Constitutionalism in Zambia, Past, Present & Future
Constitutionalism in Zambia, Past, Present & Future
Constitutionalism in Zambia, Past, Present & Future
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Writing about any constitution is tricky business and that of Zambia is no exception.
Four constitutions in 32 years hardly represents a settled state of affairs, and an end,
or even a stopping place of long duration, does not appear in sight.' This is, however,
an interesting, even exciting period in Zambia's brief constitutional history. The
subject cries out for an examination of where the country has been, where it is, and
where, at least in the opinion of these observers, it ought to be heading.
We are happy to undertake this brief assessment in the context of recognition of
the career of ProfessorJ.S. Read. This able, patient, effective, and thoughtful scholar
has been a mentor to generations of African lawyers, including Zambians. To both
of us Jim Read has been a warm and generous friend, from time to time a wise
counsellor who has contributed much to our own efforts.
In its broadest sense a constitution represents the basic structure of any organized
society. Formal or informal, written or unwritten, its existence is inevitable. One
may or may not be able to touch it as a document or to read it as a series of
documents, but as societal structure it is there. When one speaks of a modern
constitution, however, notions of formality emerge, and in post-colonial Africa this
has come down to a single document, a charter for the exercise of political power
called a constitution. Some have questioned the suitability of Western models for
use in sub-Saharan Africa, but the impact of history seems clear; one may interpret
or reinterpret history, but one cannot repeal it. As elsewhere, the basic assumption
in Zambia is that there is and shall be a written constitution. Despite the frequency
of constitutional changes, some common characteristics appear. Commitment to
constitutional principles is expressed by political leaders, although the extent to which
those principles are observed in action is open to serious debate.
With all the difficulties of definition and determination of detail, there is a stated
commitment to democracy and to government with the consent of the governed.
The aim of the constitution-making process is the achievement of a constitution that
is legitimate, credible and enduring, that guarantees rights and freedoms perceived
to be fundamental, and that provides a structure for the effective conduct of the
nation's business, for the achievement of its economic development and for the
256
Since the advent of colonialism Zambian society has undergone profound economic,
social and political change. From self-sufficient subsistence communities dependent
on agriculture, Zambia has become dependent substantially upon a money economy
and a capitalistic system. The security of communities once dependent upon various
tribal organizations is now provided largely by a unitary government. What co-
lonialism initiated independence has consummated, a disruption of tribal organization
and tribal life and the unification of ethnic communities under the umbrella of one
2 See James C.N. Paul, "Developing constitutional orders in Sub Saharan Africa: an unofficial
report", Third World Legal Studies, 1988, 1. In this article Professor Paul maps out the scope and
content of developing constitutional order in Africa. See also Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, "Civitas Dei
Afiicana: realizing the African political dream", [1969] Zambia Law Journal 65; and also S.A. de Smith,
The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, London, 1964.
3 International Round Table on Democratic Constitutional Development, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995,
22.
4 A recent report of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative which went to examine the
political situation after the May 1996 amendments to the Constitution concluded: "The political
situation in Zambia merits urgent attention from its friends and from the international community
at large as a fragile experiment in democracy is under threat in a situation where the shortage of
time is a critical factor", The Post, 24 September, 1996.
sovereign state with overriding power over the entire country.5 The national coat of
arms symbolizes this: "One Zambia, One Nation".
5 K. Mann and R. Roberts (eds.), Law in ColonialAfrica, London, 1991, 3-23 andJ.B. Ojwang, "Rural
settlement in Kenya", (1975-78) 7-10 Zambia Law Journal, 63-83; and T. Nhlapo, "Accommodating
traditional forms of governance", International Round Table on Democratic Constitutional Development, above,
168.
6 The Portuguese had by the 15th century established themselves on the east coast of Africa and
carried on a gold trade particularly around Sofala. See E.V. Exelson, The Portuguese in South-East
Africa 1600-1700, London, 1960 and AJ. Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, London,
1973.
7 H.M. Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, London, 1926.
8 Royal Charter of Incorporation of the British South Africa Company, 29 October, 1889. As
originally drawn the Charter covered the area south of the Zambezi River. On 5 March, 1891, it
was amended to include the area north of the Zambezi.
