The Nobility under Akbar and the Development of His Religious Policy, 1560-80

Author(s): Iqtidar Alam Khan

Source: The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland , Apr.,
1968, No. 1/2 (Apr., 1968), pp. 29-36
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25203020

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 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY, 1560 80
By Iqtidar Alam Khan
The significant changes that were introduced in the organization of Mughal government
and the accompanying shifts in Akbar's administrative and religious policies during the
period 1560-80 have remained for long a favourite subject of study for a number of modern
historians. The existing interpretation of these changes seems largely to run parallel to
Abul FazFs line of argument which seeks to explain the growth of institutions and policies
in terms of the unfolding of Akbar's personality. Abul Fazl often tries to ignore, or brush
aside as the outcome of **cvil advice**, all those measures or decisions which appeared to
him inconsistent with Akbar's policy during the last 25 years of his reign.1 The impression
created by Abul Fazl is reinforced by a similar tendency in Badauni, who, from an opposite
point of view, quite frequently mixes up his comments on some of Akbar's enlightened
measures of the later period with the events of the earlier phase when there was hardly any
ground for him to find fault with Akbar from a doctrinal angle. Under the influence of
these interpretations modern historians also tend to disregard facts that are inconsistent
with Abul Fazl's theory of Akbar's gradual "unveiling" of himself as "the superman*',
through the introduction, one after another, of his policies based on the principles of
Sulh-i Kul and universal kingship. This has often resulted in reducing discussion of Akbar's
religious policy and his relations with the Rajputs largely to speculation based on selected
facts that have been highlighted by Abul Fazl and Badauni. It may further be pointed out
that the whole problem of the nobility under Akbar is generally sought to be understood
in terms of their relations with the king, which is no doubt an important aspect to be
considered, but not the sole one; and the exclusive attention given to this has served to hide
from view many other equally important factors such as the pattern of racial and religious
alignments within the nobility, tribal or clan ties among groups of nobles, their relations
with other sections of the people, etc., which interacting among each other determined to
a large extent changes in the role and standing of the nobility.
In this paper an attempt is made to suggest a reappraisal of Akbar's early policies by
raising certain points which tell against the accepted interpretation. The views put forward
here are purely tentative and by no means based on an exhaustive analysis of the available
evidence. The purpose of this article will be served if it succeeds in stimulating fresh thinking
about some of the well-known generalizations so often repeated in the textbooks.
A significant aspect of the transformation that came about in the nature and functioning
of the institutions of the Mughal Empire in the 16th century was the evolution of a homo
geneous nobility out of the multiracial and religiously heterogeneous elements brought
together by Akbar. An analysis of the list of nobles who accompanied Humayun to
Hindustan in 1555 shows that the nobility inherited by Akbar consisted chiefly of two

1 A glaring example of such an attitude is Abul Fazl's attempt to create an impression as if the mahzar
(1579) recognized Akbar as an arbitrator not only between the orthodox schools of Muslim juris
prudence but also between different religions and sects. It is significant that he fails to give the text of
the document, which according to Badauni was drafted by Shaikh Mubarik, and is reproduced both in
the Tabaqat-i Akburi and Muntaklmb-ut-Tawarikh. Cf. Akbar Nama, Bibliotheca Indica, III, 269-70.

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30 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY

racial groups,2 the Persians and the Turanis; and of the two the Turanis enjoyed a pre
dominant position. The nobility left behind by Humayun had thus essentially a Turani
complexion. The Persian nobles with the exception of Bairam Khan, Mirza Nijat, and
Mirza Hasan were simply exalted scribes who could exercise but little influence on state
policies.3 But for the promotions received by a few (hardly three or four) persons of
Persian origin,4 the composition of the nobility remained unaltered during the regime of
Bairam Khan. But after Bairam Khan's fall the situation gradually changed. As is apparent
from the accompanying tables, two new elements of local origin entered the imperial
service between 1560 and 1575. These new elements were the Rajput chiefs and the Indian
Muslims (mostly Shaikhzadas, the majority of whom belonged to the families living on
madad'i mash grants or enjoying zamindari rights). At the same time, there was a marked
increase in the relative strength of the Persians especially in the higher grades.5 The net
result of this process was the gradual fading away of the Turani complexion of the nobility
as well as the erosion of the Chagatai traditions and customs of state organization,6 thus
indirectly facilitating Akbar's quest for an alternative theory of kingship in the subsequent
years.
The Persian nobles seem to have improved their position in the period 1562-677
mainly by earning promotion in the course of military operations during the revolts of
sections of the nobility. It may be noted that except for the temporary desertion by Asaf
Khan in 1565-66, none of the revolts which took place in this period were staged by the
Persians, or for that matter by any other non-Turani section of the nobles.8 Even the

' See Appendix 1. For this analysis the list of nobles accompanying Humayun in 1555 as given by Abul
Fazl is taken as (he sample with (he modification (hat the following six persons (hen known lo be minor
attendants or officials at Humayun's court have been excluded: Baqi Meg, yatish begi, Khwaja Abdus
Samad, Mir Saiyed Ali, Khwaja Ataullah, diwati-i khak, Mir Shihab Nishapuri, Khwaja Aminuddin
Mahmud. Cf. Akbar Nama, Bibliotheca Indica, I, 342.
3 cf. Appendix I. Turanis were 52-9 per ceni of the total. But if it is kept in mind that a number of Turani
nobles including Mun'im Beg were left behind in Afghanistan there is every reason to believe that the
actual percentage was much higher.
4 I have noticed only four such persons: Haji Muhammad Khan Sistani, Wali Beg, Shihabuddin Ahmad
Khan, and Khwaja Jahan.
4 cf. Appendix 1. The figure for the absolute number of nobles for the period 1565-75 is arrived at by
putting together the names contained in Abul Fazl's lists for various campaigns and expeditions of
these years. Although this figure cannot be treated as conclusive, still, for a tentative study of (his
kind, it can be accepted as a reasonably good sample.
Commenting on Mirza Sulaiman's arrival at the court in 1575, Badauni observes: "At this time (the
Emperor) revived the old tora-i chaghutui. For some time, in order to exhibit it to Mirza Sulaiman,
they spread royal tables in diwankhana and the tawachis entertained the soldiers. But when the Mirza
departed, all these (revived customs) departed too.1' (Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 216.) The English
translation (II, 220) of this passage is inaccurate and misleading.
7 cf. Appendix I. Although their strength in absolute numbers fell from 31 37 percent in 1555 to 2727 per cent
in 1565 75, this docs not necessarily prove a decline in their position. This fall in percentage was more
(he result of (he sharp rise in (he to(al number of the nobles with (he expansion of (he empire. There was
a corresponding fall in (he absolute strength of the Turanis as well. What is more important is the fact
that in the higher grades the Iranis had come to equal (he Turanis and (heir percentage was also
considerably higher (38-54 per cent). This clearly suggests rapid promotion of the Persian nobles during
the period.
There were six major rebellions between 1562 and 1567:
(a) Revolt by Mirza Sharfuddin, 1562-63.
(b) Shah Abul Mnali's revolt, 1564.
(r) Abdullah Khan's revolt, 1564.
(d) Ali Quli Khan's revolt, 1565-67.
(e) Asaf Khan's desertion, 1565-66.
(/)The revolt by the Mirzas, 1566.

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 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY 31

