V.

THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the
• CANON 1 Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
Ø Bautista v. Gonzales, Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents
Republic of the Philippines purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement
SUPREME COURT dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of
Manila Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against
EN BANC complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990 client;
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, 7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis
vs. before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent. 8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by
RESOLUTION making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a
PER CURIAM: he, he does not tell the truth either."
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on
Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a
and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977
against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars respondent filed a rejoinder.
asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of
more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the
motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a
complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as
respondent committed the following acts: witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, submit their respective memoranda.
Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against
to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent him, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him
(50%) of the value of the property in litigation. constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in
terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for
properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor
case was still pending; General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court
him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty
involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he (30) days from notice.
acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the
while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6)
months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and
of misconduct: recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved; recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property by the parties during the investigation.
subject of their land development agreement had already been Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the
sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of
document where two signatories who had not signed the original (or Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has
even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be
signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was
17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404]. terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum
of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor
supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case.
arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in
I. duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor (13) years.
General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not
ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation
still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to
the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that: present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault.
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that
present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11)
ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and II.
disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent
investigation has been substantially completed. committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of
respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of
mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights"
the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to
Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-
may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by 1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907
referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the
document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific
the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the
case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in
document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action
respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his may be brought against him.
client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really
by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer
that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of
breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)]. subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the ... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A.
subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23
anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire
that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to
the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and
new Code of Professional Responsibility. assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found
"a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis
respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. supplied].
3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the
the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a land development agreement was implemented.
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to
27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the
vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land
is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction
instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be was held on June 30, 1971.
held accountable both to his client and to society. Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a
Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to
existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he
purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land
relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was
cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves
emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
"a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale
trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent
that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the
negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety
live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the
premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court,
was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados,
inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their which provides in part that:
negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you
should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit,
the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were including court fees.Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]
action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 CONFORME Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
SCRA 517]. [Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a
documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation.
agreement. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however,
signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him.
Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
L. Bautista—were made to appear as having signed the original document on enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp.
December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this
However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v.
Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these
Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client,
24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327- The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting
329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel
merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143.
the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings
Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of
submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The
his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of
Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to
his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly
truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon
statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional
Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before
the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose
of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case,
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No.
5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack
of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-
403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and
perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-
18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no
finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him.
The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left
to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly
holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the
aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since
the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining
grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the
respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member
of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold
the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a
member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163
SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the
nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of
the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed
serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.
Ø Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. NO. 7136, August 1, 2007 By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the
Republic of the Philippines aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're
SUPREME COURT about to do.
Manila Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
EN BANC happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but
A.C. No. 7136             August 1, 2007 then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
vs. everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent. vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
DECISION I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes
PER CURIAM: on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until
Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar we are together again.
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of
for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath." us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND
Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children. YOURS ALONE!
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at
Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in Eternally yours,
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When NOLI
he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001,
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene
abandoned the conjugal house. on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which pregnant.
he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. 14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in
words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch
letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading: of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip
My everdearest Irene, of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in
Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
 Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was 18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution
attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
supplied), 19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's
of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
to the immediate members of their respective families , and that profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
supplied) Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile  special
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, 12 alleging that Irene gave
bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's
"until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied), father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows: Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St.
Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts Luke's Hospital.
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply." 15 Respondent
relationship with his own family: moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for
[his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City
Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene. Prosecutor's Office.
xxxx During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant. 17
paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a
to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
underscoring supplied) The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading: violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
 Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied), personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading: circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of
supplied) Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which
of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth
merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
CBD Case No. 02-936 fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is
Joselano C. Guevarra vs. no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
a.k.a. Noli Eala that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous
APPROVE the  DISMISSAL  of the above-entitled case for lack of relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original) Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court. knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
The petition is impressed with merit. void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate
the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no members of their respective families."
reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows. In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of
Commissioner observed: the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent. the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with supplied)
Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of
being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said
members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father.
the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous
affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child. Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the
January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in
"Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer. 31 any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been medium periods.
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence x x x x,
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 – which is the quantum of with a woman elsewhere.
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. "Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court
suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
required.33 (Emphasis supplied) On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not
with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
reading: be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds disagree.
therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his xxxx
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests  deliberate
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows  protected by
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where supplied)
he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent
enumerated. did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied), respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
under scandalous circumstances.34 grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the
 fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10
privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the
practice law which goes: same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the supplied by complainant)
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly void ab initio  is immaterial.  The acts complained of took place before the marriage
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 44 In carrying on
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. unfitness to be a lawyer.
(Underscoring supplied) As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion
Constitution reading: to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's
family and shall be protected by the State. Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." 40 fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant
his fitness to practice law." also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be
before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation 41 on March 22, 2005 informing the married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another
IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home,
had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to
the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all
"based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11 th Street,
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church
on motion of complainant, withdrawn. where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since
Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads: Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits
that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was
 where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that This Decision takes effect immediately.
Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed SO ORDERED.
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.
short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical
Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact
that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that
Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents.
Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most
certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be
acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar
to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting
in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying
criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on
January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.
Ø Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. NO. 6792, January 25, 2006 the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at
[the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open
his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the
accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused
EN BANC who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the
A.C. No. 6792             January 25, 2006 accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a
vs. second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent. his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
DECISION could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got
PER CURIAM: his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the
Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused.
of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun
crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver,
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3 the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano." 8
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and
issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery
ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4 After that hearing, on the left side of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he
complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr.
Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
for resolution. The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18,
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court
Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005. [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano." 10
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
latter for frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his Appeals.11
disbarment. In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise: involving moral turpitude.
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime,
after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on
Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the following facts:
 "1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him; "x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed; involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
fled; In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of
denied that he had shot Complainant; aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and, "x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the
not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12 victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were
be no longer possessed of good moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent not inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17
has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances
homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when
crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
warrants disbarment. mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and lawyer’s assault.
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14 skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the
homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he
the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s contention and held that homicide in that betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never
made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people
more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the
the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly
one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x." 28
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is
of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed more important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not
violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound expected to act in good faith.
himself to "obey the laws of the land." The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is
sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years 21 since he was who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all
adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public
intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 31
taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal
Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find
restore what the latter has lost. the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. 22 Where their by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 32 Thus,
unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile
license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
that office.23 We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish
character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that
of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. 24 munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser
behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that
Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family. 25 But when this effort every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high
complainant’s family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but
neurosurgeon.26 also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other profession.
persons.27 The trial court had this to say: In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined circumstances – not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their
[Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- ANGELINA SANDOVAL-

SANTIAGO GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Asscociate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
 Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and
Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75,
Ø Samala v. Atty. Valencia, A.C. NO. 5439, January 22, 2007 Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante
Republic of the Philippines and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante
SUPREME COURT - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed
Manila to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his
EN BANC decision dated May 2, 2000, 8 Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned
A.C. No. 5439             January 22, 2007 respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant, in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
vs. But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City,
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent. entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina
RESOLUTION City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following 341-MK.
grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent
knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the
initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and
a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the
report and recommendation. 2 case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property 12 and it was only
series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that respondent
deemed submitted for resolution. did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the
Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
penalty of suspension for six months. lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for
increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year. a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent
immorality and as to the recommended penalty. antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and
On serving as counsel for contending parties. good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
(RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only
nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
performance of that duty. 18 disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of
client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29
as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
privileged communications of his client. 19 Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated."
him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all
professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of
different but related action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred
client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is and guarded with care. 30
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba
he appeared for the former client. 23 against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding
and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil
in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not
confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his
employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments,
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances
the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26 indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and
severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32
Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for
whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership
the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba
husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both on February 2, 1995.
Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000
relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject
26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is property. 33 During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that
required. when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the
that: complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent further avers that Valdez
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and
rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with
averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for
case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42
Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v.
the same date, although in different courts and at different times. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S.
already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.
proof of the latter's ownership. We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to
any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's commit injustice.
submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of
dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is
this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
275500, was already issued in the name of Alba. We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita
upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also
of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in
clients." 38 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other hand, are with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second
entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two
them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52
to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him
at the expense of truth. liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the
should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. 41 latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the
>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees. hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of
2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first
Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of
Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City morality and decorum required of the legal profession.
Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to
specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for
purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the
Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the
mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
CANCIO C. GARCIA
married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction JR.
Associate Justice
as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability. Asscociate Justice
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Asscociate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
GUTIERREZ
Asscociate Justice
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALE

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Ø Kara-an v. Atty. Pineda, A.C. NO. 4306, March 28, 2007 Hearings were conducted after which, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
THIRD DIVISION (CBD) through Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III rendered a Report
[A.C. No. 4306. March 28, 2007.] and Recommendation dated February 6, 2006, recommending that the prayer for
REMBERTO C. KARA-AN, complainant,vs.ATTY. REYNALDO disbarment be denied, but that the respondent be reprimanded for his failure to
A. PINEDA, respondent. explain the cause of his absence in a hearing before the RTC and his failure to
RESOLUTION appear in several hearings before the IBP-CBD.
NACHURA,  J p: On July 7, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting
In a Complaint for Disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on and approving with modification the recommendation of Commissioner Soriano, as
September 6, 1994 1 , herein complainant Remberto C. Kara-an charged follows:
respondent-lawyer Reynaldo A. Pineda with gross misconduct as an officer of the "RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-371
court and member of the Bar for violation of the lawyer's oath, specifically his failure Adm. Case No. 4306
to abide by his duties: (1) to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines Remberto C. Kara-an vs.
and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines; (2) to observe Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda
and maintain the respect due the courts of justice and judicial officers; and (3) not to RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
delay any man's cause, for any corrupt motive or interests. STaCcA and APPROVED,  with modification,the Report and
The antecedent facts: Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
Complainant Remberto C. Kara-an filed a Complaint for Injunction and entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2078 against one Amado M. Bulauitan and "A";and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
several John Does before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 150. evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, for
Respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda entered his appearance as counsel for the Respondent's failure to explain the cause of his absence in the
defendant. On July 12, 1994, the respondent moved for the resetting of the hearing hearing before the Regional Trial Court and for his failure to
from July 13, 1994 to July 20, 1994 due to a prior professional engagement. In the appear in several hearings before the Commission on Bar
same pleading, the respondent manifested that he was still in the process of Discipline,  Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda is REPRIMANDED with
preparing his formal written opposition to the case. 2 On July 20, 1994, the stern Warning  that a repetition of his actuation shall be dealt with
respondent failed to submit any answer or written opposition but instead severely"  aCHDAE
made an agreement with the judge and the complainant to reset the hearing to We adopt the July 7, 2006 IBP Resolution. A perusal of the records shows
August 1, 1994. 3 On August 1, 1994, as the respondent failed to appear, the RTC that the evidence adduced by the complainant is insufficient to warrant the imposition
deferred the hearing to August 15, 1994. 4 On this account, the complainant filed a of the supreme sanction of disbarment.
Motion for Contempt dated August 2, 1994 before the RTC. 5 aDSHCc Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as
A little more than a month later, or on September 6, 1994, the complainant such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the
filed this Complaint for Disbarment against the respondent, alleging therein that the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
respondent failed to appear on August 1, 1994 before the RTC, despite his moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
agreement to set the hearing of the injunction case on the said date, to file his Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe —
answer or written opposition to the complaint for injunction. In his Comment filed on such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine — would accomplish the end
November 16, 1994, the respondent posited that the complaint is but a form of desired. 8 HDCAaS
harassment in order to discourage him from pursuing cases against the complainant; As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, the complainant failed
and that the same is premature since the RTC has yet to decide the pending motion to establish by clear and convincing proof that the respondent's failure to appear in
for contempt. 6 Per Resolution dated February 20, 1995, this Court referred the case the hearing on August 1, 1994 before the RTC was made oppressively or with ill-
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and decision. 7 motives as to qualify the same to gross misconduct, willful disobedience or improper
conduct tending to obstruct the administration of justice. 9 Moreover, the penalty of
disbarment sought by the complainant is unduly harsh, taking into account that this
appears to be the respondent's first offense.
However, it is worthy to note that respondent indeed fell short of his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice 10 due to his failure to
attend the August 1, 1994 hearing before the RTC and his subsequent failure to
attend some of the hearings before the IBP-CBD without giving any reasonable
explanation for his absences, which failure contributed to the delay of the resolution
of this case. The respondent should have been more conscientious in complying with
such duty as dictated by the Code of Professional Responsibility and as required by
his oath as a lawyer. HAICcD
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prayer for disbarment is DENIED
for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda is hereby
REPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future shall be dealt with severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the respondent's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1.Rollo,pp 1-10.
2.Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation and Ex-Parte Urgent Motion to
Re-Set Hearing on Petitioner's Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated July 12, 1994 for Civil Case No. 94-2078. ATICcS
3.RTC Order dated July 20, 1994, Rollo, p. 11.
4.RTC Order dated August 1, 1994, Rollo, p. 12.
5.Rollo,pp. 33-35.
6.Rollo,pp. 24-32.
7.Rollo,pp. 24-32.
8.Soriano  v. Reyes,A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 328, 343.
9.Report and Recommendation dated February 6, 2006, p. 8.
10.Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
|||  (Kara-an v. Pineda, A.C. No. 4306 (Resolution), [March 28, 2007], 548 PHIL 82-
86)
 About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any
Ø Tabang v. Gacott, A.C.NO. 6490, July 9, 2013 sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants
Republic of the Philippines that he had lost all seven titles.5
SUPREME COURT On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file
Manila petitions in court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-
EN BANC representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed
A.C. No. 6490               July 9, 2013 petitions for re-issuance of titles.6
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054) In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of
vs. Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor,
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent. acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned. 7
RESOLUTION Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed
PER CURIAM: without prejudice to their being re-filed.8
This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the
the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look more varied. 9
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed
Professional Responsibility (CPR).1 several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then
sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels. 10
Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as
located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale. 11 Later, respondent
several parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the
government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast proceeds of the sales.12
tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit,
advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons. 2 complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.
persons, as follows: In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not
1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes; fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia
2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy; Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels and that she had
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla; unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio; the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez; a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment. 13
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004, 14 IBP Investigating
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3 Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She recommended
as they were in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
he would help complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report
Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels. 4 of Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the
penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. of Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters discussed during the
to the IBP. The Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by mandatory conferences, on the parties’ Position Papers (and supporting documents),
complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be
supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he
Thus, there could not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a was required to file his Position Paper.23
penalty as grave as disbarment. On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper. 24 Subsequently, the case was
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. deemed submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.
Hearings were conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia
August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007. 17 Tabang on account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of
The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the
the Swiss American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang.
introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels
(7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and
priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public announcements
that his company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of
the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s failure to produce Leonor Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above
Petronio, the alleged lot owner. the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his
Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras. 19 He testified that own signature.
Heinze introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010, 25 Commissioner
seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of Limpingco found respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He
a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments. likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings without justifiable
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR. 26 He recommended that respondent be
wrote to respondent asking him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 adopting the
ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased. Report of Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for
complainants.20 He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent Reconsideration.28
who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.
by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion
which he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van). for Extension of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011,
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint. 21 the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension
Position Paper. Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of will be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the
Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross- first on September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which
examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing"22 him. were denied by the Court.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on
to Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco. December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached
Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of having converted to his personal use the funds that he received for his clients.
Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment. Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the Court noted in Moran v. Moron:32
findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by
Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is
deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in
seven (7) subject parcels. clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be
the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or
of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a fine – would accomplish the end desired.33
lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly
dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition. 34
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the
individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy
supreme penalty of disbarment. of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." 36
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in
for any of the following grounds: determining preponderance of evidence:
deceit; All the facts and circumstances of the case;
malpractice; The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
gross misconduct in office; knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
grossly immoral conduct; testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as
violation of the lawyer's oath; the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. necessarily with the greater number.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that
gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule
persons. By way of examples: 1.01 of the CPR.
In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but
having used a spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for more so through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro
administration. Gallinero that:
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of
disbarred for having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported the subject parcels;
vendors and for taking advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;
purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in
deed was fictitious. cash or in kind – of the subject parcels;
such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and
respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants. the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging
More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been this Court to sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents
confronted with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities assailed as fraudulent.
of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had failed to produce such Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and
persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is
particularly significant in so far as they have been made despite the fact that their related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from
interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants. anybody and for whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations. confronted him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could not have told
Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and
parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his
Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations. properties of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia
For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because legal
from the proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse an
refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of occasion to earn income.45
this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely
Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing embarks on conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia
above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the
signature. sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, 37 the burden of proof is vested upon disbarment after she had been refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing
the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient
Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit basis to file the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the
is sustained. sheer lack of evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which he is
of the seven parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less produce their actual deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
and the forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that – interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one
claims. of the most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the officer of the court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high
very basis of complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of dealing."47
how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of
name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs 39 and how he merely respected the title morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he
and ownership of the ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the
Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41 However, respondent loses sight credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage
of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting
fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable
offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in
these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging
complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his
duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable
reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to
comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a
party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves
none of this Court’s clemency.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the
Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal
record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and
Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1
 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
2
 Rollo, p. 2.
3
 Id. at 3.
4
 Id. at 4.
5
 Id.
6
 Id.
7
 Id. at 5.
8
 Id.
9
 Id.
10
 Id. at 6.
11
 Id. at 7.
12
 Id. at 8.
13
 Id. at 58-59.
14
 Id. at 198-211.
Ø Reyes v. Gaa, 246 SCRA 64 On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation
Republic of the Philippines of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
SUPREME COURT On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of
Manila administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.
EN BANC On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending
  investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).
A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave
vs. Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent. found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was
PER CURIAM: pending resolution.
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant
City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and
I consent.
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at
of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City
Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he
complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted
P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.
that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent
the City Hall. were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating
An entrapment was set up by the NBI. fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for him.
marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment
and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment. case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However,
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was
return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.
around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar
complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that
respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of
answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked II
money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for In the case at bench, respondent was caught in  flagrante delicto in the act of
examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by
powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of
Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely
fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by
explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. complainant.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony
(Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of
the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and
Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of
Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393
[1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176
SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official,
which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal
records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., took no part.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
 PREPATORY STATEMENT
Ø Geeslin v. Navarro, 185 SCRA 230 This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty.
Republic of the Philippines Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for
SUPREME COURT short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B.
Manila Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975
EN BANC which reads as follows:
  x x x           x x x          x x x
A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990 I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on installment
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants, basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the
vs. attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of Sale".
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent. Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company claim that
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990 although there is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. property being sold, the case is almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your
RODRIGUEZ, complainants, final decision within a couple of months or even less.
vs. In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent. attention this transaction and to protect my rights in the event that any unfavorable
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants in AC No. circumstances may arise in the future.
2033. xxx xxx xxx
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf. Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14,
1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for
PER CURIAM: "investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District,
Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for
Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the appropriate action." The resolution reads as follows:
disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et
misconduct. al.) The court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and with its attachments (copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro,
Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court on counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him
April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of of the status of the cases at bar.
law during the pendency of these cases. 3 It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in
The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of litigation herein on installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as
February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos. "absolute owner by virtue of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of
Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's
were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case is almost
respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED FURTHER to
transactions complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its attachments to the Solicitor General
sustained by the evidence of record. under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence of sufficient
I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of
reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:
record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of
from the office of attorney and for appropriate action. some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in virtue of his handling the
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona
premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that whereas his squatters-clients
address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of occupy only about a hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal
June 10, 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available services' with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are
documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these properties.
properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75 Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties
million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million. already with buildings and other improvements. He has nevertheless been quite
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) successful in selling portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La Salle
Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus
affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter operandi  is described in this Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen.
dated January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter was Prospero Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.
sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for the Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again
reason that the addressee had moved to another address. openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have provided more than
On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope
to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing that formal administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him
the sales made by respondent Navarro. from further perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L- xxx xxx xxx
39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
the existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were
suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action" and directing "Mr. presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of
Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid
of said letter and all its pertinent attachments." Vda. de Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 the various documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.
reads as follows: From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina
x x x           x x x          x x x Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of
Dear Justice Teehankee, First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2
This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject thetwenty-two
previously been reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties titled in the (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge
name of this Company. Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro
We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by
he is now selling to the public include those titled in the names of the heirs of the late respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO interposed
Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus as principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the
expanded his activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen mother title from which it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued
from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge property in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.
(actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases,
Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the
comprising approximately of 260 hectares. HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of
respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as 4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043
follows: 5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh G).
After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds that As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since
most of the documentary evidence submitted by defendants are irrelevant to the case 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion that
since they pertain to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land defendants cannot assail the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for
when the area of the property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square recovery of possession. Any attack on the decree of registration of title must be direct
meters. This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of defendants are and not by collateral proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance of said
untenable. decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land
name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the
jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the decision of the trial court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to
the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in
based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue
558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also
et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347,
Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957). November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs.
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by adverse Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).
possession is without merit considering that title to land becomes non-prescriptible In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that
Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh.
(Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691,
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered title 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the
registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take notice. No one can plead defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26,
ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595). 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in question Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of
when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein 12,000 square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C.
they sought the latter's intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition described in, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
defendants not only named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but and indicated in the sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.
they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No. x x x           x x x          x x x
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the pertinent It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the Municipal Court
facts and data concerning the property in question in defendants' petition submitted of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City against several persons
to the General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows: occupying other parcels by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where
x x x           x x x          x x x decisions have been rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal executions of these decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer before this Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-defendant. The
Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these
defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in listed as Judge of the Land Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that
the determination of the merits of the issues raised herein. capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it as Clerk of
validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the proceedings in Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that proceedings missing and
GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was based as also null and void. The made its conclusion that since the decree which was supposedly issued by a person
Court sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the who was not the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the
proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the survey
void; (3) all original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the of the property was only made some one year later and that said decree cannot now
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all transfer even be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.
certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under No. Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous to be
3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original certificate of title cannot be the
77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the
Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and law, inexistent and cannot give source to any legal right.
void; (5) that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before
of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs . . . and so Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in which
forth. their properties are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly assails
The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title
facts too ponderous to be ignored. of the plaintiff over the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings leading to derivative from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court that until and
the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside by final
of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven
certificates of title issued as consequence thereof. cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things, found that while are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said decision of Branch
the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final and executory, all the
the property subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 to claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in the decision
August 16, 1906, or some one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities.
hearing of the application for registration being published as required by law without Possessions by actual occupants of all these properties had better be maintained
which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case. until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh.
Said decision also made inference that since the survey of the property was not R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386,
made until a year after the rendition of the judgment the technical descriptions 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent
No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any. NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's title over her property in question
Publication of accurate technical description being an essential jurisdictional and directing the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients
requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this Thus —
requirement renders the proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
arising therefrom null and void. complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379,
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross who was 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby
said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
Court of Land Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina
because the Gaceta Official for the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of
the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients
Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng of respondent NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro
Abogado" which is quoted in his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
of the decision. After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision
As so modified the decision stands in all other respects. rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
SO ORDERED. respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5). LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR
and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order: SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON
in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING
certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER
and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND
said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN
possessions of the land. FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS
Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD)
for reception of alleged newly discovered evidence. BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under review by But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a
order of our Appellate Court. possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along,
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, when he becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases.
of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other The possessor may still believe that his right is more secure, because we resign
persons and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the final
party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily
917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa and Articles
derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).
is not a party in this case whatever orders or decisions are made in this case cannot He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code)
the case. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE
must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR
being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE
affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:
party herein. The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the those is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present that which it produces but that which it united to it either naturally or artificially.
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or
SO ORDERED. repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter,
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3). builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without
causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS
what Manresa calls a state of "forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED
has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option BY SAID DECISION.
to acquire the improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights to
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the lands belonging to and in the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.
owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements and/or
because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the persons basing their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on
accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory."
Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254). ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are ready to ask (Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
for the execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the
prudence requires that those involved may please make some kind of arrangements Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the
with the undersigned before execution by calling through the following telephones: officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent
x x x           x x x          x x x NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on
BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR account of his failure to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication
PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS of the above notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented
OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap
A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL the properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant
BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL, proceedings).
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for
LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT. libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the
Counsel for the Defense complainants also presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8). Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
Limited Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them. In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that
ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose titles were derived from Decree (1) there was no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was
No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and no survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over the
owners, ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said
1971 the following: Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as follows:
WARNING WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW orders:
In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership 1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;
with reference to an advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;
supposedly affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer 3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
certificates of title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;
Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a party to ANY case allegedly decided
4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title (b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
declared void under No. (3) above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer (4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City persons acting in their behalf, who are found to be in possession of defendant
and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register company's land to vacate the same and remove and demolish their improvements
of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and void; thereon at plaintiffs expenses;
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer (5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs, P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected from defendant company, with interest; and
the portions owned by them being as indicated in Exhibit P; (6) To pay the costs.
6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in SO ORDERED.
the enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective landholdings; (Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the
and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment.
and the defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents, After exchange of pleadings by the parties, the trial court presided by Judge
representatives and any and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist Alcantara granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor
absolute (sic) and perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a
Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by the motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas,
herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs; Judge Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge
8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands; Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge
9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for
for attorney's fees; certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and 04060.
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid
SO ORDERED. case, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6). WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the respondent Judge
ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Judge
1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions
Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered to the respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of
evidence. The case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973, the petitioner's bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of execution. The
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated restraining order issued at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent.
from the service by the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the No costs.
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas & (Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).
Company, Limited Partnership, as against the plaintiffs: This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del
1. Dismissing the amended complaint; Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration
2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)
emanating therefrom; In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company: also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of the Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of
surrender the possession thereof to defendant Company; Ortigas as follows:
 x x x           x x x          x x x reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest.
selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees. This court finds the amount EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable considering the Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His
extent and value of the property involved and the nature of the case. testimonial evidence consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez,
Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the one of the complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of
issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in the amount of Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.
Pl,000,000.00 daily. On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are
Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only the same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty.
treat it as an affirmative defense. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages. Under the General for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable Court deferred
same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs claim for damages, action on the said administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709,
therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he had suffered. the heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. It terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on
follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining order was proper and, hence, the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.
can not be the basis for a claim for damages. On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the
This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition and hope. The defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge
people who will ultimately suffer the most from defendant's acts in question are his Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the
buyers, who in all probability are middle class people who themselves wanted to lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed by
make money out of the apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for
the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the advent of the legal services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:
NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life. KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT MAKARATING
1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty.
over the land in question; Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy
2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the defendant, his Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425) sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip
successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or persons acting for or in his (Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain
behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in defunct Court of Land Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425
question and from asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or na siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim (26) ng
over the said property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and mga Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak
of suit. ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil.
SO ORDERED. 324, 340) dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II). mula't sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga nakalagda
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA- sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga kliyente ni
G.R. No. L-53125-R. Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging kalahok sa
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil
case affirming the decision of Judge Apostol. Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L- contesting the genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the defunct
50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng mga
kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na sakup ng dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba
diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng maybisa galing ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na
sa Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't katotohanan ay di naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang
sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan
paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa mula't sapul ay sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree
ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito at ng kanilang No. 1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-gawang titulo
ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na
na upang maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay
naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang may- matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan
ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na sapagkat sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942, ang bahagi
'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati
pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon
pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at
ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay di kilanlin o Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong
pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242; Director Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o
of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188). survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng San Juan patungong dakong
Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng
nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman magpatibay at Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog Pasig na
magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay
Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng
bagay ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari nito ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa
makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng
karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng
at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na iyon na Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino mang
pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di makabuo ng ni isa man
mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).
walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat na titulo Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
panahong itinakda ng batas sa pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng
tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo na karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City
kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid vs. hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan at gawin ang anumang paraang
Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng
nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila ang mga makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa
lupain o di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing sila paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang
ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap sapagkat ang krimen at ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa
panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi
mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng ng lupain na aming minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni't
karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa itinuring ipinaubaya na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran
ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas- ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng
bisa (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming
mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at sumasangayon kami sa sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng
pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin nito
naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o kabayaran kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit kinakailangan
ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan
ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment condition) at magiging mabisa
mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang
pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng buwan-buwan (monthly installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso
pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), (P5.00) hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan nang naayon sa laki o
paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord (transcripts), kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang
pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang bayaran at buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay isinasalin
pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at
naaayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang karapatan sa
tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming kani-kaniyang kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila ang
mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.
iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito, SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUANG
sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang ito na magbayad ITO
ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa
lupaing matitituluhan sa aming pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawat metro tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami
kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito ay ay mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon
mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang sa batas at siyang isinasaad din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming
halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay aming babayaran mga pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-
kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y
isang taon mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsang-
nakababayad ng buo sa halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) ayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
sa bawat metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty. In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold,
Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni and is still selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS &
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and
mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the
ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di properties sold by him except the contract of legal services which his clients allegedly
huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang magsilbing bayad signed; that he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned
sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon lamang ang by him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from
natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o tungkuling the National Housing Authority; that he has not declared for taxation purposes the
bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng thousands of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City
lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan and Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly
nang naayon sa batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).
sinuman sa aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-
ng paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro kuwadrado ay case" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled
bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa't buwan "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the cases
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City including those involved mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to the
in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168). land is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer despite the final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil
Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by Case No. Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo
said title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties covered by the injunction Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was
claiming that the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been appealed. fraudulent and had been effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation
(pp. 33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4 of the title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and
Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred, "C", respectively.
that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was
admission to the bar be recalled. rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160.
suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift Our clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from
suspension .6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership therefore
August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the of our clients is protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer,
motion to lift the order of suspension. 8 even a law student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte  motion praying for Quasha case, supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue of the
the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of
13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on January 5, 1981 11 but complete and unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.
the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12 c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the land
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, subject of the above cases had been declared null and void in the "final and
1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of executory"  decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately
the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross omits to give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and malicious
misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now 42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot
Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13 be "final and executory."
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore
with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The corresponding enumerated is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the
October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for land to be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim
investigation, report and recommendation. 18 knowledge however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the Quezon City was originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of
following findings and recommendation: Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr.
CHARGES Navarro's representation is false and malicious.
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty
deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's and decency in that having prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross
Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as neglect to appeal in a timely manner from the decision of the court and having
counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases: adopted the wrong remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his
clients into commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge
of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.  Genovea the Spouses Conrad
obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.
Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the courts. 2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden
City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what
Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo the law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the
Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the courts as stated above.
undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and 3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been
"E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record) resorted to by the complainants at the instigation of their counsel who failed in
RESPONDENTS ANSWER wanting to defeat the defendants of their God-given rights to the land in litigation that
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred: there can be no other conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
was never furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that FINDINGS
the complaint is clearly intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed in When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, the parties
defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted a
Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley period of thirty (30) days within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so
Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.
complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted
justice is an act in contempt of court for which complainants and their counsel is (sic) during the hearing of the case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is
liable. no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave against him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.
his entire devotion to the interest of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the
defense of their rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end interest of his clients" and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and
that nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally exerted his utmost learning and ability.
applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations
defense that is authorized by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in the specified by complainants, as quoted above.
ejectment case filed by the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin RECOMMENDATION
against the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record) Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148entitled Ortigas vs.
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's Navarro and has been suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His
Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the Complaint, suspension is still in effect.
respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred: The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who respondent from the practice of law.
are citizens of the United States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C.
cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice of law.
Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19
Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent
ejectment proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E.
Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148
are:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were
persons without the consent of the latter; and remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution.
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil
suspension or disbarment. Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas & Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment
Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro
null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of in his decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that
Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses
8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's
Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:
ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null
March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until
he asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their
rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the possessions of the land. 21
former Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and another one was
First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of
Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot
original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March 31,
certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he
Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his
Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto, alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.
null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set 2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the
the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer
1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for
confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his
said decision was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated
respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted. September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
rendered a decision affirming in toto  the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate
Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs- of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other
appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is not
Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of
on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of decisions are made in this and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason
case cannot  be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23
affect parties to the case. The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this wise:
must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and
being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise.The right to exercise it ought not
affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely
party herein. desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power,
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it
occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22 must be exercised. 24
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of
inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of
remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the
defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer. misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of
And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
a mere transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose
above properties. confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven
his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26
ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
that the said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his
respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden
Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
over properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended to all and satisfactory proof. 29
the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two
by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence
evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer. exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended on respondent.
ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services,
whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-two ejectment cases filed
was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations. before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of full in the earlier part of this discussion.
integrity and respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial
denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the
laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff
means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely
on the ground that "since the evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all
these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their is unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the
respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas
must be maintained and respected. 30 respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer
Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, absurdity of which he could not be unaware.
1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the
transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the
of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31,
accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed. 1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing
order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of adversely affecting the the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31,
interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at
reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is
present occupants. precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He
ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land subject of said cases. could not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final
Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him to find merely
merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se  justify
owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other
to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision
ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become
September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court final and executory.
correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro,"
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising
the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision. properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance
agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of
favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent
right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision.
respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the investigation
derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, conducted by the Solicitor
1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to General. 33
further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of
therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by
indisputably illegal. the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.
his title is his contract of legal services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to the Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz
therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree
 No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he
Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & paid on February 5, 1990.
Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro
Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-
had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & 74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June
Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness 11, 1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on
in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34 November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on
lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel
dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records
resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads: were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other before the different courts a quo.
things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of
respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L- constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to
42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence
the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath
dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are as an officer of the court.
granted, are NOTED. WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be
of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread
1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.
his suspension. Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open Fernan, C.J., took no part.
defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.
reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in Padilla, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein Footnotes
questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he
was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his
suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario
Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2,
1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as
counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared,
signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine
Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court
directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in
G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the
Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00
Ø People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
Republic of the Philippines indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
SUPREME COURT 38360; and
Manila to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
EN BANC to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
A.M. No. 3360               January 30, 1990 38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the
vs. decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent. practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
PER CURIAM: It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral
Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and
the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court,
October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission Section 29 of the same Rule.
basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and SO ORDERED. 1
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to
16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action
their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court
of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with
Marquez. this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary herein plaintiff-appellee.
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359; her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued
the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
Marquez. section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the supplied)
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms: involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
x x x           x x x          x x x does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
presentation for payment. . . .  The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.  5
against property but an offense against public order. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of
x x x           x x x          x x x Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a respondent.
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,  in the result.
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the Footnotes
public interest. 3(Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had
been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds.  A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
Ø In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182 to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano
Abesamis with the understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the
minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the
Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the defendants on the ground that there
was another pending action involving the same subject matter was sustained after
EN BANC which the plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint, the amendment
G.R. No. L-47431          December 19, 1940 consisting simply in eliminating therefrom the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis and
In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, deceased. leaving as party defendants Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias
CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant, Abesamis. As these defendants failed to answer the amended complaint, they were
vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. o ET AL., oppositors-appellees. declared in default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was rendered adjudicating seven-
Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant. eights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for
Angel Cecilio for appellees. the defendants. On February 7, 1931, the court ordered the commissioners of
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Isaias Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
dated May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their report, upon which the
Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to the approval of the amended project court declared that "no hay lugar a aprobar por ahora el informe de los comisionados
of partition presented by the executrix and hereby orders the latter to present another partidores hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha testamentaria en la cual
inventory and another project of partition which shall include only the property pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los derechos que pudieran tener sobre
adjudicated to the defendants in the final decision of this court in case No. 4816, los terrenos en cuestion." A motion for reconsideration having been denied on
consisting of only one-eight (1/8) of the three parcels of land described in the will of September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved for the approval of the
the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis. project of partition filed by the commissioners . On February 26, 1934, the court
On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate in the court of ordered the suspension of the approval of the partition of the properties until the
First Instance of Nueva Ecija the last will and testament of her deceased natural termination of the testamentary proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share virtual law library
of stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and two carabaos On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate court a partition
worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, plan adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the legatees
Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in
the conditions stated therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No. 4816. On
On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five others entered their January 26, 1937, the executrix submitted an amended inventory and later another
opposition to the distribution of the properties described in the will, for the reason that project of partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance with the
"a que dichos bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y la terms of the will, which were objected by the defendants, because these included
testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court that they had commenced an their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was
action for the partition of said properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual upheld by the court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which is
law library quoted in the beginning of this opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was law library
appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors:
virtual law library 1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. 4816 of the Court
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil case of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis
No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the estate of is entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and
Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias
Abesamis for the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first instance,
can not bind the estate of Crescenciano 4797) by the probate court. It results that when, on February 8, 1937, the court
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library disapproved the project partition filed by the executrix, it did not decide adverse
2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of partition presented by the claims of proprietorship but only lent force and effect to the decision rendered in civil
executrix on February 8, 1937, and in not distributing the estate of the deceased case No. 4816.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Crescenciano Abesamis according to the provision of the Under the fourth and last assignment of errors, it is vigorously contended that only
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library heirs or legatees may present an opposition, and that only inasmuch as the
3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as a probate court to decide oppositors-appellees are not heirs or legatees, they have no legal personality to
the question of ownership of the property involved in these proceedings part of which object to the approval of the project of partition. By virtue of the judgment in civil case
is claimed by the oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right of No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights of the property in their favor, the herein
inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by title adverse to that of oppositors had the right to oppose any project of partition which, in effect, would
the deceased and his estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library divest them of their right of ownership. To conclude otherwise would be to permit the
4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no personality to object to executrix to enrich herself at the expense of the
the project of partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, which was oppositors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
drafted in accordance with the provision of the will of the deceased Crescenciano The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
Abesamis. ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the validity of the decision of Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
the lower court in civil case No. 4816 declaring that the legatees here, defendants in
that action, are entitled only to one-eight of the property on the ground that the estate
of Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said proceeding. It should be noted that
all the coheirs, except Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, and that by
order of the court, in its instructions to the partition commissioners dated February 7,
1931, the herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole heiress of the
deceased. As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure, bound by
the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now be
permitted to assail its virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the testate
estate. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in this case the heir is of legal age and
the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force
of law, to the dominio n, ownership and possession of the properties of his
predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. (Ilustre vs.
Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil.,
396.) In the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is
no necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs can sue and be
sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs. Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz.,
1821). This disposes likewise of the second assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the third assignment of error, it should be observed that the
oppositors instituted a separate action (civil case No. 4816) for the partition of the
properties described in the will of Crescenciano Abesamis. No question of ownership,
therefore, was in fact determined in the testamentary proceedings (civil case No.
Ø Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1 Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case. Plaintiff told him
to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent herein, whereupon he went to see the
latter in his office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as a
consideration for the amicable settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash
then, he asked to be allowed to pay the same in small installments paying on that
occasion the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion
for an extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant returned to his
hometown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
EN BANC           One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in default and so
A.C. No. 190             September 26, 1964 he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of their agreement he was declared in
MARCOS MEDINA, complainant, default. Respondent assured him that he had nothing to worry about, and on that
vs. occasion respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and there complainant gave.
LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent. Before complainant left respondent told him to look for more
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:chanrobles virtual law library money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
          In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina charged           It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an extension of time
respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts constituting to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a motion to declare complainant in
malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. To this complaint default. Consequently, a decision was rendered detrimental to complainant since the
respondent filed an answer on October 19, 1954. The case was referred to the court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for the sum of
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. This official in turn P1,200.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
referred the case to the provincial fiscal of Cagayan for investigation and report. Later           On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of respondent in Luna,
after the reception of the corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of having the papers for the amicable
report to this Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice complained of settlement of the case prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared two
and recommending his disbarment. Together with this report he submitted a documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made to appear that
complaint formally charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged malpractice Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to complainant in consideration of the sum of
as found in his investigation with the prayer that the name of respondent be stricken P8,000.00 and, on the other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the former
off from the roll of attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library for the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were witnessed by respondent. Both
          A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent so that he may documents were also found to be fictitious in the sense that the considerations
answer it if he so desires in accordance with the rules. Thereupon, he answered the mentioned therein were never received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by
complaint denying the material allegations thereof and praying that it be dismissed. respondent to sign Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it
He, however, also prayed that he be allowed to introduce additional evidence. This was necessary in order that she could recover the
was allowed and the case was set for hearing. The first hearing was set on May 4, land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1964, which, by agreement of the parties was postponed to June 22, 1964. On this           Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty. Bienvenido Jimenez,
last date, however, no hearing was held, and so it was again postponed to July 22, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring the title of the
1964. And having neither respondent nor his counsel appeared on the last date set, property pursuant to the decision of the court, and complying with this request
complainant and his counsel submitted additional evidence consisting of several complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the title he showed him
decisions of the Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found guilty of estafa. the document which he was made to sign purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty.
virtual law library Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein, which she
          It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a complaint for denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to
reconveyance of a parcel of land before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan respondent to be deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent
against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of January, 1954, complainant
would raise the additional P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed documents, appellant - for nothing - lost the land already won in court. She had to
by the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the property. After inquiry, compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the bargain.
Atty. Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited in court, and in order And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to court for attorney's fees. Good morals
to correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty. Jimenez and sound public policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count
prepared another document embodying the terms of the amicable settlement which and bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for services in procuring the
they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This settlement having been carried judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am.
out, it put an end to the controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).
respondent the sum of P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law           There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which involves moral
library turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of
          From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to have been Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
established: (1) respondent after agreeing with complainant to settle the case           WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred and, as a
amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.
filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of the decision Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
sense that the consideration in either was never in fact received; (3) pretending to Barrera, J., took no part.
arrange an amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different
occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking
advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a
document wherein it was made to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth
and in fact she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received from his
client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount was
to be deposited in court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it
he misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice and conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
          In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-R, respondent was
convicted of estafa and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months
of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the accessories of
the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P800.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of
Appeals made the following derogatory comment against respondent:
          A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need not be
indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and
good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case No. 221, May 21,
1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound
to deposit the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he converted it to his own use and
benefit to the damage of appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not only that.
The confidence reposed in him by appellant was once again infringed when he lent
his signature to Exhibits 2 and 3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these
Ø In re: Delos Angeles, 106 Phil.1 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not
be disbarred from the practice of his profession.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court
Manila considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the
EN BANC youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken
against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is
EN BANC attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and
sincerely deplores.
[Adm. Case. No. 350. August 7, 1959.]
Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as
IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, Petitioner. attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this
rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva, for the
condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the
Government.
result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel v. Aspiras 100
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete, for Respondent. Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving
moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it
SYLLABUS sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as
ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; CONVICTION OF CRIME INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE. — Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and
removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his Barrera, JJ., concur.
disbarment (Mortel v. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BRIBERY. — Bribery is a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p.
736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428)

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a
final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with
subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section
Ø In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313
The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate,
from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by the
Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E.
Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the
complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the
respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a
blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document
EN BANC was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the
Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since
[G.R. AC-UNAV. April 30, 1957.] then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife.
Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, v. HILARION M.
and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the
PERALTA, Respondent.
parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a
Ramon J. Diaz for Respondent. marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the
ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with
SYLLABUS some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously
married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and
TURPITUDE; DISQUALIFICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR. — Respondent the present complaint for immorality in this court.
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity and his conviction of violation of Art. 350 of the Revised Penal Code involves Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court
moral turpitude. His act in contracting the second marriage even his act in making is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage
love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the
existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus lacking the good
criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the
moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is disqualified from
second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is
being admitted to the bar.
still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice,
DECISION decency and morality.

PARAS, C.J. : Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the
respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So
G. R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated ordered.
from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the
complainant against the respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Code of which the respondent was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the
respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.
 Ø Leynes v. Veloso, 82 SCRA 325 wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned
Republic of the Philippines his acts of concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that
SUPREME COURT affidavit, she unabashedly stated that, because her husband's thighbone was broken
Manila in a vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales to serve her husband,
EN BANC like a real wife ("upang paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang gagawin niyang
A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978 paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the assurance that she would not
FELIX LEYNES, complainant, prosecute their offspring.
vs. The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit dated March
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent. 5, 1976 of complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for immorality
A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978 (on the condition that he would not incur any liability) because he was convinced that
BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant, Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's mistress to take care of him (Exh. A).
vs. Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument scheduled
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent. before the Court en banc  on December 9, 1976 made the preposterous contention
that the respondent should be exonerated because there was no evidence presented
AQUINO, J: against him since the complainant did not appear at the hearing.
For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances in a Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the commission
house located at the poblacion of General Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it does not have to be
municipal judge of that town, was charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality proven anymore. His admission is a confession (Sec. 2, Rule 129 and secs. 22 and
in public office (Complaint dated October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of Administrative 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Matter No. 809- MJ). We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct.
Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to the bar in His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants
1938, started his judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon. his removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).
Since 1950, he has been functioning as the incumbent judge of General Nakar. A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for
The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish church of Infanta grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the date (one day after his 46th such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil.
birthday) when he suffered serious injuries in a vehicular accident at Infanta and 915).
when he was brought by plane to Manila and admitted to the V. Luna General If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement
Hospital at six- thirty in the evening. should be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to
Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency (Canon
children. (In his personal reference sheet of September 10, 1947, he indicated that 3 of Judicial Ethics, Administrative Order No. 162 of the Secretary of Justice, August
he was married with two children named Linda and Nonong but he did not mention 1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803).
his wife's name. In his information sheet for GSIS insurance dated November 9, 1960 Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality, erroneously
he named his children as Ulpiano, Evangelina and Asuncion, twelve, ten and six confounded or equated the extinction of his criminal liability with his moral fitness to
years old, respectively. Again, he did not state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58 occupy the position of town magistrate. While the moral stigma connected with
of his personal record). concubinage may be tolerated in a private person by those who are not fastifious, it is
The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales (his alleged intolerable when the concubinage is committed by a judge and even if the spouse of
housemaid) is his mistress. Out of their union, two children, named Juana and Paulo, the judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule in section
were born in 1970 and 1972 when the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. * 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-39012, January 31, 1975, 62
Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised SCRA 270,
Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his 272-3).
A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public two wives, considering that a public official in that situation "is liable
office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time to commit graft and corruption in order to support his family" (p. 163,
have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. Personal Record).
The absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his Judge Manolo Maddela on April 11, 1975 dispatched a telegram to
highly unconventional and censurable behavior. the Chief Justice "strongly recommending acceptance of (the)
Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the resignation of Municipal Judge Pedro Veloso of General Nakar,
administrative case moot. This Court may motu proprio investigate a judge for his Quezon for incompetency" (p. 156, Personal Record).
continuing, grossly immoral conduct.
Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting Ricardo Pujeda
and Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes
(Criminal Case No. 872), adopted the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey.
According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine in a house
just across the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical question: how can
the inhabitants of a town have confidence in the administration of justice by an
immoral judge who himself violates the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter
No. 489- MJ).
In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to make any
adjudication on the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the other charges of Virrey imputing to the
respondent malicious delay in the administration of justice, misconduct in office,
neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and decide Election Case No. 8.
WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as municipal judge. His
application for disability retirement is disapproved.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
* The imputation of immorality was first aired against Judge Veloso
when one F. Marquez, in a confidential letter to the President of the
Philippines dated October 20, 1972, denounced the judge as
"immoral" for having "raped and impregnated his maid". Another
complainant, Miguela Astueva, in a handwritten letter dated January
11, 1973 to the Secretary of National Defense, accused Judge
Veloso of (1) immorality for having two wives, (2) bribery and (3)
partially in deciding cases (pp. 83, 85, 97, 99, 101, Personal Record).
The same charge was repeated by Carmelita Nolledo of Barrio
Pinaglapatan, Infanta, in a letter to the President of the Philippines
dated July 26, 1975. In that letter, she inquired whether it was a
"legal act or conduct" for a public official, like Judge Veloso to have
Ø In re: Avanceña, 20 SCRA 1012 On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended conditional
pardon to Jose Avanceña.
Republic of the Philippines On October 1, 1963, Jose Avanceña was discharged from confinement.
SUPREME COURT In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:
Manila The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the accused
EN BANC beyond reasonable doubt as the author of the falsification of the Power of
A.C. No. 407             August 15, 1967 Attorney (Exhibit A), with grave abuse of confidence. The accused is a lawyer
IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent. and has taken advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of
J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent. falsification of a public document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type
Office of the Solicitor General for complainant. of the accused is a disgrace to the law profession and should be disbarred.
ANGELES, J.: In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals said:
On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as follows: A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye que el
In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avanceña, it appearing that apelante no ha explicado satisfactoriamente como Ilego a su posesion el
respondent was convicted in criminal case No. 10220 of the Court of First poder especial Exhibito A; la presuncion es concluyente que aquel es el
Instance of Manila, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Avanceña, of autor de la falsification de las firmas de los hermanos Joa que aparecen en
the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 172 of the Revised el poder especial Exhibito A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338).
Penal Code, and that in the decision rendered to that effect the Court has La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el exhibito A; fue
found that said respondent has taken advantage of the law profession in quien falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao que aparecen en dicho
committing said crime to defraud his clients, the Court ordered that document; y, fue quien Ilevo dicho documento a la oficina del notario
respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally suspended from the practice of Tumblos para su ratificacion.
law, pending final termination of the criminal case No. 10220, now pending EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda racional la
appeal in the Court of Appeals. culpabilidad del apelante, y la decision apelada estando de conformidad con
Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of public las pruebas y la ley, la misma se confirmation in toto, con las costas contra el
document before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220. apelante.
After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer an There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avanceña has committed the crime of
indeterminate penalty of two years to six years of  prision correccional, to pay a fine of falsification of public document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence,
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts
The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law profession in committing amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute
the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. A copy of the grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not
decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the action it may deem to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
appropriate to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
adopted the resolution hereinabove quoted. is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña appealed to the Court of consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so
Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he
lower court. had been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In re  Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.)
On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avanceña disbarred from the
the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. practice of law, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys.
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avanceña was committed to prison at the National
Penitentiary.1äwphï1.ñët
Ø In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399
 On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avanceña, it appearing that
EN BANC respondent was convicted in criminal case No. 10220 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Avanceña, of the crime of
[A.C. No. 407. August 15, 1967.] falsification of public document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and that in
the decision rendered to that effect the Court has found that said respondent has
IN RE:—ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, Respondent. taken advantage of the law profession in committing said crime to defraud his clients,
the Court ordered that respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally suspended from
J . Gonzales & Orense for Respondent. the practice of law, pending final termination of the criminal case No. 10220, now
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals."cralaw virtua1aw library
Solicitor General for complainant.
Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of public
SYLLABUS document before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220.
After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer an
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC indeterminate penalty of two years to six years of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
DOCUMENTS AS GROUND THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — there can be no doubt P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
that Jose Avanceña has committed the crime of falsification of public document The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law profession in committing
against his clients with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. A copy of the
by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever action it may deem appropriate
misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute grounds from removal from to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court adopted the
office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not to mention conviction by resolution hereinabove quoted.
final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña appealed to the Court of
2. ID.; CONDITIONAL PARDON DOES NOT PRECLUDE DISBARMENT. — The Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
fact that respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no lower court.
moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court,
when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
had been convicted by final judgment (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil., 293).
On January 21, 1963, Jose Avanceña was committed to prison at the National
penitentiary.
DECISION
On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended conditional
pardon to Jose Avaceña.
ANGELES, J.:
On October 1, 1963, Jose Avanceña was discharged from confinement.

In the decision of the trial court, the following is said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
reasonable doubt as the author of the falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit Fernando, JJ., concur.
A), with grave abuse of confidence. The accused is a lawyer and has taken
advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of a public Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on official leave of absence.
document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type of the accused is a disgrace to
the law profession and should be disbarred."cralaw virtua1aw library

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals

said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye, que el apelante no
ha explicado satisfactoriamente como llego a su posesión el poder especial. Exhibito
A; la presuncion es concluyente que aquel es el autor de la falsificación de las firmas
de los hermanos Joa que aparecen en el poder especial Exhibito A. (People v.
Astudillo, 60 Phil, 338.).

"La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el exhibito A; fué quien
falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao que aparecen en dicho documento: y, fue
quien llevo dicho documento a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su ratificacion.

"EN SU VIRTUD, habiéndose probado fuera de toda duda racional la culpabilidad del
apelante, y la decision apelada estando de conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la
misma se confirma in toto, con las costas contra el apelante."cralaw virtua1aw library

There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avanceña has committed the crime of
falsification of public document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence,
having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts
amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute
grounds for removal from office under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, not
to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The fact that respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is
of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so
when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he
had been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.).

Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avanceña disbarred from the
practice of law, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys.
Ø In re: Basa, 41 Phil. 275 removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpide . . . ." The sole question presented,
therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446
of the Penal Code, involves moral turpide.

