Calalas vs. CA (2000) Pamisa EH202

VICENTE CALALAS, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJUERCHE

SUNGA AND FRANCISCO SALVA, 31 May 2000, En Banc, Mendoza
Digest by: Jules B. Pamisa, EH 202
PRINCIPLE IN SUM:
“The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual,
has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving th existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.”
FACTS:
1. Eliza Sunga is a passenger of a passenger jeepney. Vicente Calalas is the

jeepney driver. Iglecerio Verena is the driver of the Isuzu truck that bumped
the passenger jeepney. Francisco Salva is the owner of the Isuzu truck.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a
third-party complaint against Salva.
2. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
truck who was responsible for the accident.
3. Another case was filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena for quasi-delict
(Civil Case No. 3490). It was held that Salva and his driver Verena jointly
liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
4. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract
of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise
the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed
the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga.
1
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident which then negates Petitioner Calalas’ liability for damages to
Sunga.
B. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was
a caso fortuito.
C. Whether or not the award of moral damages to Sunga is excessive and
without legal basis.
RULINGS:
A. YES. Calalas is liable for damages to Sunga.
SC: “The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the
other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict,also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual,has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach
of contract or culpa contractual,is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case
of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof.”
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and
the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
SC: “The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another
2
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.”
Arts. 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely

as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
SC: “In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had
to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga ‘safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances’ as required by Art. 1755? We do not think
so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.”
First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle
of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Second, it is undisputed
3
that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of
the jeepney.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only
was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him
for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
B. NO. The bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva does not
constitute caso fortuito.
SC: “A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present:
(a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not
take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the
danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
highway.”
C. YES. The award of moral damages to Sunga is excessive and without legal
basis.
SC: “As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206 (3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in
the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art.
2220.”
SC: “The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital
does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured
passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one
at fault for the accident.”
xxx

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VICENTE CALALAS, v.

COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJUERCHE

Digest by: Jules B. Pamisa, EH 202

1. Eliza Sunga is a passenger of a passenger jeepney. Vicente Calalas is the

A. YES. Calalas is liable for damages to Sunga.

Arts. 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common

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