1.

a. Doctrine/s:
An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of
the provision of Sec. 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land
in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. It follows that an action by the registered owner to recover a
real property registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe.  The rule on
imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the registered owner but
extends to the heirs of the registered owner as well.

b. Case Title:  Carmen Aledro-Runa vs. Lead Export, GR. No. 225896,
(ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO) (July 23, 2018)

c. Facts:

Segundo allegedly executed two (2) contracts covering the subject parcels of land
onseparate dates: 1) Contract of Lease executed on August 4, 1972 between him
and Alfredo A.Rivera for a period of fifteen (15) years; and 2) Deed of Absolute
Sale involving thesame lands executed by Segundo and Mario D. Advento on
March 24, 1981.On October 8, 1982, Advento sold the subject properties to
Andres M. Ringor. On April 25, 1988, Farmingtown Agro-Developers, Inc. (FADI),
leased the two (2) parcels ofland from Ringor for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
On January 31, 1995, a complaint was filed by the heirs of Segundo, namely:
petitioner, Antero,Basilisa, Nilo, Romeo, Edilberto and Expedito, all surnamed
Aledro and represented by SofiaAledro against Advento and FADI before the
Regional Trial Court,for Real Action overan Immovable, Declaration of Nullity of
Deed, and Damages.On March 31, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The
 heirs of Segundo then appealed before the CA.On October 12, 2001, the CA
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and remanded thecase thereto for
further reception of evidence.Allegedly, on September 18, 2003, the heirs of
Segundo (including petitioner) filed a motion todismiss with prejudice on the
ground of lack of interest to prosecute the case and to protectAdvento and FADI
from further prosecution respecting the subject matter of the case.On September
30, 2003, the RTC Br. 34 issued an Order dismissing the case with prejudice.
Noappeal was filed, thus, the order became final and executory.Another complaint
was filed by Sofia, widow of Segundo, in 2005 before the RTC of PanaboCity
against Advento for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Quieting of Title.On
May 30, 2007, the RTC Br. 4 rendered a decision in favor of Sofia. It ordered the
removal ofcloud cast upon the OCTs of the subject parcels of land. It also declared
the agreements of leaseas having expired and terminated. Lastly, the deed of
absolute sale executed by Segundo in favorof Advento on March 24, 1981 was
declared as null and void.On April 17, 2009, the RTC Br. 4 issued a Certificate of
Finality of its decision.On September 30, 2010, petitioner filed a case for unlawful
detainer, damages and attorney's feesagainst respondent before the 1 st Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E.Dujali, Davao(MCTC).

d. Issue/s:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred when it did not rule that
petitioner has the better right to possess the subject parcels of land.

e. Held

Subsequent buyers are buyers in bad faith; petitioner has the better right to
possess the land.
Respondent argues that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest's inaction for
almost twenty (23) years from the time of execution of the lease contract in 1972,
and fourteen (14) years in the case of the deed of absolute sale executed in 1981
barred them from seeking the nullification of the said agreements. The Court
cannot simply ignore the fact that the second case, Civil Case No. 41-2005 - an
action for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and quieting of titles where the trial
court declared the deed of absolute sale executed by Segundo in favor of Advento
as null and void, and ordered the removal of cloud upon OCT Nos. (P-6303) P-
1781 and (P-6224) P-1712 had long attained finality. Said decision was annotated
at the back of the certificates of title. Hence, even assuming arguendo that the
argument of prescription may be correct, the same becomes immaterial because
by virtue of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 41-2005, the only
issue left for resolution is who, between the petitioner - the heir of the registered
owner - and the respondent lessee, has a better right to possess the subject
properties.

It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification
is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or
execution of the judgment.

Respondent's possession as a lessee was based on a contract of lease executed

in its favor by the alleged subsequent buyers of the subject properties, namely
Ringor and later, by Gonzales and Cabuñas. These buyers only had unregistered
deeds of sale in their favor. It is baffling why these deeds, despite the long span of
time, were never registered.

Interestingly, respondent kept on insisting that res judicata has already set in, but
respondent, nor any of its predecessors-in-interest, did not cause the cancellation
of the certificate of title registered in the name of Segundo. Since 1981 when
Segundo allegedly sold the subject property to Advento, two subsequent transfers
have been made, the last buyers being Gonzales and Cabufias. Yet, the
certificates of title of the parcels of land undisputedly remain under the name of
Segundo and have never been transferred to any of the subsequent buyers up to
the present. Neither were the purported deeds of sale executed in favor of Ringor,
Gonzales and Cabufias, and other subsequent transferees registered nor
annotated on the certificates of title of the subject properties.

Thus, when Ringor purchased the lands from Advento, and was later purchased
by Gonzales and Cabuñas from Ringor, they did not directly deal with the
registered owner of the land. The fact that the lands were not in the name of their
sellers should have put them on guard and should have prompted them to inquire
on the status of the properties being sold to them.

