INSAG-16

Maintaining Knowledge,
Training and Infrastructure
for Research and
Development in
Nuclear Safety
INSAG-16
A REPORT BY THE
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP
 IAEA SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS

IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

Under the terms of Article III of its Statute, the IAEA is authorized to establish standards
of safety for protection against ionizing radiation and to provide for the application of these
standards to peaceful nuclear activities.
The regulatory related publications by means of which the IAEA establishes safety
standards and measures are issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series. This series covers
nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety, and also general safety (that
is, of relevance in two or more of the four areas), and the categories within it are Safety
Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides.
Safety Fundamentals (blue lettering) present basic objectives, concepts and principles of
safety and protection in the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.
Safety Requirements (red lettering) establish the requirements that must be met to ensure
safety. These requirements, which are expressed as ‘shall’ statements, are governed by
the objectives and principles presented in the Safety Fundamentals.
Safety Guides (green lettering) recommend actions, conditions or procedures for meeting
safety requirements. Recommendations in Safety Guides are expressed as ‘should’ state-
ments, with the implication that it is necessary to take the measures recommended or
equivalent alternative measures to comply with the requirements.
The IAEA’s safety standards are not legally binding on Member States but may be
adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own
activities. The standards are binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations and on States
in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA.
Information on the IAEA’s safety standards programme (including editions in languages
other than English) is available at the IAEA Internet site
www-ns.iaea.org/standards/
or on request to the Safety Co-ordination Section, IAEA, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna,
Austria.

OTHER SAFETY RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Under the terms of Articles III and VIII.C of its Statute, the IAEA makes available and
fosters the exchange of information relating to peaceful nuclear activities and serves as an
intermediary among its Member States for this purpose.
Reports on safety and protection in nuclear activities are issued in other series, in
particular the IAEA Safety Reports Series, as informational publications. Safety Reports may
describe good practices and give practical examples and detailed methods that can be used to
meet safety requirements. They do not establish requirements or make recommendations.
Other IAEA series that include safety related publications are the Technical Reports
Series, the Radiological Assessment Reports Series, the INSAG Series, the TECDOC
Series, the Provisional Safety Standards Series, the Training Course Series, the IAEA
Services Series and the Computer Manual Series, and Practical Radiation Safety Manuals
and Practical Radiation Technical Manuals. The IAEA also issues reports on radiological
accidents and other special publications.
 MAINTAINING KNOWLEDGE, TRAINING
AND INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY

INSAG-16

A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

 The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

AFGHANISTAN GUATEMALA PERU

ALBANIA HAITI PHILIPPINES
ALGERIA HOLY SEE POLAND
ANGOLA HONDURAS PORTUGAL
ARGENTINA HUNGARY QATAR
ARMENIA ICELAND
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
AUSTRALIA INDIA
ROMANIA
AUSTRIA INDONESIA
AZERBAIJAN IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BANGLADESH IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA
BELARUS IRELAND SENEGAL
BELGIUM ISRAEL SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
BENIN ITALY SEYCHELLES
BOLIVIA JAMAICA SIERRA LEONE
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JAPAN SINGAPORE
BOTSWANA JORDAN SLOVAKIA
BRAZIL KAZAKHSTAN SLOVENIA
BULGARIA KENYA
SOUTH AFRICA
BURKINA FASO KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
SPAIN
CAMEROON KUWAIT
CANADA KYRGYZSTAN SRI LANKA
CENTRAL AFRICAN LATVIA SUDAN
REPUBLIC LEBANON SWEDEN
CHILE LIBERIA SWITZERLAND
CHINA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
COLOMBIA LIECHTENSTEIN TAJIKISTAN
COSTA RICA LITHUANIA THAILAND
CÔTE D’IVOIRE LUXEMBOURG THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
CROATIA MADAGASCAR REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
CUBA MALAYSIA
TUNISIA
CYPRUS MALI
TURKEY
CZECH REPUBLIC MALTA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC MARSHALL ISLANDS UGANDA
OF THE CONGO MAURITIUS UKRAINE
DENMARK MEXICO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MONACO UNITED KINGDOM OF
ECUADOR MONGOLIA GREAT BRITAIN AND
EGYPT MOROCCO NORTHERN IRELAND
EL SALVADOR MYANMAR UNITED REPUBLIC
ERITREA NAMIBIA OF TANZANIA
ESTONIA NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ETHIOPIA NEW ZEALAND
URUGUAY
FINLAND NICARAGUA
UZBEKISTAN
FRANCE NIGER
GABON NIGERIA VENEZUELA
GEORGIA NORWAY VIETNAM
GERMANY PAKISTAN YEMEN
GHANA PANAMA ZAMBIA
GREECE PARAGUAY ZIMBABWE