EN BANC "Moral turpide," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, cited by
[IN RE: CARLOS S. BASA : December 7, 1920. ] numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact
question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral
IN RE: CARLOS S. BASA. turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the
accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard v. Lyon
Pedro Guevarra for Respondent. [1875], 91 U. S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty. -Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
Attorney-General Feria for the Government.
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be
SYLLABUS taken by court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION; CONVICTION OF A the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. — "Moral turpitude" includes everything other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — The crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be
the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So
ordered.
DECISION
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
MALCOLM, J. : Endnotes:

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos
S. Basa. 1. R. G. No. 15398, August 10, 1920, not published.

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found
guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, Judge of First
Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven
months and eleven days of prision correcional. On appeal, months and eleven days
of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed
down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1

The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be
Ø Arciga v. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591 the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a
marriage license.
Republic of the Philippines Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love
SUPREME COURT and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again
Manila that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present
SECOND DIVISION when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, child.
vs. Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25,
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent. 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped
corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena
AQUINO, J.: went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who
grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, marriage could not take place because  he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25,
Michael Dino Maniwang. 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she
Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the
while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital
sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel (Exh. I and J).
in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her. Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry
renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past.
themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked illegitimate child before Michael was born.
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of
with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
mind because he loved her very much. An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He pending in any court.
continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z). possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer
Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil.
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the 313).
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959). as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs.
(In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons (5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer
of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a
or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway,
with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After
arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her.
benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
depend on the surrounding circumstances. (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse
observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son
which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in
into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through
attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always
makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535). (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband,
cases: seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child.
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is
already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio
sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission
Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in
convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar
Cui, 100 Phil. 1102). nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no
married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin,
106 Phil. 256).
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long
intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado,
Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong,
Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114
Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93
SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for
disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman) Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos and de Castro, JJ., are on leave.
Fernandez and Guerrero JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.
Ø Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 871 threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's
house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for
Republic of the Philippines him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November
SUPREME COURT 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him
Manila in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine
EN BANC (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
A.C. No. 376             April 30, 1963 The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August
vs. 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal,
BARRERA, J.: and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid
in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing
Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her
recommendation. eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958,
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18.
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all,
and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and
reads as follows: sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster
her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask
to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-
clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the
newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining
with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him.
forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on xxx     xxx     xxx
the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties FINDINGS AND COMMENT
and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the
After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are
resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly
she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape,
sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage
1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959). involving her honor ....
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in
the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted
 Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for
parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living
him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the
of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public
Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying
or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ...
June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of
confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could attorneys."
not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that
that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint
moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the
an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules
paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional
years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him. evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the
sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties
moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a
take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed,
or at any time as the Court may fix.." alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent
himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member
his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This of the bar.
fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife,
married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double ... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and
for disbarment from the office of a lawyer. her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red
xxx     xxx     xxx Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time
RECOMMENDATION (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees.
respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single'
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was
not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were
 already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation
asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his
27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954
did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor
her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6,
who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). 1962).
She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
(t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on
[Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a
which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his
respondent averring, among others, the following:. moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be
sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law year.
wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April
Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument.
16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations
Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina
her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are
Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his
Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a
see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or
him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings
Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this
that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling
power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following
and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's
In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney
rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the
continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing
decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges
be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous
completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing
her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its
scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
for his lurid purpose. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling.
the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous
he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law
years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to
to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are
relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in
suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the
criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
integrity expected of a member of the bar. revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do
so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely
perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes
unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626,
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447;
therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735). In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent,
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact
charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render
complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:. discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent,
at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and
containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent Makalintal, JJ., concur.
shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If
the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all
the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of
the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in
the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law
provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against
the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to
file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced
during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at
that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly
erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective
reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people
think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him,
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has
Ø Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 narration," they should only be considered as independently relevant statements, i.e.,
as proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as proof of the truth of facts
revealed in the said statements or admissions. Elsewise stated, the admission in
evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in determining the issue of
their truth. (FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol.
EN BANC VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted by
Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be deemed proven by the said
[A.M. No. RTJ-92-904. December 7, 1993.] admission or confession. While it is true that technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in administrative cases, however, since the Investigating Justice herself
DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, Complainant, v. JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, had specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as part of the narration, or more
Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Respondent. specifically as independently relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to
thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and competent
Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for complainant. evidence against the respondent that he had illicit sex with Sol.

S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for Respondent. 2. ID.; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS THE QUANTUM OF TRUTH REQUIRED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; COMPLAINANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THIS
SYLLABUS REQUIREMENT. — The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge
must be proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE; THE ACTS OF administrative cases. This the complainant failed to do. The meetings of the
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE ADMITTED BY SOL WERE TAKEN MERELY AS PART respondent and Sol at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do not by
OF THE NARRATION BUT NOT AS EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH THEREOF; THUS themselves prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification. Evidence was
THERE IS IN THIS CASE NO DIRECT AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE AGAINST offered by the respondent to prove otherwise. However, considering their prior
THE RESPONDENT THAT HE HAD ILLICIT SEX WITH SOL. — Sol’s admission or special relationship, the respondent and Sol’s meetings could reasonably incite
confession to the complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies
five occasions made no reference to specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct expressive of such relationship.
examination, the complainant’s counsel exerted no further effort to obtain
clarifications as to the dates thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the 3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ANY PROOF OF PRIOR IMMORAL CONDUCT CANNOT BE
narration by the complainant of the information clearly indicated that the complainant A BASIS FOR RESPONDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE IN THIS CASE. —
did not ask Sol to elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. On cross-examination, But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the facts so
counsel for the respondent carefully avoided any entanglement with the details of the admitted, considering, however, that Sol’s admission that she engaged in sexual
admission not only because it might have provided an occasion for the complainant intercourse on five occasions made no reference to specific dates, that their affair
to elaborate thereon, but because it would have operated as a waiver of his objection antedated Sol’s marriage, that their last proven tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and
to the testimony as hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic notes disclose that that there is an absence of positive and competent evidence to show that any of the
the counsel for the respondent objected and entered a continuing objection to five acts of sexual intercourse took place after the respondent’s appointment to the
questions directed to elicit or which tended to elicit statements or admissions judiciary, it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent committed any of the
supposedly made or given by Sol on grounds that any such statements or sexual indiscretions after he became a judge. Respondent is not charged for
admissions would be hearsay or otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule. immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral
Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection; hence, she allowed the conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The
answers to be taken merely as part of the narration but not as evidence of the truth respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his
thereof. If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that
a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article integrity and justice. (Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975]). The ethical
XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps faith of the people in the judiciary. (Candia v. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51 [1977]).
and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and Wherefore, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial
redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent Judge Modesto C. Juanson is hereby
ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor — his private and official sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further,
conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta v. sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto severely.
must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free
from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. DECISION

4. ID.; IMMORALITY; NOT BASED ALONE OR ILLICIT SEXUAL INTERCOURSE. — DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Finally, a word on the respondent’s defense that he could not have sexual congress
with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and prostatitis. The claim is On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession, filed
both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to prove the with this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and
stage, extent or degree of seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining
capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly issued the medical certificates illicit sexual relations with his wife. Sol Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant and his
did not testify thereon. Besides, immorality — for which the respondent is charged — wife were married on 10 December 1988 and their union bore them three children, all
is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that: "immorality has not boys, ages 3 years old, 2 years old, and 4 months old, respectively. He alleges that
been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or their married life was peaceful and happy until the discovery of the sordid affair,
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is wilful, flagrant, which came about in this manner:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from the wife of
public welfare." (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751). the respondent who informed him that Sol and her husband (respondent) have been
carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which
5. ID.; RESPONDENT THUS CANON 3, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, AND she wants to show to the complainant. Although he did not believe the information
CANON 2, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; HE VIOLATED LIKEWISE THE RULE and even berated Mrs. Juanson for trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol
REGARDING OFFICIAL SESSION HOURS; FINE OF P2,000 AS PENALTY about it. Sol assured him of her love and concern for their family and claimed that the
THEREFOR. — In short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he succumbed respondent was just a client of her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao
to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked Branch). Two weeks later, Mrs. Juanson called him again to inquire if he had
for his legal advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions received the photocopies of Sol’s love letters to the Respondent. He again scolded
indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Mrs. Juanson and told her not to call him up anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and Sol
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that" [a] judge’s official left for the United States of America (USA) for a vacation. He stayed there up to 19
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal July 1992; however, Sol returned ahead of him on 10 July 1992. During his absence,
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson called up his father, Atty. Norberto
in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Alfonso, and divulged to the latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol. On
Conduct which provides that" [a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance 20 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso photocopies of Sol’s love letters to
of impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the law must the Respondent. During their pre-arranged meeting on 25 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson
delivered the original copies of Sol’s alleged love letters to Atty. Alfonso who was Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the course of their attorney-client relationship, Sol
accompanied by the complainant’s sister, Celestine A. Barreto. sought legal advice from him and during those occasions they usually talked over the
phone and not in the office. In June 1992, he received an overseas call from Sol who
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided to hire a was then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem with her
private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged illicit affair employer, the Security Bank and Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that
between Sol and the Respondent. Through surveillance conducted by its private Sol would see him upon her return to the Philippines. On 11 July 1992, shortly after
investigators, the agency found out that Sol had met with the respondent on 11 and her arrival from the USA, he and Sol met at the aforementioned apartment, which
17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, was leased not by the respondent but by Celestino Esteban. After discussing her
Metro Manila, and that they stayed inside the unit for two to three hours.cralawnad problem, with Celestino and two other persons present, he and Sol left the apartment
and took a late lunch at Fastfood, Robinson. He reassures the complainant "that his
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after his arrival from the wife has always been faithful to him and that he would do nothing as would tarnish
USA, his sister Celestine told him about the illicit relationship between Sol and their warm relationship, much less destroy complainant’s
the Respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken by the private investigators family." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and the alleged love letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date, in the presence of
their respective parents, the complainant confronted Sol and showed her the proofs; On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Lourdes T. Jaguros
Sol still denied the affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
with the Respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their house, Sol finally
admitted to having an illicit sexual affair with the respondent since late 1983 when Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the hearings on 17, 18, 21
she was an employee of Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that before they and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the parties submitted
left for the USA, she met the respondent at Unit 412-A Citihomes. testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October 1993, she submitted her
Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 1993. Pertinent portions of her
As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of the house. He and findings of facts read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Sol have been living separately since 26 July 1992. He also subsequently discovered
from the statement of billing from Pacific Bell for overseas calls which he and Sol "As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso and Sol
made while they were in the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol had made calls to Dinglasan were married at the Sta. Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988 as
the respondent’s office at the Manila Regional Trial Court.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red evidenced by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born of this
marriage. John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old, and the
Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office of the youngest Jan Joseph, four (4) months old. Complainant and his family lived a happy
judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative sanction for and normal life with their Sundays spent on outings after the Sunday mass. (p. 9, tsn,
immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. June 29, 1993).

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of 22 October 1992, the respondent filed In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from a woman introducing
his Comment on 21 December 1992. He admits that he knows Sol and that "they herself as a concerned friend telling that complainant’s wife is having an illicit affair
have been communicating with each other casually and innocently," but denies that with her said woman caller’s husband. Said caller did not identify herself but only said
they are lovers and were having an illicit affair, that Sol has been sending love letters she was in possession of love letters of complainant’s wife Sol to said caller’s
to him, and that, except for the 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had been husband. After two weeks, said `concerned friend’ called up the Complainant again to
going to the apartment situated at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro ask him if he had received said caller’s registered mail. Complainant after both calls
Manila, and staying there for hours. He asserts that he came to know Sol sometime asked his wife Sol about her having an affair with another man, and in both
in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in connection with five criminal instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls stopped for the rest of the year
cases filed by her in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and in the 1991 and early part of 1991 although Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to
go out alone every Saturday.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc., to conduct surveillance of the activities of
Complainant’s wife, Sol upon her arrival from the U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did arrive on
On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to U.S.A. for a vacation but the July 10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the Truth Verifier System Inc. through
latter decided to return to Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh. "O"). Marjorie Juinio and Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private detectives conducted
Complainant followed in returning home only on July 19, 1992 (Exh. "O-1"). surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol Dinglasan and respondent Judge Modesto
Juanson. On said date of July 17, 1992, said private detectives together with
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to his Raymond Tabangcura and Edgar Naquila, saw, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso go out of her
sister Celestine Barreto’s house, and there his father showed him five (5) loveletters house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight at Lamayan St., walk towards Sta.
written by Complainant’s wife Sol with envelopes addressed to Atty. Modesto C. Ana Church then board a taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi stopped at City
Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and pictures taken by private Homes, San Francisco Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went inside Unit 412-
investigators of Complainant’s wife and respondent Judge in company of each other A Citihomes, and stayed inside for about three hours. Respondent Judge Modesto
(Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized the handwriting of Juanson came out first of said unit, wearing blue walking shorts and light colored polo
his wife Sol in said love letters, specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol in and carrying the plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying earlier, and then followed
her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of Complainant to his patients. by Sol. At around 1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge and Sol were inside said
Likewise, in the pictures, Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a "Payless" Respondent’s Wrangler jeep on their way to Robinson Galeria at EDSA. The two ate
bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge holding the same bag later on (Exh. "F- at Mongolian Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to Robinson’s
14"). In practically all the pictures, Complainant identified his wife Sol and Supermarket. Inside the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent Judge put
Respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge was no stranger to Complainant as the his arm on the shoulder of Sol, and they were also seen holding hands (pp. 23-26,
latter knows said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of the best friends of tsn, June 21, 1993). Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the Wrangler
Complainant’s parents-in-law and was even a sponsor in the wedding of jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of Suter and Roxas Streets and
Complainant’s sister-in-law. Both Complainant and Respondent Judge had met thrice then boarded a tricycle while the jeep left. The formal report of the Truth and Verifier
and talked with each other.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad System, Inc. has been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the
many pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Sol were marked and offered as
The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent Judge (Exh. "K") were Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22" .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
handed to Complainant’s father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso by a lady who introduced
herself, as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in the presence of Complainant’s sister, Celestine The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by Edgardo Tamayo practically
Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto. Domingo Church, Quezon corroborated the findings of the Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report marked and
Boulevard, Quezon City and proceeded to the City Diners Restaurant in the same offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and pictures taken of Respondent Judge and
city where the three had a talk and where Mrs. Juanson handed to Atty. Alfonso the Complainant’s wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-14" were
five love letters with a picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late June 1992. Prior to presented before the Investigator.
said meeting on June 17, 1992, at about 11:00 a.m. a "concerned woman" had called
up Atty. Alfonso at his home and in the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang ulo ng Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, he was invited by
anak mo ng babaeng iyan" referring to Complainant’s wife. To clear Atty. Alfonso’s his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to Norbert’s sister’s house in San Juan, Metro
doubt, the woman promised to send proofs which Atty. Alfonso received by LBC in a Manila. In the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso showed his son,
parcel containing the xerox copies of Complainant’s wife’s love letters to Atty. Norbert the love letters written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" to
Modesto C. Juanson. "E"). Complainant recognized the handwritings of his wife Sol and even the GAIN
memo stationery which Complainant was using as his prescription pad for his
After the meeting with the lady who identified herself as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in the pictures
Alfonso got an overseas call from Complainant that his wife Sol was coming home to taken by the private detectives. On said day, Complainant Norbert Alfonso
Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the services of a private investigating experienced the greatest shock of his life and wondered what happened to his life.
His father, Atty. Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. In that same A My wife was crying and saying, ‘Sweetheart, I am very, very sorry. Forgive me.’
party, Complainant showed Sol the pictures and the loveletters which made Sol turn She was kneeling before me and begging forgiveness.’Forgive me, sweetheart, I love
pale and stammer when talking. Sol’s own parents were embarrassed and walked you.’chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
out of the party.
I told my wife, ‘you do not love me, you love your stupid Judge.’
On the same night at about 10 in the evening, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso
confronted his wife Sol as to the truth of her relationship with Respondent Judge. Q Is there anything else that you discussed during that confrontation aside from the
Before the Investigator said Complainant made the following testimony on direct admission?
examination:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A After that admittance of my wife having sexual relationship with the Judge,
x          x           x reminiscing the past events when we were together I told my wife, ‘That’s why pala
every Saturday umaalis ka dito. Sinong pinupuntahan mo?’ And definitely, she
admitted to me, ‘To the Judge.’ (pp. 35-41, tsn, June 29, 1993).
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol ended at about 5:00 a.m. of
Q What else did your wife tell you during that confrontation, her exact words? the following day, July 16, 1992 with Complainant asking Sol to leave the house.

x          x           x Sol also admitted to Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on December 26,
1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of the
Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both Sol Alfonso and
A She took a deep breath again and told me, ‘Sweetheart, I am very, very, very sorry, Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific
I made a mistake.’ I asked, ‘What mistake is that?’ She replied ‘I had sexual plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 (Exhs.
intercourse with the Judge.’ "P" and "P-1").chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Also, Complainant received from his sister in California, U.S.A., a Pacific Bell
x          x           x
Statement of Telephone Calls reflecting two calls made by his wife Sol to Manila, at
numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is the country code while number 476120 is the
phone number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where Respondent Judge is
Q What else, if any, happened during that confrontation?
the Presiding Judge.
A I asked my wife ‘How many times did you have sexual intercourse with the Judge’?
As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife Sol live separately, and their
three children are alternately in the custody of Complainant or Sol for certain number
Q Was there any response?
of days.
A She answered five times and then right away I said, ‘Putangina mo, five times lang.
Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is denial as he advances the
Alam mo ba kung ilang beses kitang naganyan? Tarantado ka.’ With my voice not so
position that Sol Dinglasan Alfonso was a former client when Respondent Judge was
loud because the door and the windows were opened. If I shout the neighbors will
still a practicing lawyer, and that from time to time Sol would consult him regarding
hear and then the yayas will go down right away.
her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply accompanied a former
client who was looking for a house to buy in Hongkong, and as to the visit in the
Q What was your wife doing at that time?
Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge claimed that he was only visiting his godson
George Zari who spent a vacation in the Philippines for a month."cralaw virtua1aw her that since he would meet George Zari on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A of
library Citihomes, she might just as well meet him there. She acceded and on that date he
left his office at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A thirty
Some elaboration of the respondent’s version is necessary. He is now 56 years old. minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her
(TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were married in 1961 and have the draft of the reply and instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then
two sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to send it to her employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to whom she should
1969, he was the Chief Legal Officer in the Office of the City Mayor of Quezon City henceforth communicate because he, respondent, is busy in his office. When he was
and from 1969 to 1982 he was the Second Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order to alight at EDSA-
that and until November 1990, when he was appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did not meet Sol again. (TSN, 9
Court at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, he was in the private practice of law. In April 1992, July 1993, 3-15).chanrobles law library
he was assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8 July
1993, 32). He first came to know Sol when she hired his services as her counsel in Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26 December 1989 and
six criminal cases involving dishonored checks she filed against Santiago Maramag having seen her in Hongkong. According to him, his traveling companion was Cua
and Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In 1989, he saw Sol at the wedding of her Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10).
sister Jennifer to Romeo Dizon; he stood as sponsor for the groom then. In June When confronted about the charge of immorality and unethical conduct for having
1992, Romeo saw him at his office at the City Hall in Manila and sought advice illicit relations with Sol, he answered: "I deny it very strongly, your Honor." (Id., 32).
regarding the letter Sol had received from the Security Bank requiring her to explain
why she should not be declared absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual
without an approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he would not be able to intercourse with Sol because he has been suffering from two debilitating diseases —
give any advice unless he saw the letter and talked with Sol. A few days later, he diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since 1987, and prostatitis —
received an overseas call from Sol who said that she left the Philippines sometime which have seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own words, he "could hardly
after 10 June 1992. He told her that he could not give any written or oral advice until make it," and that he has "no erection whatsoever." (Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and
he read the letter and talked with her. This overseas call might have been the 17 "12").
June 1992 call referred to in the Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able
to talk to her in the second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant’s version for she finds no
weeks later, he received a local call from Sol who told him that she was back and that reason not to believe the complainant. Accordingly to her," [n]o man in his correct
she has the letter. Sol begged to see him at his office. He, however, told her that he mind would come forward and claim that his honor and good name have been
was busy; besides, it was already late in the afternoon. She got frantic and so he told stained by an adulterous wife, doubt the paternity of his children, and in the process
her that they could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes, at 130 San destroy his family and home." She ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was to meet his godson, George Zari, in the respondent — Cua Sen, Celestino Esteban and former Judge Zari — do not inspire
said place. They did meet there at 11:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day belief.
— 11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the Security Bank and after
interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a "reply." Present at that time were Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the respondent has
Celestino Esteban, lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari, and his live-in ruined two families — his own and that of the complainant. Respondent "cannot
partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes later, he decided to go home. Sol requested for a escape from the blame and sin of what he has caused Complainant’s once happy
ride in his vehicle in order to alight at the place of her employer along EDSA and family." More pertinently she adds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Shaw Boulevard to which he obliged. While on their way, Sol invited him for lunch
and they went to the Mongolian Restaurant at Robinson’s where they had lunch. "But beyond the domestic confines of these two families, Respondent Judge is no
They had coffee nearby and then parted ways. Thereafter, on separate days, Sol ordinary mortal who can live the life he pleases having two women at the same time
called him by phone to ask about the draft of the reply. On the second call, he told — his wife and worst [sic], another man’s wife. He is a Judge who symbolizes the law
and the highest degree of morality in the community. The citizens look up to him as appointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove
the embodiment of justice and decency, as he decides cases brought to his court. He that the respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. No love notes written
can be no less." cralawnad by her after November 1990 were presented in evidence. If she did, they could have
been kept with Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place which was not, however,
And invoking our decision in Leynes v. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 [1978]) and Castillo v. unknown anymore to the respondent’s wife. Sol’s admission or confession to the
Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991]) as precedent and moral compass, she asserts that complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on five occasions
she has no other alternative but to find respondent "GUILTY as charged of Immorality made no reference to specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct examination, the
and Violation of Judicial Conduct" and to recommend his "DISMISSAL . . . from complainant’s counsel exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates
office."cralaw virtua1aw library thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the narration by the complainant of
the information clearly indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to elaborate on
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her recommendation for the five illicit sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the respondent carefully
the imposition upon the respondent of the severest administrative penalty — avoided any entanglement with the details of the admission not only because it might
dismissal from the service — it is all the more imperative to conduct an assiduous have provided an occasion for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but because it
examination and evaluation of the records and the evidence. would have operated as a waiver of his objection to the testimony as hearsay. The
transcripts of the stenographic notes disclose that the counsel for the respondent
There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the objected and entered a continuing objection to questions directed to elicit or which
respondent and the complainant’s wife. For one, there are the cards or notes, which tended to elicit statements or admissions supposedly made or given by Sol on
the complainant and the Investigating Justice described as love letters. These five grounds that any such statements or admissions would be hearsay or otherwise
"love letters" are marked as Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," and "E," and dated 3 July barred by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the
1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February 1988, 11 January 1989, and 7 March 1989, objection; hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as part of the narration
respectively. For another, if we were to give full credit to the complainant’s testimony but not as evidence of the truth thereof. Thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
that during their confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual intercourse with the
respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it would appear that the "ATTY. DEMIGILLO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
relationship had developed into an extra-marital liaison. It was furthermore
established that both Sol and the respondent took the same flights of Cathay Pacific Q What was her response to your exhortation?
aircraft to Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and back to the Philippines on 29
December 1989. There is, however, no evidence that they stayed together in the A After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said, "Sweetheart, patawarin mo
same hotel in Hongkong. On the other hand, there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. ako, nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa iyo."cralaw virtua1aw library
Cua Sen that he, a client of the respondent, was the latter’s travelling
companion.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the complainant At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register our objection as to the issue of
were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed from the attorney- the truth of the statement as purported to be answered by her wife for two reasons:
client relationship between the respondent and Sol. Her marriage to the complainant One, it is hearsay. We have no opportunity to cross-examine the . . .
did not diminish Sol’s love for the respondent, for even after she committed herself to
the complainant alone and made a vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ceremony of marriage, she still sneaked out her love notes to the Respondent.
As part of his narration.
It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or
misconduct committed before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the post- ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
 ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes, as part of the narration but just for purposes of record we would like to register
our objection as to the truth of the statement itself. First, it is hearsay; second . . . Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want to say that our objection is a
continuing one." (TSN, 29 June 1993, 36-39).
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the
Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration.
narration," they should only be considered as independently relevant statements, i.e.,
as proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as proof of the truth of facts
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
revealed in the said statements or admissions. Elsewise stated, the admission in
That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the inter-alia [sic] rule, the admission evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in determining the issue of
of a party should not prejudice the rights of another.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red their truth. (FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol.
VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted by
x          x           x Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be deemed proven by the said
admission or confession. While it is true that technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in administrative cases, however, since the Investigating Justice herself
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library had specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as part of the narration, or more
specifically as independently relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to
Q What was the exact statement of your wife? thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and competent
evidence against the respondent that he had illicit sex with
x          x           x Sol.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the facts so
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library admitted, considering, however, that Sol’s admission that she engaged in sexual
intercourse on five occasions made no reference to specific dates, that their affair
Again, subject to the observation of this Honorable Court, we would register our
antedated Sol’s marriage, that their last proven tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and
objections on these two grounds: Hearsay and res inter alia [sic] rule.
that there is an absence of positive and competent evidence to show that any of the
five acts of sexual intercourse took place after the respondent’s appointment to the
x          x           x
judiciary, it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent committed any of the
sexual indiscretions after he became a judge. Respondent is not charged for
ATTY. BARLONGAY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral
conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The
Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . . respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his
appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
You have a continuing objection? efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article
XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he
had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps alighted near the crossing overpass at United Street. It is, therefore, clear that on 17
and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering the
redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual
ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor — his private and official traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his office — if at all he did
conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta v. proceed to it — in time for the commencement of the official session hours in the
Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto afternoon, i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines
must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981). Thus, for
from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the purely personal reasons, he violated the rule regarding official session hours. Such
incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of violation amounted to neglect of duty.
proof required in administrative cases. This the complainant failed to do. The
meetings of the respondent and Sol at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 Finally, a word on the respondent’s defense that he could not have sexual congress
July 1992 do not by themselves prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification. with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and prostatitis. The claim is
Evidence was offered by the respondent to prove otherwise. However, considering both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to prove the
their prior special relationship, the respondent and Sol’s meetings could reasonably stage, extent or degree of seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his
incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly issued the medical certificates
expressive of such relationship. In short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; did not testify thereon. Besides, immorality — for which the respondent is charged —
he succumbed to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled
Sol who asked for his legal advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such that:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He
thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that" [a] "immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, dissoluteness; or is wilful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate
of Judicial Conduct which provides that" [a] judge should avoid impropriety and the attitude toward good order and public welfare." (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth ed.,
appearance of impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the 1990, 751).
law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial
the epitome of integrity and justice. (Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975]). Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON is
The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and,
preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary. (Candia v. Tagabucba, 79 further, sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
SCRA 51 [1977]).chanrobles.com : virtual law library more severely.

It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent left SO ORDERED.
his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning and arrived
at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
the private detectives (Exhibit "G"), the respondent and Sol left the unit at 1:30
o’clock in the afternoon on board a vehicle and that twenty-five minutes later, Sol Ø Toledo v. Toledo,7 SCRA 757
 Office of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14,
Republic of the Philippines and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor
SUPREME COURT General conducted hearings during which the complainant presented her evidence
Manila both oral and documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf,
EN BANC cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf
A.C. No. 266             April 27, 1963 but reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant, finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, on 24 July
vs. 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent. abandonment of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom
PADILLA, J.: he has a child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court. law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by mail a copy of the
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer the same within
of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar; 1 that 15 days from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958
they were married on 27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar "that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts and
examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor
he is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September
City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children. 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent filed a
She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or,
1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within which to file an
from receipt of notice and a copy of the complaint. 3 The respondent mailed his answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be returned to the Solicitor General
answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, for reception of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of
averring that the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly, the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in
clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or disbarment of a member abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case on 17
of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer could not September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was given a period of 15
be made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an days within which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the
irregularity in the filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's
25, June 1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the extension of time
an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and sworn to before a notary previously granted, the respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November
public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information furnished by 1958, also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his
Esperanza D. Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who memorandum in reply.
had borne him three children is not true because her very informant, whose true Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the respondent The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may
was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three be considered, by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the
children referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the
Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Attached to his answer are the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any intention of introducing
affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of
complainant with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same. (Emphasis
1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and supplied)
recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the case was received by the
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call
or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
filed by the Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to present Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as operator-
desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has
proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent because he headed a survey
filed in this Court. party that surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist by Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence and office at
profession, and the respondent, then a second year law student, were married civilly Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a
in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of
after their wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar residence and office. Among those who lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon
street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume his Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever
studies at the Far Eastern University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice her he was in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz
profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place of
once a week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, Corazon and a baby
the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock
to buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding house or at the house on in the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were
Economia street where he on lived with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's
Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced him to the respondent.
three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed He helped Abad place the seats of the station wagon in their proper places and while
her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" he was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask
and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to address
Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."
bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days before the last The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact
examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child has been
came to see him. Since then they became actually separated and she never saw him established by the testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and
again until the hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching test by the investigating
that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan Solicitor in the presence of the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and
de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the investigating
place of work and she did not care to either. Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June 1955 she coached her on what to testify or whether she testified because of any promise of
lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the respondent, his family reward or consideration, Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward
composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. manner answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the
The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing but the truth about the
named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The respondent's affair with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached
couple slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie and ate their meals her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by
together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in his
investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by the respondent The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken into
to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against him and his alleged consideration for they were not properly introduced in evidence during the
paramour, which could be a motive for falsely testifying against them, and she investigation.
answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman
that they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a dress who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a expected and required of a member of the Bar.6
woman of few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.
reason she left them was because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
she described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful but Corazon was not Footnotes
ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure, because she was stouter and taller than the 1
He took and passed the bar examinations given by this Court in August
complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with 1949 (46 Off. Gaz. 4948, 4951) and was admitted to the practice of law on 16
Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with May 1950 (47 Off. Gaz. 1221, 1226).
the respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she 2
In a letter dated 17 July 1956, she informed the Court that the respondent is
replied that she had not. employed in the Bureau of Lands and not in the Bureau of Mines.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked him whether 3
According to the respondent, he received notice of the order requiring him to
he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the complainant, and Lino readily answer the complaint on 18 September 1956.
answered that he is his brother-in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the 4
The complainant's letter dated 25 June 1956 was received in the Docket
wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the Section of this Court on 2 July 1956. It was returned to her because it was
hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description of not duly sworn to before a person authorized to administer oath. On 9 July
the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five 1956 the complainant again filed in this Court the same letter duly sworn to
feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer before a notary public.
figure than the complainant. 5
Later on he transferred to the MLQ school of Law where he finished the law
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina Payot is a course.
simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in education, and understands little 6
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 28 December 1956 andSarmiento
English. She did not even finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp vs. Cui, Adm. Case No. 141, 29 March 1957.
and incisive questions propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the
lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself
would have revealed herself if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her
answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure
to understand the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected
to remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of more than
average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected to a thorough
examination by three lawyers and her confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's
frank and ready answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity
and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be
discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
Ø Obusan v. Obusan, 128 SCRA 485 Romegil Q. Magana, a pook  leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the
Republic of the Philippines head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay
SUPREME COURT list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know
Manila Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where
EN BANC respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984 Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo
vs. Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's
Roger Castuciano for complainant. testimony.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent. He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that
they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home
Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her
was admitted to the bar in 1968. absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint
represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He
her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any
D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting memorandum.
or undissolved. After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations
Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony with a married woman separated from her own husband.
held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1) Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a
more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm.
never returned to the conjugal abode. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree
Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117
He had brought his car to that place. Phil. 768).
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of
Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Attorneys.
Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-
testimonies. Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Ø Dizon v. Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014 the case or by any defects obtaining in the notarization of the compromise
agreement.
Republic of the Philippines In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22, 2007, the Investigating
SUPREME COURT Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Manila Professional Responsibility when he notarized the compromise agreement without
THIRD DIVISION the presence of all the parties, and recommended that he be suspended as Notary
A.C. No. 10185               March 12, 2014 Public for a period of two (2) years and from the practice of law for six (6) months.
LICERIO DIZON, Complainant, In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
vs. approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent. modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for only six (6) months for violation of
RESOLUTION his obligation as Notary Public.
MENDOZA, J.: On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a petition against Resolution,3 modified its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Cabucana from the
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana), before the Integrated Bar of the practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him from re-appointment as notary
Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the latter for falsification of public public for one (1) year.
document. The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a to the penalty.
parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana, Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:
Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by
filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
on November 6, 2003, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to
MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the due him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is
execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the signatories therein his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is
testified that they signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of the irregularity in the The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section
due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue delay in the 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
resolution/decision of Civil Case No. 1-689 which caused damage and injury to A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
complainant; that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the instrument or document –
document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code and
of Professional Responsibility. Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
uttered grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the hearing of the said case notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
in MTCC. Rules.
In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was intended to harass him As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person
because he was the private prosecutor in a criminal case filed against complainant who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to
before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of action as his right was not attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of
violated because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a party to the compromise the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
agreement; and that complainant would not suffer any damage by the pendency of party's free and voluntary act and deed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the Code of Professional LAUREL, J.:
Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General
law for three (3) months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and against the respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and
PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
effective immediately, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
offense shall be dealt with more severely. Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent,
its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a
throughout the country. separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the
SO ORDERED. afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among
Associate Justice other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each
WE CONCUR: other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and
Associate Justice acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to
Chairperson shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract
another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma
Associate Justice Associate Justice hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be
valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939,
contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the
Associate Justice evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the
present case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to whether
the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent,
Footnotes the service were rendered free of charge.
1
 Rollo, pp. 181-189. The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he
2
 Id. at 180. had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of
3
 Id. at 179. them to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but
immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a
Ø In re: Santiago, 70 Phil.661 mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June
30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation Exhibit A.
Republic of the Philippines There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses
SUPREME COURT Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and
Manila prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is
EN BANC contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The
A.C. No. 932             June 21, 1940 advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment by him of the
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent, contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his
continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit
and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer
ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional
privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was either
ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the
complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the
opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow
the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the
circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately
after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the
parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
 an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in
his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure,
Ø In re: Terrell, G.R. No. 1203, May 15,1903, 2 Phil.266 sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
Republic of the Philippines In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
SUPREME COURT States, vs.  Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore,
Manila been convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding,
EN BANC while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we
G.R. No. 1203            May 15, 1903 are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one
law. year from the 7th day of February, 1903.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government. It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice
W. A. Kincaid for defendant. of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of
First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should Footnotes
not be suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons: 1 Page 222, supra.
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after
he had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading
the law then in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto.
After reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United
States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the
said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and
decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were
true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a
certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon
which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the
knowledge and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro
Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension
from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
 court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a
quo.
Ø Millare v. Montero, 246 SCRA 1 On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions
Republic of the Philippines and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP
SUPREME COURT No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and
Manila policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or
FIRST DIVISION novation explaining that —
  . . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 &
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to
vs. the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent. of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been
obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present
QUIASON, J.: complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For
respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.
practice of law. In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument
I and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the February 12 Resolution.
the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No.
the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's
respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having
Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988,
adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for with finality.
failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order
Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22). On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986. judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R.
for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23,
were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a
to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the
in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18,
to file an action for annulment. 1988.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the
Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully
annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from
344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his
the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA. client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly
implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the
for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and
Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution. dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the
for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, former cases were secured through fraud."
respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA- As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
G.R. SP No. 17040). A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the
II judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded,
represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule execution.
19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423
case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. (1993), ruled:
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable . . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial
construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not court for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only;
allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce
law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in any way or
groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary (See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court
restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]). of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules: (1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the
same cause. Regional Trial Court, Abra;
xxx xxx xxx (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the decision of the
Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. (3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the Annulment of
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole Court of Appeals;
purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The (4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the
Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 Supreme Court;
[1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
 (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari,
Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition For Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory
Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of
the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping
exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to
another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and
degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such
multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution
of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary
action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful
violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the
courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just
and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses
as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220
SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a
number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the
judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally
frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered,
thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and
Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
 Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago
upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
Ø Castañeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential
Republic of the Philippines house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be
SUPREME COURT reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife
Manila Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the
FIRST DIVISION writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was
  not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975 in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte  writ of preliminary
vs. injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents'
APPEALS, respondents. certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners. writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to
Jose M. Luison for respondents. be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the
latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register
CASTRO, J.: of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was
for more than a decade. again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain third time, lifted the restraining order.
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying
the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute
motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We dismissed the
dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed
motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
highest bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary
April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the
of Manila  issued a writ of possession to the properties. writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15,
co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil
 Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in
trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were
delay. No pronouncement as to costs. sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8)
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his
co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it
which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of
court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be
order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a
possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in
writ. the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one case and bars them from raising it.
the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited it or declined to assert it.2
from the husband's business venture. 5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the
of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-
property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy,
Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon
obviously wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The
ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a
and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, right not in esse and which may never arise.4
the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is
complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted
has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale from the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of
and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part
sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in
interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of
possession was issued, and even up to the present. the conjugal union.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it 6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners,
the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental
execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons
times in the Supreme Court). hereunder stated. The Complaint
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was
have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6 personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails
the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid
his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is or illegal.
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda
and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the
his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.7 back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the
than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of
below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the
we have motu proprio  examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
the present case). We find that Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is
merits has not even started; the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties- 39, Rules of Court)
defendants; The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of
admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party- no moment to the Agoo.
defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion); Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
and
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
moreover barred by prior judgment. supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the
on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of
cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements
are baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and
The Counterclaim sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions
unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in
services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must
preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the
to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in
value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil
The Supplemental Complaint case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this
plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk
damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in of Court.
question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while Teehankee, J., is on leave.
the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the  
Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action  consists of an allegation of additional damages caused
by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage
and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two
parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also
in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two
other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in
bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending
litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
 Ø De Ysasi III v. NLRC, GR No. 104599, March 11, 1994 During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Republic of the Philippines Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
SUPREME COURT for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
Manila During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
SECOND DIVISION medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in
  April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994 Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor
vs. and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU were not acted upon.
CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents. Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC,
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner. for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent. docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of
REGALADO, J.: full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, damages, as well as attorney's fees.
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner
with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it. vs.  National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled
of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits;
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages
gasoline, medical and dental expenses. and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent,
the hacienda  and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or
respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
house there. In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which
on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8 rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge
is worth noting: who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they
that because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the
of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in) the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked: eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
private respondent had with each other, were personal matters application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must
complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge
to come in the way.10 private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural
want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
thereof. after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d)
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Section 16[c] and [d], The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal. cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by
law or procedure in the interest of due process. reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid
is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever
to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17 the employer-employee tie (Samson
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation,
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that 1989 edition, p. 133).
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v.  NLRC  (191 SCRA 328),
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from
NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to
law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19 work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve Inc. v.  NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid
acceptance: cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the want to work anymore.
anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave
February 19, 1986 at 20-44). his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical strained family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to
bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a
1987 at 49-50). letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once
Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no
hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to intention to abandon his employment.20
live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao. The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
xxx xxx xxx confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of
circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical
illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so
III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
outright dismissal without notice and hearing. which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are
xxx xxx xxx bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
employee are as follows: unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
may be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive
assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister
could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel
to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied
possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this voluntary resignation.25
regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations. about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and
that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities. 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as
no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to farm administrator.27
begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may
any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence  per to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship. determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his dismally wanting in this case.
son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
petitioner from that time until even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for
petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail. additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my proper
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, disposition.
Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31 Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the receipts therefor.
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, "CROSSED CHECK".
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values xxx xxx xxx
and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests
who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance
the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
him to continue to perform work-related tasks: such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating — foreclosing his opportunity to
xxx xxx xxx cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that
am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-
ASSOCIATION, INC.; examine a witness.
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as
BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's
entitled to (sic) as such planter-member; entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances
JON de YSASI III above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts
and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business
said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and expenditures.
authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we
have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums
received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services work at all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying
rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their
character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly employment, the positions last held by them and such other
converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance
employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of and statistical purposes.
resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment. petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin
and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the
where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any was submitted thereto.41
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40 Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules
wise: explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the
omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of
known address. undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
xxx xxx xxx employee.42
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a General rejoins as follows:
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall The Labor Arbiter held thus:
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend While we are in full agreement with the respondent
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. as to his defense of implied resignation and/or
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify abandonment, records somehow showed that he
a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the failed to notify the Department of
reasons therefor. Labor and Employment for his sons'
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint a valid termination by an employer was not complied
with the Regional Branch of the Commission. with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
xxx xxx xxx otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must
report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of be upheld at all times provided however that
 sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
his failure to observe the notice on due process practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back
80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more
Petition), . . . particularly when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v.  NLRC, is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given
170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48
employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe wit:
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
the rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was
employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188
present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc.  vs. NLRC, 173
due process, but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to
abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse. 43 reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot
process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease
in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or
under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer. (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
every worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that
denial: a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the possible.49
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his
a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their dismissal by other employers.
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to
withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement. compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a
absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause
has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration
compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again,
the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51 we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The
awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power. rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have
be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of
awarded to petitioner. the same.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged
recommendation of the Solicitor General: to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced
petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may
Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as
be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine,
paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest
year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an
SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
parties are equally at fault.54 WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages
sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
 
#Footnotes
1 Annex C, Petition; Rollo, 57-68; Original Record, Vol. II, 248-259;
per Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy.
2 G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 69.
3 Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 45-56; Original Record, 400-411; Comm.
Irenea E. Ceniza, ponente, Pres. Comm. Ernesto G. Ladrido III and
Comm. Bernabe S. Batuhan, concurring.
4 Original Record, Vol. II, 412-421.
5 Annex A, Petition, Rollo, 42-44; Original Record, Vol. II, 466-468.
6 Rollo, 136-149.
7 Ibid., 151.
8 Ibid., 175-180.
9 Original Record, Vol. I, 248.
10 Rollo, 140.
11 Abaya vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 96389, December 11, 1992,
216 SCRA 455.
12 LBC Aircargo, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 81815, October 3,
1990, 190 SCRA 274.
13 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
14 Sec. 1, Rule XIV, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code.
15 Art. 283, Labor Code.
16 Art. 284, id.
17 A' Prime Security Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 93476,
March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 142.
18 Cf. Foodmine Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 84688, August 20,
1990, 188 SCRA 748; Artex Development Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 65045, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA 611; Tiu vs. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 83433, November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA 469.
19 Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 96283, February 25, 1992, 206 SCRA 545.
20 Rollo, 141, 143-144.
21 TSN, Vol. III, February 19, 1986, 20-43, 60.
22 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
101858, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 792.
23 Sec. 2(b), Rule I, Book III, Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code provides that employees are considered managerial
employees if they meet all of the following conditions, namely: (1)
Ø Pajares v. Abad Santos, 30 SCRA 748 purchased from the said company, the respective dates they were taken and
Republic of the Philippines by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging that
SUPREME COURT without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the
Manila complaint.
EN BANC After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a
G.R. No. L-29543      November 29, 1969 bill of particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant, the said court, she then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First
vs. Instance of Manila, alleging in support of her petition that in denying her
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees. discretion.
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant. But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees. to dismiss the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ
TEEHANKEE, J.: of preliminary injunction, for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the lower Court's Order of complaint filed by the said company in the inferior court, particularly
dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently appraise the
against respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of
defendant in a simple collection case. action against her so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2)
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated August that things asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary
16, 1968 certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law: matters, which are beyond the pale of such bill. Convinced that the said
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated motion of the company is well founded, the lower court accordingly dismissed
July 21, 1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her the petition on April 21, 1962.
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by
Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal Court of Manila and respondent the court below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court,
Udharam Bazar & Co. contending under her lone assignment of error to maintain her such appeal
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued that the lower court erred in dismissing her petition for certiorari with
Gloria Pajares before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain preliminary injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as amended by its
sum of money. The lawsuit was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case order dated August 18, 1962.
No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to the sala of the respondent Judge The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1) whether the
Abad Santos. allegations of the complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows: of the cause of action against her; and (2) whether the items asked for by the
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of said Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of particulars constitute evidentiary
ready made goods and delivered to her in good condition and same matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions. A perusal of the brief
were already sold, but did not make the full payment up to the of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all involved
present time; in this appeal.
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was
P354.85, representing the balance of her account as the value of the committed by respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars
said goods, which is already overdue and payable." in the collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by private
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85 representing
moved for a bill of particulars praying the inferior court to require the the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered
Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds of goods which she supposedly to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing
with the requirements of the Rules of Court.1 fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been
that appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still
goods represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice remains saddled with the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after
numbers on which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each having spent uselessly much more than the amount in litigation in this worthless
such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars sought all cause.
concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys
1 of the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for a is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases
bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
particularly to enable him to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial." Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
merchandise at her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
one of her creditors from whom she used to buy on credit ready made goods for for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney
resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable may be subjected to disciplinary action."
her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's
were just as much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could not logically counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the
pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her personal record of the attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future
own records of her outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer reference. So ordered.
whether from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness was in the Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount. Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case,
it had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account in
the said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote Footnotes
appellee under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness but 1
 Rule 6, section 3, formerly Rule 6, section 1.
stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the operation of her stall, she would 2
 Uypuanco vs. Equitable Banking Corporation, 27 SCRA 1272 (April 30,
not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I 1969).
would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you 3
 J. P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc., 28 SCRA 807 (July 28,
P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as heretofore." 1969).
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing
appellant's petition for certiorari against respondent judge's order denying her motion
for a bill of particulars, as pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error.
Well may we apply to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an
analogous case,2 that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove
that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time
that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases."
Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over
seven years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess
judgment and ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her
• CANON 2 Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and National Commission for Indigenous
Ø Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers Peoples. The term “practicing lawyers” shall exclude:
[The Supreme Court recently issued the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service,  (i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by
requiring all “practicing lawyers” to render a minimum of 60 hours of free legal aid law to practice;
services to indigent litigants in a year. Please note the definition of a “practicing  (ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;
lawyer”. It was published in the PhilStar and Inquirer on 14 February 2009. It takes  (iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly
effect on 1 July 2009. A subsequent en banc Resolution, however, deferred the accredited legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-governmental
effectivity to 1 January 2010. Here’s the full text of Bar Matter No. 2012.] organizations (NGOs) and peoples’ organizations (POs) like the Free Legal
BM No. 2012 Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already render free legal
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING aid to indigent and pauper litigants and
LAWYERS  (iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who
RESOLUTION are employed in the private sector but do not appear for and in behalf of
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
Comment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the (b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the
Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Rules of Court and Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R.
Resolved to APPROVE the same. No. 150135, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule (c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal,
and its implementing regulations in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. civil and administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper
February 10, 2009. litigants need legal representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and
in behalf of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions.
RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE
It shall also cover assistance by a practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in
SECTION 1. Title . – This Rule shall be known as “The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid
court-annexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
Service.”
Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also
SECTION 2. Purpose . – This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society
be considered as free legal aid services and credited as compliance under this Rule;
as agents of social change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of
access to justice by the less privileged members of society and expedite the
lawyers in the country;
resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is
bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration of
specifically tasked with handling legal aid cases;
justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is
SECTION 3. Scope . – This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for
specifically tasked with disciplining members of the Bar;
practicing lawyers to render free legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located
or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where the assistance of a
in the different geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A ; and
lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other members of the legal
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer
profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
rendered free legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms . – For purposes of this Rule:
officer holding an equivalent or similar position. The term shall also include an officer
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in
holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or a
behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited
responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who
to the National Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation
conducted the court-annexed mediation proceeding.
Board, Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices, Department of
SECTION 5. Requirements . –
(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free forty-five (45) days after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the
legal aid services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a practicing lawyers.
period of twelve (12) months, with a minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid (e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-
services each month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to judicial bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the
render legal aid service for more than five (5) hours in one month, the excess hours immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required
may be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding periods. information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for pleadings from the records.
cases where he may render free legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the (f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section
IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases where he may 4(a)(i) and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that
render free legal aid service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the year, they are employed with the government or incumbent elective officials not
IBP Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court. allowed by law to practice or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office
days of the last month of each quarter of the year. together with the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the (P2,000). Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of
Clerk of Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services its legal aid program.
in a case. The certificate shall contain the following information: (g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under
 (i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or Section 4(a)(iii) shall secure a certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the
parties in the said case(s) for whom the service was rendered, the docket concerned NGO or PO to the effect that, during that year, they have served as
number of the said case(s) and the date(s) the service was supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or actively participated in the NGO’s or PO’s free
rendered. legal aid activities. The certification shall be submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP
 (ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial National Office.
on a particular case in the court or quasi-judicial body. (h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under
 (iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or Section 4(a)(iv) shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during
any other mode of ADR on that year, they are neither practicing lawyers nor covered by Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii).
a particular case. The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office
 (iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for together with the payment of an annual contribution of Four Thousand Pesos
postponement of hearing or (P4,000) by
conference) or pleading filed on a particular case shall be considered as one way of support for the efforts of practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal
(1) hour of service. aid services. Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained support of its legal aid program.
by the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) (i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two
copy to be attached to the lawyer’s compliance report. Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall also accrue to the special
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
Chapter within the court’s jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be SECTION 6. NCLA . –
tasked with immediately verifying the contents of the certificate with the issuing Clerk (a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local
of Court by comparing the copy of the certificate attached to the compliance report chapters for the proper handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing
with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court. lawyers can represent.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the (b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with
concerned lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the respect to the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of
IBP’s NCLA for recording and documentation. The submission shall be made within certificates submitted by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this be subject to disciplinary action by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of
Rule. criminal charges against the lawyer.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk (e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by
of Court and forms mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g). any Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties is pending or by the Director of a
that will be paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an
of this Rule. For this purpose, it shall annually submit an accounting to the IBP Board administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson. This is without
of Governors. The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the prejudice to the filing of the criminal
Supreme Court in connection with its request for the release of the subsidy for its and administrative charges against the malfeasor.
legal aid program. SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) . – A lawyer
SECTION 7. Penalties . – who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year
(a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the for the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE
minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit units
IBP, through the NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render the minimum for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for alternative dispute resolution, four (4)
prescribed number of hours. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive
explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and recommendation to the and procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects as
IBP Board of Governors that the erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who may be prescribed by
is not in good standing. Upon approval of the NCLA’s recommendation, the IBP the MCLE Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in
standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter a year for at least two consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a
which submitted the lawyer’s compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: one (1)
is registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The notice to the lawyer credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit
shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for legal writing and oral
accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP. advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence
(b) The “not in good standing” declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) and three (3) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
months from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
Governors. During the said period, the SECTION 9. Implementing Rules . – The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given
lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided, authority to recommend implementing regulations in determining who are “practicing
however, that the “not in good standing” status shall subsist even after the lapse of lawyers,” what constitute “legal aid cases” and what administrative procedures and
the three-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid. financial safeguards which may be necessary and proper in the implementation of
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3) this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the various legal chapters in the
consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP
motu proprio by the CBD. The said Board of Governors, the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the
proceedings shall afford the erring lawyer due process in accordance with the rules of Supreme Court for final approval.
the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court . If found administratively liable, the SECTION 10. Effectivity . – This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on
penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be imposed upon July 1, 2009 after they have been published in two (2) newspapers of general
him. circulation.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under
this Rule or any contents thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification
and dishonesty and shall
 Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and
services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a
Ø Republic Act No. 9999 certification from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ)
or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services
to be provided are within the services defined by the Supreme Court, and that the
agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer
Fourteenth Congress and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or
organization duly accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary
Third Regular Session certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited
thousand nine. association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9999 Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing the tax deductions as provided for in this Act
AN ACT PROVIDING A MECHANISM FOR FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FOR and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
OTHER PURPOSES Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court,
Congress Assembled: shall be entitled to an allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Free Legal Assistance Act could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten
of 2010". percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual performance of the legal
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to value the profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein
dignity of every human person and guarantee the rights of every individual, contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid
particularly those who cannot afford the services of legal counsel. services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal
Furthermore, it is the policy of the State to promote a just and dynamic social order Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people Supreme Court.
from poverty through policies and programs that provide adequate social services Section 6. Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Campaign. - The DOJ,
and improve the quality of life for all. in cooperation with the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), is hereby mandated to
In addition, the State shall guarantee free legal assistance to the poor and ensure conduct an annual IEC campaign in order to inform the lawyers of the procedures
that every person who cannot afford the services of a counsel is provided with a and guidelines in availing tax deductions and inform the general public that a free
competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her own choice, if upon legal assistance to those who cannot afford counsel is being provided by the
determination it appears that the party cannot afford the services of a counsel, and State.1avvph!1
that services of a counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and protect of Section 7. Reportorial Requirement. - For purposes of determining the effectiveness
the party. and social impact of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall submit an annual report
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As provided for in this Act, the term legal services to to both Houses of Congress indicating therewith the number of parties who benefited
be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the application of law, from this Act.
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences which shall include, among The report shall state in detail, among others, the geographic location, demographic
others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts, characteristics and socioeconomic profile of the beneficiaries of this Act.
including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and Section 8. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). - Within ninety (90) days from
tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by the the date effectivity of this Act, the BIR shall formulate the necessary revenue
Supreme Court. regulations for the proper implementation of the tax component as envisioned in this
Act.
The Supreme Court shall formulate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations with respect to the legal services covered under this Act and the process
of accreditation of organizations and/or associations which will provide free legal
assistance.
Section 9. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions not affected by such declaration shall
remain in full force and effect.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree, ordinance or administrative circular
not consistent with any provision of this Act is hereby amended, repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved,