Clearly, Ringor, Gonzales and Cabuñas cannot be considered buyers in good faith
because of their failure to exercise due diligence as regards their respective sale
transactions. While this Court protects the right of the innocent purchaser for value
and does not require him to look beyond the certificate of title, this protection is not
extended to a purchaser who is not dealing with the registered owner of the land.
In case the buyer does not deal with the registered owner of the real property, the
law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised by the purchaser.
 While registration is not necessary to transfer ownership, it is, however, the
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned. Since Advento did not register the deed of sale and no transfer
certificate was issued in his name, it did not bind the land insofar as Ringor,
Gonzales and Cabuñas, as subsequent buyers, are concerned.

Ultimately, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an

indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is
entitled to the possession thereof.  Thus, as against the registered owner and the
holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to
possess. In this case, it is the petitioner who, being an heir of the registered owner
Segundo, acquires a better right of possession over the parcels of land covered by
OCT Nos. (P-6303) P-1781 and (P-6224) P-1712.

f. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated February 15, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 03735
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E. Dujali, Davao del Norte dated May 10,
2011 in Civil Case No. 218-10 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
2.

a. Doctrine/s:

The restoration of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate to its original form and
condition.
 
The purpose of the proceeding is to reproduce, after observing the procedures laid
down by law, the subject certificate of title in the form it was prior to its loss or
destruction.25 Such proceedings presuppose the prior existence of the certificate,
seeking its reissuance. Sections 2 and 3 of RA No. 26 enumerate the source
documents upon which judicial reconstitution may issue. The first provision applies
to reconstitution of original certificates of title, while the second applies to
reconstitution of transfer certificates of title.

Section 2 (of RA 26). Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of

the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
 
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may
be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original
had been registered; and
 (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Section 3 (of RA 26). Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such

of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
 
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or
destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original
had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

b. Case Title: MILA RECAMARA VS. REP. GR. NO. 211810, AUG. 28, 2019

c. Facts:

On July 5, 2011, Mila B. Recamara (Mila) filed a petition for the judicial
reconstitution of OCT No. O-10245 before the Dipolog City RTC. She alleged that
 her grandparents were the owners in fee simple of a 486-square meter parcel of
land known as Lot No. 551 of the Dapitan Cadastre. In support of her petition, Mila
presented a certified true copy of Decree No. 299019,issued by the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of the Province of Zamboanga on October 25, 1929.On the second
page of the decree is an annotation, written in Spanish. Finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the Dipolog RTC issued a notice, requiring the
actual possessors of Lot No. 551, adjacent property owners, and all persons with
an interest in the lot to appear and show cause as to why the petition should not
be granted. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) were furnished with copies of the petition and of the
aforementioned notice. On January 17, 2012, when the case was called, nobody
appeared to oppose the petition. The Dipolog RTC granted the petition. Relying on
the report of the LRA, the trial court concluded that Lot No. 551 was, in fact,
adjudicated to Macario pursuant to a decision rendered by the CFI in Cadastral
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 76. On October 9, 2013, the CA
promulgated the herein assailed decision, reversing the RTC's ruling effectively
denying Mila's petition for lack of merit. The appellate court held that Mila failed to
present any of the documents enumerated in Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No.
26, which governs proceedings for the judicial reconstitution of transfer certificates
of title.

d. Issue/s:
A) Whether or not the CA erred when it applied Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 in
deciding the Republic's appeal; and

B) Whether or not the CA erred when it failed to appreciate Decree No. 299019 as
sufficient basis for the reconstitution of OCT No. O-1024523.
e. Held

While the first issue must be decided in Mila's favor, the second cannot. Thus, her
petition for the judicial reconstitution of OCT No. O-10245 has to be dismissed. A
proceeding for judicial reconstitution under RA No. 26 has for its object the
restoration of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate to its original form and
condition. The purpose of the proceeding is to reproduce, after observing the
procedures laid down by law, the subject certificate of title in the form it was prior
to its loss or destruction. Such proceedings presuppose the prior existence of the
certificate, seeking its reissuance. Sections 2 and 3 of RA No. 26
enumerate the source documents upon which judicial reconstitution may
issue. The first provision applies to reconstitution of original certificates of title,
while the second applies to reconstitution of transfer certificates of title, In this
case, the CA held that Mila was not able to present any of the documents
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the above-shown Section 3.28. Mila's petition
for reconstitution is anchored mainly on Decree No. 299019. Verily, such is not
among the classes of documents contemplated by Section 3. However, this should
not have had any bearing on the CA's decision, as said provision applies to
proceedings for the reconstitution of transfer certificates of title. Mila's petition was
one for the reconstitution of an original certificate of title, which is governed by
Section 2. On its face, Mila's argument seems to be meritorious. Indeed, Decree
No. 299019 states that Lot No. 551 was adjudicated to Macario by the CFI of
Zamboanga and that OCT No. O-10245 was consequentially issued. However,
both the CA and the RTC failed to assess the intrinsic authenticity of the subject
decree. With this omission, the Court, before making any conclusive ruling on
the instant petition, must carefully scrutinize the same, thus ensuring
that reconstitution will only be granted if it can be determined with utmost certainty
 that a certificate of title was, in fact, issued pursuant thereto. Reconstitution cannot
be had

f. WHEREFORE, the October 9, 2013 Decision and February 26, 2014 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02859 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
3.