9 L.H. Gann, The Birth of a Plural Society: the Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South
Africa Company, 1894-1914, Manchester, 1958.
10 L.H. Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953, London, 1964.
11 Northern Rhodesia Proclamation No. 1 of 1911.
12 This was later reflected in the 1964 constitutional arrangements. At the time of independence
Britain concluded what is known as the Barotse Agreement of 1964. The status of Barotseland has
continued to be a matter of political dispute. See Report of the Constitutional Review, 1995, Chapter 29,
65.
Until the very end of the colonial history of Northern Rhodesia democr
government did not exist. In a meaningful sense there was no constitu
than that of Westminster. There was, however, a series of structural arran
decreed by the British government, loosely termed "Constitutions".'8 Enacte
Orders-in-Council, these arrangements were designed to promote govern
the active co-operation of the white settlers and acceptance by the Afric
such acceptance declining sharply, particularly during the period of the Fe
The flexibility of these "Constitutions" lay in the ease in which they
amended in response to pressures and crises.'9 Although limited African
appeared in 1958, becoming substantial in 1962, full suffrage only arrived
1964. The elections of that year brought an overwhelming victory for t
National Independence Party (UNIP) and the emergence of its leader, K
David Kaunda, as the prime minister of the last Government of Northern R
of a two-thirds majority.23 This sowed the seeds of future changes sufficiently frequent
and drastic as to undermine a needed constitutional stability and to negate a broadly-
based participation by citizens in the alteration of their fundamental law.
Commonly, independence constitutions in British Colonial Africa have borne the
imprint of the Westminster model of representative parliamentary government. There
are differences among them. In some a non-executive president substituted for the
Queen as head of state. In others, including Zambia, the President became in
addition the chief executive. The tri-partite structure had in some ways the look of
Washington rather than Westminster, but its degree of detail reflected its colonial
ancestry. The powers of the colonial Governor passed largely intact to the executive
President.
Section 32 of the Constitution stated that "the first President shall be Kenneth
David Kaunda". From this must not be drawn the inference that Kaunda was simply
the hand-picked choice of British government. On the contrary, the final Constitution
of Northern Rhodesia had conferred effective self-government upon the colony with
an election machinery based on universal suffrage. The elevation of Kaunda to the
post of Prime Minister was a result of his party's triumph at the polls.24 All political
parties saw no need for another election later in the same year, and agreement was
reached that the Independence Order should name him as the first President.
23 Provisions concerning the alteration of the Constitution were contained in section 72. It
provided in section 72(1), (2)(a)(b) that a bill amending the Constitution shall not be passed unless
"the bill is supported on second and third reading by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the
members of the Assembly". In so far as the amendment concerned Chapter III and Chapter VII of
the Constitution, section 72(3)(a)(b)(c) required the amendment to be approved by a national
referendum.
24 R. Hall, Zambia, London, 1964.
25 Art. 33(1) (2)(a)(b)(c).
26 Art. 33(4)(b).
27 Art. 33(4)(e).
28 Art. 36(1)(a)(b) (2) (3)(a)(b)(c) (4) (5).
29 Art. 48(1) (2) (3).
30 Art. 44(1) (2) (3)(a)(b)(c).
Parliament
31 Mwanakatwe, above, 107. B.C. Chikulo also made this observation in "Decentralizat
centralism: an analysis of the Zambian experience (1964-1981)", in K. Osei-Hwedie and
(eds.), Issues in Zambian Development, Lusaka, 1985, 340.
32 Art. 41(1).
33 Art. 49(1).
34 The President was also the President of the ruling party, UNIP.
35 Art. 57.
36 Art. 58.
37 Art. 63(1).
38 Art. 71(1).
39 Art. 71(5) (6).
Seven or more Members of Parliament could challenge a bill on the grounds that
it violated provisions of the Constitution which protected the fundamental rights of
an individual by asking the Speaker to refer the matter to a tribunal. Thereupon the
ChiefJustice was empowered to appoint a tribunal to report whether, in the opinion
of the tribunal, any or all provisions of the bill were inconsistent with the Constitution.40
This procedure was never used throughout the life of the 1964 Constitution.
