De Ente et Essentia

by

Thomas Aquinas
translated as

Aquinas on Being and Essence

a translation and interpretation

1965

adapted and html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

Prooemium 1. A small mistake in the beginning is a big one in
Quia parvus error in principio magnus est the end, according to the Philosopher in the first
in fine, secundum philosophum in I caeli book of ​On the Heavens and the Earth.​ And as
et mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt Ibn-Sînâ says in the beginning of his ​Metaphysics,​
quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit being and essence are what is first conceived by
Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae, the intellect.

ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare 2. Thus, to avoid making mistakes out of

contingat, ad horum difficultatem ignorance of them, and to become familiar with
aperiendam dicendum est quid nomine the difficulties they entail, we must point out what
essentiae et entis significetur et quomodo is signified by the words “being” and “essence,”
in diversis inveniatur et quomodo se and how they are found in diverse things, and
habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet how they are related to the logical intentions,
genus, speciem et differentiam. genus, species, and difference.

Quia vero ex compositis simplicium 3. Since we ought to acquire knowledge of what is

cognitionem accipere debemus et ex simple from what is composed, and come to what
posterioribus in priora devenire, ut, a is prior from what is posterior, so that, beginning
facilioribus incipientes, convenientior fiat with what is easier, we may progress more
disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad suitably in learning; we ought proceed from the
significationem essentiae procedendum meaning of the word “being” to that of the word
est. “essence.”
Caput 1 4. We should notice, therefore, that the word
Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V “being,” taken without qualifiers, has two uses, as
metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the
se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod Metaphysics.​ (1) In one way, it is used apropos of
dividitur per decem genera, alio modo what is divided into the ten genera; (2) in another
quod significat propositionum veritatem. way, it is used to signify the truth of propositions.
Horum autem differentia est quia The difference between the two is that in the
secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, second way everything about which we can form
de quo affirmativa propositio formari an affirmative proposition can be called a being,
potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. Per even though it posits nothing in reality. It is in this
quem modum privationes et negationes way that privations and negations are called
entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod beings; for we say that affirmation is opposed to
affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod negation, and that blindness is in the eye. In the
caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo first way, however, only what posits something in
non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re reality can be called a being. In the first way,
ponit. Unde primo modo caecitas et therefore, blindness and the like are not beings.
huiusmodi non sunt entia.

Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab 5. So, the word “essence” is not taken from the
ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim word “being” used in the second way; for some
hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam things which do not have an essence are called
non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed beings in this way as is clear in the case of
sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo privations. Rather, the word “essence” is taken
dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco from the word “being” used in the first way. It is for
dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est this reason that the Commentator says in the
quod significat essentiam rei. same place that the word “being” used in the first
way is what signifies the essence of a real thing.

Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo 6. And because the word “being” used in this way
dictum dividitur per decem genera, is used apropos of what is divided into the ten
oportet quod essentia significet aliquid genera, as we have said, the word “essence”
commune omnibus naturis, per quas must signify something common to all natures, by
diversa entia in diversis generibus et means of which (nature) diverse beings are
speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas placed into diverse genera and species; as, for
est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis. example, humanity is the essence of man, and so
with other things.
Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in 7. And because that by which a real thing is
proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod constituted in its proper genus or species is what
significatur per diffinitionem indicantem is signified by the definition expressing what the
quid est res, inde est quod nomen real thing is, philosophers sometimes use the
essentiae a philosophis in nomen word “quiddity” for the word “essence.” This is
quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod what the Philosopher often calls ​what something
philosophus frequenter nominat quod was to be,​ i.e., that by which it belongs to
quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod something to be what it is.
aliquid habet esse quid.

Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per 8. It is also called form, in the sense in which the
formam significatur certitudo word “form” signifies the full determination of each
uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II real thing, as Ibn-Sînâ says in the second book of
metaphysicae suae. his ​Metaphysics.​

Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur 9. Further, it is given another name, nature, taking
accipiendo naturam secundum primum the word “nature” in the first of the four ways given
modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius by Boethius in his book ​On the Two Natures​. In
in libro de duabus naturis assignat, this way, whatever can in any way be grasped by
secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur the intellect is called a nature. For a real thing is
omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo not intelligible except through its definition and
capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis essence.
nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam.

Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in V 10. The Philosopher, too, says in the fifth book of
metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est the ​Metaphysics that every substance is a nature.
natura. Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo But the word “nature” taken in this way appears to
sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, signify the essence of a real thing according as it
secundum quod habet ordinem ad has an ordering to the thing’s proper operation;
propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res and no real thing lacks a proper operation.
propria operatione destituatur.
Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, 11. The name “quiddity,” however, is taken from
quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed the fact that what is signified by the definition is
essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam the essence. But it is called essence from the fact
et in ea ens habet esse. that through it and in it a real being has existence.

Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur 12. Because the word “being” is used absolutely
de substantiis et per posterius et quasi and with priority of substances, and only
secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est posteriorly and with qualification of accidents,
quod essentia proprie et vere est in essence is in substances truly and properly, in
substantiis, sed in accidentibus est accidents only in some way with qualification.
quodammodo et secundum quid.

Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt 13. Further, some substances are simple and
simplices et quaedam compositae, et in some are composed, and essence is in each. But
utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus essence is in simple substances in a truer and
veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod more noble way, according to which they also
etiam esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim have a more noble existence; for they ─ at least
causa eorum quae composita sunt, ad that simple substance which is first, and which is
minus substantia prima simplex, quae God ─ are the cause of those which are
Deus est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum composed. But because the essences of the
essentiae sunt nobis magis occultae, simple substances are more hidden from us, we
ideo ab essentiis substantiarum ought to begin with the essences of composed
compositarum incipiendum est, ut a substances, so that we may progress more
facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina. suitably in learning from what is easier.

In substantiis igitur compositis forma et 14. In composed substances there are form and
materia nota est, ut in homine anima et matter, for example, in man soul and body.
corpus.
Non autem potest dici quod alterum 15. But we cannot say that either one of them
eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. alone may be said to be the essence. That matter
Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia alone is not the essence of a real thing is clear,
rei planum est, quia res per essentiam since through its essence a real thing is knowable
suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie and assigned to a species or to a genus. But
ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque matter alone is neither a principle of knowledge,
cognitionis principium est, neque nor is it that by which something is assigned to a
secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel genus or to a species; rather a thing is so
speciem determinatur, sed secundum id assigned by reason of its being something actual.
quod aliquid actu est.

Neque etiam forma tantum essentia 16. Neither can the form alone of a composed
substantiae compositae dici potest, substance be said to be its essence, although
quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. some try to assert this. For it is evident from what
Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod has been said that essence is what is signified by
essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem the definition of a real thing. And the definition of
rei significatur. Diffinitio autem natural substances contains not only form, but
substantiarum naturalium non tantum matter as well; otherwise natural definitions and
formam continet, sed etiam materiam; mathematical ones would not differ.
aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et
mathematicae non differrent.

Nec potest dici quod materia in 17. Neither can it be said that matter is placed in
diffinitione substantiae naturalis ponatur the definition of a natural substance as something
sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens added to its essence or as something outside its
extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus essence, because this mode of definition is proper
diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, to accidents, which do not have a perfect
quae perfectam essentiam non habent. essence. This is why accidents must include in
Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua their definition a subject which is outside their
subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus. It is clear therefore that essence includes
genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia matter and form.
comprehendit materiam et formam.
Non autem potest dici quod essentia 18. Further, neither can it be said that essence
significet relationem, quae est inter signifies some relation between matter and form
materiam et formam vel aliquid or something added to them, because this would
superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de of necessity be an accident or something
necessitate esset accidens et extraneum extraneous to the real thing, and the real thing
a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, would not be known through it. And these are
quae omnia essentiae conveniunt. Per traits of essence. For through the form, which is
formam enim, quae est actus materiae, the actuality of matter, matter becomes something
materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. actual and something individual. Whence what
Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat supervenes does not confer on matter actual
esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse existence simply, but such an actual existence; as
actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, accidents in fact do. Whiteness, for example,
ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et makes something actually white. Whence the
quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur acquisition of such a form is not called generation
generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. simply, but generation in a certain respect. It
Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae remains, therefore, that the word “essence” in
in substantiis compositis significat id composed substances signifies that which is
quod ex materia et forma compositum composed of matter and form.
est.

Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in 19. Boethius is in agreement with this in his
commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit commentary on the ​Predicaments​, where he says
quod usia significat compositum. Usia that ​ousia signifies the composite. For ​ousia in
enim apud Graecos idem est quod Greek is the same as ​essentia in Latin, as he
essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in himself says in his book ​On the Two Natures.​
libro de duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam Ibn-Sînâ, too, says that the quiddity of composed
dicit quod quiditas substantiarum substances is the composition itself of form and
compositarum est ipsa compositio matter. And the Commentator, likewise, in his
formae et materiae. Commentator etiam considerations on the seventh book of the
dicit super VII metaphysicae: natura Metaphysics says: “The nature which species
quam habent species in rebus have in generable things is something in between,
generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est i.e., composed of matter and form.”
compositum ex materia et forma.
Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse 20. Reason, too, is in accord with this, because
substantiae compositae non est tantum the existence of a composed substance is not the
formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius existence of the form alone nor of the matter
compositi. Essentia autem est secundum alone, but of the composite itself; and essence is
quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod that according to which a real thing is said to be.
essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non Whence it is necessary that the essence, whereby
tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, a real thing is denominated a being, be neither the
sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse form alone nor the matter alone, but both,
suo modo sola forma sit causa. although the form alone in its own way is the
cause of such existence.

Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex 21. We see the same in other things which are
pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res constituted of a plurality of principles, namely, that
non denominatur ex altero illorum the real thing is not denominated from one of
principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod these principles alone, but from what includes
utrumque complectitur, ut patet in both, as is evident in the case of tastes.
saporibus, quia ex actione calidi Sweetness, for example, is caused by the action
digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et of what is hot dispersing what is moist; and
quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa although heat in this way is the cause of
dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur sweetness, a body is not denominated sweet from
corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui heat, but from the taste which includes what is hot
calidum et humidum complectitur. and what is moist.

Sed quia individuationis principium 22. But matter is the principle of individuation.
materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi From this it might perhaps appear to follow that an
quod essentia, quae materiam in se essence which includes in itself matter along with
complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum form is only particular and not universal. And from
particularis et non universalis. Ex quo this it would follow that universals would not have
sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem a definition, if essence is that which is signified by
non haberent, si essentia est id quod per a definition.
diffinitionem significatur.
Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non 23. We should notice, therefore, that the principle
quolibet modo accepta est individuationis of individuation is not matter taken in just any way
principium, sed solum materia signata. Et whatever, but only designated matter. And I call
dico materiam signatam, quae sub that matter designated which is considered under
determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. determined dimensions. Such matter is not placed
Haec autem materia in diffinitione in the definition of man as man, but it would be
hominis, in quantum est homo, non placed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates
ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione had a definition. Rather, it is non-designated
Socratis, si Socrates diffinitionem matter which. is placed in the definition of man; for
haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis this bone and this flesh are not placed in the
ponitur materia non signata; non enim in definition of man, but bone and flesh absolutely.
diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec These latter are man’s non-designated matter.
caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt
materia hominis non signata.

Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et 24. It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man
essentia Socratis non differunt nisi and the essence of Socrates do not differ, except
secundum signatum et non signatum. as the non-designated from the designated.
Unde Commentator dicit super VII Whence the Commentator says in his
metaphysicae: Socrates nihil aliud est considerations on the seventh book of the
quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae Metaphysics that “Socrates is nothing other than
sunt quiditas eius. animality and rationality, which are his quiddity.”

Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei 25. The essence of the genus and that of the
secundum signatum et non signatum species also differ in this way, i.e., as the
differunt, quamvis alius modus non-designated from the designated, although the
designationis sit utrobique, quia mode of the designation differs in each case.
designatio individui respectu speciei est Whereas the designation of the individual with
per materiam determinatam respect to the species is through matter
dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei determined by dimensions, the designation of the
respectu generis est per differentiam species with respect to the genus is through the
constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur. constitutive difference which is taken from the
form of the thing.
Haec autem determinatio vel designatio, 26. This designation which is in the species with
quae est in specie respectu generis, non respect to the genus is not through something in
est per aliquid in essentia speciei the essence of the species which is in no way in
exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia the essence of the genus; rather, whatever is in
generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, the species is also in the genus, but as
est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. undetermined. For, if animal were not the whole
Si enim animal non esset totum quod est that man is, but a part of man, it would not be
homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur predicated of man, since no integral part may be
de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo predicated of its whole.
toto praedicetur.

Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri 27. We can see how this comes about if we
poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt examine how body taken as part of animal differs
corpus secundum quod ponitur pars from body taken as genus; for body cannot be a
animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus in the same way in which body is an
genus. Non enim potest eo modo esse integral part.
genus, quo est pars integralis. Hoc igitur
nomen quod est corpus multipliciter
accipi potest.
Corpus enim, secundum quod est in 28. The word “body” can be taken in many ways.
genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod Body according as it is in the genus substance is
habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint so called from the fact that it has a nature such
designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim that three dimensions can be designated in it; but
tres dimensiones designatae sunt the three designated dimensions themselves are
corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. a body according as body is in the genus quantity.
Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet Now, it happens in things that what has one
unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfection may also attain to further perfection.
perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in This is clear, for example, in man who has a
homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet sensitive nature, and further an intellectual nature.
et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et Similarly, another perfection, such as life or some
super hanc perfectionem, quae est other such perfection, can be added to the
habere talem formam, ut in ea possint perfection of having a form such that three
tres dimensiones designari, potest alia dimensions can be designated in it. The word
perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid “body,” therefore can signify some real thing
huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen which has a form from which follows the
corpus significare rem quandam, quae possibility of designating in it three dimensions,
habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in and signify this in an excluding way, i.e., in such a
ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum way such that no further perfection may follow
cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma from that form; in a way such that if anything be
nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si added, it is outside the signification of body.
quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter Taken in this way, body will be an integral and
significationem corporis sic dicti. Et hoc material part of animal because soul will be
modo corpus erit integralis et materialis outside what is signified by the word “body”; the
pars animalis, quia sic anima erit praeter soul will be something over and above the body,
id quod significatum est nomine corporis in a way such that animal is constituted out of
et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod these two as out of parts, i.e., out of soul and
ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et body.
corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur
animal.
Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc 29. The word “body” can also be taken in another
modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, way, namely, to signify a thing which has a form
quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres such that three dimensions can be designated in
dimensiones possunt in ea designari, it, no matter what sort of form it is, whether some
quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea further perfection can come from it or not. And
possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio taken in this way, body will be a genus of animal,
sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus because there is nothing in animal which is not
animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere implicitly contained in body. Soul is not a form
quod non implicite in corpore continetur. other than the form through which three
Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, dimensions could be designated in that thing;
per quam in re illa poterant designari tres thus, when we said that body is that which has a
dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur form such that because of it three dimensions can
quod corpus est quod habet talem be designated in the body, form meant any form,
formam, ex qua possunt designari tres whether animality or stoneness, or any other form.
dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: And so the form of animal is implicitly contained in
quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas the form of body, when body is its genus.
sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et
sic forma animalis implicite in forma
corporis continetur, prout corpus est
genus eius.

Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad 30. And such likewise is the relation of animal to
hominem. Si enim animal nominaret man. For, if animal were to name only that thing
tantum rem quandam, quae habet talem which has a perfection such that it can sense and
perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri be moved by a principle within itself, and name
per principium in ipso existens cum this thing as excluding other perfection, then any
praecisione alterius perfectionis, tunc further perfection would be related to animal as a
quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion
superveniret, haberet se ad animal per of animal; and so, animal would not be a genus.
modum partis et non sicut implicite Animal is a genus according as it signifies a thing
contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal from whose form the senses and movement can
non esset genus; sed est genus come forth, no matter what sort of form it is,
secundum quod significat rem quandam, whether a sensible soul only or a soul which is
ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus both sensible and rational.
et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive
sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis
et rationalis simul.
Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate 31. The genus, thus, signifies indeterminately
totum id quod est in specie, non enim everything that is in the species; it does not signify
significat tantum materiam; similiter etiam the matter alone. Similarly, the difference, too,
differentia significat totum et non signifies everything in the species, and not the
significat tantum formam; et etiam form alone; the definition, too, signifies the whole,
diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. and so does the species, but in diverse ways.
Sed tamen diversimode,

quia genus significat totum ut quaedam 32. The genus signifies the whole as a name
denominatio determinans id quod est determining what is material in the real thing
materiale in re sine determinatione without the determination of the proper form.
propriae formae. Unde genus sumitur ex Whence the genus is taken from the matter,
materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet although it is not the matter. And from this it is
quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet clear that a body is called a body from the fact
talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo that it has a perfection such that three dimensions
designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem can be designated in the body, and that this
perfectio est materialiter se habens ad perfection is related materially to further
ulteriorem perfectionem. perfection.

Differentia vero e converso est sicut 33. The difference, on the contrary, is a name
quaedam denominatio a forma taken from a determinate form, and taken in a
determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod de determinate way, i.e. as not including a
primo intellectu eius sit materia determinate matter in its meaning. This is clear,
determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur for example, when we say ​animated​, i.e., that
animatum, scilicet illud quod habet which has a soul; for what it is, whether a body or
animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, something other, is not expressed. Whence
utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit Ibn-Sînâ says that the genus is not understood in
Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as
differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed something outside its essence, as the subject also
solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut is understood in its properties. And this is why the
etiam subiectum est de intellectu genus is not predicated essentially of the
passionum. Et ideo etiam genus non difference, as the Philosopher says in the third
praedicatur de differentia per se book of the ​Metaphysics and in the fourth book of
loquendo, ut dicit philosophus in III the ​Topics,​ but only in the way in which a subject
metaphysicae et in IV topicorum, nisi is predicated of its property.
forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de
passione.
Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit 34. The definition, lastly, and the species include
utrumque, scilicet determinatam both, namely the determinate matter which the
materiam, quam designat nomen name of the genus designates, and the
generis, et determinatam formam, quam determinate form which the name of the
designat nomen differentiae. difference designates.

Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species 35. From this it is clear why the genus, the
et differentia se habent proportionaliter difference, and the species are related
ad materiam et formam et compositum in proportionately to the matter, to the form, and to
natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, the composite in the real world, although they are
not identical with them.

quia neque genus est materia, sed a 36. The genus is not the matter, but taken from
materia sumptum ut significans totum, the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the
neque differentia forma, sed a forma difference the form, but taken from the form as
sumpta ut significans totum. signifying the whole.
Unde dicimus hominem esse animal 37. Whence we say that man is a rational animal,
rationale et non ex animali et rationali, and not that man is made up of animal and
sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et rational as we say that man is made up of soul
corpore. Ex anima enim et corpore dicitur and body. Man is said to be composed of soul
esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus and body as some third thing constituted of two
quaedam res tertia constituta, quae other things, and which is neither of them. For
neutra illarum est. Homo enim neque est man is neither soul nor body. But if man may be
anima neque corpus. Sed si homo aliquo said in some way to be composed of animal and
modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, rational, it will not be as a third thing out of two
non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, other things, but as a third concept out of two
sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus other concepts. For the concept “animal” is
intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est without the determination of the form of the
sine determinatione specialis formae, species, and it expresses the nature of a thing
exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est from that which is material in relation to the
materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. ultimate perfection. But the concept of the
Intellectus autem huius differentiae difference “rational” consists in the determination
rationalis consistit in determinatione of the form of the species. And from these two
formae specialis. Ex quibus duobus concepts the concept of the species or of the
intellectibus constituitur intellectus definition is constituted. And thus just as the
speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituents of a real thing are not predicated of
constituta ex aliquibus non recipit that real thing, so too the concepts which are
praedicationem earum rerum, ex quibus constituents of another concept are not predicated
constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit of that concept; for we do not say that the
praedicationem eorum intellectuum, ex definition is the genus or the difference.
quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus
quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia.

Quamvis autem genus significet totam 38. Although the genus signifies the whole
essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut essence of the species, it is not necessary that
diversarum specierum, quarum est idem the diverse species in a same genus have one
genus, sit una essentia, essence.
quia unitas generis ex ipsa 39. For the oneness of the genus proceeds from
indeterminatione vel indifferentia its very indetermination or indifference; not
procedit, non autem ita, quod illud quod however in such a way that what is signified by
significatur per genus sit una natura the genus is some numerically one nature found
numero in diversis speciebus, cui in diverse species, and to which another thing
superveniat res alia, quae sit differentia supervenes, namely the difference, determining
determinans ipsum, sicut forma the genus as form determines matter which is
determinat materiam, quae est una numerically one. It is rather because the genus
numero, sed quia genus significat signifies some form, not determinately this form or
aliquam formam, non tamen determinate that form, which the difference expresses
hanc vel illam, quam determinate determinately, but which is not other than the form
differentia exprimit, quae non est alia which was indeterminately signified by the genus.
quam illa, quae indeterminate
significabatur per genus.

Et ideo dicit Commentator in XI 40. This is why the Commentator says in his
metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur considerations on the eleventh book of the
una per remotionem omnium formarum, Metaphysics that prime matter is said to be one
sed genus dicitur unum per by reason of the removal of all forms, whereas the
communitatem formae significatae. genus is said to be one by reason of the
commonness of the designated form.

Unde patet quod per additionem 41. Whence, it is clear that when one adds the
differentiae remota illa indeterminatione, difference and removes that indetermination
quae erat causa unitatis generis, which was the cause of the oneness of the genus,
remanent species per essentiam there remain species which are diverse in
diversae. essence.

Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est 42. The nature of the species, as we have said, is
indeterminata respectu individui sicut indeterminate in relation to the individual, as the
natura generis respectu speciei, nature of the genus is indeterminate in relation to
the species.
inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, 43. Because of this, just as that which is a genus,
prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat as predicated of the species, implies in its
in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, signification, though indistinctly, everything that is
totum quod determinate est in specie, ita determinately in the species; so too that which is
etiam et id quod est species, secundum a species, according as it is predicated of the
quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet individual, must signify, though indistinctly,
quod significet totum id quod est everything which is essentially in the individual.
essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte.

Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur 44. And it is in this way that the essence of the
nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate species is signified by the word “man”; whence
praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura man is predicated of Socrates. But if the nature of
speciei cum praecisione materiae the species is signified as excluding designated
designatae, quae est principium matter, which is the principle of individuation, it
individuationis, sic se habebit per modum will be as a part; and in this way it is signified by
partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine the word “humanity,” for humanity signifies that by
humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id which man is man; and it is not the case that man
unde homo est homo. Materia autem is man by reason of designated matter. And so
designata non est id unde homo est designated matter is in no way included among
homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter the things by which man is man. Since, therefore,
illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit humanity includes in its concept only those things
homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo by which man is man, it is clear that designated
intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus matter is excluded from or is cut out of its
homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a signification. And because a part is not predicated
significatione eius excluditur vel of its whole, humanity is not predicated of man,
praeciditur materia designata. Et quia nor is it predicated of Socrates.
pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est
quod humanitas nec de homine nec de
Socrate praedicatur.
Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas 45. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the quiddity of a
compositi non est ipsum compositum, composite is not the composite itself whose
cuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiddity it is, even though the quiddity too is
quiditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, composed. Humanity, for example, though
licet sit composita, non est homo, immo composed, is not man; it must be received into
oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod something which is designated matter.
est materia designata.

Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio 46. As we have said, the designation of the
speciei respectu generis est per formam, species with respect to the genus is through
designatio autem individui respectu forms, whereas the designation of the individual
speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut with respect to the species is through matter. This
nomen significans id, unde natura is why the word which signifies that from which
generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae the nature of the genus is taken, and signifies it as
determinatae perficientis speciem excluding the determinate form which perfects the
significet partem materialem totius, sicut species, must signify a material part of the whole,
corpus est pars materialis hominis. as, for example, body is a material part of man.
Nomen autem significans id, unde But the word which signifies that from which the
sumitur natura speciei cum praecisione nature of the species is taken, and signifies it as
materiae designatae, significat partem excluding designated matter, signifies a formal
formalem. part.

Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma 47. And thus humanity is signified as a certain
quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, form, and it is said to be the form of the whole, not
non quidem quasi superaddita partibus indeed as something added to the essential parts,
essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, namely to form and matter, as the form of a house
sicut forma domus superadditur partibus is added to its integral parts; rather, it is a form
integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, which is a whole, that is, a form which includes
quae est totum scilicet formam both form and matter, but which excludes those
complectens et materiam, tamen cum things by reason of which matter can be
praecisione eorum, per quae nata est designated.
materia designari.
Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis 48. It is clear, therefore, that the word “man” and
significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen the word “humanity” signify the essence of man,
humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum but diversely, as we have said; the word “man”
est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it does not
ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit exclude designation by matter, but contains it
designationem materiae, sed implicite, implicitly and indistinctly, as we have said before
continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum that the genus contains the difference. And this is
est quod genus continet differentiam; et why the word “man” is predicated of individuals.
ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de But the word “humanity” signifies it as a part,
individuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas because it contains in its signification only what
significat eam ut partem, quia non belongs to man as man, and it excludes all
continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod designation by matter. Whence it is not predicated
est hominis in quantum est homo, et of individual men.
praecidit omnem designationem. Unde
de individuis hominis non praedicatur.

Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae 49. And this is why the word “essence” is
quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, sometimes found predicated of a real thing, for we
dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam say that Socrates is a certain essence; and
quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut sometimes it is denied, as when we say that the
dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est essence of Socrates is not Socrates.
Socrates.

Caput 2 50. Having seen what is signified by the word

Viso igitur quid significetur nomine “essence” in composed substances, we must see
essentiae in substantiis compositis how a composed essence is related to the notion
videndum est quomodo se habeat ad of the genus, of the species, and of the difference.
rationem generis, speciei et differentiae.
Quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis 51. Because that to which the notion of the genus,
vel speciei vel differentiae, praedicatur de or of the species, or of the difference, belongs is
hoc singulari signato, impossibile est predicated of this designated singular, it is
quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel impossible that the notion of a universal ─ e.g., of
speciei, conveniat essentiae secundum the genus or of the species ─ belong to an
quod per modum partis significatur, ut essence according as it is signified a part, as by
nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. Et the word “humanity” or “animality.” And this is why
ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non Ibn-Sînâ says that rationality is not a difference,
est differentia, sed differentiae but the principle of a difference. And for the same
principium; et eadem ratione humanitas reason humanity is not a species, and animality
non est species nec animalitas genus. not a genus.

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio 52. Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion of
generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, the genus, or of the species, belongs to an
secundum quod est quaedam res essence as to some real thing existing outside
exsistens extra singularia, ut Platonici singular things, as the Platonists held, because in
ponebant, quia sic genus et species non this way the genus and the species would not be
praedicarentur de hoc individuo; non predicated of this individual; for it cannot be said
enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc that Socrates is what is separated from him. Nor,
quod ab eo separatum est; nec iterum further, would this separated something be of any
illud separatum proficeret in cognitionem use in knowing this singular.
huius singularis.

Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel 53. Whence it remains that the notion of the
speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum genus, or of the species, belongs to an essence
quod significatur per modum totius, ut according as it is signified as a whole, as by the
nomine hominis vel animalis, prout word “man” or “animal” according as it contains
implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, implicitly and indistinctly everything that is in the
quod in individuo est. individual.
Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta 54. Now, a nature or essence signified as a whole
potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, can be considered in two ways. In one way it can
secundum rationem propriam, et haec be considered according to its proper content, and
est absoluta consideratio ipsius. Et hoc this is an absolute consideration of it. And in this
modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod way nothing is true of it except what belongs to it
convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. as such; whence if anything else is attributed to it,
Unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, the attribution is false. For example, to man as
falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia, homini in man belong rational and animal, and whatever
eo quod est homo convenit rationale et else falls in his definition. But white or black, or
animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius anything of this sort, which is not of the content of
cadunt. Album vero aut nigrum vel humanity, does not belong to man as man.
quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de Whence, if one should ask whether the nature so
ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini considered can be said to be one or many, neither
in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur should be allowed, because each is outside the
utrum ista natura sic considerata possit content of humanity and either can be added to it.
dici una vel plures, neutrum For if plurality were of its content, it could never
concedendum est, quia utrumque est be one, as it is in Socrates. Similarly, if oneness
extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque were of its content, then the nature of Socrates
potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas and Plato would be one and the same, and it
esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset could not be plurified into many individuals.
esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum
quod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas
esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et
eadem Socratis et Platonis nec posset in
pluribus plurificari.

Alio modo consideratur secundum esse 55. In the other way an essence is considered
quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de according to the existence it has in this or that.
ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens When the essence is so considered, something is
ratione eius, in quo est, sicut dicitur quod predicated of it accidentally, by reason of that in
homo est albus, quia Socrates est albus, which it is; for example, it is said that man is white
quamvis hoc non conveniat homini in eo because Socrates is white, although to be white
quod homo. does not belong to man as man.
Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, 56. This nature has a twofold existence, one in
unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et singular things, the other in the soul; and
secundum utrumque consequuntur accidents follow upon the nature according to
dictam naturam accidentia. Et in either existence. In singular things it has a
singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse multiple existence in accord with the diversity of
secundum singularium diversitatem et these singular things; yet the existence of none of
tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam these things belongs to the nature considered in
primam considerationem, scilicet itself, i.e., absolutely. For it is false to say that the
absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. nature of man, as such, has existence in this
Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia singular thing; because if existence in this singular
hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat thing belonged to man as man, man would never
esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc exist outside this singular thing. Similarly, if it
singulari conveniret homini in quantum belonged to man as man not to exist in this
est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singular thing, man would never exist in it. But it is
singulare. Similiter etiam si conveniret true to say that it does not belong to man as man
homini in quantum est homo non esse in to exist in this or that singular thing, or in the soul.
hoc singulari, nunquam esset in eo. Sed It is clear, therefore, that the nature of man,
verum est dicere quod homo non in absolutely considered, abstracts from any of
quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc these existences, but in a way such that it
singulari vel in illo aut in anima. Ergo excludes no one of them.
patet quod natura hominis absolute
considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita
tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius
eorum.
Et haec natura sic considerata est quae 57. And it is the nature so considered which is
praedicatur de individuis omnibus. Non predicated of all individuals. Yet it cannot be said
tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis that the notion of a universal belongs to the nature
conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de so considered, because oneness and
ratione universalis est unitas et commonness are of the notion of a universal.
communitas. Naturae autem humanae Neither of these belongs to human nature
neutrum horum convenit secundum suam considered absolutely, for if commonness were of
absolutam considerationem. Si enim the content of man, commonness would be found
communitas esset de intellectu hominis, in whatever thing humanity is found. And this is
tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas false, because in Socrates there is no
inveniretur communitas. Et hoc falsum commonness, but whatever is in him is
est, quia in Socrate non invenitur individuated.
communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in
eo est individuatum.

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio 58. Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion of
generis vel speciei accidat naturae the genus or of the species attaches to human
humanae secundum esse quod habet in nature according as it has existence in individuals,
individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis because human nature is not found in individuals
natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit with a oneness such that it would be some one
unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod thing belonging to all, which the notion of a
ratio universalis exigit. universal requires.

Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei 59. It remains, therefore, that the notion of the
accidat naturae humanae secundum illud species attaches to human nature according to
esse quod habet in intellectu. the existence it has in the intellect.
Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu 60. For human nature exists in the intellect in
habet esse abstractum ab omnibus abstraction from all that individuates; and this is
individuantibus, et ideo habet rationem why it has a content which is the same in relation
uniformem ad omnia individua, quae sunt to all individual men outside the soul; it is equally
extra animam, prout aequaliter est the likeness of all of them, and leads to a
similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium knowledge of all insofar as they are men. And it is
cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. Et from the fact that the nature has such a relation to
ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad all individuals that the intellect discovers and
omnia individua intellectus adinvenit attributes the notion of the species to it. Whence
rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. Unde the Commentator says in his considerations on
dicit Commentator in principio de anima the first book of ​On the Soul that “it is the intellect
quod intellectus est qui agit which causes universality in things.” Ibn-Sînâ, too,
universalitatem in rebus. Hoc etiam says this in his ​Metaphysics​.
Avicenna dicit in sua metaphysica.

Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat 61. And although the intellectually grasped nature
rationem universalis secundum quod has the character of a universal according as it is
comparatur ad res extra animam, quia compared to things outside the soul, because it is
est una similitudo omnium, tamen one likeness of all of them; still according as it
secundum quod habet esse in hoc exists in this intellect or in that one, it is something
intellectu vel in illo est quaedam species particular ─ a particular species grasped by a
intellecta particularis. Et ideo patet particular intellect. From this one can see the
defectus Commentatoris in III de anima, weakness of what the Commentator says in his
qui voluit ex universalitate formae considerations of the third book of ​On the Soul;​
intellectae unitatem intellectus in from the universality of the intellectually grasped
omnibus hominibus concludere, quia non form he wanted to conclude that there is one
est universalitas illius formae secundum intellect in all men. This falls short of the truth
hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed because the intellectually grasped form has its
secundum quod refertur ad res ut universality not according to the existence which it
similitudo rerum, has in an intellect, but according as it is related to
real things as a likeness of them.
sicut etiam, si esset una statua corporalis 62. What is true here is like what would be true of
repraesentans multos homines, constat a corporeal statue representing many men: the
quod illa imago vel species statuae image or form of the statue would have its own
haberet esse singulare et proprium and individual existence according as it exists in
secundum quod esset in hac materia, this matter, and it would have the character of
sed haberet rationem communitatis commonness according as it is the common
secundum quod esset commune representation of many.
repraesentativum plurium.

Et quia naturae humanae secundum 63. Further, because it belongs to human nature
suam absolutam considerationem absolutely considered to be predicated of
convenit quod praedicetur de Socrate, et Socrates, and because the notion of the species
ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum does not belong to it absolutely considered but is
suam absolutam considerationem, sed among the accidents which follow upon it
est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur according to the existence it has in the intellect,
eam secundum esse, quod habet in one can see why the word “species” is not
intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non predicated of Socrates, i.e., why it is not said that
praedicatur de Socrate, ut dicatur: “Socrates is a species.” This would of necessity
Socrates est species, quod de be said if the notion of the species belonged to
necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei man according to the existence which man has in
conveniret homini secundum esse, quod Socrates; or, if the notion of the species belonged
habet in Socrate vel secundum suam to man absolutely considered, i.e., to man as
considerationem absolutam, scilicet in man, for whatever belongs to man as man is
quantum est homo. Quicquid enim predicated of Socrates.
convenit homini in quantum est homo
praedicatur de Socrate.
Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per 64. Still, to be predicated belongs to the genus in
se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. virtue of what it is, since this is placed in its
Praedicatio enim est quiddam, quod definition. For predication is something which is
completur per actionem intellectus achieved by the combining and dividing activity of
componentis et dividentis, habens the intellect, and which has for its foundation in
fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, the real thing the union of those things, one of
quorum unum de altero dicitur. Unde which is said of another. Whence the notion of
ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in predicability can be included in the notion of that
ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, intention which is the genus, which (intention) is
quae similiter per actum intellectus similarly achieved by the activity of the intellect.
completur. Nihilominus tamen id, cui Nonetheless, that to which the intellect, combining
intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis one thing with another, attributes the intention of
attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non predicability is not the intention of the genus itself;
est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, rather it is that to which the intellect attributes the
cui intellectus intentionem generis intention of the genus, for example, that which is
attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc signified by the word “animal.”
nomine animal.

Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura 65. It is clear, therefore, how an essence or
se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio nature is related to the notion of the species. The
speciei non est de his, quae conveniunt notion of the species is not among the things
ei secundum suam absolutam which belong to the nature absolutely considered,
considerationem, neque est de nor is it among the accidents which follow upon
accidentibus, quae consequuntur ipsam the nature according to the existence it has
secundum esse, quod habet extra outside the soul, as whiteness or blackness.
animam, ut albedo et nigredo, sed est de Rather the notion of the species is among the
accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam accidents which follow upon the nature according
secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, to the existence it has in the intellect; and it is in
et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi this way, too, that the notion of the genus and of
ratio generis vel differentiae. the difference belong to it.

Caput 3 66. It remains, now, for us to see in what way

Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essence is in separated substances, namely, in
essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet the soul, in the intelligences, and in the First
in anima, intelligentia et causa prima. Cause.
Quamvis autem simplicitatem causae 67. Although everyone admits the simplicity of the
primae omnes concedant, tamen First Cause, some try to introduce a composition
compositionem formae et materiae of matter and form in the intelligences and in
quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias souls. The originator of this position appears to
et in animam, cuius positionis auctor have been Ibn-Gabirol, author of the book
videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri Fountain of Life.​
fontis vitae.