a. Doctrine/s:

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original

form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a
person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to
have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced inexactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred . As such, a petition for reconstitution of  lost
or destroyed OCT  requires,  as a condition precedent, that an OCT has
indeed been issued. For this purpose, Republic Act (RA) No. 26 governs the
process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be
done.

b. Case Title: REP. VS. JUAN FULE GR. No. 239273, March 2, 2020

c. Facts:
Juan Fule and Delia Fule filed before the RTC a Petition forReconstitution of OCT
No. T-1929(464) covering a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Lucena.
They alleged that the said OCT was issued in the name of Isabel Zarsadias
based on Decree No. 130359 issued by the then Court of  First Instance,
Province of Tayabas, dated 5 December 1922; that the same OCT was
on file with the Register of Deeds of Lucena City and was among thosepresumed
burned during the fire that razed the City Hall building of Lucena City on 30
August 1983. The Fule’s submitted as documentary evidence during the
proceeding in the RTC, the Certified Microfilm Copy of the 
 D e c r e e   N o .   1 3 0 3 5 9 ;   T a x Declaration of Cadastral Lot 1204; And the
Certification from the Registry of Deeds of Lucena City dated 10 June 2011
and 20 June 2012 stating that OCT No. T1929(464)
c o v e r i n g   L o t   N o .   1 2 0 4   r e g i s t e r e d   i n   t h e   n a m e   o f   I s a b e l Zarsadias
is among those titles presumed burned during the fire that razed the City Hall
building of the City of Lucena on 30 August 1983 which then housed the Registry
of Deeds and that aforesaid titled has neither been
reconstituted judicially or administratively nor second owner's duplicate certificate
has beenissued. The RTC issued an Order dated 11 February 2015 finding merit
in the petition for reconstitution. In their Appeal Brief, the OSG
assigned the lone err or that the RTC erred in granting the
Petition for Reconstitution despite respondents' failure to establish the
existence of OCT No. T-1929(464) and the fact that it was lost or
destroyed. The CA ruled that the respondents were able to prove that Lot 1204
was covered by OCT No. T-1929(464) registered in the name of Isabel
Zarsadias and that the same was lost or destroyed.

d. Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the order of the RTC granting the
petition for reconstitution.

e. Held:

The petition is meritorious.

In this petition, petitioner simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the
CA regarding the prior existence OCT No. T-1929(464) based on the evidence on
record, particularly, the certified microfilm of Decree No. 130359 and the
certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Lucena City. Petitioner is not
calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the aforesaid
evidence. It, however, questions whether the said evidence is sufficient to support
the RTC and CA's conclusion that OCT No. T-1929(464) actually existed and got
lost or destroyed which is a condition precedent to the granting of a petition for
reconstitution. Accordingly, petitioner raises the issue on whether or not the RTC
and the CA, considering the documentary evidence presented by respondents in
the reconstitution proceedings, are justified under the law and jurisprudence in
their findings that the subject OCT actually existed and was subsequently lost or
destroyed. Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution
of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.

Moving on, petitioner's failure to attach to the instant petition the copies of the
certified microfilm of Decree No. 130359 and the certification issued by the
Register of Deeds of Lucena City is not a fatal mistake, which merits the
immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for
review on certiorari should be accompanied by "such material portions of the
record as would support the petition" is left to the discretion of the party filing the
petition. Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment
sought to be appealed from, there are no other records from the court a quo that
must perforce be attached before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45
petition. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that will
ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached are
sufficient to support the Petition.
In this case, the Court finds that the documents (the CA decision and resolution)
submitted by petitioner sufficiently supported the allegations in its petition. As
noted earlier, petitioner assails the correctness of the CA conclusion in its
decision vis-à-vis the evidence presented by respondents. The assailed decision
and resolution already contain the undisputed factual findings and the legal basis
of the CA in affirming the RTC's order granting the petition for reconstitution.
Certainly, by reading and examining the assailed decision and resolution, the
Court could judiciously determine the merits of the petition.

In the instant case, the respondents, unlike in Dela Raga, did not present clear and
convincing evidence to prove that OCT No. T-1929(464) actually existed and
formed parts of the records of the Register of Deeds.

Anent the tax declaration presented by respondents, the same is not a reliable
source of reconstitution of a certificate of title. As the Court held in Republic of
the Philippines v. Santua, a tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of
claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding.
A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of land covered by the
lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-issuance of such title is
proper.