The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of
the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957.
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and
enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
© IAEA, 2003
Permission to reproduce or translate the information contained in this publication may be
obtained by writing to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100,
A-1400 Vienna, Austria.
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
December 2003
STI/PUB/1179
 INSAG-16

MAINTAINING KNOWLEDGE,
TRAINING AND
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
IN NUCLEAR SAFETY

INSAG-16

A report by the
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2003
 The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) is an
advisory group to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, whose main functions are:

(1) To provide a forum for the exchange of information on generic nuclear

safety issues of international significance;
(2) To identify important current nuclear safety issues and to draw
conclusions on the basis of results of nuclear safety activities within the
IAEA and other information;
(3) To give advice on nuclear safety issues in which an exchange of
information and/or additional efforts may be required;
(4) To formulate, where possible, commonly shared safety concepts.

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Maintaining knowledge, training and infrastructure for research and

development in nuclear safety : INSAG-16 / a report by the
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. — Vienna : Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, 2003.
p ; 24 cm. — (INSAG series, ISSN 1025–2169 ; INSAG-16)
STI/PUB/1179
ISBN 92–0–113203–4
Includes bibliographical references

1. Nuclear engineering — Safety measures. 2. Radiation — Safety

measures. 3. Radioactivity — Safety measures. I. International
Atomic Energy Agency. II. International Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group. III. Series.

IAEAL 03-00346
 FOREWORD

by Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General

Over many years research activities have, in a broad sense, been a major
source of expertise in support of the safety of nuclear power. However, in
recent years the level of funding for research provided by governments, as well
as research sponsored by industry, has seen a reduction for various reasons.
Deterioration of the nuclear research and development infrastructure puts at
risk the continuation of the knowledge base and the educational opportunities
that it provides. Ultimately, this will affect the expertise required to deal with
the safety aspects of nuclear installations.
This INSAG report, which was previously issued as INSAG Note No. 4,
discusses the role that safety research has played, the present declining trend
and the circumstances that are critical in maintaining a research infrastructure.
The report describes new and emerging challenges that necessitate continued
support of research and education opportunities and provides recom-
mendations on how sufficient research capacity and competence can be
maintained.
The report is written for decision makers in government, industry and
international organizations who have responsibility for research activities and
educational facilities.
I am pleased to release this report to a wider audience. The sustainability
of nuclear research infrastructures remains a topical issue of particular concern
for the nuclear community. I hope that the recommendations elicit a proper
response.
 CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3.1. Progress of safety research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3.2. Requirements of safety research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

4. NEW CHALLENGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

5. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR

SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

PUBLICATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR

SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 1. INTRODUCTION

1. Like all major technological ventures, nuclear power owes its successful
development to a strong underpinning of research and to keeping a constant
pool of expertise, which has contributed to a good safety record around the
world as well as economic success. Elements of this underpinning must remain
robust if safe nuclear power is to remain an option. Safety in this context must
be viewed in its broadest sense. Safety research and expertise should be
directed not only to topics relating to the safety associated with plant
performance and operation and with accident prevention, but also towards
protection of workers and the public against radiation exposure and protection
of the environment from accidental releases of radioactive material. This
research should also be directed to the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and
other facilities which have the potential to cause radiation exposure, and to the
management of nuclear waste at an acceptable level of safety in the short as
well as the long term.