The Constitution provided for a House of Chiefs, mainly a deliberative body.41 It
could consider and discuss any bill introduced or proposed to be introduced in the
National Assembly or any other matter referred to the House by the President. It
had no legislative powers and, as such, could not enact or block legislation. Parliament
retained its essentially British characteristics until the introduction of the one-party
state in 1973. There was throughout a vibrant opposition present in Parliament. The
presence of such opposition consolidated democracy in Zambia and enhanced the
prestige and reputation of the Zambian Parliament. The African National Congress
played an important role in making parliamentary business effective under the multi-
party system. Its members kept ministers alert and accountable to the public for
ministerial actions.42
The judiciary
The judiciary consisted of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. Both were
established as courts of superior record. The Court of Appeal was the highest court
in the land, with sweeping appellate jurisdiction.43 The High Court had unlimited
original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under
any law.4 The High Court also had jurisdiction to supervise any civil or criminal
proceedings before a subordinate court or any court-martial. It could make orders,
issue writs or give directions as it might consider appropriate for the purpose of
ensuring that justice was duly administered by any court.45 The Chief Justice was
appointed by the President.46 The judges of the Court of Appeal and of the High
Court were appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the
Judicial Service Commission.47 The judges had security of tenure and could be
removed only for infirmity of body or mind or for misbehaviour, and even then they
could be removed only in accordance with the constitutionally prescribed procedure.48
On the whole these judges remained reasonably independent, though there were
some incidents of executive interference. In 1969 the President questioned a decision
of a High Court judge reducing the sentence of two Portuguese soldiers who had
been convicted by a subordinate court of illegal entry into Zambia. This led to the
resignation of the Chief Justice who led other judges in support of the judge so
criticized.49 Perhaps more serious than this isolated incident was the President's
50 For a detailed study of the lower courts see F.O. Spalding et al., "One nation, one judiciary:
the lower courts of Zambia", (1970) 1 Zambia Law Journal 1.
51 Chapter III of the Constitution of 1964.
52 Arts. 13-25.
53 Art. 25(4)(c)(d)(e).
54 Art. 28(1).
55 Art. 28(2)(a)(b).
56 E.g. Kachasu v. Attorney-General (1964) ZR 145; Attorney-General v. Mumba (1974) ZR 218; Chimba
& Others v. Attorny-General (1972) ZR 165 and Patel v. Attorney-General (1968) ZR 99.
57 Art. 72(1).
58 Art. 72(3)(a)(b)(c).
59 Constitutional (Amendment) (No. 3) Act of 1969 amended the Constitution so that, after it
became law, it would no longer be necessary to submit to a referendum any Act of Parliament
which provided for the alteration of Chapters III and VII and arts. 71(2), 72 and 73 of the
Constitution.
60 See B. Turok, Development in Zambia: A Reader, London, 1979, 71.
61 Mwanakatwe, above, 88.
62 Mubako, above, 67-68. Mubako supports the view that the decision to introduce the "One
Party Democracy" at the time and in the manner it was introduced was largely influenced by
political developments in the ruling party UNIP.
Zambia Independence Order, 1964, were repealed. In that sense the Constitution
was truly a Zambian document as opposed to its predecessor which was legislated
into being by the British Parliament as part of the Act that severed Zambia's
connection to the British Crown and granted it independence. The preamble declared
Zambia a "One-Party Participatory Democracy under the Philosophy of Humanism".