In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in affirming the order of the RTC granting
the petition for reconstitution of the lost or destroyed original certificate of title. The
evidence presented by respondents is not sufficient to support the RTC and CA's
conclusion that OCT No. T-1929(464) actually existed and got lost or destroyed
which is a condition precedent to the granting of a petition for reconstitution.
f. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 September 2017
and Resolution dated 8 May 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
105351, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for
Reconstitution filed by spouses Juan Fule and Delia Fule before the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 57, docketed as Misc. Case No. 2012-105,
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
4.

a. Doctrine/s:

It is also a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the title was procured
by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose.

b. Case Title:  Virgilia Aquino vs. Estate of Tomas Aguirre, GR. No. 232060, Jan.
14, 2019.

c. Facts:

In 2009, petitioners Virgilia Aquino, Nazaria Aquino, Avelina Ronquillo, Patrocinio

Aquino, Manuela Aquino, Lucita Bamba, Ramoncito Nepomuceno, and Domingo
Manirnbao filed LRC Case No. 8843-2009-59 for reconstitution of the lost Cavite
Registry of Deeds copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 3269
registered in the name of their deceased parents. On March 21, 2014, the RTC
issued an Order, decree. The Government did not adduce any contrary evidence.
Considering the finding of the LRA that the technical description on TCT No. T-
3269 was found correct and does not overlap with other properties in the area, the
petition is granted.

On the claim that the property subject of the petition for reconstitution is covered
by another existing title - TCT No. T-6874 - respondent Estate of Tomas B. Aguirre
filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of General Default with Motion to Admit
Attached Opposition, which the trial court denied in a May 22, 2014
Order. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals.

It is also a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the title was procured
by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose.

Indeed, the reconstitution proceeding constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens

title of Tomas Aguirre. The proper recourse of the private respondents to contest
the validity of the certificate of title is not through the subject petition for
reconstitution, but in a proper proceeding instituted for such purpose.

The conflict between the two sets of titles has to be resolved. The present standoff
cannot remain indefinitely under a titling system that assures the existence of only
one valid title for every piece of registered land.

Based on the foregoing, the petition for annulment is warranted. There is no need
to rule upon the other incidents in this case. The injunctive reliefs prayed for were
already denied by this Court during the Clarificatory Hearing.

Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a May 15, 2017 Resolution, the CA held its
ground.

d. Issue/s:
Whether or not the court of appeals in its decision and resolution compelled herein
petitioners to pray for the honorable Supreme Court to exercise its power to review
factual findings of appellate courts.
e. Held

The Petition is granted.

In its Urgent Motion to Lift Order of General Default with Motion to Admit Attached
Opposition filed before the R TC, respondent alleged and admitted that its title -
TCT No. T-6874 - was derived from the same Original Certificate of Title No. 1002,
pursuant to the same Decree No. 101200, and was issued from the same LRC
Record No. 8843 as petitioners' title, TCT No. T-3269. The only difference is that
its TCT No. T-6874 was entered only on March 21, 1963, while petitioners' TCT
No. T-3269 was entered on March 21, 1956, or much earlier.

On its face, therefore, respondent's title –TCT No. T-6874- is null and void, for it
was issued upon land that had been earlier titled in the name of another, namely,
Basilio Aquino - petitioners' supposed predecessor-in-interest.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that in the case of two certificates of title purporting
to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails.

In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite we held that if two certificates of title

purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is
to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. 

By respondent's own admission, its title is subordinate to petitioners'. In fact, it is

patently null and void on its face, because it could not have acquired title upon
land already earlier registered in the name of another. Primus tempore, potior
jure - first in time, stronger in right. For this reason, respondent has no right - and
 no personality - to intervene in the reconstitution proceedings instituted by the
petitioners.

As for the sufficiency of the petition for reconstitution, the Court agrees with
petitioners' argument that, since the source of reconstitution is the owner's
duplicate copy, there is no need to give notice to other parties. "The service of
notice of the petition for reconstitution filed under R.A. 26 to the occupants of the
property, owners of the adjoining properties, and all persons who may have any
interest in the property is not required if the petition is based on the owner's
duplicate certificate of title or on that of the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's.

In the present case, the source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was
petitioner's duplicate copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly,
the Petition is governed, not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. 

Having disposed of the relevant issues in the foregoing manner, the Court finds it
unnecessary to delve into the other allegations in the Petition. They are irrelevant
to a complete and effective determination of the case.

f. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 7, 2015

Decision and May 15, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
136103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 21, 2014 Order and all other
orders of the Bacoor, Cavite Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 in LRC Case No.
8843-2009-59 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
5.

a. Doctrine/s:

The constructive notice rule on registration should not be made to apply to title
holders who have been unjustly deprived of their land without their negligence.
The actual title holder cannot be deprived of his or her rights twice – first, by
fraudulent registration of the title in the name of the usurper and second, by
operation of the constructive notice rule upon registration of the title in the name of
the innocent purchaser for value. As such, prescription, for purposes of
determining the right to bring an action against the Assurance Fund, should be
reckoned from the moment the innocent purchaser for value registers his or her
title and upon actual knowledge thereof of the original title holder/claimant. As
above-discussed, the registration of the innocent purchaser for value’s title is a
prerequisite for a claim against the Assurance Fund on the ground of fraud to
proceed, while actual knowledge of the registration is tantamount to the discovery
of the fraud.