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Speaker of the House of President of the Senate
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2361 and House Bill No. 4301
was finally passed by the Senate and the House of the Representatives on January
27, 2010 and January 26, 2010, respectively.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives

Approved: FEB 23, 2010

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
 On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37
§ Olbes v. Deciembre, 457 SCRA 341 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the
latter issued a receipt,7 herein quoted as follows:
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5365             April 27, 2005
SPOUSES FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, Complainants, "August 31, 1999
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent. Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan
DECISION of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was
the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as (Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed 8-31-99
upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had P10,000.00
already been paid. PNB Check No. 46241 –8/15/99"8
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition1 for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed
by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five)
Court.  Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount
falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.  After he had filed his of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999,
Comment2 on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively. 9
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas
Dulay, held several hearings.  During those hearings, the last of which was held on Pambansa (BP) 22.  He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the
May 12, 2003,3 the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he
documentary evidence.  After the filing of the parties' respective formal offers of immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and
evidence, as well as petitioners' Memorandum,4 the case was considered submitted 0046242 totaling P100,000.10
for resolution.  Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners
Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22.  He stated, among
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004. others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two o'clock in the afternoon at
The Facts Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.11
working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to
receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.5 Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent.  Allegedly,
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it
from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000.  As security for the loan, she would have been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal,
issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the
(Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any heavy traffic conditions in those places.12  
other loans that might be obtained in the future. 6 Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois,
Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their
dealings with respondent.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied petitioners' claims, which he called baseless ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
and devoid of any truth and merit.  Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had Q.       Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the
deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 complainant issued to you, you filed two separate criminal cases
transactions.  Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that
their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to correct?
"ACCOUNT CLOSED."  Thus, he filed criminal cases against them.  He claimed that A.       Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at
the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his different banks.
presence.  He further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money Q.       These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the
indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with them complainants on July 15, 1999, is that correct?
convinced him that they had the capacity to pay. A.       I will consult my records, You Honor, because it's quite a long
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, time.  Yes, Your Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the
which were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer.  The criminal next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his COMM. DULAY:
rights against their deception and violation of their obligations.  He maintained that Which are the first two checks?
his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action. ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Report of the Investigating Commissioner The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that in the morning.  And Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule afternoon, Your Honor.
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ATTY. PUNZALAN:
The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts was not credible.  Q.       Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these
Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence two checks with number 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been
presented: issued to you?
"In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before A.       I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the
the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that: morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
2.       That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both Q.       This was issued to you in what particular place?
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally A.       Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right Q.       Is that your house?
there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to A.       No, it's not my house?
be immediately used by them in their business venture. Q.       What is that, is that your law office?
"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with A.       That is my retainer client.
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that: Q.       What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
2.       That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of
OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately the question?
exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks ATTY. PUNZALAN:
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their That is very material.  I am trying to test your credibility
business venture. because according to you these checks have been issued in
"The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer.  That's why I
contrast to his testimony before this Commission on cross-examination am asking your client…
during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus: COMM. DULAY:
 The name of the client is not material I think.  It is enough transaction.  This appears to be the only previous transaction between the
that he said it was issued here in Pasig.  What building? parties.  In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell
ATTY. DECIEMBRE: due such that they had to pay interest.  That respondent would trust them
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor. once more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a
COMM. DULAY: business and immediately release the amounts under the circumstances
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his client's described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of
office? the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants.  That
ATTY. PUNZALAN: respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what
he is telling the truth.  The place, Your Honor, according to businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of
the respondent is his client.  Now I am asking who is that credibility of respondent's version.  These circumstances really cast doubt as
client? to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction.  The resolution of
COMM. DULAY: the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly
Your answer. lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants.  Complainant Franklin
ATTY. DECIEMBRE: Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondent's filing of the criminal cases. 
A.       It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against
Q.       And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent
issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct? is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions."15
A.       Yes. The Court's Ruling
Q.       So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved
four checks issued in the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.  However, the penalty should be more
morning and two in the afternoon? severe than what the IBP recommended.
A.       That is correct, sir. Respondent's Administrative Liability
"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. 16 It
with the complainants.  As between his version as to when the four checks is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to
were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more credible.  Respondent possess good moral character.17 "A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose
involving the four checks took place.  Such distortion on a very material fact primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or
would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader."18  
complainants. By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of
"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when the transactions law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
took place are also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the justice.19 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
written statements made before the public prosecutors.  Thus further adding manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal
to the lack of credibility of respondent's version of the transaction. profession.20  
"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to respondent as The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
security for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that "Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be and promote respect for law and legal processes.
more credible.  Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post x x x                                         x x x                                  x x x
Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and "Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
which has since been paid   x x x.  Respondent does not deny the said legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
 x x x                                         x x x                                  x x x frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them.  As a matter of fact,
"Rule 7.03.           A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months 26 because of the
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or Complaints.  Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal misconduct.  He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from,
profession." and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
bar.21 Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in practice of law.  It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the
their public or in their private lives.  As officers of the courts and keepers of the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. 27   Good moral character
public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and includes at least common honesty.28 No moral qualification for bar membership is
are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and more important than truthfulness and candor.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession
honor.22 places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30   Lawyers must
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting be ministers of truth.  Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with by any artifice.  In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. 31
others.  The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are
times.  Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their disgraceful and dishonorable;32 they reveal a basic moral flaw.  The standards of the
professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the
to be officers of the court.23 penalties of criminal laws.33
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the
who said that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of
Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted.  Found law to be too mild.  His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is
untrue and unbelievable was respondent's assertion that they had filled up the reprehensible.  His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one
checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal.  After a petitioner is loathsome.
careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings. In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,34 the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell another's property, as
inevitable conclusion.  Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a
him by petitioners.  According to Franklin Olbes' testimony on cross-examination, Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were
they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid.  On the sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years.  Here, the conduct
pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him, 24 he was not able to return of herein respondent is even worse.  He used falsified checks as bases for
them.  He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
in him by petitioners.  It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and
made them trust him with their blank checks.25 violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He is
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately.  Let
transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar
amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent's full Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondent's personal record.  Let
knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for SO ORDERED.
his material gain. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
And he did not stop there.  Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, Nazario, and  Garcia, JJ., concur.
thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for
 27 
Vda. de Espino v. Presquito, 432 SCRA 609, June 28, 2004; Rural Bank of
Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 350 SCRA 138, January 24, 2001; Rayos-Ombac v.
Footnotes Rayos, 349 Phil. 8, January 28, 1998; Villanueva v. Sta. Ana, 315 Phil. 795,
1 
Rollo, pp. 1-10. July 11, 1995.
2 
Id., pp. 56-61.
28 
Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992.
3 
Records, Vol. IV.
29 
Constantino v. Saludares, 228 SCRA 233, December 7, 1993; Tan v.
4 
Petitioners' Memorandum was received by the IBP-CBD on September 16, Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992.
2003; Records, Vol. II, pp. 182-192.  Respondent did not submit any
30 
Custodio Sr. v. Esto, 81 SCRA 517, February 22, 1978.
Memorandum, but filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2004; Records, Vol.
31 
Article 19.  "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
II, pp. 194-198. performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
5 
Rollo, p. 1. observe honesty and good faith."  New Civil Code.
6 
Id., p. 2.
32 
Sebastian v. Atty. Calis, 372 Phil. 673, September 9, 1999.
7 
Id., p. 3.
33 
Sabayle v. Tandayag, supra citing In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399, 1928.
8 
Annex "A" of Petition; id., p. 11.
34 
399 SCRA 422, March 24, 2003.
9 
Affidavit of Franklin Olbes, p. 3; Records, Vol. II, p. 21.
10 
Rollo, p. 4.
11 
Id., p. 5.
12 
Id., pp., 7-8.
13 
Id., p. 8.
14 
Id., pp. 56-61.
15 
Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, pp. 10-14.
16 
Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 228, July 1, 2003; Eustaquio v. Rimorin, 399
SCRA 422, March 24, 2003; Sebastian v. Atty. Calis, 372 Phil. 673,
September 9, 1999; Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1, September 18,
1992.
17 
Ernesto L. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1999), p. 22.
18 
Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the RTC, Br. IV, Tagbilaran City, Against
Atty. Samuel C. Occeña; 383 SCRA 636, 638, July 3, 2002, per curiam.
19 
Busiños v. Atty. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687, December 22, 1997.
20 
Malecdan v. Pekas, 421 SCRA 7, January 26, 2004; Rivera v. Corral, 384
SCRA 1, July 4, 2002; Nakpil v. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758, March 4, 1998.
21 
Sanchez v. Somoso, 412 SCRA 569, October 3, 2003; Lao v. Medel, 405
SCRA 227, July 1, 2003; Eustaquio v. Rimorin, 399 SCRA 422, March 24,
2003.
22 
Sanchez v. Somoso, supra; Sabayle v. Tandayag, 158 SCRA 497, March
8, 1988.
23 
Garcia v. Manuel, 395 SCRA 386, January 20, 2003.
24 
TSN, May 20, 2002, pp. 65-66.
25 
TSN, February 4, 2002, p. 18.
26 
TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 44-45.
 commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional
ethics adopted by the American Bar Association. "Unprofessional conduct in an
attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or
which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We
censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan
Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known
Ø IBP Guideline, Art. 1, Sec. 1 Public Service § Valid Reasons for refusing to
better.
accept representation of indigent clients
Ø Tan Tek Beng v. David, AC No. 1261, December 29,1983 DECISION

AQUINO, J.:
SECOND DIVISION
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer
[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.] Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a
nonlawyer (alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the
TAN TEK BENG, Complainant, v. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, Respondent. attorney’s fees received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their
agreement reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
"December 3, 1970
Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf.
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING CASES AT LAW FOR "Manila
THE PURPOSE OF GAIN; CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — Where in the
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to "Dear Mr. Tan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly
with the clients, the Court held that the said agreement is void because it was In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the must be followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and "1. On all commission or attorney’s fees that we shall receive from our clients by
technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act virtue of the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall
No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic,
of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
inheritance and commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2
are involved.
R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37, 42).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE FOR CENSURE. — The "2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.
 mutual accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan
"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to
cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest. the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil
action to enforce the agreement.
"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall
be turned over to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself
approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients. as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as
president and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance
"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or
honest and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng
you must be sincere, honest and fair with me. refused.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Very truly yours, This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that
(Sgd.) Illegible respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because
the scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and
TIMOTEO A. DAVID his counsel.

"P.S. On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges
Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel
I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients. dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor General’s Office was informed of that fact. A
report on this case dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to
(Sgd.) Initial this Court.

"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
stated in the last paragraph of this letter. malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138,
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
MR. TAN TEK BENG" "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of
said agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
with the clients. unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J.,
Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional
ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"34. Division of Fees. — No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."cralaw virtua1aw
library

"35. Intermediaries. — The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled

or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He
should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client should be personal, and
the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A lawyer should accept no

compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the
knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal
Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan
Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known
better.chanrobles law library

"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code
of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7
C.J.S. 743).

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of

this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Makasiar (Chairman), J., took no part.

 complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
Ø Atty. Khan v. Atty. Simbillo, AC No. 5299, August 9, 2003 change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising;
that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
FIRST DIVISION exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003 that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4
Information Office, Complainant, The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
vs. and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent. passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
x-----------------------x 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003 the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner, the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The
vs. IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. 7
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which was
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 9
Office, Respondents. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
RESOLUTION entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1 In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
other half after a decision thereon has been rendered. Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information solicit legal business.
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2 misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as marriage bonds, to do so.
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names
for a party without authority to do so. of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. 12 It is a advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v.
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 15 The following elements name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
distinguish the legal profession from a business: cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money; distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16 be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August profession.
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
Court’s authority. of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self- partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. supplied)
Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
six months from the time of the filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages people, who GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

Footnotes
1 
Rollo, p. 13.
2 
Id., pp. 14-15.
3 
Id., p. 9.
4 
Id., pp. 21-57.
5 
Id., p. 60.
6 
Id., p. 62.
7 
Id., p. 72.
8 
Id., p. 75.
9 
Id., p. 73.
10 
Id., p. 109.
11 
Id., p. 110.
12 
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246,
253.
13 
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA
160, 174.
14 
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
15 
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
16 
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1,
10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
17 
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.
18 
Id., p. 110.
19 
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
20 
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
21 
Id., p. 65.
22 
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.
 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional, and the commission of offenses of this character amply justices
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor
of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. As a result, the respondent
• CANON 3
attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
Ø In re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37
month.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:
SECOND DIVISION
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practicing attorney and a member of the
[G.R. No. 32329. March 23, 1929.] provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made
use of a card written in SpAanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Duran & Lim for Respondent. "LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government. "Attorney
SYLLABUS "Notary Public
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; SECTION 21 OF
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS AMENDED BY ACT No. 2828, AND "CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
CANONS 27 AND 28 OF THE CODE OF ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION CONSTRUED "Province of Isabela
AND APPLIED; SOLICITATION OF CASES BY AN ATTORNEY AS GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION. — Application is given to section 21 of the Code "(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828, providing: "The practice of soliciting of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals;
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute
brokers, constitutes malpractice," and to Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town
Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The law is a profession and not a business.
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in
disbarment or suspension. translation, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928 The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal
provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related
"MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end
month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."cralaw
particular. You can come to my hose at any time here in Echague, to submit to me virtua1aw library
any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
The statue as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professional Ethics
"I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar
here in Echague. I will attend the sessions of the Board in Ilagan, but will come back Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics
home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will
exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see "27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will received any work regarding preparations lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity
of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and
public even on Sundays. conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per
"I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement
"I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the
to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court
and would charge only three pesos for every registration. "28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
"Yours respectfully, cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
(Sgd.) "LUIS TAGORDA disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in
order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
"Attorney claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
"Notary Public."cralaw virtua1aw library reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital view of the considerations which have influenced the court to be relatively lenient in
attachés or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly this particular instance, and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future
advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves
upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an
disbarred."cralaw virtua1aw library attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between Street, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense
when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type Separate Opinions
is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer
may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would
be unprofessional. (State v. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; OSTRAND, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
People v. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation
sufficient punishment.
of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to
strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or

suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and
those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon he
action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined
the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case,
suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should
go further than this if only to reflect out attitude toward cases of this character of
which unfortunately the respondent’s is only one. The commission of offenses of this
nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that
he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience
mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of
the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in
 It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
Ø Ulep v. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
EN BANC assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 services should be allowed supposedly
MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent. in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
R E SO L U T I O N Arizona, 2reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
REGALADO, J.: 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
law."chanrobles virtual law library (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3The
Annex A said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and
SECRET MARRIAGE? cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and
P560.00 for a valid marriage. gratitude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. the advertisements herein complained of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
Annex B law library
GUAM DIVORCE. Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it
DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
hours.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non- xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.chanrobles virtual law library would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767 need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like
birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law? reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position contrary to law, morals, public order and public
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
services).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
newspaper publications.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library is recognized, and that is:
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Article 26. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4 and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent Philippine Law.
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution  whose nature,
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library within the limits provided by this Code.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
to the very name being used by respondent - "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
connotes doctors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of outright malpractice.
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the ensuring prevention of illegal practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged law library
or committed There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
demeaning the integrity of the Bar. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
from offering such services to the public in to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
general.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library virtual law library
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and to practice law or perform legal services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such law library
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be no choice but to prohibit such business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
virtual law library clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of Court. 5
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a 2. Philippine Bar Association:
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in xxx xxx xxx.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
skill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in 4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The outside of court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages,
in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., such other related laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
p. 39).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The experience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the term as "the practice of law." 7
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of 4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:chanrobles virtual law library
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice
practice. 6 law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:chanrobles virtual law library While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
are wit: standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
2. Such practice is unauthorized; and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
patently immoral; and protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers to be amended so that such act could become
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that justifiable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be are highly reprehensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8 a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of
the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
its services. The Respondent's name - The Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not help matters. done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only 6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."  9 Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:chanrobles virtual law library the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and guilty of unlawful practice of law.
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this . . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. of the law - accurate or inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only when we are acting
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator.
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
law library person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a
virtual law library question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer
on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men
had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions the situation is not presented by the proofs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the virtual law library
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before
specialized staff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business. whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged 154-156.).
primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to 1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the provided that:chanrobles virtual law library
fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just problem;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the (b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, bar; .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a (c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
program, he drew employees' wills.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law whole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
library
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:chanrobles virtual law library to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings
as a lawyer or in another capacity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
library the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion- preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
unauthorized practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p.
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the 101.).
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to 1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
take.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law. judicious disposition of this case.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact 2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the no Philippine marriage can be secret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the library
situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public 2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE - THE services, are available." 11chanrobles virtual law library
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this
common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation - into account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
knowledge or skill. 12chanrobles virtual law library defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
court. 13chanrobles virtual law library C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to 176-177),stated:
inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14chanrobles virtual law library clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
the practice of law. 15One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
case in court, is also practicing law. 16Giving advice for compensation regarding the attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
practice of law. 17One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18chanrobles virtual and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library law library
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after citing the doctrines in several Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
law," thus: embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
Black defines "practice of law" as:chanrobles virtual law library the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
considered to be in the practice of law when he: importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the
pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144). within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of advice, contract drafting and so forth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."chanrobles virtual law library library
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines
own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor,"
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign big law firms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20chanrobles virtual law library the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and specialists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
general rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non- matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court Nogales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and operation and effect of law. 26The justification for excluding from the practice of law
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
evidence to support the case. 21chanrobles virtual law library department can exercise little control. 27chanrobles virtual law library
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not
and are now assailed in this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual of unilateral adoption as it has done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
law library library
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one- there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22chanrobles virtual guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines
law library for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular Association. 29chanrobles virtual law library
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23chanrobles virtual law library In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in
lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or therefor. 30chanrobles virtual law library
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
control of the court. 24chanrobles virtual law library constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the the practice of law. 31That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25The practice of law is not a who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32chanrobles virtual law library
conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights facts. 33He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34Nor shall he pay or give something of it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40chanrobles
to attract legal business. 35Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional virtual law library
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41chanrobles virtual law library
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36chanrobles The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
virtual law library consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37The addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
proceeding, 39was held to constitute improper advertising or fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses
solicitation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: represented." 42chanrobles virtual law library
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or the profession. 43chanrobles virtual law library
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.). profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44chanrobles virtual law
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which library
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for
to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above- proceeding will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
mentioned exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library virtual law library
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated supposedly rendering the alleged support
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
authority in that state." 46This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern
as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for
in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television action as may be necessary under the
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
these characteristics of lawyers: ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent,
Trustworthy from 71% to 14% The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
Professional from 71% to 14% advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Honest from 65% to 14% Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
Dignified from 45% to 14% activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero,
and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that Endnotes:
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could
"render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See
Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
Ø Dacanay v. Baker and McKenzie, 136 SCRA 349
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova,
SUPREME COURT Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Manila Plana, J., took no part.
EN BANC Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO,
VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA,
JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B.
KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising
law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to
H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel
is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of
another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
 office of respondent at the same time giving his calling card with the name
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220
Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not
be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her
consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary
injunction as threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Branch
Ø Samonte v. Gatdula, AM No. 99-1292, February 26, 1999
37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No.
37-14552.
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the
  ejectment case and the issuance of the restraining order by the Regional Trial
THIRD DIVISION Court, and claimed that contrary to complainant Samonte's allegation that she
[A.M. No. P-99-1292. February 26, 1999] was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R. motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was duly served
GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent. upon the parties, and that the application for injunctive relief was heard before
RESOLUTION the temporary restraining order was issued. The preliminary injunction was
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: also set for hearing on August 7, 1996.
The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of
RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, complainant
engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the order
functions as Branch Clerk of Court. stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor to calm her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only
Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment filed temporary and that the application for preliminary injunction would still be
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of
error was committed in the complaint which stated that the address of preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to court "fuming mad"
defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
The mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office,
admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers
subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant however, was recommended the Law Finn of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle
Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm,
Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the although he was invited to join but he chose to remain in the judiciary.
Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot
temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an
of the application for preliminary injunction.. administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon but the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's
City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent
order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed this administrative charge
wrong address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she wanted because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee
the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law
from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as a partner in the
against him. Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression
The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and
for investigation, report and recommendation. private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to
In her report Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three be noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence
times, on September 7, 1997, on September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but that respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the
neither complainant nor her counsel appeared, despite due notice. The return violation committed by respondent in having his name included/retained in the
of service of the Order setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he must
abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the also be administratively sanctioned."
complainant, the investigating Judge proceeded with the investigation by and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the
"conducting searching questions" upon respondent based on the allegations minor infraction he has committed.
in the complaint and asked for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of
evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, an infraction. The complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to
to give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was again no substantiate her allegation that it was the respondent who gave her the calling
appearance despite notice. card of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that
The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the
Comment and submitted documentary evidence consisting mainly of the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny
pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC Civil Case No. Q96-28187 that his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint which
to show that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly issued. admittedly came into the hands of the complainant. The respondent testified
The investigating judge made the following findings: before the Investigating Judge as follows:
"For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings despite notice, "Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling card of the
she failed to substantiate her allegations in the complaint particularly that "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room 220
herein respondent gave her his calling card and tried to convince her to change Mariwasa building?
her lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be established with certainty that A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I gave her a calling
respondent indeed gave her his calling card and even convinced her to change card. I was surprised when she presented (it) to me during one of her follow-
her lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187, ups of the case before the court. She told me that a friend of hers
complainant was duly notified of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of recommended such firm and she found out that my name is included in that
the TRO and the subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of firm. I told her that I have not assumed any position in that law firm. And I am
RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting this with the Judiciary. since I passed the bar. It is impossible for me to enter an
administrative case could be an indication that her filing of the charge against appearance as her counsel in the very same court where I am the Branch Clerk
the respondent is only intended to harass the respondent for her failure to of Court."
obtain a favorable decision from the Court. The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is
However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card his name which appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising
attached as Annex "B" of complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 or solicitation of legal services.1 Respondent does not claim that the calling
allegedly given by respondent to complainant would show that the name of card was printed without his knowledge or consent and the calling
herein respondent was indeed included in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, card2 carries his name primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his name is Cubao, Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression
included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name
said office. Thus, while he may not be actually and directly employed with the in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section
7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with official functions."
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk. should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be
characterized by proprietor and decorum but above all else must be above
suspicion.3cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC,
Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private
practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will be
dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his
name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

1
 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, Bar Matter No. 553, June 17, 1993
2
 Annex B, Complaint
3
 Annang vs. Vda. de Blas, 202 SCRA, 635, Mirano vs. Saavedra, 225 SCRA, 77.
 however, such right may be renounced, and if the accused object to appear at said
investigation, he can not be compelled to do so.

3. ID.; ID.; GIVING WIDE PUBLICITY AND SENSATIONALISM TO INVESTIGATION

CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. — In the case at bar, while the Provincial
Fiscal has established a justification for his reinvestigation of the case although the
same is on appeal and pending consideration by this Tribunal, however, said Fiscal
Ø Cruz v. Salva, GR No. L-12871, July 25, 1959
committed a grievous error and poor judgment when he allowed, even encouraged,
the reinvestigation to be conducted with much fanfare, publicity and sensationalism.
Such actuations of the Fiscal constitute contempt of court punishable by public
censure.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12871. July 25, 1959.]

DECISION
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, Respondent.

Baizas & Balderrama for Petitioner. MONTEMAYOR, J.:

City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
SYLLABUS Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; AUTHORITY OF conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which
THE FISCAL TO REINVESTIGATE WHILE CASE IS PENDING APPEAL; CASE AT took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present case
BAR. — Ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the
nominally, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court, the functions and memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.
actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the
government by the Solicitor Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as
involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of
General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido
conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced
the appeal. In the present case, however, one of the defendants was not included in them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view
the trial much less in the judgment for the reason that he was arrested only after the of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed
trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and
rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, this upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was
defendant remained to stand trial. Therefore, insofar as this defendant is concerned, affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
the Fiscal was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation
2. ID.; ID.; ACCUSED MAY NOT BE COMPELLED TO ATTEND INVESTIGATION. of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record.
— While it is the right of the accused to be present at the preliminary investigation, Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of
Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby
number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.
persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real
killers of Manuel Monroy. The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation
being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that the affidavits and
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were
conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator
confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General to what steps he
should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal
have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang case of People v. Oscar Castelo, Et Al., G. R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants. consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent
Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice
new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants
confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority
Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial
was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it
meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, had sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva was because of the latter’s oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the
copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and
motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for
reinvestigation designating for said purpose a committee of three composed of this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to
himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed
Ernesto A. Bernabe him.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be
petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on allowed to appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that
September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply
investigation to be conducted at that time and place by this office against you and implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several
Sergio Eduardo, Et Al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural
wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that
September 21, due to the fact that his counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants
hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either
Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication,
Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for
particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend,
fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was
this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.
This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
and his committee began, ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to
intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with
General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
the appeal. improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." (69 United States Law Review, June,
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil., 556).
justification for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal
case against Castelo, Et Al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify
Guzman was not included in the trial much less in the judgment for the reason that he before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a
was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or
against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants
case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or
remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said
Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than
Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva,
had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said
oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new investigation, if he later changed his mind and renounced his right, and even
evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be
Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by compelled to do so.
conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons
criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by
tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, the Respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only
including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and
dismissal of the case against Realista. confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then
he respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly,
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
as suggested by authorities, the duty and role of a prosecuting attorney is not only to
prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the
investigation was conducted not in respondent’s office but in the session hall of the
"We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wasted
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones
any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a field day. Not only this,
but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be
notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo sufficient.
had concluded his testimony, respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the
the questions asked will be reproduced as my own" ; and the second, after Jose preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is
Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said
newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask question to the witness preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner’s objection to appear
if you want to. We are willing to adopt the questions as ours." Why respondent was and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said
willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner
questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is hereby set aside.
is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the
press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part
of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent
wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled
the transcript now before us. for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in
connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court;
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more
during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid
descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already Barrera, JJ., concur.
been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and
advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all
with the apparent placet and complaisance of Respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what we regard a grievous error and poor
judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and
good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it is being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained
and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the
others favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature
 adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly the
imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a
regular and with standard height building and not a high rise one  but an inspection of
the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation already occupies
portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigned’s residential house in particular,
which readily poses danger to their residential house and life.
• CANON 4
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and
• CANON 5
for the protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately
Ø Dulalia Jr. v. Cruz, AC No. 6854, October 5,2004 requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your earliest opportune
Republic of the Philippines time.
SUPREME COURT Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is
Manila the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4),
SECOND DIVISION Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if
A.C. No, 6854            April 25, 2007 there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380] construction with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant, National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your compliance with the
vs. provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent. Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-
DECISION compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code
CARPIO MORALES, J.: by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided in
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01, 1 6.02,2 and x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)
7.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows: because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondent’s
Complainant’s wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondent’s marriage with Carolina Agaton
the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the being still subsisting.5
purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit 6 he filed
respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3
Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted (e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
verbatim: Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
xxxx Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). 9
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,10 the IBP Commission on Bar
Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the
Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors. dismissal of the complaint in light of the following findings:
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the
abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his family, and those application of his wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial
other families mentioned above are respective owners of the residential houses building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in
adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano- favor of Imelda’s relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other
Dulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its
reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being
the construction of his building. employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily undersigned has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification made by
answered all the charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear, the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of
convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges
upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.
clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal
presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. As for respondent’s September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he
Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283). opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainant’s
x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied) wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the National Building Code,
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,12 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and on top of expressing his concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties,
approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala. health and safety" occasioned by the construction of the building.
Hence, the present Petition for Review13 filed by complainant. Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a September 28, 2004,17 whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly
second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building
Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting. Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to
Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wife’s application for building permit, in instate proper legal action against you."18
violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005 19 from the Office of the Municipal
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Engineer showed, complainant’s wife eventually withdrew the application as she had
Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03. not yet secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the
To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29, 200515 Joint Resolution of the barangay where the building was to be constructed.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainant’s complaint for Respecting complainant’s charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent private practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a
portion of which joint resolution reads: position coterminous to that of the appointing authority, suffice it to state that
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not prohibited. 20
respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an It is, however, with respect to respondent’s admitted contracting of a second
opposition for the issuance of complainant’s building permit, but rather to redress a marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent
wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County,
conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken
for constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainant’s wife effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that
Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. 23 For while Article
fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application,
Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or
same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that Responsibility which provides:
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
respectable members of the community."24 Gross immoral conduct on the other hand continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
reprehensible to a high degree.25 information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz, 26 this Court declared Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect
that the therein respondent’s act of contracting a second marriage while the first on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until
marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he was he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990
suspended for two years after the mitigating following circumstances were does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."
considered: Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:29
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the
any woman; forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person; abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child; imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
relation to his wife; diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when susceptible to committing mistakes.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the mother and child went to Australia; WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. 27 Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the
In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with
benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable more severely.
provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not refuted, until his Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically SO ORDERED.
involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
absentee even during the pendency of this case. Associate Justice
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda WE CONCUR:
Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact elected him and LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been Associate Justice
handling free legal aid cases. Chairperson
Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at
the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA
his residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
while the first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice,
Associate Justice
decency and morality.28
 vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to
do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment
finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate
court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
Ø De Roy v. CA, 157 SCRA 757 October 27, 1987.
Republic of the Philippines This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
SUPREME COURT when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
Manila reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for
THIRD DIVISION reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988 v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In
vs. its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents. strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
RESOLUTION reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
  Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
CORTES, J.: filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate
al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time. the grace period, to wit:
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the
grounds, would still resolve to deny it. rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30,
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R.
No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June
30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering
the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge
in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in
such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article
2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the
"last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate
the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded,
since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
 as a basis for determining whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the
administrative offense, to wit:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is
quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275
aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could
not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI.
Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite
P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal
of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the
respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in
Ø People v. Gacott, 242 SCRA 514 implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .
Republic of the Philippines xxx xxx xxx
SUPREME COURT Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of
Manila the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the
EN BANC validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly
  observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as
G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995 P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
vs. Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees,
Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents. instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former
RESOLUTION President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal,
binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
REGALADO, J.: subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by
No. 11529 of the court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to
P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2
Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental has been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed, both continue
motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995. to have the force and effect of law (Rollo, pp. 7-8).
For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate xxx xxx xxx
copies of the basic motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council, But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable
Solicitor General, Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken
Administrator and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and Ombudsman. Copies of the belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a
supplemental motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or entities and, particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may
additionally, to the individual members of this Court. be the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be
In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the
speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of
resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws,
discretion in granting the motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. We recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn
quote the pertinent portions of his ponencia  not only for easy reference but to serve
 duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal findings of the ponente in the main case, and compelling legal warrant for the
developments. . . . administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under
xxx xxx xxx similar and comparable situations.
The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official
the performance of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in procedure and requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very
the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it Court to violate and forego, in suppression of facts which must appear in official
not for the public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of documents. His further argument that —
his duties, it is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only
his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, open criticisms on my private qualifications as a minister in the
respondent judge's error is not a simple error in judgment but one temple of justice but will open more comments on my official acts,
amounting to gross ignorance of the law which could easily competence and credibility as a judge that might undermine the
undermine the public's perception of the court's competence. people's faith in the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in
We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by respondent judge in his Puerto Princesa City and in the entire country because it is always
aforesaid original and supplemental motions are completely refuted by the foregoing difficult to disassociate my private credential from that of my public
discussion demonstrative not only of his adjudicatory error but also of judicial qualifications.7
incompetence. In fact, just to cite a few representative cases, it may be worthwhile for is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic. The Court
respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations regrets that respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of
in Aducayan vs. Flores, etc., et al.,1 Ajeno vs. Inserto,2 Libarios uncommon sympathetic consideration in this case.
vs. Dabalos,3 and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc.,4 which would put his asseverations Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public
at rest. career, judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently
Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other demonstrating his true worth through observance of judicial standards, to vindicate
supplications, arguments, and even his insinuations for that matter, which although himself from a misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and to rise to higher
born more of fecundity in formulation and less of bases in law, we have decided to levels which is the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming
anatomize even with some expense of prolixity. as valid his meticulosity on the confidential nature of disciplinary cases, he
Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only nevertheless sent copies of his motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of
purpose of (h)is motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the this resolution. It is elementary that copies of such motions are merely filed with the
kind reconsideration" of the decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is court and furnished only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us to keep sub
"grossly ignorant of the law and as such, (he) was reprimanded and fined in the rosa what he himself publicizes.
amount of P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be spread on (his) From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent judge then
personal records."5 goes into a critical second gear by rhetorically wondering aloud in this fashion:
He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court
primarily stemmed from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor and, on a personal required me to comment on the above-entitled petition. On August
note, he expresses this concern: ". . . I am again begging with humility that the 23, 1994 I filed my comment thereto and on October 24, 1994, in a
spreading of the aforesaid Decision on my personal records be reconsidered Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme Court resolved to note
because doing so will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the my Comment. When the Third Division of the Honorable Court
judiciary in the future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my last day and my last required me to comment in G.R. No. 116049, the supposition is that
breath in life."6 a valid raffle of said case to that Division had already been made.
The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into That was my thinking and impression for, why would the case go to
consideration and is not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad that Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in quandary,
misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is more than ample substantiation for the however, as to why all of a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was
 transferred to the Second Division of the Supreme Court without us grounds therein, the Court en banc  resolved to accept this aspect of the case from
or any party being informed by the Honorable Supreme Court about the Second Division.
it. In our level at the Regional Trial Court in Palawan, we observe the His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present
raffle of cases with solemnity and abide by the result of the raffle Constitution which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
faithfully. And the said Second Division meted me out excessive discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
penalties when it was the Third Division that required me to Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
comment. Why did this happen? (Emphasis supplied.) 8 voted thereon." This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the second
Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the uninformed, we sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which provided: "The
assure His Honor that the Supreme Court also conducts "a valid raffle," observes Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
such raffle of its cases "with solemnity," and abides by the result thereof "faithfully." vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."
This case was validly and solemnly raffled to Mr. Justice Bidin who was then with the Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase
Third Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred to the Second "en banc" in referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution
Division where he served as working chairman until his retirement on April 7, 1995. In and, from this, he argues that it is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can
accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case remained with him as the administratively punish him.
original ponente and he accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the Committee on the
member of the Second Division. There is no rule in the Court that the parties be Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to take up that
informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as respondent judge precise matter with the committee chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto
would want or expect. To do so would easily be revelatory of the identity of Concepcion, by pointing out the equivalent provision in the 1973 Constitution,
the  ponente which is precisely what some litigants used to, and still, watch for and hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the "Court," without qualification. It was
speculate upon. accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as the power to discipline is
In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further informed that concerned, the qualification was not intended to make a difference, as a reference to
because of the retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the uncertainty of the date when the Court by itself necessarily means the Court en banc. It was only decided to state
his replacement could act upon his unfinished cases and the subsequent "en banc" there because all internal procedural and administrative matters, as well as
proceedings therein, after its summer session and working recess the Court en banc, ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. On
after due deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to assign the other hand, where the reference is to the Court acting through its divisions, it
the preparation of this resolution to the present writer thereof, he having been and would necessarily be so specified. For lack of transcription of the proceedings of the
still is with the Second Division. Respondent judge, with his claim of extensive committees of said Commission, the writer has perforce to rely on his recollection
magisterial experience, should have verified all the foregoing facts from the records and notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing facts as they transpired.
of this Court, instead of proceeding upon speculations. At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that
Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a constitutional basis, there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that
respondent judge questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
administratively discipline him. Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
constitutional issue as to require the referral of this case, or at least the disciplinary determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was
aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter merely involves a not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and
clarification of the misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably because decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be
of his unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them explained.
being on internal procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
are aware of the submissions of respondent judge on this point through the copies of intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the
the motions which he furnished them, and he insistently harps on constitutional Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein."
Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a
decided by the full Court itself. division thereof rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto,
Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with situations like
"Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.
Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia: WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases: judgment in the case at bar are hereby DENIED. This resolution is immediately final
xxx xxx xxx and executory.
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a SO ORDERED.
judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
(1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.  
xxx xxx xxx Footnotes
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the 1 G.R. No. L-30370, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 78.
aforequoted provision was maintained. 2 A.M. No. 1098-CFI, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 166.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all 3 A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48.
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, 4 A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 1.
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in 5 Rollo, 53-54.
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty 6 Ibid., 66.
of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the 7 Ibid., 67-68.
constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the 8 Ibid., 66.
decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower 9 Section 12, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution.
courts,9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of 10 Section 4(1), Article VIII, id.
three, five, or seven members. 10
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of
the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members
of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of
more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter
may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court
promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred
in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a
decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII,
1987 Constitution).
 Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent
with the following offenses:

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient

justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds
of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of
the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the
purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or
persons interested therein.

2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.

• CANON 6 3. Dishonesty.
Ø Collantes v. Renomeron, AC No. 3065, August 16, 1991
4. Extortion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection
Manila with pending official transaction before him.

EN BANC 6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
A.C. No. 3056               August 16, 1991
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs. As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent. Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of
lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the
respondent.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny
registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action
PER CURIAM:p except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify
certain details about the transactions.
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron
Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a
Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide
application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed
by V & G or GSIS representatives. respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be
taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute
clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of
directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to official transactions awaiting his action.
respondent through his niece.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a
respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the
respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 pleadings.
challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within
twenty-four (24) hours. The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges
of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality,
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law
certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the
Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that: registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material
benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a
public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of
himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.
nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of
documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro
Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be
refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.) reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and
(3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator,
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of
Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. grave misconduct.
1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless
of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample
with assignment. evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent
committed grave misconduct.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on
June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to
respondent Register of Deeds. him for registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties
 interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA,
his inaction. Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint
against said respondent.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the
registration of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds,
on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public
formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a
in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such violation of his oath as a lawyer.
resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused
the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102
submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice.
The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
x x x           x x x          x x x suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo,
1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent
claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz,
retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to
not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the
respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the
incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an
he never did so. officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his
every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its
serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.) intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility—
all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron as moral character.
be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of
immediately. the highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society
whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics,
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice,
Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal
government service (pp. 1419, Rollo). Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in

the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the
Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule
103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code
of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable"
may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every
lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a

public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling
of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs.
Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
Ø Pimentel v. Llorente, et. al., AC No. 4680, August 29,2000
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred
from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll Republic of the Philippines
of Attorneys SUPREME COURT

SO ORDERED. SECOND DIVISION

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Adm. Case No. 4680             August 29, 2000
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.: resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he
filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and
Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents
lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646,
Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election §27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed
officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for
said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court set aside the resolution and directed the
its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration
a candidate for the Senate in that election. was denied on August 15, 2000.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), 2 respondents Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the
Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground
precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique that it was filed late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon pleading under Rule 139-B, §12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the
were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent
received while, on the other hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101 further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless
precincts, Enrile's votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP
voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his
Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents' petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, §12(c).
knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious
breach of public trust and of their lawyers' oath. The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation Villanueva,6 in which this Court held:
of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had
constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for
complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue. reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion
is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made
responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford
the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may
under their control and supervision. have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the
evidenced.7
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had
been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court, On the question whether petitioner's present petition was filed within the 15-day
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. 3 Petitioner filed a period provided under Rule 139-B, §12(c), although the records show that it was filed
motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It
would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the Court1 9 is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in
resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was opposition thereto,20 the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified..
received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the
parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended
than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could
within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human
respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who
beyond the 15-day period for filing it. prepared the SoVs.

Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In
1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar rejecting this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No.
Confidant, the delay would only be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked, 6646, §27(b), this Court said:
considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for
public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake
fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer
called the attention of the Court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a magnitude of she error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the
party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did
have in the proper administration of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number
jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with procedure like verification of pleadings12 and of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total
prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment proceedings. number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8,
1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.22
interest of justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus,
we have given due course to appeals even though filed six, 14 four,15 and three16 days Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation
late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious. of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of
the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to pad the votes
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the basis of of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of
the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by
returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for
already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said
canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In
parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would not have risked addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of
the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ
§27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish from those indicated in the SoVs.24
criminal intent on the part of respondents.17
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in
of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. 18 As the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the
long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the
variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under
SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct. greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office
is a public trust.
Respondent Llorente's contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due
execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which Third. Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal
reads: profession, in general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in
the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension
[p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the
presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ________ this case of Salayon, after a long public service.29 Under the circumstances, a penalty of
_______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added) fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P.
numerous individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount
liable. The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with
opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein. more severely.1âwphi1.nêt

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member SO ORDERED.
of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.25 However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may
be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. 26

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed
a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in Footnotes:
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By express provision of Canon 6,
1 
this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, §221(b). The third member of the Board,
likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood." Ceferino Adamos, now deceased, was the Clerk of Court of the Pasig City
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their
2 
public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said: SEC. 27. Election Offenses. — In addition to the prohibited acts and
election offenses enumerated in Section 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to behave at all Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense.
times in a manner consistent with truth and honor it is important that the
common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak xxx             xxx             xxx
the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality . . . 28
 (b)Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 (1978).
14 

canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received

by a candidate in any election . . . Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395 (1980).
15 

Rollo, p. 116.
3 
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 304 (1995).
16 

Pimentel, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133509, Feb. 9, 2000.

4 
IBP Report, p. 5; Rollo, p. 121.
17 

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. —

5 
In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922); Re. Agripino A. Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1
18 

(1977).
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary
sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such See Prudential Bank v. Castro, 155 SCRA 604 (1987); Richards v. Asoy,
19 

as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision 152 SCRA 45 (1987).

exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall
be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 161 (1991).
20 
other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise. G.R. No. 133509, Feb. 9, 2000.
21 

253 SCRA 1 (1996).

6  Id., at 10.
22 

Id., at 6.
7  E.g., Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 849
23 

(1991); Angelia v. Tan, G.R. No. 135468, May 31, 2000.

Counted from May 18, 1999, the 15th day falls on June 2, 1999.
8 
Tabulated as follows (Pimentel v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
24 

133509, Feb. 9, 2000):

Tajan v. Cusi, Jr., 57 SCRA 154 (1974); In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562
9 

(1970); Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 (1998).

CANDIDATE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS STATEMENT OF VOTES
See Pangan v. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 (1981); In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399
10 

(1928).
Biazon 83,731 87,214
11 
Calo v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447 (1967).
Coseteng 54,126 67,573
12 
In re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245 (1975).
Enrile 91,798 90,161
13 
Agripino Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1 (1977).
Fernan 69,712 72,031
Ø Berenguer v. Florin, AC No. 5119, April 17,2013
Honasan 62,159 62,077

Mitra 56,097 56,737 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
Pimentel 68,040 67,936
FIRST DIVISION

Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 (1989).

25 
A.C. No. 5119               April 17, 2013

Collantes v. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584 (1991); (Gonzales-Austria v.

26 
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,
Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 (1989); See RUBEN AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS 425 vs.
(4th ed., 1989). ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO
VEGA, Respondents.
158 SCRA 497 (1988).
27 

DECISION
Id., at 506.
28 

REYES, J.:
She first served in the lower courts before working in the Supreme Court
29 

from 1981-1990 (Comment, p. 5; Rollo, p. 48). This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo
Berenguer (complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin),
Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre,

Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered
owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in
April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers
protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to
lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively
for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09. 2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside 18 the Resolution dated
application for exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land April 8, 1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when
and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited until the
of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG). DARAB has decided the appeal. In an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the
said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition 20 on ground of
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their partiality.
application for exclusion from the CARP’s coverage in the Order 4 dated February 15,
1999 based on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be excluded is principally (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural
devoted to coconuts and not the raising of livestock.5 grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified true copy"
but the name and authority of the person certifying is not indicated as required in SC
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR. Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners
signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition 7 for the implementation
administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly
of the Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform
reviewable by the CA.21
Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order 8 dated
March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and implementation of the
Writ of Possession.9 Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15,
1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on grounds
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration, 10 claiming that
of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
they were denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s
petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit in an Order11 dated March 22, 1999. Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession 23 in favor of BARIBAG.

On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication Board Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession
(DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations. 24
Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the execution would
be premature in view of their pending appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless, On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash 25 the Writ of Possession, to no
BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff. 15 avail.

In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint 26 for the disbarment
the Berenguers’ appeal. of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for
DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for confederating in the commission of the following acts:
the Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of
possession prayed for. A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY
RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
 B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX- findings of DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also
PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE
PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1)
AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN the writ of possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its
CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE invalidity; (2) he did not participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD; he did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; (3) the Legal Division he heads has no
FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the writ
INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY; of possession was to ascertain that no violations against any law are committed by
the person/s executing the writ. 30
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY
PETITIONERS THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity;
CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND (2) he is not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over
REFUSING TO FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE the DAR which issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine the writ’s
BOARD; validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however, that he was in the meeting presided
by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not as a
RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in
CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT HEARING implementing the CARP.32
CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply, 33 the case was referred to the
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan)
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE Recommended34 that Florin be "suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.27 years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse
and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is
anchored on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against
executory decision that would require a certification of finality as prescribed by the Jornales and Vega be dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the
DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as Berenguers’ counsel, was charges against them.35
not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time when it
was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the
possession was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and findings36 of the CA in its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
enforcement; (4) it was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as 53174,37 which reads:
DAR lawyers in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion for a cease and desist order
and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty;
(5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was
treated as a petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against
devoted to pasture and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial Respondents.39
land, hence, outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at
(CLOA) was therefore void;" the time it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15,
1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers were not denied due process;
E. Florin who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s acquisition of
over Petitioners’ Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop vs. University of their landholding nor did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued
the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December 1992, which is squarely in point with to BARIBAG.
the case at bar."
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court penalty to be imposed.
ruled thus – "Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand
why the DAR awarded them to members of respondent Baribag and not to the Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x x x."
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning therefore.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
our observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
in petitioners’ application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also attorney for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional
Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’ application for exclusion. Clearly, such In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
order was not yet final and executory when she issued the assailed writs of execution
and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set aside." 38
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006- misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a
282 modifying the recommended penalty, viz: person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 42 (Citations
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating omitted)
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust against the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by
Judgment, Orders and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the the complainants in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are
complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions.
for one (1) year. The charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No.
lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz: 06-00 provides:

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a the Court of Appeals shall have the following effects:
government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this (a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The
Court as a member of the Bar. appeal shall stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution
pending appeal, as he may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of
xxxx the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional xxxx
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 44 of said clearly stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the
the public. pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal.

x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or partial
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high judgments.50
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours) Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:

Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an
against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such
DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is execution shall issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to
part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.47 appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a
government, performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. resolution, order or decision has been served to the counsel or representative on
Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose decision, record and to the party himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon
including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an administrative complaint. motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any
DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its
Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty
Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or other law recommended and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3)
enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision. months55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr., 56 three (3) months
suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out that the
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith.
Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same
upon meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and
conditioned for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the adopts the finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate
event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond the charges against them. Hence, the complaint against them should be dismissed.
requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant.
(Emphasis ours) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is
found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months effective
denying the Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro
and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
nothing in the records that will show whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to
the Rules. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such guidance.
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice, 51 the
facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of SO ORDERED.
possession in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated
February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of BIENVENIDO L. REYES
execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final Associate Justice
and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the
issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the
DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension. WE CONCUR:

As to the penalty – MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate
intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned. 54 In this case, it appears,
however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the CASTRO
Associate Justice
acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act Associate Justice
that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the
writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but
an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
 17
 Id. at 111-113.

18
 Id. at 114-120.
Footnotes
19
 Id. at 123-125.
1
 Rollo, pp. 1-21.
20
 Id. at 126-130.
2
 Id. at 23-30.
21
 Id. at 246.
3
 Id. at 185-203.
22
 Id. at 249-250.
4
 Id. at 31-36.
23
 Id. at 204-206.
5
 Id. at 33-35.
24
 Id. at 291-293.
6
 Id. at 37-44.
25
 Id. at 147-151.
7
 Id. at 45-47.
26
 Id. at 1-21.
8
 Id. at 76-78.
27
 Id. at 2.
9
 Id. at 204-206.
28
 Id. at 175-178.
10
 Id. at 89-92.
29
 Id. at 253-256.
11
 Id. at 93-95.
30
 Id. at 254.
12
 Id. at 96.
31
 Id. at 259-261.
13
 Id. at 97-99.
32
 Id. at 259-260.
14
 Id. at 100-104.
33
 Id. at 283-290.
15
 Id. at 105-106.
34
 Id. at 327-340.
16
 Id. at 48-54.
35
 Id. at 339-340. 53
 Rollo, p. 339.

36
 Id. at 337-339. 54
 Atty. Claro v. Judge Efondo, 494 Phil. 220, 228 (2005).

37
 Id. at 307-320.  OSG v. De Castro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2018, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA
55

29, 30-31.
38
 Id. at 337-339.
56
 398 Phil. 60 (2000).
39
 Id. at 325.

40
 Id. at 354-381.

41
 A.C. 7430, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 1.

42
 Id. at 9.

43
 448 Phil. 199 (2003).

44
 CANON 6. – These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official task.

45
 Supra note 43, at 207-209.

46
 511 Phil. 56 (2005).

47
 Id. at 64.

48
 Section 1.

49
 Section 2(a).

50
 Section 2(b).

 Dipatuan v. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA
51

48, 55. Ø Valencia v. Cabanting, AM Nos. 1302,1391,1543; April 26,1991

52
 Cabang v. Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172, 182.
 Republic of the Philippines In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana
SUPREME COURT allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a
Manila certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However,
they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
EN BANC
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo
Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short)
another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives
and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543             April 26, 1991 sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a
different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences.
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant, (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent. On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant, was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff,
vs. versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY.
ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, respondents. Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of
Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant, in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty.
vs. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent. the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B)
was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.

On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered
a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the
PER CURIAM: belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)

These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial
profession committed in the following manner: court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this
case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14,
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391. 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. 2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302). A deed of donation  propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the
grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a
Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said deed of confirmation of the donation  propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights
counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still
the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen
litigation by a counsel. the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).

On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino. On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw
allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.
proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint
subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public
Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of
violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975,
Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Jovellanos as follows: Administrative Case No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.

1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW: Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974,
the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302,
one Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when report and recommendation.
as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years
before in the year 1965. Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3,
1976, all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS: Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.

In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar
confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, of the Philippines.1âwphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit
executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of
de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch
executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7,
Report)
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It
threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila. get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this
prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case No.
1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot
suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty after  finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is
of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva." said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are: Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to
conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in
of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly,
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
falsifying notarial documents.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V- attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that
2170. the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not
covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
I
II
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is
settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative
x x x           x x x          x x x testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al.,
L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the
object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los
profession. Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an
even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.1âwphi1 He enjoys the legal
upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence. proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
administration of justice as an officer of the court.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance
SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a
vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA
administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be no evidence to substantiate the charges.
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's
cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is
liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence,
are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87). whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989,
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts
show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in
112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her
of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring additional charges.
that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. III
Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession. There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative
cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be Civil Case No. V-2170.
dismissed for lack of evidence.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be
on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the
subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the
withdrawal of her complaint. Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in
a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary
witness to attest to the holding of the conference.

Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar.
A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession,
with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive
mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote
conspiracy.
Ø Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 508
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the
roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391
against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and
Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, [G.R. No. 70332-43. November 13, 1986.]
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION)., Respondent.

