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BY
*****************************
TO
MARCH, 2023
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CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this seminar report was written by *********************, with
supervision.
************ DATE
SEMINAR SUPERVISOR
H.O.D (DEPARTMENT)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
With profound gratitude I appreciate the Almighty God for His mercies and blessings upon my
life..
I sincerely appreciate my dear parents and guardian for their care, love and provision for me to
I also want to express my appreciation to my supervisor for his patience and valuable
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page………………………………………………………………………………………..i
Certification……………………………………………………………………………………..ii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………..iii
Table of contents………………………………………………………………………………..iv
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………….1
CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review……………………………………………….……..………………………..5
CHAPTER THREE
CHAPTER FOUR
References………………………………………………………………………………………21
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
prevent unauthorized reception. Scrambling is the process of rendering the sound, pictures and
data unintelligible. Encryption is the process of protecting the secret keys that have to be
transmitted with the scrambled signal in order for the descrambler to work. After descrambling,
any defects on the sound and pictures should be imperceptible, i.e. the CA system should be
individual receivers/ set-top decoders shall be able to deliver particular program services, or
individual programs to the viewers. The reasons why access may need to be restricted include :
EBU Project Group B/CA has developed a functional model of a conditional access system for
use with digital television broadcasts. It should be of benefit to EBU Members who intend to
introduce encrypted digital broadcasts; by using this reference model, Members will be able to
The model is not intended as a specification for a particular system. Rather, it provides a
framework for defining the terms and operating principles of conditional access systems and it
illustrates some of the conflicts and trade-offs that occur when designing such systems. to
enforce payments by viewers who want access to particular programs or program services;
considerations
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TRANSACTIONAL MODELS
Transactional models can be used to illustrate the underlying commercial transactions that take
technology employed. A similar analogy is sometimes used for the sale of goods to the public
through retail and wholesale chains: in that situation, there is a flow of goods and services in one
direction – from the manufacturers to the end customers – and a flow of money in the reverse
also the network operator and the CA system operator. Historically, CA systems originated in
this form and the model remains true for many cable systems today: the cable operator acts as the
service provider (usually by purchasing the rights to show programmes made by third parties)
and also as the carrier and the CA system operator. In such circumstances, and especially where
– as in most cable systems – the cable operator supplies and owns the decoders, a single
proprietary system is acceptable, because there is no requirement to share any part of the system
with competitors. A model of a devolved CA system is shown in Fig. 2. In this case, the
functions of the service provider, network operator and CA system operator are split. Indeed,
there are two separate service providers, A and B, who share a common delivery system (owned
and operated by a third party) and a common CA system which is owned and operated by a
different third party. Thus all billing and collection of money is carried out by the CA system
operator who then passes on payments in respect of program rights back to the appropriate
service providers. This model is true for many analogue satellite systems today and also applies
to a retail market in which there is only one retailer. Note how the CA system operator has
information about the names, addresses and entitlement status of all viewers; program providers,
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on the other hand, have access only to 2. This is generally a Service Information (SI) function.
However, regulators might specify that programmes should be scrambled where parental control
is required. In current analogue systems, parental control often uses the CA system. the names,
An alternative model of a devolved CA system is shown in Fig. 3. Here, there are two
independent CA Subscriber Authorization System (SAS) operators, I and J (see Section 5.3.).
System J is used by service provider C only, whereas system I is used by all three service
providers. Conversely, service providers A and B use system I only, whereas service provider C
uses systems I and J. Thus, viewers to the services provided by C can use a decoder which is
appropriate for either system I or J. A further feature of this model is that the billing and the
money flow is directly between the viewers and the Subscriber Management System (SMS)
operators (see Section 5.3.); it does not pass via the SAS operators or the transmission system
operators. Consequently, sensitive information about the names and addresses of subscribers is
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
loosely based on the Euro crypt conditional access system but its principles of operation are
A Conditional Access Sub-System (CASS) is a detachable security module which is used as part
of the CA system in a receiver. It is also possible to embed the security module in the receiver
itself, in which case each receiver will typically have its own secret individual address.