In this regard, the RTC held that the Assurance Fund would be subsidiarily liable
to petitioners, should the judgment debt be left unsatisfied from the land or
personal property of Anduiza. If the constructive notice rule were to be applied,
then petitioners’ claim against the Assurance Fund filed on March 18, 2009 would
be barred, considering the lapse of more than six (6) years from the registration of
Spouses Amurao’s title over the subject lot on July 19, 2001. However, as earlier
explained, the constructive notice rule holds no application insofar as reckoning
the prescriptive period for Assurance Fund cases. Instead, the six (6)-year
prescriptive period under Section 102 of PD 1529 should be counted from January
28, 2008, or the date when petitioners discovered the anomalous transactions over
 their property, which included the registration of Rowena’s title over the same.
Thus, when they filed their complaint on March 18, 2009, petitioners’ claim against
the Assurance Fund has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the CA erred in ruling
otherwise.

b. Case Title: SPS. JOSE MANUEL AND MARIA ESPERANZA RIDRUEJO

STILIANOPOULOS VS. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR LEGAZPI City, GR.
No. 224678, July 3, 2018.

c. Facts:

This case stemmed from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42486, Annulment of TCT No. 52392 and TCT No.
59654, and Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 1320 with Damages (subject
complaint) filed by petitioners against respondents The Register of Deeds for
Legazpi City (RD-Legazpi) and The National Treasurer (National Treasurer), as
well as Jose Fernando Anduiza (Anduiza), Spouses Rowena Hua-Amurao
(Rowena) and Edwin Amurao (collectively; Spouses Amurao), and Joseph
Funtanares Co, et al. (the Co Group) before the RTC.

Petitioners alleged that they own a 6,425-square meter property known as Lot No.
1320, as evidenced by TCT No. 13450 in the name of Jose Manuel, who is a
resident of Spain and without any administrator of said property in the Philippines.
On October 9, 1995, Anduiza caused the cancellation of TCT No. 13450 and
issuance of TCT No. 42486 in his name.
 Thereafter, Anduiza mortgaged Lot No. 1320 to Rowena. As a result of Anduiza’s
default, Rowena foreclosed the mortgage, and consequently, caused the
cancellation of TCT No. 42486 and issuance of TCT No. 52392 in her name on
July 19, 2001. On April 15, 2008, Rowena then sold Lot No. 1320 to the Co Group,
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 52392 and issuance of TCT No. 59654 in
the latter’s name.

According to petitioners, their discovery of the aforesaid transactions only on

January 28, 2008 prompted them to file a complaint for recovery of title on May 2,
2008.

The RTC: (a) dismissed the case against Spouses Amurao and the Co Group as
they were shown to be purchasers in good faith and for value; and (b) found
Anduiza guilty of fraud in causing the cancellation of petitioners’ TCT. CA reversed
and set aside the RTC’s ruling insofar as the National Treasurer’s subsidiary
liability was concerned. It held that petitioners only had six (6) years from the time
Anduiza caused the cancellation of TCT No. 13450 on October 9, 1995, or until
October 9, 2001, within which to claim compensation from the Assurance Fund.
Since petitioners only filed their claim on March 18, 2009, their claim against the
Assurance Fund is already barred by prescription.

d. Issue/s:

Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners’ claim against the Assurance
Fund has been barred by prescription.
e. Held:

No. An action for compensation against the Assurance Fund is a separate and
distinct remedy, apart from review of decree of registration or reconveyance of
title, which can be availed of when there is an unjust deprivation of property. To
recover against the Assurance Fund, however, it must appear that the execution
against “such defendants other than the National Treasurer and the Register of
Deeds” is “returned unsatisfied in whole and in part.” “Only then shall the court,
upon proper showing, order the amount of the execution and costs, or so much
thereof as remains unpaid, to be paid by the National Treasurer out of the
Assurance Fund”, pursuant to Section 97 of PD 1529.

Another important provision in Chapter VII of PD 1529 is Section 102, which

incidentally stands at the center of the present controversy. This provision sets a
six (6)-year prescriptive period “from the time the right to bring such action first
occurred” within which ore may proceed to file an action for compensation against
the Assurance Fund.

Jurisprudence has yet to interpret the meaning of the phrase “from the time the
right to bring such action first occurred”; hence, the need to clarify the same. The
general rule is that “a right of action accrues only from the moment the right to
commence the action comes into existence, and prescription begins to run from
that time.” However, in cases involving fraud, the common acceptation is that the
period of prescription runs from the discovery of the fraud. Under the old Code of
Civil Procedure, an action for relief on the ground of fraud prescribes in four years,
“but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud.”
Meanwhile, under prevailing case law, “when an action for reconveyance is based
on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original
certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of
the RD constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the
discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.”
However, in actions for compensation against the Assurance Fund grounded on
fraud, registration of the innocent purchaser for value’s title should only be
considered as a condition sine qua non to file such an action and not as a form of
constructive notice for the purpose of reckoning prescription. This is because the
concept of registration as a form of constructive notice is essentially premised on
the policy of protecting the innocent purchaser for value’s title, which consideration
does not, however, obtain in Assurance Fund cases.