2. This statement derives from INSAG reports addressing the need for and
benefits derived from research and development. INSAG-121 stated the
following principle:

“Organizations concerned ensure that operating experience and the

results of research relevant to safety are exchanged, reviewed and
analysed, and that lessons are learned and acted on.”

It then developed the following conclusions:

“…research and development activities are needed to maintain

knowledge and competence within organizations that support or regulate
nuclear power plant activities.
Nuclear research and development is an essential element of nuclear
plant safety and its continued support is very important…co-operative research
on an international scale to reach a common understanding on major safety
issues is an important way to avoid duplication of efforts and to reduce costs.”

1
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP, Basic Safety
Principles for Nuclear Power Plants 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1, INSAG-12, IAEA, Vienna
(1999).

1
3. In recent years, funding for long term strategic activities such as research
and development, preserving corporate knowledge and maintaining technical
expertise has been reduced in many countries. Industry funding by the
designers and operators has been reduced as a result of the belief that the
research needed for the initial design of plants has been completed, a lack of
commitment to build new plants, the effects of deregulation and a highly
competitive market place, and a preoccupation with short term profitability
and shareholders’ interests at the expense of long term programmes such as
research.

4. Government funding has been reduced as a result of scepticism in some

governments and among parts of the public about nuclear power as a
sustainable source of energy and the belief by some governments that the
nuclear industry, as a user of a maturing technology, should be the primary
source of research and development funding in the future. Because of the poor
image that nuclear energy has had in some countries, teaching in nuclear
technology and nuclear safety at universities has also diminished considerably.
It follows that new researchers are not entering such programmes, raising
concerns about the continuity of knowledge even in universities.

5. A nuclear power programme in any State represents a significant

investment. That investment can be expected to be valuable to society for
60 years or more, provided that the plants are well maintained and upgraded
throughout their operating lifetimes, that operating experience and new
research results are utilized in continual improvement of plant safety and
economics, and that the safety authority retains the capability both to assess
plant safety and to make soundly based decisions on their continued operation.

6. Nuclear power programmes have required a continued investment in

safety research both by industry — to meet its responsibility for ensuring safe
operation — and by government to ensure that the regulatory organization has
the competence and independence to discharge its responsibility. If capabilities
are not maintained by both the industry and the regulatory organization, the
safety of nuclear facilities may deteriorate.

2
 2. PURPOSE

7. The purpose of this report is to emphasize the importance of maintaining

capabilities for nuclear research and education, especially with regard to safety
aspects, so that nuclear safety may be maintained in IAEA Member States, and
to alert Member States to the potential for significant harm if the infrastructure
for research, development and education is not maintained.

3. DISCUSSION

8. Throughout the development of nuclear power, safety considerations

have been of paramount concern. Thus, efforts in safety research have been
widely supported by governments, design organizations and electrical utilities,
operating organizations, research institutions and universities. The results
gained from research have been used to form important technical bases for new
designs, safety developments and regulatory programmes. Therefore, many
safety research programmes have been supported and organized by several
IAEA Member States.

3.1. PROGRESS OF SAFETY RESEARCH

9. Safety research has never lost its importance, but its scope and emphasis
have changed as challenges to safety have arisen. Past successes in safety
research have permitted the nuclear industry to grow, maintaining public
confidence through well founded designs and operating limits and, particularly,
through sound regulatory practices. Examples of the enhancement of the
regulatory process as a result of research in several countries include: research
on emergency core cooling in the 1970s; research on probabilistic safety
assessment in the 1980s that led to technical advances and the use of probabil-
istic techniques in decision making on safety; and, in the 1990s, ageing research
which improved the understanding of material properties and behaviour and
provided a knowledge base for considering the safety implications of long term
operation of plants, sometimes beyond their initial design lifetimes. Other
examples include: the improved understanding of thermal-hydraulic
phenomena that led to the approval of advanced light water reactor designs;
understanding of severe accident source terms; the improved process of reactor

3
inspection and oversight; and effective accident management schemes and
emergency plans. Research has enabled sound design, operational and
regulatory decisions and the provision of strong oversight of licensees’
activities. However, in the absence of growth in a number of countries where
significant development of nuclear power has taken place, there is a significant
danger of stagnation or even decline in the research and educational infra-
structure.