rebellion of the Uzbek officers which was led by Ali Quli Khan, who himself had a Persian
background, was in reality the rebellion of the whole clan of the Uzbek nobles serving
under Akbar, amongst whom, but for Ali Quli Khan and his brother, all leading figures,
like Abdullah Khan, Ibrahim Khan, and Sikandar Khan, were Turanis.9 ft is also sug
gestive that during the operations against the Uzbek officers while Mun'im Khan, the most
senior Chaghtai noble of the realm, endeavoured to secure a peaceful settlement, a group
of senior Khurasani officers such as Khwaja Jahan, Asaf Khan, Muiz ul-Mulk, and Mir.
Ghiasuddin appeared to be quite apathetic if not actually hostile towards the efforts aimed
at reconciliation.10
There is another piece of information which sheds some light on the attitudes of the
Turanis and Khurasanis during this period. Abul Fazl has noted that a large section of the
Turani nobles participating in the operations against Mirza Sharfuddin and Shah Abul
Maali in 1563-64 were quite lukewarm, while Persian officers like Husain Quli Khan,
Ismail Quli Khan, and others who were directing the operations, as well as other Persians
serving under them, were steadfast and unsparing in their support of the royal cause.11
On no occasion after 1567, not even in 1580-81,12 was such undivided support of the
Persian nobles available to Akbar in his struggle with the recalcitrant sections of the nobility.
These facts put together indicate clearly that the trend visible in the fortunes of the Persians,
from the table for 1565-75, is not unreal or accidental, and also confirm the suggestion
that the rise in their numbers in the higher grades actually took place between 1562
and 1567.
There can be no doubt that the recruitment of the Rajputs in Mughal service com
menced soon after Akbar's assumption of the direction of the state. The same was perhaps
the case with the Shaikhzadas. The presence of important clans of the Rajputs and the
Shaikhzadas in Mughal service can be traced as far back as 1561.13 Apparently during this
period Akbar was anxious to win recruits from these sections by placating and befriending

Abdullah Khan was a close relative (perhaps a step-brother) of Babur's well known noble, Qasim Husain
Khan Uzbek (maternal grandson of Sultan Husain Mirza of Herat), and an uncle of Ali Quli. He
served under Humayun in 1536. Cf. Akbar Noma, I, 142; Gulbadan, Humayun Noma, 17.
Sikandar Khan, a former servant of Mirza Kamran, remained in the Mughal service from the
early years of the reign of Humayun and was not one of those who joined Humayun's service in Persia.
Cf. Mirza Haider Doghlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, tr. Ross, 1895, 474.
Ibrahim Khan was the scniormost among the Uzbek officers. Ali Quli Khan treated him just like
an uncle. For his biography see Maalhir ul-Umara, Calcutta, I, 75 77. Cf. Tarikh-i At/i, MS India
Office Ethe 12, f. 620a.
10 For the attitudes of these officers see Akbar Nama, II, 261-262, 268-269; Tazkira-i Humavttn w Akbar,
288, 290; Tabaqat-i Akbari, II, 187; Tarikh-i Al/i, f. 620a. From a reference in BayazieVs account it
appears that at the time of Asaf Khan's selection as the commander of the royal army lhat was sent
against Ali Quli Khan in 1565 there arose a controversy which had racial overtones. In the heat of
argument Khwaja Jahan is reported to have remarked: "liven n single hair of Asaf Khan is more
useful than the whole of the Chaghtai clan."
11 Akbar Nama, 11,200.
11 Appendix 4. In 1580-81, while 32 Persians supported the imperial side, 12 actually joined the rebels and
3 remained neutral-.
18 cf. Akbar Noma. II, 155, 180. The most important section of the Shaikhzadas taken into service was
composed of the Saiyads of Barha. They were in service as far back as 1561. The list of Ain-i Akbari
contains the following nine names from the Barhas: Saiyad Mahmud (No. 75), Saiyad Ahmad (No. 91),
Saiyad Qasim (No. 105), Saiyad Hashim (No. 143), Saiyad Raju (No. 168), Saiyad Jamaluddin
(No. 217), Saiyad Chaju (No. 221), Saiyad Bayazid (No. 295), Saiyad Lad (No. 409). Numbers within
brackets are those given by Blochmann. With the exception of the last two, all belonged to the
categories of mansabdars of 500 and above.

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32 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY

them in different ways. One of the measures for the attainment of this goal was his move to
establish matrimonial relations with the Rajput chiefs. Indeed, it is possible that an attempt
to establish similar relations was made with the Shaikhzadas of Delhi and Agra, though it
seems to have proved abortive.14 The abolition of pilgrimage tax in 1562 and that of the
jiziah in 156415 were steps of a similar nature dictated principally by the exigencies of state
policy rather than consideration of religious tolerance or intellectual influences of any kind.
It is interesting to note that soon after the suppression of the Uzbek rebellion Akbar's
attitude towards the Rajputs changed radically. He now adopted a vigorous policy to
reduce them into submission by force. There was a corresponding shift in the religious
policy too, shown by efforts at placating orthodox Muslim sentiments. The appeal of such
a policy was, apparently, directed towards the Persians, Turanis, and the newly recruited
Indian Muslims, all of whom were equally bigoted in their devotion to Islam. The public
manifestation of Akbar's attitude during the siege of Chittor (1568) is in this connection
quite instructive. The fall of Chittor was proclaimed by him as the victory of Islam over
infidels. A fathnama issued on 9th March, 1575, conveying the news of his victory at
Chittor to the officers of the Punjab is so full of intolerant professions and sentiments and
couched in such aggressive language that it could compete favourably with similar
documents issued by the most orthodox of the Muslim rulers of India.hl There is some
other evidence as well which reinforces the impression conveyed by this document. For
example, there exists a farman of Akbar, presumably of this period, which directs Qazi
'Abdul Samad, the muhtasib of Bilgram, and other officials of the town "to prevent the
Hindus of that pargana from practising idol-worship and take such other steps as might
help in eradicating the manifestations of heresy and deviation from that pargana*'.17 The
reimposition of jiziah in 1575 was the logical culmination of this policy.18 Apparently, this
policy of Akbar was by and large successful in attaining the object that he had in mind: it is
noteworthy that all the important Rajput chiefs, with the exception of the Kachwahas,
joined Akbar's service after the fall of Chittor and not before it.1* This would suggest that
14 Mtoitakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 61-62.
15 Akbar Numa, II, 190, 203-4.
* cf. Abul Qasim Namakin, Munshial-i Namakin, Aligarh MS, ft". 26a-32a. "As directed by the word of
God", Akbar claims, "we, as far as it is within our power, remain busy in jihad and owing to the
kindness of the supreme Lord, who is the promoter of our victories, wc have succeeded in occupying
a number of forts and towns belonging to the infidels and have established Islam there. With the
help of our bloodthirsty sword we have erased the signs of infidelity from their minds and have
destroyed temples in those places and also all over Hindustan."
17 Sharaif-i Usmani, MS, Department of History, A. M. U. Aligarh (a local history of Bilgram compiled
in the 18th century, containing a largo number of documents), f. 144a. The date is illegible. From
certain other documents reproduced in the same book (If. 56a and 58a) it appears that Qa/.i 'Abdul
Smad was alive during the years 1571 92. Obviously, there is greater likelihood of its being issued in
the 70's rather than in the 80's or 90*s, when, according to the unanimous testimony of our authorities,
Akbar was drifting away from orthodox Islam.
18 cf. Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 210. "During the same period (983n) (the Emperor) directed Shaikh
Abdun Nabi and Makhdum ul-Mulk to investigate and reimposc (oj^-Ujyt.) jiziah on Hindus.
Farmans lo this effect were sent on all sides. But this order soon disappeared like a painting on water."
Lowe's translation of the passage (II, 213) is misleading. He has dropped (he word jiziah.
19 This point is amply borne out by the following chronology of Akbar's relations with the Rajput chiefs:
Raja Ram Chand of Bhatta attacked 1561
Kachwahas joined service, gave daughter in marriage Jan.-Feb. 1562
Mirtha reduced Jan.-Feb. 1562
Raja Ram Chand sent Tan Sen 1562
Abortive expedition against Jodhpur 1563