As earlier intimated, an action against the Assurance Fund operates as form of

relief in favor of the original property owner who had been deprived of his land by
virtue of the operation of the Torrens registration system. It does not, in any way,
affect the rights of the innocent purchaser for value who had apparently obtained
the property from a usurper but nonetheless, stands secure because of the
indefeasibility of his Torrens certificate of title. The underlying rationale for the
constructive notice rule – given that it is meant to protect the interest of the
innocent purchaser for value and not the original title holder/claimant – is therefore
absent in Assurance Fund cases. Accordingly, it should not be applied, especially
since its application with respect to reckoning prescription would actually defeat
the Assurance Fund’s laudable purpose.
Thus, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, the constructive notice rule on registration should not be
made to apply to title holders who have been unjustly deprived of their land without
their negligence. The actual title holder cannot be deprived of his or her rights
twice – first, by fraudulent registration of the title in the name of the usurper and
second, by operation of the constructive notice rule upon registration of the title in
the name of the innocent purchaser for value. As such, prescription, for purposes
of determining the right to bring an action against the Assurance Fund, should be
reckoned from the moment the innocent purchaser for value registers his or her
title and upon actual knowledge thereof of the original title holder/claimant. As
above-discussed, the registration of the innocent purchaser for value’s title is a
prerequisite for a claim against the Assurance Fund on the ground of fraud to
proceed, while actual knowledge of the registration is tantamount to the discovery
of the fraud.

In this case, it has been established that petitioners are residents of Spain and
designated no administrator over their property, i.e., Lot No. 1320, in the
Philippines. They remain in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
13450 in their names, the surrender of which was necessary in order to effect a
valid transfer of title to another person through a voluntary instrument. As the
records show, not only did Anduiza, the usurper, forge a deed of sale purportedly
transferring petitioners’ property in his favor, they were also not required by the
RD- Legazpi or through a court order to surrender possession of their owner’s
duplicate certificate of title for the proper entry of a new certificate of title in
Anduiza’s favor. Neither was the issuance of TCT No. 42486 in the name of
Anduiza recorded/registered in the Primary Entry Book, nor was a copy of the
deed of sale in his favor kept on file with the RD-Legazpi. Consequently,
petitioners were not in any way negligent as they, in fact, had the right to rely on
their owner’s duplicate certificate of title and the concomitant protection afforded
thereto by the Torrens system, unless a better right, i.e., in favor of an innocent
purchaser for value, intervenes. As it turned out, Anduiza mortgaged Lot No. 1320
to Spouses Amurao, particularly Rowena. As a result of Anduiza’s default, Rowena
foreclosed the mortgage, and consequently, caused the cancellation of TCT No.
42486 and issuance of TCT No. 52392 in her name on July 19, 2001. Spouses
Amurao and later, the Co group, in whose favor the subject lot was sold – by virtue
of the final judgment of the RTC – were conclusively deemed as innocent
purchasers for value. Their status as such had therefore been settled and hence,
cannot be revisited.

In this regard, the RTC held that the Assurance Fund would be subsidiarily liable
to petitioners, should the judgment debt be left unsatisfied from the land or
personal property of Anduiza. If the constructive notice rule were to be applied,
then petitioners’ claim against the Assurance Fund filed on March 18, 2009 would
be barred, considering the lapse of more than six (6) years from the registration of
Spouses Amurao’s title over the subject lot on July 19, 2001. However, as earlier
explained, the constructive notice rule holds no application insofar as reckoning
the prescriptive period for Assurance Fund cases. Instead, the six (6)-year
prescriptive period under Section 102 of PD 1529 should be counted from January
28, 2008, or the date when petitioners discovered the anomalous transactions over
their property, which included the registration of Rowena’s title over the same.
Thus, when they filed their complaint on March 18, 2009, petitioners’ claim against
the Assurance Fund has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the CA erred in ruling
otherwise.
f. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 16, 2016 and
the Resolution dated May 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
104207 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 19,
2013 and the Order dated April 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi
City, Albay, Branch 2 (RTC), are hereby REINSTATED in toto. Accordingly, the
RTC is hereby DIRECTED to conduct execution proceedings with reasonable
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
6.

a. Doctrine/s:
The law says (Section 96 in relation to Section 97) that it is required to implead the
person causing the fraud, in this case, de Ocampo, in the claim for damages.
However, in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court, respondents Anglo,
Sr. and Anglo Agricultural Corporation presented evidence with respect to the
death of de Ocampo and the absence of properties that could constitute his estate.

b. Case Title: The Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental vs. Oscar Anglo Sr. GR.
No. 171804, Aug. 5, 2015.

c. Facts:

Subject property: two parcels of prime sugar land in Negros Occidental

On June 29, 1960, Alfredo de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the
two parcels of land. This was contested by the Republic of the Philippines Bureau
of Education. According to the Republic, the lots were bequeathed to the Bureau
of Education by Esteban Jalandoni on September 21, 1926. And by virtue of the
donation, they have a TCT.