10. We must be concerned about potential complacency in our approach to

plant safety. While there is ample evidence of improving performance of the
industry, we are also experiencing dynamic changes resulting from an increas-
ingly competitive economic environment and an unchanging or declining infra-
structure, with margins between electricity supply and demand shrinking and
electricity demand rapidly increasing in some IAEA Member States. This
situation is aggravated by the downward trend in research funding. Additional
challenges to the infrastructure stem from renewed interest in reactors and fuel
cycles that are ‘proliferation resistant’, the use of simple passive systems to
enhance safety, the implementation of emerging technologies (for example,
digital instrumentation and control) and the potential for new plants utilizing
novel concepts (for example, new fuel materials). All of these challenges
require research by designers and operators to develop the concepts, and
action, including research if necessary, by governments to enable safety
authorities to ensure that safety is thoroughly considered before approval is
granted.

11. International experience also indicates that the more utility staff are
involved in the application of the knowledge gained from research to the
design, operation and maintenance of an individual plant, the more safety is
enhanced. This application of knowledge gained from research is a way to
improve staff competence and to maintain the knowledge base at the plant.

3.2. REQUIREMENTS OF SAFETY RESEARCH

12. Safety research by both industry and regulatory organizations can only
develop and thrive where several conditions are satisfied. Although the
challenges may be changing, these requirements remain critical to maintaining
the necessary research infrastructure:

(1) Necessary technical expertise in all safety disciplines must be maintained

through a vigorous educational process. This is particularly true of those

4
 disciplines which are specific to nuclear facilities, such as nuclear science
and engineering, reactor physics and radiation related health physics, and
studies of the unique problems associated with the chemistry, materials
and thermal-hydraulic performance of new and existing reactors.
(2) Analytical tools and techniques must be maintained and further
enhanced to better quantify safety margins and thus to facilitate better
decisions.
(3) Experimental facilities must be maintained to provide data to elucidate
basic physical processes, to confirm and validate mathematical models
used in analytical tools, and to respond to new problems as they arise.
(4) The development of a constant pool of safety experts requires
educational institutions firmly rooted in the pursuit of excellence with
current knowledge of research in all disciplines relating to safety. This can
be kept up only if research institutions are maintained and are active at
the forefront in research activities, and if employment opportunities exist.
In some cases, this may be achieved by in-house training of scientists and
engineers who lack direct education and training in nuclear safety. Unless
the need to maintain a cadre of safety experts is made clear and the
facilities necessary for this purpose are maintained, the infrastructure will
wither and the talent pool will be continuously depleted.
(5) Major nuclear research projects play a significant role. They are of prime
importance for attracting capable scientists and engineers who may
otherwise be absorbed by faster growing technologies that appear more
attractive.
(6) Achieving the public confidence necessary for continued development of
nuclear technology demands a mature regulator possessing the necessary
tools and expertise to monitor performance and assess the potential for
unintended consequences in order to ensure that there is no undue risk to
the public. These tools must address concerns relating to long term waste
management and radiation effects as well as reactor safety. The public
must also be confident that operators and workers at nuclear facilities are
competent and expert in both generating power and maintaining safety.

4. NEW CHALLENGES

13. Even though a good level of safety for nuclear facilities and applications
has been achieved in most countries, there are also areas where improved
knowledge will be necessary to regulate and operate current reactors efficiently

5
and effectively as they age, and to provide the scientific and technical basis for
the development of innovative nuclear reactors and novel means for the
management and disposal of high level waste. Experience indicates that new
issues will continue to emerge from operational experience, and an enterprising
and dynamic industry will continue to propose innovative initiatives to improve
economics while maintaining safety. A questioning attitude is necessary in
industry and in regulation to evaluate and resolve problems as they arise.
Furthermore, new designs are being proposed which have many characteristics
that differ from those of current plants. Knowledgeable and well trained
personnel are necessary to sustain and enhance the safety of nuclear power and
to provide effective regulation through all its phases, from research and
conceptual design through operation to waste management and decommis-
sioning.