Replacement of the CASS is one means of recovering from a piracy attack. Replacement of the
CASS also enables new features to be added to the system as and when they are developed.
For analogue systems and some digital systems, the CASS is typically a smart card [1]. For
digital systems which use the Common Interface (see Section 3.6.), the CASS will be a
PCMCIA3 module and this may have an associated smart card (Liddell, 2014).
The basic process of scrambling and descrambling the broadcast MPEG-2 transport stream [2] is
shown in Fig. 4. The European DVB Project has defined a suitable, highly-secure, Common
Scrambling Algorithm.
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3.3. Entitlement Control Messages
The generation, transmission and application of Entitlement Control Messages (ECMs) – which
are used to recover the descrambling control word in the decoder – is illustrated in Fig. 5. The
ECMs are combined with a service key and the result is decrypted to produce a control word. At
present, the control word is typically 60 bits long and is updated every 2-10 seconds.
If the access conditions are to be changed at a program boundary, it may be necessary to update
the access conditions every frame, which is much more frequently than is required for security
out a change in entitlements in advance and then instigating the change with a flag. A third
method would be to change the control word itself at a program boundary. However, the second
and third approaches would not allow a program producer to change the access conditions
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Entitlement Management Messages
The card supplier provides the CASS (usually a smart card) and then the SAS sends the EMMs
over-air or by another route, e.g. via a telephone line. To retain the confidentiality of customer
information, it is best that the card supplier delivers the smart cards direct to the Subscriber
Management System (or another business centre which guarantees confidentiality) for mailing to
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the viewer (see Section 3.5.). It is possible to supply the cards through retail outlets as well,
provided the retailer can guarantee confidentiality. In this situation, considerable care has to be
taken if the cards have been preauthorized by the SAS, because such cards will be a worthwhile
target for theft. When using the CA Common Interface, in conjuction with a PCMCIA module
Note 1: Descrambling requires possession of a descrambler, a decrypter and the current service
key.
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Note 2: Decryption requires the Entitlement Management Messages (EMMs) for the current
program – which usually involves secret keys stored in a detachable Conditional Access
SubSystem (CASS).
As shown in Fig 7., the reference model is completed by the addition of a Subscriber
Management System (SMS), which deals with the billing of viewers and the collection of their
payments. The control word need not be a decrypted ECM; it can be generated locally (e.g. from
a seed) which means that the control word could be changed very quickly (Oded, 2011) .
Common Interface
The European DVB Project has designed a Common Interface for use between the Integrated
Receiver Decoder (IRD) and the CA system. As shown in Fig. 8, the IRD contains only those
The CA system is contained in a low-priced, proprietary module which communicates with the
IRD via the Common Interface. No secret conditional access data passes across the interface.
The Common Interface allows broadcasters to use CA modules which contain solutions from
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CHAPTER THREE
To be acceptable for use by EBU members, a conditional access system needs to meet the
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Convenience for viewers
The CA system should impose a minimum of burden on the authorized viewer at any stage in the
transaction. In particular it should not require special action when changing channels (e.g.