In 1965, the CFI ordered the registration of the lot in favor of de Ocampo. In the
same year, an OCT was issued in his name.

On January 6, 1966, de Ocampo sold one whole lot and a portion of the other lot
to Anglo Sr. The deed of absolute sale was registered and annotated at the back
of the OCTs.
 The Republic caused the annotations of notice of lis pendens in Anglo Sr.’s TCT.
Despite the notice of lis pendens, Anglo Sr., conveyed the lots to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation in exchange for shares of stock. The CA ruled against de
Ocampo and ordered his OCT and TCT to be declared null. De Ocampo passed
away during the pendency of the litigation and left no property to his heirs. The
only available remedy for Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation was to
recover the value of the lots from the Assurance Fund as provided under Act No.
496 and PD 1529. During trial, Anglo Sr. And Anglo Agricultural Corporation
presented Atty. David Lozada, the then Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
He confirmed that at the time of the sale between de Ocampo and Anglo Sr., there
were no annotations of notices of lis pendens in de Ocampo’s OCT.

The RTC ruled that Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation were entitled to
Php6,623,617 as damages payable under the Assurance Fund. But they did not
implead de Ocampo in their claim for damages. RP opposed this, saying that
Anglo Sr., is a purchaser in bad faith because he did not ascertain the legal
condition of the title he was buying.

d. Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation are entitled to an
award of damages from the Assurance fund and

2. Whether or not Anglo Sr., and Anglo Agricultural Corporation should have
impleaded de Ocampo in their complain for recovery of damages from the
Assurance Fund
e. Held

1. No. Respondents do not meet the criteria set to recover damages from the
Assurance Fund.

In the sale to Anglo Sr., by de Ocampo, the former was in good faith. Individuals
who rely on a clean certificate of title in making the decision to purchase the real
property are often referred to as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
However, Anglo Sr. no longer had an interest over the lots after he had transferred
these to Anglo Agricultural Corporation in exchange for shares of stock. Hence, he
no longer has a claim from the Assurance Fund.
Anglo Agricultural Corporation cannot be considered as a transferee in good faith
because it was already aware of the title’s notices of lis pendens. Thus, it also has
no right to claim damages from the Assurance Fund.
The governing law at the time of the transactions in this case is Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Based solely on Section 95 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
following conditions must be met:

1. The individual must sustain loss or damage, or the individual is deprived of land
or any estate or interest
2. The individual must not be negligent.
3. The loss, damage, or deprivation is the consequence of either
(a) Fraudulent registration under the Torrens system after the land’s original
registration, or
(b) Any error, omission, mistake, or misdescription in any certificate of title or in
any entry or memorandum in the registration book.
 2. The individual must be barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any
law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest
therein.

Anglo Agricultural Corporation does not meet the first requisite. It no longer
suffered a loss due to respondent Anglo Sr.’s undertaking to assume all liability in
the agreement.

The respondents complied with the procedural requirement under PD 1529.

The law says (Section 96 in relation to Section 97) that it is required to implead the
person causing the fraud, in this case, de Ocampo, in the claim for damages.
However, in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court, respondents Anglo,
Sr. and Anglo Agricultural Corporation presented evidence with respect to the
death of de Ocampo and the absence of properties that could constitute his estate.
RP did not present countervailing evidence to show that de Ocampo or his estate
was still a viable party. Using preponderance of evidence, the Regional Trial Court
could reasonably conclude that de Ocampo can no longer be impleaded.

f. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated

September 7, 2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents Oscar Anglo, Sr. and Anglo Agricultural Corporation's claim
from the Assurance Fund is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
7.

a. Doctrine/s:
Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD
1529(Sections 91 and 92) and the Rules of Court(Rule 90, Section 1), while an
heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before
the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the
order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court
must first be had. 

b. Case Title: Sps. Salitico vs. Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix, GR. No.
240199, April 10, 2019.