Arturo M. de Castro for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT; VIOLATION

THEREOF NOT PROVEN; PETITIONER HAS DIVESTED HIS INTEREST WITH
IMPUTED BUSINESS. — The new Solicitor General’s Office after adopting the
statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor
General’s Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and
concluding that; . . . "Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen Petitioner sought
to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had
already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The used his influence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen.
sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was He didn’t ask anyone - neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that
duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation."cralaw virtua1aw matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen. Petitioner should not be faulted
library for Trigen’s transaction with the municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with
it even before petitioner has assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE SHOWS NO PUBLIC BIDDING AND AWARD. — The canvasses conducted found that Trigen’s offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and
prosecution’s lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a advantageous to the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Underlining supplied). It is
public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery,
purchases from Trigen. . . . In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.
declared by the prosecution’s sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on
direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded
the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in
the twelve (12) information? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict DECISION
the evidence of the prosecution itself. Even the respondent Court finally found that
petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award, which of course is a false
assumption because of Vega’s testimony that there was no public bidding at all. ALAMPAY, J.:

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PETITIONER SIGNED VOUCHERS

AFTER DELIVERY OF MATERIALS AND PAYMENT. — Treasurer Vega testified The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision
that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the promulgated on November 6, 1984, by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein
purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3
the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) municipal paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, Practices-Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856-6867 of
1984. The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner said Court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the
signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed as a matter respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985.
of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and
paid them. (Rollo. pp. 301-303) . . . Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein
that petitioner signed vouchers after payment . . . . petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as
the Information presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is hereunder
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "ACTUAL INTERVENTION UNDER SECTION 3(H) EXPLAINED. — quoted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In as much as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were
delivered, petitioner’s signature on the vouchers after payment is not , we submit, the "That on or about the month of July, 1980 and sometime subsequent thereto, in the
kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual municipality of Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order Honorable Court, the above named accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and
that liability may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as
1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in the such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval
corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and there wilfully and
office. For the law aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in
(Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. II, page connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and
603)." There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of
construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro- —————
Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president,
incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211- Total P7,730.50
90-10-174 in the amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and
delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and =========
approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act."cralaw virtua1aw library (Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)

except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6,
amounts involved. 1984, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-
326) and in each case he was sentenced,." . . to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860, 6861, and 6862 were allegedly imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to
committed in July, 1980; Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864, in August, 1980; and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer perpetual
Criminal Cases Nos. 6865, 6866 and 6867 in October, 1980. The separate vouchers disqualification from the public office, and to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40,
involved in the twelve (12) cases are said to be the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Decision; Rollo, 322).

"Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P 558.80 After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by
respondent of its comment to the petition, herein petitioner presented to this Court on
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60 June 7, 1985, an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 12, 1983, suspending him from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of
Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00 Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the
lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly,
Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30 and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, petitioner’s
preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of
Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00 Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately.

Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00 A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner’s new
counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. In this
Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80 supplemental pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any
way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he
Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00 signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered
and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no
Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00 bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against
herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases
Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00 by personal canvass.

Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00 Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated
comment dated November 4, 1984, to the original petition filed in this case dated
Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00 April 30, 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10, 1985. He
argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same raise factual issues
which are, therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg. 20; Rollo, 341). petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the
The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been
Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort
library was presented, The consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of
Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan, showing the
x          x           x printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation.
(Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the
(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General.
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the
"SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers." — In addition to acts or omissions of petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute Sandiganbayan, as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be petitioner’s counsel, the Court in its resolution of January 16, 1986, gave due course
unlawful:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs.

x          x           x Petitioner’s exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on
April 14, 1986, raised the following legal questions.

"(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, x          x           x
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest."cralaw virtua1aw library "From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions
arise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other
"a) The public officer has financial or peculiary interest in a business, contract or supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the
transaction; Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently
delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also
"b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of
the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-
"Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
conviction. (Rollo, pp. 333-339).
"2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General’s Office was that petitioner’s evidence intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-
of divestment of interest in Trigen Corporation, which is said to have been effected on mentioned law?
February 25, 1980, before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship, should have been
presented at the earliest opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was "3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the
not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against said law, caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of
the contracts m question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and is not a mandatory requirement."cralaw virtua1aw library
gained by the transacting corporation?
"Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC
"4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen
Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? "In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales
(Appellant’s Brief, page 15) or disposal of stocks (Section 141, Corporation Code of the Philippines).

It was then discussed and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to "Upholding the evidence of petitioner’s divestment of his interest with Trigen would
establish the presence of all the elements of the offense, and more particularly to necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality’s dealings
adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or indirectly, a financial or pecuniary interest or transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes
in the imputed business contracts or transactions. charged." (Rollo, pp. 299-300).

Discussion of petitioner’s arguments in this regard will not however, be recited In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor
anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General, after seeking and General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following
obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar, filed on observations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People’s Brief). Rollo,
293). Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and
award.
The new Solicitor General’s Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the
consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General’s Office moved for the acquittal "The prosecution’s lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never
of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding that:chanrobles law library : red was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct
purchases from Trigen.
x          x           x
"Q. n other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding?

"Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen "A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.

"Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, "Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of
1980, he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste- Trigen?
Tuason. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate
which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. "A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)

"Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not "In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution’s
reported to the SEC. SEC records, as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen,
the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm’s President. how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of
construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12)
"The prosecution’s evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner’s interest with informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence
Trigen is weak. Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It of the prosecution itself.
have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales
report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. Reporting the sale "Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the
bidding and award, which of course is a false assumption because of Vega’s "Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?
testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Respondent Court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. Yes, sir.

". . . In short, Accused’s intervention may not be present during the bidding and "A.J. ESCAREAL:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
award, but his liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such
as signing the vouchers under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that "Q. Under what authority were they paid?
the transactions were regular and proper." (Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration/new trial, page 7). "A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.

"No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment "Q. Who authorized the payment?

"Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in "A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.
the information? Can there be intervention after payment.
"ATTY. CONSULTA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to
L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after "Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts issued by
delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor
municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7), decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated Trieste, the materials had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to
November 2, 1984). The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when Trigen?
petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers, But it can safely be assumed as
a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega x          x           x
signed and paid them. (Rollo, pp. 301-303)

x          x           x "A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued by Trigen to indicate
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor
payment Trieste?

"Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have "A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.
altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue
Maravilla:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph x          x           x

"Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer, as
you said, and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature, were the purchases "Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution’s exhibits which are Trigen
in question already paid? receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared, what
can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments
"A. They had already been paid for, sir. made by Trigen to the municipality?.
"A.J. ESCAREAL:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law
aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation on
"Payment made by Trigen? Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. II, page 603).

"ATTY. CONSULTA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used
his influence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He
"I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
didn’t ask anyone — neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter,
to get the construction materials from Trigen.
"A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers
marked Exhibits E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were prepared, they had already been
delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal "Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction.
treasurer.
"Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen’s transaction with the municipality, which
"Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer — the amounts were by the way, has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the
already paid by the municipal treasurer? mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen’s
offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality. . . .
"A. Already paid. (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).

"Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts? It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, under
delivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions.
"A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.
Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the
"Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be
nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues
been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen? and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the
affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The
"A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor
signed by the mayor." (Tsn, Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-49). General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People’s
Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally
"Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court
delivered, petitioner’s signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the
kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law. decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed
and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of
x          x           x acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2,

"What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in 1984, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to 6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso
the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, as
may attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the amended, is hereby set aside and reversing the appealed judgment, a new judgment
Secretary of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as
is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged implead the petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the
against him with costs de oficio. same civil case and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

SO ORDERED. On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as
concur. Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.
Melencio-Herrera J., took no part.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with
Feliciano, J., is on leave. compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
Ø Solicitor General Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim.
The motion was opposed by respondent Enrile.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:

EN BANC The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff
government is deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing
to be indubitable.
G.R. No. 91391             January 24, 1991
On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner
Chairman Diaz, former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and
vs.
Bautista), the propriety of impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE
even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to
ENRILE, respondents.
determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought.
Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this time nor may therefore,
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent. the Motion to Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H",
Petition)

Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the
petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: "harassment suit" against him.

The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:
of the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated
February 23, 1989, praying for leave to implead additional parties to his
 counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who
Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the counterclaim assisted the PCGG in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint against
and admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with counterclaim. Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor General, he continues to assist the
PCGG in prosecuting this case.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth
individually or in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. He is sued in his personal and official capacities.
27)
On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman,
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a now Senate President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not
motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the one of the documents left by then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos
resolution states: including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the US State
Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and PCGG's findings, he refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to
former PCGG officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, prosecute Defendant.
Ramon Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering
these motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers, x x x           x x x          x x x
resolution of these motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits.
(Rollo, p. 31) Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no
evidence linking Defendant to the illegal activities of former President and
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed of Chairman
their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando
of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as Romero and Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987.

The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and
additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized,
No. 0033. allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint against
Defendant.
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments
of malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or
Chairman Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the instigated, the filing of this harassment suit against Defendant.
allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed the complaint. This can be gleaned
from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action
and Cross-Claim: against Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident
bad faith, and with grave abuse of power and in excess of their duty and
x x x           x x x          x x x authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated, violated, impeded or
impaired the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp.
260-262)
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of
him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.
Republic. He cites the case of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held
. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the
a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable
that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will cause and without any administrative investigation.
not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may
adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-
counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in 44894, March 16 1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the
representation of another — such as trustees — in their individual capacities Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and
(Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their
be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the
participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their
of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim party affiliations. (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs
of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity  proviso under Section 4(a) of
lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the action, Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the
even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically
pp. 924-925) dropped.

Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA
his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all 556 [1988]) then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the
cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as
counterclaim in the same case. follows:

Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his
immunity arising solely from occupying a public office. separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion
does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission. The
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or
acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case: any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr.
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved.
mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the
municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover
in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was immunity
instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the
Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are
 immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office . . . " In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages
(at pp. 581-582) claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the
petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case: were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the
petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed
against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.
It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of
Executive Order No. 1 was intended merely to restate the general principle of
the law of public officers that the PCGG or any member thereof may not be To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is
held civilly liable for acts done in the performance of official merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case
duty, provided that such member had acted in good faith and within the would lead to mischievous consequences.
scene of his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that
the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
or any particular official thereof may be held liable in damages to a private maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293
offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958];
be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554,
exempted from complying with orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587) Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of
Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.
grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page
586) The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General.1âwphi1 As counsel of
the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use
as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The
commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception
baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take
417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise
him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against
injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.
on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike.
The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from
the right. The issue is whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued
counterclaim in the case filed against him. on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a
party. Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by entirely separate and distinct civil action.
respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the
filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the
a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against
separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General. the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,

Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Ø Enriquez v. Hon. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 933

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12817             April 29, 1960

JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and

ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner. counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the
respondent. petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated
action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27
PADILLA, J.: June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No.
1829 approving Resolution No. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On
28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional
section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor
services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the
General dated 24 June 1957.
appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500 and
payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment
Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, shall have become final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court; and that the municipality
Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in
and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and
and municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes
Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner filed
September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542,
127 providing, among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the
Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex
appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24
indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting
provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and
31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the
Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the
administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for
Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's
a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered
requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was
municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of
council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a
to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of
authority over the waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August
the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11
and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his
be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13 September
validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal
mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a special
 SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the
is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal
powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity
frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in
decision. the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition
or disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not
subdivisions. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among
provincial government and its officers, including district health officers, and of others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of
the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the office or position upon which he is about to enter. . . ." 5 Instead of engaging the
the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the
writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial
pertinent to the duties thereof. fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section
1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal
council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions
supervision  over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National
in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of
municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof
Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both
municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the
sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of the
provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947
the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913,
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf
5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the
of the province.
Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals.
In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other distinguished supervision from control as follows:
political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its
council.
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity
to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1 and
and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council
when in the case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily
of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to
involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in
prosecute its case.
the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and
mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit
the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is Ø Misamin v. San Juan, AC No. 1418, August 31, 1976
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, SUPREME COURT
JJ., concur. Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

Footnotes
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
1
 See Reyes vs. Cornista, 92 Phil., 838; 49 Off. Gaz. 931; Municipality of vs.
Bocaue and Province of Bulacan vs. Manotok, 93 Phil., 173. ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

2
 Section 13, Rule 115 and Section 1, Rule 126, Rules of Court. RESOLUTION

3
 Cf. Benusa vs. Torres, 55 Phil., 7337; People vs. Lopez, 78 Phil., 286.  

4
 Canon No. 31 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. FERNANDO, J.:

5
 Section 23, Revised Administrative Code. It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the
legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of
Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua,
owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was
a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would
seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be
the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the
scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things
were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was
to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be
competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the
recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those
instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with
found guilty of malpractice. complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his
separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC evidence.
while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he
contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922,
position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer
Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been
community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1 subsequently adhered to. 6

Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his
set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That
failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be
counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but
affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that
explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the
respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his
NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar.
respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2 He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take
care that his honor remains unsullied
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of
his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread
the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor on his record.
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of
Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have
been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the
  MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
Footnotes LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.

1 Report and Recommendation, 2. RESOLUTION

2 Ibid, 2-3. REYES, J.:

3 Ibid, 4. Before us is a verified complaint1 filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion
(complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
(respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.
4 43 Phil. 191.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment 2 to the complaint.
5 Ibid, 194.
In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
6 Cf, Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 (1936); De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Phil. 554 (1939); In re Attorney C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 (1958);
Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1;
Magnoy Gellada, Adm. Case No. 767, Dec. 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 549. The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation 4 dated
September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, are as follows:

On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International
School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and
raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are
the complainants in the instant case.

On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of
Ø Lahm v. Mayor, AC No. 7430, February 15, 2012 a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00
Republic of the Philippines in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants
SUPREME COURT herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a
Manila comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7430               February 15, 2012

Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs xxx
the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein
sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x. The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being
premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the
xxxx Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant
case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the Order
immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of
International School Manila. Court.5

The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the
resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order
on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed. lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority
to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said
the September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo
illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss
ante until the expiration of David Edward Toze’s employment contract.
the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007
requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the
morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze’ claim of moral and exemplary Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
damages.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED
xxxx for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.6
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was
issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was 2008-6447 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of Governors
Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the had previously recommended the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent. for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v.
Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person
of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition, 8 but it was denied by
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the
illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of
resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.
that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
the lawyer’s oath. Thus: Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer’s
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such the bar on such grounds.12
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
(emphasis supplied) constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 9 Gross In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 10 before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a
against the respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the respondent are of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical
intrinsically connected with the discharge of the respondent’s quasi-judicial functions. and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a
public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court xxx
may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for
the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. 11 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him. professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of
the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 19
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. 14 (emphasis Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
supplied and citations omitted) preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring
the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been resolved. It
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005
for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in
Agrarian Reform – Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases effect.
against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government. Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in
proper cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan 16 where the orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in
his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. – A preliminary injunction or
Mediation Board. restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to
the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts
performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission,
controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
cases.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance preliminary injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the
of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be
disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an
conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. 17 incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the
parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle
involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no
of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction
prerogatives.18 and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a
restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to delegated capacity.20
the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it
is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in
complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of
damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the
(emphasis supplied) delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that
the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that: The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September
14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the dismissal case before the respondent.
application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its
Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between
to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward
report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July
delegation. (emphasis supplied) 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.

The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as
respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the former’s
issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point, Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that: Injunction Against the Respondents.

The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Toze’s Verified Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the
Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Toze’s Verified
Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Relations Commission. Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof
would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted
xxxx prejudice to International School Manila.

The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor xxxx
Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005
Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first,
states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction
or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his
before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.

From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the penalty to be imposed.
attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the
resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Toze’s Employment Contract with ignorance of the law is a serious charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than
International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00, suspension from office without salary
dismissal case moot and academic. and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal
from the service.24
xxxx
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for six
assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance months. Additionally, in parallel cases,25 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the
that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between David Edward law was meted the penalty of suspension for six months.
Toze and International School Manila. The respondent’s lackadaisical attitude in
sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five (5) months only to Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended
thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondent’s disregard to settled rules from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the same or
and jurisprudence.1âwphi1 Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within the similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of recommendation.
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a
Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the
delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the people’s faith respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314,
and confidence in the judiciary x x x. 21 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This case, however, is
still pending.
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance
with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct
thereby occasioning sanction from this Court. demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also
and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the
Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land and promote their official functions.26
respect for law and legal processes".
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the
Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules Associate Justice
should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws
and rules will render them administratively liable.1âwphi1 Where the law involved is ATTESTATION
simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. "Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law." consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a
rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too ANTONIO T. CARPIO
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious Associate Justice
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse Chairperson, Second Division
of judicial authority."28 (citations omitted)
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their RENATO C. CORONA
information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as Chief Justice
attorney.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Footnotes

Associate Justice
* Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special
WE CONCUR: Order No. 1195 dated February 15, 2012.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO 1 
Rollo, pp. 1-7.
Associate Justice
2 
Id. at 16-28.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice 3 
Id. at 95.
 Id. at 260-275.
4 
Id. at 267-272.
21 

Id. at 261-265.
5 
Discipline of Judges of regular and Special Courts and Justices of the
22 

Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.

Id. at 275.
6 

Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

23 

Id. at 258-259.
7 

Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

24 

Id. at 276-305.
8 

Amante-Descallar v. Ramas, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2142, March 20, 2009, 582

25 

Spouses Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, 468 Phil. 329, 335 (2004), citing Re
9  SCRA 23; Baculi v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009, 586 SCRA
Administrative Case Against Atty. Occeña, 433 Phil. 138 (2002). 69; Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, A.M. Nos.
RTJ-07-2049, RTJ-08-2141 and RTJ-07-2093, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 59.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Liangco, A.C. No. 5355, December 13,
10 

2011. Olazo v. Tinga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 1, 9.
26 

11 
Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-24864, April 30, 1985. A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2063, RTJ-07-2064 and RTJ-07-2066, June 26, 2009,
27 

591 SCRA, 51.

Ali v. Bubong, 493 Phil. 172, 182 (2005), citing Reyes v. Gaa, 316 Phil. 97,
12 

102 (1995). Id. at 77.

28 

13 
448 Phil. 199 (2003).

14 
Id. at 207-209. Ø PNB v. Cedo, AC No.3701, March 28, 1995

15 
511 Phil. 56 (2005).
Republic of the Philippines
16 
A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 217. SUPREME COURT
Manila
Dipatuan v. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA
17 

48, 55. EN BANC

18 
Id. at 56.  

19 
Cabili v. Judge Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011. A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

20 
Rollo, pp. 267-268; 271.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant, Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to
vs. the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent. spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm
"Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior
RESOLUTION Partners.

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel

for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
BIDIN, J.:
trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that
he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is
Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter
Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus: therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained
by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
he had intervened while in said service.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No.
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum
Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy
subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose
out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the
employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy. Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the
attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty.
filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to
misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing
later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission. of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly
admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in physical injuries. This Court's remarks in  Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil.
itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the 571, are apropos:
client’s secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other
lawyers and staff members at all times. "Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number
of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client,
since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice
IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the the complainant's cause."
money he expected to earn.
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law against his former client information given to him in a professional
for 3 years. capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, Tribunal further said:
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the
recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship
December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of
Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
into consideration the aforesaid pleadings. dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect
the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste.
emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily
interests. In the similar case of  Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez  (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled: treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to
disagree with him, that even if respondent did not use against his
client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
 It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose. Ø Catu v. Rellosa, AC No. 5738, February 9, 2008

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO

S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
Manila
courts in Metro Manila.
FIRST DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5738             February 19, 2008
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot 1 and the building erected thereon
located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina
Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu 2 and
Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa  of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to

conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and
Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings xxx       xxx       xxx
between the litigants as punong barangay.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to and employees during their incumbency shall not:
hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of xxx       xxx       xxx
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that (2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
commission of a patent injustice against her. (emphasis supplied)

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit
their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7 LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he
presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with by the IBP Board of Governors.10
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well
as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former
intervened while in said service. Government Lawyers

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8 Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in (4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
said service." the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision. (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
Profession of Elective Local Government Officials
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public
tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
public officials and employees.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 12 governs: barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and
the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal
municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a attention to the performance of their official duties.
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they
employee of the national or local government is accused of an may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside
offense committed in relation to his office; their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. 14 Since the
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for
them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to
the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. 16 society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and
importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his Responsibility.
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from
the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department Responsibility:

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. 17 Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides: For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private Code of Professional Responsibility:
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission
is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport
and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an profession.19
officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney
for violation of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of Footnotes
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is 1
 Particularly described as lot no. 19, block no. 3, Pas-14849.
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar 2
 Complainant's sister-in-law.
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
3
 Hereafter, "Elizabeth and Pastor."
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza. 4
 Hereafter, "Barangay 723."
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
5
 These were scheduled on March 15, 2001, March 26, 2001 and April 3,
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and 2001.
guidance.
6
 Dated July 5, 2002. Rollo, pp. 2-23.
SO ORDERED.
 Report and Recommendation dated October 15, 2004 of Commissioner
7

RENATO C. CORONA Doroteo B. Aguila of the IBP-CBD. Id., pp. 103-106.

Associate Justice
 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
8

Employees.

9
 Supra note 7.
WE CONCUR: 10
 CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-476 dated November 4, 2004. Rollo, p. 102.

REYNATO S. PUNO  G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526. (emphasis in the
11

Chief Justice original)

Chairperson
12
 The Local Government Code of 1992.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 This rule of statutory construction means that a special law repeals a
13

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO general law on the same matter.

Associate Justice
14
 Section 52(a), RA 7160. They may also hold special sessions upon the call
of the local chief executive or a majority of the members of
the sanggunian when public interest so demands. (Section 52[b], id.)
 15
 This rule of statutory construction means that the express mention of one INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS,
thing excludes other things not mentioned. INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS
AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
16
 Id. PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING
CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
 See Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. P-202, 22 July 1975, 65 SCRA 179; Zeta v.
17

Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, 20 December 1978, 87 SCRA 303.

DECISION
18
 Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
PUNO, J.:
19
 Id.
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on
one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government
20
 See Section 27, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT.
service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent
counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial

Ø PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 526 difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK
Republic of the Philippines had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests
SUPREME COURT totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as
uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
EN BANC GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005 business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering
its liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners, to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
vs. bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG Republic Act No. 265.
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C.
TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the
MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter
Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, in which he had intervened while in said service."
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from
No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public
above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence office.13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. 14
with former President Marcos.
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s
by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second
to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
resumed his private practice of law. December 5, 2001.17

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3)
he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s
liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was
petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the
of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly
the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
the substantive issue. revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.20
I
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the
Substantive Issue United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two
ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field
Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the
applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not,
second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03 lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the
Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of "do no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation
behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence,
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with
pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the
one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a
the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty new era in American legal ethics.21
to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --
competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began
poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all to guide lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar
aspects of a lawyer's practice. codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory
America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes
early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the
up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
members.22 should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code
of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and
and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively. 31
Ethics.23
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.32
insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession
was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA
1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24 Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis
Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
canons. Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish
lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon
and influence garnered in government service."25 These concerns were classified 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification
as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse- of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the
interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer government.
represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model
and former are adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation Code of Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of
conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined
government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon
the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in
problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.36
disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that
the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results
temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. 30 Canon Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model
36 provides, viz.: Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement
format," where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following
each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules."
The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any
on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of abstract principles of law.
the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as
the norm’s indefinite nature.38 Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.: Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to
said service. proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared
expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor
is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota
P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and
representing respondents Tan, et al. he advised that the following procedure should be taken:

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03 1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that
studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in
of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation 4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for
of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the General involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to
Monetary Board. proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within
the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in
liquidation of Genbank. black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary The provision reads in part:
Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head
for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents
reads: into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
The Board decided as follows: insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned
forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may,
...
upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to
do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately
subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of: gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to,
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank
Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
Genbank;
...
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977; If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by
Genbank, together with its attachments; and the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of banking or financial community.
the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution
and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment
Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board,
recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As
functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the
banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts
collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution. which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No.
final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate
arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc.
Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the
in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on
or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation
Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the
Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the
injunction contemplated in this Section. issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by
the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non- owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03
this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non- of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
Case No. 0096. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.: the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings.
Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties
pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to
seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role
occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between
of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not
things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41
strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining
the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as: Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the
interests of others.42 II

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under Balancing Policy Considerations
the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a
interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to
commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by
United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law." In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure
that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally,
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement,
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or
talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered
passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of
by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
the phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude,
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the
hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer,
experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model
practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government
Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer
service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them
shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be
disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only the ability to quit inhibits official independence." 54 The case at bar involves the
make it less appealing to enter."47 position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It
cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows
tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office.
counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a
has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay corrosive effect on the rule of law.
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our
commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of
Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of
the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to the legal profession.
divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It
was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the
legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and
for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of
the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to
were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of
Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect. free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an
doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
confidence.51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the
benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides"
process. carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential
official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the
reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from
service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the
he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that
vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there
private employment does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is
affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly
defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and The question of fairness
selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for
this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
switching of sides for no two sides are involved. should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule
cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General,
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid
conflict of loyalties while still in government service.61 The example given by the to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make
he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and
vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
"The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
concern as "probably excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last 0096-0099 is denied.
client – the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms
want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who were hardest to beat – not the No cost.
least qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a
non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that
he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later SO ORDERED.
defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending
both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases. Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.
the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon
departure from government x x x."67 More, he contends that the concern can Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea
that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.
the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem
justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor
their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68

III Footnotes
1
 Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of 17
 Rollo, p. 43.
the Yujuico Family Group and the directors and officers of GENBANK.
18
 Rollo, pp. 2-40.
2
 Rollo, pp. 240, 242.
19
 Rollo, pp. 12-14.
3
 Rollo, p. 7.
 Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Revolution, 57
20
4
 Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248. SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004).

5
 Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248. 21
 Ibid.

6
 Rollo, pp. 217-218. 22
 Ibid.

7
 Rollo, p. 143. 23
 Ibid.

8
 Rollo, pp. 216-220.  Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil.
24

37 (1927).
9
 Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.
25
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).
10
 Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.
26
 Id. at 457.
11
 Rollo, p. 63.
27
 Ibid.; The use of the word "conflict" is a misnomer; "congruent-interest
12
 Rollo, p. 61. representation conflicts" arguably do not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits
lawyers from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the
former government client and the new client are entirely parallel.
13
 Rollo, pp. 57-63.
28
 Supra, note 20.
14
 Rollo, p. 178.

 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of

29
15
 Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The "Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as
Professional Responsibility (1963), DR 9-101(b); ABA Model Rules of
counsel for petitioners" in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 was filed with the
Professional Responsibility, MR 1.11(a) and (b) (1983).
Sandiganbayan’s Second Division. However, the motion was ultimately
resolved by the Sandiganbayan’s Fifth Division in its proceedings held on
July 11, 2001.
30
 Supra, note 25 at 458.

16
 Rollo, p. 42.
31
 Supra, note 20.
32
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002). 43
 Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of "intervene" which is
"to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events."
 Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to
33

be too broadly encompassing." ABA Opinion No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states:  Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of "intervene" which is "to
44

"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." come in or between by way of hindrance or modification," and the second
definition of "intervention" which is "interference that may affect the interests
34
 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); of others."
"The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules
state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without 45
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 461 (1986).
being subject to disciplinary action."
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional
46

 DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in

35
Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957).
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
 Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before
47
36
 Supra, note 20. Council on Younger Lawyers, 1976 Annual Convention of the Federal Bar
Association (September 16, 1976).
37
 Ibid.
 Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
48

38
 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): "The Board of Education of New York City v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
other rubric formerly used for dealing with disqualification is the appearance 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 326,
of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional 331 (D.D.C. 1980).
Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of
impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that 49
 Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).
might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted,
disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective 50
 Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were
judgment by the former client. Second, since ‘impropriety’ is undefined, the filed sometime in August 1986. The motion for disqualification in Civil Case
term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore has to be No. 0096-0099 was filed on February 5, 1991.
recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved . .
. by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety." 51
 United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
39
 Supra, note 32.  First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978);
52

EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco
40
 See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20. Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language

41
 Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in
53

Unabridged, p. 1183 (1993). Matters Before an Agency, Duke L.J., Vol. 1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.
42
 Id. 54
 Ibid.
  Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil.
55

569 (1949).

56
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 320 (1986). CONCURRING OPINION
57
 Id. at p. 321. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional

58
I join Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his ponencia. Motions to disqualify counsel from
Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1957). representing their clients must be viewed with jaundiced eyes, for oftentimes they
pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process. 1 Such motions are filed to
59
 Supra, note 38. harass a particular counsel, to delay the litigation, to intimidate adversary, or for other
strategic purposes. It therefore behooves the courts to always look for the parties’
 United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United
60 inner motivations in filing such motions.
States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983).
This case illustrates the sad reality that the filing of motions for disqualification may
61
 Supra, note 53 at 44. be motivated, not by a fine sense of ethics or sincere desire to remove from litigation
an unethical practitioner, but to achieve a tactical advantage.
62
 Ibid.
The facts are undisputed.
63
 Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.
Subsequent to the downfall of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, came the first
64
 Ibid. edict2 of President Corazon C. Aquino creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
subordinates, and associates.
65
 Id. at 45.
PCGG’s initial target was Lucio Tan and the above-named private respondents
66
 Id. at 42. (Tan et al., for brevity). It issued several writs of sequestration on their properties and
business enterprises. To nullify such writs, Tan et al. filed with this Court petitions
67
 Id. at 42-43. for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On February 15, 1990, after comments
thereon were submitted, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
68
 Id. at 43. proper disposition. These cases were raffled to it Fifth Division, docketed as follows:

(a) Civil Case No. 0095 - Sipalay Trading Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering Lucio Tan’s shares of stocks in
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Hotel);

(b) Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris
Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel
Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19, Since 1987, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza has been the counsel for Tan et al. in all
1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corporation held by the above cases. But it was not until February 5, 1991, or after four years, that
and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and the PCGG filed three (3) identical motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. In Civil
Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.; Cases Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a motion to disqualify him. It filed another similar
motion in Civil Case No. 0100. The last motion was filed in Civil Case No. 0005. His
(c) Civil Case No. 0097 -- Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, disqualification was sought under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr. and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which Responsibility which reads:
seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the shares
of stocks in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.; engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
(d) Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. In each motion, PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, then Solicitor General of the
and Fortune Tabacco Corp. v. PCGG., which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order Marcos Administration, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and
dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Fortune Tobacco Corp. Trust Company (GENBANK), subsequently acquired by Tan et al. and became Allied
held by and /or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Bank. PCGG’s allegations are similar in every aspect, thus:
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.;
and (1) He was the former Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines for almost
14 years appearing on behalf of the Republic in multitudes of cases.
(e) Civil Case No. 0099 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which (2) The records show that, as then Solicitor General, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of appeared as counsel for the Central Bank of the Philippines in Special Proceedings
stocks in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao No. 107812, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in connection with the
Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos. Central Bank’s Petition for assistance in the Liquidation of General bank and Trust
Company (herein called "Genbank", for brevity). The records also show that
(f) Civil Case No. 0100 – Allied Banking Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify Defendant Lucio Tan and his group were the same persons who acquired Genbank’s
the PCGG’s Search and Seizure Order dated August 13, 1986, issued on bank assets, liabilities and interest.
documents of Allied Banking Corp.3
(3) Consequently, Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Defendant herein
Civil Cases Nos. 0096 and 0100 involve Tan, et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied runs counter to the long-cherished ethical canon of the legal profession which
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank). prohibits a counsel to appear in litigation adverse to the interests of his former client.
Interpreting this sanction, jurisprudence has held, that:
Meanwhile, on July 17, 1987, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, ‘The lawyer’s obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and to keep his
restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al. This time, the case was confidences, also forbid the lawyer from accepting retainers or employment from
raffled to the Second Division, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 0005. Among the others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
properties sought to be reconveyed were Tan et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied confidence has been reposed in him. (Canon of Professional Ethics, 6). The
Bank. prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that
the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest. (5 Am. Jur. 296).’
(4) The reason for the prohibition is obvious. Apart from the obligation to keep (3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
inviolate the prior relationship between counsel and his former client, such counsel foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the
obtains material information in confidence. Consequently, he should not be allowed Monetary Board.
to represent a party with adverse interest to his former client, arising out of the very
transaction subject of the former relationship. (4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting
the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
(5) In the case at bar, it should be stressed that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group liquidation of Genbank."
acquired the assets and liabilities of Genbank. This manner of acquisition has been
alleged to have been fraudulent, arbitrary and a product of collusion between them Plainly stated, it was Atty. Mendoza who was the legal author of the closure of
and the Central Bank officials. (Refer to Criminal Case No. 005 pending before this Genbank and the eventual sale to Mr. Lucio Tan and his Group. Clearly, Atty.
Honorable Court.) Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for Defendants, clearly Mendoza should be disqualified in this case."
violates the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that:
On April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 4 in Civil Case No. 0005
‘A lawyer shall not after leaving the government service accept engagement or denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza.
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service." (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Rule 6.03)’ On May 7, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 5 in Civil Case No. 0100 also
denying PCGG’s similar motion.
(6) In the liquidation of Genbank and its eventual acquisition by Lucio Tan and his
group, Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor–General, personally advised the Central Bank Motions for reconsideration were filed but to no avail. The PCGG took no further
officials on the procedure to bring about Genbank’s liquidation. In the Memorandum action. These Resolutions, therefore, became final and executory.
for the Governor of the Central Bank dated March 29, 1977 (signed by the following
subordinates of then CB Governor Gregorio Licaros, namely: Senior Deputy
Governor Amado R. Brinas (deceased), Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, Deputy Subsequently, in a Decision dated August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan jointly
Governor & General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, Special Asst. to the Governor granted Tan et al.’s petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. On March 29,
Carlota P. Valenzuela, Asst. to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and Director 1996, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 112708-096 affirmed the said Decision. The PCGG
Antonio T. Castro, Jr.), the following portion disclosed Atty. Mendoza’s participation: neither assigned as error nor mentioned the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0100.
‘Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General
(atty. Mendoza) and he advised that the following procedure should be taken: In the interim, the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos.
0096-0099 remained pending with the Sandiganbayan. It was only on July 11, 2001,
or after ten (10) years, that it denied the PCGG’s motion by merely adopting
‘(1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that its Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying a similar
studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of motion, thus:
August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank cannot be reorganized or placed in a
condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors
and creditors and the general public. "Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER" dated February 5,1991 which
appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and it
‘(2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion
of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his ‘OPPOSITION’ dated
March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to the same On the substantive aspect, Mr. Justice Callejo’s Dissent states that Atty. Mendoza
motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. According to him, Atty.
March 7,1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Mendoza’s acts of (a) advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the
Civil Case No. 0005 (pp.134-135,Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division liquidation of GENBANK, and (b) filing Special Proceedings No. 107812, a petition by
hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case the Central Bank for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK, with the then Court of
No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp.1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. First Instance (CFI) of Manila, constitute "intervention." And that while it may be
0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in the case at bar." 7 true that his posture in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 is not adverse to the interest of
the Central Bank, still, he violated the proscription under the "congruent-interest
The PCGG moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but was representation conflict" doctrine.
denied. In the Resolution dated December 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan ruled:
Crucial to the resolution of the present controversy are the following queries:
"Acting on respondent PCGG’s ‘MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION’ dated August
1, 2001 praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 (1) Is certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, July 11 and December 5, 2001 denying the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty.
to which petitioners have filed an ‘OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099?
RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001’ dated August 29, 2001, as well as
the respondent’s ‘REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration)’ dated (2) May Sandiganbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 be
November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty. considered a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine
Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that of res judicata?
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005
(re:Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second (3) Does Atty. Mendoza’s participation in the liquidation of GENBANK constitute
Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the intervention?
motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when
PCGG failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant
motion is hereby DENIED.8 There are some important points I wish to stress at this incipient stage. I believe they
should be considered if we are to arrive at a fair resolution of this case. The
scattershot manner in which the PCGG filed the various motions to disqualify
Hence, the PCGG’s present petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the Atty. Mendoza shows its intent to harass him and Tan et al. It may be recalled
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to that the PCGG filed three (3) identical motions, one in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099,
disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. another in Civil Case No. 0100 and the last one in Civil Case No. 0005. Of these
cases, only Civil Cases Nos. 0096, 0100 and 0005 actually involve Tan et
Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., in his Dissent, granted the petition. On the al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank. Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099 have
procedural issues, he ruled that the assailed Resolutions dated July 11 and entirely different subject matter. Thus, insofar as these cases are concerned, the
December 5, 2001 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza are motions to disqualify lack substantive merit. Why then would the PCGG file
interlocutory orders, hence, in challenging such Resolutions, certiorari is the proper identical motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in these unrelated cases? Its intention is
remedy, not appeal, as invoked by Tan et al. Based on the same premise, he suspect. To subject Tan et al. to numerous and baseless motions to disqualify their
likewise rejected Tan et al.’s claim that the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil lawyer is, no doubt, a form of harassment.
Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under
the doctrine of res judicata. As this juncture, it is important to emphasize that in evaluating motions to disqualify a
lawyer, our minds are not bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of
the combined effect of a party’s right to counsel of his own choice, an attorney’s independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.
interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing In short, it is separable from the merits. Clearly, the present petition
disqualified counsel, and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding. 9 for certiorari, to my mind, is dismissible.

I. Whether the PCGG’s proper II. Whether the Resolution dated April

remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005

Resolutions dated July 11 and constitutes a bar to similar motions to

December 5, 2001 is appeal, not disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the

certiorari. doctrine of res judicata.

The bottom line of this issue lies on how we categorize an order denying a motion to I am convinced that the factual circumstances of this case justify the application
disqualify an opposing party’s counsel. Is it interlocutory or final? of res judicata.

An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing The ponente refuses to apply res judicata on the ground that the Sandignbayan
more can be done with it in the lower court.10 On the other hand, an interlocutory Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 is just an interlocutory order.
order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the
case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine Assuming arguendo that an order denying a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is
the entire controversy.11 indeed an intelocutory order, still, I believe that res judicata  applies.

In Antonio vs. Samonte,12 this Court defined a final judgment, order or decree as "one It will be recalled that on August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision
that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some rights or rights granting Tan et al.’s petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. Such Decision
of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate reached this Court in G.R. Nos. 112708-09.15 On March 29, 1996, we affirmed it.
branch, thereof and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside x x The PCGG could have assigned or raised as error in G.R. Nos. 112708-09 the
x." In De la Cruz v. Paras,13 it was held that a court order is final in character if "it Sandiganbayan Resolution dated May 7, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0100 denying its
puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza but it did not. The fact that a final Decision
therein disposed of," such that no further questions can come before the court therein has been promulgated by this Court renders the Resolution dated May 7,
except the execution of the order. In Day v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga 1991 beyond review. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of disqualification
City,14 this Court ruled that an order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is as it was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.16 To rule
final and appealable, although the other issue or issues have not been resolved, if otherwise is to encourage the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings on the basis of the
the latter issues are distinct and separate from others. same set of facts. This should not be countenanced. Public policy, judicial
orderliness, economy of judicial time and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace
With the foregoing disquisition as basis, it is my view that an order denying a motion and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judicial rulings and
to disqualify counsel is final and, therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not that controversies once decided shall remain in repose, and that there be an end to
Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from representing Tan et al.  is separable from, litigation.17
III. Whether Atty. Mendoza’s "Although a precise definition of "matter" as used in the Disciplinary Rule is difficult to
formulate, the term seems to contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction or
participation in the liquidation of set of transactions between identifiable parties. Perhaps the scope of the term
"matter" may be indicated by examples. The same lawsuit or litigation is the same
matter. The same issue of fact involving the same parties and the same situation or
GENBANK constitutes intervention.
conduct is the same matter. By contrast, work as a government employee in
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
As stated earlier, Atty. Mendoza is sought to be disqualified under Rule 6.03 of the regulations, or laws, or in briefing abstract principles of law, does not
Code of Professional Responsibility which states: disqualify the lawyer under DR 9-101 (B) from subsequent private employment
involving the same regulations, procedures, or points of law; the same
Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept "matter" is not involved because there is lacking the discrete, identifiable
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific parties.
intervened while in said service.
In the case at bar, the Court’s task is to determine whether Special Proceedings No.
In determining whether Atty. Mendoza committed a breach of this Rule, certain 107812 falls within the concept of "matter." This must be analyzed in relation with
factual predicates should be established, thus: (a) in connection with what "matter" Civil Case No. 0096. Anent Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099, there is no doubt
has Atty. Mendoza accepted an engagement or employment after leaving the that they do not involve the shares of stocks of Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Thus, only
government service?; (b) in connection with what "matter" did he intervene while in Special Proceedings No. 107812 and Civil Case No. 0096 must be considered.
government service?; and (c) what acts did he particularly perform in "intervening" in
connection with such "matter"? Special Proceedings No. 107812 is a "petition by the Central Bank for Assistance in
the Liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company" filed by Atty. Mendoza as
The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor General, "actively intervened" in Solicitor General. The parties therein are the Central Bank of the Philippines and
the closure and liquidation of GENBANK. As primary evidence of such intervention, it Arnulfo B. Aurellano, on the one hand, and the Worldwide Insurance & Surety
cited his act of filing Special Proceedings No. 107812 with the then Court of First Company, Midland Insurance Corporation, Standard Insurance Co., Inc and General
Instance (CFI) of Manila; and the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 of certain key Bank & Trust Company, on the other. The issues, among others, are whether or not
officials of the Central Bank stating that he (Atty. Mendoza) advised them of the the Central Bank acted in good faith in ordering the liquidation of GENBANK; and,
procedure to be taken in the liquidation of GENBANK and that he was furnished whether the bidding for GENBANK is a sham.
copies of pertinent documents relating to such liquidation.
Civil Case No. 0096 is for the annulment of various sequestration orders issued by
Tan et al. denied Atty. Mendoza’s alleged "intervention," claiming that when he filed the PCGG over Tan et al.’s properties. The parties therein are Lucio Tan, Mariano
Special Proceedings No. 107812 with the CFI of Manila, the decision to prohibit Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corporation, Iris Holdings & Development Corp., Virgo
GENBANK from doing business had already been made by the Central Bank Holdings & Development Corp., and Jewel Holdings, Inc., as petitioners, and the
Monetary Board. Also, Atty. Mendoza, in appearing as their counsel in Civil Cases PCGG, as respondent. The issues here are "whether the Sequestration Order issued
Nos. 0096-0099, does not take a position adverse to his former client, the Central by the PCGG on June 19, 1986 over the shares of stocks in Allied Bank of Lucio C.
Bank. Tan and his co-petitioners in Civil Case No. 0096 was issued without notice, hearing
and evidence."
The first concern in assessing the applicability of the Rule is the definition of "matter."
The American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility A careful perusal of the above distinctions shows that the two cases are different in
stated in its Formal Opinion 342 that: all aspects, such as the parties, issues, facts and relief sought. Special
Proceedings No. 107812 cannot therefore be considered a "matter" in connection Webster Dictionary18 defines "intervene" as "to come or happen between two points of
with which Atty. Mendoza accepted his engagement as counsel in Civil Case No. time or events;" "to come or be in between as something unnecessary or
0096. The connection between the two cases, if there be, is very minimal as to give irrelevant;" or "to come between as an influencing force. The ponencia defines
rise to the application of the proscription. "to intervene" as "to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance." "Intervention" is interference that may affect the interest of others.
As aptly stated by Justice Puno: Corollarily, the counterpart of Rule 6.03 is the Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-101 (B) of the
American Bar Association (ABA), thus:
"But more important, the ‘matter’ involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is entirely different from the ‘matter’ involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again the bald A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a manner in which he had
facts speak for themselves. It is given that Atty. Mendoza had nothing to do with the "substantial responsibility" while he was a public employee.
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The ‘matter’ where he got Substantial responsibility envisages a lawyer having such a heavy responsibility for
himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law the matter in question that it is likely he becomes personally and substantially involve
to liquidate GENBANK through the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding the matter. 19 Since the word
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject ‘matter’ Sp. Proc. "intervene" has two connotations, one affecting interest of others and one done
No. 107812, however, is not the same nor related to but different from the merely in influencing others, Rule 6.03 should be read in the context of the former. To
subject ‘matter’ in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves interpret it otherwise is to enlarge the coverage of Rule 6.03. Surely, this could not
the sequestration of the stocks owned by Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged have been the intention of the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility.
ground that they are ill- gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the Further, that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent papers relative to the
shares of stocks of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the liquidation of GENBANK is not sufficient to disqualify him in Civil Case No. 0096.
issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by In Laker Airway Limited v. Pan American World Airways,20 it was held that:
the Central Bank due, among others, to the banking malpractices of its owners and
officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in "Like the case law, policy considerations do not support the disqualification of
the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the a government attorney merely because during his government service he had
dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the access to information about a corporation which subsequently turned out to
Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his become an opponent in a private lawsuit. If the law were otherwise, the limiting
alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an language of the Disciplinary Rule could be bypassed altogether by the simple claim
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. that an attorney may have viewed confidential information while employed by the
0096." government, and government lawyers would face perpetual disqualification in their
subsequent practices."
As Solicitor General, Atty. Mendoza represented the Republic of the Philippines in
every case where it was involved. As a matter of practice and procedure, he signed In fine, I fully concur in Justice Puno’s Dissent that "Rule 6.03 of the Code of
every pleading prepared by his Associates. Taking this into consideration, will it be Professional Responsibility cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged
just to disqualify him in all the cases containing pleadings bearing his signature? The intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an
answer must be in the negative. His disqualification might be too harsh a penalty for intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
one who had served the government during the best years of his life and with all his
legal expertise.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari.
 11
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 22 SCRA 785 (1968).

Footnotes
12
 111 Phil. 699 (1961).

1
 Gregori v. Bank of America, 207 Cal.App. 3d 291 (1989); McPhearson v.
13
 69 SCRA 556, G.R. No. L-41053. February 27, 1976.
Michaels Co., No. CO34390, March 4, 2002.
14
 191 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 79119. November 22, 1990.
2
 Executive order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986.
 Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential
15

3
 Resolution, at 3-4. See also Memorandum for Respondents,  rollo, at 397- Commission on Good Government, vs. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading
398. Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, 255 SCRA 438, March 29,
1996.
4
 Attachment "F" of the Petition, rollo, at 57-63. Civil Case No. 0005 involved
the PCGG’s and the OSG’s complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
16
 46 Am Jur 2d § 516.
restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al.’s shares of stock in
Allied Bank.
17
 46 Am Jur 2d § 515

5
 Comment on the Petition, rollo, at 148. Civil Case No. 0100 involved Allied
18
 Second Edition, New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, 183.
Bank’s petition seeking to nullify PCGG’s Search and Seizure Order against
Tan, et al.’s shares of stock. 19
 ABA Formal Opinion 342 (November 24, 1975.

6
 Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential 20
 103 F.R.D. 22; 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15513, June 26, 1984.
Commission on Good Government, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay
Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation,  respondents. 255
SCRA 438, March 29, 1996. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
7
 Attachment "A" of the Petition, rollo, at 42.

8
 Attachment "A-1" of the Petition, rollo, at 43.

9
 7 Am Jur 2d §197 citing Higdon v. Superior Court (5th Dist) 227 Cal App 3d
1667, 278 Cal Rptr 588, 91 CDOS 1622, 91 Daily Journal DAR 2595.
DISSENTING OPINION
10
 Mejia v. Alimorong,  4 Phil. 573, 1905, Insular Government v. Bishop of
Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil. 487, (1910); People v. Makaraig, 54 Phil. 904, 1930. CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
While I concur in the scholarly and ably-written dissent of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Its ruling in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. notwithstanding, this Court
Sr., I feel compelled to write a separate dissenting opinion to reflect the additional in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato ruled that the therein petitioners did not have
reasons behind my position. standing to sue.

Justices Artemio V. Panganiban and Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez are of the opinion It explained that the doctrines of law of the case and conclusiveness of judgment do
that the petition can be dismissed on procedural grounds, they contending that the not pose a barrier to the determination of petitioners’ right to maintain the suit:
Presidential Commission on Government (PCGG) is precluded from filing a motion to
disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case Nos. 0096 since the Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) had already denied PCGG’s motion to disqualify of "law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact
Atty. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case No. 0005. In short, they are invoking the that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The
doctrines of conclusiveness of judgment and law of the case. doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an
appellate court. Thus in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 999 (1958), it was stated:
I believe Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato1 penned by the distinguished Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza is instructive. "‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
To recall, Kilosbayan, Incorporated (Kilosbayan, Inc.), et al. filed on January 28, 1994 controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
a petition with this Court challenging the validity of the Contract of Lease between the case continues to be the law of these case, whether correct on general principles
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
Management Corporation (PGMC) on the ground that the same was made in facts of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)
violation of the charter of the PCSO. This Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona, Jr.2 invalidated the contract. "It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a
second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or
One of the issues raised before this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior
Jr. was the standing of petitioners to maintain the suit. On that score, this Court held appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered
through Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that petitioners or re-adjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)
had standing to sue.
"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where after a definite
As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., PCSO and determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will
PGMC entered into negotiations for a new agreement which would conform to the refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such
Court’s decision. determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its
mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
On January 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second
(ELA). appeal . . .

On February 21, 1995, Kilosbayan, Inc, et al. filed a petition against then PCSO Chair "As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same is held to be the law of
Manuel Morato seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it was the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming
substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in Kilosbayan, Incorporated himself aggrieved to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77)
v. Guingona, Jr.
"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded may be. The rule on collateral estoppel it was held, "must be confined to situations
as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided
expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain
the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant
none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87)" facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be similar or identical,
collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in the second case.
As this Court explained in another case. "The law of the case, as applied to a former Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with
decision of an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that
to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its
questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the This exception to the General Rule of the Issue Preclusion is authoritatively
same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 formulated in Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments,  as follows:
(1979))
§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue
before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following
law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are not. circumstances:

Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related ....
doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment."3 According to the doctrine, an issue actually
and directly passed upon and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in (2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are
question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action. substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take
(Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid
[1960]) inequitable administration of the laws; . . .

It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of Illustration:
issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. ....
147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND
SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd
Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 2. A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court
591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a sustain B's defense of sovereign immunity and dismisses the action. Several
patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his wife for the years later A brings the second action against B for an unrelated tortious injury
years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income, this occurring after the dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not conclusive
determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts on the question whether the defense immunity is available to B. Note: The
to his wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For doctrine of stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question of
income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive sovereign immunity. See §29, Comment i.
as to any other contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it
The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or Mendoza is not an interlocutory order but a final order, and that as a result, the
ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners principle of res judicata applies.
seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993
Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination With all due respect, I believe that we cannot characterize the denial of PCGG’s
in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a final order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude determination interlocutory in the following manner:
of their standing in the present suit. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in
the original) Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not
The doctrine of law of the case does not, I believe, apply to the present case for this a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order or decree is one
is the first time that the issue to disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before which does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some
this Court. It is the decision in this case which will be the law of the case. A reading intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which requires further steps to
of Republic v. Sandiganbayan4 cited by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez shows that the be taken in order to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the
issue currently before this Court was not passed upon. Thus, this Court in Republic v. merits.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sandiganbayan stated:
Justice Oscar M. Herrera, an authority in remedial law, distinguishes between a final
The key issues, in query form, are: judgment and interlocutory order in this wise:

(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN’s denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss proper? The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final or
executory as of right (final and executory), is definite and settled. A final judgment
(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
than resolving it as part of the judgment? by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on
the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED correct? judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far
as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to
lifted for failure to bring an action in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the
await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a
constitutionally prescribed period?5
motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of
course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final, or to use the
I also believe that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in established and more distinctive term, final and executory. (Investment, Inc. v. Court
the case at bar, the question of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza of Appeals cited in Denso [Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA
should be granted is undoubtedly a legal question. Moreover, Civil Case No. 005 and 280; see also Bank of America NT & SA, G.R. No. 78017, June 8, 1990 186 SCRA
Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims. 417)

Justices Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez further opine that the order of the An interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0005 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of
the whole controversy.7 (Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123553, July 13, xxx
1998, 96 SCAD 205) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, the word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the
Justice Florenz D. Regalado is of the same view: commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not
a final decision of the whole controversy." An interlocutory order does not terminate
An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case but leaves nor does it finally dispose of the is (sic) case; it does not end the task of the court in
something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case. An order adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
is final, for purposes of appeal, if it disposes of the entire case. against each other but leaves something yet to be done by the court before the case
is finally decided on its merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Where the order is interlocutory, the movant has to wait for the judgment and
then appeal from the judgment, in the course of which appeal he can assign as Applying the foregoing test, it is clear that the order denying PCGG’s motion to
error the said interlocutory order. The interlocutory order cannot be appealed from disqualify Atty. Mendoza is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the
separately from the judgment. The general rule is that where the interlocutory case.
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy is certiorari, prohibition or mandamus depending on the Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court is in agreement with Justice Callejo’s
facts of the case. conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza is an interlocutory order. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v.
Where the order appealed from is interlocutory, the appellate court can dismiss the Risjord,11 the American Court ruled that an order denying motions to disqualify the
appeal even if no objection thereto was filed by the appellee in either the trial or opposing party’s counsel in a civil case are not appealable prior to final judgment in
appellate court.8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) underlying litigation since such an order does not fall within the collateral order
exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,12 which is cited by
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Another respected scholar of remedial law, Justice Jose Y. Feria, has formulated this
guideline in determining whether an order is final or interlocutory:
Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with "jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts ... except where a direct review may be had in the
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or
Supreme Court." We have consistently interpreted this language as indicating that a
final: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
party may not take an appeal under this section until there has been "a decision by
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test
the District Court that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the
court to do but execute the judgment.’" Coopers  s & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
merits of the case.9 (Emphasis and underscoring)
463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), quoting  Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945) . This rule, that a
In fact, this same test was used in Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals,10 cited by Justice party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final
Panganiban to determine whether the trial court’s order was interlocutory or final: judgment on the merits, serves a number of important purposes. It emphasizes the
deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called
In this particular instance, the test to determine whether the order of 06 January 1995 upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial.
is interlocutory or final would be: Does it leave something else to be done by the Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district
trial court on the case? If it does, it is interlocutory, if it does not, it is judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In
final. Evidently, the trial court would still have to hear the parties on the merits addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of "avoid[ing] the
of the case… obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost
of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may disqualification motions are not immediately appealable "collateral orders."
give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 [FN12] We agree with these courts that under Cohen such an order is not
U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). See DiBella v. United States, subject to appeal prior to resolution of the merits.
369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654, 656, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962). The rule also serves the
important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration. Eisen v. Carlisle & FN11. Counsel for respondent represented at oral argument in this Court that the
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) . case was, at that time, in the discovery stage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36.

Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that FN12. See n. 10, supra.
all appeals under § 1291 await final judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., supra, we held that a "small class" of orders that did not end An order denying a disqualification motion meets the first part of the "collateral order"
the main litigation were nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § test. It "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question," because the only issue is
1291. Cohen was a shareholder's derivative action in which the Federal District Court whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his representation. In
refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff in such a suit to post security for addition, we will assume, although we do not decide, that the disqualification question
costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without awaiting final judgment on the "resolve [s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," the
merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to require that costs be second part of the test. Nevertheless, petitioner is unable to demonstrate that an
posted. We held that the Court of Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the order denying disqualification is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
appeal pursuant to § 1291 because the District Court's order constituted a final final judgment" within the meaning of our cases.
determination of a claim "separable from, and collateral to," the merits of the main
proceeding, because it was "too important to be denied review," and because it was
"too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be In attempting to show why the challenged order will be effectively unreviewable on
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id., at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225. Cohen did final appeal, petitioner alleges that denying immediate review will cause it irreparable
not establish new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a "practical harm. It is true that the finality requirement should "be construed so as not to cause
rather than a technical construction." Ibid. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be
Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 413-414, 46 S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed. 339 suffered," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331, n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, n. 11, 47
(1926); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 67 U.S. 524-531, 2 Black 524, L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In support of its assertion that it will be irreparably harmed,
530-531, 17 L.Ed. 347 (1863); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 203, 6 How. 201, petitioner hints at "the possibility that the course of the proceedings may be indelibly
203, 12 L.Ed.2d 404 (1848); Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. 6, 15, 13 stamped or shaped with the fruits of a breach of confidence or by acts or omissions
Pet. 6, 15, 10 L.Ed. 33 (1839). We have recently defined this limited class of final prompted by a divided loyalty," Brief for Petitioner 15, and at "the effect of such a
"collateral orders" in these terms: "[T]he order must conclusively determine the tainted proceeding in frustrating public policy," id., at 16. But petitioner fails to supply
disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of a single concrete example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it warns. The only
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final ground that petitioner urged in the District Court was that respondent might shape the
judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at products-liability plaintiffs' claims for relief in such a way as to increase the burden on
2457 (footnote omitted). See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658, 97 S.Ct. petitioner. Our cases, however, require much more before a ruling may be
2034, 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). considered "effectively unreviewable" absent immediate appeal

[1] Because the litigation from which the instant petition arises had not reached final [2] To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged order must
judgment at the time the notice of appeal was filed. [FN11 the order denying constitute "a complete, formal and, in the trial court, final rejection," Abney v.
petitioner's motion to disqualify respondent is appealable under  § 1291 only if United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040, of a claimed right "where
it falls within the Cohen doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, and 5 denial of immediate review would render impossible any review
of the other 10 Circuits have also reached the conclusion that denials of whatsoever," United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29
L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). Thus we have permitted appeals prior to criminal trials when a trial judge." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (1980), cert. pending, No. 80-
defendant has claimed that he is about to be subjected to forbidden double 431. But interlocutory orders are not appealable "on the mere ground that they
jeopardy, Abney v. United States, supra, or a violation of his constitutional right to may be erroneous." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98, n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275,
bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951)  because those n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967). Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground not only
situations, like the posting of security for costs involved in Cohen, "each involved an would constitute an unjustified waste of scarce judicial resources, but also would
asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not transform the limited exception carved out in Cohen into a license for broad disregard
vindicated before trial." United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291. This we decline to do. [FN13]
1547, 1552, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). By way of contrast, we have generally denied
review of pretrial discovery orders, see, e. g., United States v. Ryan, FN13. Although there may be situations in which a party will be irreparably damaged
supra; Cobbledick v. United States, supra. Our rationale has been that in the rare if forced to wait until final resolution of the underlying litigation before securing review
case when appeal after final judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing counsel, it is not necessary, in
party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be entered against him, and order to resolve those situations, to create a general rule permitting the appeal of all
challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling. See Cobbledick v. United such orders. In the proper circumstances, the moving party may seek sanctions short
States, supra, at 327, 60 S.Ct. at 542. We have also rejected immediate appealability of disqualification, such as a protective order limiting counsel's ability to disclose or to
under § 1291 of claims that "may fairly be assessed" only after trial, United States v. act on purportedly confidential information. If additional facts in support of the motion
MacDonald, supra, at 860, and those involving "considerations that are ‘enmeshed in develop in the course of the litigation, the moving party might ask the trial court to
the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.’" Coopers & reconsider its decision. Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the result in the District Court
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S., at 469, 98 S.Ct., at 2458, quoting Mercantile National and absolutely determined that it will be harmed irreparably, a party may seek to
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558, 83 S.Ct. 520, 522, 9 L.Ed.2d 523 (1963) . have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), see n. 7, supra, and, in the exceptional circumstances for which it was
An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of designed, a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals might be available. See In re
orders that are indeed reviewable on appeal after final judgment, and not within Continental Investment Corp., supra, 637 F.2d, at 7; Community Broadcasting of
the much smaller class of those that are not. The propriety of the district court's Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U.S.App.D.C., at 262, 546 F.2d, at 1028.  See generally
denial of a disqualification motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of
the underlying litigation may be evaluated, which is normally only after final judgment. Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450, 468-480 (1978). We need not
The decision whether to disqualify an attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual be concerned with the availability of such extraordinary procedures in the case before
situation of the case then at hand, and the order embodying such a decision will us, because petitioner has made no colorable claim that the harm it might suffer if
rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection of a claim of fundamental right that cannot forced to await the final outcome of the litigation before appealing the denial of its
effectively be reviewed following judgment on the merits. In the case before us, disqualification motion is any greater than the harm suffered by any litigant forced to
petitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for meaningful review will perish wait until the termination of the trial before challenging interlocutory orders it
unless immediate appeal is permitted. On the contrary, should the Court of Appeals considers erroneous.
conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was
prejudicial error, it would retain its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed III
from and order a new trial. That remedy seems plainly adequate should petitioner's
concerns of possible injury ultimately prove well founded. As the Second Circuit has [3][4][5] We hold that a district court's order denying a motion to disqualify
recently observed, the potential harm that might be caused by requiring that a party counsel is not appealable under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying
await final judgment before it may appeal even when the denial of its disqualification litigation. [FN14
motion was erroneous does not "diffe[r] in any significant way from the harm resulting
from other interlocutory orders that may be erroneous, such as orders requiring
discovery over a work-product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the
FN14. The United States in its brief amicus curiae, has challenged petitioner's administration of justice. That the practice of law is a profession explains why lawyers
standing to attack the order permitting respondent to continue his representation of repute and of eminence welcome their designation as counsel de oficio, as an
the plaintiffs. In light of our conclusion that the Eighth Circuit was without jurisdiction opportunity to manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a profession.
to hear petitioner's appeal, we have no occasion to address the standing
issue.13 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original) The law must be thought of as ignoring commercial standards of success. The
lawyer’s conduct is to be measured not by the standards of trade and counting house
The ruling in Firestone was subsequently reiterated in Flanagan v. United but by those of his profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
States14 and Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller.15 the ethical rule against advertising or solicitation of professional employment, rests
on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Justice Panganiban further suggests that the prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is not perpetual but merely lasts for five years primarily In the matter of fixing his fees, an attorney should never forget that "the profession is
relying on the Civil Code provisions on prescription and the doctrine that the right to a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-making trade" and
practice law is a property right protected by the Constitution. that his standing as a member of the bar "is not enhanced by quibbling relative to just
fees, equivalent to the bargaining between a prospective purchaser and a merchant
I do not agree with this framework of analysis. Carried to its logical conclusion, in the market before a sale is made." Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits.
Justice Panganiban’s proposal would mean that after five years from the termination The returns are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that,
of the attorney-client relationship, all lawyers would be able to represent an interest in unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government
conflict with that of the former client and that they would no longer be bound by the interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State
rule on privileged communication. regulation. However, while the practice of law is a profession and an attorney is
primarily an officer of the court, he is as much entitled to protection from the against
any attempt by his client to escape payment of his just fees, as the client against
It bears emphasis that the law is not trade nor a craft but a profession, a noble
exaction by his counsel of excessive fees.
profession at that.

To summarize, the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from
The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
business are: (a) "a duty of public service, of which emolument is a by-product, and in
entrusted only to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. If
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;" (b) "a
the respect of the people in the honor and integrity of the legal profession is to be
relation as officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough
retained, both lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize that the legal
sincerity, integrity, and reliability;" (c) "a relation to client in the highest degree
profession is a profession and not a trade, and that the basic ideal of that profession
fiduciary;" and (d) "a relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. It is not a
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
business, using bargain counter methods to reap large profits for those who conduct
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
it. From the professional standpoint, it is expressive of three ideals – organization,
learning and public service. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration. The professional spirit – the spirit of public service – These characteristics make the law a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it
constantly curbs the urge of that instinct. is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. Its basic ideal is to render service and to secure justice for those who seek
its aid. If it has to remain a noble and honorable profession and attain its ideal, those
The law as a profession proceeds from the basic premise that membership in the bar
enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also,
is a privilege burdened with conditions and carries with it the responsibility to live up
by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. And because they are the vanguards
to its exacting standards and honored traditions. A person enrolled in its ranks is
of the law and the legal systems, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves in
called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the state – the
their professional and private dealings with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond While it is true that over time memory does fade, the ravages of time have been
reproach.16 mitigated with the invention of the paper and pen and its modern offspring – the
computer. It is not uncommon for lawyers to resort to note taking in the course of
Moreover, the relation of attorney and client is, however, one of trust and confidence handling legal matters.
of the highest order. It is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and
good faith. The proposition that "a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
meaning of our constitutional guarantees" is not unqualified. In JMM Promotion and
… A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals20 which Justice Panganiban relies on, this
learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones . Court held:
Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A profession, trade or calling is a property within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living
The rule is a rigid one designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of
fraudulent conduct but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, and to
protect him from unfounded suspicion of professional misconduct. The Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession,
question is not necessarily one of right of the parties but of adhere to proper calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of
professional standards. An attorney should not only keep inviolate his client’s a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct
confidence but should likewise avoid the appearance of treachery and double- affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
dealing.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be
Thus, in Nakpil v. Valdes,18 this Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno held that the within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or
is probability, not certainty of conflict.19 others.

Justice Panganiban justifies his theory on the ground that in 5 years time, the lawyer In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property,
will develop a mild case of amnesia such that "in all probability, the lapse of the said the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.
period would also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
details of a specific case despite active participation in the proceedings therein." He
thus cites his own personal experience as a member of this Court: Under the foregoing, the perpetual application of Rule 6.03 is clearly a valid and
proper regulation.
Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a
thousand cases in full-length ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned In his ponencia, Justice Reynato S. Puno labels as insignificant the role of then
minute or extended Resolutions. This does not include the thousands of other cases, Solicitor General in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK),
assigned to other members of the Court, in which I actively took part during their saying that "it is indubitable from the facts that Atty. Mendoza had no iota of
deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that I cannot with certainty recall the details participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK" and that his
of the facts and issues in each of these cases, especially in their earlier ones. only involvement was "advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila."
Justice Puno observes that "the procedure of liquidation is simple and is given in
black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29."

Atty. Mendoza’s lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate Footnotes
GENBANK is to me not material. What is material is his role in facilitating the
liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In advising the Central Bank, 1
Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then  246 SCRA 540 (1995).
Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza
2
synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law with a  232 SCRA 110 (1994).
view to successfully liquidate the bank.
3
 The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" is also called "collateral
Ultimately, Justice Puno advocates for a liberal interpretation of Rule 6.03 since a estoppel" or "preclusion of issues," as distinguished from "preclusion of
strict interpretation would cause "a chilling effect on government recruitment of able claims" or res judicata. In the Rules of Court, the first (conclusiveness of
legal talent." judgment, collateral estoppel or preclusion of issues) is governed by Rule 39,
§49 (c) while the second (res judicata or preclusion of claims) is found in
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to this position which is grounded on the Rule 39, §49 (b).
premise that this is "the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers."
4
Effectively, this is likely to result in the compromising of ethical standards which this  255 SCRA 438 (1996).
Court must never allow. While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into
government service, this does not justify the disturbance of our mores. 5
 Id.  at 448-449.

The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must 6

 Black’s Law Dictionary 815 [1991], 6th ed.
be strictly construed. Admittedly the salary for serving in government often pales in
comparison to that of the private sector. I submit, however, that while financial 7
 II O. Herrera, Remedial Law 528 (2000).
considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of
lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think that serving in government is 8
 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 492 (1997), 6th ed.
its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to know
that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been 9
tempted by the promise of financial success that private practice usually brings. But  2 J. Feria & M. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 152 (2000).
in the end, we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in government. And I
10
would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference. There is  365 SCRA 359 (2001).
more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth. As Winston Churchill puts
it: "What is the use of living if it be not to strive for noble causes and make this 11
 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
muddled world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone?"
12
 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
ACCORDINGLY, concurring in the dissenting opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., I vote to grant the petition insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned, thus 13
 449 U.S. 368, 373-380 (1981).
granting the motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza in the said case.
14
 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
 15
 472 U.S. 424 (1985). questions of duty are continually arising.2 The Code of Professional Responsibility
establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal profession and
 R. Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
16 the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its
Code of Judicial Conduct 3-5 (2004). provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any departure from the "straight
and narrow" path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and enjoin all
lawyers to be like Caesar’s wife – to be pure and appear to be so.3
17
 Id. at 165.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

18
 286 SCRA 758 (1998).

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 4 of then
19
 Id. at 773.
President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance,
20
 260 SCRA 319 (1996). restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee,
Mariano Tanenglian,5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong (represented by Tarciana C.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee,
Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied
Banking Corporation, Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc.,
Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw
Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc.,
DISSENTING OPINION Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and Development Corp.
(collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then President
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea,
Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of
The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’ proverbial "bad the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued
man" who wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named
may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the "good persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
man" as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the former President Marcos.
sometimes murky waters of professional conduct.1
Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari,
With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration
behooves the Court to strictly apply the Code of Professional Responsibility and issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the
provide an ethical compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the profession, often find cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein
themselves in the unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is as follows:
certainly, without exception, no profession in which so many temptations beset the
path to swerve from the line of strict integrity; in which so many delicate and difficult
a. Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as
Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel follows:
Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19,
1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in 1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial
the name of respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and difficulties. The Central Bank then extended an emergency loan to GENBANK
Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.; reaching a total of ₱310 million. In extending this loan, the Central Bank, however,
took control of GENBANK with the execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of
b. Civil Case No. 0097 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, GENBANK’s outstanding shares in favor of the Central Bank and the election of
Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of Directors of
PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central
the shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Bank issued a Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business
Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, and placing it under receivership.
Jr.;
2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities
c. Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. were: (a) submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued by a bank acceptable to
and Fortune Tobacco Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated Central Bank to guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency
July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by loan; and (b) a 2-year period to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On
and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a Monetary Board Resolution, approved
T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy Co. This bid, among other
things, offered to pay only ₱500,000.00 for GENBANK assets estimated at
d. Civil Case No. 0099 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, ₱688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of ₱103,984,477.55; Cash of ₱25,698,473.00;
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices. The required
seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of letter of credit was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a
stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao letter of Panfilo O. Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an irrevocable
Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos. letter of credit to secure the advances of the Central Bank in the amount of ₱310
million. Without this letter of commitment, the Lucio Tan bid would not have been
approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud because it was not meant to be
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty.
fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O. Domingo conspired
Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during
together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the doing away with the
the administration of former President Marcos.
required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of the term of payment from two
years to five years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Bank advances which was deficient by more than ₱90 Million, and many other
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. concessions to the great prejudice of the government and of the GENBANK
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to the Central Bank, "actively stockholders.
intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK),
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977.
Banking Corporation. As shown above, among the litigated properties are the
Respondents Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T. Santos are not only
sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).
incorporators and directors but they are also the major shareholders of this new
bank.6
Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
Tan, et al. since Atty. Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to
Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation. disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs.
Further, he appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. He filed the said petition with the Court 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and docketed therein as had become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said resolutions to
Special Proceeding No. 107812.7 the Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. 9

The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil
respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Case No. 0005, which was adopted by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-
Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 0099, denied the similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
proscribing former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence, that the PCGG "has failed to prove that
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." there exists an inconsistency between Atty. Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group." 11 The
Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the assailed Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:
Resolution dated July 11, 2001 stating:
... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under
Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA consideration is not whether the attorney has ever appeared for the party against
AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER" dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to whom he proposes to appear, but whether his accepting the new retainer will require
have been resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and it appearing that (1) him, in forwarding the interests of his new client, to do anything which will injuriously
the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. affect his former client in any matter in which he formerly represented against him,
0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his "OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 and whether he will be called upon, in his new relation, to use against his former
manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to the same motion filed by client any knowledge or information acquired through their former connection. Nor
PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March 7, 1991, the does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having once been
herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. employed by a client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter against him but
0005 (pp. 134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby merely forbids the attorney’s appearance or acting against the client where the
reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of attorney can use, to the detriment of such client, the information and confidences
the Second Division (pp. 1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying acquired during the existence of their relation as attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp.
the said motion as its Resolution in the case at bar. 8 828-829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, supra). Significantly,
PCGG’s "Reply" does not controvert Atty. Mendoza’s claim that in appearing in the
instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of the
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the
Central Bank of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty.
assailed Resolution dated December 5, 2001, which reads:
Mendoza’s claim that the position he took as Solicitor General in behalf of the Central
Bank in 1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. 107812) has been maintained by
Acting on respondent PCGG’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August his successors in office. In fact, even incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia
1, 2001 praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 had interposed no objection to Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Lucio
denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, Tan group for as long as he maintains the same position he has taken on behalf of
to which petitioners have filed an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which position refers to the
RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001" dated August 29, 2001, as well as various resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank in regard
the respondent’s "REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration) dated
General Bank and Trust Co. as being regular and in accordance with law (Annex "A", Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. –
Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404-1405).12
…
The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme
prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Court.
the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said provision prohibits a former public
official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The
before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or above-mentioned rules do not preclude the resort to this Court by way of a petition
separation from public office. for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of orders or resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. The special civil action of certiorari may be availed of where there is
As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 13
Division) was adopted by the Fifth Division in the resolutions now being assailed by
the PCGG. Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG. In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of
its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an
Procedural Issues interlocutory order; hence, not appealable. The word "interlocutory" refers to
"something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which
The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole
the assailed Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and controversy."14 An interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally dispose of
December 5, 2001 are final and executory; hence, the PCGG should have filed a the case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof; and (2) whether the instant yet to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. 15
petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated
April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions
for certiorari of resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of
In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant interlocutory orders. For example, in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,16 we took
petition for certiorari, respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition for certiorari which assailed the
of Court which reads: resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the petitions for certiorari of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, sequestered shares of stock in the San Miguel Corp.
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
to assail the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos.
7975, likewise, states: 0096-0099.
With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following
i.e., the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) elements must concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it
Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the doctrine of res has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the
judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case. merits; and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.24 When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part: issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.25

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment of judgment, the doctrine of res judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final
or final order, may be as follows: order which, as earlier discussed, leaves nothing else to be done. As explained by
Justice Panganiban, a judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a
determination of which party is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon
…
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.26 To reiterate, the said judgment
or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some incidental, subsidiary or
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly collateral matter arising in an action.
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
Case No. 0005 denying the PCGG’s similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. therein was evidently an interlocutory order as it
did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases because, strictly speaking, the
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating
interlocutory motions.27
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts – (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine Substantive Issue
of res judicata or res adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while paragraph (c)
estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness of judgment.19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace
The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty.
M. Magalit,20 Justice Artemio Panganiban explained that the term "final" in the
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099
phrase judgments or final orders in the above section has two accepted
violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal
Responsibility.
because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by
the highest possible tribunal involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an order
that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
interlocutory.22 The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a judgment or
an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT
action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.
allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment apply only to those falling under the second category. 23
Rule 6.01 – The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to lawyers temporarily enter government service from private life then leave it for large
see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is garnered in government service.30 To address this, the disqualification of a former
cause for disciplinary action. government lawyer who has entered private practice may be sought based either on
"adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation conflict."
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from
public duties. representing a client in private practice if the matter is substantially related to a
matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and if the
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept interests of the current and former clients are adverse. 31 It must be observed that the
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had "adverse-interest conflict" applies to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified
intervened while in said service. from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the interests of the
former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the
same or substantially related.32 On the other hand, in "congruent-interest
A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility
representation conflict," the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all,
were adopted from the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice client even if the
Association (ABA).28 Rule 6.03, in particular, is a restatement of Canon 36 of the
interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel. 33 The
Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:
"congruent-interest representation conflict," unlike the "adverse-interest conflict," is
unique to former government lawyers.
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.
I believe that Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for respondents
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096, which involves the sequestered shares of stocks in
merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. Allied Banking Corp., violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our Code
of Professional Responsibility, which is akin to the doctrine of "congruent-interest
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, representation conflict."
should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject
employ.
matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation
certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. 29 Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain
reading of the rule shows that the interdiction (1) applies to a lawyer who once served of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had
in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." intervened as the Solicitor General

In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations applicable to

former government lawyers is called the "revolving door" – the process by which
The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) "any employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he
matter" and (2) "he had intervened" thereon while he was in the government intervened as a public official."39 The sequestration of the shares of stock in Allied
service.34 Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case
No. 0096, necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its
The United States’ ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to liquidation, in which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General.
formulate a precise definition of "matter" as used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR),
nonetheless, it suggested that the term "contemplates a discrete and isolatable It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza’s participation in GENBANK’s liquidation
transaction or set of transaction between identifiable parties." 35 is sufficient to place his present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in
Civil Case No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His role was significant and
There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central substantial. The Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, officials40 of the Central Bank, is revealing:
admitted by respondents Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with the then CFI of
Manila, the petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK (Special Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General
Proceeding No. 107812).36 GENBANK was subsequently acquired by respondents and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:
Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp., whose shares of stocks have been
sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096. 1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that
studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of
The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "merely August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in
advised the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK" which a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
procedure is "given in black and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29." This procedural depositors and creditors and the general public.
advice, according to the majority opinion, "is not the matter contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." 2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation
of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling
within the contemplation of the term "matter" within the meaning of Rule 6.03. 3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
Specifically, Atty. Mendoza’s giving counsel to the Central Bank on the procedure to foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the
go about GENBANK’s liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Monetary Board.
Proceedings No. 107812 did not merely involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles 4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting
of law.37 These acts were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, i.e., the liquidation of Genbank.41
procedure for the liquidation of GENBANK. Consequently, the same can be properly
considered "matter" within the contemplation of Rule 6.03.
The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in
Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s
Rule 6.03 does not only apply if precisely the same legal issues are involved in each liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
representation.38 The Comments of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that
drafted our Code of Professional Responsibility explained that the restriction covers
"engagement or employment, which means that he cannot accept any work or The Board decided as follows:
 … filing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 29 43 of
Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes "intervention" as to place him within the
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means –
subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of: 1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to
occur, fall or come between points of time or events; 3: to come in or between
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between
Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of two things …44
Genbank;
Further, "intervention" is defined as –
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977; 1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the 2: interference that may affect the interests of others …45
Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A.
No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency of With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the
Genbank, together with its attachments; and Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and filing the necessary
petition therefor with the court, Atty. Mendoza "had intervened," "had come in," or
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor "had interfered," in the liquidation of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by
General. respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking institution. Moreover, his acts clearly
affected the interests of GENBANK as well as its stockholders.
for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank."42 Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies

By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not
GENBANK and, more significantly, by filing the petition for assistance in its
liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK and take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if
its subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al.
no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s
I disagree with the ponencia’s holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as
having intervened as it describes the participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he former government client (Central Bank) and
"had no iota of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK."
his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central
Bank, without the participation of Atty. Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA’s Canons of
participation in the proceedings taken subsequent to such declaration, i.e., his giving Professional Ethics, now superseded by the ABA’s Code of Professional
advise to the Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and his Responsibility. In lieu of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA’s Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft
"has not changed sides" – i.e. "there is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two
Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9–101(B) governments in question," stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of the ABA Commission
commands, thus: on Professional Ethics, the ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply
irrespective of the side chosen in private practice. The said court believed that it "is
as it should be for there lurks great potential for lucrative returns in following into
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
private practice the course already charted with the aid of governmental resources." 50
responsibility while he was a public employee.

The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but
The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional
he signed the complaint in that action and admittedly had "substantial responsibility"
Ethics, Opinion No. 37, is –
in its investigatory and preparatory stages. It thus concluded that "where the overlap
of issues is so plain and the involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the
"[to avoid] the manifest possibility that … [a former Government lawyer’s] action as a appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification." 51
public legal official might be influenced (or open to the charge that it had been
influenced) by the hope of later being employed privately to uphold or upset what he
The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest representation
had done.46
conflict" doctrine. It bears stressing that this doctrine applies uniquely to former
government lawyers and has been distinguished from the normal rule applicable for
The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the non-government lawyers in this wise –
policy consideration that an attorney must seek to avoid even the appearance of
evil.47
To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has
represented passenger A and has recovered substantial damages in a suit against a
Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American driver. No conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the lawyer from later
courts and the ABA has persuasive effect on the interpretation of Rule representing passenger B against the driver with respect to exactly the same
6.03.48 Accordingly, I find the case of General Motors Corporation v. City of New accident. B may obtain the benefits of the lawyer’s help regardless of the fact that the
York,49 where the pertinent ethical precepts were applied by the United States Court lawyer might be able to employ to B’s advantage information and strategies
of Appeals (2nd Circuit), particularly instructive. The said US court disqualified the developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the interest of A and
privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the antitrust case it filed against B do not conflict.
the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US
Department of Justice, had not only participated in the latter’s case against General
The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into
Motors Corp. but signed the complaint in that action.
one that is arguably more connected with the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in
private practice represents Small Soap Company in its suit for damages under the
George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap Company. The lawyer would not be
served as a trial attorney assigned at the General Litigation Services of the Antitrust disqualified from representing Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a
Division of the US Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962. Sometime in 1954, he succeeding suit for damages based on precisely the same conspiracy. The
participated in the investigation of the alleged monopolization by General Motors congruence of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost
Corp. of the city and intercity bus business. The investigation culminated with the certainly mean that the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a
filing of the antitrust complaint against General Motors Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed conflict – an opposing interest between the two clients – the existence of a
the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time that he left the substantial relationship between the matters involved in both cases is irrelevant.
Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.
Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual
Soap Company to force divestiture of an acquired company on a theory that, reading of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reveals that no
because of the acquisition, Giant Soap has monopolized an industry in conflict with conflict of interests or adverse interests is required for the interdiction to apply. If it
antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving government service and while in private were so, or if conflict of interests were an element, then the general conflict of
practice, represent Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages interests rule (Rule 15.03)54 would apply. Rather, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly
based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does the absence of opposing interests covers "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
between Medium Soap and the lawyer’s former government client similarly mean that intervened while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our Code of
there should be no disqualification? Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer "cannot accept
any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which
At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the he intervened as a public official, except on behalf of the body or authority which he
normal former-client conflict rules: the lawyer is disqualified from representing the served during his public employment."55
successive client in private practice, despite the fact that the interests of the client
and the lawyer’s former government client are apparently aligned. All that is required In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the Central Bank
for disqualification is the relationship between the former and the succeeding but respondents Tan, et al. Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private
representations.52 practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.) and former government client (Central Bank)
are apparently aligned, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.
The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine has been
explained, thus: Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit

The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other temporal limitation because cases have to be
rule would have upon the decisions and actions taken by the government lawyer
during the course of the earlier representation of the government. Both courts and resolved based on their peculiar circumstances
commentators have expressed the fear that permitting a lawyer to take action in
behalf of a government client that later could be to the advantage of private practice Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of
client would present grave dangers that a government lawyer’s largely discretionary the provisions therein. That Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no explicit temporal
actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private practice limitation is deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time is a factor to consider
employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice clients … in determining its applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered.
For example, in Control Data Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US
The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not District Court of Minnesota held that the lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an
idle. Lawyers who represent the government often exercise enormous discretion employee of the Department of Justice had been in charge of negotiations in antitrust
unchecked by an actual client who oversees the lawyer’s work. For that reason a case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel for the
special rule is needed to remove the incentive for government lawyers to take plaintiffs suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose conduct was
discretionary decisions with an eye cast toward advantages in future, the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was himself 10 years removed
nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes that and, from the matter over which he had substantial responsibility while in public employ at
particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire the time he accepted the private engagement relating to the same matter. 57 Clearly, it
firm with which the former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily is the degree of involvement or participation in the matter while in government
discouraging lawyers from entering temporary public service.53 service, not the passage of time, which is the crucial element in Rule 6.03.
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that "body of of Rule 6.03
principles by which the conduct of members of the legal profession is controlled.
More specifically and practically considered, legal ethics may be defined as that The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would
branch of moral science which treats of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to have a "chilling effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to
his clients, to the courts, to the bar, and to the public." 58 In this connection, the Court defend its interests." This concern is similar to that raised by the City of New York in
has consistently characterized disciplinary proceedings, including disqualification the General Motors case where it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US
cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal, thus: court would "chill the ardor for Government service by rendering worthless the
experience gained in Government employ."61 It appeared that the City of New York
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v. Standard Oil
pure criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather Co,62 known  as  the Esso Export Case, thus:
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the for too long a time, or will prevent him from engaging in the practice of a technical
Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for specialty which he has devoted years in acquiring, and if that sterilization will spread
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the to the firm which he becomes associated, the sacrifice of entering government
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely service will be too great for most men to make.63
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice
and honest administration of justice…59 Irving F. Kaufman, also the ponente of the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two
cases. It noted that the said court denied the motion to disqualify the former
For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in government lawyer in Esso Export Case because the lawyer therein "never
disqualification cases against lawyers. investigated or passed upon the subject matter of the pending case … never
rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal advice in relation to the
In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that regulations involved in the litigation."64 Hence, the accommodation between
had lapsed is not sufficient to consider it far removed from the present engagement maintaining high ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one
of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096. In hand, and encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, was struck
fact, the validity of the said liquidation is still pending with the Court. 60 The validity of under far different circumstances of the Esso Export Case.
the sequestration of the shares in Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily intertwined with Special Proceeding No. 107812 In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The
involving the liquidation of GENBANK and the acquisition thereof by respondents Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics 65 was
Tan, et al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are so overlapping and the considered more to the point:
involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain, direct and
substantial, his disqualification as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the
No. 0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03. attorney, although he did not "investigate" or "pass upon" it, …, there would
undoubtedly be an appearance of evil if he were not disqualified. 66
Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar
Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case
circumstances of this case justify the strict application for the cautious application of the "appearance-of-evil doctrine" because the former
Government lawyer’s connection with the matter at issue was the tenuous one of Footnotes
mere employment in the same Government agency.
1
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (1974).
In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and
preparatory stages, but also signed the complaint in the action. Thus, according to  Foreword of Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial
2

the US court, where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the involvement while in Ethics.
Government employ so direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be
avoided through disqualification. 3
 Abragan v. Rodriguez, 380 SCRA 93 (2001).

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification cases involving 4
 EO No. 1, promulgated on February 29, 1986, created the PCGG which
former government lawyers will have to be resolved on the basis of peculiar was primarily tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
circumstances attending each case. A balance between the two seemingly conflicting Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
policy considerations of maintaining high ethical standards for former Government associates.
employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into Government service, on the
other, must be struck based on, inter alia, the relationship between the former and
the succeeding representations of the former government lawyer. Likewise, as
5
 Mariano Tan Eng Lian in some pleadings.
already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter while in Government
employ is a crucial element in determining if his present representation is within the
6
 Memorandum of the PCGG, pp. 7-9.
purview of Rule 6.03.
7
 The case is now pending with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152551.
In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza in the
liquidation of GENBANK while he was the Solicitor General is so direct that the 8
 Rollo, p. 42.
appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.
9
 Id. at 43.
Conclusion
 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (retired), with Associate
10

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Nathanael M. Grospe, concurring; Id. at 57.
improperly influenced while in government service or that he is guilty of any
impropriety in agreeing to represent respondents Tan, et al. However, I am 11
 Rollo, p. 61.
constrained to vote for his disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid
any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public and private segments of the 12
 Id. at 61-62.
legal profession.
13
 People v. Sandiganbayan, 408 SCRA 672 (2003).
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify
Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned. 14
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 22 SCRA 785 (1968) citing BOUVIER’S LAW
DICTIONARY, 3rd Revision, Vol. I, p. 1651.
15
 Ibid.  AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
29

RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2001 ed., p. 52.

16
 396 SCRA 443 (2003).
30
 WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986), p. 456.
17
 340 SCRA 289 (2000).
31
 Ibid.
18
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715
(2000).  This prohibition is restated in Rule 15.03 of our Code of Professional
32

Responsibility, thus:
19
 FERIA, II CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, 2001 ed., p. 123.
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
20
 344 SCRA 838 (2000). all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

21
 Ibid.
33
 WOLFRAM, supra.

22
 Id.
34
 AGPALO, supra.

23
 Id.
35
 WOLFRAM, supra.

24
 Id.
36
 MEMORANDUM for Respondents Tan, et al., p. 56; Rollo, p. 446.

25
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, supra.
37
 According to the ABA Formal Opinion No. 342, these acts do not fall within
the scope of the term "matter" and do not disqualify a lawyer under DR 9-
101(B) from subsequent private employment involving the same regulations,
26
 Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, supra.
procedures or points of law. WOLFRAM, supra.
27
 Id. 38
 In United States v. Trafficante (328 F.2d 117 [1964]), the United States
Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) held that, under Canon 36, the attorney who
 The ABA first adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics on August 27,
28
was formerly employed in the office of the Regional Counsel of the Internal
1908. Canons 1 to 32 thereof were adopted by the Philippine Bar Association Revenue Service and who handled the tax claims against Trafficante which
(PBA) in 1917. In 1946, the PBA again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 resulted in stipulated settlement in the tax court was disqualified from
of the ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics. The ABA’s Canons of representing the latter in subsequent suits for foreclosure of liens for balance
Professional Ethics were superseded by the Code of Professional due on those income taxes and for other federal taxes. The court therein
Responsibility on January 1, 1970. In 1980, the Integrated Bar of the rejected the lawyer’s claim that disqualification should be ordered only if
Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, precisely the same issues were involved in each representation.
which it later submitted to the Supreme Court for approval. On June 21,
1988, the Supreme Court promulgated the present Code of Professional 39
 AGPALO, supra.
Responsibility. (AGPALO, infra.)
  Then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor
40
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed
Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
Assistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of the all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr. implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The
Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of
41
 RoIllo, p. 109. recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take
over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary
Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
42
 Id. at 113. (Emphasis supplied.)
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or
43
 The provision reads in part: otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose
of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute
the head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and
examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial recover accounts and assets of such institution.
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the
condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34
of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only
Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining
Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in
creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in
but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions. be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of
a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check,
… in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff
conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, orders dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation
plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay
praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business:
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an 55
 See note 39.
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by 56
 318 F.Supp. 145 (D.Minn.1970).
financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or 57
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.
financial community.
 MALCOLM, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS ADAPTED FOR THE
58
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (1949 ed.), p. 8.
appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with
the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & PD No.
59
 Heck v. Santos, 423 SCRA 329 (2004) citing In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562
1827, Jan. 16, 1981) (1970).

 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), p.

44
60
 See note 7.
1183.
61
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.
45
 Ibid.
62
 136 F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.1955).
46
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.
63
 Quoted in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of
47

Professional Ethics, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 657 (1957).

64
 Id.

48
 See Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259 (2000).
65
 See note 42.

49
 Supra.
66
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

50
 Id. at 650.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
51
 Id. at 652.

52
 WOLFRAM, supra.

53
 Ibid.

54
 See note 32. SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.: The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
the relevant part of which I quote as follows:
The Petition in this case should be DISMISSED on two grounds: (1) res judicata,
specifically, conclusiveness of judgment; and (2) prescription. "Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.

In his Dissent, the esteemed Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. argues that Atty. Estelito P. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 1 because having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
after leaving his post as solicitor general, he appeared as counsel in a "matter in
which he had intervened while he was in said service" (as solicitor general). He xxxxxxxxx
postulates that the Code of Professional Responsibility should be a beacon to assist
good lawyers "in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of "(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
professional conduct," in order "to avoid any appearance of impropriety." He adds adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
that the Code should be strictly construed and stringently enforced. conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
On the other hand, the distinguished Justice Reynato S. Puno contends in and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
his ponencia that Rule 6.03 of the Code has been incorrectly applied by Justice
Callejo, because the "procedural advice" given by Atty. Mendoza is not the "matter" "(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
contemplated by the said Rule. The ponencia explains that an "ultra restrictive that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
reading of the Rule" would have "ill-effects in our jurisdiction." appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."
With due respect to both Justices Puno and Callejo, I respectfully submit that there is
no need to delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there The above provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by
is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res
allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096- judicata serves as an absolute proscription of a subsequent action when the following
0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same court resolving the very same issue requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order was final; (2) it adjudged the
on the "disqualification" of Atty. Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (3) it was rendered by a court that had
same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can no longer be jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) between the first and the
altered or changed. second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.2
I believe that the material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza
may still be barred from representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in In regard to the fourth requirement, if there is no identity of causes of action but only
another case resolving the very same ground for disqualification involving the same an identity of issues, res judicata exists under the second concept; that is,
parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of a under conclusiveness of judgment. In the latter concept, the rule bars the re-
sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties but on different  claims
when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the Code) was raised. or causes of action.3 Such rule, however, does not have the same effect as a bar by
former judgment, which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon
Conclusiveness the same claim, demand or cause of action.

of Judgment
In other words, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question and damages" vis-à-vis their sequestered properties. The Complaint was docketed
has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit as Civil Case No. 0005 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan
by a court of competent jurisdiction; it has thus been conclusively settled by a (SBN).
judgment or final order issued therein. Insofar as the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them) are concerned, and while the judgment or order remains Meanwhile, in separate Petitions before this Court, the validity of the sequestration
unreversed or un-vacated by a proper authority upon a timely motion or petition, such Writs was questioned by herein respondents, but said Petitions were referred by the
conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other Court to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to the
action between the same parties or their privies, in the same or in any other court of SBN Fifth Division and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and 0099. Civil
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, the Case No. 0096, in particular, involved the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued
only identities required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of by the PCGG over herein private respondents’ shares of stock in Allied Banking
judgment is that between parties and issues.4 Corporation (formerly General Bank and Trust Company or "GenBank").

While it does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which proscribes In all the above-mentioned cases, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the counsel of Tan
subsequent actions, conclusiveness of judgment nonetheless operates as an et al.
estoppel to issues or points controverted, on which the determination of the earlier
finding or judgment has been anchored.5 The dictum laid down in such a finding or On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed in Civil Case No. 0005 a Motion 7 to disqualify
judgment becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same Atty. Mendoza as counsel for therein Respondents Tan et al. In a Resolution 8 dated
parties, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) denied that Motion. The anti-
the facts of the case or incident before the court. The binding effect and enforceability graft court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
of that dictum can no longer be re-litigated, since the said issue or matter has already PCGG.9 Because the latter did not appeal the denial, the Resolution became final and
been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case. 6 executory.

Relevant Antecedents Similarly, in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a Motion 10 to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for Respondents Lucio Tan et al. According to respondent court,
Showing the Application of the "the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No.
0005"; in fact, both incidents were taken up jointly by the Second and the Fifth
Conclusiveness Doctrine Divisions of the Sandiganbayan.11 Indeed, a perusal of both Motions reveals that,
except as to their respective captions, the contents of the Motions are identically
Let me now discuss some relevant antecedents to show the application to this case worded. Both Motions were anchored essentially on the same ground: that by virtue
of res judicata, specifically the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Mendoza was
prohibited from acting as counsel of Tan et al. in the pending cases. During his
tenure as solicitor general, Atty. Mendoza had allegedly "intervened" in the
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the
dissolution of GenBank, Allied Bank’s predecessor.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued sometime in June to
August 1986 several Writs of Sequestration over certain properties of Respondents
Lucio Tan et al., properties they had supposedly acquired by taking advantage of Thus, in its herein assailed July 11, 2001 Resolution, respondent court resolved to
their close relationship with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. reiterate and adopt "the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Second Division x x x denying the motion."
On August 17, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint
against the same respondents for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting Resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 a Final Order Motions to Disqualify, though separately filed at different times in those two cases,
are likewise the same or identical. Also undisputed is the fact that no appeal or
As distinguished from an interlocutory order, a final judgment or order decisively puts certiorari petition was taken from the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Second Division
an end to (or disposes of) a case or a disputed issue; in respect thereto, nothing else in Civil Case No. 0005, which had denied PCGG’s Motion.
-- except its execution -- is left for the court to do. Once that judgment or order is
rendered, the adjudicative task of the court on the particular matter involved is To counter the application of res judicata, Justices Morales and Callejo opine that the
likewise ended.12 Such an order may refer to the entire controversy or to some said April 22, 1991 Resolution was merely interlocutory. It "merely settled an
defined and separate branch thereof.13 On the other hand, an order is interlocutory if incidental or collateral matter x x x; it cannot operate to bar the filing of another
its effects are merely provisional in character and still leave substantial proceedings motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases x x x," Justice Callejo explains.
to be further conducted by the issuing court in order to put the issue or controversy to I beg to disagree.
rest.14
True, there is, as yet, no final adjudication of the merits of the main issues of
I have no quarrel with the general test -- expounded, with acknowledged authorities, "reversion, reconveyance and restitution." However, I submit that the question with
in the Dissenting Opinions of Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Callejo -- for respect to the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza had nonetheless been conclusively
determining whether an order is interlocutory. Such test, however, applies to orders settled. Indeed, the April 22, 1991 SBN Resolution had definitively disposed of the
that dispose of incidents or issues that are intimately related to the very cause of Motion to Disqualify on its merits. Since no appeal was taken therefrom, it became
action or merits of the case. The exception lies when the order refers to a "definite final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period. 16
and separate branch" of the main controversy, as held by the Court in Republic v.
Tacloban City Ice Plant.15 While it merely disposed of a question that was collateral to the main controversy, the
Resolution should be differentiated from an ordinary interlocutory order that resolves
Under the present factual milieu, the matter of disqualification of Atty. Mendoza as an incident arising from the very subject matter or cause of action, or one that is
counsel for respondents is a "defined and separate branch" of the main case for related to the disposition of the main substantive issues of the case itself. Such an
"reversion, reconveyance, and restitution" of the sequestered properties. This matter order is not appealable, but may still be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
has no direct bearing on the adjudication of the substantive issues in the principal grounds adduced before final judgment. Verily, res judicata would not apply therein.17
controversy. The final judgment resolving the main case does not depend on the
determination of the particular question raised in the Motion. The April 22, 1991 But, as illustrated earlier, the issue of the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza is
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 had finally separate from and independent of the substantive issues in the main case for
and definitively determined the issue of Atty. Mendoza’s disqualification to act as "reversion, reconveyance and restitution." This particular question, in relation to Rule
counsel for Tan et al. Since that Resolution was not appealed, it became final and 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, was finally settled in the Resolution
executory. It became a conclusive judgment insofar as that particular question was of April 22, 1991, issued by the SBN Second Division. In fact, I submit that this
concerned. question had to be squarely resolved before trial proceeded, so as not to prejudice
the movant in case its arguments were found to be meritorious. Otherwise, the
Applying the Doctrine of Motion would be rendered naught.

Conclusiveness of Judgment In 2001, ten years after its filing, the identical Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza in
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 finally came up for deliberation before the Fifth Division of
There is no question as regards the identity of the parties involved in Civil Case Nos. the Sandiganbayan. The Fifth Division correctly noted that the pending Motion was
0005 and 0096. Neither has the jurisdiction of the Second and the Fifth Divisions of "exactly the same in substance as that Motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005." Thus, it
the Sandiganbayan been placed at issue. Clearly, the matter raised in the two resolved to reiterate and adopt the Second Division’s April 22, 1991 Resolution
denying the Motion. Interestingly and understandably, the Fifth Division of the anti- No. 0005 seeks to recover alleged ill-gotten shares of stock of respondents Tan et al.
graft court no longer separately reviewed the merits of the Motion before it, because in Allied Bank. Civil Case No. 0096 questions the validity of the Sequestration Writ
the Second Division’s Resolution disposing of exactly the same Motion and involving over the same shares of stock involved in Civil Case No. 0005. In the ultimate
the same parties and subject matter had long attained finality. That Resolution analysis, both cases refer to the determination of who has a valid ownership claim
became a conclusive judgment between the parties with respect to the subject matter over said stockholdings.
involved therein.
In any event and as earlier discussed, in our jurisdiction, the only identities required
Exception to Application of for the principle of conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an estoppel are those
of parties and issues.20
Conclusiveness of Judgment
Similar Motions in
Justice Morales further cites Kilosbayan v. Morato,18 in which the Court19 said that "the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does Other PCGG Cases
not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved."
Explaining further, the Court cited therein the "authoritative formulation" of the Parenthetically, it is worth mentioning that in their Memorandum, 21 Respondents Tan
exception in Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments, thus: et al. aver that similar Motions to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza were likewise filed in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0095 and 0100. The former case, Sipalay Trading v.
"§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final PCGG, involved shares of stock of Lucio Tan in Maranaw Hotels and Resort
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue Corporation; the latter case, Allied Banking Corporation v. PCGG, sought the
in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following invalidation of an Order for the search and seizure of certain documents of Allied
circumstances: Bank.

xxxxxxxxx In both cases, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions to Disqualify, as well
as the Motions for Reconsideration. No further actions were taken by the PCGG on
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are such denials, which thus became executory. Consequently, Atty. Mendoza was
substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take allowed to represent Lucio Tan in those cases.
account or an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid
inequitable administration of the laws; x x x. [Emphasis and omissions in the On the merits of the said cases, which were consolidated, the Sandiganbayan
original.]" granted both Petitions on August 23, 1993, by nullifying the Writ of Sequestration
questioned in Civil Case No. 0095, as well as the Search and Seizure Order assailed
In accordance with the above exception to the rule, Justice Morales believes that the in Civil Case No. 0100. On March 29, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the SBN’s
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply to this case, because the Decision in the aforementioned consolidated cases.22 Consequently, now deemed res
issue at bar -- disqualification of counsel -- "is undoubtedly a legal question" and judicata are all issues raised in Civil Case Nos. 0095 and 0100 -- principal, incidental
"Civil Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially and corollary issues, including the matter of the alleged disqualification of Atty.
unrelated claims." Mendoza.

I respectfully disagree with respect to her second point, which actually qualifies the Presence of Identities of
exception. I believe that the two cases involve substantially related claims. Civil Case
Parties and Issues time.29 It was designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until relevant proofs are lost, memories
As earlier discussed, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of faded, and witnesses no longer available.30 Consistent with law and jurisprudence
judgment to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and issues. In the case and the purpose of statutes of limitations, the prohibition on former government
before us, both identities are clearly present. Hence, the principle of conclusiveness attorneys from involvement in matters in which they took part long ago, pursuant to
of judgment applies and bars the present Petition. their official functions while in public service, should likewise have an expiry or
duration.
From the foregoing, I submit that this Petition should be dismissed on the ground of
conclusiveness of judgment. Parenthetically, the proper recourse to assail the July In the present case, the liquidation of GenBank, in which Atty. Mendoza purportedly
11, 2001 and the December 5, 2001 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth participated as then solicitor general, took place in 1977 or more than a quarter of a
Division) should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. century ago. Since early 1986, he has ceased to be solicitor general and has since
The certiorari proceeding before this Court is apparently a substitute for a lost appeal, engaged in the private practice of law. In 1987, he became counsel for Respondents
deserving only of outright dismissal.23 In any event, contrary to the allegations of Tan et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and, since 1990, in Civil Case Nos. 0095 to
petitioner, respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to 0100.31 At the time, at least ten (10) years had passed since his alleged involvement
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions. in the GenBank liquidation. Moreover, in 1991 when the separate Motions to
Disqualify were filed by PCGG in these aforementioned cases, he had been outside
government service for about five (5) years, and fifteen years had gone by since the
Proscription
said liquidation.
Time-Barred
Now it is already 2005. If we go by the rationale behind prescription, the extent of the
individual participation of government officials in the GenBank liquidation may indeed
True, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not expressly specify "have become so obscure from the lapse of time," if not from "defective memory."
the period of its applicability or enforceability. However, I submit that one cannot infer
that, ergo, the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent.
It is undeniable that government lawyers usually handle a multitude of cases
simultaneously or within overlapping periods of time. This is in fact a common
All civil actions have a prescriptive period.24 Unless a law makes an action remonstration, especially among prosecutors, public attorneys, solicitors, government
imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the action is subject to a bar by corporate counsels, labor arbiters, even trial and appellate judges. Yet, as dutiful
prescription five (5) years after the right of action accrued. 25 Criminal offenses -- even public servants, they cannot reject or shrink from assignments even if they are
the most heinous ones -- as well as the penalties therefor, likewise already overloaded with work. Similarly, lawyers in private practice, whether by
prescribe.26 Relatedly, even so-called perpetual penalties and multiple sentences themselves or employed in law firms, are in a comparative plight.
have maximum periods.27
It would not be strange or uncommon that, in a period of five years, an attorney in
Relevantly, it is worth pointing out that Republic Act No. 6713 prohibits public officers government service would have handled or interfered in hundreds of legal matters
and employees from practicing their profession for only one year after their involving varied parties.32 Thousands of attorneys who have chosen to dedicate their
resignation, retirement or separation from public office, in connection with any matter service to the government for some years are in such a situation. Hence,
before their former office.28 to perpetually and absolutely ban them from taking part in all cases involving some
matter in which they have taken part in some distant past, pursuant to their official
Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from functions then, would be unduly harsh, unreasonable and unfair. It would be
transactions or facts that have been obscured by defective memory or the lapse of tantamount to an unwarranted deprivation of the exercise of their profession. Be it
remembered that a profession, trade or calling partakes of the nature of a property details of a specific case despite active participation in the proceedings therein. This
right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. 33 principle holds if, in the interval, one has handled countless other legal matters as is
so common among lawyers in government offices.
Moreover, to attribute to a former government lawyer a violation of some ethical rule
because of participation in a matter that has been forgotten in good faith due to the Consequently, after the said period, former government attorneys should be allowed
lapse of a long period of time and does not involve interest adverse to the to take up cases involving matters that were brought before them during their
government would likewise be harsh, unreasonable and unfair. incumbency in public office, so long as such matters do not come within the
"adverse-interest conflict" doctrine and the conflict-of-interest rule 36 applicable to all
Similarly, there are many competent private practitioners who, at some point in their lawyers in general.
long careers, would wish to serve the government. Would their fine and wide-ranging
practice and experience, which would otherwise be beneficial to the government, For the same reasons, the disqualification of members of the judiciary under Section
likewise forever bar them from getting involved in matters that concern a party with 5(b) and (d)37 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct38 should also prescribe
whom they have had dealings several years ago and whose interests are not in five (5) years from the time they assumed their judicial position; or from the time
adversely affected? In the case of acknowledged experts in specific fields of law, of they retire from or otherwise end their government service.
what use would their needed expertise be to the government if they have to inhibit
themselves from every case involving a party they have served in the distant past, I realize that the application of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
considering the limited number of parties that may actually be involved in a specific and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct is quite important to
field (for instance, intellectual property or bioethics law)? many members of the bar who have served, or who aspire to serve, the government.