It declared the right of all men freely to determine and build their own political,
economic and social system by ways and means of their own free choice. It recognized
"the protection of life, liberty and property, freedom of conscience, expression and
association within the context of our National Constitution"67 (emphasis added). The
provisions of the Constitution relating to the executive, the judiciary and Parliament
remained substantially the same as those contained in the 1964 Constitution.68 The
executive arrangement changed in that the Secretary-General of the Party, in line
with the new political order, became the deputy leader of the nation and acted in
the absence of the President.69 The Constitution also created the office of the Prime
Minister to be leader of government business in Parliament.70
By far the most significant feature of the 1973 Constitution was the declaration
of Zambia as a one-party state. Enacted at a low point in the country's economic
fortunes with attendant unhappiness of the populace and against the background of
recent political turmoil within the ruling party, this Constitution was set forth as a
better model for the management of political conflict in a country in dire need of
stability and rapid economic development. The Constitution declared the United
National Independence Party as the one and only political party allowed to exist
and to operate in the country.71 It became illegal to form or attempt to form any
other political party or organization, and illegal to belong to any political party other
than UNIP. This far-reaching change completely altered the democratic character
of Zambia. Like the 1964 Constitution, it contained a Bill of Rights, guaranteeing
those fundamental personal interests set forth in the preamble. These rights, however,
were rendered practically meaningless in the context of a one-party state with
sweeping executive powers. Freedom of speech and assembly could be exercised only
within the United National Independence Party. The presidential power of detention
without trial was continued in certain situations.72 The Constitution provided for the
application of the Emergency Powers Act and the Public Security Regulations when
a state of emergency was declared to exist. For most of its existence Zambia had
been under such a state of emergency, first as a result of a pre-independence religious
rebellion and later because of the liberation wars in southern Africa. The police were
given extensive powers in the case of emergency. A high ranking police officer was
empowered to arrest and detain any person in respect of whom he or she had reason
to believe that there were grounds justifying such detention. No warrant was required.
The law required the state within 14 days of detention to give reasons in detail
therefor,73 and also provided for a review by a tribunal at the request of the detainee,
67 Ibid.
68 Arts. 107-116-Judiciary; 63-94-Parliament; 37-62-Executive.
69 The Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, art. 42(1) (2).
70 Ibid., art. 48.
71 Ibid., art. 4(1) (2).
72 Ibid., art. 26.
73 Ibid., art. 27(1)(a).
but not sooner than one year after detention.74 The tribunal, appointed by the Chief
Justice, submitted recommendations to the President, but these were not binding
upon him.75
Through the life of the Second Republic the power to detain was misused to reach
political opponents. Cases found their way to the courts on writs of habeas corpus,
but the courts, especially in political cases, routinely upheld the state's power to
detain individuals without trial. Courts refused to examine the facts on which
government had determined that an individual was a threat to national security. In
some cases without political overtones the courts used their independence to protect
citizens through ordering their release.
One notable improvement in the 1973 Constitution over its predecessor was the
introduction of the Office of the Investigator General.76 Analogous to that of an
ombudsman, the Investigator General had jurisdiction to inquire into the conduct
of any person in the public service with respect to the exercise of authority or abuse
thereof. This useful tool had its limits. The Investigator General had no power to
discipline public servants or to effectuate change. The powers were to submit findings
and recommendations to the President, who was not required to implement them
or even to disclose the findings and recommendations received. On the whole the
President followed the recommendations, which significantly were not political in
character.
The 1973 Constitution laid the groundwork for a Leadership Code. Recommended
by the Chona Commission and championed by President Kaunda, the Code had as
its purpose the imposition of strict financial standards upon all in leadership posts
from the President to the civil service, including employees of parastal bodies.
Provision for such a Code was contained in the 1973 Constitution,79 but implementing
regulations did not appear until 1976.80 The much debated proposal included
restrictions on ownership of land, prohibition on the receipt of gifts and the publication
of personal assets. It was designed to prevent the transformation of political power
into personal wealth, but was not successful. Once implemented, its enforcement
was spotty; presidential exemptions were granted, and evasions were frequent.81 The
expressed hostility of government to capitalism and the ambivalence of its actions in
this regard created a situation in which many political leaders failed to invest
effectively for the futures of themselves and their families. The result was the
development of untoward zeal on the part of political leaders to retain power at all
costs. The rewards, monetary and otherwise, of holding office were substantial; their
loss in many instances became devastating. The bad fruits of this lie in the manipulation
of the Constitution for the purpose of retaining power.
The years of the Second Republic and the one-party state were difficult for
Zambia. Throughout the period from 1973 to 1991 the economy of the country
continued to stagnate with attendant unhappiness of many segments of society.82
"The Party and Its Government" became increasingly unpopular. The trade union
movement (never captured by the Party), the business community, the churches,
scholars and students at the University, the legal profession: all from time to time
expressed increasing hostility. These were groups difficult for the government to
control. Attempts at coups, while unsuccessful, contributed to the unsettled quality
of the political atmosphere.83
As the decade of the 1980s drew to a close, demands for an end to the one-party
state became more insistent. Pro-democracy groups, initially spurred by the trade
union movement, formed the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD).84 The
"winds of change" in Eastern Europe came to Africa in general and to Zambia in
the legal recognition of the principle of 'party supremacy' in Zambia", (1982) 14 Zambia Law Joumal,
82.