c. Facts:
Amanda is the registered owner of a parcel of land registered in her name located
in Bambang, Bulacan. By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda
H. Burgos dated May 7, 1986 (Huling Habilin), the subject property was inherited
by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee.  Thereafter, Resurreccion, as
the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled Bilihang
Tuluyan ng Lupa which transferred ownership over the parcel of land in favor of
the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the subject
property. Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the will was undertaken.
Respondent Recaredo was appointed as the executor of the Huling Habilin. The
latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the Probate Court, which
approved it. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate. On March 9, 2010,
the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate the
subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To
protect their interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was however denied registration by
the respondent RD.Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in their favor of the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the execution of the corresponding
Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They
likewise prayed that OCT P-1908 be cancelled and a new one be issued in their
names. The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause
of action. RTC found that Resurreccion had indeed validly sold the subject
property which she inherited from Amanda to the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
Nevertheless, the RTC held that the action filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is
premature on the ground that it was not shown that the Probate Court had already
fully settled the Estate of Amanda, even as it was not disputed that the Huling
Habilin had already been allowed and certified. Hence, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint for the sole reason that the petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action
had supposedly not yet accrued, as the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully
settled by the Probate Court. The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Notice of
Appeal, which was granted by the RTC. The appeal was given due course by the
CA. The CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate proceedings
before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
states that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court. The CA also cited Rule 90, Section 1, which states
that no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax have
been made, unless the distributees or any of them give a bond in a sum fixed by
the court conditioned on the payment of the said obligations.
d. Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC's Decision and Order which
dismissed the petitioners Sps. Salitico's Complaint for Specific Performance due to
lack of cause of action.

e. Held:
No. Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of
the inheritance are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent's death meaning that the
transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore,
at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership
of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of heirs, or
partition, or distribution. "Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her
hereditary share immediately after such death. As applied to the instant case,
upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute owner of the
devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of
Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there
was no legal bar preventing Resurreccion from entering into a contract of sale with
the petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former's share or interest over the
subject property. Nevertheless, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case
does not necessarily mean that the RD may already be compelled to cancel OCT
P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. According
to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of
testate or intestate proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the
transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds only upon the submission of a
certified copy of the partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or
order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final distribution,
supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the
case may be. Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final
distribution from the testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final distribution
of a portion or the whole of the property, the Register of Deeds may be compelled
to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the transferee only when the
executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an order from the
court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the
executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees.  The
aforementioned sections of PD 1529 are in perfect conjunction with Rule 90,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states that the actual distribution of property
subject to testate or intestate proceedings, i.e., the issuance of a new title in the
name of the distributee, shall occur only when the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate, have been paid. Only then can the testate or intestate
court assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same. Under
Rule 90, Section 1, the testate or intestate court may also order the distribution of
the property pending the final order of distribution if the distributees give a bond in
a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of the aforesaid said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations. Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and
the Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of
the final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final
distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may be issued
in the name of the distributees. In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the
pendency of the settlement of the Estate of Amanda, the Probate Court had issued
an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution, both of
 which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new certificate of
title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. To clarify, this holding does not go
against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the aforesaid Civil Code
provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from disposing
his/her hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, inasmuch
as the right thereto is vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the
death of the decedent or testator. The rule, however, does not state that the
transferee may already compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
the specific property in his/her name. Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code
together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, while an
heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before
the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the
order in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court
must first be had.Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale
between Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would
warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the
latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order
of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate
Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a
new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

f. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated

October 19, 2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of the Court of Appeals
Twelfth Division and Former Special Twelfth Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 105166 are PARTIALLY REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix to DELIVER the owner's
duplicate copy of Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-1908 to the petitioners Sps.
Salitico.

With respect to the petitioners Sps. Salitico's prayer compelling the Register of
Deeds to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in their favor, for
the reasons stated above, the said prayer is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
8.

a. Doctrine/s:
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this
jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or
bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.

b. Case Title: LOGROSA VS. AZARES, GR. No. 217611, March 27, 2019.

c. Facts:
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a
parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this
jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or
bad faith that the doctrine finds no application. In the instant case, there is no
accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the
TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith. During the trial, when he was asked
why he did not require petitioner Logrosa and the other parties to execute a
document acknowledging his status as sole owner of the subject properties,
respondent Cesar explained that there was no need to do so because "we
previously agreed with each other that whatever they would decide to till the land
in that particular area that would be given to them. I have my intention to give that
house constructed to them then, I will give that particular land to them."
 With this clear admission against interest on the part of respondents Sps. Azares
that there was indeed an intention on their part to make petitioner Logrosa and the
other respondents as co-owners of the subject properties, the Court cannot
subscribe to the CA's view that there is insufficiency of evidence confirming
petitioner Logrosa's status as co-owner of the subject properties.

d. Issue/s:

Whether the CA was correct in upholding the RTC's Decision dated February 27,
2012, which dismissed petitioner Logrosa's complaint for partition because of its
finding that the latter is not a co-owner and is a mere trustee of the subject
properties.

e. Held:

The instant Petition is meritorious.

The Court finds that the evidence on record sufficiently substantiates petitioner
Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the subject properties.

It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves

as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best proof of
ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has long been
well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is
attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application.
f. WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision dated July 30,2014 and Resolution dated February 26, 2015
promulgated by the Court of Appeals - Cagayan de Oro City, Special Twenty-First
Division and Former Special Twenty-First Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 02878-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2012 promulgated by Regional Trial
Court of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 4026 is
likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to
issue an Order under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court for the partition of the subject
properties.

SO ORDERED.