I submit that the restraint on the exercise of one’s profession, or right of employment On the one hand, our rules of discipline should protect the interest of the public by
including that of attorneys formerly in government service, must survive the test of discouraging attorneys in government from so shaping their practice as to give unfair
fairness and reasonableness. The restriction should not be as pervasive and longer advantage to their future private clients, or from jeopardizing confidential information
than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the interests of the learned while in government service. On the other hand, government service should
government. After all, the disqualification of government attorneys is a drastic not be discouraged by overly strict ethical rules that perpetually prohibit government
measure, and courts should hesitate to impose it except when necessary. 34 lawyers from later making reasonable and appropriate use in private practice of the
expertise or experience they have gained.39
Thus, I submit that the restriction on government lawyers -- specifically with respect
to subsequent engagement or employment in connection with matters falling under The reality is that the best lawyers will want to join the more lucrative private sector
the "congruent-interest representation" -- should be allowed to expire after a sooner or later, and the government will hardly be able to attract them if they would
reasonable period when no further prejudice to the public may be contemplated. The later be unreasonably restricted from putting their government experience to some
duration of this prohibition should be no more than five (5) years from retirement or use.40 After all, government service should afford lawyers the opportunity to improve
separation from government service. Five years is the prescriptive period for suits for their subsequent private employment. The nature of the job brings such lawyers into
which no period is prescribed by law.35 inevitable contact with clients interested in their fields of expertise. Because the
practice of law is becoming increasingly specialized, the likely consequence of a
It would be reasonable to assume that five years after separation from the service, wholesale approach to disqualification would be encouragement of a two-track
one would most likely have lost the loyalty of one’s former personal contacts, if not professional structure: government lawyer, private lawyer. The suspicion, and the
the loyal associates themselves, who may be able to facilitate the acquisition of reality, of ethical improprieties unrelated to particular government cases would be
important information from the former office. In all probability, the lapse of the said eliminated -- but at the cost of creating an insular, static legal bureaucracy. 41
period would also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of
Such a pervasive, perpetual ban would deter too many competent attorneys from already surrounds the handling of Civil Case No. 0005 and No. 0096, both of which
entering government service, to the detriment of the public. 42 The Court must strike a involve the same parties and the same subject matter.
balance. I believe that the adoption of the aforementioned period of limitation would
achieve the purpose behind Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as In Civil Case No. 0005, which seeks to recover allegedly unlawfully acquired
well as Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. properties consisting of shares of stock of Respondent Tan et al. in Allied Bank, Atty.
Mendoza is allowed to serve as their counsel. However, in Civil Case No. 0096,
To summarize, the present Petition is barred by the principle of conclusiveness of which merely questions the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued against the
judgment, because the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the SBN Second Division in Civil shares of stock in Allied Bank of the same respondents, he is prohibited, per the
Case No. 0005 -- which resolved on the merits the very same ground for the dissenters, from acting as their counsel. This is preposterous.
disqualification of Atty. Mendoza, and which involved essentially the same parties
and the same subject matter as the present case -- constituted a final and executory Moreover, treating the first Resolution as not yet final and executory, even if no
order, no timely appeal having been taken therefrom. appeal or certiorari has timely been taken therefrom, would allow the questioned
counsel to act as such throughout the trial period until final judgment by the court a
Furthermore, the disqualification of former government lawyers from congruent- quo. Thereafter, on appeal, his alleged "disqualification" may still be raised by the
interest representation under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility other party as an issue. If the appeals court or this Tribunal ultimately finds that the
should be effective only for a period of five (5) years from the retirement or the said counsel is indeed disqualified on the ground of conflict of interest or "congruent-
separation from government service of the official concerned. The purpose of such interest representation conflict" and thus reverses the trial court’s ruling, the case
prescriptive period is to prevent undue restraint on former government lawyers from would necessarily be remanded for new trial. As a result, the entire proceedings
the private practice of their profession, especially in the field of expertise that they would become naught and thereby unnecessarily waste the precious time, effort and
may have gained while in public office. Similarly, the disqualification of members of resources of the courts as well as the parties. Worse, the evidence (or defense)
the judiciary, under Section 5 (b) and (d) of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial adduced by the "disqualified" counsel through his prior connections with the
Conduct should end five (5) years after they assumed their judicial position. government (or the adverse party) could have already created bias in the court or in
the public mind.
Implications of the
These are precisely the procedural absurdities abhorred by the doctrine of res
Dissenting Opinions judicata, the fundamental principle of due process and of the rule proscribing forum
shopping.
Endless re-litigations of the same question, as well as forum shopping, are invited by
the opinion of the dissenters that the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Having already shown that Atty. Mendoza can no longer be disqualified at this point
Sandiganbayan’s Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 does not bar the filing of for his alleged violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, due
another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza from other cases between the same to res judicata and prescription, I submit that there is no more need to discuss on the
parties. Such a holding would effectively allow herein petitioner to file exactly the merits whether indeed there was in fact such violation. Such discussion would be
same Motion in each of other and future cases involving the same parties or their merely academic and moot.
privies and the same subject matters, even after the first Motion involving the same
question or issue will have already been finally resolved in one of like cases. May I close this Opinion with this oft-quoted ruling of former Chief Justice Pedro L.
Yap, who was himself a former PCGG commissioner, on the soundness of upholding
Further, it would also allow petitioner to let a contrary resolution of the incident in one final judgments even "at the risk of occasional errors":
case become final through petitioner’s withholding recourse to a higher court in order
to await a possible favorable ruling in one of the other cases. As it is, absurdity
"It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn 7
 Rollo, pp. 216-220.
and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a
disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive 8
 Penned by Justice Romeo M. Escareal (chairman) and concurred in by
determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Nathanael M. Grospe (members); rollo, pp.
Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more 57-63.
than an important principle of public policy: and that it is not too much to say that it is
a fundamental concept in the organization of the jural sytem. Public policy and sound 9
 Resolution dated July 24, 1991; rollo, pp. 233-237.
practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 43
10
 Rollo, pp. 221-225.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

11
 Resolution dated July 11, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division),
referring to the Record of Civil Case No. 0096, Vol. I, pp. 134-135; rollo, p.
42. This unsigned Resolution was unanimously approved by Justices Minita
V. Chico-Nazario (Division chairperson, now a member of this Court),
Rodolfo G. Palattao and Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (members).

Footnotes 12
 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 355 Phil. 804, August 17, 1998
(citing Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334, January 27,
1
 "Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept 1987; and Denso [Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had 280, February 27, 1987). In this case, the Court held:
intervened while in said service."
"The order of the trial court dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim was a final
2
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715, June 19, order since the dismissal, although based on a technicality, would require
2001. nothing else to be done by the court with respect to that specific subject
except only to await the possible filing during the reglementary period of a
3
 Ibid. motion for reconsideration or the taking of an appeal therefrom."

4
 Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732, February 7, 1991 (reiterated The Court further said that errors of judgment, as well as procedure, that do
in Calalang v. Register of Deeds,  231 SCRA 88, March 11, 1994; and not relate to the jurisdiction of the court or involve grave abuse of discretion
in Intestate Estate of San Pedro v. Court of Appeals,  265 SCRA 733, are reviewable by timely appeal, not by a special civil action for certiorari,
December 18, 1996). unless for valid and compelling reasons.

5
 Camara v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 608, July 20, 1999.
13
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683, September 17, 2001
(citing Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant, 258 SCRA 145, July 5, 1996;
6 and Dela Cruz v. Paras, 69 SCRA 556, February 27, 1976).
 Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 302, February 11, 1986; Vda. De
Sta. Romana v. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,  118 SCRA
330, November 15, 1982.  Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, supra (citing Bairan v. Tan Siu
14

Lay, 18 SCRA 1235, December 28, 1966).

15
 Supra, p. 155. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with
the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in
16
 Pascual v. Court of Appeals,  300 SCRA 214, December 16, 1998; Navarro five years.
v. NLRC, 327 SCRA 22, March 1, 2000; Testate Estate of Manuel v.
Biascarr,  347 SCRA 621, December 11, 2000; People v. Alay-ay, 363 SCRA The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
603, August 23, 2001; Vda. de Sta. Romana v. Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank, supra. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six
months.
 Manila Electric Co. v. Arciaga, 50 Phil. 144, March 18, 1927 (citing Reilly v.
17

Perkins, 56 Pac 734). Light offenses prescribe in two months."

18
 246 SCRA 540, 561, July 17, 1995, per Mendoza, J. "Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by
final sentence prescribe as follows:
 Voting here was close (5 justices fully concurred in the ponencia, 2 wrote
19

separate concurring opinions, while 5 dissented.) 1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
20
 Nabus v. Court of Appeals, supra. 2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
21
 Rollo, pp. 391-471. 3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of
arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
22
 GR Nos. 112708-09, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.
4. Light penalties, in one year."
 Spouses Morales v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 337, January 28,
23

1998; Cabellan v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 119, March 3, See also Act No. 3326, as amended.
1999; Republic v. Court of Appeals,  322 SCRA 81, January 18, 2000.
27
 "Art. 70 [Revised Penal Code]. x x x.
24
 See Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum
25
 Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66, June 10, 1988. duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
26
 Arts. 90 & 92 of the Revised Penal Code provide as follows: No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum
total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.
"Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. "Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. "In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties
(pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."
28
 "Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. x x x. 37
 "Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in
"These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to,
subparagraph (b); (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice instances where
his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply." xxxxxxxxx

29
 Ochagabia v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 233, March 11, 1999; Peñales v. (b) The judge previously served as lawyer or was a material witness in the
IAC, 229 Phil. 245, October 27, 1986. matter in controversy;

30
 Order of R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342 xxxxxxxxx
(1944); Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge, 2004 WL 3016015, December 30,
2004. (d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer
in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge
31
 Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 399-400. served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein;
32
 Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of
about a thousand cases in full-length ponencias and countless cases by way x x x x x x x x x"
of unsigned minute or extended Resolutions. This does not include the
thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of the Court, in which I [Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the old Code of Judicial Conduct.]
actively took part during their deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that I
cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in each of these  AM No. 03-05-01-SC, promulgated on April 27, 2004 and effective June 1,
38
cases, especially in the earlier ones. 2004.

 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87,

33
39
 In re Sofaer, 728 A2d 625, April 22, 1999.
August 5, 1996.
 Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A2d 37,
40
34
 Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp 551, 1995. December 21, 1984.
35
 Art. 1149, Civil Code.  Ibid. (citing Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, 94 Harv.L.Rev.
41

1244, 1428-30 [1981]).

36
 Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility:
42
 Ibid.
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."  Legarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194, February 26, 1988, per
43

Yap, J. (later CJ).
  However, whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza
participated in the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at
  sometime in 1987 when he agreed to represent the respondents, the Code of
Professional Responsibility had not yet been promulgated.
 
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme
Court on 21 June 1988.1 Prior to its official adoption, there was no similar
 
official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court other than
the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.
 
I fear it would set a dangerous precedent to hinge Atty. Mendoza’s culpability
SEPARATE OPINION on the Code of Professional Responsibility, as it would effectively imply that
the Code of Professional Responsibility has application even as to acts
TINGA, J.: performed prior to its enactment. Our laws frown upon the prospectivity of
statutes. Article 4 of the Civil Code declares that "Laws shall have no
My vote to grant the petition hinges on the reasons stated hereunder. They retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." There is no declaration in
pertain to a significant and material dimension to this case which deserves the Code of Professional Responsibility that gives retroactive effect to its
greater illumination. canons and rules. It is settled that the presumption is that all laws operate
prospectively absent clear contrary language in the text, 2 and that in every
To sustain the view that Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) should be case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of
disqualified as counsel in Civil Case No. 0096, as the dissenters are wont to laws.3
hold, there should be a clear legal basis that would mandate such
disqualification. The dissenters would hold Atty. Mendoza liable for violating The Court in Co v. Court of Appeals provided an exhaustive disquisition on
Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, while the scope of the rule on the prospective application of statutes:
the ponencia  disputes the assertion that the provision was indeed
transgressed. I maintain that Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been
present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be violative of his right to applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682
due process. (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the
Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in
I have qualms in holding any member of the Bar liable for violating Section payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, in connection with acts that effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30,
they may have engaged in as government officials before the enactment of 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting
the said Code. In this case, at the time Atty. Mendoza entered the to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
government service he had no idea of the kind of inhibition proposed to be retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64
foisted on him currently. Indeed, he is being faulted for representing the SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90,
respondents in Civil Case No. 0096 notwithstanding the fact that as Solicitor amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application;
General and in the discharge of his official functions, he had advised the People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of General Bank convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when the alleged
and Trust Company, which was subsequently acquired by the respondents. violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette;
Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. general rules, affirmed by jurisprudence, that abhor the retroactivity of
27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and statutes and regulations such as the Code of Professional Responsibility.
P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn
farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations Hence, to impute culpability on the part of Atty. Mendoza, it would be
implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, necessary to ascertain whether his accession to represent the respondents
adjudging that RA 6389 which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for violated any binding law or regulation at the time of the engagement. It is but
the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of proper to frame the question in such manner, for only then could it be
a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling ascertained whether Atty. Mendoza knew or should have known that his
that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be professional representation of the respondents was illegal. It would also be
accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding unfair to ascribe liability to any lawyer whom, at the time he/she was in
that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (See also Bonifacio government service, was not guided by any definitive rule prescribing the
v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419). possible subsequent restrictions on the lawyer’s professional activity as a
consequence of the exercise of public office.
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to
administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Ostensibly, Atty. Mendoza’s actions violated Canon 36 of the Canons of
Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or Professional Ethics, which some authorities deemed as a source of legal
ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7 Canon 36 states:
effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling
that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez
v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon
permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
expired before the Circular was issued.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New
Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Canon 36 would apparently cover the allegations imputed to Atty. Mendoza.
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .’"4 However, a thorough review should first be examined on whether Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics may be used as legal basis in resolving
I believe that there is a greater demand to ward off the retroactive application this case.
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for the Code is the source of penal
liabilities against its infringers. It is well entrenched that generally, penal laws The Canons of Professional Ethics originated from the American Bar
or those laws which define offenses and prescribe penalties for their violation Association.8 They were adopted by the Philippine Bar Association as its own
operate prospectively.5 The Constitution itself bars the enactment of ex-post in 1917 and in 1946.9 There is no denying the high regard enjoyed by the
facto laws.6 I do not think it necessary to flirt with the constitutional issue Philippine Bar Association in the legal community in its nearly one hundred
whether the Code of Professional Responsibility operates as a penal statute years of existence. However, there is also no denying that the Philippine Bar
within the definition of an ex-post facto law, but I am satisfied with the Association, a civic non-profit association,10 is a private entity of limited
membership within the Philippine bar. The rules or canons it has adopted
are per se binding only on its members, and the penalties for violation of the It might be possible to concede that this principle embodied under Canon 36
same could affect only the status or rights of the infringers as members of the or even as stated in American case law, subsisted within that penumbra of
association. ethical standards from which the Court could have derived a jurisprudential
rule had one been called for by a particular case. However, it remains that
At the same time, reference has been had by this Court to the Canons of none such was pronounced by this Court in jurisprudence, and indeed the
Professional Ethics in deciding administrative cases against lawyers, prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as
especially prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Ethics. Hence, a norm until the enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21
the belief by some commentators that the said Canons may serve as a June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty. Mendoza agreed to represent the
source of legal ethics in this country. However, I think it would be grave error respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing him from such
to declare that the Canons of Professional Ethics, on their own, serves as an engagement or penalizing him for such representation.
indisputable source of obligations and basis of penalties imposable upon
members of the Philippine legal profession. This would violate the long- I am mindful that what the Court is called upon to decide is whether the
established constitutional principle that it is the Supreme Court which is Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, and not just mere error
tasked with the promulgation of rules governing the admission to the practice in fact or law, in denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. The absence
of law, as well as the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. 11 The of a definitive disqualificatory rule that would have guided Atty. Mendoza
task of formulating ethical rules governing the practice of law in the when he undertook the questioned acts sufficiently justifies the
Philippines could not have been delegated to the Philippine Bar Association Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion.
by the Supreme Court. Neither could such rules as adopted by the private
body be binding on the Supreme Court or the members of the bar. We should not render insensate the concerns raised by the minority, arising
as they do from an understandable concern that the line dividing the
If provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Philippine Bar professional activities and the government services rendered by lawyers
Association have jurisprudentially been enforced, or acknowledged as basis should remain distinct. Yet the majority likewise demonstrates that there is no
for legal liability by the Supreme Court, they may be recognized as a binding unanimity on prevalent legal thought on the matter, and a healthy debate on
standard imposable upon members of the bar, but not because said the issue will result in no harm. Still, the due process dimension, as
Canons or the Philippine Bar Association itself said so, but because the highlighted by the absence of a definitive rule for which Atty. Mendoza could
Supreme Court said so. This is keeping in line with the entrenched rule, as have been held accountable, proves determinative to my mind. The Court is
evinced by Article 8 of the Civil Code, which states that "judicial decisions the enforcer of the constitutional guarantees of due process to all persons,
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the and my vote is but a consequence of this primordial duty.
legal system."

Thus, I would be willing to consider Canon 36 as binding on Atty. Mendoza

when he deigned to represent the respondents if at such time, this Court had Footnotes
expressly acknowledged Canon 36 as a rule or standard which deserves
obeisance by members of the bar. After all, it would only be through such
R. Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers (1st
1 
process of judicial recognition that these guidelines adopted by a private
ed., 1991), at 369.
entity could be considered as a normative rule compulsory on all
practitioners. Unfortunately, no such case exists in Philippine jurisprudence.
R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (5th ed., 2003), at 355; citing
2 

Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950); People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143

(1955); Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 12174, 28
December 1962, 6 SCRA 886; Commissioner v. Lingayen Gulf
Electric Power Co., Inc., 164 SCRA 27 (1988).

Id., citing Montilla v. Agustina Corp., 24 Phil. 220 (1913); Cebu

3 

Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.

20563, 29 October 1968, 25 SCRA 789 (1968).

Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993.

4 

Agpalo, supra note 2, at 357; citing People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387

5 

(1923).

See Article III, Sec. 22, Constitution.

6 

See, e.g., G. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at 9.

7 

Agpalo, supra note 1, at 381.
8 

VI. LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Ibid.
9  • CANON 7
Ø Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, AC No. 4749,January 20,2000
See Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 228 Phil. 564, 572
10 

(1986).

See Section 5(5), Article VIII, Constitution. See also Section 5(5),
11 

Article X, 1973 Constitution and Section 13, Article VIII, 1935

Constitution.

SECOND DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 4749           January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.: Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these
Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: courts).

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not by:
indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in
his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using 1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No.
this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC. February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction
which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,
1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM. Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,
November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div. order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid
Attorneys." or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum 4 dated June
3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he
1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed
of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law. and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and
pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his
good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is
Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all
food faith, to the contrary.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150. and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated
was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this
case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of suspension for three months.
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of
the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B"
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060
delinquent in his dues.
for at least three years."
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of
his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is.
his IBP dues was in 1991."
His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him
xxx     xxx     xxx
 The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is
the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
4 of Respondent's Memorandum). the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the membership or association dues.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Responsibility which provides:
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice deceitful conduct.
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior TO THE COURT.
citizen since 1992.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
Rule 139-A provides: of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year
members thereof. suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED. Ø Leda v. Tabang,AC No. 2505,February 21,1992

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Footnotes EN BANC

1 
Rollo, pp. 4-9.  

2 
Id., p. 11. A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

3 
Id., p. 13. EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
4  ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
Records, pp. 35-42.

5 
Id., pp. 39-40.

6 
Records, p. 57. PER CURIAM:

7 
Rollo, p. 38. Complainant,  Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian
Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one
8  docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Comment-Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Records, pp. 40-41. Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14
February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted

marriage at Tigbauan,  Iloilo.  The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of
Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had
finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in
1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that
they had not  lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar.  In b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is
his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations already married in his application to take the bar exam.
but  Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No.
78,  claiming that  Respondent had  acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification
thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral he submitted to the Supreme Court;
character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became
aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5). d. For (sic) guilty of deception for  the reason that he deceived me
into signing of  the affidavit of  desistance and the conformity to his
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required  him to answer the explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when
Complaint. in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me
to resume our marriage and introduced me to  his family, friends and
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to
June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October
1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and
could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he
examinations  "in order to keep stable our future."  He also admitted having indicated had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore
belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the and considered her only a friend.  Their marriage contract was actually void for failure
complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the
and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an
which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed. affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982.  Attached to it was years old at the time.  He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to
Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out put her family name "in shame."  As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-
of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me
pursuing her Complaint against Respondent. even (sic) you  go to any court."  According to Complainant, although the letter was
unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies
marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the
making a mockery of our marriage institution. beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the
contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5)
years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.  He could  not have Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various
abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78  and in the case at bar is duplicitous and
wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in deplorable.
the eyes of the law, he was single.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally
investigation, report and recommendation.  On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General married" to Complainant.  Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he
submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending
the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to instead that it is only the second  page where his signature appears that he meant to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely  of Complainant's
conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court. own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case,
he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g];  4[b]).
On 26  March 1990,  the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar
Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation.  In an undated Report, the Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to
latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage
marriage is settled. and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the
marriage contract.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we
find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established. In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be
made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case,
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter order from the beginning."
bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II
of the Code  of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be Thirdly, Respondent denies that he  had sent  the unsigned
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact letter (Annex  "F," Petition)  to  Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with
in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the
had been known, would have disqualified him outright  from taking the Bar beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil
Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character. Code.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as Fourthly,  the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had
"single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar
wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would
beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge
assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76
of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident.  He has resorted to
therewith has been regularly performed. conflicting submissions before this  Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in
devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose.  In  so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing authorized by law to administer oaths.  The  official, priest or minister
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
artifice."  Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10).  Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking marriage.
in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer
of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to  admission to the practice of law; its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of law  (People v. Tuanda, Adm.  Case
No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692).  As  so  aptly put  by  Mr.
Justice  George  A.  Malcolm: "As good character  is  an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350
[1933]).

WHEREFORE,  finding  respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy

to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office
of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further
Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and

served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a

woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other.  The contracting parties
 admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have
passed the examinations.

2. STATUTES; WORDS AND PHRASES; "INTEREST OF THE STATE" EXPLAINED

AND CONSTRUED. — We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the
phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state"
cannot be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone.
These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with
them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution
of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and
Ø In Re: Parazo, G.R. No. 120348,December 3,1948 correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when
public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same
Constitution provides that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety
requires it.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine
EN BANC Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to
cases where the "security of the state," i. e., "national security" is involved, it could
[G.R. No. 120348. December 3, 1948.] easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public
safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar.
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind
some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it
extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter
Felixberto M. Serrano for Respondent. may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo 4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is
A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers’ Association) as amici curiæ. of course more general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as
broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything
SYLLABUS though of minor importance, but affecting the public.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AUTHORITY OF SUPREME COURT TO 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT TAKES CHARGE OF ADMISSION
PROMULGATE RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW; SUPREME OF LAWYERS; BAR EXAMINATIONS, HOW GIVEN AND CONDUCTED. — Under
COURT CONDUCTS BAR EXAMINATIONS. — Section 13, Article VIII of the constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the
Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By
admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar
of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar
Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar Examiners who
of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
 examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No.
Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the
admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and
adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the
6. SUPREME COURT; MAINTENANCE OF HIGH STANDARD OF THE LEGAL exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of
PROFESSION. — The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and lawyers, who are officers of the Court.
legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of
the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only DECISION
those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and
show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by
passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. MONTEMAYOR, J.:

7. ID.; LEGAL PROFESSION AS THE MOST POPULAR IN THIS JURISDICTION;

CONDUCT OF BAR EXAMINATIONS IMBUED WITH GENERAL INTEREST AND The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the
NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. — It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local
inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September
services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters — "CLAIM ’LEAK’
popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In
schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel
to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news
Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and item in full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw
exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation "Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some
of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
general interest and national importance.
"These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one
8. ID.; BAR EXAMINATIONS ANOMALY AS WITHIN THE MEANING OF subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.
"INTEREST OF THE STATE." — The present case falls and may be included within
the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it does, not only the "Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed
interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.
legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the
members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the "The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests
Supreme Court having charge of and connection with said examinations, but also the actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this
highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and private university holding proudly around the city.
independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.
"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the
9. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, SUPREME COURT AS; DUTY AND NECESSITY Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of
TO ADOPT MEASURES TO PRESERVE INTEGRITY OF LEGAL PROFESSION. — the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university
possessed of those tests before the examinations.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court
"The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr.
on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said
body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a
questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he
technical schools."cralaw virtua1aw library made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution
of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been
called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the "In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter,
Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination
Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as
Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice
purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an
implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the
charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was
August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony
this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the
pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the
which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of consideration of this Court.
Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on
the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, "From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and
the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations. consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to
have given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperation, in order to
occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination
Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before
the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires
he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to
publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as
given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the
revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving Court of the result."cralaw virtua1aw library
the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations
and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear
appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly
to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court requires that he
to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a
complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law
irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the
revelation. bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar
examiners who were appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations that is to say — that only when national security or public safety is involved, may this
questions and later pass upon and correct the examination papers; and last but not Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or
least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which
very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of fact, the vote of the
explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the Justices is not unanimous.
alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to
punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53,
identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the particularly the Senate where it originated, we examined the record of the
court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being
investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by
from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or
be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be
involve imprisonment. compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee,
however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that
consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he
could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading,
postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating
counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his the clause added by the committee — "unless the court finds that such revelation is
counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purpose of
and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected
his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such
request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses
he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the
hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the
Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court
Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the
Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases,
"SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state requires
magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a
source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of
related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might
interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw library go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved.
Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and
as it does interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national substituted by the phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public
importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved,
of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.
 "national security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security" was equally
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People’s Court,
confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress,
wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "national security"
much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar
discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it must
interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that
instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase
Cuenco, used the words "public interest," when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a
before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the state" newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his
(interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee information.
and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest," Senator Sebastian
referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more
understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and
the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of minor
the state," may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and
Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the
amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."cralaw phrase "interest of the state" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does
virtua1aw library include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and
nation, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town,
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal
such as the theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such
only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine,
the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the
phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the
can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" discharge of their functions, etc.
alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," —
are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the
with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the state." Under constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the
Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when Philippine Bar By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the
public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the
Constitution provides that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners
of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
requires it. examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar
Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are
The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of
Penal Code, thus: Title I, — Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practising law or
Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a
prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law
added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried and later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously,
to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation for in them may be born the idea that there is no need of much law study and
and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves,
show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented
passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner. It is of to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and designation of this Court.
public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in They would be suspected, — one or two or more of them — that through negligence,
this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they
compared to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they
predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished
thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important
Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, still, the Supreme Court itself which has the overall supervision and control over the
and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the
their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like
Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these
importance. considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the
present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law
out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of this country as well as the
given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly good name and reputation of the members of the Commitee of Bar Examiners,
obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection with
when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents
would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the
long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would Philippine Government.
naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person
contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No.
know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the
passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and
training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the
in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of
Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparation, lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac v. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21
have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the
be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the
since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.
use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale
It will be noticed from Parazo’s news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and
that, his informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the
supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group
questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the
meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its
of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the
newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward present, on that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of
and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation;
start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants,
immunity. and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and
cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar charges contained in the news item, said charges are considered and held to be
Examination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar without basis, proof or foundation.
examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the examinations were
actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal
examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It
or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally
that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not
actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein
on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who
reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions
said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the
came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function
are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating
respondent Parazo’s informants who claim to have seen all these things. any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty,
even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not
In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar Examinations held in August, proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack
1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his
answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each subject information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It
belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court’s endeavor to probe
therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not
questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are
(7,200) examination papers involved, in the hands of eight different examiners. The found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this
owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the books or because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private
papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing
witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, - grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination
evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably
questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too
subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the other hand, if too many obtain a passing grade, the examiner Montemayor, justify conclusively the finding of the majority that respondent is guilty of
may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of this Court.
measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may
raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not
appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, protect him. It would protect him only if we could agree with his theory that the words
succeed in getting hold of questions long before examination day, and study and "interest of the state" used in the law should be read to mean security of the state or
prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds public safety. But there is nothing in the whole text of Republic Act No. 53 and/or in
that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can be gleaned in the Senate
may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his journal, or in the grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the words in
correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of question, that can justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they
examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations. embrace within the small circle of public security or safety of the state.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas
the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which and concepts within which the ideas of security or safety occupy a place, however
formed the basis of his news item or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is no legal basis for us to reduce the
Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this decision, and that, in refusing to make purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a minimum that, if given effect,
the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional enactment. Such
respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and would be violative of the Constitution.
identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he
omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original
power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.) Ordinarily, in such cases, he bill and the Senate committee that would limit the privilege up to the point where it
can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. runs in conflict with the wide area of public interest, the opposing sides arrived at a
However, considering that cases like the present are not common or frequent, in this meeting ground in which the line of limitation was pushed up to the place where the
jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No one is authorized to push
heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to that line of limitation still farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We
mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a have to stop at the line of limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the
certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the law.
respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it
hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege
month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the or reducing any limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much we may
revelation demanded of him. So ordered. sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in Congress, we are powerless to retrieve
that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject in the statute a law of our own
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur. creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat the legislative
intent. There is no alternative for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and
Separate Opinions wait for a more respective mood of Congress.

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library consists in the disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court demand
obedience for their effectiveness. Administration of justice is impossible with
The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial orders is the elan vital of
the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing because it are verities no one can eloign.
means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it,
will never allow such a thing to obtain. We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an PARAS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
executive department or without a legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this
Republic, Congress functions only one third of the year. During the remaining two If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star
thirds of the year the life of the nation does not suffer any impairment. It can even be Reporter the story (Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the decision of the
said that during those two thirds of the year there is more normalcy than during the majority, in good faith and in a spirit of public service, he voluntarily should have
Congressional session when legislative reforms and the enactment of new laws revealed the identities of his informants, thereby enabling this Court, conformably to
cannot but produce some public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to "institute an immediate probe
the way of life of the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the
society without some effective system of administration of justice, functioning without students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the
long interruptions. examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a spirit of public service, he should at
least have tried to secure their consent to the revelation. The point I want to
While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its underscore is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing
full measure and this Supreme Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or stories as in substantiating their truth. And if I am constrained to dissent from the
defiance of its orders, and it should mete out to all affected parties the tremendous ruling of the majority, it is only because the respondent, in my opinion, cannot legally
weight of its power and will punish, without fear or favor, the guilty parties, regardless be compelled to make the revelation, in view of Republic Act No. 53 — which this
of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to disagree with the Court is bound to enforce — providing that "the publisher, editor or duly accredited
penalty imposed upon Respondent. reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said
Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter,
already declared invalid in our opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil., 741. The unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in section 6 of Rule 64, under demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in believing that the
which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum not exceeding P1,000 or phrase "interest of the state," as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters
imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there are affecting the security or safety of the state.
mitigating circumstances that attenuate respondent’s responsibility, — youthfulness,
honest but wrong belief in the existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm, In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by
— we should not impose upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we Senator Sotto provided for absolute immunity. The committee on revision of laws,
imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-278 1 , the very one which, as can be however, inserted an amendment by adding the clause "unless the court finds that
gleaned from the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of Republic Act No. 53. such revelation is demanded by the public interest." Senator Sotto’s attempt to
suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the remarks of the Chairman of the
We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the committee presently to be mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to change the words
discretion to reduce the imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the "public interest" into "interest of the state," a proposal that was readily accepted.
revelation exacted from him. The penalty should be measured by the responsibility, Hence, the use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.
and that measure cannot be left at the discretion of the guilty one. His future
revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his responsibility for the offense he Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the
has already perpetrated. His past disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future state," as intended by the lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall that the
action. The past cannot be remade. What has been done cannot be undone. These original intention of the author of the bill was to provide for absolute immunity, and
this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated by any subsequent exception, It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of
especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the deliberations of his information does not absolutely prevent this Court from verifying, by any
the lawmakers. For instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing reasonable and feasible means, the truth of the alleged anomaly; and it is certainly
Senator Sotto’s advocacy of absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause not required, by the mere publication of the story in question, to admit the accuracy of
"unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said story if its investigation should fail because of lack of evidence or of the refusal
added to the original bill, Senator Cuenco gave the example of a newspaperman who of those who know to come out and testify.
publishes an information regarding theft of plans of forts and fortifications, in which
case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interes publico y el interes mismo del Estado In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.
requieran que se publique el nombre del informante." Again, after proposing the
change of "public interest" to "interest of the state," Senator Sotto, when asked by BRIONES, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Senator Garcia as to the essential difference between the two phrases, explained
that "La diferencia esta en que puede haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado Deploro no poder estar conforme con la decision de la mayoria sobre este incidente.
por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y no se puede Me preocupa como al que mas el buen nombre, el prestigio, la respetabilidad de esta
discutir al autor, y la frase ’public interest’ es muy elastica. En cambio, si se pone Corte Suprema 3 — baluarte inexpugnable de las libertades y fueros civiles — pero
’interest of the state,’ claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes del Estado, hay algo que me preocupa mas y es la substancia misma de esas libertades y
el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but not least, fueros. En realidad, en tanto la Corte Suprema crece y se agiganta en el concepto
it should be noted that the Act in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor publico en cuanto ella se mantiene enhiesta en la cima de la cumbre donde la coloca
to prevent the repetition of the case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was su categoria y constituye la ultima esperanza del ciudadano cuando en su derredor
imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of the information contained in a news todo parece crujir y requebrajarse.
item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the respondent, the security
or safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the state" was El recurrido, Angel Parazo, es reportero del periodico diario "The Star Reporter" que
intended to be limited to cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and se edita en Manila. A raiz de los ultimos examenes de abogacia, publico un articulo
fortifications and espionage), given during the deliberations which solely affect the informativo en el que se decia que algunos examinandos habian visto copias de
security or safety of the state. algunos cuestionarios antes de la celebracion de los examenes y que dichas copias
fueron utilizadas por los examinandos procedentes de cierta universidad privada. El
It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety," "national Magistrado encargado de los examenes emplazo al recurrido para que explicase la
security," or "public security," or whether "public interest" and "interest of the state" noticia y diese los nombres de sus informantes a fin de poder investigarles
were interchangeably used in the discussions, as long as in using the phrase minuciosamente y ver la manera de adoptar las medidas que fueran procedentes. El
"interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers definitely knew and accordingly recurrido comparecio, pero se nego en absoluto a revelar el origen de su
recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey. Conjectures cannot informacion. De ahi el presente expediente por desacato.
prevail over the clear legislative intent.
La controversia gira en torno a la interpretacion del articulo 1 de la Ley de la
The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to Republica No. 53, aprobada por el Congreso en su ultimo periodo de sesiones.
frustrate the main purpose of the law. This would further make the law more Dicho articulo se lee como sigue:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
consonant with the spirit of the constitutional provisions that "the privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of "El publicista, editor o reportero debidamente acreditado de cualquier periodico,
the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise" (Article III, section 1, revista o publicacion periodica de circulacion general, no puede ser compelido a
paragraph 5), and that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the press revelar el origen de cualquier noticia o informacion que le haya sido transmitida en
(Article III, section 1, paragraph 8). confianza y que haya aparecido en dicho periodico, revista o publicacion, a menos
que el tribunal o una camara del Congreso o un comitè del mismo halle y determine
que el interes del Estado requiere que se haga tal revelacion."cralaw virtua1aw respecto a una conversacion que tuvo con este, o acerca de algun consejo que le
library diera como tal, ni tampoco el secretario, taquigrafo o empleado de un abogado, sin el
consentimiento del cliente y del abogado, pueden ser examinados respecto a un
Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial de las motivaciones de esta ley como tema de hecho cuyo conocimiento hayan adquirido en el desempeño de sus deberes.
historia contemporanea. Hace dos años un juez del Tribunal del Pueblo (People’s
Court) lanzo publicamente algunos ataques contra esta Corte. Un periodista, Benito "(f) A ninguna persona debidamente autorizada para ejercer la medicina, la cirugia o
Sakdalan, se hizo eco de dichos ataques publicando bajo su firma y responsabilidad la obstetricia, se obligara en alguna causa civil, a revelar, sin el consentimento del
un articulo informativo acerca del particular. A instancia de parte, un Magistrado de paciente, cualquier informe que dicha persona haya adquirido al asistir al paciente
esta Corte mando emplazar a Sakdalan para una investigacion del incidente. con caracter profesional, que necesariamente hubo de adquirir para poder obrar con
Sakdalan comparecio, pero cuando se le pregunto de quien habia recibido su tal caracter, y que tienda a denigrar la dignidad del paciente.
informacion, negose en absoluto a hacer la revelacion exigida. El Magistrado de
referencia ordeno entonces que se le detuviera a Sakdalan en la escribania de esta "(g) El clerigo o sacerdote no puede ser examinado sin el consentimiento de su
Corte por dos dias, en castigo por lo que se creyo un desacato. penitente, respecto a la confesion que le haya hecho este, en su caracter sacerdotal,
y en cumplimiento de los deberes que le impone la religion a que pertenece.
El caso Sakdalan causo un revuelo tremendo en la prensa, despertando entre sus
camaradas una general simpatia perfectamente explicable. Sakdalan se convirtio en "(h) El funcionario publico no puede ser examinado mientras este en el ejercicio de
heroe del dia, por lo menos en las columnas de los periodicos. El tono predominante su cargo, o despues, respecto a lo que se le hubiese comunicado en confidencia
de los comentarios periodisticos era que Sakdalan estaba justificado en su negativa, oficial, cuando el tribunal determine que el interes publico se perjudicara con la
que el sagrado de la conciencia del periodista debia ser respetado, y que la orden de revelacion."cralaw virtua1aw library
detencion constituia una violacion de la libertad de la prensa. El revuelo repercutio
en los circulos legislativos, culminando en la aprobacion de la Ley de la Republica Es indudable que la medida coloca al periodista en la categoria de estas exenciones
No. 53 que nos ocupa. especialisimas, situandole al nivel del sacerdote, del abogado y del medico. El
Senador Cuenco, ponente del proyecto de ley al ponerse a discusion, dijo en parte lo
Resulta importante y util destacar este fondo historico, pues por ello se explican que sigue a modo de explicacion de sus elevados fines:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
ciertas caracteristicas del proyecto de ley original presentado en el Senado. Una de
las mas salientes, por ejemplo, era lo absoluto del privilegio: no se proveia ninguna "El proyecto de ley que esta ahora bajo la consideracion de esta Camara tiene por
excepcion, ninguna salvedad, no pudiendose obligar al periodista a revelar el origen objeto eximir al director, redactor o reporter de un periodico, de la obligacion de
de su informacion bajo ninguna circunstancia. revelar el nombre de la persona de quien haya obtenido una informacion, a menos
que el interes del Estado asi lo requiera. La legislacion que se trata de dictar no es
La medida tiene antecedentes bien conocidos en nuestra misma legislacion. del todo nueva. Nuestra ley procesal considera como privilegiada y digna de ser
Primeramente en el antiguo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, y ahora en el mantenida en secreto toda comunicacion recibida por el sacerdote, el abogado y el
Reglamento de los Tribunales, figuran ciertas disposiciones que restringen la libertad medico en el ejercicio de su ministerio o profesion. El proyecto no solo dignifica y
para testificar o el derecho de examinar a ciertos testigos sobre determinadas eleva la profesion periodistica, sino que da facilidades a los periodicos para obtener
materias. Verbigracia, en nuestra ley sobre pruebas y evidencias, regla 123, seccion noticias. (El subrayado es nuestro.)
26, se provee lo siguiente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"El periodismo, mas que un medio para obtener bienes materiales, es un apostolado,
x          x           x un sacerdocio. El periodista no es un mercachifle, sino una persona llamada a
cumplir una mision elevada, sublime, augusta. La hoja periodica es catedra. De ella
irradia la luz que difunde la cultura, la instruccion, los principios eticos y morales, las
"(e) El abogado no puede, sin el consentimiento de su cliente, ser examinado reglas de una ciudadania honrada y patriotica." (Diario de sesiones del Senado, Julio
9, 1946.) concepto elevado de la profesion no quisiera que se diese el caso de que una
traicion al Estado quedase impune: que nosotros llevasemos a extremos exagerados
Elevar y ennoblecer la profesion del periodista y dar facilidades a los periodicos para la proteccion que se da al periodista."cralaw virtua1aw library
obtener una informacion honrada, veridica, imparcial y constructiva — cometido
essencial de una buena prensa, digna del apelativo de cuarto poder del Estado — tal Puesta a votacion la enmienda, fue rechazada, votando a favor 3 y en contra 7.
es el objeto fundamental de la medida, en frase definidora del Senador Cuenco,
ponente de la misma y chairman del comite de revision de leyes del Senado. Es Sotto, sin embargo, no se dio por enteramente derrotado. Esforzandose por sacar
importante destacar esta motivacion legislativa, pues ello nos ayuda, al interpretar la avante su proyecto de ley con la menor cortapisa posible para la libertad de la
ley, a determinar si el privilegio debe ser entendido rigidamente en contra o prensa, propuso otra enmienda en el sentido de sustituir las palabras "public interest"
liberalmente en pro del periodista. Estimo que la indicada exposicion de motivos con "interest of the State," de tal suerte que la salvedad se leyera como sigue:
justifica, mas aun, requiere una interpretacion liberal. "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State."
* Ya no hubo debate sobre esta enmienda: el mismo comite la acepto, por boca de
Como queda dicho, en el proyecto de ley original presentado por el Senador Sotto el su chairman el Senador Cuenco. Puesta a votacion, la misma se aprobo por
privilegio se establecia de una manera absoluta, incondicional. Sin embargo, el unanimidad. Sin embargo, antes de la votacion, el Senador Garcia pregunto que
comite de revision de leyes del Senado al cual se habia endosado el bill, lo informo diferencia esencial habia entre las frases "public interest" e "interest of the State."
con una enmienda, añadiendo al final del articulo 1 transcrito arriba las siguientes Sotto contesto que "la diferencia esta en que puede haber un caso de espionaje
palabras: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public como el citado por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y no
interest." * Al discutirse, sin embargo, el proyecto en pleno Senado, Sotto formulo se puede descubrir al autor," mientras que, por otro lado, la frase "public interest" es
una enmienda mediante la supresion de la salvedad insertada por el comite, tratando muy elastica." "En cambio — continuo Sotto — si se pone "interest of the State",
asi de restaurar la fraseologia original del proyecto. Cuenco, en su caracter de claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes del Estado, el periodista estara
ponente y chairman del comite de revision de leyes, se opuso a la enmienda Sotto obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." (Diario de Sesiones del Senado,
por supresion y siguio un debate bastante extenso. Sotto dijo enfaticamente que supra.)
"esas palabras deben suprimirse porque matan el objeto del proyecto de ley. Si,
como ha dicho el sesudo presidente del comite de revision de leyes, el pretende De lo expuesto resulta evidente que la sustitucion de la frase "public interest" por la
colocar al periodista en el mismo nivel del sacerdote, tengamos en cuenta que en el de "interest of the State" no fue simplemente casual e inimportante, sino que fue
caso de este no hay esa excepcion."cralaw virtua1aw library harto deliberada, hecha con el proposito de restringir el alcance de la salvedad. Se
dijo que la frase "public interest" es muy elastico y el Senado, en pleno, acepto este
Cuenco, cerrando el debate, hizo las siguientas manifestaciones en contra de la pronunciamiento. Asi que se puso "interest of the State" para denotar que solo se
enmienda Sotto:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph podria obligar al periodista a descubrir, como testigo, la fuente de su informacion
cuando el Estado estuviese vitalmente interesado en la materia; es decir, cuando
"El Sen. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, como ya he manifestado el Comite siente no estuviese envuelta la seguridad del Estado, de la Nacion, conceptos que en este
poder aceptar la enmienda, porque puede haber casos, quiza muy contados, en que caso se confundirian. En ejemplo del espionaje citado por el Senador Cuenco, abona
el interes publico y el interes mismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre esta interpretacion. "Interes del Estado" tiene aqui un significado particularisimo,
del informante. Supongamos que un periodista publicara una informacion referente al repelente de otros casos extraños a la seguridad nacional: ese significado no puede
hurto o sustraccion de unos planos de fortalezas o de un sitio importante de defensa. ser mas que el interes del Estado en su propia vida, en su propia seguridad. No cabe
Si la inmunidad que se otorga al periodista fuese absoluta, como la que se propone extender el alcance de la frase a otros casos en que el Estado pudiera estar mas o
en la enmienda, el autor de la sustraccion podria quedar impune. menos interesado, porque si la intencion del Congreso fuera esa, la frase "public
interest" seria mas que suficiente, pues la misma cubre y comprende todos los
"Señor Presidente: he sido periodista por espacio de veinticinco años y me honro en matices publicos desde la seguridad del Estado y de la Nacion hasta el ultimo asunto
serlo, antes que abogado, antes que legislador, pero, por lo mismo que tengo un en que el publico tuviera interes hasta cierto punto. Esta forma de interpretar es tanto
mas logica, obligada, cuanto que los legisladores aceptaron y aprobaron destacan las siguientes: (a) los examenes de abogados estan colocados bajo la alta
unanimemente el pronunciamiento de que la frase "public interest" era muy elastica, supervision de esta Corte Suprema, cuyo prestigio, buen nombre y respetabilidad es
cubria demasiado. Por tanto, hay que concluir que cuando adoptaron la frase de supremo interes del Estado el conservar y mantener; (b) miles de abogados se
sustitutiva "interest of the State," la adoptaron para limitar, para restringir la salvedad, hallan esparcidos por el pais ejerciendo su noble profesion, y centenares si no miles
reduciendola solamente a algunos casos, muy contados, segun expresion del se añaden cada año a esa vasta legion; asi que la Corte Suprema y esta enorme
Senador Cuenco. ¿Que casos son estos? Entiendo que deben ser congeneres es masa de letrados estan vitalmente interesados en elevar el "standard" profesional,
decir, del mismo tipo que el caso de espionaje citado; es decir, casos que afecten procurando que entren solo los idoneos, moral e intelectualmente, y este interes cae
vitalmente a la seguridad del Estado, de la Nacion. Verbigracia: una conspiracion tambien bajo la categoria de "interes del Estado" ; (c) acaso por natural inclinacion, la
para derrocar violentamente nuestra forma de gobierno y establecer en su lugar una abogacia es la profesion mas popular en Filipinas; de ahi la abundancia de colegios
dictadura comunista totalitaria al estilo sovietico, seria uno de esos muy contados de y escuelas de derecho en donde estudian miles de jovenes de ambos sexos
que habla el Senador ponente. No cabe aplicar, extender la frase a casos de otra aspirando a ponerse la toga de Marco Tulio; de ahi naturalmente tambien el interes
especie, de otro genero, porque ese equivaldria a establecer un "standard," una del Estado en que esa profesion tan popular no caiga en descredito, cosa que
norma de interpretacion arbitraria, hasta caprichosa, como mas adelante voy a ocurriria facilmente si los examenes de abogados no se efectuasen propia y
demostrar, apreciando que el interes del Estado esta entrañado en algunos asuntos honradamente como una prueba rigida de la capacidad y caracter de los
y matices de caracter publico y excluyendolo, sin embargo, de otros, y en esto sin examinandos, circulando previamente cuestionarios de "contrabando" tal como se ha
mas guia y norma que la opinion harto debatible del juez o tribunal sentenciador denunciado en el articulo informativo que nos ocupa; (d) entre los abogados se
sobre lo que es digno de ser catalogado bajo la frase "interes del Estado" y sobre lo escoge el personal para la judicatura y la administracion de justicia — magistrados,
que no lo es. jueces de primera instancia, fiscales, jueces de paz y letrados en las diferentes
oficinas y agencias del gobierno; de ahi que sea naturalmente tambien interes del
Resulta evidente, de lo dicho, que no es exacto y carece de fundamento lo que en la Estado el conservar la integridad y buen nombre de una profesion que proporciona al
decision de la mayoria se afirma, a saber: que las frases "public interest" o "interest gobierno y a la nacion tan valiosos servidores y elementos; (e) en la pureza de los
of the State" se entendieron y usaron indistintamente por los Senadores. Por el examenes de abogados esta envuelto no solo el buen nombre de la Corte Suprema
contrario, el Diario de Sesiones del Senado demuestra de un modo inequivoco que como queda dicho, sino tambien el buen nombre de la junta examinadora y de los
los Senadores sabian muy bien lo que hacian al cambiar una frase por otra y se empleados de la Corte que intervienen y vigilan dichos examenes; asi que todo
daban perfecta cuenta de que el cambio no era simplemente gramatical o cargo de venalidad y corrupcion tiene que afectar a dicho buen nombre y proyectar
lexicografico, sino que entrañaba una considerable diferencia en cuanto al una sombra de sospecha sobre el mismo: de ahi que sea interes del Estado el que
significado y alcance de la salvedad o excepcion. Sabian muy bien que la frase se investiguen implacablemente los cargos para depurar los hechos y hallar la
"public interest" es muy elastica, al decir del Senador Sotto, y que desde luego tiene verdad castigando a los culpables si los hay, y purificando de tal manera los
un marco mucho mas amplio que la frase "interest of the State." La presuncion es examenes, pero si, por otro lado, los cargos resultaren falsos, reivindicando el buen
que los legisladores toman muy en serio la tarea de legislar y que cuando cambian nombre de los afectados; (f) en resumen, de lo dicho se sigue que los examenes de
una frase por otra lo hacen no por simple capricho, sino con verdadera deliberacion. abogados tienen importancia nacional y, por tanto, cualesquier cargos de venalidad,
La tarea legislativa no es un juego de niños. Pero ¿que mejor prueba de la diferencia corrupcion e irregularidad tienen tambien importancia nacional y es interes del
entre ambos conceptos que la misma admision de la mayoria en su decision al decir Estado el que se investiguen hasta el limite maximo de las posibilidades legales.
que "interest of the State" is not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest"
which may include most anything though of minor importance but affecting the public" En ultimo analisis, se puede decir que la mayoria estima envuelto en el presente
1 . . .?La endoblez de la teoria de la mayoria salta a la vista si se examinan sus caso el "interes del Estado," primero, porque se trata de la profesion de abogado —
implicaciones y consecuencias. ¿Por que decide la mayoria que en el presente caso profesion de noble y vasta significacion social, juridica y politica — y, segundo,
se halla envuelto el interes del Estado y que, por tanto, el recurrido esta obligado a porque tratandose de acusaciones referentes a los examenes de abogados cuya
revelar la fuente de su informacion y si no lo hace incurre en desacato, punible con supervision corresponde a esta Corte Suprema, el buen nombre, el prestigio y la
prision? Por varias razones que se exponen en la decision, entre las cuales se respetabilidad de este alto tribunal estan necesariamente afectados.
 sistemas de regadio, los hermosos y enormes edificios particulares y publicos, las
Veamos ahora si la tesis puede resistir a un examen rigido, objetivo. No sere yo ingentes fabricas, en una palabra, todo eso que constituye la maravilla de los
quien discuta o ponga en tela de juicio la prestancia, el elevado rango de la profesion presentes tiempos, traduciendo en realidad tangible lo que no parecia ser mas que
de abogado a la cual me honro en pertenecer. Pero ¿que hay de las otras loca fantasia de la imaginacion de los poetas? ¿no hemos acaso conquistado el
profesiones? ¿Son ellas menos dignas de merecer el supremo interes del Estado? secreto divino de los atomos, desencadenando, es verdad, las fuerzas ciegas de la
Durante las deliberaciones sobre el presente asunto tuve ocasion de formular estas destruccion sobre el mundo, pero tambien abriendo para el genero humano vastos
preguntas y otras semejantes. Recuerdo que inclusive cite casos especificos panoramas y perspectivas de progreso y bienestar casi ilimitado? Se dice que la
preguntando, por ejemplo, si en los examenes de medicos, farmaceuticos, abogacia es la carrera mas popular y mas codiciada en Filipinas, pero ¿no existe el
ingenieros, dentistas y nurses, no podria tambien considerarse envuelto el interes del peligro de que esta popularidad se este fomentando insensatamente a expensas de
Estado si al igual que en este asunto se formulasen graves cargos de irregularidad, la vitalidad de la nacion? ¿no se cree acaso llegado el momento de que los caudillos
corrupcion y venalidad. Respecto al caso de los medicos no obtuve una contestacion y directores del pensamiento en este pais emprendan una seria cruzada para
categorica, definitiva; pero con relacion a las otras profesiones, la respuesta fue orientar las aficiones y energias de nuestra juventud hacia carreras mas practicas y
decididamente negativa; respecto a ellas, no cabria invocar el interes del Estado — mas constructivas no solo para ellos particularmente, sino sobre todo para la nacion?
su rango, su significacion social no justificarian tal invocacion. Ahora veo que en la ¿por que se va a consagrar precisamente con una sentencia judicial — nada menos
decision de la mayoria el ejercicio de la medicina se incluyo entre los "casos y que del mas alto tribunal — la supremacia de la profesion de abogado en este pais,
materias de importancia nacional, en los cuales el Estado o la nacion entera, y no en desdoro de las otras profesiones, por que?"
solo un ramo o instrumento del mismo como una provincia, una ciudad o un pueblo,
o una parte del publico, esta interesado o podria quedar afectado." Asi que, a juicio Y asi, por el estilo, las otras profesiones podrian reclamar y pretender con justicia
de la mayoria, el ejercicio de la medicina es al parecer de indole tan nacional y tan que tienen tanta categoria como los abogados para que se considere aplicable a
importante como el ejercicio de la abogacia para los efectos del concepto "interes del ellas el concepto juridico "interes del Estado" de que habla la ley de la Republica No.
Estado" ; al paso que las otras profesiones y vocaciones quedan definitivamente 53 que nos ocupa. Y si esto fuese asi, esto es, se estimase envuelto el "interes del
excluidas del coto privilegiado. Estado" en casi todas las materias, verbigracia, hasta en los examenes de nurses, al
punto de que interes del Estado equivaldria practicamente a interes publico ¿que
Los farmaceuticos, sin embargo, podrian naturalmente formular las siguientes quedaria entonces del privilegio concedido por dicha ley a la prensa? ¿no seria mas
preguntas: ¿Por que se va a pos-tergar nuestra honrada y benemerita profesion? bien una letra muerta, como predijo el Senador Sotto al pedir la supresion de la
¿no nos cuesta tanto tiempo y tantos esfuerzos, si no mas, hacer la carrera que el salvedad o excepcion?
abogado, verbigracia? ¿no prestamos acaso a la sociedad, a la humanidad, un
servicio tan util, tan indispensable y tan importante como el de cualquier otro Se dice, con cierto enfasis, que la profesion de abogado tiene una calidad
profesional? ¿no somos quienes preparamos con infinito cuidado las drogas y excepcional, un rango privilegiado, porque de ella se escogen y nombran los
medicamentos que prescribe y receta el medico? ¿no esta en nuestras manos la magistrados, los jueces de primera instancia, los jueces de paz y los fiscales, en una
salud, la vida, e incluso la muerte de los ciudadanos, de los hombres? ¿por que, palabra, el personal basico de la administracion de justicia. Se ha insinuado inclusive
pues, se va a sentenciar que el interes del Estado no esta vinculado en nuestra que de esa profesion surgen regularmente los lideres politicos y sociales de las
profesion? naciones y pueblos. Comencemos por esto ultimo. ¿Tienen los abogados la
exclusiva del liderato publico y social del mundo? Esto lo diria un panegirista de la
Por su parte, los ingenieros de todas clases - civiles, industriales, quimicos, profesion en un discurso de fin de curso de un colegio de leyes, pero la historia nos
mecanicos, navales, mineros, etc. - podrian hacer estas embarazosas preguntas" dice que el liderato no ha sido nunca cuestion profesional, sino que el lider ha
¿Por que todos los mimos y caricias van a ser para los abogados? ¿nada mas que surgido como un precipitado individual o social independientemente de las
porque la mayor parte del tiempo nos ponemos la humilde blusa del obrero y profesiones y oficios. Ha habido y hay en el mundo muchos caudillos no abogados y,
estamos casi siempre sucios - la suciedad inherente al sudor y mugre del trabajo? por cierto, los mejores no siempre han sido siempre los de esta clase. Es verdad que
¿no construimos acaso los caminos, los puentes, los sistemas de aguas, los hubo un Lincoln — abogado — uno de los caudillos mas sobresalientes que la
democracia produjera en el mundo; pero tambien hubo un Washington - agrimensor nombre. Si, como al parecer admite la mayoria, el interes del Estado no se extiende
— padre de la nacion que produjo a Lincoln. Y el caso de Filipinas es todavia mas a los examenes de ingenieros y farmaceuticos por no ser materia de suficiente
tipico como demostracion de la tesis de que el caudillaje no es cuestion profesional. monta nacional, luego tampoco debe extenderse a los examenes de abogados tan
Como todo el mundo sabe, nuestros dos mas grandes caudillos en el pasado no solo porque la Corte Suprema tiene intima relacion con estos en virtud de sus
eran abogados; Rizal era medico; y Bonifacio, el llamado padre de la democracia facultades de supervision, pues, como queda dicho, ningun poder es mas prestigioso
filipina, no solo no era profesional, sino que apenas era nada, academicamente que el otro — desde luego esta Corte no puede pretender ser mas que los otros
hablando — era un simple bodeguero, un verdadero plebeyo. Sin embargo, esto no poderes del Estado.
le impidio, mientras fraguaba el acero candente del Katipunan, empaparse en las
gestas de la revolucion francesa leyendo a Thiers en español. (¿Cuantos de Puede aducirse, por analogia, otro buen argumento en favor de la tesis de esta
nuestros abogados — dicho sea entre parentesis — sobre todo de la epoca de disidencia. Una de las garantias constitucionales es la inviolabilidad del secreto de la
Bonifacio, habran leido, o siquiera visto el forro, de la Revolucion Francesa de comunicacion y correspondencia, excepto cuando la seguridad publica y el orden
Thiers?) requieran otra cosa y mediante una orden legal del tribunal. (Constitucion de
Filipinas, Articulo III, seccion 5, bill de derechos.) Es verdad que la constitucion habla
Es verdad que el personal basico de la administracion de justicia esta compuesto de de seguridad publica, mientras que la ley de la Republica No. 53 habla de interes del
abogados, pero en la misma decision de la mayoria se reconoce que la Estado, pero la letra aqui no es lo importante, sino la identidad del fondo, de la
administracion de justicia es solo una de las principales funciones del gobierno y a substancia del privilegio.
renglon seguido se apunta el sistema de enseñanza publica (public school system)
como otra funcion de importancia nacional. Entonces cabe preguntar: ¿por que no se Se ha insinuado que si se permitiera al periodista ocultar la fuente de su informacion
va a considerar tambien envuelto el "interes del Estado" en los examenes de tratandose de asuntos publicos de reconocida seriedad, ello fomentaria la intriga y la
maestros, sobre todo si son de servicio civil? No solo los maestros constituyen la cobardia entre los ciudadanos, sancionando la abyectada anonimidad, aquello de
base de nuestro sistema de enseñanza publica, sino que incluso tienen mas "tirar la piedra escondiendo la mano." El argumento tiene cierta fuerza, pero es de
envergadura nacional porque se cuentan por miles, formando la clase mas doble filo. Si se admite la falta o flojedad del valor civico entre los ciudadanos ¿que
numerosa de nuestros servidores publicos. Sin embargo, en opinion de la mayoria de malo hay en que, mientras se fomente y fortalezca esa virtud con la educacion de
los maestros no tienen suficiente calibre como los abogados para que se extienda las masas y los habitos de una ciudadania militante, se deje a la prensa cierta latitud
aplicable a ellos la frase "interes del Estado" usada en la referida ley de Republica y cierta libertad para sacar el mejor partido posible de la anonimidad informativa en
No. 53. Este no es mas que uno de los absurdos a que conduce la arbitrariedad de sus campañas contra la corrupcion, los abusos y las anomalias? Con esto se
la norma adoptada por la mayoria en su decision. lograria, por lo menos, que la prensa cumpliese y realizase su cometido social con
cierta eficacia descorriendo parte del velo, y dejando que el Estado, con sus
Analizare ahora el argumento aquiles de la mayoria. Se dice que el interes del agencias de investigacion del crimen y de los chanchullos, haga el resto. Por
Estado se halla envuelto en el presente caso porque de por medio anda el prestigio, ejemplo, en el presente caso: ¿por que la Corte Suprema va a insistir en actuar
el buen nombre de esta Corte Suprema en virtud de las facultades de alta como si fuese una agencia policiaca? ¿por que va a tratar al periodista como si este
supervision que ejerce sobre los examenes de abogados. El que escribe estas lineas fuese un detective, obligandole a revelar todos sus datos, incluso los nombres de
no cede a nadie en su celo por mantener incolume el prestigio de esta Corte; pero, al sus informantes? Nos quejamos de nuestra impotencia ante al silencio contumaz del
propio tiempo, no puede cerrar los ojos a la realidad, a saber: que no somos mas recurrido: ¿por que no entregar el caso a la National Bureau of Investigation — la
que uno de los tres poderes del Estado; que estos poderes son iguales y ninguno de famosa NBI cuya eficiencia todos reconocen — y dejar que la misma sea quien se
ellos tiene mas prestigio que el otro. Los examenes de abogados no tienen mas entienda con el recurrido y maneje la informacion de este con la tecnica y medios de
importancia y envergadura nacional porque los supervisamos que, por ejemplo, los que dispone para sus investigaciones?
examenes de ingenieros y farmeceuticos, cuyas juntas examinadoras son
nombradas por el poder ejecutivo y son responsables ante el mismo. El poder En realidad, el periodista ya rinde un buen servicio cuando denuncia una anomalia si
ejecutivo tiene tanto derecho como esta Corte para velar por su prestigio y buen bien reservandose el nombre de su informante. ¿Por que castigarle si insiste en
conservar su secreto, excepto cuando medie la seguridad del Estado y de la Nacion, Endnotes:
unica salvedad que establece la ley? Esta bien que no se le premie o aplauda por el
bien que hace, pero castigarle? Es el colmo!