79 The Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 32.
80 The Leadership Code Act, 1976.
81 The 1991 Constitutional Commission recommended the abolition of the Leadership Code on
the grounds that "although well intended, it had failed to achieve its objectives": Report of the
Constitution Commission, 1991, 187.
82 There are several accounts of the economic situation during this period. See, for example,
Mwanakatwe, above, 113; "Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth", World Bank
Report, 1989; "African economies: African alternative framework for structural adjustment pro-
grammes for social economic recovery and transformation (AAF-SAF)", United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.3).
83 There were two significant coup attempts, in 1980 and 1990. The 1990 attempt followed food
riots to protest against the rising cost of food, particularly maize meal. See Mwanakatwe, above,
165.
84 The MMD was formed at a meeting held at the Garden Motel in Lusaka in July 1990. It was
largely an initiative of intellectuals, students and unions.
92 Part III of the Constitution. For the limitations on the rights see arts. 16(2); 17(2)(a)(b); 19(5);
20(3)(a)(b); 21(2)(a)(b); and 25.
93 The Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991, art. 23(4)(d)(e).
94 Ibid., arts. 22(3)(a)(b) and 26(1).
95 Ibid., art. 34(1) (2).
96 Ibid., art. 34(3)(a)(b)(c)(d).
97 Ibid., art. 34(6) (7) (8) (11).
98 Ibid., art. 35(2).
99 Ibid., arts. 93(1) (2); 95(1); 54(1); 55(1) and 56(1).
100 Ibid., art. 68.
'01 Ibid., art. 79(1)(a)(b).
102 Ibid., art. 79(3).
This Zambian exercise in democracy met with unstinting praise from the inter-
national community.103 After decades of turbulence in much of the continent, this
episode was greeted hopefully as a harbinger of better days in other places. One
concern lingered: the size of the turnout on 31 October was disappointing. Reasons
advanced for this included a hasty determination of constituencies, inefficient man-
agement of the registration process, distances of polling stations from many people,
and fears (which turned out to be unfounded) that violence would attend the voting
process.'04 This negative factor was overshadowed by the twin accomplishments of
1991: the return of multi-party democracy and the orderly transfer of political power.
There is much to be said for the Constitution of 1991. Although enacted by
Parliament, it was, as Constitutions in their nature must be, the product of compromise.
It maintained, indeed strengthened, the separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers. It reduced the domination of the executive. It strengthened the power of
a largely independent judiciary by its direct assertion of the supremacy of the
Constitution.
A thoughtful observer perceived the 1991 Constitution as one "that can serve the
interests of the people for a long time".'05 As a part of the compromise on which
that Constitution was based, however, representatives of political parties, especially
MMD, undertook to promote constitutional debates once multi-party politics became
firmly re-established in the country. Specifically, MMD campaigned in the 1991
elections on the platform that if elected to power it would change the 1991 Constitution
and replace it with one which would be above partisan considerations and would
strengthen democracy and the protection of human rights. A year after the government
acquired power, the Minister of Legal Affairs created a task force to review the
Constitution. Comprising seven members, it was chaired by the Attorney-General.
Subsequently, the government was persuaded that it was unwise to leave a task of
this magnitude in the hands of a few under the chairmanship of the principal legal
advisor to the government. For the third time, and for the second within three years,
the government appointed a Constitutional Review Commission. Popularly known
as the Mwanakatwe Commission (after its chairman), this body received terms of
reference far wider than those accorded any previous Constitutional Commission.106
It was directed to recommend a system that will "ensure that Zambia is governed
in a manner that will promote the democratic principles of regular and fair elections,
transparency and accountability, and that will guard against the re-emergence of a
dictatorial form of government; ... appropriate arrangements for the entrenchment
and protection of human rights, the rule of law and good governance; ... the
103 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report, The Post, 24 September, 1996; Michael
Bratton, "Zambia starts over", (1992) 3 Journal ofDemocracy, 81;John Milimo, "Multiparty democracy
in Africa: lessons from Zambia", (1993) 10 International Journal of World Peace, 35; and National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Uneven Paths: Advancing Democracy in Southern Africa,
Windhoek, 1993, 37.