14. Examples of areas where novel emerging issues of these types have
already been identified are provided below. For each example listed, and for all
other areas that may be identified in a comprehensive evaluation, emphasis
must be placed on understanding the uncertainties and highlighting those
needing attention, as well as on the role of information on the contributors to
the risks in identifying safety related and regulatory related needs.

15. Economic conditions are leading to extension of the operating cycle,

higher fuel burnup and increasing of power levels. Initiatives have been taken
in several IAEA Member States to explore the use of mixed oxide fuel, either
because of considerations relating to non-proliferation or to recycle fuel to use
it more efficiently. These are being evaluated by regulatory bodies in Member
States. The combined effects of these considerations must be evaluated to
determine the overall impact on safety.

16. Economic deregulation has had many influences on plant performance

and may have the potential to lead to a departure from extant safety principles
if the impacts of deregulation on plant performance, including the performance
of both equipment and operators, are not fully understood and monitored by
the plant operator and an independent regulator to provide early warning of a
change in organizational culture. Similarly, extending the effective operating
lifetimes of nuclear power plants will bring great economic benefits but
requires effective programmes for mitigating or managing the deleterious
effects of plant ageing.

17. Extension of plant operating lifetimes, decommissioning, the introduction

of new technology and ageing of the workforce all pose unique challenges in

6
the area of human performance. We must be prepared to understand these
challenges and to develop means to measure, monitor and trend organizational
and management performance with regard to safety as well as individual
human performance.

18. New reactor concepts (for example, the pebble bed modular reactor or
advanced light water reactors) are under development which appear to have
advantages in terms of both economics and safety over existing plants. Where
there is a reasonable prospect that such new designs may be proposed to a
State’s regulatory authority, it is essential that the regulatory authority
prepares in advance for such a proposal, ensuring that it has the proper mix of
technical skills and experimental facilities to evaluate thoroughly the safety of
such new designs.

19. Similarly, in the fuel cycle, new concepts are under consideration for both
the enrichment of new fuel and the disposal of radioactive waste, and research
expertise is needed. The application of techniques of risk analysis to manufac-
turing and processing facilities for nuclear materials is well under way, but
these facilities differ from reactors and it may be necessary to adopt a different
technique for risk assessments.

20. Analysis of the risk associated with both the interim above ground
storage of spent fuel and the transport of high level waste to final repositories
requires detailed analyses of cask designs and evaluation of material behaviour.
Similarly, the long term storage of radioactive waste will require monitoring as
operational information begins to be compiled. Experience from reactors and
from other industries using advanced technology indicates that operational
observations may necessitate ‘mid-course corrections’ by the regulatory body
as well as by the operator of the facility to maintain safety.

21. New approaches to enrichment and recycling as well as consideration of

transmutation of high level waste will require careful evaluation of the need for
safety research in parallel with developmental analyses.

22. The complexities of these techniques and the complex concerns relating
to safety, non-proliferation and operations will require a cadre of safety experts
to evaluate future research needs. Adequate research must be conducted to
understand these new technologies, their associated risks to public health and
safety and the uncertainty in risk estimates, and to evaluate where controls are
needed for the protection of public health or where further research is needed
to reduce uncertainties.

7
23. Support of the educational infrastructure is a specific and primary
responsibility of government. Industry can and does support educational insti-
tutions in partnership with government. This pattern can be seen in aero-
nautical engineering, chemistry, electronics, biochemistry and other fields of
endeavour in high technology which may be vital to long term national
interests. Nuclear engineering is no different in principle; it is, however, passing
through a difficult period, and these concerns need to be addressed promptly
and with vigour.