Es que, se dira, el periodista puede obrar de mala fe denunciando unas anomalias

imaginarias y provocando con ello un tremendo escandalo con todos los daños y 1. Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil., 630.
perjuicios que de ello pueden seguirse para el buen nombre y la reputacion de las
personas y de las instituciones. Es verdad. No se puede negar que hay bribones en *. "a menos que el tribunal encuentre que el interes publico requiere que se haga tal
la prensa — esos que en otras ocasiones he llamado "tulisanes de la pluma," peores revelacion."cralaw virtua1aw library
a veces que los salteadores de caminos. Tampoco se puede negar que hay lo que
se llama prensa amarilla, dedicada a cultivar el sensacionalismo malsano y morboso. *. "A menos que el tribunal encuentre que el interes del Estado requiere que se haga
Pero el remedio contra esto no es la ley de la Republica No. 53 que nos ocupa: tal revelacion."cralaw virtua1aw library
existen otros remedios, unos en el codigo penal; otros, en la misma ley de desacato;
y otros, en el desprecio, repulsa y hostilidad de la misma opinion publica, ya que,
1. "el interes del Estado" no es tan amplio y comprensivo como "el interes publico", el
despues de todo, la prensa no puede vivir sino del favor publico. Poco despues de la
liberacion un periodista publico un articulo virulento denunciando supuestas cual incluye casi todo, aunque de menor importancia con tal que afecte al publico . . .
anomalias o irregularidades en relacion con los examenes de abogados celebrados
durante la ocupacion japonesa. Se le emplazo para que probase sus cargos. No los
probo: era evidente la mala fe. Le castigamos por desacato y si no se le impuso una
pena mas severa fue porque canto la palinodia retractandose. (Vease In re Francisco
Brillantes, por desacato.)

La Ley de la Republica No. 53 es una medida liberal, progresiva, concebida y

promulgada para capacitar la prensa a realizar su transcendental cometido del mejor
modo posible. La prensa es una de las mas preciosas conquistas y posesiones de
nuestra civilizacion. Se puede prescindir de algunas cosa — jamas de una prensa
libre, veraz, eficiente. Sin este formidable implemento social, la democracia no se
puede concebir. Por tanto, la ley debiera interpretarse libremente, hasta el maximo
grado de liberalidad, compatible con la vida y seguridad del Estado.

El caso Sakdalan, que se origino en esta Corte, fue la causa ocasional que
determino la aprobacion de esa ley. Es, en verdad, una deplorable coincidencia que
el caso Sakdalan se repita en esta misma Corte con el presente caso de Parazo, y
en peores terminos y circunstancias, pues mientras a Sakdalan se le tuvo arrestado
por solamente dos dias, a Parazo se le va a encarcelar ahora por un mes. Mucho me
temo que esta decision enturbie una ejecutoria tan preclara de liberalismo como la
que abrillanta nuestra jurisprudencia en materias sobre libertad de imprenta.

Voto en favor de la exoneracion del recurrido.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION

Ø Tan v. Sabandal, BM No. 44, February 24, 1992 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only
law filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of
Attorneys. Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's
own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion
Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty.
his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with
character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial
allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr.
that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Nicolas Sabandal."
Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v.
Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211). In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,
respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del
Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the
of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not
hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference: submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and
Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the
Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial
excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to
without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive
respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise
required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be
a member of the Bar.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that
Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant
Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
no position to submit their respective Comments.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August
respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying
that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the
actuations in the community." respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would
disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
 mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13
of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the
versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747
Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which May 1990.
said respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in
certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already
out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that
free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further
(ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had
public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until the shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit
present. (Emphasis Supplied) to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter
stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This
February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment
Gil L. Batula, to wit: on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5
of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; November 1990, stated thus:
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the
Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private
been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory personal disposition which raises the question whether personal
criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases.
does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of
from admission to the Philippine Bar. the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of
reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 any party to change or amend said final resolutions which are
February 1990. already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and
executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the
complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any
Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics
his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of and strategy could not improve his case.
a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to
inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a
Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747
Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the
1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his
dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to
him, was already considered closed and terminated. In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be
allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had
been reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and His plea must be DENIED.
conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under (10) years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar
Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to
Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good
Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the
land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of
from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the the gravity of the civil case against him.
defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for
the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas
defendant Nicolas Sabandal. Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because
of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to
Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He
and Dagpin were required to comment on the same. did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26
November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-
Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred
Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor
his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and
February 1991. prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable
settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to
Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was
the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral
29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
Garcia.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic
member of the Bar. preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing.
The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this
Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
property which he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the
termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been
his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No.
as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also
a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and
the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the
the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer
on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was
submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of SO ORDERED.
candor and truthfulness.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and
were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not,  
therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral
character. Footnotes

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin * In Bar Matter No. 44 (Eufrosina Yap Tan and Nicolas El. Sabandal)
(in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of Bar Matter No. 59 (Benjamin Cabigon v. Nicolas El Sabandal) & SBC
no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. 624 (Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes Agnis v. Nicolas El. Sabandal)
That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither [126 SCRA 60].
tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another
subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character:
 By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian
City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to
submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held
several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested
the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
Ø Melendrez v. Decena, 176 SCRA 662
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in
his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero,
Republic of the Philippines
who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal
Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite
EN BANC
postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the Court in a
Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989 complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and
recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs. On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent. Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and
proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following:

FINDINGS
PER CURIAM:
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from
In a sworn complaint1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real
Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16,
malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, records).lâwphî1.ñèt  In the said Real Estate Mortgage document,
that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by
precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy,
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere
respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same.
had compromised that case without their authority. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a
Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent
against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is
beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.
Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise
three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they the amount of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May
stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their
pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of
on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, the mortgage.
records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate
mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead
said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants'
interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had
special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's
authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the own handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and
event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment
1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the same,
again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He
Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly
document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of
document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May
notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the
of it. alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00.
With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously
second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan
to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of
obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies
October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from
second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to
Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only
extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at the
respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to him, and on June time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was
20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the
for P12,000.00. original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that
complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance
week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he
Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the has violated any right of the complainants.
legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate
Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent,
that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and we find against respondent.
that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in abandoned.
the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real
Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as
not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the
computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From
on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were
P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false
30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the
31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate successive documents was a are formality.
Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00
equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate,
loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least explained to
totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real
indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the
the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Section complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on
7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as most notaries public do not go through the desired practice.
complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise
of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their
following cases: contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew
fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it
the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings; may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself,
returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from
"agreement" includes wills. said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated
loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of
respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate
(5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the
inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the
complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan
their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason why complainants were
writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance.
This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free
from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first
Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the
amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants
the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.). rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as
a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order.
of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case that
true, he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited
for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but
few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious. common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in
question'
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the
same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that
three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. respondent, who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal
With its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda,
of the accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by compromised the case with the accused without their consent and
his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the
(Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2).lâwphî1.ñèt amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the
Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing
Officer is worth quoting: Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable
settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman
Melendre[z].
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with
respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is
it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent. We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the
complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their
must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning there money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between
was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent,
respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that complainants
counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on
respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case
grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar, complainants filed amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as
a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity advance payment, being then the only amount carried by the
between the status of the complainants and the respondent. accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and
Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did
intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps
only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of
respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the amount was given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in
abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were ashamed court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they
then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about. have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private
complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to
confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor.
and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of
offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] the respondent.'
saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the
P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against
complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the respondent Decena are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude
settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him. for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether
case and relieved respondent as their counsel. they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist.
Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor
of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
A parting comment.
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received
P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are
complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was faultless.
given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein
the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent
Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private too much. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they
prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand
charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them
from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their
settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to
respondent received said amount from the accused without the ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to
knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged by him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence
the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal
complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability
it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said
amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said and made the following recommendation:
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his
Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent
years. 3 eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine
the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of
several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five
(25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence
held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor
presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross- General.
examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also
testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in The following acts of respondent:
the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor
General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of 1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that
procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of
respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper P4,000.00;
which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was
in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one
Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his 2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987,
which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their 3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May
witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross- 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to
examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December P10,000.00;
1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had
become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the 4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage
complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and documents and inducing them to sign those documents with
argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross- assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";
examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the
against him has been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant mortgaged property; and
Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented
earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows 6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the
that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that
complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a
had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous certain period of time.
continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation
proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.
during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and
We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something
fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked
immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon
these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or the complainants in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of
good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional
satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction
respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued
the anti-usury law. membership in the Bar.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name
capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be
criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of
to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and
approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grñ;no-Aquino, Medialdea and
complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 Regalado, JJ., concur.
to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case
amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Footnotes
Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00
advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about
these matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. 1 The complaint was originally filed on 29 August 1979 with the
Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Zamboanga del Sur Chapter) and
authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a was referred to this Court on 17 November 1979.
client's claim, but the full amount in cash.6 Respondent's failure to turn over to
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the 2 Rollo, p. 94; Report and Recommendation, pp. 42-59.
estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
3 Id., pp. 52-53.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed
in his personal or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his 4 December 22, 1980; January 9, 1981; January 24, 1981; February
professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral 7, 1981; February 21, 1981; February 28, 1981; March 7, 1981;
unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the March 26 & 27,1981; April 9 & 10, 1981; April 27 & 28,1981; May 12,
lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at 1981; May 13,1981; July 2,1981; July 3,1981; August 17 & 19,1981;
law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is October 5 & 8, 1981; October 7 to 8, 1981; November 23 to 26,
not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued 1981; February 22 to 26, 1982; February 22, 1982; February 23,
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of 1982; February 24,1982; April 29 & 30,1982; June 10 to 11, 1982;
privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although and June 28 to 29, 1 982 (Total-25).
not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which
puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice 5 June 15, 1983; November, 1983; December 12, 1983; February
of law. 8 24,1984; March 1, 1984; April 17,1984; May 9 & 16,1984; June 20 to
21, 1984; July 16, 1984; September 5, 1984; October 3, 1984;
 October 22, 1984; December 27, 1984; February 18, 1985; March
13, 1985; April 29, 1985; May 9, 1985; May 28 to 29, 1985; July 17,
1985; September 27, 1985; October 10, 1985; November 13, 1985;
January 27, 1986; February 20, 1986; October 16, 1986; November
7, 1986; November 11, 1986; December 17,1986; December
24,1986; January 9, 1987; February 26, 1987; March 26, 1987; April
24, 1987; May 18, 1987: June 8, 1987; October 16, 1987; October
21, 1987; October 26, 1987; and October 28,1987 (Total-40).

6 Section 23, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. THIRD DIVISION

7 Manolo v. Gan, 93 Phil. 202 (1953). A.C. No. 6313             September 7, 2006

8 Caballero v. Deipairan 60 SCRA 136 (1974); Balinon v. De Leon, CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
94 Phil. 277 (1954). vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry,
from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should
be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof.1

Ø Vitug v. Roncal, AC No.6313,September 7,2006 Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine
Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A
classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as
culled from the records are hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000
when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"),
the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who
was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings
with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter 2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein
he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was
congenital heart ailment. dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise
agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started import of the Affidavit.
having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after
respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to
had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved,
accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled,
for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking
against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour,
assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able
marriage had already been annulled. to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues
that respondent's aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01,
of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed the instant
the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant
only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's
support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow
could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her
public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child. 10 Subsequently, he and Aquino
document "without even taking a glance at it."5 communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity,
his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit
him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent
handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also
2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she
he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga. than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the
amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed.
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one
that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty.
forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not Tolentino.
know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he
gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still
a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months.
English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the
her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could assistance until June when her alleged fiancé from the United States would have
keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance
Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees. for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent.
According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting
adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend,
believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file
considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he
when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high she filed the instant complaint.
school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where
she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation. 13 After the parties submitted
to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the their respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation 14 dated 2 September 2005.
of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the After presenting the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating
Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent
Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more
than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign. Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is
wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation
as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those
worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as
money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to MORAL CHARACTER.
pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for
Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her
"to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He
 Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it
entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to
respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and the Supreme Court.
gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their
demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the
because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes IBP has recommended.
and emotional dependency.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
xxxx affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension
and disbarment. x x x15 One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution 16 dated 17 and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. 23 A grossly immoral act
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
his client and attempting to mislead the Commission," 17 respondent was meted out disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 24 It is a willful, flagrant, or
the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 respectable members of the community.25
to complainant.
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
account of the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28
financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that
the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule
to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between them is telling the immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is
truth. aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in
low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the
IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial
to his promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment.
filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met
deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing
herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case she
would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29 Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the
necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that
despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said
induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was
with, if not badgering, him for financial support. aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for
which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a
status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written
impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The
that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any
a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is
an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit,
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the
his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him negative.
in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his
marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with
also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable
relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be
verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant
of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later
cases.31 We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is
entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
misrepresentation or deceit on his part. settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that
cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 35
without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting
as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for
by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds
issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. 36 It is an investigation by
is in order. the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed
the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
settlement of complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men
she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 37 As such, it involves
to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. 38 The complainant or
agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is
– and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
fees. citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 39

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where
existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross
other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage, 40 abandoned his
presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an
that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case
issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern
Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46  respondent
requested for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He
sum of money. therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of
men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled
at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a
However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a
finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with
conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently
her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his
finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and
retirement during the pendency of the case.
answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth
investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
evidence solely on this aspect. remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years
ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and
thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor. 48 Considering further
that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This,
of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the 6
 Id. at 7.
alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
7
 Id. at 51-52.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of
immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a  The Complainant charges respondent of violating the following rules of the
8

repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Code of Conduct of Professional Responsibility:

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for Canon 1, Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
of this Decision.
Canon 1, Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated system.
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country. Canon 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SO ORDERED. SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur. Canon 16, Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.

Canon 16, Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Footnotes
9
 Rollo, pp. 1-7.
1
 Buado v. Layag, A.C. No. 5182, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 159; Berbano
v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 258.
10
 Id. at 12.

2
 Rollo, p. 5; The demand letter is dated 5 January 2000 but both parties
11
 Id. at 14.
admit that the same should read 5 January 2001.
12
 Id.
3
 Id. at 6.
13
 Id. at 25.
4
 Id. at 40-41.
14
 Id. at 77-83.
5
 Id. at 2.
15
 Id. at 81-83.
16
 Id. at 76. 32
 Rollo,  p. 34.

17
 Id. 33
 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 168, 173 (1996).

18
 Id. at 99-130. 34
 See Rodriguez v. Valencia and Rodriguez, 81 Phil. 787 (1948).

 IBP Resolution dated 27 April 2006 filed with the Office of the Bar
19 35
 In re De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127, 133 (1974).
Confidant on 20 June 2006.
36
 In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970,  31 SCRA 562, 600.
20
 Rollo, p. 56.
 Roldan v. Panganiban, A.C. No. 4552, 14 December 2004, 446 SCRA
37
21
 Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865 (1963). 249; Rivera v. Atty. Corral, 433 Phil. 331 (2002) ; In re Almacen, supra.

22
 Tolosa v. Cargo, A.C. No. 2385, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 21, 26. 38
 De Ere v. Rubi, 378 Phil. 377 (1999).

23
 Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., 342 Phil. 408, 412 (1997). 39
 Tajan v. Cusi, Jr., 156 Phil. 128, 134 (1974).

24
 Id.  Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336 (1999); Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil.
40

313 (1957).
25
 Id.
Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 213 Phil. 437 (1984); Toledo v. Toledo,  117 SCRA
41

 See Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691 (2000); See also Concerned

26 768 (1963).
Employee v. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA
448, 457. 42
 Royong v. Oblena, supra note 21.

27
 Id. at 461. 43
 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, supra note 29; Cabrera v. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256
(1960).
28
 Id. at 461-462.
44
 Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582.
 The operative circumstances in  Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474,
29

15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, are markedly different from those 45
 In re Almacen, supra.
obtaining in the present case.
46
 A.C. No. 4921, 6 March 2003, 398 SCRA 658.
30
 Rollo, p. 2.

31
 Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr., 389 Phil. 474 (2000). Ø In Re: Almacen,G.R. No.L-27654, February 18, 1970
 Republic of the Philippines ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
SUPREME COURT certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
Manila TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to
EN BANC assume the practice of the noblest profession.

  He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to
him, as follows:
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of
ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
vs.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY. the case.

RESOLUTION xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this

petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
CASTRO, J.: calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate Constitution with impunity.
of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a
great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this xxx xxx xxx
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
"that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in
Atty. Almacen's statement that
the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed
by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
 ... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions perfected out of time.
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by
and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-
June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8,
on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel 1967, dismissing the appeal.
a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied
Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further
he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the
appeal, in the following words: motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those
raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court
90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
 Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest
issue. latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter
was heard in oral argument.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case,
and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no
for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after
the Said date was ordered expunged from the records. At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7,
St. Matthew: —
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading "Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with
that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as with what measure you measure, it shall be
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck
unprofessional. in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the
beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye";
on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou
waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye,
reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested from thy brother's eyes."
"that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero
vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, "Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the
since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act." Prophets."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely xxx xxx xxx
and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty.
Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of
permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
"to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation of law.
xxx xxx xxx We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the
ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ...
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
will bear us on this matter, ... against our client and sensing that you have not performed your
duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom",
your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
xxx xxx xxx
and his Constitutional right of free speech.
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for
xxx xxx xxx
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all
in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the
That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by
simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case. our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O
remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE,
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE,
for acts he said in good faith. what injustices are committed in thy name."

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His
Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any
reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is
to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so
YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even as to curtail these abuses.
our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines xxx xxx xxx
today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who
have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
marketable commodity in the Philippines." found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two
more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that
xxx xxx xxx
 no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases
generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr.
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the
state of things and nothing more. same petition different reasons may read different justices to the
same result ... .
xxx xxx xxx
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may
lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has
our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's
must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260,
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three
but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would
must uphold the latter. not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take
these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances. infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite
aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions Six years ago, in Novino, et al.,  vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963
by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated
the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to Justice Bengzon:
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has
lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely
petitions for certiorari. hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of
the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
 need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time
Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
often merely ordered "dismissed".
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari  from general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no
Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice.
hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites: Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but
a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco,
I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not
Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The
Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection,
considered:
since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition.
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance,
not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
decisions of the Supreme Court;
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from
himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
exercise of the power of supervision. justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5 Such right is especially written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion." expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are
integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can
justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
aggrieved parties. position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11 conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity
is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our
citizens whom it is expected to serve. judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other
class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W.
as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels 212, 216)
the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned,
to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison
not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979.
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all June 26, 1967)
good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
maintenance of its supreme importance." campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by precedents.
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted
to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, 1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to
but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer
the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v.
Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652) It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge
or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at.
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice
tempers. the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule
is otherwise.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to 2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients
as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As
judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to 4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
do. representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with began:
the general public.
Unless the record in  In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two- my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in
year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic
time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to action as the law allows and the case warrants.
two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his
judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court: Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of ... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper
(N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of
for instance: the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute
libelous publication by an attorney, directed against and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be
a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author." intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up
in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
into disrepute with the public.
graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in
our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest 5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and
the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
81 Pac. 220.
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
 judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and
justice. ... in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by
officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty
guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that of professional misconduct.
freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final 7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725. widow residing here.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes ... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack,
fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity
result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said: of this court, and make out a  prima facie case of improper conduct
upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court
the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial as well as to his client.
officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of
this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the 8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members
officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if respondent for 30 days, saying that:
based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does
case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the
criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for ethics of the profession. ...
them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
 The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful
determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of and vigilant that the widow got no undue
government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If
served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the
such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or
with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for
could ever properly serve their client or the public good by the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated,
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is citizen of the state to read it.
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by
a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant months, delivered its opinion as follows:
misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through
its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to
lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was
retribution — not the court. so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by
him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose.
by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry
criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional
the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced
attorneys. by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any
that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed
than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action
Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an
had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph: these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting
far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and
the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the
citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the
an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I
court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be
"This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything
insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act repute."
constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney
in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter
shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court,
court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it
of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully
power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer,
judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the
passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge,
example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374,
hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
under such conditions." Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of
being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years. 1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to
12. In  In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions
in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
in his general conduct of a case. rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the
legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution
disbarred. would be resting on a very shaky foundation,

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma disclosed
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make
him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he ... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
expressed an intention to resign from the bar. intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence 2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper,
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more
the legal fraternity. putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he
Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the
courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and
of such condemnable practices. glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
free speech, this Court declared: shaky foundation.

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and ... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to
still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of 3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen"
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments
the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into
the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any question the capability of the members — and some former
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken
 quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate
called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction." the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail. decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that,
is destroyed.
in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment. contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
appeal.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much
of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The
of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney.
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the
first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
 existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause
Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
practice. 23 expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that — incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions
upon him.
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney,
almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment
and sound judicial discretion. 24 to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics.
As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by
the Rules of Court. 25
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and
in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of
involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The
the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his maintained.
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing
office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day,
complainant or a prosecutor. Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he
may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be,
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the
it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it suspension to take effect immediately.
be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent. Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part. 8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83 N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also State ex
rel Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct., 72 N. W. 193.
 
9 In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959).
Footnotes
10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918) ; In re Gomez, 43 Phil.
1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909 on September 17, 1965 in the Court 376; Cabansag v. Fernandez, L-18974, Oct. 18, 1957; Austria vs.
of First Instance of Rizal. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967; Re Troy (1920), 111 Atl. 723;
State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St. Rep.
90; Goons v. State, 134 N.E. 194; State vs. Sweetland, 54 N.W.
2 See e.g. "Mounting Discontent against the Supreme Court's Minute
415; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec.
Resolution," 32 Lawyers J. p. 325; "Lack of Merit Resolutions are
657.
Obnoxious," 31 Lawyers J. p. 329.

11 State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (NS)

3 In the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, this Court rejected by minute
585; Re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 747; Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep.
resolutions 803, 682 and 848 petitions, respectively, and resolved by
637; Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657; Brannon v. State, 29 So. 2d
extended decisions or resolutions 584, 611 and 760 cases,
918; Medgar Evers v. State, 131 So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d 467.
respectively. For the period covering the first six months of the year
1969, this Court rejected by minute resolutions 445 petitions, and
resolved by extended decision or resolutions 279 cases. 12 "A judge as a public official," said Justice Thornal in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, "is neither sacrosanct nor immune to
public criticism of his conduct in office."
4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil.
376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J.,
dissenting); Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug. 31, 13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432: "The harsh and sometimes unfounded
1967; Cabansag vs. Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957. criticism of the members of any of the three branches of our
Government may be unfortunate lot of public officials ..., but it has
always been deemed a basic principle that such comment may be
5 In re Gomez, supra.
made by the public ... . Nor should the judicial branch ... enjoy any
more enviable condition than the other two branches."
6 In re Gomez, supra; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801
(1930) ; In re Abistado 57 Phil. 668 (1932); People vs. Alarcon; In re
In Bridges v. California, 86 L. ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for
Contempt Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil. 265 (1939).
the majority, said: "... an enforced silence, however, limited, solely in
See Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 90 L. ed. 1295; In
the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably
re Bozorth, 118 A. 2d 432; In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d 432
engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it
(1959) ; In re Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 474; Hill vs. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d
would enhance respect." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the
286; Caig v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293 (Concurring opinion of Justice
minority opinion, said: "Judges as persons, or courts as institutions,
Taft).
are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons
or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office are
7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321 (1954). identified with the interest of justice they may forget their common
human frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets
upon the bench as there have sometimes been wielders of authority Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 315; People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579; People
who have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what they vs. Venturanza, et al., 85 Phil. 211, 214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of
called their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their Rizal, 99 Phil. 907, 914; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29,
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous 1959; Paragas vs. Cruz, L-24438, July 30, 1965; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85
stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt "A man Phil. 772, 775.
cannot be summarily laid by the heels because his words may make
public feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked to 19 In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re
act at some later date, any more than he can for exciting public Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 1965; Cornejo
feeling against a judge for what he already has done." ... Courts and vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775. State vs. Dist. Court, 151 Pac. 2d
judges mast take their share of the gains and pains of 1002; In re Shannon, 27 Pac. 352; State ex rel. Grice vs. Dist. Court,
discussion which is unfettered except by laws of libel, by self- 97 Pac. 1032; Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 2d 405; State vs.
restraint, and by good taste. Winds of doctrine should freely blow for Kaiser, 13 P. 964; State vs. Bee Pub. Co. 83 N.W. 204; Patterson
the promotion of good and the correction of evil. Nor should vs. Colorado. 51 L. ed. 879; Re Hart, 116 N.W. 212.
restrictions be permitted that cramp the feeling of freedom in the use
of tongue or pen regardless of the temper of the truth of what may be 20 69 Phil. 265.
uttered."
21 42 O.G. 59.
14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.
22 Article VIII, Section 12, Constitution.
15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.
23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.
16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F. Supp., where an attorney was
suspended for three years for writing a judge a letter in which he said
that the judge in signing an order took "advantage of your office to 24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.
rule with passion and vehemence." Also People v. Green, 3 P. 65,
where an attorney was disbarred for stopping a judge upon the street 25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
and addressed abusive, insulting language to him. See also Johnson
v. State, 44 So. 671; In re McCowan, 170 P. 1101; State v. 26 See Norman Dorsen, Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp. 60-61;
Calhoon, 102, 2d 604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793; State v. Rhodes, Griswold, "Of Time and Attitudes," 74 Harvard Law Review, 81, 94;
131 NW 2d 118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034; In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States, (1961) pp.
re Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re Greenfield, 262 176-177; see also Freund, On Law and Justice (1968) ch. 4.
NYS 2d 349; In re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re Smith, 36 A 130.
27 In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De Durant, 10 Ann.
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60; In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In Cas. 1913, 1220.
Snyder's Case, 76 ALR 666; Re Troy, 111 A. 723; State v. Sprigs,
155 P. 2d 285. 28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286; Fairfield County Bar vs. Taylor,
22 Atl. 441.
18 Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; In the matter of the Intestate
Estate of Rosario Olba, Contempt proceedings against Antonio
 29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34; Treadwell's case, 7 Pac.
724; Deles vs. Aragona, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644, and
the cases therein cited.

30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-29755, January 21, 1969.

31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs. Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12 (Supp) pp. FIRST DIVISION
87, 89, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 2, P.
870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte Alabama State [A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
Bar Ass'n., 8 So. 768.
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA,
32 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. JR., Respondent.

Jose M. Castillo for complainant.

33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa. 2d 699; People vs. Winogard, 287
Pac. 864; People vs. Kelly, 285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris, 112
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
N.E. 978; People vs. Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In re Gullickson, 181
Atl. 716; Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A. 878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98
A. 799; States vs. Kern, 233 N.W. 629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E.
SYLLABUS
383; State vs. Trapley, 259 Pac. 783; State vs. Jennings, 159 S.E.
627; In re Jacobson, 126 S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs. O'Niell, 44 Atl. 2d
880; State ex rel Oklahoma Bar Ass'n vs. Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d 873;
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — Among the duties of an attorney
Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs. Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136 N.E. 2d 136; In
are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to
re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S. 619.
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE

CASE AT BAR; PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of complainant or his
manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting
remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of
Ø Castillo v. Padilla,127 SCRA 743 respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate
language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is
not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in
offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his
pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to
observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
be dealt with more severely.
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance
no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by
RESOLUTION the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20
(b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
PLANA, J.:
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence,
the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was
practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow
proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to
measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession,
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that
resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings.
He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.
defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of
the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was
evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward triggered by complainant’s own manifest hostility and provocative remarks.
respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his
and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed irritation through the use of improper words.
with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense
complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty.
Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph SO ORDERED.

". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
for ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation
called up this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that
Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any
good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and
confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he
harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would sock
 case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in
writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare behavior.

His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from
requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
for entering an appearance at such a late date. He forthwith came with a recital of the
circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the
respondents Tiburcio, et al.
Ø In Re: Clemente Soriano, G.R. No. L-24114, June 30, 1970
He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent
Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents,
Republic of the Philippines
went to him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated
SUPREME COURT
case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano,
Manila
etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed
Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity
EN BANC Hills  case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the present
case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970 addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon
the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST these two cases were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-
ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114, People's Homesite and Housing contract dated October 8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional
Corporation and University of the Philippines, services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of
vs. land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was on the
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL. same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of his written
appearance in the present case.
RESOLUTION
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of
land would find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional
services solely in the Varsity Hills  case, for in this latter case, the records of which we
are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19 hectares is involved,
CASTRO, J.: 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the
present case.
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10,
1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and
entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and
Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore
al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which
done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Wittingly should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the
or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this
minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more of this Court, which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from
can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were situated in the
province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably Manila, he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail
precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in or by telegram.
the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before
rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of
his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were
the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the
then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be
substitution.2 Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any
counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at the
hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the
with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did so. appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents
Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after
thoughts. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Clemente M.
Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as
counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee
Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10, 1969, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the
latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Villamor, J., is on leave.
Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity
Hills  case, he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the
befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. 3 He  
did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills  case before
accepting the said case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he # Footnotes
been less precipitate in his actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a
final judgment in the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. 1 Annex "R-1" of Petition in the Varsity Hills case, entitled
Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his clients complained to him about having "Memorandum of plaintiffs" (the respondents in this case).
been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that circumstance of itself should
have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the 2 U. S. vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189.
present case. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty.
Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court — which assurance Atty.
Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident, categorically denied having given. What
Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of • CANON 8
members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section • CANON 9
Ø US v. Ney, 8 Phil. 146 signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys,
but with the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this
Manila court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and
the practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers
EN BANC sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding.
G.R. No. 3593            March 23, 1907
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being
within the law.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants. Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits,
a subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise;
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was
C.W. Ney for defendants.
not a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of
the addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this
TRACEY, J.: instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person
residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt. bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to
recognize as a practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not papers in an action other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents
entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that amounts to a signing by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally
after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as one of agency. (In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to
such was not qualified for admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and discountenance the use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have
an order was entered accordingly. been duly admitted to practice.

In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or
attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not
Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and
all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law
Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español — C.W. Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Ney, abogado americano."
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and
with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were 1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
 2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from
duties or in his official transactions. presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment
for acts so defined. (Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.) The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200
pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has costs de oficio. So ordered.
been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant
Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.
order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for Johnson, J., does not concur in the result.
its review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for
its violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own
petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular
signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and
constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in
setting forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the
courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not
effectively qualified by the addition that he would devote himself to consultation and
office work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the
equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law
of other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person might as a calling,
advise without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish
lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands.
Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status
disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent American advocates was
an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State.
(In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the Ø Tapay v. Bancolo, AC NO. 9604, March 20, 2013
defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to
which he was a party.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not
Manila
answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under
this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque SECOND DIVISION
in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper
signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013
to say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the
man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants, In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally
vs. dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents. prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman
ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty3 be
DECISION filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

CARPIO, J.: Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that
he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented
as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal
The Case
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia
and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public
Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive
larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
The Facts the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for
insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October
2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter- WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence,
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation
and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by
SO ORDERED.4
one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental.
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter
informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the
to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged
attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty.
his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime
Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo
counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
counsel, Atty. Bancolo. questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures
of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code.
practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and The Investigating
persecute innocent people.
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain
Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the responsibilities in their law firm.
secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents
admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature
complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony
Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly
minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally.
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office. undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings.
parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006.
On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over
failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to
that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit xxxx
their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’
position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23
October 2006. Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the
bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as
a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law
firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he
done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office
L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly,
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Responsibility.7 which provides:

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of CANON 9

the IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as standing.
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where
Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we held:
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8 professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008. possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And,
the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
denied both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP
Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and
Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007. signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority
The Court’s Ruling and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
(1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent
there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by
Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's
certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1 record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of guidance.
his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder.
However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the SO ORDERED.
affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his ANTONIO T. CARPIO
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 Associate Justice
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the
Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did WE CONCUR:
not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint
Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of
the Joint Answer. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses,
the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Associate Justice Associate Justice
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly
involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we
agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
Footnotes
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one
year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder. 1
 Docketed as OMB-V-C-04-0445-I and OMB-V-A-04-0429-I.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of 2
 Docketed as OMB-V-C-05-0207-E.
merit.
3
 Docketed as OMB-V-A-05-0219-E.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby 4
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this  IBP Records (Vol. I), p. 14.
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
5
be dealt with more severely.  Docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1612.
 6
 Sub-Office Report No. 0008-2005.

7
 IBP Records (Vol. III), pp. 4-6. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
8
 Id. at 1. Manila

9
 478 Phil. 378, 389 (2004). THIRD DIVISION

10
 529 Phil. 876 (2006).  

11
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Section 3. A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a
District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned
firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He wrote:

Ø Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24; 1997

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
me and your company, as represented by your Sales and pursued the housing loan without my authority
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said of the minds between me and the swindling sales
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. agent who concealed the real facts from me.
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite
acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he
faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the
plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already
I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996
my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
hence the need to annul the controversial contract." the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope
containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and
addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed. began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage.
and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she
Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at
the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as
I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
"manipulated contract" entered into between me and 2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as established reputation;"
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
 3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
the Philippine Bar may properly use. entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger,
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting
had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She
closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately
desciplined (sic) . . ." Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution  in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo
P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"  in which he questioned the authority
3
his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract
of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according
on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice,
he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed agreement with
and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between
Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his
Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents
Royal Family  . . ."4
as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the
house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for
in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious
were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as
and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
demonstrable.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya"
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that
— in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
"DATU  ASHARY M. ALAUYA." conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation. 14 Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced
ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise
honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that: that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in
a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
observe honesty and good
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;" than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15 counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title
of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and
utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
"(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . .
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, "
public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the 6 Dated April 22, 1996.
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use
of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming 8 Id at p. 60.
a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more 9 id. at p. 32.
severely.
10 Id. at p. 34.
SO ORDERED.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.
12 Id. at p. 35.
Footnotes
13 Id.
a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.
14 See  Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21,
b Annexes F and G, id. 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.

c Annex C-2, id. 15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo  at p. 14; copies of the letter 16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
were also furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation, The Finance Management and Budget Office and-the
Financial Division of the Supreme Court. 17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation
of the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6)
months' salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3)
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996. removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after due notice
and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no
3 Dated April 19, 1996. criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

4 Rollo at p. 23. 18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia,
etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413;
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al.
that NOTICES (or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68: SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248
by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the SCRA 272, 275.
parties by and over the signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court
or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being 19 Art. 19, Civil Code.
incorporated verbatim in said notices.
 20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1,
which should apply by analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo
Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza
discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03). against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed
as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Matter No. 681, entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise
their profession at the regular courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6,
Rules of Court. 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent
was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by
the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration
Ø Guballa v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-46537, July 29, 1977 was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of
the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision.
Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member
Republic of the Philippines of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to
SUPREME COURT the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
Manila
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his
SECOND DIVISION day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner, case;
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of
FORTEZA, JR., respondents. moral damages is contrary to law; and

d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses. 2

SANTOS, J: The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the
same law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same
from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3

The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court
which was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the
Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that
consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in Fernando, (Chairman) Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. 5
Footnotes
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed
the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case 1 Petition, Annex "A", pp. 22-24.
of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner,
and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal
before the Court of Appeals ... " 6 2 Id., p. 4.

On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ 3 Id., p. 5.
of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of
petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7 4 Id.

Hence the instant Petition. 5 Id., Annex "B", pp. 16-21.

Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory 6 Id., Annex "C", p. 25.
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The
alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the 7 Id., p. 5.
litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be
not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It 8 Id., Annex "D", p. 26.
should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition
of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of
the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other
words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial
and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover,
petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated,
not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6,
1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To
allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which
has already taken well over six years to resolve,

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction
is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209
Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10)
 small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their
Ø Five J Taxi v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994 reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the
Manila petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour
shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi
or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car
SECOND DIVISION
washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.
 
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners,
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994 he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned
that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon,
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his
vs. armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners. same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule
was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However,
R E SO L U T I O N on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the
previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth
REGALADO, J.: P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he
adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak
Company."
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action
for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo
plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for
the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees. the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected
minimis  amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require
Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for
with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is
unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice
claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable
mere afterthought. as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private
respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss
by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the
Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi
their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents
the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required
terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to
petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal
resolution. interest.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public
respondent. YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies 1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions
are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4 1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to 1990 605.00 570.00
defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article
114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there 1991 165.00 2,300.00
is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in
the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents ———— ———— ————
must be refunded therefor.
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to
withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even
indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and
deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private
We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of
evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
SO ORDERED.
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his
decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to
restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as  
claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private
respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount #Footnotes
doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing
illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as
illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.) 1 Penned by Presiding Commission Bartolome S. Carale, with
Commissioner S. E. Veloso concurring, in NLRC NCR CA No.
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car 003285-92; Rollo, 35.
wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private
respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their 2 It appears that Maldigan was hired in November, 1987, although
P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty petitioners claim that he was already working as an extra driver in
is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play. October, 1986. Sabsalon started working on June 24, 1979.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized 3 San Miguel Corporation vs. Javate, Jr., G.R. No. 54244, January
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 469; Planters Products, Inc. vs.
Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC
or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their
organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia
was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who VII. LAWYER AND THE COURTS (MIDTERMS)
did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, • CANON 10
he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Ø Masinsin v. Albano, G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
Republic of the Philippines
from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the
SUPREME COURT
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of
Manila
attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative
is a lawyer. 8
THIRD DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car  
G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994 No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory.
On 22 August 1985, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in
ADELINA, ROLDAN, petitioners, the ejectment case and to set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due
vs. time dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and
CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Damages" was filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents. XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. This time, petitioners
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners. appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was
issued by the MTC for the enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was held in
abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987.
On 11 March 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower
RESOLUTION court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court was to be of no avail. The petition was
denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.

Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners
VITUG, J.: refused to remove their house on the premises in question, upon motion of private
respondent, an order of demolition was issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, began. Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the
prohibition, relief from judgment, as well as declaratory relief, with prayer for Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari, with
preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court preliminary injunction and restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February
("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.
Case No. 107203-CV.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed assailed anew the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction,
by private respondent Vicente Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the Regional
petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restraining order. 2
After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:
Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering An ex-parte motion of petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order was
the defendants and all persons claiming right under them to vacate this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial court,
the premises and to remove their house/apartment and surrender ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.
possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of P100.00 a month from January 1987 as the reasonable In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the jurisdiction to enforce its decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203,
land is actually vacated, and the costs of suit. 1 when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the
National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA
2016. projects under the Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP)
and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,
The petition is totally without merit. however, is under the administration of the
Presidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for
acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in
G.R. No. 98446, entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.," to which this case is intimately related, where we ruled: The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status
of the alleged negotiation for the acquisition by the government of
certain areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring
. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for
the said lot for its program.
resolution of this court is the implication of Presidential Decree No.
1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law," and its
amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set
amended by Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed
2016. All the above statutes are being implemented by the Housing the decision of the lower courts, in order to avoid eviction from the
and Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly
Development Coordinating Council, Office of the President. under the Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing
Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same.
Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED. 5
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution
of this case. On May 20, 1992, this Court required the National
Housing Authority to submit a Comment on the status of the program What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of
of acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which
disputed property, as part of the Areas for Priority Development not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and
(APD), under the aforementioned decrees and proclamations. petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the
inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.
In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan,
Manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of the National Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same
Housing Authority, submitted the following report on the status of Lot MTC decision before different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes.
6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Never, again, should this practice be countenanced. 6
Manila, known as the Carlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions
of the report read: The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating
ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a
Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here
at No. 1890 Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which is reminded of that pledge; thus -
the subject matter of the case and located within the
Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to LAWYER'S OATH
Presidential Proclamation No. 1967,  is not for
acquisition by NHA. I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution
 and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted 5 Rollo of G.R. No. 98446, pp. 90-91.
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its
commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any 6 The Court has since issued Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the effective 01 April 1994, hereunder quoted for guidance:
same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.) TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN,

COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade
TRIAL COURTS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL
disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power. 7
MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in
the future will be dealt with most severely. Double costs against petitioners.
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR CIVIL
COMPLAINTS, PETITIONS AND OTHER
This resolution is immediately executory. INITIATORY PLEADINGS FILED IN ALL COURTS
AND AGENCIES, OTHER THAN THE SUPREME
SO ORDERED. COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, TO
PREVENT FORUM SHOPPING OR MULTIPLE
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur. FILING OF SUCH PLEADINGS.

  Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated April 1, 1994,

applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the
#Footnotes Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is
intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or
complaints involving the same issues in other
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 98446, 13-14. tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.

2 Rollo of G.R. No. 86421, 13-14. Complementary thereto and for the same purpose,
the following requirements, in addition to those in
3 Ibid., Annex "H", Petition, 29-30. pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and
existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in
4 Rollo of G.R. No. 98446, 14-15. the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or
 other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies
other than the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, and shall be subject to sanctions provided
hereunder:

(1) The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal

party seeking relief in the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading shall certify
under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously EN BANC
filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced A.C. No. 5624               January 20, 2004
any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,
or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his vs.
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may DECISION
have been terminated, he must state the status
thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly
undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days violating his oath as a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order."1
pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein
have been filed. In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the
legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are
"The complaint and other initiatory, pleadings estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children – namely,
referred to and subject of this Circular are the Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three
original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, years old – both of whom are in complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for
third (fourth, etc.) — party complaint, or complaint-in- the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122,
intervention, petition, or application where- in a party before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another
asserts his claim for relief. case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the
Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, "James Benedict
C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Ø Hueysuan-Florido v. Atty. Florido, AC No. 5624, January 20, 2004
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 5 from the Court of Appeals stating
residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to
minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an respondent had been issued.
alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his
motion for temporary child custody.2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did
informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
respondent.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the attorney’s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’
Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and
the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their country.
children to respondent.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The
the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in
children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, his disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification
that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police.
The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held
matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious
caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. 3 In
order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in
respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic.
City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious
Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others. resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the
assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case
van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them No. 3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and
to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
room, where they stayed until later in the morning. Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was
respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, its fabrication.
Branch 31, a verified petition4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his
right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer.1âwphi1 The burden cast on the
resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the
allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of
counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client’s cause, it law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead,
must never be at the expense of the truth.8 Thus, the Code of professional suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the
Responsibility states: offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
COURT. SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a country.
paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by SO ORDERED.
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be concur.
forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or
oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. 10 By calling
complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a "vindictive congenital
prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Footnotes

1 
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They Rollo, p. 1.
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: 2 
Id., p. 14.

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds 3 

Id., p. 9.
therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct 4 
Id., p. 10.
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take 5 
Id., p. 13.
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so. 6 
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report and Recommendation, p. 9.
 Rollo, p. 10.
7 
EDUARDO R. SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
Muñoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, 28 September 1973, 53 SCRA 190.
8  JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent.