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 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY 33

the factors which induced the Rajputs to join Mughal service were anything but their
appreciation of Akbar's attitude towards the non-Muslims.
It would appear from the breakdown of the total figure of nobles for 1565-75, 1580,
and 1575-95 under different racial categories that the Indian Muslims who entered the
Mughal service in the early 60's improved their positions particularly during 1575-80.20
It is significant that during the rebellion of 1580-81 the Indian Muslims and the Rajputs
as a body sided with the King while the Turanis and to a lesser degree Persians as well
were divided over it.21 This clearly shows that during the years preceding the revolt the
Indian nobles must have been specially cultivated to make them the most steadfast
supporters of the central authority in a conflict that arose around certain issues vitally
affecting the position of the nobility.
The emergence of the Indian Muslims as an important section of the nobility was also
important in so far as it must have contributed towards creating wider support for the
Empire amongst the Muslim communities in India. Apparently the reorganization of the
Department of Sadarat during the 70's was motivated by Akbar's desire to gain and
preserve the sympathies of still further sections of the Muslim upper class in Northern India.
Shaikh Abdun Nabi, after his appointment as Sadr in 1564-65, was given wide powers,
and considerable resources were placed at his disposal for the purpose of obliging the
"deserving people". According to Badauni "if the bounty of all former kings of Hind were
thrown into one scale and the liberality of this age into the other, yet this would prepon
derate".22 It is evident even from Badauni's bitter denunciation of the policy of resuming
excessive land from the grants carrying more than 100 bighas of land (1575) that this
measure was not so much aimed at curbing the theologians, as has been generally thought,
but was motivated by the desire of extending state patronage to a larger number of influential
and leading Indian Muslims, without maintaining any particular distinction between "the
learned" and "the illiterate".23 Similarly, Akbar's well-known order (of 1578) directing all
the madad~i maash grants in a pargana to be concentrated in a few select villages, and
making it obligatory on the part of grantees to reside in the villages where their grants were
situated, has been criticized by Badauni for the hardships it imposed on the grantees. But
as the original text of the farman, now discovered, shows, the intention was to protect the
grantees against jagidars and due care was sought to be taken to ensure that the grantees'
interests were not adversely affected.24

Military measures against the Ujjaynia Chief, Gajpati of Achna down to 1567
Chittor occupied February 1568
Ranthembor reduced May 1569
Kalinjar surrendered by the ruler of Bhatta August 1569
Chandra Sen, Jodhpur, joined service November 1570
Kalyan Mai, Bikaner, joined service, gave niece in marriage November 1570
Mar Rai, joined service and gave niece in marriage November 1570
Raja Gajpati Ujjainiya of Achna joined service 1567-73
Jai Chand of Nagarkot disgraced and expedition sent against his state Feb. -March 1573
Cf. Akbar Noma, II, 155, 182 83, 197-98, 335-40, 340-41, 358; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 49, 50, 63,
161-62, 179-80.
10 Appendix I.
u Appendix 4.
" Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 71; tr., II, 70.
" Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 205.
' Akbar Nama, III, 240; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 254. The original farman is preserved in the U.P.
Record Office, Allahabad (No. 24). Cf. Irfan Habib, The agrarian system of Mughal India, 302 n. 21.
JRAS, 1968, 1 &2. 3

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34 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY

In this discussion a reference to the much debated mahzar of 1579 will not be without
interest. It is obvious that the mahzar reproduced by Badauni and Nizamuddin was the
outcome of Akbar's eagerness to win recognition as the sole head of the orthodox Muslims
of India and not of the whole world.25 This policy had little in common with the concept of
"universal kingship" that won official recognition later. In the mahzar the king's title as
head of the orthodox Muslims (Amir ul-Muminin and Badshah-i Islam) rests on the sanction
given by the leading Ulama of the realm, while, according to the theory that developed later,
kingship is recognized as a divine attribute: it is communicated by God to kings without
the intermediate assistance of any one.20 It is, therefore, natural that Abul Fazl, an
exponent of the later theory, should have thought it lit not to reproduce the text of the
mahzar, but to treat it rather casually. He does not disclose the fact, pointedly mentioned
by Badauni, that the chief architect of the document was his own father, whose works,
even when quite minor, are referred to by him in the most laudatory terms. Moreover, the
summary of this document as given by him is inaccurate and tendentious. It tends to
create the impression that the mahzar declared the king's role to be that of an arbitrator,
not only between the orthodox schools of Muslim law, but also between the various
religions and sects (I^aJUj l^ioO- There is also no reference in Abul Fazl's account to the
titles of Badshah-i Islam and Amir ul-Muminin used for the king in the mahzar.21 It is
obvious that Abul Fazl found it rather embarrassing to handle the mahzar, which would
seem to have been the final and by far the most blatant of Akbar's measures to placate and
win over orthodox Muslim opinion in India. Hence the full significance of the mahzar can
be appreciated only if it is viewed against the background of Akbar's general attitude of
promoting and befriending the Indian Muslims. It was in line with a series of other measures
by which Akbar strove to show that he shared the religious beliefs and sentiments of his
Muslim subjects. His devotion to the tomb at Ajmcr,28 his relations with Salim Chishti2*
and his hostility towards the Mahadavis (who were so unpopular with the orthodox