Hoc autem dictis philosophorum 68. But this is not in agreement with what
communiter repugnat, qui eas philosophers commonly say, because they call
substantias a materia separatas them substances separated from matter, and
nominant et absque omni materia esse prove them to be without all matter. The strongest
probant. Cuius demonstratio potissima demonstration of this is from the power of
est ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est. understanding which is in them. For we see that
Videmus enim formas non esse forms are not actually intelligible except according
intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod as they are separated from matter and from its
separantur a materia et a condicionibus conditions; nor are they made actually intelligible
eius; nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu, except by the power of a substance
nisi per virtutem substantiae intelligentis understanding them, according as they are
secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et received into, and are affected by, that substance.
secundum quod aguntur per eam.

Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantia 69. Whence it is necessary that there be in any
intelligente sit omnino immunitas a intelligent substance a total freedom from matter,
materia, ita quod neque habeat materiam such that the substance does not have matter as
partem sui neque etiam sit sicut forma a part of itself, such too that the substance is not
impressa in materia, ut est de formis a form impressed on matter, as is the case with
materialibus. material forms.
Nec potest aliquis dicere quod 70. Nor can it be said that it is only corporeal
intelligibilitatem non impediat materia matter that impedes intelligibility, and not any
quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. matter whatsoever. For if this were so by reason
Si enim hoc esset ratione materiae of corporeal matter alone, then it would have to be
corporalis tantum, cum materia non that matter impedes intelligibility by reason of the
dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod corporeal form, since matter is called corporeal
stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret only according as it is found under the corporeal
quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet form. But this cannot be ─ namely, that matter
impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma impedes intelligibility by reason of the corporeal
corporali. Et hoc non potest esse, quia form ─ because the corporeal form itself, just as
ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu other forms, is actually intelligible according as it
intelligibilis est, sicut et aliae formae, is abstracted from matter. Whence there is in no
secundum quod a materia abstrahitur. way a composition of matter and form in the soul
Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo or in an intelligence if matter in them is taken in
modo est compositio ex materia et forma, the sense in which matter is taken in corporeal
ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis substances.
sicut in substantiis corporalibus,

sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. 71. But there is in them a composition of form and
Unde in commento IX propositionis libri existence. Whence it is said, in the commentary
de causis dicitur quod intelligentia est on the ninth proposition of the ​Book on Causes​,
habens formam et esse, et accipitur ibi that “an intelligence is something having form and
forma pro ipsa quiditate vel natura existence,” and form is taken there for the simple
simplici. quiddity or nature itself.
Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre. 72. It is easy to see how this may be so.
Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad Whatever things are so related to one another
invicem quod unum est causa esse that one is a cause of the other’s existence, the
alterius, illud quod habet rationem one which is the cause can have existence
causae potest habere esse sine altero, without the other, but not conversely. Now the
sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur relation of matter and form is such that form gives
habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma existence to matter. It is impossible, therefore,
dat esse materiae. Et ideo impossibile that matter exist without some form. But it is not
est esse materiam sine aliqua forma. impossible that some form exist without matter,
Tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam for form, to the extent that it is form, does not
formam sine materia. Forma enim non depend on matter. But if some forms are found
habet in eo quod est forma which cannot exist except in matter, this happens
dependentiam ad materiam, sed si to them because of their distance from the first
inveniantur aliquae formae, quae non principle, which is first and pure act. Whence
possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit those forms which are nearest to the first principle
eis secundum quod sunt distantes a are forms subsisting of themselves, that is without
primo principio, quod est actus primus et matter. For not every sort of form needs matter,
purus. Unde illae formae, quae sunt as has been said; and the intelligences are forms
propinquissimae primo principio, sunt of this sort. And therefore it is not necessary that
formae per se sine materia subsistentes the essences or quiddities of these substances be
(non enim forma secundum totum genus other than form itself.
suum materia indiget, ut dictum est) et
huiusmodi formae sunt intelligentiae. Et
ideo non oportet ut essentiae vel
quiditates harum substantiarum sint aliud
quam ipsa forma.

In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae 73. Thus the essence of a composed substance
compositae et substantiae simplicis quod and that of a simple substance differ in this: the
essentia substantiae compositae non est essence of a composed substance is not form
tantum forma, sed complectitur formam alone, but includes form and matter; the essence
et materiam, essentia autem substantiae of a simple substance is form alone.
simplicis est forma tantum.
Et ex hoc causantur duae aliae 74. And from this follow two other differences.
differentiae: una est quod essentia One difference is that the essence of a composed
substantiae compositae potest significari substance can be signified as a whole or as a
ut totum vel ut pars, quod accidit propter part. This happens on account of the designation
materiae designationem, ut dictum est. Et of matter, as has been said. And therefore the
ideo non quolibet modo praedicatur essence of a composed thing is not predicated of
essentia rei compositae de ipsa re the composed thing itself in just any way, for it
composita; non enim potest dici quod cannot be said that man is his quiddity. But the
homo sit quiditas sua. Sed essentia rei essence of a simple thing, which (essence) is its
simplicis, quae est sua forma, non potest form, cannot be signified except as a whole, since
significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi nothing is there besides the form as receiving the
praeter formam quasi formam recipiens; form. Thus, no matter what way the essence of a
et ideo quocumque modo sumatur simple substance is taken, it is predicated of the
essentia substantiae simplicis de ea simple substance. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the
praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself,
quiditas simplicis est ipsummet simplex, because there is nothing other receiving the
quia non est aliquid aliud recipiens quiddity.
ipsam.

Secunda differentia est quod essentiae 75; The second difference is that the essences of
rerum compositarum ex eo quod composed things, because they are received into
recipiuntur in materia designata designated matter, are multiplied according to its
multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, division. And this is why it happens that certain
unde contingit quod aliqua sint idem things are the same in species and diverse in
specie et diversa numero. Sed cum number. But since the essence of a simple thing
essentia simplicis non sit recepta in is not received into matter, such a multiplication is
materia, non potest ibi esse talis impossible here. And this is why, of necessity,
multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non many individuals of a same species are not found
inveniantur in illis substantiis plura among these substances; rather, as Ibn-Sînâ
individua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt expressly says, there are among them as many
ibi individua, tot sunt ibi species, ut species as there are individuals.
Avicenna expresse dicit.
Huiusmodi ergo substantiae quamvis sint 76. Although substances of this sort are forms
formae tantum sine materia, non tamen alone without matter, they are not utterly simple
in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt so as to be pure act. They have an admixture of
actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potency, which becomes clear in the following
potentiae. Et hoc sic patet. consideration.

Quicquid enim non est de intellectu 77. Whatever is not of the understood content of
essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est an essence or quality is something which comes
adveniens extra et faciens from without and makes a composition with the
compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essence, because no essence can be understood
essentia sine his, quae sunt partes without the things which are parts of it. Now,
essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem every essence or quiddity can be understood
essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine without anything being understood about its
hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; existence. For I can understand what a man is, or
possum enim intelligere quid est homo what a phoenix is, and yet not know whether they
vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse have existence in the real world. It is clear,
habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod therefore, that existence is other than essence or
esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, quiddity, unless perhaps there exists a thing
nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit whose quiddity is its existence.
ipsum suum esse;
et haec res non potest esse nisi una et 78. And there can be but one such thing, the First
prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat Thing, because it is impossible to plurify a thing
plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem except: (1) by the addition of some difference, as
alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur the nature of the genus is multiplied in its species,
natura generis in species, vel per hoc or (2) by the reception of a form into diverse
quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis, matters, as the nature of the species is multiplied
sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in in diverse individuals, or (3) by this: that one is
diversis individuis, vel per hoc quod absolute and the other is received into something;
unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo for example, if there were a separated heat, it
receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor would by virtue of its very separation be other
separatus, esset alius a calore non than heat which is not separated. Now, if we posit
separato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si a thing which is existence alone, such that this
autem ponatur aliqua res, quae sit esse existence is subsistent, this existence will not
tantum, ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, receive the addition of a difference because it
hoc esse non recipiet additionem would no longer be existence alone, but existence
differentiae, quia iam non esset esse plus some form. And much less will it receive the
tantum, sed esse et praeter hoc forma addition of matter because it would no longer be a
aliqua; et multo minus reciperet subsistent existence, but a material existence.
additionem materiae, quia iam esset Whence it remains that such a thing, which is its
esse non subsistens sed materiale. own existence, cannot be but one.

Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit 79. Whence it is necessary, that in every thing
suum esse, non potest esse nisi una. other than this one its existence be other than its
Unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re quiddity, or its nature, or its form. Whence it is
praeter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud necessary that existence in the intelligences be
quiditas vel natura seu forma sua. Unde something besides the form, and this is why it was
oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse said that an intelligence is form and existence.
praeter formam; et ideo dictum est quod
intelligentia est forma et esse.
Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est 80. Now, whatever belongs to a thing is either
causatum ex principiis naturae suae, caused by the principles of its nature, as the
sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit ab ability to laugh in man, or comes to it from some
aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the
aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest influence of the sun. But it cannot be that the
esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab existence of a thing is caused by the form or
ipsa forma vel quiditate rei (dico sicut a quiddity of that thing ─ I say caused as by an
causa efficiente) quia sic aliqua res esset efficient cause ─ because then something would
sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam in be its own cause, and would bring itself into
esse produceret, quod est impossibile. existence, which is impossible. It is therefore
Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius necessary that every such thing, the existence of
esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat which is other than its nature, have its existence
esse ab alio. Et quia omne, quod est per from some other thing. And because every thing
aliud, reducitur ad illud quod est per se which exists by virtue of another is led back, as to
sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit its first cause, to that which exists by virtue of
aliqua res, quae sit causa essendi itself, it is necessary that there be some thing
omnibus rebus, eo quod ipsa est esse which is the cause of the existence of all things
tantum. Alias iretur in infinitum in causis, because it is existence alone. Otherwise, there
cum omnis res, quae non est esse would be an infinite regress among causes, since
tantum, habeat causam sui esse, ut every thing which is not existence alone has a
dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia cause of its existence, as has been said. It is
est forma et esse et quod esse habet a clear, therefore, that an intelligence is form and
primo ente, quod est esse tantum. Et hoc existence, and that it has existence from the First
est causa prima, quae Deus est. Being, which is existence alone. And this is the
First Cause, which is God.

Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio 81. Now everything which receives something
est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod from another is in potency with respect to what it
receptum est in eo est actus eius. receives, and what is received into it is its act. It is
Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel necessary therefore that the quiddity itself or the
forma, quae est intelligentia, sit in form, which is the intelligence, be in potency with
potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo respect to the existence which it receives from
recipit; et illud esse receptum est per God; and this existence is received as an act. It is
modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et in this way that potency and act are found in the
actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et intelligences, but not form and matter, unless
materia nisi aequivoce. equivocally.
Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum 82. Whence, to ​suffer​, and to ​receive,​ and ​to be a
esse et omnia huiusmodi, quae videntur subject​, and all things of this sort, which are
rebus ratione materiae convenire, observed to belong to things by reason of matter,
aequivoce conveniunt substantiis also belong equivocally to intellectual and to
intellectualibus et corporalibus, ut in III de corporeal substances, as the Commentator says
anima Commentator dicit. in his considerations on the third book of ​On The
Soul.​

Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae 83. And because the quiddity of an intelligence is,
quiditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo as has been said, the intelligence itself, its
quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod quiddity or essence is identically that which it itself
est ipsa, et esse suum receptum a Deo is; and its existence received from God is that
est id, quo subsistit in rerum natura. Et whereby it subsists in reality. And this is why
propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur substances of this sort are said by some to be
huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo composed of “that by which it is” and “that which
est et quod est vel ex quod est et esse, is,” or as Boethius says, of “that which is” and
ut Boethius dicit. “existence.”

Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et 84. And because there is potency in the
actus, non erit difficile invenire intelligences as well as act, it will not be difficult to
multitudinem intelligentiarum; quod esset find a multitude of intelligences, which would be
impossibile, si nulla potentia in eis esset. impossible if there were no potency in them.
Unde Commentator dicit in III de anima Whence the Commentator says, in his
quod, si natura intellectus possibilis esset considerations on the third book of ​On The Soul​,
ignorata, non possemus invenire that if the nature of the possible intellect were not
multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est known, we would not be able to find multitude
ergo distinctio earum ad invicem among the separated substances. The separated
secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita substances, therefore, are distinct from one
quod intelligentia superior, quae magis another according to their grade of potency and
propinqua est primo, habet plus de actu act, in such a way that a superior intelligence
et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis. which is nearer to the First Being has more act
and less potency, and so with the others.
Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae 85. This grading has its termination in the human
tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis soul, which holds the lowest grade among
intellectualibus. Unde intellectus intellectual substances. Whence its possible
possibilis eius se habet ad formas intellect is related to intelligible forms in the way in
intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae which prime matter, which holds the lowest grade
tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, in sensible existence, is related to sensible forms,
ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in as the Commentator remarks in his
III de anima dicit. Et ideo philosophus considerations on the third book of ​On The Soul​.
comparat eam tabulae, in qua nihil est And this is why the Philosopher compares it to a
scriptum. blank tablet on which nothing has been written.

Et propter hoc quod inter alias 86. And because it has more potency than other
substantias intellectuales plus habet de intelligible substances, the human soul is so close
potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum to material things that a material thing is drawn to
propinqua rebus materialibus, ut res it to share its existence, but in such a way that
materialis trahatur ad participandum esse from soul and body results one existence in one
suum, ita scilicet quod ex anima et composed thing; and yet this existence is not
corpore resultat unum esse in uno dependent on the body inasmuch as it is the
composito, quamvis illud esse, prout est soul’s existence.
animae, non sit dependens a corpore.

Et ideo post istam formam, quae est 87. And posterior to this form which is the soul are
anima, inveniuntur aliae formae plus de found other forms which have more potency, and
potentia habentes et magis propinquae which are still closer to matter, so close that they
materiae in tantum quod esse earum sine do not exist without matter. Among these forms,
materia non est. In quibus etiam invenitur too, is found an order and a grading, down to the
ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas first forms of the elements, which are the closest
elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimae to matter. These last are so close to matter that
materiae. Unde nec aliquam operationem they operate only according to the active and
habent nisi secundum exigentiam passive qualities, and the other sorts of things,
qualitatum activarum et passivarum et which are required as the means by which matter
aliarum, quibus materia ad formam is disposed for the receiving of form.
disponitur.
Caput 4 88. From the preceding it is clear how essence is
His igitur visis patet quomodo essentia in found in diverse substances. For we find that they
diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex have essence in three different ways.
modus habendi essentiam in substantiis.

Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius 89. There is a thing, God, whose essence is his
essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et existence itself. And this is why we find some
ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi philosophers who say that God does not have a
dicentes quod Deus non habet quiddity or essence, because his essence is not
quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia other than his existence. And from this it follows
sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex that he is not in a genus, because everything
hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, which is in a genus must have a quiddity which is
quia omne quod est in genere oportet other than its existence. And this is so since the
quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse quiddity or nature of a genus or species, in the
suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis case of those things which have a genus or
aut speciei non distinguatur secundum species, is not multiplied according to the
rationem naturae in illis, quorum est intelligible content of the nature; rather, it is the
genus vel species, sed esse est existence in these diverse things which is diverse.
diversum in diversis.
Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est 90. Nor is it necessary, if we say that God is
esse tantum, ut in illorum errorem existence alone, for us to fall into the error of
incidamus, qui Deum dixerunt esse illud those who say that God is universal existence
esse universale, quo quaelibet res whereby each and every thing formally exists. For
formaliter est. Hoc enim esse, quod Deus the existence which God is, is such that no
est, huius condicionis est, ut nulla sibi addition can be made to it. Whence by virtue of its
additio fieri possit; unde per ipsam suam purity it is an existence distinct from every
puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni existence. This is why, in the commentary on the
esse. Propter quod in commento IX ninth proposition of the ​Book on Causes,​ it is said
propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod that the individuation of the First Cause, which is
individuatio primae causae, quae est existence alone, is through its pure goodness. But
esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem as regards that universal existence, just as it does
eius. Esse autem commune sicut in not include in its intelligible content any addition,
intellectu suo non includit aliquam so too neither does it include in its intelligible
additionem, ita non includit in intellectu content any exclusion of addition, because if this
suo praecisionem additionis; quia si hoc were the case, nothing in which something is
esset, nihil posset intelligi esse, in quo added over and above its existence could be
super esse aliquid adderetur. understood to be.

Similiter etiam, quamvis sit esse tantum, 91. Similarly, although God is existence alone, it
non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae is not necessary that the other perfections or
perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet excellences be wanting in him. Rather he has all
omnes perfectiones, quae sunt in the perfections which are in every genus. This is
omnibus generibus. Propter quod why he is called simply perfect, as the
perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut Philosopher and the Commentator say in book
philosophus et Commentator in V five of the ​Metaphysics​. But he has these
metaphysicae dicunt. Sed habet eas perfections in a more excellent way than all things
modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in because in him they are one, whereas in other
eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem things they have diversity. And this is so because
habent. Et hoc est, quia omnes illae all these perfections belong to him according to
perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum his simple existence. If some one could perform
esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per the operations of all the qualities through some
unam qualitatem posset efficere one quality, he would have every quality in that
operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa one quality; so too God has all these perfections
una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, in his existence itself.
ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes
perfectiones habet.
Secundo modo invenitur essentia in 92. Essence is found in a second way in created
substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in intellectual substances. Existence in them is other
quibus est aliud esse quam essentia than their essence, although essence is without
earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. matter. Whence their existence is not absolute,
Unde esse earum non est absolutum, but received, and therefore limited and confined to
sed receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum the capacity of the recipient nature. But their
ad capacitatem naturae recipientis, sed nature or quiddity is absolute, not received in any
natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, matter. And this is why it is said in the ​Book on
non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo Causes that the intelligences are unlimited from
dicitur in libro de causis quod below and limited from above, for they are limited
intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et as regards their existence, which they receive
finitae superius. Sunt enim finitae from above; but they are not limited from below
quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori because their forms are not limited to the capacity
recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius, of a matter receiving them.
quia earum formae non limitantur ad
capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis
eas.

Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur 93. And this is why, as has been said, there is not
multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut found among such substances a multitude of
dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter individuals in one species, with the exception of
corpus, cui unitur. Et licet individuatio the human soul on account of the body to which it
eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat is united. And although its individuation depends
quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non on the body as upon the occasion for its
acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in beginning because it does not acquire its
corpore, cuius est actus, non tamen individuated existence except in the body of which
oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio it is the actuality, it is not necessary that its
pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum, individuation be lost when the body is taken away
ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse because that existence, since it is absolute,
individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma always remains individuated once the soul
huius corporis, illud esse semper acquires it by being made the form of this
remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit individual body. And this is why Ibn-Sînâ says that
Avicenna quod individuatio animarum vel the individuation and multiplication of souls
multiplicatio dependet ex corpore depends on the body as regards its beginning, but
quantum ad sui principium, sed non not as regards its termination.
quantum ad sui finem.
Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non 94. And because quiddity in these substances is
est idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles not the same as existence, they are orderable
in praedicamento, et propter hoc within a predicament. And this is why they have a
invenitur in eis genus et species et genus, a species, and a difference, although their
differentia, quamvis earum differentiae proper differences are hidden from us. For even in
propriae nobis occultae sint. In rebus the case of sensible things, the essential
enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae differences themselves are not known; whence
essentiales ignotae sunt, unde they are signified through accidental differences
significantur per differentias accidentales, which rise out of the essential ones, as a cause is
quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut signified through its effect; this is what is done
causa significatur per suum effectum, when biped, for example, is given as the
sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. difference of man. But the proper accidents of
Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterial substances are unknown to us;
immaterialium nobis ignota sunt; unde whence their differences cannot be signified by us
differentiae earum nec per se nec per either through themselves or through accidental
accidentales differentias a nobis differences.
significari possunt.
Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non 95. But we must notice that the genus and the
eodem modo sumitur genus et differentia difference of these substances are not taken in
in illis substantiis et in substantiis the same way in which the genus and the
sensibilibus, quia in sensibilibus genus difference of sensible substances are taken. In
sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, the case of sensible substances the genus is
differentia vero ab eo quod est formale in taken from that which is material in the thing,
ipsa. Unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri whereas the difference is taken from that which is
sui de anima quod forma in rebus formal in it. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says at the
compositis ex materia et forma est beginning of his book ​On the Soul that form in
differentia simplex eius, quod constituitur things composed of matter and form is the simple
ex illa, non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit difference of that which is constituted by it; but not
differentia, sed quia est principium in such a way that the form is the difference, but
differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua because the form is the principle of the difference,
metaphysica. Et dicitur talis differentia as the same writer says in his ​Metaphysics​. And
esse differentia simplex, quia sumitur ab this sort of difference is called a simple difference
eo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a because it is taken from what is part of the
forma. Cum autem substantiae quiddity of the thing, namely, from the form. But
immateriales sint simplices quiditates, since immaterial substances are simple quiddities,
non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo their difference cannot be taken from what is part
quod est pars quiditatis, sed a tota of the quiddity, but from the whole quiddity. This is
quiditate; et ideo in principio de anima why Ibn-Sînâ says, at the beginning of ​On the
dicit Avicenna quod differentiam Soul,​ that only those species have a simple
simplicem non habent nisi species, difference whose essences are composed of
quarum essentiae sunt compositae ex matter and form.
materia et forma.
Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia 96. Similarly, their genus too is taken from the
sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti. whole essence, but in a different way, for
Una enim substantia separata convenit separated substances agree with each other in
cum alia in immaterialitate et differunt ab immateriality, and differ from each other in grade
invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum of perfection, according as they withdraw from
recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad potentiality and approach pure actuality. The
actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod genus is taken from that in them which follows
consequitur illas in quantum sunt upon their being immaterial; for example,
immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut intellectuality or something of this sort. But the
est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi. difference, which is unknown to us, is taken from
Ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis that in them which follows upon their grade of
gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis perfection.
differentia, nobis tamen ignota.

Nec oportet has differentias esse 97. And it is not necessary that these differences
accidentales, quia sunt secundum be accidental because they are determined by
maiorem et minorem perfectionem, quae greater and lesser perfection which does not
non diversificant speciem. Gradus enim diversify a species. For grades of perfection in the
perfectionis in recipiendo eandem reception of a same form do not diversify a
formam non diversificat speciem, sicut species, as whiter and less white in participating
albius et minus album in participando whiteness which is of the same nature. But a
eiusdem rationis albedinem. Sed diverse grade in the forms or natures themselves
diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis which are participated does diversify a species.
formis vel naturis participatis speciem For example, nature proceeds by grades from
diversificat, sicut natura procedit per plants to animals by way of certain things which
gradus de plantis ad animalia per are midway between animals and plants,
quaedam, quae sunt media inter animalia according to the Philosopher in book seven of ​On
et plantas, secundum philosophum in VII Animals​. Nor, similarly, is it necessary that
de animalibus. Nec iterum est intellectual substances be divided always by two
necessarium, ut divisio intellectualium true differences, because this cannot come about
substantiarum sit semper per duas in the case of all things, as the Philosopher says
differentias veras, quia hoc est in book eleven of ​On Animals.​
impossibile in omnibus rebus accidere, ut
philosophus dicit in XI de animalibus.
Tertio modo invenitur essentia in 98. Essence is found in a third way in substances
substantiis compositis ex materia et composed of matter and form. Here it is both the
forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et case that existence is received and limited
finitum, propter hoc quod ab alio esse because they have existence from another; and
habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas that their nature or quiddity is received in
earum est recepta in materia signata. Et designated matter. And so, they are limited both
ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius, et from above and from below. And because of the
in eis iam propter divisionem materiae division of designated matter, the multiplication of
signatae possibilis est multiplicatio individuals in one species is here possible. As
individuorum in una specie. Et in his regards the question how the essence of these
qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones substances is related to the logical intentions, we
logicas, supra dictum est. have explained that above.

Caput 5 99. What remains now is to see how essence is in

Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia accidents; how it is in all substances has been
in accidentibus. discussed.

Qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis, 100. And because essence, as has been said, is
dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, that which is signified by the definition, it is
essentia est id quod per diffinitionem necessary that accidents have essence in the way
significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeant in which they have definition. They have an
essentiam quo habent diffinitionem. incomplete definition because they cannot be
Diffinitionem autem habent incompletam, defined unless a subject is placed in their
quia non possunt diffiniri, nisi ponatur definition. And this is so because they do not have
subiectum in eorum diffinitione. Et hoc existence in themselves free of a subject.
ideo est, quia non habent per se esse,
absolutum a subiecto,
sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur 101. But just as a substantial existence results
esse substantiale, quando componuntur, from matter and form when they are composed,
ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur so from an accident and a subject results an
esse accidentale, quando accidens accidental existence when the accident comes to
subiecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma the subject. And this is also why neither
substantialis completam essentiam habet substantial form nor matter have a complete
nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione essence because it is necessary to place in the
formae substantialis oportet quod definition of substantial form that of which it is the
ponatur illud, cuius est forma; et ita form; and so its definition is formulated by the
diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuius, addition of something which is outside its genus,
quod est extra genus eius, sicut et just like the definition of an accidental form.
diffinitio formae accidentalis. Unde et in Whence, also, the body is placed in the definition
diffinitione animae ponitur corpus a of the soul by the natural philosopher, who
naturali, qui considerat animam solum in considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of
quantum est forma physici corporis. a physical body.
Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et 102. But there is this difference between
accidentales tantum interest, quia sicut substantial and accidental forms. Just as
forma substantialis non habet per se substantial form does not have existence in itself,
esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita separately from that to which it comes, neither
nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia. Et does that to which it comes, namely, matter. And
ideo ex coniunctione utriusque relinquitur thus from the conjunction of the two results that
illud esse, in quo res per se subsistit, et existence in which a thing subsists in itself, and
ex eis efficitur unum per se; propter quod from them is produced something essentially one;
ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur and because of this an essence is the result of
essentia quaedam. Unde forma, quamvis their conjunction. Whence, although the form
in se considerata non habeat completam considered in itself does not have the complete
rationem essentiae, tamen est pars nature of an essence, it is nonetheless part of a
essentiae completae. Sed illud, cui complete essence. But that to which an accident
advenit accidens, est ens in se comes is a being complete in itself and subsisting
completum, subsistens in suo esse. in its own existence. And this existence naturally
Quod quidem esse naturaliter praecedit precedes the accident which supervenes. And this
accidens quod supervenit. Et ideo is why the supervening accident does not, by its
accidens superveniens ex coniunctione conjunction with that to which it comes, cause that
sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud existence in which a thing subsists, and through
esse, in quo res subsistit, per quod res which the thing is a being in itself. It causes,
est ens per se, sed causat quoddam rather, a certain second existence, without which
esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens the subsisting thing can be understood to be, just
intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest as what is first can be understood without what is
intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente second. Whence something essentially one is not
et subiecto non efficitur unum per se, sed produced from an accident and a subject, but
unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum something accidentally one. And this is why an
coniunctione non resultat essentia essence does not result from their conjunction, as
quaedam, sicut ex coniunctione formae from the conjunction of form and matter. And this
ad materiam. Propter quod accidens is why an accident neither has the nature of a
neque rationem completae essentiae complete essence, nor is it part of a complete
habet neque pars essentiae completae essence. But just as it is a being in a qualified
est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita way, so too does it have essence in a qualified
et essentiam secundum quid habet. way.
Sed quia illud, quod dicitur maxime et 103. Now, whatever is said to be most fully and
verissime in quolibet genere, est causa most truly in any genus is the cause of the things
eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut which are posterior in that genus; for example,
ignis qui est in fine caliditatis est causa fire, which is unsurpassed in heat, is the cause of
caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II heat in hot things, as it is said in the second book
metaphysicae dicitur, ideo substantia of the ​Metaphysics​. This is why substance, which
quae est primum in genere entis, has first place in the genus of being, having
verissime et maxime essentiam habens, essence most truly and most fully, must be the
oportet quod sit causa accidentium, quae cause of accidents, which participate in the nature
secundario et quasi secundum quid of being secondarily and in a qualified way.
rationem entis participant.