5. CONCLUSION

24. If the infrastructure for nuclear safety is not maintained, there will be a
steady decrease in expertise, and thus in capability to respond to new
challenges. The lead time in developing replacement educational opportunities
is very long, because most institutions will require an indication of the number
of enthusiastic potential students before investing in new infrastructure, and
potential students may look elsewhere in the absence of an exciting analytical
and experimental programme and a growing career field. Once lost, it would
require massive inputs of resources from many IAEA Member States to
attempt to re-establish the infrastructure, as was done to establish it when
nuclear technology was new. The result could be a downward spiral in which
expertise is lost, influence of the technical community on the decision making
process is diminished, and complacency, fed by diminished technical capability,
begins to exert a strong effect. If such a situation were to arise, it could be a
harbinger of future accidents. In this context, it should also be recalled that
governments that are Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety are
committed to taking “the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of
qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available
for all safety related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its
life” (Article 11.2 of the convention). Maintaining the necessary supporting
research infrastructure for nuclear safety is indeed, in the opinion of INSAG,
such an appropriate step.

25. In view of the above, INSAG has the following recommendations:

— In order to maintain and further enhance the safety of nuclear facilities

and to protect workers and the public and the environment from radio-
logical consequences, the infrastructure for safety research (experimental

8
 facilities, highly competent staff and modern analytical tools) must be
maintained and supported by the responsible governmental organizations
as well as by the operating organizations and manufacturers. This support
should include international networking and co-operation, including joint
funding of centres of excellence that have facilities and equipment for use
in nuclear research.
— Education in nuclear science and technology needs to be stabilized in
order to maintain sufficient human resources in sciences and engineering
relating to nuclear safety. Part of the research infrastructure should be
maintained at universities. There is a concern that deterioration of the
research infrastructure may lead over time to a deterioration in safety
which the public will not tolerate. National and international bodies have
a key role to play in ensuring that the skills and capabilities required by
the nuclear industry and its regulators are available and that the infra-
structure required for this is provided for.
— Maintaining the safety of nuclear facilities, a pool of expertise and the
level of safety research is a common concern of IAEA Member States
and therefore, to the extent practicable, research facilities and research
data should be shared in joint research programmes by IAEA Member
States.
— The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) is actively engaged in
this effort. It has recently published two important reports dealing with
research capabilities and facilities and with major research programmes
at risk. Following up on the conclusions of these reports, the OECD/NEA
continues to review safety research needs and organizes and sponsors
internationally funded projects which contribute to maintaining key
research facilities and teams. However, it is important that such efforts
encompass all countries having nuclear power programmes. The IAEA
and OECD/NEA could explore this possibility further.
— More frequent interactions among research managers in Member States
should be considered to ensure that full advantage is being taken of the
joint expertise and equipment available around the world. Results of
national research programmes should be made public and broadly
shared. This will increase public confidence and help to ensure that
regulatory processes reflect the state of knowledge.

9
 MEMBERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY GROUP

Abagian, A. A. Lipár, M.

Alonso, A. Servière, G.

Baer, A. (Chairperson) Soda, K.

Birkhofer, A. Taylor, R.

Díaz, E. Thadani, A.

Eun, Y.-S. Waddington, J.

Högberg, L. Zhang, Y.

Kakodkar, A.

INVITED EXPERTS

Frescura, G. Madden, V.

11
 PUBLICATIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY
ADVISORY GROUP

75-INSAG-1 Summary report on the post-accident review meeting 1986

on the Chernobyl accident

75-INSAG-2 Radionuclide source terms from severe accidents to 1987

nuclear power plants with light water reactors

75-INSAG-3 Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants 1988

75-INSAG-4 Safety culture 1991

75-INSAG-5 The safety of nuclear power 1992

75-INSAG-6 Probabilistic safety assessment 1992

75-INSAG-7 The Chernobyl accident: Updating of INSAG-1 1993

INSAG-8 A common basis for judging the safety of nuclear 1995

power plants built to earlier standards

INSAG-9 Potential exposure in nuclear safety 1995

INSAG-10 Defence in depth in nuclear safety 1996

INSAG-11 The safe management of sources 1999

of radiation: Principles and strategies

INSAG-12 Basic safety principles for nuclear 1999

power plants 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1

INSAG-13 Management of operational safety in 1999

nuclear power plants
INSAG-14 Safe management of the operating lifetimes 1999
of nuclear power plants

INSAG-15 Key practical issues in strengthening safety culture 2002

13