swapping a smart card or keying in a Personal Identification Number) nor should it significantly
delay presentation of picture and sound when “zapping” (a sensible upper limit on the “zapping”
time is 1 second). Furthermore, it should be easy to gain initial access to the broadcasts, requiring
the minimum of equipment, outlay and effort. Ideally, the complete system would be integrated
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into the television set which would be able to access any combination of programme services to
Security
The CA system must be effective in preventing piracy, i.e. unauthorized viewing by people who
Although no CA technology can deliver per-72 EBU Technical Review Winter 1995 EBU
Project Group B/CA fect security, the overall system – combined with appropriate anti-piracy
legislation and evasion deterrent measures – must make piracy sufficiently difficult and/or
uneconomic that the levels of evasion are kept small. Smart cards or payment cards must be
resistant to tampering. For Pay-Per-View services in particular, the counting mechanism which
It is very important that the relationship between the service provider and the CA system operator
is well defined so that, for example, a CA system operator can be compelled to act when piracy
reaches a certain level. There are a number of ways to recover from a piracy attack. It is possible
to initiate electronic counter measures over-air, whereby pirate cards are disabled or subtle
changes are made in the operation of genuine CASSs. Alternatively, by issuing new CASSs,
The viewers should be able to benefit from a large choice of digital receivers or set-top boxes,
produced by a wide range of manufacturers competing in an open market. Such an open market
ideally requires that the complete digital broadcasting system, excluding the CA system, be fully
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described in open standards which are fully published by the appropriate organization (e.g. the
ETSI4 or the ISO5). The terms of licensing any Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) included
within a standard must be regulated by the appropriate standards organization. (For example, in
the case of an ETSI standard, licensing is open to all manufacturers on an equitable basis.) It is
instead, the flexibility offered by the DVB Common Interface should ensure that a plurality of
Authorized program services should be accessible to any viewer whose IRD conforms to the
relevant standard and who has the relevant CA entitlements issued solely under the control of the
service provider. It must also be ensured that all approved service providers have fair access to a
The primary contract should be between the service provider and the viewer. Although third
parties (such as common carriers and/or CA system operators) may necessarily be involved in
the broadcasting process, the CA system (and any other part of the system) should not require the
service provider to share commercially-sensitive information with rival service providers, e.g.
The cost of setting up and operating the CA system is significant but must not be prohibitive. In
particular, it should be capable of being scaled to allow low start-up costs when the subscriber
base is very small. The system should not pose a constraint on the ultimate number of
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households that can be addressed; this could reach many tens of millions. The costs of upgrades
to the CA system and of recovering from security breaches should be minimized by selecting a
Payment schemes:
It is important that the CA system supports a wide range of charging and payment schemes.
These include:
advance notice).
Pay-Per-View (PPV) and Impulse Pay-Per-View (IPPV) often require the provision of a return
path from the viewer to the CA system operator: in many systems this is implemented using a
telephone connection and a modem built into the IRD. The return path can be used to record
viewing history, which is important when considering the program rights issues.
The acceptability and rules of operation for such a telephone return-path need further study. In
particular, a system must exist for those viewers who do not have a telephone connection. One
possible method would be to purchase credits in advance and to store them as viewing tokens on
a smart card or CA module. The card or module could be reauthorized at a trusted dealer when
information on past viewing could be transferred to the system operator. Provided security was
not compromised, it would also be possible to have the smart card or module credited over-air
with tokens which could be initiated by a telephoned (voice) request from the viewer. There must
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be a method to ensure that all service providers are paid fairly for the programmes provided, in
Multiple-decoder households:
2.use throughout a household, which may have multiple receivers/decoders and a VCR;
3.use by one individual anywhere within a household, in which case the entitlement needs to be
transferable from one IRD to another, probably using a detachable security element such as a
smart card.
In the third case given above, there is a conflict with the requirement to validate the security
device for use with a particular decoder only. Therefore, each decoder should have its own CASS
and the records of multiple CASSs within a household should be grouped together in the SMS to
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SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
Satellite transmission
The DVB Project has given its backing to two CA approaches for the transmission of digital
television via satellite, namely SimulCrypt and Multi-Crypt. These approaches are also relevant
SimulCrypt
In the case of SimulCrypt, each service is transmitted with the entitlement messages for a number
of different proprietary systems, so that decoders using different conditional access systems (in
SimulCrypt requires a common framework for signalling the different Entitlement Message
streams. Access to the system is controlled by the system operators. Operation of the system
requires commercial negotiations between broadcasters and conditional access operators. A code
of conduct has been drawn up for the operation of SimulCrypt (Liddell, 2014).