Quod tamen diversimode contingit. Quia 104. But this happens in diverse ways. For, since
enim partes substantiae sunt materia et the parts of substance are matter and form,
forma, ideo quaedam accidentia certain accidents follow principally on form,
principaliter consequuntur formam et certain others follow principally on matter. There
quaedam materiam. Forma autem are forms whose existence does not depend on
invenitur aliqua, cuius esse non dependet matter, for example, intellectual souls; but matter
ad materiam, ut anima intellectualis; does not have existence except through form.
materia vero non habet esse nisi per Whence some of the accidents which follow on
formam. Unde in accidentibus, quae form are such that they share nothing with matter;
consequuntur formam, est aliquid, quod for example, to understand, which does not take
non habet communicationem cum place through a bodily organ, as the Philosopher
materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non proves in the third book of ​On the Soul.​ But some
est per organum corporale, sicut probat other of the accidents following on form are such
philosophus in III de anima. Aliqua vero that they do share something with matter; for
ex consequentibus formam sunt, quae example, to sense. But no accident follows on
habent communicationem cum materia, matter which shares nothing with form.
sicut sentire. Sed nullum accidens
consequitur materiam sine
communicatione formae.
In his tamen accidentibus, quae 105. Among those accidents which follow on
materiam consequuntur, invenitur matter we find a certain diversity. For some
quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim accidents follow on matter according to the
accidentia consequuntur materiam ordering which it has to a special form; for
secundum ordinem, quem habet ad example, male and female among animals, the
formam specialem, sicut masculinum et diversity of which derives from matter, as is said
femininum in animalibus, quorum in the tenth book of the ​Metaphysics​. Whence
diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut these accidents do not remain on the removal of
dicitur in X metaphysicae. Unde remota the form of animal, except equivocally. Other
forma animalis dicta accidentia non accidents follow on matter according to the
remanent nisi aequivoce. Quaedam vero ordering which it has to a general form. Thus, on
consequuntur materiam secundum the removal of the special form they still remain in
ordinem, quem habet ad formam the matter; for example, the blackness of an
generalem, et ideo remota forma speciali Ethiopian’s skin is from the mixture of the
adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo cutis elements and not from his soul; and this is why it
est in Aethiope ex mixtione elementorum remains in him after death. And because each
et non ex ratione animae, et ideo post and every thing is individuated by matter and
mortem in eis remanet. Et quia placed in a genus or species by its form,
unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia accidents which follow on matter are accidents of
et collocatur in genere vel specie per the individual, and it is according to these that
suam formam, ideo accidentia, quae individuals of a same species differ from one
consequuntur materiam, sunt accidentia another.
individui, secundum quae etiam individua
eiusdem speciei ad invicem differunt,

accidentia vero, quae consequuntur 106. But accidents following on form are the
formam, sunt propriae passiones vel proper attributes of the genus or of the species.
generis vel speciei; unde inveniuntur in Whence they are found in every thing which
omnibus participantibus naturam generis participates in the nature of the genus or of the
vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in species. For example, man’s ability to laugh
homine formam, quia risus contingit ex follows on the form because laughter takes place
aliqua apprehensione animae hominis. by reason of the fact that a man’s soul has
grasped something.
Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia 107. It should also be noticed that sometimes the
aliquando ex principiis essentialibus essential principles cause accidents in a state of
causantur secundum actum perfectum, perfect actuality, as heat in the case of fire which
sicut calor in igne, qui semper est actu is always actually hot. But sometimes they cause
calidus; aliquando vero secundum accidents which are only aptitudes, their
aptitudinem tantum, sed complementum completion being received from an exterior agent;
accidit ex agente exteriori, sicut for example, transparency in the air, which is
diaphaneitas in aere, quae completur per completed by some exterior light-emitting body.
corpus lucidum exterius. Et in talibus And in such things the aptitude is an inseparable
aptitudo est accidens inseparabile, sed accident, but the completion, which comes from
complementum, quod advenit ex aliquo some principle which is outside the essence of the
principio, quod est extra essentiam rei vel thing, or which does not enter the constitution of
quod non intrat constitutionem rei, est the thing, is separable; for example, being moved
separabile, sicut moveri et huiusmodi. and things of this sort.

Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus 108. It should be noticed, further, that the genus,
alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et the species, and the difference of accidents are
species quam in substantiis. taken in a way which differs from the way in which
those of substances are taken.
Quia enim in substantiis ex forma 109. In substances something essentially one
substantiali et materia efficitur per se results from the substantial form and matter, a
unum una quadam natura ex earum certain nature results from their conjunction, a
coniunctione resultante, quae proprie in nature which is properly placed in the
praedicamento substantiae collocatur, predicament of substance. This is why concrete
ideo in substantiis nomina concreta, quae names of substances which signify the composite
compositum significant, proprie in genere are properly said to be in a genus, as species or
esse dicuntur sicut species vel genera, ut genera; for example, man or animal. But the form,
homo vel animal. Non autem forma vel or the matter, is not in a predicament in this way,
materia est hoc modo in praedicamento though each is in a predicament by reduction, as
nisi per reductionem, sicut principia in principles are said to be in a genus. Something
genere esse dicuntur. Sed ex accidente essentially one does not, on the contrary, result
et subiecto non fit unum per se. Unde from an accident and its subject. Whence the
non resultat ex eorum coniunctione result of their conjunction is not a certain nature,
aliqua natura, cui intentio generis vel to which the intention of genus or species may be
speciei possit attribui. Unde nomina attributed. Whence names of accidents expressed
accidentalia concretive dicta non concretely are not placed in a predicament as
ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species species or genera; for example, white or musical,
vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi except by reduction. They are placed in a
per reductionem, sed solum secundum predicament only according as they are signified
quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo in the abstract; for example, whiteness and music.
et musica.
Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex 110. And because accidents are not composed of
materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis matter and form, their genus cannot be taken from
sumi genus a materia et differentia a matter and their difference from form, as in the
forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed case of composed substances. Rather, their first
oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso genus must be taken from their way of existing
modo essendi, secundum quod ens itself, according to which the word “being” is
diversimode secundum prius et posterius diversely predicated of the ten genera according
de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut to a priority and posteriority; for example, an
dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura accident is called quantity from the fact that it is
substantiae, et qualitas secundum quod the measure of substance, and quality according
est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis as it is the disposition of substance, and so with
secundum philosophum IX the other accidents, according to the Philosopher
metaphysicae. Differentiae vero in eis in the fourth book of the ​Metaphysics​. But their
sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex differences are taken from the diversity of the
quibus causantur. Et quia propriae principles by which they are caused. And because
passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti proper attributes are caused by the proper
causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in principles of the subject, the subject is placed in
diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in their definition to function as the difference if they
abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod are defined in the abstract, which is the way in
sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod which they are properly in a genus; as when it is
simitas est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso said that snubnosedness is the turned-up-ness of
esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur the nose. But the converse would be the case if
secundum quod concretive dicuntur. Sic their definition were taken according as they are
enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione said concretely. For in this way the subject is
poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc placed in their definition as a genus because they
diffinirentur per modum substantiarum are then being defined after the manner of
compositarum, in quibus ratio generis composed substance, in which the genus is taken
sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod from matter; as when we say that a snub nose is
simum est nasus curvus. a turned up nose.

Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens 111. We have a similar case if one accident is the
alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principle of another, as action and passion and
principium relationis est actio et passio et quantity are principles of relation. And this is why
quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit the Philosopher divides relation according to
philosophus relationem in V these in book five of the ​Metaphysics​.
metaphysicae.
Sed quia propria principia accidentium 112. But because the proper principles of
non semper sunt manifesta, ideo accidents are not always manifest, we sometimes
quandoque sumimus differentias take the difference of accidents from their effects;
accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut as when ​concentrating and ​diffusing are called the
congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differences of color. These effects are caused by
differentiae coloris, quae causantur ex the abundance and the scarcity of light, which
abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo cause the diverse species of color.
diversae species colorum causantur.

Caput 6 113. And so it is clear how essence is in

Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substances and in accidents, and how it is in
substantiis et accidentibus et quomodo in composed substances in simple ones, and how
substantiis compositis et simplicibus et the universal intentions of logic are found in all of
qualiter in his omnibus intentiones these, with the exception of the First Principle,
universales logicae inveniuntur excepto which is infinitely simple, and to which, because of
primo, quod est in fine simplicitatis, cui its simplicity, belongs the notion neither of the
non convenit ratio generis vel speciei et genus nor of the species, nor consequently
per consequens nec diffinitio propter definition. With this, let the discussion, its tasks
suam simplicitatem. In quo sit finis et achieve brought to a close.
consummatio huius sermonis. Amen.