiniri, nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum definition. And this is so because they do not
diffinitione. Et hoc ideo est, quia non habent have existence in themselves free of a subject.
per se esse, absolutum a subiecto,

sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse 101. But just as a substantial existence results
substantiale, quando componuntur, ita ex from matter and form when they are
accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse composed, so from an accident and a subject
accidentale, quando accidens subiecto results an accidental existence when the
advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma accident comes to the subject. And this is also
substantialis completam essentiam habet why neither substantial form nor matter have a
nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae complete essence because it is necessary to
substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud, place in the definition of substantial form that
cuius est forma; et ita diffinitio eius est per of which it is the form; and so its definition is
additionem alicuius, quod est extra genus formulated by the addition of something which
eius, sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis. is outside its genus, just like the definition of
Unde et in diffinitione animae ponitur corpus an accidental form. Whence, also, the body is
a naturali, qui considerat animam solum in placed in the definition of the soul by the
quantum est forma physici corporis. natural philosopher, who considers the soul
only insofar as it is the form of a physical body.

Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et 102. But there is this difference between
accidentales tantum interest, quia sicut substantial and accidental forms. Just as
forma substantialis non habet per se esse substantial form does not have existence in
absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita nec illud itself, separately from that to which it comes,
cui advenit, scilicet materia. Et ideo ex neither does that to which it comes, namely,
coniunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse, matter. And thus from the conjunction of the
in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur two results that existence in which a thing
unum per se; propter quod ex coniunctione subsists in itself, and from them is produced
eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam. Unde something essentially one; and because of this
forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat an essence is the result of their conjunction.

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completam rationem essentiae, tamen est Whence, although the form considered in itself
pars essentiae completae. Sed illud, cui does not have the complete nature of an
advenit accidens, est ens in se completum, essence, it is nonetheless part of a complete
subsistens in suo esse. Quod quidem esse essence. But that to which an accident comes
naturaliter praecedit accidens quod is a being complete in itself and subsisting in
supervenit. Et ideo accidens superveniens its own existence. And this existence naturally
ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non precedes the accident which supervenes. And
causat illud esse, in quo res subsistit, per this is why the supervening accident does not,
quod res est ens per se, sed causat by its conjunction with that to which it comes,
quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res cause that existence in which a thing subsists,
subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum and through which the thing is a being in itself.
potest intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex It causes, rather, a certain second existence,
accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per without which the subsisting thing can be
se, sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex understood to be, just as what is first can be
eorum coniunctione non resultat essentia understood without what is second. Whence
quaedam, sicut ex coniunctione formae ad something essentially one is not produced
materiam. Propter quod accidens neque from an accident and a subject, but something
rationem completae essentiae habet neque accidentally one. And this is why an essence
pars essentiae completae est, sed sicut est does not result from their conjunction, as from
ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam the conjunction of form and matter. And this is
secundum quid habet. why an accident neither has the nature of a
complete essence, nor is it part of a complete
essence. But just as it is a being in a qualified
way, so too does it have essence in a qualified
way.

Sed quia illud, quod dicitur maxime et 103. Now, whatever is said to be most fully
verissime in quolibet genere, est causa and most truly in any genus is the cause of the
eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut things which are posterior in that genus; for
ignis qui est in fine caliditatis est causa example, fire, which is unsurpassed in heat, is
caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II metaphysicae the cause of heat in hot things, as it is said in
dicitur, ideo substantia quae est primum in the second book of the Metaphysics. This is
genere entis, verissime et maxime why substance, which has first place in the
essentiam habens, oportet quod sit causa genus of being, having essence most truly and
accidentium, quae secundario et quasi most fully, must be the cause of accidents,
secundum quid rationem entis participant. which participate in the nature of being
secondarily and in a qualified way.