Surigao Mineral v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072, 9 January 1970, 31 SCRA 1;

9  Eduardo R. Santos for and in his own behalf.
In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562;
Montecillo v. Gica, G.R. No. L-36800, 21 October 1974, 60 SCRA 235; In re
Gomez, 43 Phil. 376 [1922]; Sulit v. Tiangco, G.R. No. L-35555, 20 July
1982, 115 SCRA 207; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. L-79690-707, 7 DAVIDE, JR., J.:
October 1988, 166 SCRA 316.
The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706,
National Security Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610; People v. Taneo, G.R. No.
10 
an action for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial
117683, 16 January 1998, 284 SCRA 251. Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan while the respondent is the presiding Judge of the
said court. In his verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator
on 18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of
the law and gross incompetence. The complainant supports his charge with the
allegation that after the answer in the said case was filed and "without notice and
hearing," the latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, 1 the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is

hereby respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance
with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled case.
Ø Santos v. Paguio, A.M. No. MTJ-93-781, November 16, 1993
SO ORDERED.

He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its
Order of 19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-932 — a petition
Republic of the Philippines for certiorari filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 — had already opined
SUPREME COURT that the said decision is void upon its face because it:
Manila
. . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious
FIRST DIVISION reason that the same cannot be considered a decision at all. Instead
of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely prays that
judgment be rendered.
 
but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28
A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993
June 1991] in order to nullify the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a
new decision in Civil Case No. 90-17063 promulgated on 25 January 1993. The In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993,4 the respondent denies the imputations and
dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows: alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was not the original counsel for the
defendants but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the latter until the time
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby that the parties were directed to file their respective position papers, specifically until
rendered in favor of the plaintiff by: 29 November 1991 when Atty. Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and
the complainant filed his notice of appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the
Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only after a preliminary conference was held
1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any
where the parties with their respective counsels discussed the possibility of an
rights under them to vacate the premises occupied
amicable settlement and after the defendants failed to comply with the 16 November
by them, more particularly the portion on which are
1990 Order for the parties to submit in writing their "respective position statements
erected their respective dwelling structure/unit, at
setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the affidavits of
117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of plaintiff
their witnesses and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from
aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling
receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion
structure/units from said subject premises of plaintiff;
praying that judgment be rendered in this case; (3) the defendants did not appeal
from the 28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution on 2
2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a motion
P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month by way of for reconsideration and to declare the decision null and void on the ground that the
monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief and there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4
thereafter until they shall have vacated the premises December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was granted and a writ of
of the plaintiff; execution was issued, a copy of which was sent to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January 1991,5 he received an order from Branch 18 of
3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from implementing the writ of execution;
severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine currency, (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., issued
on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter,
P500.00, Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial he (respondent) handed down a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25
attended by said attorney before this Honorable January 1993 that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the
Court; and dispositive portion" of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the
defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to set aside the decision, which the
4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs. court set for its consideration and to which the plaintiff filed its opposition on 8
February 1993 together with a motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March
SO ORDERED. 1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by the former did not
appear on the date it was set for consideration. He finally contends that the issue
regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was rendered moot
According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision
and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the
exhibits the respondent's gross ignorance in "decision preparation," and that
charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the complainant's
respondent's "haste to amend the same to favor plaintiff was both appalling (sic) and
sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful attitude.
downright improper." The complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed
from office if only to save the integrity of the judiciary."
In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993, 6 the complainant reiterates his
charge that the respondent is incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a
sensible and credible decision," and maintains that the respondent's attempt to
convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision is True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original
permissible and proper shows "gross ignorance." Further, that the respondent defective decision since the RTC dismissed the petition
believes that "he could correct the decision after its finality" and after the RTC of for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what
Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face clearly manifests his "patent was rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at
ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence." all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2 years to discover and correct his
error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time the
In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993,7 the respondent argues that while the 28 Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ
June 1991 Decision "could hardly be enforced for the reason that there is some sort was nonetheless issued on December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated
of ambiguity or omission (sic) in its dispositive portion," he was not prohibited from correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denying that the
having the defect "timely corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as herein
done, and that the "clarified decision" did not prejudice "the substantial rights of the respondent, is a reflection on the integrity of the court in dispensing
parties" since they "were given their day in court and passed through the usual justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least careless
course of the proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be guilty of gross ignorance of in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both
the law and of lack of competence. the original and amended decisions still contained errors in grammar
and syntax indicating that there was no adequate editing of the
decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he
Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and
would have avoided such fractured phrases as:
Manifestation on 28 July 1993.8 Not to be outdone, the respondent filed a
Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993.9
1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows:
(Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991);
The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid);
On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum
containing its evaluation, report and recommendation. After summarizing the 3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid);
antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instant complaint is meritorious,
and made the following findings: 4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of
lease of which right becomes one of a detainer plain and
It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have simple (page 6, Ibid);
overlooked the missing dispositive portion of his original decision
which is considered the executory portion thereof. The only 5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the
ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision property (Ibid).
before he signed the same. If only he devoted even only a little time
to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the most It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their
important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. fractured constructions have no place in a court decision. Careful
The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It did not have the editing and rewriting should have been done.
effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this must have been
simply copied from plaintiff's complaint. and recommends that:
 . . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning such nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its
that any repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be meted execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even
with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is also his incompetence.
admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions.
We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for
We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be such unmitigated  faux pas. The counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to
sufficiently supported by the pleadings submitted by the parties in this case. have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the obvious inefficacy of
any writ of execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, while
After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do the counsel for the defendants — the complainant herein — merely filed a motion for
find its body to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive reconsideration based solely on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial
portion" disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a brief and that there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously, the complainant initially
dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of fact, when he assailed
the plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation and motion the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was amended was a
praying that judgment be rendered filed after the defendants failed to file their " final decision," a position totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void
position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by the Court as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it candor,
Administrator. How it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an fairness and good faith, 12 both attorneys should have called the court's attention to
arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter against the glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991 Decision.
the respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or incompetence.
We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least,
There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the inefficiency, neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of
fatally infirmed "dispositive portion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable for ignorance of law and
on the part of the respondent betraying the absence of due care, diligence, jurisprudence or for incompetence when he handed down a new  decision on 25
conscientiousness and thoroughness — qualities which Judges must, among others, January 1993. The 28 June 1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal
possess. Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken intents and purposes, it had no  fallo  and could not attain finality, hence the
a little more time and effort to at least read its original copy before he finally affixed respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and
his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be an expert on justice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the
the English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the
can, through constant study, extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is "void upon its face" forever bars the
produce a decision which fosters respect for and encourages obedience to it and respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case.
enhances the prestige of the court.
We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a
As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct sacred task and all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and
prescribed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a
industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him" 10 and that public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
he should be conscientious, studious and thorough. 11 the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and
act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never
forget that he is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even
justice. 15 Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of competence,
granted the motion for its execution and issued the corresponding writ with full
diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to
knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of
preserve, promote and enhance the people's confidence in the Judiciary.
A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
his complaint in this case he alleged under oath that after the defendants filed their
answer, the respondent "without any hearing, or at least this counsel was never  
notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course
inaccurate, if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his # Footnotes
complaint was that, as disclosed in the Comment which he did not refute, after the
defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, the case was set for
preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were required to submit their 1 Annex "A" of the Complaint; Rollo, 17-25.
position papers and the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that
the case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on Summary Procedure 2 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-17. Per Judge Demetrio B.
and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the submitted Macapagal, Sr.
position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further
suppressed the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants 3 Annex "C" of Comment;  Id., 50-57.
only after the court had conducted the preliminary conference and issued the order
for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, 4 Rollo, 29-40.
entitled to any notice before then.
5 Should be 1993 (as appearing in Annex "A" of Comment; Rollo,
The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant 45).
to give his complaint a strong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was
entitled to adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this
6 Should be Reply; Rollo, 69-72.
Court absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor
tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would
have a bearing on its initial action. Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to 7 Should be Rejoinder; Id., 82-86.
faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
8 Should be Sur-rejoinder only; Rollo, 88-92.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of
Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. 9 Unpaginated in the rollo.
PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt 10 Canon 5.
with more severely.
11 Canon 31.
Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings,
always keeping in mind his duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional 12 Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility.
Responsibility.
13 Section 5(g), Rule 135, Revised Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
14 Sy vs. Academia, 198 SCRA 705 [1991].
Cruz and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Ø Libit v. Oliva, AC No. 2837, October 7, 1994
 Republic of the Philippines introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial
SUPREME COURT Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of
Manila the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the
speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final
EN BANC Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)

  Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification
of the said sheriff's return.
A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En
Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of
ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
vs.
recommendation.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.

In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect
RESOLUTION
that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the
complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed
to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali.

PER CURIAM: With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and
recommendation:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro
Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that
Domingo Panis issued the following order: Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's
Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby
ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend
determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have to show the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the
been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff
will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.) Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" — Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella
dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's
After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court
(NBI), through herein complainant, charged respondents as follows: of the Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office
That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional of Attys. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons
Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named to the law office of the respondents (Exh. "H" — Sinumpaang
Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" — Sworn
No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief
TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's
 Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the
[should be plaintiff] in said civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" — Motion to Declare falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10
Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. [1991].
Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his
Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule
letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment of 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" — Demand Letter dated March 28,
1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q- in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. artifice.
"S"), the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30,
1984 signed and filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme
typewriter, as shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198- penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is
585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of
and Attorneys.
"V-2").
The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation
of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of SO ORDERED.
misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The
facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the Feliciano, J., is on leave.
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other party.

At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but
Ø Monterey v. Arayata, 61 Phil. 820
a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can
not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the Republic of the Philippines
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete SUPREME COURT
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, Manila
on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential
that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but EN BANC
rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in
Per Rec. Nos. 3527, 3408             August 23, 1935 The established facts show that the respondent Arayata is the son of Arcadio Arayata
who died on November 5, 1916, leaving a widow and five children; that Arcadio
JUSTA MONTEREY, complainant, Arayata in life, purchased from the Bureau of Lands lot No. 3448 of the Hacienda de
vs. Santa Cruz de Malabon, for which transfer certificate of title No. 7591 was issued to
EUSTAQUIO V. ARAYATA and TERESO MA. MONTOYA, respondents. him; that on August 27, 1931, many years after Arcadio Arayata's death, the
respondent attorney prepared the deed, Exhibit A, stating therein that his father sold
the land in question to him for the sum of P4,000; that after affixing the names of the
Eustaquio V. Arayata in his own behalf.
alleged vendor and the two witnesses, the respondent brought an old man and the
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
two witnesses before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and requested the latter to
ratify said document, assuring him that the old man was the grantor and vendor and
IMPERIAL, J.: the other two were the instrumental witnesses thereto; that the notary honestly
believing said information, legalized and registered the document after verifying from
It is alleged in the charges filed against Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata (1) that on the old man that he ratified the contents thereof; that the transfer was invalid and the
August 27, 1931, while practicing his profession, he prepared and drew up in his document not genuine because another, not Arcadio Arayata, signed it; that the
favor a deed of sale of the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 7591, for respondent later applied for and obtained transfer certificate of title No. 8370 of said
the sum of P4,000, stating therein that the person who executed the document and land from the registry of deeds of Cavite after the former title was cancelled; that
sold the land to him was his father, Arcadio Arayata, when he knew positively that sometime later, or on April 11, 1933, the respondent sold a portion of said land
this alleged vendor had already died on November 5, 1916; that knowing the having an area of two and one-half (2 ½) hectares to Sinforosa Torres, married to
document to be fictitious, he appeared before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and Basilio Sorosoro, for the sum of P500.
made the latter legalize said document and state that Arcadio Arayata personally
appeared before him, although said fact was not true; and he later succeeded in With regard to the second charge, it likewise appears established that on June 5,
having the register of deeds cancel the transfer certificate of title issued to Arcadio 1933, the respondent, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil and said marriage not
Arayata and issue transfer certificate of title No. 8370 in his favor; and (2) that on having been dissolved, signed under oath an application to marry Engracia F. Ortega
June 5, 1933, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil, he filed an application to stating therein that he was single, he being in fact married; the application was
marry Engracia F. Ortega, stating therein under oath that he was single when in fact registered and duly considered and on September 25, 1933, the register of the
he was married, said marriage not having been dissolved. Province of Cavite issued the corresponding license upon payment by the
respondent of the sum of P2; for some unknown reasons the marriage applied for
The charge filed against attorney and notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya consists in was not solemnized; the respondent's wife, nevertheless, filed a complaint for bigamy
having ratified the deed of sale and having stated that Arcadio Arayata personally against the former, which is now pending in the justice of the peace court of Santa
appeared before him and confirmed the sale, knowing fully well that said person is Rosa, Laguna, for which reason the investigator is of the opinion, and so
already dead and therefore could do neither the one nor the other. recommends, that no action should be taken on the second charge. The
recommendation is well founded and has our approval.
The investigation was finally conducted by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Cavite, who recommended that a disciplinary action be taken against In his first answer, respondent Arayata admitted that the sale had been made by his
Arayata and that Montoya be exonerated, it having been clearly established that the father who was his true predecessor in interest, but alleged that nobody, including the
latter, in ratifying the document, acted in good faith and relied on Arayata's assurance complainant, could complain of the transfer because none was prejudiced, he being
that the old man then with him was really the vendor Arcadio Arayata who ratified all the true and only heir. In his second answer, however, and in the course of the
the contents of the instrument. We concur in the appreciation of the facts and we are investigation, he set up another defense alleging that the person who had really sold
of the opinion that said notary public and attorney should really be exonerated and him the land was his uncle Januario Arayata who, in the deed and relative to the
held innocent. land, assumed the name of Arcadio Arayata. He further alleged that it was his said
uncle who signed the deed of transfer and ratified it before notary Montoya. We find
this second new defense improbable and unestablished.

The acts committed by the respondent Arayata relative to the deed of sale Exhibit A,
and his statements to notary Montoya with regard to said document, constitute
malpractice and unprofessional conduct under the provisions of section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, meriting for him a disciplinary action mitigated in this case
by the circumstance that he was apparently the heir entitled to the ownership of the
land and that the complainant has neither real nor direct interest in the transaction
complained of by her.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata guilty of

malpractice and suspend him from the practice of his profession for one (1) month,
Ø Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Asso. v. Insular Life Assurance Co.,
hereby reprimanding him for having prepared and executed the deed of sale in
question. So ordered. G.R.No.L-25291, January 30, 1971

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Butte, Goddard,
and Diaz, JJ., conc Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-

NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE
M. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.

Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents. Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were
conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the
issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a
notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation
conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the
CASTRO, J.:
conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto  so
that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc  of the Court of security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any
Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for
Case 1698-ULP. union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to
April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its
Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still
Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions
members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their
bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October
1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to
latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the meet and discuss the remaining demands.
Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia,
as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail. 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their
economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and
Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own
latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the
Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the
receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as Companies' unfair labor practices.
personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without
increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These
Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts employees resigned from the Unions.
which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed
and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular
1, 1957. Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes,
respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus
each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows: causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance
offered by some picketers.
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct
picketing. Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as
evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office,
you may: the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of
First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal
cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention
restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding,
to do so.
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and
driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of
2. Take your meals within the office. the Companies' building.

3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent
sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
prepared.
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours. more convinced of our decision.

6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold
your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will
The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the continue to do so with or without you.
motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against
were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958. you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the
home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May forced to obtain your replacement.
31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus,
on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of Before, the decisions was yours to make.
the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the
picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket So it is now.
line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued
between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in
the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. the strike.
These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light
coercion" against two others. On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material
allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them dismissal of the complaint.
as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to
their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge
and to report back to work on June 2, 1958. Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions'
complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on
secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in
management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being
required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically 1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in
all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A
readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and and B;
members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating
the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission 2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the
Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers matter of readmission of employees after the strike;
& Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the 3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them
retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in
Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of
although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them. their right to strike; and

On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against 4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the
the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their
Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.
right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to
abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B,
coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The
they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work
special delivery mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which were striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free
representing the employees in the collective bargaining. speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of
opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB
during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs
were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the
an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay
collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families,
instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
Am. Jur. 563, citing  NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is
F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045) equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the
bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees consequences of returning to work would be.
individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the
prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the
is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company
employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given
Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332). for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain
with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike
interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the
urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers
adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization,
collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in. 2
of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to
return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court
engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their which states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call
homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by
activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main
activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This
activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to
employer's molestation.1 work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance
of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted
in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not
provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or
same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not,
and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the
constitutes unfair labor practice. petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for
union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally,
employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike,
tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their
section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two
evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M.
statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men,
inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process,
(Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing  NLRB v. Ford, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building.
C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735). This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
breakers.lâwphî1.ñèt Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal
charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone
misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to
but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances
obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from
surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of
stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies'
conduct doctrine,"
gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and
from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually and by registered
evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not
to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported
collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion for work, the respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was
by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently a member — refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending
were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the
they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union
relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal
established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were
on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.) readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending
criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote,
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor
amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against
respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the
of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without
respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit,
the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were
respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..
responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the 3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union
letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which
could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8,
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for letter dated April 15, 1958.)
them in order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners'
strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was
that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal
supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is
for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the
states, inter alia: meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of
some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike."
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the
MANILA following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the
petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the
negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7,
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic]
respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand
unions intends to go on strike against
for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners'
demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the
Plaza Moraga, Manila petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the
financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26,
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP 1969, p. 49.)
Plaza Moraga, Manila
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2)
Plaza Moraga, Manila . there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on
June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953,
BARGAINING... they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.

However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with
from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the the second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June
deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had
dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure
cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads: their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused
readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the
Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal
charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents
whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was
and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing
practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43
sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act. NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)

The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or screening committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they
lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus,
readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused
note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella,
the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the
lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept.
exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent
less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement. Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He
testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the
authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the
leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain the basis for
discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged
the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while
condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, those whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56).
Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing  Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious
Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.) misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or
discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other
charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."
respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent
Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed
Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges
It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees — having been involved in against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for
unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first
strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure
the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring. and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to
take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is in the following stereotyped tenor:
having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees
hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular FG
Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958. U.

The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed
committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were
Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three
terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the were dropped or dismissed.
amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every
year of your service in the Group Company. Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions
do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers
Ver & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he
y did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the
trul overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to
y rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his
you testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the
rs, management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958.
He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received
(Sg them and later directed them — when Olbes refused them an audience — to Felipe
d.) Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he
JO and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were
SE not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to
M. produce De Asis and Enage — who testified anyway as witnesses for the
OL respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The respondents did
BE nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents'
S attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor,
Pre but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10,
sid 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause,
ent, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
Ins
ura At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return,
nce does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S.
Life Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted
Acti discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were
ng prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the
Pre next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:
sid
ent,
 ... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of
unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the
officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After
activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his
the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the
discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Constitution.
Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor
Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728) Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the
labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard
refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions.
reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on
the employee relieved from the duty of returning further. the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of
his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.)
the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the
Companies. We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos
emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and
the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public
1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy
business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with
(Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies
or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance
this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should
only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent not have given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly
Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not
therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the respondents
in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board rather than Tongos.
examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo  that Tongos
indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip — which the respondents never Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente Alsol and
denied or tried to Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-
disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant
and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the
of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also
employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead — acts considered
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist
involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it
every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted
affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard
and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a
conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to
believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened.lâwphî1.ñèt The reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:
picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police
blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no
acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding offices bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p.
at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate
secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of
the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to
sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing reinstatement.
criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for
injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the
picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are
lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p.
rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault 854, citing  Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they
did not resort to violence. Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-
striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those
The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The
affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.
commentary: .
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty
We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives
quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is
essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required
human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report
passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those
engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra
direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents
regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he
when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and
diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this
afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and
accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried
minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is
of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an
472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378) explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-
management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats [W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct
or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the
Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on
respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor Labor Relations, p. 418.)
which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the
Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions
Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an
FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing  Waterman S.
"turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery,
Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F.
emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v.
there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick
the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable Co., 99 F2d 99.)
interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements.
employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such
instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in [W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed
connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an
constitute unfair labor practice. "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a
defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved
activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained employee can be found, the employer must discharge the
by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-
used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's
is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are
labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement
employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) . A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the
backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the
members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if
actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the
and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice
Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable
respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work — upon the invitation for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and
of the respondents — they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964,
officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or
also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been
likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena
the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
(Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, supra). Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of
1958, which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do
readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were
readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent
can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the
backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the
Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter
which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during
incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the ... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the
Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other
employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a
they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages determination as to whether or not the acts of the
to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle employees concerned justified the adoption of the
that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of employer of disciplinary measures against them, the
the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]). mere fact that the employees may be able to put up
a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the
same acts, does not erase or neutralize the
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by employer's right to impose discipline on said
the dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employees. For it is settled that not even the
employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge
employees by serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the against him is a bar to the employer's right to
required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal impose discipline on its employees, should the act
prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities. upon which the criminal charged was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial employer's interest... The act of the employees now
establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by under consideration may be considered as a
serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.
thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication
termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81,
employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)
of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the
underscored portions of the above citation read however as follows: employees now under consideration may be considered as a
misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito
Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted
as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's
allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted
insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be
by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined
resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in
rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the
Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a immediately succeeding paragraph.
report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the
exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt
presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to
practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled
Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine
could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may
aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima
measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the facie  right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision,
publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the
assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is
Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's
employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges
measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees,
an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the an activity inimical to the employer's interest."
act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest. Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions
and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is
his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their
some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which
least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this
same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al.
deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if
not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their * As reproduced on pp. 123-127 of the mimeographed and
proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public paperbound Supreme Court decisions for December 1964.
who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar
meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities ** Id., p. 126. (The entire decision may now be found in printed form
culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain in 12 SCRA 699-700.)
that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark,
appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved
precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.

Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no
substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is
our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby,
admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. Ø Asa v. Castillo, 500 SCRA 309
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17,
1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to
reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or
comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of
their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,

Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION
 
A.C. No. 6501 August 31, 2006
Footnotes
(CBD Case Nos. 03-1076, 03-1108, 03-1109, 03-1125)
1 Cf. Chicago Apparatus Company, 12 NLRB 1002; Fruehauf Trailer
Co., 1 NLRB 68; Remington Rand, Inc., 2 NLRB 626; Metropolitan ATTY. LEON L. ASA and ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, Complainants,
Engineering Co., 4 NLRB 542; Ritzwoller Company, 11 NLRB 79; vs.
American Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB 443; Ralph A. Fruendich, Inc., 2 NLRB ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ATTY. GINGER ANNE
802). CASTILLO, Respondents.

2 See Robert Bros., Inc., 8 NLRB 925; Hercules Campbell Body, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Inc., 7 NLRB 431; Aronson Printing Co., 13 NLRB 799; E.A.
Laboratories, Inc., 88 NLRB 673; Star Beef Company, 92 NLRB ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, Complainant,
1018; Jackson Press, Inc., 96 NLRB 132. vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. OLIVEROS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x alia, "Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his services in providing
coffee and opening doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel Law Offices." 2
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, Complainant,
vs. Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger Anne to be a brazen falsehood
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, Respondent. concocted to besmirch Asa’s reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed before IBP an
administrative complaint3 against Castillo and Ginger Anne, for gross violation of the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed
as CBD Case No. 03-1076.
ATTY. LEON L. ASA, Complainant,
vs. In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged Castillo with machinations and
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, Respondent. deceit arising from the following alleged incidents:

DECISION In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to January 20, 2000 attended by
Dr. Laurel, the Nonan minors’ counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III (Cassiday),
Asa and Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to be received by Dr. Laurel in trust
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
for the Nonan heirs would be deposited at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC), St. Francis Square Branch, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-
Subject of the present Decision are four administrative cases, docketed by the 250-00043-0. Castillo, however, proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), he explaining that he knew an employee
Nos. 03-1076,03-1108,03-1109, and 03-1125. there who could facilitate "the transaction." Dr. Laurel rejected this proposition and
instead instructed Castillo to file the appropriate motion to have the funds deposited
I. CBD Case No. 03-1076 at the RCBC.4

In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an associate of the Laurel Law Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was instructed to prepare, Castillo filed
Offices of which Attorneys Leon L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros (Oliveros) are the same with the Angeles trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently received a copy of a
partners, endorsed to the law firm a guardianship case, Special Proceeding No. March 2, 2000 RTC Order5 signed by the then trial Judge Eliezer R. De los Santos
5222, "In re: Guardianship of the Minors Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jerill Nonan," granting his motion and accordingly directing that the funds to be held in trust for the
which was pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59. Nonan children be deposited at the Trust Department of the UCPB Head Office. Dr.
Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the therein petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed with the Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion
Laurel, guardian ad litem of the minors Nonan who appear to have inherited a for Reconsideration6 of the March 2, 2000 Angeles RTC Order in order to have the
sizeable amount of US dollars. funds deposited at the RCBC transferred to the RTC, as previously agreed upon.
This motion was granted.
A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and Castillo as regards their sharing
in the attorney’s fees in the guardianship case. Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged that in a "Reply to
Answer"7 dated June 25, 2001 filed by Castillo with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
On page 6 of a pleading entitled "Reply to Petitioner-Guardian’s 145 in Civil Case No. 01-506, "Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut Planters Bank,
Comment/Opposition,1 ETC." dated July 19, 2002 filed before Branch 59 of the Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S. Hernandez," Castillo again committed a clear
Angeles RTC and signed by Castillo’s daughter Ginger Anne Castillo (Ginger Anne) falsehood when he therein stated that:
as "counsel" for Castillo who filed a Notice Ad Cautelam, it was alleged that, inter
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who Castillo subsequently filed a complaint13 against Oliveros before the IBP, docketed
personally knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in extolling his academic as CBD Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyer’s oath and the Code of
credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer as follows: Professional Responsibility.

Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo? Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in embezzling US $950,000
representing the share adjudicated to the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with Dr.
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers of the Laurel Law Laurel and a certain Atty. Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum shopping to
Offices,8 (Underscoring supplied), undermine and defeat the jurisdiction of the Philippine court in the guardianship
proceedings; (3) Oliveros, along with Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated
other acts of fraud in the guardianship proceedings; and (4) Oliveros, together with
he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any time a lawyer at the
Asa, deliberately and maliciously filed a groundless administrative complaint against
Laurel Law Offices. In support of this allegation, they appended to the complaint a
him and Ginger Anne.
certified true copy of the Service Record9 of Justice Kalalo which does not show that
he was ever connected with the Laurel Law Office.
In his Answer14 to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-1108, Oliveros, decrying the
allegations against him as patently false, baseless and malicious, claimed that the
In their Answer10 to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger Anne declared:
complaint was Castillo’s way of retaliating against him for having joined Asa in filing
the administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne (CBD Case No. 03-1076).
There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the statement that Asa’s services in the
guardianship case consisted in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there
III. CBD Case No. 03-1109
was a conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in fact the truth, the
comportment being "strictly in accordance with long cherished Filipino hospitality,"
and "he [Castillo] would have done the same with his own visitors." 11 In any event, Castillo also filed an administrative complaint15 against Asa before the IBP, charging
they claim that the assailed factual narration was material and relevant to Castillo’s him with embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of confidence and
question why Asa was given the lion’s share of attorney’s fees when he had not violation of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The case
rendered any known material service which redounded to the benefit of the Nonan was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1109.
children.
Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel scandalously mismanaged the
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan funds at the UCPB estate of the Nonan heirs, the bulk of which they indiscriminately pocketed; (2) Asa
was not attended with malice or bad faith, nor was it intended to benefit them as the and Oliveros filed a groundless administrative complaint against him and Ginger
funds could only be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive access to all the Anne to compel him to withdraw his claim for attorney’s fees against Dr. Laurel and
information pertaining to the interest and benefits accruing thereto. his bid to replace the latter as guardian of the Nonan heirs; (3) despite an
Agreement16 dated February 16, 2000 between him and Asa that the latter would
receive only 25% of whatever he (Castillo) would receive as attorney’s fees, Asa
As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 "Reply to Answer" filed with the Makati RTC in
secretly pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the guardianship case
Civil Case No. 01-506, the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no control nor
on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to account for and turn over the amount of
influence over the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of retired Justice Kalalo in
$130,000 in attorney’s fees which belonged to him (Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked
his favor during the proceedings adverted to.12
on a scheme to force him into resigning as counsel for Dr. Laurel to enable them to
exercise absolute control over the guardianship case and appropriate for themselves
II. CBD Case No. 03-1108 the attorney’s fees allocated for him.
In his Answer to the Complaint17 in CBD Case No. 03-1109, Asa alleged as follows: It On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another administrative complaint, 21 against Castillo
was in fact Castillo who reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement as the latter before the IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1125,
had earlier bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that he would not give him charging him with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, immoral conduct,
(Asa) any share in the attorney’s fees he would receive from the guardianship case, violation of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of
Castillo reasoning that he was the therein counsel of record and had endorsed the his baseless, malicious and derogatory allegations in CBD Case No. 03-1109 which
case to the Laurel Law Offices. He thus reported the matter to Dr. Laurel and were founded on deceit and deliberate falsehood, and of promoting a groundless,
informed him that he "would likewise not give Castillo’s share in the attorney’s fees false and unlawful suit.
he [Asa] might receive because [Castillo] has no word of honor." 18
IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:
As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly pocketed, Asa explained that
several days prior to April 18, 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the attorney’s By Report and Recommendation22 of February 27, 2004, the IBP CBD, through
fees of both Castillo and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount to be paid by Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the
the four heirs or $25,000 per heir. When the first heir Merceditas Feliciano consolidated cases in this wise.
(Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on April 18, 2000, he deposited $24,500 of this amount
in his and his wife’s joint Dollar Account No. 247-702-9275 at the Philippine National From the facts and evidence presented, what have been shown by the counsels
Bank (PNB), Ortigas Branch as his share in the attorney’s fees, while he opened a are mutual bickerings, unjustified recriminations and offensive personalities between
new account in the name of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount of brother lawyers which detract from the dignity of the legal profession and do not
$160,500. deserve the attention of the Commission. The voluminous case record contains
but personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies hurled by the counsels against each
Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own $25,000 plus interest other which constitute highly unprofessional conduct. A great part of man’s comfort,
amounting to $25,023.13 representing full payment of his attorney’s fees from as well as of his success at the bar, depends upon his relations with his professional
Merceditas, as evidenced by a Receipt19 dated May 2, 2000 signed by Castillo. brethren. With them he is in daily necessary intercourse, and he must have their
respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail along in smooth waters. Hence, the
Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 belonging to Dr. Laurel, $100,000 parties are advised to conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward each
represented partial payment for his consenting to be the guardian  ad litem of the other and try to maintain the dignity of the legal profession.23 (Underscoring supplied)
Nonan heirs and $60,000 represented reimbursement for expenses incurred over
several years by Dr. Laurel, the total of which was placed temporarily on April 18, By Resolution24 of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
2000 in his (Asa’s) Dollar Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however, approved the February 27, 2004 Report and Recommendation and dismissed the
withdrew $160,000.00 the following day from RCBC and placed it in his own Dollar consolidated cases for lack of merit.
Time Deposit Account for which $500.00 was spent for the purpose. A
Certification20 to this effect, issued by RCBC Ortigas Business Center Manager The records of the cases were then forwarded for final action to this Court.
Dolores L. Del Valle, was appended to Asa’s Answer.
Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration 25 in CBD
Finally, Asa declared that Castillo’s claim for $130,000 in attorney’s fees is baseless Case No. 03-1125. He too, together with Oliveros, filed on August 3, 2004 a Motion
and unconscionable, and that Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass him in for Reconsideration26 in CBD Case No. 03-1076.
retaliation for the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed against him and Ginger
Anne.
Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated Omnibus Motion for Partial
Reconsideration27 dated August 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and CBD Case
IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125 No. 03-1109.
On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment28 on Castillo’s Consolidated Omnibus course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to
Motion for Partial Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while also Oliveros filed disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof is privileged. 35
his Comment on the same motion on February 28, 2005.
x x x this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over
On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply to the Comments of Asa lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as
and Oliveros, with Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner. 29 members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves
beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made
THIS COURT’S RULING in the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from
civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan
or in any committee thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary
In his questioned "Reply to Petitioner-Guardian’s Comment/Opposition," Castillo’s
authority of the legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally remains
statement reads:
subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the
observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.36 (Underscoring
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his services in supplied)
providing coffee and opening the doors whenever there is a conference at the Laurel
Law Offices. He also conveniently provides himself with the Nonan expediente to
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus admonished to exercise greater care and
give assistance to the parties during their so-called conferences. Worse, his express
circumspection in the preparation of their pleadings and refrain from using offensive
reluctance to appear before this Honorable Court was repeatedly announced by Atty.
or otherwise improper language.
Jose Oliveros because of his so-called failing health x x x30

In support of Asa and Oliveros’ allegation that Castillo employed deceit and
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall
falsehood in attempting to change the depositary bank for the funds to be held in trust
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
by Dr. Laurel for the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC Order
colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 of
directing Dr. Laurel and his principal counsel Castillo to deposit the balance of the
the same Canon mandates that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
proceeds of the settlement with any and all of the adjudicated heirs with UCPB and
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
the March 14, 2000 RTC Order directing the deposit of the settlement proceeds with
the RCBC.
That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe honorable, candid and courteous
dealing with other lawyers31 and employ respectful and restrained language is in
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2000 signed by
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.32 It is through a scrupulous
Dr. Laurel, however, fails to establish any wrongdoing on the part of Castillo in having
preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance
filed the Motion to deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply stated that:
or respect due to the courts and judicial officers.33

Considering the present raging controversy arising from the P50 Billion coconut levy
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Anne’s choice of words manifestly falls short of
funds, the stability of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Head Office at
this criterion. Their disparaging statements in the pleading referred to above belie
Makati, may be seriously affected x x x
their proffered good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and propriety.

The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect the deposits of the Nonan children if the
Castillo’s claim that the statement about Asa’s services is relevant and pertinent to
proceeds of the settlement will be deposited with a solvent and more conservative
the claim for attorney’s fees and was, for all legal intents and purposes, a "privileged
bank like the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION (RCBC) x x x 37
communication"34 deserves short shrift. Indulging in offensive personalities in the
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly Castillo explained, however, that he "can only say that he has no control, nor
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. influence on the voluntary and spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired
Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals in his favor during the highly adversarial
of the act done as well as the motivation thereof. 38 In the case at bar, Asa and proceedings."40
Oliveros failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that Castillo
willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit and falsehood in filing the Motion to have Castillo’s explanation does not impress, however. The records show that the above-
the funds deposited at UCPB. quoted statements attributed by Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an
unsigned and unsubscribed affidavit entitled "Question and Answer Format in Lieu of
Respecting Castillo’s June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in the Makati RTC Civil Case Direct Testimony of Justice Felipe Kalalo"41 dated January 21, 1993. This affidavit
No. 01-506, he therein alleged: was earlier filed by Castillo with the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in connection with his
claim for attorney’s fees in Civil Cases Nos. 43049 and 56637 which affidavit was
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who subsequently withdrawn,42 however, as it was unsigned and unsubscribed.
personally knew the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling his academic credentials
and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as follows: Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon specifically
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo? commands that a member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice. Rule 10.02 of the same Canon provides that a member of the bar shall not
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers at the Laurel Law
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper or assert as a fact that
Offices.
which has not been proved.
Q: How could you characterize and rate the trial competency, performance and
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court directs that a lawyer must employ
expertise of Atty. P.M. Castillo?
such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law. 43
A: He is highly competent, low key, aggressive and very brilliant in the conduct of
trial, as well as, in the formulation of courtroom strategies. His pleadings are also
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from lawyers, particularly when they
very well written, direct to the point, convincing, scholarly and exhaustive. To be sure,
appear and plead before the courts.44 They have an obligation to the court as well as
he is one of the popular trial lawyers of our firm (The Laurel Law Offices), not only
to the opposing party to make only truthful statements in their pleadings. 45 The
because he came from an exclusive school, but also because of his scholastic
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what
records at Ateneo de Manila was also impressive. That is why he was taken in by
is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
former VP Salvador H. Laurel even before the release of the 1964 bar where he was
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. 46
also No. 2 among the Ateneo bar candidates for the year. He was No. 15 among the
bar topnotchers. This is not to mention his impressive and highly (sic) batting average
of winning about 80% to 90% of his load cases and work. He was also one of the In light of the above findings reflecting Castillo’s administrative culpability, his charge
busy lawyers of our office, until he went on private practice and excelled as one of against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases against him and
the more successful and respected trial practitioners. 39 (Underscoring supplied) Ginger Anne necessarily fails.

To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed clear falsehood for Justice As regards Castillo’s claim that Asa secretly pocketed $24,500 and $160,500, the
Kalalo had never been a lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices. undated certification issued by RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del Valle
reading:
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar Savings expenses while in the various states in the United States in order to pursue the claim
Account at our Business Center. A credit was made to his assigned Dollar Savings of the Nonan children against the Hillblom estate ……….US$60,000.00
Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty
Thousand Five Hundred (USD: 160,500.00) as initial transaction. We further certify x x x x49 (Underscoring supplied),
that on April 19, 2000, there was a debit made for said account in the amount of US
Dollars: One Hundred Sixty Thousand (USD: 160,000.00) and that same amount was validate Asa’s explanation that the amount of $160,500 belonged to Dr. Laurel but
placed in the Dollar Time Deposit Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left was merely temporarily placed in his (Asa’s) account.
the amount of USD: Five Hundred in his account to serve as the maintaining balance
requirement. Subject Dollar Savings Account had closed already, 47
The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian shows that $12,500 was
received by Asa as attorney’s fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from 1996 to
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian  dated February
48
2000.50 Confirming such disbursement is a Receipt51 dated April 18, 2000 signed by
13, 2002 filed with the Angeles City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating Asa. The remaining $12,500 of the $25,000 attorney’s fees of Asa per heir (as priorly
that: agreed upon by Dr. Laurel and Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the Laurel Law
Offices as Official Receipt No. 176652 issued by the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel
3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his Principal Foreign Law Offices dated April 19, 2000 shows:
Legal Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of settlement from one of
the duly adjudicated heirs of Larry Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and through RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum of Twelve thousand five hundred US
her Guardian Ad Litem, Milagros Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION ONE Dollars US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of LLO [Laurel Law Offices] in
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was attorney’s fees of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222 of RTC Angeles City, Br.
deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis 59.
Square Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-
000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in the name of "Salvador H. Laurel, in trust
for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan", in compliance with the Order of this Cash……….US$12,500-
Honorable Court dated April 26, 2000;
By: Sgd.
4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders of this Honorable Court, the Guardian Ad
Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III disbursed the following amounts for the Treasurer/Cashier
purposes indicated:
On Asa’s alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillo’s attorney’s fees: It appears that
A. ATTORNEY’S FEES & OTHER NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES: Asa and Castillo each received $25,000 as attorney’s fees but pursuant to their
February 2000 Agreement, the aggregate amount of $50,000 would be divided
xxxx between them, and Castillo would receive 75% thereof or $37,500, while Asa would
receive 25% or $12,500. The records show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he
having remitted, as reflected above, the remaining $12,500 to the Laurel Law Offices.
(7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the guardian
ad litem of the Nonan children and accepting all responsibilities attached to said
position ……….US$100,000.00 Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the $12,500 which Asa remitted to
the Laurel Law Offices, as reflected in the Partial Inventory, Account and Report of
Guardian.53
(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel for expenses incurred during the last six (6)
years for airfare, car rentals, overseas calls, and representation and other incidental
Respecting Castillo’s claim that, in violation of the Code of Professional Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as well as
Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros "embarked on another sinister strategy to spite, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the
insult and provoke him to ostracize him and make him feel unwanted to continue as practice of law for a period of One (1) Year, effective upon receipt of this Decision.
[Dr. Laurel’s] lawyer in furtherance of their conspiracy to force him into resignation for
them to replace him and have absolute control over the guardianship case, the funds Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective personal records of Atty.
of the estate and the attorney’s fees," the same is unsubstantiated, hence, deserves Ginger Anne Castillo and of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar
no further consideration. Confidant. Let copies too be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

As to Castillo’s charge against Asa and Oliveros of embezzlement due to alleged SO ORDERED.
scandalous mismanagement of the estate of the Nonan heirs, premised on the
October 13, 2003 RTC Order54 in SP No. 5222, this Court finds the evidence CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
presented insufficient to warrant the imposition of sanctions against them.
Associate Justice
Finally, on Castillo’s Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner, the matters raised
therein55 being entirely inappropriate, to say the least, for consideration in these
administrative proceedings, the same is denied. WE CONCUR:

A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in bickering and LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations Associate Justice
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not Chairperson
receive any sympathy from this Court.56 Personal colloquies between counsels which
promote unseemly wrangling should thus be carefully avoided. 57 ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended for Six (6) Months by this
Court in CBD Case No. 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,58 for committing falsehood in PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He was Associate Justice
then warned that commission of the same or similar offense in the future would call
for the imposition of a more severe penalty. This Court thus imposes upon him a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of One (1) year.

WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against Atty. Leon L. Asa and Atty.
Jose A. Oliveros are DISMISSED. Footnotes

1
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of  Rollo, pp. 16-28.
Professional Responsibility and is hereby admonished to refrain from using offensive
2
and improper language in her pleadings.  Id. at 21.

Ø Banogon v. Zerna, 154 SCRA 593

 The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and
executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the
private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from
the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the
Republic of the Philippines private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land
SUPREME COURT registered in their the pursuant thereto.4
Manila
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926,
FIRST DIVISION became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the
petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it
occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged
G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987
predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the
1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein
ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA petitioners themselves waited another  twelve years,  or until 195 7, to file their petition
MUNOZ, petitioners, for review. 5
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not
the HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of
yet become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been
Negros Oriental (Branch III).
registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of
re-opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the
same party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? 6

CRUZ, J.: Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now
pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that
decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran  7 where it was
amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition held:
thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to
dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and
... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and
the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners
section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for
then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. 2
review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within
one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for review
lawyers. cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on
further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been
1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented
Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3 before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree.
 Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and  there can be therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are
no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do
the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We so again. 10
therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may
be filed at any time the rendition of the court's decision  and before Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for
the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition
registration. (Emphasissupplied). thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they
doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay were the parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in
was not only for thirty one days  but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition possession of the land in dispute.
now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common
sense. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of
them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike: purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen
popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed
is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened
them."8 enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade courts.
the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where,
as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is
calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9 immediately executory. It is so ordered.

This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.
insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants
had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our
disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render  
justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely
designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily,
Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 41-43; pp. 44-45.

2 Ibid., pp. 10-17.

3 Id., pp. 42-43.

4 Id., p. 15.

5 Id., p. 28.

6 Id., pp. 12-14.

7 48 Phil. 836.

8 Li Kim Tho v. Go Siu Ko, et al., 82 SCRA 776; Aguinaldo v.

Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137.

9 Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 394.

10 Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 141.

Ø Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-22320, July 29, 1968
11 Rollo, p. 11.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22320           July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents. stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start,
or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality
CASTRO, J.: of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They
chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the
postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968,
the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
specifically directed against the following observation therein made:

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the
their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the
petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages
execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have
alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For
execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and
instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the
executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as
Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil
very ends of justice.
case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil
case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for
their counsel.". any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial
petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued
the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear,
condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have
known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ
mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was
are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above- actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of
quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of
participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt,
the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any
Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her
proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to
quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay issue the following order:
an execution long overdue.
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this
morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact
that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the
 court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice
his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice
therefore deemed submitted for resolution. was practically waylaid.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases
disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a
comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and
of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent
controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected
Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be
November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent
others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil
denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other,
prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment
the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the
controverted writ of execution. And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be
branded as having been instituted for delay.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of
October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement
was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally  had
by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532
cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank. 1 As a and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied
matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in
counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they
days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were
January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration. definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed
negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement
at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII)
delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of
chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of
spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs
projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the
obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses
to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed
desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty.
fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he
above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First
39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record
the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil
motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the
they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary
of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. injunction issued in civil case 7532.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of
counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N.
condemned." Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the
petitioners.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
as in the case at bar. Fernando, J., took no part.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies Footnotes
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to See "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," Annex "G" of Petition for Certiorari
1

acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist with Urgent Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its 2
See "Manifestation," Annex "2" of Answer.
primacy is indisputable.
3
On February 4, 1961, Damaso Perez and Gregorio Subong elevated the
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but judgment in the basic civil case 39407 to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this which was denied for lack of merit.
Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be
paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural
in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of
4
Acosta, et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar Mining
the petitioners  who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the Co., Inc. vs, Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961; Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette
final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. The National Administrator of Regional Office No.
its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the 2, etc., et al., L-20491, August 31, 1965, and the cases cited therein.
movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his
appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August
 5
Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Philippine National Bank vs.
Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
522. Ø Canlas v. CA, 164 SCRA 160

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own
client, more often than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself,
would have his petition decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court
cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is
corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased
into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the
questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious
ethical implications, on its merits as well.

We turn to the facts.

The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a
petitioner) parcels of land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document
obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to
sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently
favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon the filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project
maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties
following his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed
to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the
R Corporation was itself the highest bidder. Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:

Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of
& R Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer,
years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas,
a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the
respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed
P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject
stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
November 19, 1982, the court 3 approved the compromise. Q30679 ... 9

The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits — a fact the whereas it originally reads:
petitioner himself concede 4 — for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to
repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of
demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution TRANSFEREE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does not PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer,
appear that the sum was actually collected. 5 assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas,
any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
for the latter with respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City
obligation to the petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil
respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private Case No. Q30679. . .10
respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the
money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim
mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of upon the respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the
contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private same, the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the
respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both motions. The private
his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation. respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a
motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced
disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various
criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Hence the instant petition.
Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for
reconveyance and reformation of document, 13 praying that the certificates of title As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper
issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and procedure. Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ...
be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. I.
Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement
with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so that
[petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner] THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A
dismissal. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN
DUE COURSE.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the
alteration complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well II.
within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00
which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to
Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a III.
judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all
rights over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot be said to have CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER
violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING
clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the OF THIS SUIT.
injunction case abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently
dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of finality.
IV
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
Of Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of
DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND
Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion of the compromise agreement
THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE
obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees;
ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21
(2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order directed against
the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set
aside. The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a
petition for certiorari," 22 disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that
in such a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time,
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to
allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not
dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the
preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of
first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987,
judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two
the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20
orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with
judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being plain
What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to
Housing Corporation :  23 extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.

xxx xxx xxx Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes
the absence of an appeal 26 and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment,
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic appeal lies in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there
fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure
judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case,
the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His
his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to
not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular execution. The orders
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the parties'compromise agreement.
case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid
on him by his opponent. 24 to hold on to his lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on
us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the as the subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038
respondent Court reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first of the Civil Code applies:
place, and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not
assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence
that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to
presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ...
court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had
entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
compromise agreement.
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake,
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
expedite the former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had
deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had,
(Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to for this purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in
redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did which the decision had become final.
not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that
petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of
respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure — for the
enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in
his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees,
proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules,
after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
an impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
ago that the Court held: services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney... A
written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and unreasonable.
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in
which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive
all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that Art. 2208 ...
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be
won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules.
no financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the
redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount.
fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should have The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant
and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite
... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-
that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature
fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law warrants the sum claimed.
advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not
becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to
"delay no man for money." 36 All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to
P20,000.00.
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice
of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation
lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we similar to that vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty
reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however,
job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and
enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much
less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were
purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to
was not named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his
Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to
independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was executed redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner
subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may
Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever right already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise
he had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the
the lands. properties in their entirety.

Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the
"just fees and disbursements" 40 due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of properties as a gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having
this Court. made money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the
properties. 44
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise
agreement and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword
have observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear the conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled
that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing given his that the deed, as originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private
passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his
indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to
the private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor.
favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to
mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he had actually done the private facilitate the registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and
respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything out of the that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted
transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been issued him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an
to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the
annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate,
petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against
circumstances. the party who prepared it.

We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this is not the proper
private respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of occasion for it — we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no
Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed falsehood" 49
him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all
intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the
private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his petitioner is subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The
counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
private respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid
the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple
suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter himself had
something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the opinion
 Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights
at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the
of another: decision approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract — not
one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise — in which, as we
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed
under his guardianship; properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object
of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a
intrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal have been
land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
given;
property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ
administration; pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not the
judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded
corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific
instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and performance.
government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale; At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of
the Civil Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the innocent purchasers for value. 54
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition as earlier detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court.
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the It appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to third persons
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno
profession. Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.** We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In
condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, respondent has not settled his hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty.
paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate
in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera,
longer be said to be "subject of litigation." the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the
sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson) and Medialdea,  ** JJ., concur.
the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the
resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client Paras and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
 
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking
cognizance of the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the Footnotes
final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to
the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
1 Rollo, 3,186.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and
as a matter of general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and 2 Id., 186.
foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that from a technical
vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the resolution 3 Civil Case No. 30679, former Court of First Instance of Rizal,
of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to Branch IX, Quezon City, Hon. Jose P. Castro, Presiding Judge.
have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have
done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it 4 Rollo, Id., 6.
would establish a barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the
case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent and for which 5 Id., 7.
it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer of good
conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as
6 Id.
serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.

7 Id., 188.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

8 Id.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent,
Francisco Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
9 Id., 191; emphasis in the original.
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be
imposed on him for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, 10 Id.; emphasis in the original.
after which the same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625;
11 Francisco Herrera v. Paterno R, Canlas, AC No. 2625.
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals for execution; and 12 Rollo, Id., 195.

4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs. 13 Civil Case No. 40066, Branch CI, Quezon City; Hon. Pedro
Santiago, Presiding Judge.
SO ORDERED.
14 Rollo, Id., 51. His recall motion before Judge Castro would be 28 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, supra; Laingo v. Camilon, supra,
denied on March 6, 1984. (Id.,194.) Macalora v. Court of Appeals, supra, Windor Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra.
15 Id., 49.
29 Rollo, Id., 84.
16 Id., 59
30 CIVIL CODE, arts. 1390, et seq. There is no appeal from a
17 Id. judgment on compromise, unless the aggrieved party repudiates it
upon the grounds mentioned by Article 2038. An appeal may be
brought upon denial. (Mabale v. Apalisok, No. L-46942, February 6,
18 Id., 69-86
1979, 88 SCRA 234.) Relief is likewise available under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court, or under the above provisions of the Civil Code.
19 AC-G.R. SP No. 07860; Nocon, Rodolfo, Ejercito, Bienvenido,
Martinez, Antonio, JJ.
31 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 2.
20 The resolution was penned by Justice Jorge Imperial, with whom
32 Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 322 (191 0).
Justices Vicente Mendoza and Manuel Herrera concurred. The
petition was apparently re-raffled to the Seventh Division of the Court
of Appeals. See rollo, Id., 152-153. 33 Supra, 321-322.

21 Id., 17-18. 34 Rollo, Id., 6.

22 Id., 18. 35 Attorney's oath.

23 No. L-29080, August 17, 1976, 72 SCRA 326. 36 Id.

24 Supra, at 343-344; emphasis in the original. 37 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5, par. (5).

25 Rollo, Id., 81. 213 38 RULES OF COURT, supra, rule 39, sec. 29, par. (b). The rule
states: '(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or
mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent
26 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1.
to the judgment under which the property was sold. Such redeeming
creditor is termed a redemptioner."
27 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, No. L-52733, July 23, 1985, 137
SCRA 730; Laingo v. Camilon, No. L-35833, June 29, 1984, 130
39 Rollo, Id., 60.
SCRA 144; Macalora vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-51042, September
30, 1986, 177 SCRA 435; Windor Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, No. L- 34332, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 275. 40 RULES OF COURT, supra, rule 138, sec. 37; emphasis ours.
41 Rollo, Id., 233. ** Designated to sit as a member of the Second Division to
participate in the consideration and resolution of this case.
42 Id., 7.

43 Id.

44 According to him, he sold them 'for not more than Pl,000,000.00'

(see Id., 219). The private respondent claims however that the same
is worth P5,000,000.00.

45 Id., 191.

46 Id.

47 Id. 59

48 Civil Case No. 40066, rollo, Id.

49 Attorney's oath, Id.

* Emphasis supplied.

50 No. L-35702, May 29,1973.

51 SCRA 120. 11 No. L-26096, February 27,1979, 88 SCRA 513.

52 Mabale v. Apalisok supra, at 247-248; see fn.

53 CIVIL CODE, supra, arts, 1390,1391.

54 Pres. Decree No. 1529, sec. 32.

55 See rollo, Id.,

56 See fn. 45.