The philosophy behind the system is that in one geographical area, it will only be necessary to
have a single smart card or CA module and a single decoder to receive the local service. If one
wanted to descramble the service of a neighbouring area, one could subscribe to, and use the
smart card/ module for that service. Consequently, it is only necessary to have a single
Subscriber Management System for a given area. When a viewer wants to watch services from
two neighbouring areas, it is necessary for both services to carry the entitlement messages for
that viewer. Therefore it is necessary to have secure links between the different Subscriber
Management Systems of the different operators to allow transfer of the entitlement messages
between operators.
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MultiCrypt
MultiCrypt is an open system which allows competition between conditional access system
The Common Conditional Access Interface can be used to implement MultiCrypt. Conditional
access modules from different system operators can be plugged into different slots in the
Return path
For most home installations, a return path could be set up between the set-top decoder and the
Subscriber Management System using a modem and the telephone network or a cable TV return.
For example, calls could be initiated by the customer using a remote control unit which autodials
a number delivered over-air. Also, the broadcaster may want the customer’s decoder box to
contact the SMS. This process could be initiated by commands sent over-air or (less likely) the
SMS could dial up the customer’s decoder box and interrogate it directly (Menezes,2017).
security;
The return path establishes a one-to-one link between the broadcaster and each decoder
Pre-booked Pay-Per-View (PPV) and impulse PPV could be registered using the return path.
Also, electronic viewing tokens could be purchased via the return path. A central server with a
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gateway would be necessary as a buffer for the large numbers of requests that would be expected
as part of a Pay-Per-View service. These payment billing services could also be obtained by the
viewer dialling up the SMS using his conventional telephone and having a conversation with an
operator at the SMS. However this approach would be more time-consuming and costly to both
The return path could be used for audience participation (for example voting, games
playing,teleshopping and telebanking). The return path could also be used for message delivery
from the SMS to the decoder, although its limited bandwidth means that it is not very suitable for
more complicated procedures such as Video-On-Demand (VOD). The return path could be used
to deliver to the SMS diagnostic information such as measurements of signal strength and bit
error rate (BER) to help solve transmission problems, and other information such as a record of
For large shared networks, the capacity for transmission of entitlement messages may be
inadequate and additional capacity may be achieved by using the telephone network. The return
path could also be used to check that the decoder is tuned to the correct channel when giving
authorization over-air. This could reduce the number of over-air signals that had to be repeated
perpetually.
There are also a number of reasons for not using a return path, as follows: a)
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b) Installation difficulties;
The customer may not have a telephone at all, or may not have a telephone in the relevant room
(in which case an extension socket would have to be fitted or a “cordless” connection would have
When the decoder is communicating, it will not be possible to make or receive normal
telephone calls, unless there is more than one telephone line to the house. e)Telephone tapping.
Depending on how the communication system works, there is a potential for reduced system
security due to telephone tapping. Ideally, to overcome this problem, it is recommended that the
Subscriber Management System should return the calls made by the IRD (although this will
increase the costs to the SMS), the communication should be encrypted, and the Subscriber
Overall, the benefits of using a return path far exceed the costs. In situations where the
return path does not exist but alternative facilities exist for performing some of its functions,
decoders should be manufactured which are capable of implementing the return path. Cheaper
decoders could be sold which do not have this option installed (Kahn, 2017).
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CHAPTER FOUR
A basic set of transactional and functional models of CA systems for use with digital video
broadcasting systems has been outlined. These models are intended to help EBU Members to
understand and evaluate practical CA systems for use with future DVB services and, in
particular, to understand the functionality, technical terms, and trade-offs in these systems. The
specification or evaluation of a practical CA system requires considerably more depth and detail
than could be included in this outline. In particular, an evaluation of security issues requires a
careful analysis of the overall system security, including non-technical issues such as the theft of
data.
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REFERENCES
Google Books.
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