Quod tamen diversimode contingit. Quia 104. But this happens in diverse ways. For,
enim partes substantiae sunt materia et since the parts of substance are matter and
forma, ideo quaedam accidentia principaliter form, certain accidents follow principally on
consequuntur formam et quaedam form, certain others follow principally on
materiam. Forma autem invenitur aliqua, matter. There are forms whose existence does
cuius esse non dependet ad materiam, ut not depend on matter, for example, intellectual
anima intellectualis; materia vero non habet souls; but matter does not have existence
esse nisi per formam. Unde in accidentibus, except through form. Whence some of the
quae consequuntur formam, est aliquid, accidents which follow on form are such that
quod non habet communicationem cum they share nothing with matter; for example, to
materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non est understand, which does not take place through
per organum corporale, sicut probat a bodily organ, as the Philosopher proves in
philosophus in III de anima. Aliqua vero ex the third book of On the Soul. But some other
consequentibus formam sunt, quae habent of the accidents following on form are such

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communicationem cum materia, sicut that they do share something with matter; for
sentire. Sed nullum accidens consequitur example, to sense. But no accident follows on
materiam sine communicatione formae. matter which shares nothing with form.

In his tamen accidentibus, quae materiam 105. Among those accidents which follow on
consequuntur, invenitur quaedam diversitas. matter we find a certain diversity. For some
Quaedam enim accidentia consequuntur accidents follow on matter according to the
materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ordering which it has to a special form; for
ad formam specialem, sicut masculinum et example, male and female among animals, the
femininum in animalibus, quorum diversitas diversity of which derives from matter, as is
ad materiam reducitur, ut dicitur in X said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics.
metaphysicae. Unde remota forma animalis Whence these accidents do not remain on the
dicta accidentia non remanent nisi removal of the form of animal, except
aequivoce. Quaedam vero consequuntur equivocally. Other accidents follow on matter
materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet according to the ordering which it has to a
ad formam generalem, et ideo remota forma general form. Thus, on the removal of the
speciali adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo special form they still remain in the matter; for
cutis est in Aethiope ex mixtione example, the blackness of an Ethiopian’s skin
elementorum et non ex ratione animae, et is from the mixture of the elements and not
ideo post mortem in eis remanet. Et quia from his soul; and this is why it remains in him
unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia et after death. And because each and every thing
collocatur in genere vel specie per suam is individuated by matter and placed in a
formam, ideo accidentia, quae consequuntur genus or species by its form, accidents which
materiam, sunt accidentia individui, follow on matter are accidents of the
secundum quae etiam individua eiusdem individual, and it is according to these that
speciei ad invicem differunt, individuals of a same species differ from one
another.

accidentia vero, quae consequuntur formam, 106. But accidents following on form are the
sunt propriae passiones vel generis vel proper attributes of the genus or of the
speciei; unde inveniuntur in omnibus species. Whence they are found in every thing
participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, which participates in the nature of the genus or
sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam, of the species. For example, man’s ability to
quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione laugh follows on the form because laughter
animae hominis. takes place by reason of the fact that a man’s
soul has grasped something.

Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia 107. It should also be noticed that sometimes
aliquando ex principiis essentialibus the essential principles cause accidents in a
causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut state of perfect actuality, as heat in the case of
calor in igne, qui semper est actu calidus; fire which is always actually hot. But
aliquando vero secundum aptitudinem sometimes they cause accidents which are
tantum, sed complementum accidit ex only aptitudes, their completion being received
agente exteriori, sicut diaphaneitas in aere, from an exterior agent; for example,
quae completur per corpus lucidum exterius. transparency in the air, which is completed by
Et in talibus aptitudo est accidens some exterior light-emitting body. And in such
inseparabile, sed complementum, quod things the aptitude is an inseparable accident,
advenit ex aliquo principio, quod est extra but the completion, which comes from some
essentiam rei vel quod non intrat principle which is outside the essence of the
constitutionem rei, est separabile, sicut thing, or which does not enter the constitution
moveri et huiusmodi. of the thing, is separable; for example, being
moved and things of this sort.

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Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus 108. It should be noticed, further, that the
alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et genus, the species, and the difference of
species quam in substantiis. accidents are taken in a way which differs from
the way in which those of substances are
taken.

Quia enim in substantiis ex forma 109. In substances something essentially one

substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum results from the substantial form and matter, a
una quadam natura ex earum coniunctione certain nature results from their conjunction, a
resultante, quae proprie in praedicamento nature which is properly placed in the
substantiae collocatur, ideo in substantiis predicament of substance. This is why
nomina concreta, quae compositum concrete names of substances which signify
significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur the composite are properly said to be in a
sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel animal. genus, as species or genera; for example,
Non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo man or animal. But the form, or the matter, is
in praedicamento nisi per reductionem, sicut not in a predicament in this way, though each
principia in genere esse dicuntur. Sed ex is in a predicament by reduction, as principles
accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se. are said to be in a genus. Something
Unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione essentially one does not, on the contrary,
aliqua natura, cui intentio generis vel speciei result from an accident and its subject.
possit attribui. Unde nomina accidentalia Whence the result of their conjunction is not a
concretive dicta non ponuntur in certain nature, to which the intention of genus
praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut or species may be attributed. Whence names
album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, of accidents expressed concretely are not
sed solum secundum quod in abstracto placed in a predicament as species or genera;
significantur, ut albedo et musica. for example, white or musical, except by
reduction. They are placed in a predicament
only according as they are signified in the
abstract; for example, whiteness and music.

Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex 110. And because accidents are not
materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi composed of matter and form, their genus
genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut cannot be taken from matter and their
in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut difference from form, as in the case of
genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo composed substances. Rather, their first
essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode genus must be taken from their way of existing
secundum prius et posterius de decem itself, according to which the word “being” is
generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas diversely predicated of the ten genera
ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et according to a priority and posteriority; for
qualitas secundum quod est dispositio example, an accident is called quantity from
substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum the fact that it is the measure of substance,
philosophum IX metaphysicae. Differentiae and quality according as it is the disposition of
vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate substance, and so with the other accidents,
principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia according to the Philosopher in the fourth book
propriae passiones ex propriis principiis of the Metaphysics. But their differences are
subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in taken from the diversity of the principles by
diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in which they are caused. And because proper
abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt attributes are caused by the proper principles
proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas of the subject, the subject is placed in their
est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset, si definition to function as the difference if they
eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod are defined in the abstract, which is the way in
concretive dicuntur. Sic enim subiectum in which they are properly in a genus; as when it

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eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia is said that snubnosedness is the turned-
tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum up-ness of the nose. But the converse would
compositarum, in quibus ratio generis be the case if their definition were taken
sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum according as they are said concretely. For in
est nasus curvus. this way the subject is placed in their definition
as a genus because they are then being
defined after the manner of composed
substance, in which the genus is taken from
matter; as when we say that a snub nose is a
turned up nose.

Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens alterius 111. We have a similar case if one accident is
accidentis principium sit, sicut principium the principle of another, as action and passion
relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et and quantity are principles of relation. And this
ideo secundum haec dividit philosophus is why the Philosopher divides relation
relationem in V metaphysicae. according to these in book five of the
Metaphysics.

Sed quia propria principia accidentium non 112. But because the proper principles of
semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque accidents are not always manifest, we
sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum sometimes take the difference of accidents
effectibus, sicut congregativum et from their effects; as when concentrating and
disgregativum dicuntur differentiae coloris, diffusing are called the differences of color.
quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate These effects are caused by the abundance
lucis, ex quo diversae species colorum and the scarcity of light, which cause the
causantur. diverse species of color.

Caput 6 113. And so it is clear how essence is in

Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substances and in accidents, and how it is in
substantiis et accidentibus et quomodo in composed substances in simple ones, and
substantiis compositis et simplicibus et how the universal intentions of logic are found
qualiter in his omnibus intentiones in all of these, with the exception of the First
universales logicae inveniuntur excepto Principle, which is infinitely simple, and to
primo, quod est in fine simplicitatis, cui non which, because of its simplicity, belongs the
convenit ratio generis vel speciei et per notion neither of the genus nor of the species,
consequens nec diffinitio propter suam nor consequently definition. With this, let the
simplicitatem. In quo sit finis et consummatio discussion, its tasks achieve brought to a
huius sermonis. Amen. close.

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