104 Mwanakatwe, above, 229.
105 Ibid., 223.
'06 The Commission was appointed on 22 November, 1993, under Statutory Instrument No. 151
of 1993 as amended by Statutory Instrument No. 173 of 1993.
107 Terms of Reference of the Commission (1), (2), (3), (4). The terms of reference are contained
in Statutory Instrument No. 151 of 1993.
108 Ibid., term of reference (9).
109 Report of the Constittional Review Commission, 1995, Chapter 27 of the Report, recommendation
27 and 27(1).
"0 Ibid., Chapter 28 of the Report.
1l Ibid., 64.
112 Ibid., Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6, 10.
13 Ibid., Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.0-4.3.7.
114 Ibid., Chapter 7, paragraph 7.2, 15.
115 Ibid., Chapter 7, paragraph 7.2.15 and paragraph 7.2.16, 18.
116 Ibid., Chapter 7, paragraphs 7.2.17 and 7.2.20, 18 and 19.
117 Ibid., Chapter 7, paragraph 7.2.21, 19.
Bank of Zambia,127 local government,l28 the army and.police,129 thus further involving
the Constitution in the details of governmental structure. The Report further
recommended the creation of a human rights commission to investigate on its own
initiative'30 or on a complaint made by one or more persons, any human rights
violations, and to promote programmes aimed at enhancing respect for human rights.
It further sought to restrict declarations of emergencies to situations involving threats
to the security of the country by invasion, general insurrection, or at a time of
national disaster. It also provided a check in that the declaration of an emergency
was made subject to judicial review by the Constitutional Court.3"
The government, in a white paper, rejected most of the progressive re-
commendations of the Mwanakatwe Report.132 It rejected the introduction of several
new personal rights, the introduction of a Constitutional Court, the recommendations
on rights of women and a recommendation for the establishment of an independent
Electorial Commission to conduct elections in Zambia.l33 It clearly departed from
its original promise in 1991 to introduce in Zambia a Constitution that strengthened
individual rights and freedoms and lessened the power of the executive. It rejected
the Mwanakatwe Report's recommendation that there should be separation of
Church and State, instead deciding that the preamble would contain a provision
declaring Zambia a Christian state.'34 Significantly, the government did accept the
recommendation that a presidential candidate must be born of parents both of whom
are Zambians by birth or descent,'35 and the retroactive application of the two-term
amendment.'36 The government also accepted the banning of chiefs from political
activity by requiring them to refrain from such activity or give up their chieftainships.137
Contrary to the recommendation of the Commission, the government determined
to restrict the appointment of ministers to members of the National Assembly.'38 It
did accept the recommendation to create a human rights commission and the
inclusion of legally non-enforceable principles of state policy in the Constitution.'39
The most telling of the government responses to the Mwanakatwe Report was the
rejection of the Commission's call for a broadly-based Constituent Assembly to ratify
proposed constitutional changes.'4 Rather, the government determined to amend
the 1991 Constitution by Act of Parliament, staying away from those provisions
relating to fundamental rights, amendments to which would require a referendum.