" Tabaqat-i Akbari, II, 345-46; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 272. Cf. Nurul Hasan, "The 'Mahzar' of
Akbar's Reign", Journal of U.P. Historical Society, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, 126, where it is maintained that
although the titles used are Suitan-i Adil and Amir ul-Muminin, the "intention of the signatories was
clearly to call Akbar a Khalifa". It may well be that the use of the word khalifa was avoided because
the intention was to proclaim Akbar as the head of the Muslims of India and not of the whole world.
The very opening lines of the mahzar make it quite clear that it was exclusively concerned with conditions
in India.
" Abul Fazl, Ain-i Akbari, I, ed. Sayed Ahmad Khan, 3; tr. Blockmann, I, 3.
" Akbar Nama, 111,269-70.
81 Apparently Akbar's interest in Ajmer was very great between 1568 and 1579. During this period he
visited Ajmer almost every year. But his veneration for Khwaja Moin Chishti seems to have disappeared
rather abruptly after his last visit in September 1579. Next year in July he avoided going there on the
occasion of annual urs and deputed his son, Daniyul, to officiate for him. While mentioning this fact
Abul Fazl specifically states that he no longer believed in visiting tombs. Cf. Nafais ul-Maathir, MS
Br. Museum, f. 53 a & b; Shaikh Mustafa Gujarati, Majalis, (llaiderabad), 58; Akbar Nama, II, 276,
317; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 49. 105, 108, 124, 132, 139, 170, 172, 185, 198, 226, 272.
" It appears that relatives of Shaikh Salim Chishti were greatly benefited in terms of wealth and status by
the Shaikh's close relations with Akbar. Cf. Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 109.
30 cf. Nafais ul-Maathir, MS, British Museum, ff'. 62 a & b. Allauddaullah, the earliest authority on Akbar's
reign, quotes a proclamation issued by Akbar before setting out from Ajmer to invade Gujarat in which
it was stated that the Emperor considered it necessary to subjugate Gujarat in view of the fact that a
number of the Afghans in that region deviating from true Islam (c-jIju &Jbj j*- ?l;) had accepted
Mahadavism and were tyrannizing the orthodox people (jo #|JL)
According to Ghausi Shattari, Shaikh Muhammad of Nahrwala, a Bohra theologian of orthodox

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 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY 35

sections),30 and his attempt to deliver the Friday sermon31 make a definite pattern, and
show Akbar's great anxiety to conciliate Muslim orthodoxy.
This phase in Akbar's policy ended some time around 1580. Apparently, the attempt
to project Akbar's image as Badshah-i Islam proved abortive. The revolt of 1580-81
showed that it failed to create the desired impression upon the Turani and Persian nobles
who took a major part in it,32 and who were feeling agitated over the introduction of dagh,
a new mode of revenue collection, and such other administrative reforms as affected their
income and power. The dismissal of Shaikh Abdun Nabi and Makhdum ul-Mulk
(December 1579), and the abolition of ihc jiziah for the second time (1580),33 in the tense
political atmosphere in the east indicate a sudden collapse of the policy pursued so
vigorously during the preceding 13 years.
The turning point might well have come immediately after the mahzar. This document
not only failed to strengthen Akbar's hands but was responsible for reopening a very
sensitive issue by seeking to provide a theological justification of his sovereignty. It is
noteworthy that zfatwa of kufr against Akbar appeared only after the signing of mahzar?*
It is understandable that Akbar soon realized his mistake in issuing the mahzar and took
a decision to put it in cold storage.
But if the policy behind the mahzar ended in a debacle, this very failure liberated
Akbar from the fetters of a pro-Islamic policy. Subsequently, there was, more or less, a
smooth unfolding of Akbar's enlightened religious policy based on his philosophy of
Sulh-i Kul. The ground for this was partly prepared by Akbar's success in putting down
the rebellion of 1580-81, and partly by the experience acquired during the 20 years preceding
1580 when the alternative had been given a full and fair trial.

Appendix 1
Period Total No. Turanis Persians Indian Rajputs and Unspecified
of Nobles _ Muslims other Hindus
1555 51 27 ~T6 ? ? 8
_____(52; 9%) (31^37%)_ (1
1565-75 500 and above 96 38 37 9 8 4
_ (39-58%) (38-54%) (9-37
Absolute numbers 176 67 48 25 18 18
_(3806%) (27-27%) (14-2%) (10-22%) (10-22
1580 272 66 47 ~ 44 43 " 72
_(24-26%)_(17-27%) (16-
1575-95 1,000 and above 87 32 24 14 14 3
(36;78%) (27-58%) (16-09%) (16-09
500 and above 184 64 47 34 30 9
__ (34-78%) _ (25-54%) (18-4

views, had taken a vow not lo put on a turban as lon

community. When Akbar reached Nahrwala he prom
the suppression of Mahadavis and he himself put the
event is made by Abdul Haq Dchlvi and also in some o
John Rylands Library, f. 207b; Akhbar ul-Akhyar,
(A summary of a mathnavi, written in 1141 n.), Orie
81 Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 268; Tabaqat-i Akbari, I
" Appendix 4.
" Akbar Nama, II, 278; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 276. Cf. Tabaqat-i Akbari, II, 347.
14 Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, II, 276.

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36 THE NOBILITY UNDER AKBAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS RELIGIOUS POLICY

Appendix 2: 1565-75
Mansab Turanis Persians Indian Rajputs and Other Total
______Muslims other Hindus _
3_0W_-5_000_[5_ 15 2~ ~~4 ? ~~3~6
1,000-2,500_I4_ I7~" 5 3 4 43 __
500-900 _9 5_ __ 2 ^___ " _ 1 ~?" 17
Mansab not known_29_11_16_10_14_80_
Total_67_48__25_ 18 ll 176
Appendix 3: Racial composition during 1575-95 based on the list c/Ain-i Akbari
Mansab Total Turanis Persians Indian Rajputs Other Others
_No.___ _ Muslims Hindus
5,000 15 7 T """" 2 ~ ?
4,500 2 ? 2 ? ? ? ?
4,000 6 2 2 ? 2 ?
3,500 2 ? 2 ? ? ? ?
3,000 11 8 3 ~ ? ?
2,500 5 2 ? 2 I ? ?
2,000 17 4 3 5 3 1 1
1,500 7 2?32 ? ?
1,250 1 ? ? ? 1 ? ?
1,000 21 7 6 4 2 ? 2
900 34 13 9 8 3 ? 1
800 2 1 ? 1 ? ? ?
700 22 12 3 3 2 1 1
600 4 I 3 ? ? ? ?
500_35_5 8
Total 184 64 47 34 27 3 9

Appendix 4: Rebellion of 1580-$ 1

Turanis Persians Indian Raj
Muslims Hindu offic
_ _ _____ _and za
On the side of the rebellion 33 12 3 6 22
All zamindars
of east
On the Imperial side 28_32 41_37_50_188_J
Neutral_5_3_ ?_---_?_8__
Total_66_47_44_43_72 272

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