The government white paper was widely condemned by opposition parties,
churches, scholars and students at the universities, members of trade unions, and a
In 1994 Mwanakatwe wrote of the failure of the MMD to carry through promptly
on its 1991 pledge to promote constitutional debate once multi-party politics were
firmly re-established. He assigned two reasons for this change in priorities. First was
the stark necessity of facing the country's devastating economic problems. Second
came the suggestion that "frequent constitutional changes have inevitably a de-
stabilizing effect.... A constitution by its nature is always a product of compromise."143
He suggested a number of basic constitutional principles which should characterize
a modern democracy: the clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial power;
the absence of domination of the legislature by the executive; power in an independent
judiciary to determine authoritatively the constitutionality of legislative and executive
action; and a charter of fundamental rights, constitutionally protected and legally
enforceable through individual access to the courts. He concluded:
"In Zambia the new Constitution adopted in 1991 incorporates most of these
principles. It is a constitution that can serve the interests of the people for a long
time. However, a constitution works efficaciously when it is widely accepted by
the people to whom it gives protection. Therefore, a constitution that is not widely
accepted cannot serve any useful purpose. Often it is not even worth the paper on
which it is written."'44
That change came early to the 1991 Constitution is not surprising. Indeed that
document, a compromise between UNIP and MMD mediated by the churches, was
by that compromise destined for early re-examination. The Mwanakatwe Commission
represented that re-examination. Its product and the government's reaction to it
have been the subject of vigorous debate, such debate only heightening in its intensity
following the government's substantial amendment of the Constitution by an Act of
141 Citizens' "Green Paper" Summary of Resolutions by the Citizens' Convention on the draft
Constitution, 1-10 March, Lusaka, 1996. The conference was an initiative of church organizations
and NGOs. The convention was attended by over 257 participants from a cross-section of the
Zambian population.
142 The Constitution of Zambia was amended under Act No. 18 of 1996. The constitutional
amendments were adopted without the participation of the major opposition party in Parliament,
UNIP, whose members walked out of Parliament in protest at the amendments.
143 Mwanakatwe, above, 222.
144 Ibid., 223.
too is the fairness of the electoral process itself. From independence every Constitution
of Zambia has contained provisions for an Electoral Commission detailed by act of
Parliament and appointed by the President.'48 The 1996 Constitution describes this
Commission as "autonomous".149 Its autonomy and impartiality must exist and must
be seen to exist. Again, manipulation for partisan purposes strikes a severe blow
to the Constitution itself. The Mwanakatwe Commission recommended that the
presidential appointment of members of the Commission be subject to ratificatio
by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly and that the tenure of members o
the Commission be seven years, all in the interests of that necessary independence.'5
The rejection of those recommendations by government is ominous.
A constitution conferring great powers needs express limitations on the exercise
thereof: hence the necessity for a Bill of Rights enforceable by an independent
judiciary. The Constitutions of Zambia have contained detailed provisions relativ
to "Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual". These hav
been and remain flawed through the presence of "savings clauses", exceptions to
each of the enumerated rights, exceptions conferring wide executive and legislative
discretion.
Two fundamental rights need emphasis: freedom of the press and freedom from
discrimination, particularly against women. Although the present Constitution make
reference to freedom of the press, the powers to derogate therefrom are sweeping.'5
Constitutional provisions proscribing sex discrimination are confined to enumerated
areas and do not address the injustices inflicted through application of aspects o
customary law.'52 It is significant that the government rejected recommendations o
the Mwanakatwe Commission dealing with the rights of women. It also rejected the
moderate reductions recommended in the exceptions to other fundamental rights.
One additional flaw in the 1996 Constitution should be noted. Against the
recommendation of the Mwanakatwe Commission and over the objections of man
of the churches, the government inserted in the preamble a provision to "declar
the Republic a Christian Nation while upholding the right of every person to enjoy
that person's freedom of conscience or religion". The concept of a preferred religio
is antithetical to the equality of the people regarding their religious beliefs.
To some the lesson to be drawn from the current constitutional troubles is that
Zambia is not ready for a democratic form of government, or perhaps better put
that Western-style democracy is not suitable for the people of that part of Afric
called Zambia. We subscribe to neither. One can only begin to make progress from
where one is; the past is indeed the prologue. As stated earlier, history cannot b
repealed. Whatever the accomplishments, the mistakes, the experiences along the
148 See Constitution of Zambia, 1964, art. 67; Constitution of Zambia, 1973, art. 73(1); Constitution
of Zambia, 1991, art. 76.
149 The Constitution of Zambia (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996), art. 76.
150 Report of the Constitutional Review Commission, above, Chapter 12, paragraph 12.21.1, 39.
15' The Constitution of Zambia (as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996), art. 20(3)(a)(b)(c).
152 Art. 23 makes exceptions to which the prohibition against discrimination does not apply. As
a result it does not apply to matters relating to taxation; it is inapplicable to non-citizens and with
respect to matters relating to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death
or other matters of personal law. Most importantly, it is inapplicable in the case of members of a
particular race or tribe, to customary law "with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law
with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons".