Operations Manual: Part A
Operations Manual: Part A
Operations Manual: Part A
PART A
GENERAL/BASIC
REVISION HIGHLIGHTS
SECTION CHANGE
Included reference to MEL Annex Ic to MNPS NAT HLA checklist for flight dispatchers and
2.3.6.3
check of OPERATIONS NOTES under applicable MEL item provisions
Error corrected. Reports on extended flight duty periods and reduced rest periods are kept in
7.1.15
iQSMS.
8.1.2.D.6. Error corrected. Planning to isolated destination applicable.
8.3.2.E.6. Updated RVSM height monitoring to include NAT RVSM and PPR reporting and overfly.
CHAPTER REV/DATE
A00 05/23.06.22.
A01 03.01/26.04.22.
A02 05/23.06.22.
A03 03/14.01.22.
A04 04/31.05.22.
A05 04/31.05.22.
A06 0/14.12.20.
A07 05/23.06.22.
A08 05/23.06.22.
A09 0/14.12.20.
A10 0/14.12.20.
A11 04/31.05.22.
A12 0/14.12.20.
A13 01/09.08.21.
DISTRIBUTION LIST
RECEIPIENT FORMAT
CCAA – OPS DEPARTMENT EC
CCAA – AIRWORTHINESS DEPARTMENT EC
CREWS EC
OCC EC
GROUND OPS EC
SALES EC
CAMO EC
Email: stjepan.bedic@etfairways.com
Table of contents:
0 ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS MANUAL .................................................................... 7
0.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................ 7
0.2. SYSTEM OF AMENDMENT AND REVISION ................................................................................................................... 34
(a) ETF Airways, being the AOC holder, hereafter is referred to as ‘the Operator’. The Operator has prepared this
Operations Manual in accordance with the regulations set down by the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of the European Parliament on common rules in the field of civil
aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency. Content of the OM reflects the
requirements set out in Annex III (Part-ORO), Annex IV (Part-CAT) and Annex V (Part- SPA), as applicable. The
manual complies with all applicable regulations and with the terms and conditions of the applicable AOC.
ETF Airways is compliant with the rules and regulations contained in Commission Regulation 965/2012
referred to as the implementing Regulations (IR’s). In addition, the operator has complied with the associated
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC’s) where appropriate.
The operator is defined as a complex operator and has established a Management System with reference to
the requirements of ORO.GEN.200 details of which are found in section 3 of this manual.
The management program is acceptable to the CCAA, hereafter referred to as the ‘Competent Authority’, as
defined by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
The operator complies with the terms and conditions of the ‘Air Operators Certificate’ issued by the
Competent Authority and operationally conforms with the information, rules and requirements contained in
the Operation Manual, a copy of which is carried on the operator’s aeroplanes operating for Commercial Air
Transport (CAT). The manual is issued to all operational staff and is available electronically. The operator
monitors the regulations and updates the operations manuals.
(b) The operations Manual is the operator’s statement detailing its method of compliancy to the rules and
regulations whilst providing a safe operation during all Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operations. The manual
contains operational instructions that are to be complied with by the relevant personnel.
Every flight shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the operations manual and scope and
privileges defined in operations specifications attached in the AOC. All staff shall follow these OM instructions,
as well as principles of good airmanship and common sense to achieve the primary goal, which is safety.
Reckless or negligent behaviour which could endanger the aircraft, person therein or cause or permit and
aircraft to endanger any person or property is strictly forbidden. ETF Airways shall use SMS and Compliance
monitoring to ensure the related compliance.
(c) The Operations Manual is made up of four sections, which may be supplemented together with other
publications, such as the aeroplane flight manual, pilots operating handbook and commercially produced
route and airway manuals, aircraft MEL, Management Manual.
(d) Definitions
For the purpose of this regulation and applied in this manual the following terms shall apply;
Reference to the Company, is now ‘the Operator’ where the Operator is the AOC holder ETF Airways.
For the purpose of this OM, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) ‘accelerate-stop distance available (ASDA)’ means the length of the take-off run available plus the length of
stopway, if such stopway is declared available by the State of the aerodrome and is capable of bearing the mass of the
aeroplane under the prevailing operating conditions;
(2) ‘acceptable means of compliance (AMC)’ means non-binding standards adopted by the Agency to illustrate means
to establish compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules;
(4) ‘adequate aerodrome’ means an aerodrome on which the aircraft can be operated, taking account of the applicable
performance requirements and runway characteristics;
(7) ‘aided night vision imaging system (NVIS) flight’ means, in the case of NVIS operations, that portion of a visual flight
rules (VFR) flight performed at night when a crew member is using night vision goggles (NVG);
(8) ‘aircraft’ means a machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the
reactions of the air against the earth’s surface;
(8a) ‘aircraft tracking’ means a ground based process that maintains and updates, at standardised intervals, a record
of the four dimensional position of individual aircraft in flight;
(8b) ‘aircraft tracking system’ means a system that relies on aircraft tracking in order to identify abnormal flight
behaviour and provide alert;
(9) ‘alternative means of compliance’ means those means that propose an alternative to an existing acceptable means
of compliance or those that propose new means to establish compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its
Implementing Rules for which no associated AMC have been adopted by the Agency;
(10) ‘anti-icing’, in the case of ground procedures, means a procedure that provides protection against the formation
of frost or ice and accumulation of snow on treated surfaces of the aircraft for a limited period of time (hold-over
time);
(11) ‘approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV) operation’ means an instrument approach which utilises lateral
and vertical guidance, but does not meet the requirements established for precision approach and landing operations,
with a decision height (DH) not lower than 250 ft and a runway visual range (RVR) of not less than 600 m;
(12) ‘cabin crew member’ means an appropriately qualified crew member, other than a flight crew or technical crew
member, who is assigned by an operator to perform duties related to the safety of passengers and flight during
operations;
(13) ‘category I (CAT I) approach operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing using an instrument
landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS), GLS (ground-based augmented global navigation satellite
system (GNSS/GBAS) landing system), precision approach radar (PAR) or GNSS using a satellite-based augmentation
system (SBAS) with a decision height (DH) not lower than 200 ft and with a runway visual range (RVR) not less than
550 m for aeroplanes and 500 m for helicopters;
(14) ‘category II (CAT II) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS
with:
(a) DH below 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft; and
(b) RVR of not less than 300 m;
(15) ‘category IIIA (CAT IIIA) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS
with:
(a) DH lower than 100 ft; and
(b) RVR not less than 200 m;
(16) ‘category IIIB (CAT IIIB) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing operation using ILS or MLS
with:
(a) DH lower than 100 ft, or no DH; and
(b) RVR lower than 200 m but not less than 75 m;
(17) reserved
(18) reserved
(19) ‘certification specifications’ (CS) means technical standards adopted by the Agency indicating means to show
compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules and which can be used by an organisation
for the purpose of certification;
(20) ‘circling’ means the visual phase of an instrument approach to bring an aircraft into position for landing on a
runway that is not suitably located for a straight-in approach;
(21) ‘clearway’ means a defined rectangular area on the ground or water under the control of the appropriate
authority, selected or prepared as a suitable area over which an aeroplane may make a portion of its initial climb to a
specified height;
(22) ‘cloud base’ means the height of the base of the lowest observed or forecast cloud element in the vicinity of an
aerodrome or operating site or within a specified area of operations, normally measured above aerodrome elevation
or, in the case of offshore operations, above mean sea level;
(22a) ‘cockpit voice recorder (CVR)’ means a crash-protected flight recorder that uses a combination of microphones
and other audio and digital inputs to collect and record the aural environment of the flight crew compartment and
communications to, from and between the flight crew members;
(23) ‘code share’ means an arrangement under which an operator places its designator code on a flight operated by
another operator, and sells and issues tickets for that flight;
(23a) ‘competency’ means a dimension of human performance that is used to reliably predict successful performance
on the job and which is manifested and observed through behaviours that mobilise the relevant knowledge, skills and
attitudes to carry out activities or tasks under specified conditions;
(23b) ‘competency-based training’ means assessment and training programmes that are characterised by a
performance orientation, emphasis on standards of performance and their measurement and the development of
training to the specified performance standards;
(23c) ‘competency framework’ means a complete set of identified competencies that are developed, trained and
assessed in the operator’s evidence-based training programme utilising scenarios that are relevant to operations and
which is wide enough to prepare the pilot for both foreseen and unforeseen threats and errors;
(24) ‘congested area’ means in relation to a city, town or settlement, any area which is substantially used for
residential, commercial or recreational purposes;
(25) ‘contaminated runway’ means a runway of which a significant portion of its surface area (whether in isolated
areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one or more of the substances listed under the
runway surface condition descriptors;
(26) ‘contingency fuel’ means the fuel required to compensate for unforeseen factors that could have an influence on
the fuel consumption to the destination aerodrome;
(27) ‘continuous descent final approach (CDFA)’ means a technique, consistent with stabilised approach procedures,
for flying the final-approach segment of a non-precision instrument approach procedure as a continuous descent,
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without level-off, from an altitude/height at or above the final approach fix altitude/height to a point approximately
15 m (50 ft) above the landing runway threshold or the point where the flare manoeuvre shall begin for the type of
aircraft flown;
(28) ‘converted meteorological visibility (CMV)’ means a value, equivalent to an RVR, which is derived from the
reported meteorological visibility;
(29) ‘crew member’ means a person assigned by an operator to perform duties on board an aircraft;
(30) ‘critical phases of flight’ in the case of aeroplanes means the take-off run, the take-off flight path, the final
approach, the missed approach, the landing, including the landing roll, and any other phases of flight as determined
by the pilot-in-command or commander;
(31) reserved
(33) ‘Dangerous Goods (DG)’ means articles or substances which are capable of posing a hazard to health, safety,
property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the technical instructions or which
are classified according to those instructions;
(34) ‘dangerous goods accident’ means an occurrence associated with and related to the transport of dangerous goods
by air which results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property damage;
(36) ‘de-icing’, in the case of ground procedures, means a procedure by which frost, ice, snow or slush is removed from
an aircraft in order to provide uncontaminated surfaces;
(37) reserved
(38) reserved
(39) reserved
(40) ‘dry lease agreement’ means an agreement between undertakings pursuant to which the aircraft is operated
under the air operator certificate (AOC) of the lessee or, in the case of commercial operations other than CAT, under
the responsibility of the lessee;
(41) ‘dry operating mass’ means the total mass of the aircraft ready for a specific type of operation, excluding usable
fuel and traffic load;
(42) ‘dry runway’ means a runway whose surface is free of visible moisture and not contaminated within the area
intended to be used;
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(42a) ‘EFB application’ means a software application installed on an EFB host platform that provides one or more
specific operational functions which support flight operations;
(42b) ‘EFB host platform’ means the hardware equipment in which the computing capabilities and basic software
reside, including the operating system and the input/output software;
(42c) ‘EFB system’ means the hardware equipment (including any battery, connectivity provisions, input/output
components) and software (including databases and the operating system) needed to support the intended EFB
application(s);
(42d) ‘EBT module’ means a combination of sessions in a qualified flight simulation training device as part of the 3-
year period of recurrent assessment and training;
(43) reserved
(44) reserved
(44a) ‘electronic flight bag (EFB)’ means an electronic information system, comprised of equipment and applications
for flight crew, which allows for the storing, updating, displaying and processing of EFB functions to support flight
operations or duties;
(45) reserved
(45a) ‘emergency exit’ means an installed exit-type egress point from the aircraft that allows maximum opportunity
for cabin and flight crew compartment evacuation within an appropriate time period and includes floor level door,
window exit or any other type of exit, for instance hatch in the flight crew compartment and tail cone exit;
(46) ‘en-route alternate (ERA) aerodrome’ means an adequate aerodrome along the route, which may be required at
the planning stage;
(47) ‘enhanced vision system (EVS)’ means a system to display electronic real-time images of the external scene
achieved through the use of imaging sensors;
(47a) ‘enrolment’ means the administrative action carried out by the operator where a pilot participates in the
operator’s EBT programme;
(47b) ‘enrolled pilot’ means the pilot that participates in the EBT recurrent training programme;
(47c) ‘equivalency of approachesmeans all the approaches that place an additional demand on a proficient crew
regardless of whether they are used or not in the EBT modules;
(47d) ‘equivalency of malfunctions’ means all the malfunctions that put a significant demand on a proficient crew
regardless of whether they are used or not in the EBT modules;
(47e) ‘evaluation phase’ means one of the phases of an EBT modulewhich is a line-orientated flight scenario,
representative of the operator’s environment during which there are one or more occurrences to evaluate key
elements of the defined competency framework;
(47f) ‘evidence-based training (EBT)’ means assessment and training based on operational data that is characterised
by developing and assessing the overall capability of a pilot across a range of competencies (competency framework)
rather than by measuring the performance in individual events or manoeuvres;
(48a) ‘flight crew member’ means a licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the operation of an aircraft
during a flight duty period;
(49) ‘flight data monitoring (FDM)’ means the proactive and non-punitive use of digital flight data from routine
operations to improve aviation safety;
(49a) ‘flight operations officer’ or ‘flight dispatcher’ means a person designated by the operator to engage in the
control and supervision of flight operations, who is suitably qualified, who supports, briefs or assists, or both, the pilot-
in-command in the safe conduct of the flight;
(49b) ‘flight data recorder (FDR)’ means a crash-protected flight recorder that uses a combination of data sources to
collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of the aircraft;
(49c) ‘flight recorder’ means any type of recorder that is installed on the aircraft for the purpose of facilitating accident
or incident safety investigations;
(50) ‘flight simulation training device (FSTD)’ means a training device which is:
(a) in the case of aeroplanes, a full flight simulator (FFS), a flight training device (FTD), a flight and navigation
procedures trainer (FNPT), or a basic instrument training device (BITD);
(b) in the case of helicopters, a full flight simulator (FFS), a flight training device (FTD) or a flight and navigation
procedures trainer (FNPT);
(51) ‘fuel ERA aerodrome’ means an ERA aerodrome selected for the purpose of reducing contingency fuel;
(52) ‘GBAS landing system (GLS)’ means an approach landing system using ground based augmented global navigation
satellite system (GNSS/GBAS) information to provide guidance to the aircraft based on its lateral and vertical GNSS
position. It uses geometric altitude reference for its final approach slope;
(53) reserved
(54) ‘grounding’ means the formal prohibition of an aircraft to take-off and the taking of such steps as are necessary
to detain it;
(55) ‘head-up display (HUD)’ means a display system which presents flight information to the pilot’s forward external
field of view and which does not significantly restrict the external view;
(56) ‘head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS)’ means the total airborne system that provides head-up guidance to
the pilot during the approach and landing and/or missed approach procedure. It includes all sensors, computers,
power supplies, indications and controls;
(68) ‘hold-over time (HoT)’ means the estimated time the anti-icing fluid will prevent the formation of ice and frost
and the accumulation of snow on the protected (treated) surfaces of an aeroplane;
(69a) ‘human–machine interface (HMI)’ means a component of certain devices that is capable of handling human–
machine interactions. The interface consists of hardware and software that allow user inputs to be interpreted and
processed by machines or systems that, in turn, provide the required results to the user;
(69b) ‘in-seat instruction’ means a technique used in the manoeuvres training phase or the scenario-based training
phase, where the instructors can:
(a) providesimpleinstructionstoonepilot;or
(b) performpredeterminedexercisesacting,inapilotseat,aspilotflying(PF)orpilotmonitoring(PM)for:
(1) thedemonstrationoftechniques;and/or
(2) triggeringtheotherpilottointerveneorinteract;
(69c) ‘instructor concordance’means the consistency or stability of scores between different EBT instructorswhich
gives a score (or scores) of how much homogeneity, or consensus, there is in the ratings given by instructors (raters);
(70) ‘landing decision point (LDP)’ means the point used in determining landing performance from which, an engine
failure having been recognised at this point, the landing may be safely continued or a balked landing initiated;
(70a) ‘landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA)’ means a landing distance that is achievable in normal operations
based on landing performance data and associated procedures determined for the prevailing conditions at the time
of landing;
(71) ‘landing distance available (LDA)’ means the length of the runway which is declared available by the State of the
aerodrome and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane landing;
(72) ‘landplane’ means a fixed wing aircraft which is designed for taking off and landing on land and includes
amphibians operated as landplanes;
(72a) ‘line-orientated flight scenario’ means the assessment and training involving a realistic, ‘real-time’, full mission
simulation of scenarios that are representative of line operations;
(73) reserved
(74) ‘low visibility procedures (LVP)’ means procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe
operations during lower than standard category I, other than standard category II, category II and III approaches and
low visibility take-offs;
(75) ‘low visibility take-off (LVTO)’ means a take-off with an RVR lower than 400 m but not less than 75 m;
(76) ‘lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operation’ means a category I instrument approach and landing
operation using category I DH, with an RVR lower than would normally be associated with the applicable DH but not
lower than 400 m;
(76a) ‘maintenance check flight (‘MCF’)’ means a flight of an aircraft with an airworthiness certificate or with a permit
to fly which is carried out for troubleshooting purposes or to check the functioning of one or more systems, parts or
appliances after maintenance, if the functioning of the systems, parts or appliances cannot be established during
ground checks and which is carried out in any of the following situations:
(a) as required by the aircraft maintenance manual (‘AMM’) or any other maintenance data issued by a design
approval holder being responsible for the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft;
(b) after maintenance, as required by the operator or proposed by the organisation responsible for the
continuing airworthiness of the aircraft;
(c) as requested by the maintenance organisation for verification of a successful defect rectification;
(d) to assist with fault isolation or troubleshooting;
(76b) ‘manoeuvres training phase’ means a phase of an EBT module during which, according to aircraft generation,
crews have time to practise and improve performance in largely psychomotor skill-based exercises by achieving a
prescribed flight path or performing a prescribed event to a prescribed outcome;
(76c) ‘mixed EBT programme’ means an operator’s recurrent training and checking programme as per ORO.FC.230, a
portion of which is dedicated to the application of EBT but which does not replace proficiency checks as per Appendix
9 to Annex I (Part-FCL) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011;
(77) ‘maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC)’ means the maximum passenger seating
capacity of an individual aircraft, excluding crew seats, established for operational purposes and specified in the
operations manual. Taking as a baseline the maximum passenger seating configuration established during the
certification process conducted for the type certificate (TC), supplemental type certificate (STC) or change to the TC or
STC as relevant to the individual aircraft, the MOPSC may establish an equal or lower number of seats, depending on
the operational constraints;
(78) ‘medical passenger’ means a medical person carried in a helicopter during a HEMS flight, including but not limited
to doctors, nurses and paramedics;
(78a) ‘minor failure condition’ means a failure condition that would not significantly reduce aircraft safety, and which
involves flight crew actions that are well within their capabilities;
(78b) ‘misuse of substances’ means the use of one or more psychoactive substances by flight crew, cabin crew
members and other safety-sensitive personnel in a way that:
(a) constitutes a direct hazard to the user or endangers the lives, health or welfare of others, and/or
(b) causes or worsens an occupational, social, mental or physical problem or disorder;
(79) ‘night’ means the period between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil twilight or
such other period between sunset and sunrise as may be prescribed by the appropriate authority, as defined by the
Member State;
(83) ‘non-precision approach (NPA) operation’ means an instrument approach with a minimum descent height (MDH),
or DH when flying a CDFA technique, not lower than 250 ft and an RVR/CMV of not less than 750 m for aeroplanes and
600 m for helicopters;
(91) ‘operational control’ means the responsibility for the initiation, continuation, termination or diversion of a flight
in the interest of safety;
(92) ‘other than standard category II (OTS CAT II) operation’ means a precision instrument approach and landing
operation using ILS or MLS where some or all of the elements of the precision approach category II light system are
not available, and with:
(a) DH below 200 ft but not lower than 100 ft; and
(b) RVR of not less than 350 m;
(93) ‘performance class A aeroplanes’ means multi-engined aeroplanes powered by turbo-propeller engines with an
MOPSC of more than nine or a maximum take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg, and all multi-engined turbo-jet powered
aeroplanes; Boeing 737 is a Performance class A aeroplane.
(94) ‘performance class B aeroplanes’ means aeroplanes powered by propeller engines with an MOPSC of nine or less
and a maximum take-off mass of 5 700 kg or less;
(95) ‘performance class C aeroplanes’ means aeroplanes powered by reciprocating engines with an MOPSC of more
than nine or a maximum take-off mass exceeding 5 700 kg;
(96) ‘pilot-in-command’ means the pilot designated as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of the
flight. For the purpose of commercial air transport operations, the ‘pilot-in-command’ shall be termed the
‘commander’;
(96a) ‘portable EFB’ means a portable EFB host platform, used on the flight deck, which is not part of the configuration
of the certified aircraft;
(96b) ‘portable electronic device (PED)’ means any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer
electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo, that is not included
in the configuration of the certified aircraft. It includes all equipment that is able to consume electrical energy. The
electrical energy can be provided from internal sources such as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or the
devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources;
(97) ‘principal place of business’ means the head office or registered office of the organisation within which the
principal financial functions and operational control of the activities referred to in this Regulation are exercised;
(98) ‘prioritisation of ramp inspections’ means the dedication of an appropriate portion of the total number of ramp
inspections conducted by or on behalf of a competent authority on an annual basis as provided in Part-ARO;
(98a) ‘psychoactive substances’ means alcohol, opioids, cannabinoids, sedatives and hypnotics, cocaine, other
psychostimulants, hallucinogens, and volatile solvents, with the exception of caffeine and tobacco;
(98a) ‘proficient’ means having demonstrated the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes that are required to
perform any defined tasks to the prescribed standard;
(99) ‘public interest site (PIS)’ means a site used exclusively for operations in the public interest;
(100) ‘ramp inspection’ means the inspection of aircraft, of flight and cabin crew qualifications and of flight
documentation in order to verify the compliance with the applicable requirements;
(101) ‘rectification interval’ means a limitation on the duration of operations with inoperative equipment;
(103a) ‘required navigation performance (RNP) specification’ means a navigation specification for PBN operations
which includes a requirement for on-board navigation performance monitoring and alerting;
(103b) ‘rules of the air’ means the rules established in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012;
(103c) ‘runway condition report (RCR)’ means a comprehensive standardised report relating to the conditions of the
runway surface and their effect on the aeroplane landing and take-off performance, described by means of runway
conditions code;
(104) ‘runway visual range (RVR)’ means the range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of a runway
can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centre line;
(105) ‘safe forced landing’ means an unavoidable landing or ditching with a reasonable expectancy of no injuries to
persons in the aircraft or on the surface;
(105a) ‘safety-sensitive personnel’ means persons who might endanger aviation safety if they perform their duties and
functions improperly, including flight crew and cabin crew members, aircraft maintenance personnel and air traffic
controllers;
(105b) ‘scenario-based training phase’ means a phase of an EBT module which focuses on the development of
competencies, whilst the pilot is trained to mitigate the most critical risks identified for the aircraft generation. It
should include the management of specific operator’s threats and errors in a real-time line- orientated environment;”
(106) ‘seaplane’ means a fixed wing aircraft which is designed for taking off and landing on water and includes
amphibians operated as seaplanes;
(107) ‘separate runways’ means runways at the same aerodrome that are separate landing surfaces. These runways
may overlay or cross in such a way that if one of the runways is blocked, it will not prevent the planned type of
operations on the other runway. Each runway shall have a separate approach procedure based on a separate
navigation aid;
(107a) ‘specially prepared winter runway’ means a runway with a dry frozen surface of compacted snow or ice which
has been treated with sand or grit or has been mechanically treated to improve runway friction;
(108) ‘special VFR flight’ means a VFR flight cleared by air traffic control to operate within a control zone in
meteorological conditions below VMC;
(109) ‘stabilised approach (SAp)’ means an approach that is flown in a controlled and appropriate manner in terms of
configuration, energy and control of the flight path from a pre-determined point or altitude/height down to a point
50 ft above the threshold or the point where the flare manoeuvre is initiated if higher;
(109a) ‘sterile flight crew compartment’ means any period of time when the flight crew members are not disturbed or
distracted, except for matters critical to the safe operation of the aircraft or the safety of the occupants;
(110) ‘take-off alternate aerodrome’ means an alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft can land shall this become
necessary shortly after take-off and if it is not possible to use the aerodrome of departure;
(111) ‘take-off decision point (TDP)’ means the point used in determining take-off performance from which, an engine
failure having been recognised at this point, either a rejected take-off may be made or a take-off safely continued;
(112) ‘take-off distance available (TODA)’ in the case of aeroplanes means the length of the take-off run available plus
the length of the clearway, if provided;
(115) ‘take-off flight path’ means the vertical and horizontal path, with the critical engine inoperative, from a specified
point in the take-off for aeroplanes to 1 500 ft above the surface;
(116) ‘take-off mass’ means the mass including everything and everyone carried at the commencement of the take-
off for helicopters and take-off run for aeroplanes;
(117) ‘take-off run available (TORA)’ means the length of runway that is declared available by the State of the
aerodrome and suitable for the ground run of an aeroplane taking off;
(117a) ‘task specialist’ means a person assigned by the operator or a third party, or acting as an undertaking, who
performs tasks on the ground directly associated with a specialised task or performs specialised tasks on board or from
the aircraft;
(118) reserved
(119) ‘Technical Instructions (TI)’ means the latest effective edition of the ‘Technical instructions for the safe transport
of dangerous goods by air’, including the supplement and any addenda, approved and published by the International
Civil Aviation Organisation;
(120) ‘traffic load’ means the total mass of passengers, baggage, cargo and carry-on specialist equipment and including
any ballast;
(120a) ‘type A EFB application’ means an EFB application whose malfunction or misuse has no safety effect;
(121) reserved
(122) ‘undertaking’ means any natural or legal person, whether profit-making or not, or any official body whether
having its own personality or not;
(123) ‘V1’ means the maximum speed in the take-off at which the pilot must take the first action to stop the aeroplane
within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means the minimum speed in
the take-off, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the take-off and achieve
the required height above the take-off surface within the take-off distance;
(124) ‘VEF’ means the speed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail during take-off;
(125) ‘visual approach’ means an approach when either part or all of an instrument approach procedure is not
completed and the approach is executed with visual reference to the terrain;
(126) ‘weather-permissible aerodrome’ means an adequate aerodrome where, for the anticipated time of use,
weather reports, or forecasts, or any combination thereof, indicate that the weather conditions will be at or above
the required aerodrome operating minima, and the runway surface condition reports indicate that a safe landing will
be possible;
(128) ‘wet runway’ means a runway whose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3
mm deep within the area intended to be used.
DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS USED IN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL
For the purpose of Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, the
following definitions shall apply:
(a) ‘Abnormal flight behaviour’ means, in the context of an aircraft tracking system, an event affecting a flight:
(1) which is outside of the parameters defined by the operator for normal operation or which indicates an
obvious deviation from normal operation; and
(2) for which the operator has determined that it poses a risk for the safe continuation of the flight or for third
parties.
(a) ‘Accuracy’ means, in the context of PBN operations, the degree of conformance between the estimated, measured
or desired position and/or the velocity of a platform at a given time, and its true position or velocity. Navigation
performance accuracy is usually presented as a statistical measure of system error and is specified as predictable,
repeatable and relative.
(b) ‘Aircraft-based augmentation system (ABAS)’ means a system that augments and/or integrates the information
obtained from the other GNSS elements with information available on board the aircraft. The most common form of
ABAS is receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM).
(ba) ‘Airport moving map display (AMMD)’ means a software application that displays an airport map on a display
device and uses data from a navigation source to depict the aircraft current position on this map while the aircraft is
on the ground.
(c) ‘Area navigation (RNAV)’ means a method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path
within the coverage of station-referenced navigation aids or within the limits of the capability of self-contained aids,
or a combination of these.
d) ‘Availability’ means, in the context of PBN operations, an indication of the ability of the system to provide usable
service within the specified coverage area and is defined as the portion of time during which the system is to be used
for navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot or other system
managing the flight of the aircraft.
(e) reserved
(f) ‘Continuity of function’ means, in the context of PBN operations, the capability of the total system, comprising all
elements necessary to maintain aircraft position within the defined airspace, to perform its function without non-
scheduled interruptions during the intended operation.
(fa) ‘Controlled portable electronic device (C-PED)’ means a PED subject to administrative control by the operator that
uses it. This includes, inter alia, tracking the allocation of the devices to specific aircraft or persons and ensuring that
no unauthorised changes are made to the hardware, software, or databases. C-PEDs can be assigned to the category
of non-intentional transmitters or T-PEDs.
(fb) ‘EFB installed resources’ means certified EFB hardware components external to the EFB host platform itself, such
as input/output components (installed remote displays, keyboards, pointing devices, switches, etc.) or a docking
station.
(fc) ‘EFB mounting device’ means an aircraft certified part that secures a portable or installed EFB, or EFB system
components.
(fd) ‘EFB system supplier’ means the company responsible for developing, or for having developed, the EFB system or
part of it.
(g) ‘Emergency locator transmitter’ is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on
designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually activated.
(h) ‘Exposure time’ means the actual period during which the performance of the helicopter with the critical engine
inoperative in still air does not guarantee a safe forced landing or the safe continuation of the flight.
(i) ‘Fail-operational flight control system’ means a flight control system with which, in the event of a failure below alert
height, the approach, flare and landing can be completed automatically. In the event of a failure, the automatic landing
system will operate as a fail-passive system.
(j) ‘Fail-operational hybrid landing system’ means a system that consists of a primary fail-passive automatic landing
system and a secondary independent guidance system enabling the pilot to complete a landing manually after failure
of the primary system.
(k) ‘Fail-passive flight control system’: a flight control system is fail-passive if, in the event of a failure, there is no
significant out-of-trim condition or deviation of flight path or attitude but the landing is not completed automatically.
For a fail-passive automatic flight control system the pilot assumes control of the aeroplane after a failure.
(l) ‘Flight control system’ in the context of low visibility operations means a system that includes an automatic landing
system and/or a hybrid landing system.
(m) reserved
(n) ‘Hybrid head-up display landing system (hybrid HUDLS)’ means a system that consists of a primary fail-passive
automatic landing system and a secondary independent HUD/HUDLS enabling the pilot to complete a landing manually
after failure of the primary system.
(na) ‘Installed EFB’ means an EFB host platform installed in an aircraft, capable of hosting type A and/or type B EFB
applications. It may also host certified applications. It is an aircraft part, and, is therefore, covered by the aircraft
airworthiness approval.
(o) ‘Integrity’ means, in the context of PBN operations, the ability of a system to provide timely warnings to users when
the system shall not be used for navigation.
(p) reserved
(q) reserved
(r) ‘Lateral navigation’ means a method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on a horizontal plane using
radio navigation signals, other positioning sources, external flight path references, or a combination of these.
(ra) ‘mass’ and ‘weight’: In accordance with ICAO Annex 5 and the International System of Units (SI), both terms are
used to indicate the actual and limiting masses of aircraft, the payload and its constituent elements, the fuel load, etc.
These are expressed in units of mass (kg), but in most approved flight manuals and other operational documentation,
these quantities are published as weights in accordance with the common language. In the ICAO standardised system
of units of measurement, a weight is a force rather than a mass. Since the use of the term ‘weight’ does not cause any
problem in the day-to-day handling of aircraft, its continued use in operational applications and publications is
acceptable.
(s) ‘Maximum structural landing mass’ means the maximum permissible total aeroplane mass upon landing under
normal circumstances.
(t) ‘Maximum zero fuel mass’ means the maximum permissible mass of an aeroplane with no usable fuel. The mass of
the fuel contained in particular tanks shall be included in the zero fuel mass when it is explicitly mentioned in the
aircraft flight manual.
(ta) ‘Miscellaneous (non-EFB) software applications’ means non-EFB applications that support function(s) not directly
related to the tasks performed by the flight crew in the aircraft.
(x) ‘Personal locator beacon (PLB)’ is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive signals on
designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.
(xa) ‘Ramp inspection tool’ means the IT application including a centralised database used by all stakeholders to store
and exchange data related to ramp inspections.
(y) ‘Receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM)’ means a technique whereby a GNSS receiver/processor
determines the integrity of the GNSS navigation signals using only GNSS signals or GNSS signals augmented with
altitude. This determination is achieved by a consistency check among redundant pseudo-range measurements. At
least one satellite in addition to those required for navigation has to be in view for the receiver to perform the RAIM
function.
(z) reserved
(aa) ‘Space-based augmentation system (SBAS)’ means a wide coverage augmentation system that augments and/or
integrates the information obtained from the other GNSS elements with information from a satellite-based
transmitter. The most common form of SBAS in Europe is the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
(EGNOS).
(ab) reserved
(ac) ‘Transmitting PED (T-PED)’ means a portable electronic device (PED) that has intentional radio frequency (RF)
transmission capabilities.
(ad) ‘Vertical navigation’ means a method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on a vertical flight profile
using altimetry sources, external flight path references, or a combination of these.
(ae) ‘Viewable stowage’ means a non-certified device that is attached to the flight crew member (e.g. with a
kneeboard) or to an existing aircraft part (e.g. using suction cups), and is intended to hold charts or to hold low-mass
portable electronic devices that are viewable by the flight crew members at their assigned duty stations.
‘Aeroplane upset’ refers to an undesired aircraft state characterised by unintentional divergences from parameters
normally experienced during operations. An aeroplane upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well
as inappropriate airspeeds for the conditions.
‘Angle of attack (AOA)’ means the angle between the oncoming air, or relative wind, and a defined reference line on
the aeroplane or wing.
‘Approach-to-stall’ means flight conditions bordered by the stall warning and stall.
‘Competency’ means a combination of skills, knowledge, and attitudes required to perform a task to the prescribed
standard.
‘Developing upset’ means any time the aeroplane begins to unintentionally diverge from the intended flight path or
airspeed.
‘Energy state’ means how much of each kind of energy (kinetic, potential or chemical) the aeroplane has available at
any given time.
‘Error’ means an action or inaction by the flight crew that leads to deviations from organisational or flight crew
intentions or expectations.
‘Error management’ means the process of detecting and responding to errors with countermeasures that reduce or
eliminate the consequences of errors, and mitigate the probability of further errors or undesired aircraft states.
‘First indication of a stall’ means the initial aural, tactile or visual sign of an impending stall, which can be either
naturally or synthetically induced.
‘Flight crew resilience’ means the ability of a flight crew member to recognise, absorb and adapt to disruptions.
‘Fidelity level’ means the level of realism assigned to each of the defined FSTD features.
‘Flight path’ means the trajectory or path of the aeroplane travelling through the air over a given space of time.
‘Flight path management’ means active manipulation, using either the aeroplanes automation or manual handling, to
command the aeroplane flight controls to direct the aeroplane along a desired trajectory.
‘FSTD Training Envelope’ refers to the high and moderate confidence regions of the FSTD validation envelope.
‘Load factor’ factor means the ratio of a specified load to the weight of the aeroplane, the former being expressed in
terms of aerodynamic forces, propulsive forces, or ground reactions.
‘Loss of control in flight (LOCI)’ means a categorisation of an accident or incident resulting from a deviation from the
intended flight path.
‘Manoeuvre-based training’ means training that focuses on a single event or manoeuvre in isolation.
‘Negative training’ means training which unintentionally introduces incorrect information or invalid concepts, which
could actually decrease rather than increase safety.
‘Negative transfer of training’ means the application (and ‘transfer’) of what was learned in a training environment
(i.e., a classroom, an FSTD) to normal practice, i.e. it describes the degree to which what was learned in training is
applied to actual normal practices. In this context, negative transfer of training refers to the inappropriate
generalisation of knowledge and skill to a situation or setting in normal practice that does not equal the training
situation or setting.
‘Post-stall regime’ means flight conditions at an angle of attack greater than the critical angle of attack.
‘Scenario-based training’ means training that incorporates manoeuvres into real-world experiences to cultivate
practical flying skills in an operational environment.
‘Stall’ means a loss of lift caused by exceeding the aeroplane’s critical angle of attack.
Note: A stalled condition can exist at any attitude and airspeed, and may be recognised by continuous stall warning
activation accompanied by at least one of the following:
(a) buffeting, which could be heavy at times;
(b) lack of pitch authority and/or roll control; and
(c) inability to arrest the descent rate.
‘Stall Event’ means an occurrence whereby the aeroplane experiences conditions associated with an approach-to-stall
or a stall.
‘Stall (event) recovery procedure’ means the manufacturer-approved aeroplane-specific stall recovery procedure. If
an OEM-approved recovery procedure does not exist, the aeroplane-specific stall recovery procedure developed by
the operator, based on the stall recovery template contained in GM5 ORO.FC.220&230, may be used.
‘Stall warning’ means a natural or synthetic indication provided when approaching a stall that may include one or more
of the following indications:
(a) aerodynamic buffeting (some aeroplanes will buffet more than others);
(b) reduced roll stability and aileron effectiveness;
(c) visual or aural cues and warnings;
(d) reduced elevator (pitch) authority;
(e) inability to maintain altitude or arrest rate of descent; and
(f) stick shaker activation (if installed).
Note: A stall warning indicates an immediate need to reduce the angle of attack.
‘Startle’ means the initial short-term, involuntary physiological and cognitive reactions to an unexpected event that
commence the normal human stress response.
‘Stick pusher’ means a device that, automatically applies a nose down movement and pitch force to an aeroplane’s
control columns, to attempt to decrease the aeroplane’s angle of attack. Device activation may occur before or after
aerodynamic stall, depending on the aeroplane type.
Note: A stick pusher is not installed on all aeroplane types.
‘Stick shaker’ means a device that automatically vibrates the control column to warn the pilot of an approaching stall.
Note: A stick shaker is not installed on all aeroplane types.
‘Stress (response)’ means the response to a threatening event that includes physiological, psychological and cognitive
effects. These effects may range from positive to negative and can either enhance or degrade performance.
‘Surprise’ means the emotionally-based recognition of a difference in what was expected and what is actual.
‘Threat’ means events or errors that occur beyond the influence of the flight crew, increase operational complexity
and must be managed to maintain the margin of safety.
‘Threat management’ means the process of detecting and responding to threats with countermeasures that reduce or
eliminate the consequences of threats and mitigate the probability of errors or undesired aircraft states.
‘Train-to-proficiency’ means approved training designed to achieve end-state performance objectives, providing
sufficient assurances that the trained individual is capable to consistently carry out specific tasks safely and effectively.
Note: In the context of this definition, ‘train-to-proficiency’ can be replaced by ‘training-to-proficiency’.
‘Undesired aircraft state’ means flight crew-induced aircraft position or speed deviation, misapplication of controls, or
incorrect systems configuration, associated with a reduction in margins of safety.
Note: Undesired states can be managed effectively, restoring margins of safety, or flight crew response(s) can induce
an additional error, incident, or accident.
Note: All countermeasures are necessary flight crew actions. However, some countermeasures to threats, errors and
undesired aircraft states that flight crew employ, build upon ‘hard’/systemic-based resources provided by the aviation
system.
‘Unsafe situation’ means a situation, which has led to an unacceptable reduction in safety margin.
A aeroplane
a/c aircraft
AAC aeronautical administrative communications
AAIM aircraft autonomous integrity monitoring
AAL above aerodrome level
ABAS aircraft-based augmentation system
AC advisory circular
AC alternating current
ACAS airborne collision avoidance system
ADF automatic direction finder
ADG air driven generator
ADS automatic dependent surveillance
ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast
ADS-C automatic dependent surveillance - contract
AEA Association of European Airlines
AEO all-engines-operative
AFFF aqueous film forming foams
AFM aircraft flight manual
AFN aircraft flight notification
AFN ATS facilities notification
AGL above ground level
AHRS attitude heading reference system
AIS aeronautical information service
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
ALSF approach lighting system with sequenced flashing lights
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance
AML aircraft maintenance licence
AMSL above mean sea level
ANP actual navigation performance
AOC aeronautical operational control
AOC air operator certificate
APCH approach
APU auxiliary power unit
APV approach procedure with vertical guidance
AR authorisation required
ARA airborne radar approach
ARA Authority Requirements for Aircrew
A-RNP advanced required navigation performance
ARO Authority Requirements for Air Operations
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practices
ASC Air Safety Committee
ASDA accelerate-stop distance available
ASE altimeter system error
ATA Air Transport Association
ATC air traffic control
ATIS automatic terminal information service
ATN air traffic navigation
ATPL airline transport pilot licence
23.06.2022. Rev. 05 Page 26 of 34
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
0 – ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS MANUAL
DR decision range
DSTRK desired track
EC European Community
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
EFB electronic flight bag
EFIS electronic flight instrument system
EGNOS European geostationary navigation overlay service
EGT exhaust gas temperature
ELT emergency locator transmitter
ELT(AD) emergency locator transmitter (automatically deployable)
ELT(AF) emergency locator transmitter (automatic fixed)
ELT(AP) emergency locator transmitter (automatic portable)
ELT(S) survival emergency locator transmitter
EPE estimated position of error
EPR engine pressure ratio
EPU estimated position of uncertainty
ERA en-route alternate (aerodrome)
ERP emergency response plan
ETOPS extended range operations with two-engined aeroplanes
EU European Union
EUROCA European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
EVS enhanced vision system
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAF final approach fix
FALS full approach lighting system
FANS future air navigation systems
FAP final approach point
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
FC flight crew
FCL flight crew licensing
FCOM flight crew operating manual
FDM flight data monitoring
FDO flying display operation
FDR flight data recorder
FFS full flight simulator
FGS flight control/guidance system
FI flight instructor
FLIPCY flight plan consistency
FLTA forward-looking terrain avoidance
FMECA failure mode, effects and criticality analysis
FMS flight management system
FNPT flight and navigation procedures trainer
FOD foreign object damage
FOSA flight operational safety assessment
fpm feet per minute
FRT fixed radius transition
FSTD flight simulation training device
ft feet
FTD flight training device
FTE full time equivalent
23.06.2022. Rev. 05 Page 28 of 34
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
0 – ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS MANUAL
(a) The Operations Manual is issued on the authority of ETF Airways. Manuals are issued only in electronic
form and entire manual is reissued after each revision. Online system is used for document distribution as
described in the management manual.
(b) As the entire manual is issued only in electronic copy and is published as a whole each time a revision is
made, there is no need for record of amendments and revisions.
(c) During EFB evaluation period, printed version of Operations Manual will be on board. With each revision,
new copy of OM will be printed.
(d) Handwritten amendments are not permitted or possible due to the nature of electronic medium.
(e) Each page of the manual shall have a revision number and an effective date on the bottom of the page
(f) List of effective pages shall be used in form of list of effective chapter.
(g) Changes are marked with a vertical line on each page. Editorial changes are not marked.
(h) ETF Airways shall not use temporary revisions, apart the case specified in point (i)
(i) Amendments or revisions of Operations Manual Parts A, B and C must be approved by Flight Operations
Manager and amendments or revisions of Operations Manual Part D must be approved by Training
Manager.
(j) Manuals shall be distributed via online system as described in the Safety Management Manual Ch 1.
(k) Revision that require approval shall be designated as whole numbers, such as: 1, 2, 3, 4 etc.
Revision that does not require an approval shall be designated as decimal numbers.
For example, if we have a revision that requires an approval, it will be called revision 1.
After that, revisions which do not require approval shall be designated as 1.1, 1.2, ... 1.15 etc.
When the next revision requiring approval comes, it will be designated as revision 2.
Subsequent revisions not requiring approval shall be designated 2.1, 2.2 etc.
(i) Immediate changes required in the interest of safety may exceptionally be published and applied
immediately by the operator, irrespective of the requirement to have the change approved (Eg. AFM,
QRH, MEL changes directed by AD or ASO). However for prior approval item, such approval shall have
been applied for.
Refer to OM-A-3.5.2 for information about changes requiring and changes not requiring prior approval from CCAA.
Contents
1. ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................................................. 2
1.1. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................................................................. 2
1.1.1 ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER ....................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. NOMINATED PERSONS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.1 SUCCESSION, DEPUTATION AND DELEGATION ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.2.2 FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANAGER .............................................................................................................................................................. 6
1.2.3 CREW TRAINING MANAGER ..................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.2.4 GROUND OPERATIONS MANAGER ........................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.5 CAMO MANAGER ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................ 8
1.3.1 SAFETY MANAGER .................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.3.2 COMPLIANCE MONITORING MANAGER ................................................................................................................................................. 10
1.3.3 SECURITY MANAGER .............................................................................................................................................................................. 10
1.3.4 HEAD OF OCC ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
1.3.5 CABIN CREW MANAGER ......................................................................................................................................................................... 10
1.3.6 CHIEF PILOT ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 10
1.4. AUTHORITY, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER..................................................................................................... 11
1.5. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CREW MEMBERS OTHER THAN THE COMMANDER ......................................................................... 13
For clarification, the above mentioned persons are sometimes called "post holders", which is an older term, not in
official use anymore. Other management personnel in the company, such as Safety Manager, Compliance
Manager, Security Manager etc. are not titled as "Nominated persons" or "Post holders."
Regular absence includes vacations, training and travel not longer than one month.
Irregular absence is prolonged sickness, leave, etc. longer than one month.
Emergency absence is any situation where person is missing, impaired or death suspected.
For regular absence routine daily tasks are delegated to the most senior person in the office. This is communicated
by company memo to the management. Absence dates and delegated persons are clearly identified. Next higher
senior person by authority and accountability will supervise decision making, enabling direct access for delegated
persons.
Where practicable, principal position holder will supervise decision making through regular communication with
the office (e-mails, mobile communication, etc.).
For irregular absence, duties and responsibilities are transfered to suitable persons. This is announced and approved
by Accountable Manager. He/She will make sure that change is communicated to the Authority and other external
parties if liaison is regulated. Decision is communicated to all personnel by company memo.
For emergency absence successsion shall be part of contingency plan and this must be communicated to all
stakeholders, including Authority, if nomination acceptance is regulated.
Deployment chart
The Flight Operations Manager is responsible to ensure effectiveness of the management system, by taking
appropriate and timely analysis, proposing adequate plan and by taking planned action in his/her area of
responsibility in coordination with other areas, in order to address negative trends in safety performance, mitigate
identified risks and to close findings of non-compliance or safety investigation findings within required time
limitations. In doing so, applying policies and procedures stipulated in the Safety Management Manual and
Compliance Monitoring Manual, and by using proactively IQSMS platform.
The Crew Training Manager is responsible to ensure effectiveness of the management system, by taking appropriate
and timely analysis, proposing adequate plan and by taking planned action in his/her area of responsibility in
coordination with other areas, in order to address negative trends in safety performance, mitigate identified risks
and to close findings of non-compliance or safety investigation findings within required time limitations. In doing so,
applying policies and procedures stipulated in the Safety Management Manual and Compliance Monitoring Manual,
and by using proactively IQSMS platform.
She is responsible for the safe, secure and economical conduct of all activities regarding the organization of ground
handling activities for the airline. In particular, she ensures in co-operation with other company divisions and
external enterprises, passengers, cargo and aircraft handling and dispatch. She makes sure that all the Stations
Managers and subcontracted services, especially de/anti-icing services, undertake all required measures for the
safety of the passengers and the aircraft. She is also responsible for emissions trading scheme and dangerous goods
and weapons policies.
She is responsible to ensure that all ground handling subcontractors are aware of ETF Airways updated procedures
and standards and that they have contractual obligation to perform according these standards.
The Ground Operations Manager is responsible to ensure effectiveness of the management system, by taking
appropriate and timely analysis, proposing adequate plan and by taking planned action in his/her area of
responsibility in coordination with other areas, in order to address negative trends in safety performance, mitigate
identified risks and to close findings of non-compliance or safety investigation findings within required time
limitations. In doing so, applying policies and procedures stipulated in the Safety Management Manual and
Compliance Monitoring Manual, and by using proactively IQSMS platform.
The CAMO Manager is responsible to ensure effectiveness of the management system, by taking appropriate and
timely analysis, proposing adequate plan and by taking planned action in his/her area of responsibility in
coordination with other areas, in order to address negative trends in safety performance, mitigate identified risks
and to close findings of non-compliance or safety investigation findings within required time limitations. In doing so,
applying policies and procedures stipulated in the Safety Management Manual and Compliance Monitoring Manual,
and by using proactively IQSMS platform.
The safety manager as defined under AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(1) is expected to support, facilitate and lead the
implementation and maintenance of the safety management system, fostering an organisational culture for an
effective safety management, risk management and occurrence reporting. The competencies for a safety manager
shall thus include, but not be limited to, the following:
(2) Relevant and documented work experience, preferably in a comparable position, in:
(i) management systems including compliance monitoring systems and safety management;
(ii) risk management; and
(iii) the operations of the organisation.
The compliance monitoring manager shall be responsible for ensuring that the compliance monitoring programme
is properly implemented, maintained and continually reviewed and improved.
(b) The commander, or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated, shall, in an emergency situation
that requires immediate decision and action, take any action he/she considers necessary under the circumstances
in accordance with 7.d of Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008: "In an emergency situation, which endangers
the operation or the safety of the aircraft and/or persons on board, the pilot in command must take any action he/she
considers necessary in the interest of safety. When such action involves a violation of local regulations or procedures,
the pilot in command must be responsible for notifying the appropriate local authority without delay."
In such cases he/she may deviate from rules, operational procedures and methods in the interest of safety.
(c) Whenever an aircraft in flight has maneuvered in response to an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)
resolution advisory (RA), the commander shall submit an ACAS report to the competent authority.
(e) The commander shall, as soon as possible, report to the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit any hazardous
weather or flight conditions encountered that are likely to affect the safety of other aircraft.
All persons carried in the aircraft must obey all lawful commands given by the commander for the purpose of
securing the safety of the aircraft and of persons or property carried therein.
Taking into consideration Tokyo convention, the Commander has full authority over the passengers once the doors
of the aircraft have been closed, however he shall coordinate with the local airport staff in case a problem with
unruly passenger emerges before that time.
The Commander shall perform briefing and de-brifing of the crew before / after each duty day.
It is not allowed to release the crew from duty without a de-briefing except for special circumstances, as determined
by the Commander. The de-briefing shall include at least the following mandatory items:
1. Good events or aspects of the duty day, either as a whole crew or as individual crew members.
2. Feedback for possible improvement, either as a whole crew or as individual crew members, in which
case, it is recommended to perform this part of the de-briefing person to person, and not in group.
3. Quick review of any incident, accident or reportable event that might have happened.
4. Ask for feedback from the crew.
5. MANDATORY thank you to all crew members.
1.5. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CREW MEMBERS OTHER THAN THE COMMANDER
All crew members shall obey lawful commands of the Commander.
In the absence of the Commander, the First Officer (Copilot) has full authority of the Commander for immediate
needs.
Only qualified ETF Airways crew members shall wear uniforms on the airplane.
(a) The crew member shall be responsible for the proper execution of his/her duties that are:
(1) related to the safety of the aircraft and its occupants; and
(2) specified in the instructions and procedures in the operations manual.
(b) The crew member shall:
(1) report to the commander any fault, failure, malfunction or defect which the crew member believes
may affect the airworthiness or safe operation of the aircraft including emergency systems, if not already
reported by another crew member;
(2) report to the commander any incident that endangered, or could have endangered, the safety of the
operation, if not already reported by another crew member;
(3) comply with the relevant requirements of the operator’s occurrence reporting schemes;
(4) comply with all flight and duty time limitations (FTL) and rest requirements applicable to their
activities;
(5) when undertaking duties for more than one operator:
(i) maintain his/her individual records regarding flight and duty times and rest periods as referred
to in applicable FTL requirements; and
(ii) provide each operator with the data needed to schedule activities in accordance with the
applicable FTL requirements.
(c) The crew member shall not perform duties on an aircraft:
(1) when under the influence of psychoactive substances or when unfit due to injury, fatigue, medication,
sickness or other similar causes; (no alcohol to be consumed 8 hours before reporting to duty, during duty
and/or while wearing unform; blood alcohol level below 0.2 parts per thousand)
(2) until 24 hours have elapsed after deep water diving or following blood donation;
(3) if applicable medical requirements are not fulfilled;
(4) if he/she is in any doubt of being able to accomplish his/her assigned duties; or
(5) if he/she knows or suspects that he/she is suffering from fatigue as or feels otherwise unfit, to the extent
that the flight may be endangered.
Content
2 OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION ........................................................................................................................... 2
2.1 SUPERVISION OF THE OPERATION BY THE OPERATOR .............................................................................................................................. 2
2.1.1 LICENSE AND QUALIFICATION VALIDITY .......................................................................................................................................................2
2.1.2 COMPETENCE OF OPERATIONS PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................................................2
2.1.3 CONTROL, ANALYSIS AND STORAGE OF THE REQUIRED RECORDS ...............................................................................................................2
2.1.4 IMMEDIATE REACTION TO SAFETY PROBLEM ...............................................................................................................................................3
2.1.5 MONITORING OF AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND CREW PERFORMANCE IN NAT HLA AND RVSM AIRSPACE .......................................................3
2.2 SYSTEM AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROMULGATION OF ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION ....................... 3
2.3 OPERATIONAL CONTROL .......................................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.3.1 OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER ...................................................................................................................................................................6
2.3.2 PLANNING PHASE OF FLIGHT ........................................................................................................................................................................7
2.3.3 FLIGHT PREPARATION ...................................................................................................................................................................................9
2.3.4 FLIGHT EXECUTION .......................................................................................................................................................................................9
2.3.5 DISTRIBUTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL ...................................................................................................10
2.3.6 OCC STANDARD, NON STANDARD, EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND CHECK LISTS .....................................................................................10
2.4 POWERS OF AUTHORITY ..........................................................................................................................................................................26
ETF Airways shall use Leon software to ensure that crews with expired licence and qualification cannot be scheduled
for a flight. Crew Training Manager shall feed the system with appropriate data. OM-D defines validity of each license
and qualification
Aircraft technical log shall be stored 36 months after the date of the last entry
Crew duty time and rest records shall be stored for 15 months, while records of exercise of Commander's discretionary
rights have to be stored for 6 months.
All the records are stored in computerized system. All the above mentioned data is automatically stored. In case of
contingency procedures such as EFB failure, the crew shall scan the documents, send to OCC and these scanned
documents shall be stored on the company server and cloud by OCC, while the appropriate data shall be manually
entered into the system.
Personnel records shall be stored for the periods indicated below, all in electronic copies:
Record Period
Flight crew licence and cabin crew attestation As long as the crew member is exercising the
privileges of the licence or attestation for ETF.
Crew member training, checking and qualifications 3 years
Records on crew member recent experience 15 months
Crew member route and aerodrome / task and area
3 years
competence as appropriate.
Dangerous goods training as appropriate 3 years
Training / qualification records of other personnel for
Last 2 training records
whom a training programme is required
For the period of 5 years, ETF will store management system records, including compliance audit, safety risk
management, safety action group minutes, safety council minutes and appropriate personal training records.
ETF Airways shall preserve the information used for the preparation and execution of a flight and personnel
training records, even if the operator ceases to be the operator of that aircraft or the employer of that crew
member, provided this is within the timescales prescribed in this chapter.
If a crew member becomes a crew member for another operator, ETF Airways shall make the crew member’s
records available to the new operator, provided this is within the timescales prescribed in this chapter.
Training records for operational control personnel shall be stored for 3 years for initial and recurrent training.
2.1.5 MONITORING OF AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND CREW PERFORMANCE IN NAT HLA AND RVSM AIRSPACE
Operators are required to investigate all lateral deviations of 10 NM or greater, and it is imperative,
whether these are observed on ground radar, via ADS reports or by the flight crew, that the cause(s) of
track deviations be established and eliminated. Therefore, it will be necessary to keep complete in-flight
records so that an analysis can be carried-out.
When a navigation error is identified, follow-up action after flight is taken, both with the operator and,
where the deviation is 25 NM or more, the State of operator of the aircraft involved, to establish the
circumstances and contributory factors.
For procedures of reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurences in NAT HLA and RVSM airspace refer to
OM-A-11.2.
Operations bulletins can be issued by Flight Operations Manager, Ground Operations Manager, Training
Manager, Head of OCC, EFB Administrator and Security Manager.
Flight crews will receive Operation Bulletins through EFB Aviator application and other operational personnel
will have acess to bulletins through OMS system.
Operations Control Center (OCC) has a system that ensures operational control personnel have access to
information relevant to the safe conduct of each flight, to include information associated with:
List containing information on the emergency and survival equipment carried on board all of his airplanes
is available in OCC for immediate communication to rescue coordination centers. The list includes the
following information, as applicable, the number, color and type of life-rafts and pyrotechnics, details of
emergency medical supplies, water supplies and the type and frequencies of emergency portable radio
equipment. On request, OCC duty officer will send list to rescue coordination center.
OCC shall be organized in such a way that there is an available OCC officer during usual office hours (08:00-
16:00) and 1:30 before and 30 minutes after an active flight.
OCC library
OCC shall have access to ETF Airways OM and all manuals which are considered to be part of OM.
OCC shall have access to Ground Operations department database (fuel, handling, hotels etc.)
OCC shall have an ipad with same applications as flight crew.
Minimum one laptop or computer, Internet access via either wifi, or telephone hot spots, at least
one mobile phone.
In addition to data provided by Air Support, Jeppesen or airport AIS/Meteo Office, WX and NOTAM
information can be obtained in electronic form by using internet services or mobile applications. List of
approved sources is available in OCC.
Flight File
The forms used to analyze operation to a new airport are filed in the Flight File, which is stored on the
Flight Operations Share Point directory and uploaded to the EFBs:
The Flight File serves three purposes:
a. Initial Assessment of the operation;
b. Submission for operational approval;
c. Briefing for flight crew inaugurating the route.
The OCC coordinates with crew and the maintenance dept. the tasks relevant to operational control.
The OCC acquires the time of departure by receiving the MVT message from handler.
The OCC monitor flight progress and estimates the arrival time.
Whenever possible, on ground, the Commander shall have the company mobile phone turned on.
2.3.6 OCC STANDARD, NON STANDARD, EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND CHECK LISTS
ETF Airways OCC have established procedures and check lists for all operational tasks and conditions in order
to standardize and optimize normal, abnormal and emergency functioning of OCC and successful functioning
of operational control and supervising.
1. Following feasibility assessment for a new flight or series of flights proposed by Sales and a complete
assessment by MoC project leaders assigned, as required for the area of operation, the flight or series of
flights are announced by the commercial department and entered in Leon software based on the confirmed
timetable. This presumes all commercial conditions have been met too.
Following additional steps need to be taken when a flight or series of flights is entered in Leon software:
2. Ground Operations department prepares information related to ground handling, fuel and noise
restrictions. Passenger lists are forwarded from the commercial department to ground handling agents.
3. OCC verifies if the airport is in OM-C. If not, FOM shall issue a one time approval and categorization.
5. If the flight plan is acceptable to the ATC and fuel is sufficient, a check is made if the flight is carried over
critical areas. A critical area is the area outside of EUR area, which can present a problem for single engine
operations and oxygen considerations. FOM shall thereafter analyse the route, either approve it and prepare
the briefing, or reject it.
NOTE 1: The route is flown over critical areas if at least one of the conditions below is fulfilled:
1. The route, or a part of the route is located outside of the usual area of ETF Airways
operations which is Europe, Middle East and North Africa.
2. There are certain areas within the usual area of ETF Airways Operations which are also
considered to be critical, Alps, mountainous parts of Turkey, Atlas mountains.
3. The area has special requirements such as MNPS, polar navigation, metric altimetry, ETOPS,
P-RNAV, VFR only, non controlled airspace, problems with coverage of emergency services,
problems with navigation, weather or volcanic activity.
NOTE 2: When performing the analysis, the FOM shall consider the following issues:
Items a) b) c) d) e) for aerodromes are usually covered during OCC flight preparation and selecting
aerodromes from PART C.
Depending on the complexity of the routes, the FOM shall decide about the appropriate training.
6. Crew is schedule to the flight as soon as possible to allow for timely crew roster.
Crew planner is notified by FOM or CTM in case there is some special crew composition requirement other
than usual. Such cases usually occur during training and checking, or special operations.
Crew planner checks who is available. The following items are checked:
The planned duty period shall not be greater than allowed by OM-A-07.
Crew planner assigns flight and cabin crew members by using Leon system. Flight crew members shall be
assigned in accordance with seniority list and pairing restriction table as described in OM-A-4.1.6.
Crew planner publishes the roster once it is authorized by FOM or persons delegated by FOM.
The usual way is via Leon software.
In case of changes which occur more than 2 days before the flight, crew is notified via Leon. If the change is
done less that two days before the flight, the crew must be notified via telephone.
Every crew member is responsible to report if he/she feels unfit for duty. In such cases, a standby crew
member shall be called.
This section covers some non-standard situations which may be met during flight operations. Although effort
has been made to give instructions about such cases, it is the responsibility of the Commander and the OCC
to react adequately in any situation. Therefore, nothing shall have higher priority than common sense in
solving such situations.
In case of operational irregularities, all action, either operational or precautionary shall be taken by the OCC
after effecting the necessary coordination with other departments and offices concerned.
Instructions for deviation from the published schedule may be given by the Operation control centre for
special reasons.
Decisions required in case of operational irregularities shall be governed by the following principles:
All planned flights shall be operated in accordance with planned schedule. Up to 15 minutes earlier departure
is allowed provided:
- no passengers and no cargo/mail are to be expected any more
- airport lost tolerance is respected at departure / destination airport
In order to avoid certain meteorological or other conditions which might adversely affect the further
operation of the flight. Due consideration, however, shall be given to commercial aspects, i.e. loss of revenue
shall be kept to a minimum.
Non-scheduled flights (charter flights, additional flights, ferry flights, etc.) are permitted to depart up to 30
minutes ahead of the scheduled departure time.
Departures ahead of scheduled exceeding 15 minutes are permitted after coordination with Operations
control centre. Night flying restrictions, runway closures and other relevant limitations shall duly be taken
into account when considering an early departure.
Delay of a flight
All flights shall be operated in accordance with the published schedule. In case of unforeseen delays it is the
responsibility of departments, stations and/or flight crew concerned to reduce delays as much as possible.
Flights may, however, be delayed for the following reasons:
- To avoid adverse meteorological conditions at the departure airport, en route or at the airport of
destination
- To ensure connection for passengers load from other flights operating behind schedule
- To take “AOG” (aircraft on ground) spare parts on board for an airplane grounded en route due to technical
reasons.
The Operations control centre shall have the authority to delay a flight. In case of adverse meteorological
conditions the Commander decides about a delayed departure. Shall the expected delay exceed 10 minutes,
the Operation control centre shall be notified immediately.
The Commander shall immediately be informed as soon as a delay is expected to occur. In case of late arrival
or late positioning of an airplane all efforts shall be taken to reduce the ground time to an absolute minimum.
In case of delay of more than 10 minutes, report with delay reason shall be received from crew, departure
station and OCC.
An overflight of a scheduled stop is defined as the omission of a scheduled intermediate stop on a multi-
sector flight.
All flights shall be operated in accordance with the published schedule. Overflights of scheduled stops may,
however, become possible for operational and/or commercial reasons either prior to departure or during
flight as outlined below:
- Operational and or other conditions at next station are prohibitive or render a landing highly improbable
(i.e. meteorological conditions, runway closure, disaster, strike, etc.)
- No revenue load to or from next station is expected
- Existing delays have to be reduced.
- Commercial logic shall be checked (do we save money with overflight or it results in reduced revenue)
Generally the authority to arrange an overflight rests with the Operations control centre. The final authority
in respect or an overflight whilst in flight rests with the Commander. He shall, however, act, whenever
possible, according to recommendations forwarded to him by the Operations control centre. Arrangements
for an overflight of a scheduled stop prior to departure shall be made by the Operations control centre in
coordination with other company departments, and in close coordination with the Commander.
Rerouting of flight
Flights may be rerouted for commercial and/or operational reasons, e.g. in order to accommodate additional
revenue load.
The authority for rerouting of flights rests with the Operations control centre.
Requests for rerouting of flights for commercial reasons shall be forwarded to the Flight Operation Control
Centre.
Requests for rerouting of flights for operational reasons shall be forwarded to the Flight Operation Control
Centre. Dissemination of rerouting of flights shall be made by means of a flight disposition message or an
operational circular as appropriate.
In case of a flight operating behind schedule the Operations control centre shall review the traffic and
operational situation for the possibility of omitting one or more intermediate scheduled stops in order to
advance the flight towards its ultimate destination and, where appropriate, to enable a return flight to depart
on time. Considerations shall be given to providing best service to revenue load on board of the flight
concerned and to meet crew time limitations and maintenance requirements. Dissemination of a rerouting
of flight shall be made in the form of a flight disposition message.
Crew shall be notified via telephone and entire briefing shall be updated via ipad.
Meaning of the term: a published scheduled or non-scheduled flight proceeding to another airport than its
next planned destination.
All flights shall be operated in accordance with the published schedule. However, flights may divert en route
for the following reasons:
Responsibility to divert while en route rests entirely with the Commander. However, OCC shall forward
recommendations for alteration of route and/or destination or alternate to the Commander of the flight
concerned. In case of a flight diverting while en route, notification shall be passed to the Operations control
centre and to the station of originally planned destination and point of departure. Notification shall contain
data about reason for diversion of flight, new planned destination and/or alternate and estimated time of
arrival of the flight. Offices receiving any such massage shall immediately inform the Operations control
center. In case information is received by the Operations control centre, that operational conditions have
changed to a degree necessitating alteration of planned routing and/or destination, recommendations for
alternative plans shall be forwarded to the Commander. Alternative plans recommended by Operations
centre involving a change to actual ATS flight plan while aircraft is inflight must be coordinated with the
appropriate ATS unit whenever is practicable. While aircraft is in flight, it is the responsibility of the
Commander to request to ATC for the relevant clearance before making a change in flight plan.The alternate
airport(s) to be selected for a diversion shall be coordinated as far as possible between offices concerned,
taking into consideration operational and commercial aspects.
Cancellation of flight
Although it is the policy to operate in accordance with the published schedule, certain circumstances may require the
cancellation of a flight or segment thereof such as:
- if by operating a flight with considerable delay, serious difficulties in performing subsequent operations would
be created.
- if from a traffic point of view, the conditions are such that a termination of the contract of carriage is feasible
or necessary.
- if additional expenses in operation (i.e. ferry flight or utilization of reserve airplane etc.) would be far in excess
of a possible loss of revenue.
- if weather conditions at airport of departure and/or destination would cause serious delay on both present
and/or subsequent flights.
- lack of airplane.
Before cancelling a flight due to technical defects, the Operations control centre shall review all possibilities or an
alternative solution in close cooperation with Maintenance Division. The line stations of the respective flight shall,
whenever practicable, be informed in advance of the possibility of a cancellation and be consulted about chances of
alternative load protection.
When the cancellation of a flight becomes advisable form the local point of view, the flight operations officer, station
manager and/or the Commander shall communicate their recommendations together with suggestions concerning
load protection to the Operations control centre. The Operations control centre shall, after coordination with the
appropriate offices, issue the final decision.
When the cancellation of a flight or segment thereof becomes advisable from the operational point of view (extended
delay etc.) the Operations control centre generally shall communicate such intention to the station(s) concerned.
Offices and station(s) concerned shall forward respective information to the Operations control centre. Information
of a cancellation of flight or segment thereof shall be issued in the form of a flight disposition message containing
relevant information on the cancellation and other data in connection therewith (routings, delay, etc.). Upon receipt
of a flight disposition message, station managers concerned shall take the necessary action with respect to load
protection.
Completion of flight
After successful completion of flight, ETF OCC will normally receive standard movement messages from departure and
destination airport.
OCC shall verify that the crew has updated EFL on ipad and that Leon system is updated with actual flight data.
o Lateral & Vertical separation. See: State AIPs, ICAO Doc 7030;
o Datalink Requirements (ADS-C, CPDLC). Restricted. See State AIPs, ICAO DOC 7030;
o State Approvals (NAT HLA /RVSM). See: State AIPs, ICAO Doc 7030;
o Approval for flight in NAT ADS-B airspace. See: State AIPs, ICAO Doc 7030;
2.Minimum Equipage (Navigation/Altimetry/Communications)
o NAT HLA/MNPS. See: State AIPs, ICAO Doc 7030. Restricted (Refer to OM-B-1.1.3 and MEL Annex Ia, MEL Annex Ib
and MEL Annex Ic under RNP 10/RNAV 10 when allocating aircraft);
o RVSM. See: State AIPs, ICAO Doc 7030;
o HF Communications. See: State AIPs, ICAO Doc 7030. Restricted (Refer to OM-B-1.1.3 and MEL Annex Ia, MEL
Annex Ib and MEL Annex Ic under RNP 10/RNAV 10 when allocating aircraft);
o MEL provisions. (Refer to HIL and MEL, check OPERATIONS NOTES under applicable MEL item provisions).
3.Special non-compliance routings
o Long Range Navigation Systems. See: State AIPs for routes in case of LRNS failure
o Not approved for NAT HLA /RVSM . See: State AIPs for special routes.
o Routings without functioning HF Communications. See: State AIPs for non-DLM routes with VHF coverage.
o Maintenance Flights, temporarily non-RVSM. See: State AIPs.
o Delivery and Humanitarian Flights. See: State AIPs.
4. Flight planning
o Eastbound or westbound flights should be flight planned by significant points at whole degrees of latitude at each
crossed ten degrees of longitude (10°W, 20°W, 30°W, 40°W etc.);
o Northbound or southbound flights should be flight planned by parallels of latitude spaced at five degree intervals
(65°N, 60°N, 55°N etc.). See Chapter 4 and Chapter 16 of ICAO Doc 007.
o Separate Organised Track System (OTS) structures. See: Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of iCAO Doc 007.
o North American Region., transitional airspaces and linking route structures in and through NAM Region. See:
Chapter 3 of ICAO Doc 007 and AIS of the relevant State authorities and/or via their websites.
o Flight Levels on OTS Track may plan at any of the levels as published for that track. Aircraft on a random route may
plan any flight level(s) irrespective of direction. See: North Atlantic Flight Level Allocation Scheme (NAT FLAS
Attachment 5 to ICAO Doc 007), States AIPs and NOTAMs.
o Mach Number See: Chapter 7 of ICAO Doc 007.
o FPL completion. A free text editor is available on the EUROCONTROL website.
o Approvals:
- NAT HLA, the letter ‘X’, in addition to the letter ‘S’, within Item 10.
- RVSM operations, the letter ‘W’ must also be included in Item 10.
- RNP approval; in Item 10 (Equipment) with the letter “R” and annotate Item 18, PBN/A1(RNAV 10 (RNP 10)
Approval) or PBN/L1 (RNP 4 Approval). See: Chapter 4 of ICAO Doc 007.
- ADS-B, B1 or B2 in Item 10b.
5. Flight Monitoring
o Oceanic clearances. See: Chapter 5 of ICAO Doc 007.
o Transponder Use. See: Chapter 16 of ICAO Doc 007.
o Re-Routes. See: Chapter 16 of ICAO Doc 007.
(a) For the purpose of determining compliance with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and its
delegated and implementing acts, ETF Airways shall grant access at any time to any facility, aircraft, document, records,
data, procedures or any other material relevant to its activity subject to certification whether it is contracted or not,
to any person authorised by one of the following authorities:
(1) CCAA
(2) the authority acting under the provisions of points ARO.GEN.300(d), ARO.GEN.300(e) or Subpart
ARO.RAMP of Annex II to this Regulation, meaning ramp inspection of the country where the aircraft is located
at that moment.
(b) Access to the aircraft mentioned under (a) shall, include the possibility to enter and remain in the aircraft during
flight operations unless otherwise decided by the commander for the flight crew compartment in the interest of safety.
The commander shall ensure that:
(1) admission to the flight crew compartment does not cause distraction or interference with the
operation of the flight; and
(2) all persons carried in the flight crew compartment are made familiar with the relevant safety
procedures.
The commander shall make the final decision regarding the admission to the flight crew compartment.
The commander shall, within a reasonable time of being requested to do so by a person authorised by an authority,
provide to that person the documentation required to be carried on board.
Commander shall provide the documentation to the inspector only after all post flight entries were finished.
Content
3 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM .......................................................................................................................................... 2
3.1 SAFETY POLICY ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2
3.2 THE PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING SAFETY HAZARDS AND FOR EVALUATING AND MANAGING RISKS ........................................... 2
3.3 COMPLIANCE MONITORING SYSTEM ....................................................................................................................................... 2
3.4 ALLOCATION OF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ...................................................................................................................... 2
3.5 DOCUMENTATION OF ALL KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROCESSES ......................................................................................... 3
3.5.1 Making personnel aware of their responsibilities ......................................................................................................................3
3.5.2 OM revisions ..............................................................................................................................................................................3
3 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
ETF Airways management system is described in SMS manual and Compliance Monitoring Manual.
3.2 THE PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING SAFETY HAZARDS AND FOR EVALUATING AND MANAGING RISKS
All personnel shall receive access to OM. Document distribution system ensures control over who received
the document and each revision is supplemented by a list of changes from the previous document version.
Al personnel are required to be acquainted with the contents of OM and contents of the revisions.
3.5.2 OM revisions
For changes requiring prior approval, ETF Airways shall provide CCAA with the following documentation:
1. Highlight/Summary of Revision
2. Amended OM;
3. Operations Manual Approval sheet (signature sheet);
4. Applications (if required).
The change shall only be implemented upon receipt of formal approval by the CCAA in accordance with
ARO.GEN.330.
CCAA shall be notified of a change not requiring prior approval, and shall receive the new OM revision. All
such changes will be approved only by the relevant nominated person.
Any change not requiring prior approval (indirect approval) shall be managed in accordance with the
applicable ETF’s management system procedures and notified to the CCAA by ETF in advance of the
effective date and on the form determined by the CCAA; together with the applicable revision of operations
manual, other relevant documents; referred to as notification package.
The notification package shall be delivered to the CCAA in accordance with General Administrative
Procedure Act of the Republic of Croatia. It can be submitted electronically to email ops@ccaa.hr or
uploaded to dedicated CCAA server account, in which case information about package submission needs to
be sent to email address ops@ccaa.hr.
With reference to operations manual content, as per AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 of Regulation (EU) 965/2012,
the scope of ETF’s indirect approval refers to changes of the following information in the operations manual
and any referred complement documents:
7. Qualification requirements, except changes related to flight crew members experience for operation
on more than one type or variant;
8. Crew health precautions;
9. Handling, notifying and reporting accidents, incidents and occurrences and using the CVR recording;
10. Rules of the air;
11. Route/role/area and aerodrome/operating site instructions and information;
12. The list of aerodromes categorized in accordance with AMC1 ORO.FC.105(b)(2); (c).
Changes not within the abovementioned scope shall only be implemented upon receipt of formal approval
by the CCAA in accordance with point ARO.GEN.330 of Regulation (EU) 965/2012, Air Traffic Act and
General Administrative Procedure Act of the Republic of Croatia.
All ETF’s documents which are available to operations personnel to perform their duties by containing
necessary instructions, information and procedures, are to be considered as an integral part of the
operations manual and shall be subject to notification or prior approval as applicable to the
abovementioned scope.
Notwithstanding requirements in this chapter, ETF shall inform the CCAA of a planned change of a
nominated person in accordance with point ORO.GEN.210 (b) of Regulation (EU) 965/2012 or of a safety
manager at least 20 days before the date of the proposed change. Notification shall contain written résumé
of the proposed person's qualifications for the function.
The content of this chapter is subject of prior CCAA approval and becomes invalid in case of regulatory
change which affects the extent of indirect approval allowed by the applicable regulation or in case when
revoked by the CCAA.
Contents
4. CREW COMPOSITION .............................................................................................................................................. 2
4.1. CREW COMPOSITION ........................................................................................................................................... 2
4.1.1 TYPE OF AEROPLANE BEING USED ............................................................................................................................................2
4.1.2 THE AREA AND TYPE OF OPERATION BEING UNDERTAKEN .....................................................................................................3
4.1.3 THE PHASE OF FLIGHT ...............................................................................................................................................................3
4.1.4 THE MINIMUM CREW REQUIREMENT AND FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD PLANNED .........................................................................4
4.1.5 EXPERIENCE (TOTAL AND ON TYPE), RECENCY AND QUALIFICATION OF THE CREW MEMBERS ............................................5
4.1.6 THE DESIGNATION OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND/COMMANDER AND THE RELIEF OF THE FLIGHT CREW .............................6
4.1.7 DESIGNATION OF THE SENIOR CABIN CREW MEMBER (SCCM) ...............................................................................................8
4.2. DESIGNATION OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND/COMMANDER ................................................................................. 9
4.3. FLIGHT CREW INCAPACITATION ......................................................................................................................... 10
4.4. OPERATION ON MORE THAN ONE TYPE.............................................................................................................. 10
4. CREW COMPOSITION
The type of aeroplane is used for flight and cabin crew determination. ETF is using B737-800 aeroplane and
flight crew is composed of:
- minimum two pilots of which one needs to be captain.
- For flights with passengers, minimum four cabin crew members of which one needs to be SCCM
(purser)
In case crew composition is composed of two captains, at least one of which must be either seat qualified,
and seated at the right seat.
Validity of the aerodrome and the route competence qualification is 1 Year after the initial qualification or
the last flight performed to that airport.
Before using the privileges of any operation which needs pecific approval, (RVSM, LVO…) the flight crew
members must have valid qualifications for each approved operations. This is obtained with mandatory
training during Operators Conversion Course and Recurrent training and checking.
At this time, no special consideration regarding crew (flight or cabin) composition is given to the phase of
flight due to the nature of ETF operation (short to medium range, charter passenger flight.
Therefore, type of aircraft, the area of operation, crew qualification requirements and the flight/duty time
limitations are to be considered as factors to determine the crew composition in vast number of cases. In
special (non-standard) cases, the FOM will determine the crew composition on the basis of applicable
regulations.
4.1.4 THE MINIMUM CREW REQUIREMENT AND FLIGHT DUTY PERIOD PLANNED
Minimum crew is composed of minimum flight crew and minimum cabin crew.
For a flight with (any) passengers on board, following minimum flight & cabin crew requirements apply:
Aeroplane type Minimum flight crew members Minimum cabin crew members
B737-800 2 4
When the number of cabin crew is reduced below the minimum stated above, for example in the event of
incapacitation or other unforeseen circumstances, minimum cabin crew requirements above may be
reduced to 3 cabin crewmembers of which one must be SCCM.
Conditions that allowed reduction of cabin crew are:
a) reduction of passenger numbers to 150 for B737-800
b) passengers shall be seated as close as possible to the emergency exits that are covered by the cabin crew
c) Cabin Crew shall be seated as to cover fwd and aft emergency exits in a way that no less than one CCM is
at the FWD CCM station, and no less than one CCM is at the AFT CCM station.
The condition is only allowed for the completion of the assigned duty, but the flight shall not leave the home
base.
If the number of passengers carried on the flight is reduced due to reduction of the cabin crew a report shall
be submitted. It is commander duty to fill in ASR after the flight.
In case of a reduction of number of cabin crewmembers below 3, the aircraft can only be flown without
passengers.
Aeroplane type Minimum cabin crew members
B737-800 3
For all ground operations with passangers minimum number of CCM shall be the same as given above. For
fuelling with passengers on board see OM-A-8.
CCM are normally not required on flights with only company personnel on board (ie positioning flights). It is
the Commander’s responsibility to ensure that such company personnel is properly briefed in accordnace
with briefing procedures prescribed in OM-A-8.3.16.
4.1.5 EXPERIENCE (TOTAL AND ON TYPE), RECENCY AND QUALIFICATION OF THE CREW MEMBERS
Flight Crew
For qualification requirements, refer to OM-A-05.
ETF shall assure that a pilot (Captain or co-pilot) is not assigned to operate an aeroplane as part of the
minimum certificated crew, either as pilot flying or pilot non-flying unless he/she has carried out three take-
offs and three landings in the previous 90 days as pilot flying in an aeroplane, or in a flight simulator of the
same type/class.
The 90-day period may be extended to 120 days by line flying under supervision of a TRE (with TRI
unrestricted privileges) or a TRI unrestricted.
For periods beyond 120 days the recency requirement for 3 take-offs and 3 landings shall be satisfied during
a training flight or in the simulator.
An inexperienced flight crewmember shall not be assigned and shall not undertake duties as a flight
crewmember together with another inexperienced flight crewmember.
A flight crewmember is considered inexperienced following completion of a Type Rating or command course,
and the associated line flying under supervision, until he has achieved on the Type either:
− 100 flying hours and flown 10 sectors within a consolidation period of 120 consecutive
days, or
− 150 flying hours and flown 20 sectors (no time limit).
A lesser number of flying hours or sectors, subject to any other conditions which the Authority may impose,
may be acceptable to the Authority when:
− Introducing a new aeroplane type; or
− Flight crewmembers have previously completed a type conversion course with ETF.
FOM after consultation with the Training Manager may impose additional limitation on crew pairing
regarding experience and proficiency.
In case such limitation apply, FOM will in written inform Crew scheduling department on his decision
Cabin crew
ETF Airways shall ensure that each Cabin Crew member shall only be assigned to duties, and operate, on a
particular aircraft type or variant if they;
a) hold a valid attestation (Cabin Crew Attestation) issued in accordance with Annex V (Part-CC) TO
Regulation (EU) No. 1178/2011;
b) are qualified on the type or variant in accordance with this Subpart and complete appropriate training
before undertaking assigned duties:
i. Aircraft Type Specific and Operator Conversion Training Conversion
ii. Differences training (if applicable)
c) comply with other applicable requirements of this Subpart and Annex IV (Part-CAT)
d) wear the ETF Airways uniform
Each Cabin Crew member shall be medically fit to discharge the duties specified in the OM.
Following training, each Cabin Crew member shall undergo checking in order to verify proficiency in carrying
out normal, safety and emergency duties.
ETF Airways shall ensure all cabin crew members complete a recurrent training course once every 12 months
in order to remain qualified to perform duties as cabin crew member.
ETF Airways shall ensure that each cabin crew member who has been absent from all flying duties for more
than 6 months, and still remains within the period of the previous recurrent training, completes refresher
training (Refer to OMD Ch.2.2.5).
4.1.6 THE DESIGNATION OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND/COMMANDER AND THE RELIEF OF THE FLIGHT CREW
The term “Commander” denominates the flight crewmember holding overall responsibility for the
aeroplane, its crew, its passengers and its load.
For each flight, the Crew planning will designate the Commander according to the rules given in OM
Part A, chapters;4.1 and 4.2, Seniority list and Pairing restriction table.
Seniority list and pairing restrictions table are issued by FOM and are distributed to Crew planning and OCC.
Crew planning shall insert restrictions from pairing restriction table into Leon system [User edit -> Other ->
Do Not Fly With]. Based on restrictions inserted, Leon will gennerate caution warning to planning staff.
Sample of pairing restriction table is shown below:
For non-standard crew composition, next table shall be used for designation of the Commander:
LH seat RH seat Observer Remarks
TRE/TRI/LTC/
CPT FO Crew Line check
Line SFI/SFE
Training CPT TRI/TRE LIFUS
or TRI/TRE FO LIFUS
checking CPT/T LTC CPT IOE
Commercial situations TRE/TRI/
FO/T Safety Pilot FO IOE
flights LTC
CPT FO Standard crew
No CPT TRE Either seat
training or CPT TRI/LTC qualification is
checking TRE TRI required for RH seat
CPT CPT
TRE or TRI FO/T (Safety Pilot)
Base training
CPT/T TRE or TRI (Safety Pilot)
Special flights Designated by the Flights Operations Manager
(1) Safety pilot: a pilot who conducts the flight as a 3rd crew member during training of another pilot and
is seated in the observer seat. The safety pilot must be experienced pilot
(2) When TRE/TRI/LTC or CPT are seated on RH seat, either seat qualification is required.
The Commander will be designated according to seniority list issued by FOM.
(3) Special flights = maintenance check, Aircraft positioning flight.
Blue box indicates that Commander will be designated according the seniority list issued by FOM
whenever due to any reason 2 Pilots with a qualification as Commander will be assigned for the
flight. In case that both pilots are RH seat qualified Commanders, the designated Commander
can make a decision about who will occupy the LH and RH seat.
This shall be recorded in Journey and Flight Log (LH seat shall be placed on first row)
After start of FDP, change of seat is not allowed.
When a TRE or TRI is Observer, he must not interfere in any decision process except on the Commander
request. Nevertheless, he may provide advice, at the appropriate time, about the management of the flight.
For applicable procedure check ETF OM-A Ch. 8.3.10
A senior cabin crew member (SCCM) is nominated by ETF for each flight, except for flights where cabin crew
is not required.
The entire crew on duty and off duty when away from home base are subordinated to the Commander. In
the absence of the Commander (i.e. due to operational reasons, different rotations of flight and cabin crew
etc.), cabin crew members are subordinated to the First Officer. In the absence of the Flight Deck crew, cabin
crew members are subordinated to the Senior cabin crew member (Purser).
In the unlikely event that the Flight Deck crew with Senior cabin crew member (Purser) are missing, the chain
of command follows seniority order. As a general rule, all cabin crew members initially report to the Senior
cabin crew member (Purser) who will bring the issue up to the Commander if deemed necessary. A cabin
crew member may decide to report directly to the Commander (or First Officer in Commander's absence)
shall there be an issue unsolved with the Senior cabin crewmember (Purser) or a conflict of interests.
For each flight, the Crew planning department will designate suitably qualified Commander in accordance
with Table in OM-A Ch.4.1.6. For qualification requirements, refer to OM-A 5.2.
For commercial operations, the experience of the route or area to be flown and of the aerodrome facilities
and procedures to be used shall include proper aerodrome, area and route knowledge.
1. Area and route training shall include knowledge of:
i. terrain and minimum safe altitudes;
ii. seasonal meteorological conditions;
iii. meteorological, communication and air traffic facilities, services and procedures;
iv. search and rescue procedures where available; and
v. navigational facilities associated with the area or route along which the flight is to take place.
2. Depending on the complexity of the area or route, as assessed by the operator, the following methods
of familiarisation shall be used:
i. for the less complex areas or routes, familiarisation by self-briefing with route documentation,
or by means of programmed instruction; and
ii. in addition, for the more complex areas or routes, in-flight familiarisation as a pilot-in-
command/commander or co-pilot under supervision, observer, or familiarisation in a flight
simulation training device (FSTD) using a database appropriate to the route concerned.
3. Aerodrome knowledge:
i. Aerodrome training include knowledge of obstructions, physical layout, lighting, approach aids
and arrival, departure, holding and instrument approach procedures, applicable operating
minima and ground movement considerations.
ii. ETF manual describe the method of categorisation of aerodromes and list of categorised
airports.
For Aerodrome categorisation reffer to OM A 8.1.2.C
ETF shall only designate flight crew member to act as pilot in command / Commander if he/she has
completed an ETF command course if upgrading from co-pilot to pilot in command.
No pilot may accept a designation as Commander unless, in addition to his qualifications and training, he has
the recent experience and knowledge required and considers himself to be in all respects competent and fit
for the task.
The commander:
• must be a captain and one of the pilots of the flight
• may delegate the conduct of the flight to a relief pilot (pilot-in-command), but remains Commander of
the flight (Exceptional case of enlarged crew)
• may delegate the flying of the aeroplane to the co-pilot (pilot flying)
• may, in exceptional circumstances (e.g. unfit), designate another Captain as Commander for the
remainder of the flight. Any such change in command shall be reported ASAP to the dispatch office
(Exceptional case of enlarged crew)
Paragraphs below describe the procedures that shall be followed to determine the succession of command
in case of the commander incapacitation.
Commander
Captain
First officer
First officer under supervision
Not applicable.
Contents
5 QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 2
5.1 A DESCRIPTION OF THE REQUIRED LICENCE, RATING(S), QUALIFICATION/COMPETENCY, EXPERIENCE, TRAINING,
CHECKING AND RECENCY. ........................................................................................................................................... 2
5.2 FLIGHT CREW ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
5.2.1 Commander ...............................................................................................................................................................................3
5.2.2 Pilot relieving the Pilot in command/Commander .....................................................................................................................4
5.2.3 Co-Pilot ......................................................................................................................................................................................4
5.2.4 Pilot relieving the Co-Pilot .........................................................................................................................................................5
5.2.5 Pilot in command under supervision (PICUS) .............................................................................................................................5
5.2.6 System panel operator ...............................................................................................................................................................5
5.2.7 Operation on more than one type or variant.............................................................................................................................5
5.2.8 Operation in MNPS NAT HLA airspace .......................................................................................................................................5
5.3 CABIN CREW ......................................................................................................................................................... 6
5.3.1 Senior cabin crew member (SCCM) ...........................................................................................................................................6
5.3.2 Cabin crew member (CCM) ........................................................................................................................................................6
5.3.3 Operation on more than one type or variant.............................................................................................................................7
5.4 TRAINING, CHECKING AND SUPERVISION PERSONNEL .......................................................................................... 7
5.4.1 Flight crew..................................................................................................................................................................................7
5.4.2 Cabin crew .................................................................................................................................................................................8
5.5 OTHER OPERATIONS PERSONNEL ........................................................................................................................ 10
5 QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
All pilots joining ETF must undergo the appropriate company training program, as specified in this manual
and in the OM-D / Training.
This chapter contains a brief description of the required licenses, ratings, qualifications, competency,
experience, training, checking and recency for operations personnel to conduct assigned duties. All crew
member shall carry with them the required licenses, certificates and ratings to conduct assigned duties. All
crew member are responsible for ensuring the validity of their licenses, certificates and ratings prior to
accepting and/or conducting assigned flight duties with ETF.
• All pilots shall be suitably qualified to perform their respective crew duties on all flights.
• The holder of licence or rating must not exercise privileges other than those granted by that licence or
rating.
• A licence holder must not exercise the privileges granted by any licence or rating unless the holder
maintains competency by meeting the relevant requirements.
• The validity of the licence is determined by the validity of the ratings therein and the medical certificate.
All flight crewmembers shall be suitably qualified to perform their respective crew duties on commercial-
and non-commercial flights.
• Pilot must have minimum ICAO level 4 English qualifications and shall be applied without alterations.
• Pilot must have Class 1 medical certificate issued by AME, AeMC, which shall not be valid for a period
greater than 12 months.
• A Flight Crew Licence entitles the holder to exercise the privileges of the licence and associated ratings
only as long as the licence remains valid.
• Expiry dates are notified to crew through LEON and are available each time a crew member logs on to
the system.
• The Company facilitates the maintenance of validity of ratings through the Recurrent Training
programme, the details of which are described in OM Part D.
Final responsibility for ensuring the licence and ratings remain valid rests with the holder. Under no
circumstances may a crew member fly without a current licence.
Before joining ETF, candidates are requested to submit their personal documents for operations
management review. Through this review rough selection will be done and successful candidates will be
31.05.2022. Rev. 04 Page 2 of 10
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
5 – QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
invited for further assessment. During this assessment candidate’s competence, aviation experience and
interpersonal skills will be checked through operations management interview.
Validity and authenticity of his/her licenses, logged flight time and medical certificates will be confirmed with
issuing authorities if not EASA Member State.
A license holder must not exercise the privileges granted by any license or rating unless the holder maintains
competency by meeting the relevant requirements.
The validity of the license is determined by the validity of the ratings therein and the medical certificate.
The holder of a pilot license must not act in any capacity as a pilot, except as a pilot undergoing skill testing
or dual training, unless the holder has a valid and appropriate type rating.
Note: There is no limit to the number of ratings that may be held at one time, but there are restrictions
concerning the number of ratings that can be exercised at any one time.
Flight Crew must carry with them original license during flight duties.
Certificate of good standing or Non-criminal record (as applicable) is also required for security background
check.
Finally, before simulator assessment, English language proficiency will be checked. As a minimum, ICAO level
IV is expected to be endorsed in the license.
Pilot in command/Commander
A flight crew member shall not be assigned and shall not undertake duties as commander unless he meets
the following minimum requirements.
5.2.1 Commander
The minimum qualification requirements for a pilot to act as commander of a commercial air transport flight
for ETF are:
• EASA PART-FCL (or in case of non-eu license an EASA accepted JAR-FCL)/ATPL;
• Valid B737-800 Type Rating;
• Valid Instrument Rating;
• Valid ETF Proficiency Check;
• Valid Class 1 Medical;
• ETF line check including route qualicfications as well as aerodrome qualification in accordance with
airport category defined by ETF.
• Age: not be older than 65 years (shall not have attained his 65th birthday)
• Experience:
- has acquired at least 2000 hours total flight time and 1000 hours on type experience or
- minimum 3500 hours total flight time, out of which 500 hours on CS 25 (or equivalent)
aircraft.
In order to exercise the privileges for LVO the Commander and F/O must have completed relevant training
and checking according approved programs in OM D. If combination of flight crew with and without
limitations stated above, the more restrictive minima shall be followed
Recency
A pilot shall not act as a Commander unless he/she has carried out at least three take-offs and three landings
as pilot flying in an aeroplane of the same type or an approved flight simulator of the same type, in the
preceding 90 days. The 90 days period may be extended to 120 days by line flying under supervision of a TRE
or a TRI. For periods beyond 120 days the recency requirement for 3 take-offs and 3 landings shall be satisfied
during a training flight or on the simulator.
Route and aerodrome qualification
Route and Airport Qualification can be obtained and extended under the provisions given in OM A 4.2.
Minimum entry requirements before commencing ETF Conversion Course are stated below for different
levels of entry:
DIRECT ENTRY CAPTAINS
1. Valid ATPL Licence issued by CCAA or other EASA member state (Validation by CCAA can be accepted)
2. Valid TR and IR
3. Valid Medical Class 1
4. Valid English Level Proficiency level IV
5. Minimum 3000 hours total flight time of which at least 500 hours as PIC on type or 500 hours in
Commercial Air Transport on Aircraft with MTOW greater than 27000 kg.
Captains entering ETF may be credited for Command Course received in previous Companies and will start
the Conversion Training as Commanders.
Not applicable
5.2.3 Co-Pilot
A flight crewmember shall not be assigned and shall not undertake duties of First officer unless he/she meets
the following minimum requirements.
Qualification
1. Valid Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) or a Commercial Pilot Licence ) issued by EASA member
state or validated by Croatian CCAA with Instrument rating for the aeroplane type,
2. Valid Type Rating and Instrument Rating TR/IR
3. Valid medical certificate class I,
4. Completed ETF conversion course for the aeroplane type in accordance with OM-D.
5. has a Valid ETF Proficiency Check
6. has a valid English language proficiency (at least LEVEL IV)
In order to exercise the privileges for LVO the Commander and F/O must have completed relevant training
and checking according approved programs in ETF OM D. If combination of flight crew with and without
limitations stated above, the more restrictive minima shall be followed.
Recency
Operated as pilot flying during at least 3 take-offs and landings on an aeroplane of the same type, or on the
flight simulator of the same type in the preceding 90 days. The 90 day period may be extended to 120 days
by line flying under supervision of a TRE or a TRI without limitations for LIFUS training. For periods beyond
120 days the recency requirement for 3 take-offs and 3 landings shall be satisfied during a training flight or
on the simulator.
Not used.
Not applicable
ETF operates only one aeroplane type B737-800. Various models of the same aeroplane type are treated as
one type.
Before operating in MNPS NAT-HLA airspace both Commander and First Officer must have completed the
training as specified in OM-D-2.1.14.
In case of non-standard crew (2 Commanders) the Commander occupying RH seat must be Either seat
qualified as well.
In order to be qualified for MNPS NAT-HLA flight crew member has to pass LINE CHECK in MNPS NAT-HLA
every 12 months. This will also be counted as the period of validity of the route and aerodrome
competence qualification.
After sucesfull completion of Line Check the instructor shall send a copy of Line Check to TM.
TM will enter endorsemnt in LEON software and will inform FOM, Crew Planning Department and OCC
about the new Qualified Flight Crew member able to operate in MNPS NAT-HLA.
ETF Airways will nominate a Senior cabin crew member (SCCM) whenever more than one cabin crewmember
are assigned for a flight.
The Senior cabin crew member has responsibility to the Commander for the conduct and co-ordination of
cabin safety and emergency procedures specified in the Operation Manual.
The designated senior cabin crew member shall have at least one-year experience as an operating
crewmember, and shall have completed appropriate course.
To be designated as Senior Cabin Crew in ETF Airways cabin crew member shall:
a) have at least one year’s experience as an operating cabin crew member
b) have completed the Senior Cabin Crew Member training and checking
ETF Airways shall ensure that each Cabin Crew member meets the minimum requirements:
a) Is at least 18 years of age,
b) Have been assessed, in accordance with the applicable requirements of Annex IV (Part-MED) to
Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011, as physically and mentally fit to perform their duties and discharge
their responsibilities safely. Medical assessment interval for the active Cabin Crew member is every
five years (60 months)
c) Has successfully completed initial safety training in accordance with ORO.CC.120/CC.TRA.220
Subpart Cabin Crew and holds a valid attestation of safety training issued in accordance with Annex
V (Part-CC) to regulation (EU) No 1178/2011,
d) Has completed the appropriate aircraft type specific and operator conversion and/or differences
training covering at least the subjects listed in ORO.CC.125 and ORO.CC.130 Subpart Cabin Crew,
e) Shall undergo recurrent training in line with the provisions of ORO.CC.140,
f) Shall undergo refresher training if absent from flying duties in excess of 180 days in line with the
provisions of ORO.CC.145;
g) Shall receive an Aircraft Type Qualification (ATQ) card showing updated validity periods as relevant
to the aeroplanes type(s) or variant(s) on which the CCM is qualified to operate;
h) Complies with other applicable requirements of this Subpart and Annex IV (Part-CAT);
i) Is competent to perform his/her duties in accordance with procedures specified in OM and CSPM.
j) Wears the ETF Airways cabin crew uniform.
The number of the required cabin crewmembers depends on the number of seats on an aircraft and weather
there are any passengers on board or not. Occasionally, due to duty time or special requirements, cabin crew
has to be enlarged.
Regarding minimum number of cabin crew per aircraft type in ETF Airways and for conditions of reduction
of required cabin crewmembers due to unforeseen circumstances refer to OMA Ch. 4.1
Additional cabin crew member and cabin crew member during familiarisation flight
Any cabin crewmembers that are required above the minimum cabin crew, for any reason, are considered
additional cabin crew members.
For training purposes, a trainee for a cabin crew member (on familiarisation flights) can be included in the
cabin crew. However, such personnel cannot form the minimum crew because regulations for required crew
actually define required “licensed personnel”.
In assigning additional cabin crew member during familiarisation to a flight, the number of available seats
shall be taken into consideration, since all cabin crewmembers must be assigned a seat (either crew or
passenger’s).
Details about below mentioned personnel could be found in ETF OM-D1 Ch. 1.4 – Training and checking
personnel.
Flight Operation Manger and/or his deputy conduct interviews with potential instructing personnel
(employed by ETF or contracted) to ensure that candidates are satisfying ETF's and CCAA's
standards regarding:
1. technical competencies and skills;
2. aviation experience;
3. credentials and licenses;(include verification of authenticity of licences);
4. Interpersonal skills by flight operations management;
5. medical fitness;(medical certificate);
6. security background/non-criminal as described in OM Part A, ;
7. English language fluency.
* For the continuous use of privileges of TRI/SFI they must be enrolled into ETF Airways Company Instructor
standardization program as per OM D 2.1.10.
** In order to be nominated for conducting the Line Checks, TRI shall have completed training for CRM
concepts and the assessment of CRM skills which is part of ETF Airways TRI Company standardization training
program.
In ETF Airways, Cabin Crew Ground Instructors (CC GTI) and Cabin Crew Instructors (CCI) are considered as
training, checking or supervision personnel for cabin crew.
CC GTI and CCI are nominated by the Cabin Training Manager and Training Manager.
Cabin Crew Ground Training Instructor (CC GTI) shall meet the following requirements:
1. Be well familiar with the operator's procedures and organization
2. Have good knowledge of the contents of Operation's manual, operational documents, forms and related
records
3. To be in possession of valid EASA Cabin Crew Attestation
4. To have at least a total of 24 months experience as Cabin Crew Member
5. Have completed "Train the Trainer" training and operator internal training for operator's specific
elements
Cabin Crew Instructor shall meet the following requirements:
1. Be well familiar with the operator's procedures and organization
2. Have good knowledge of the contents of Operation's manual, operational documents, forms and related
records
Contents
6. CREW HEALTH PRECAUTIONS............................................................................................. 2
6.1 CREW HEALTH PRECAUTIONS ....................................................................................................................... 3
a) Alcohol and other intoxicating liquids ......................................................................................................................................3
b) Narcotics .................................................................................................................................................................................3
c) Drugs.......................................................................................................................................................................................3
d) Sleeping Tablets ......................................................................................................................................................................4
e) Anti-Depressants .....................................................................................................................................................................4
f) Pharmaceutical Preparations ...................................................................................................................................................4
g) Immunisation ...........................................................................................................................................................................5
h) Deep Sea Diving.......................................................................................................................................................................6
i) Blood/bone marrow donation ...................................................................................................................................................6
j) Meal precuations prior to and during flight ...............................................................................................................................6
k) Sleep and rest ..........................................................................................................................................................................7
l) Surgical Procedures ................................................................................................................................................................7
m) Pregnacy .................................................................................................................................................................................7
n) Vision Correction .....................................................................................................................................................................7
o) Infectuous diseases .................................................................................................................................................................8
IDENTIFYING A SICK AND POTENTIALLY INFECTIOUS TRAVELER .................................................................................................... 9
GENERAL INFECTION CONTROL MEASURES .......................................................................................................................... 10
Protecting yourself and others ...........................................................................................................................................................10
6.2 PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES TESTING....................................................................................................... 18
6.2.1 Procedures for psychoactive substances testing .......................................................................................................................19
6.2.2 Alcohol test ...............................................................................................................................................................................21
6.2.3 Psychoactive substances test ....................................................................................................................................................23
6.3 SUPPORT PROGRAMME ....................................................................................................................................... 24
6.3.1 Objectives and Benefits of the Program .....................................................................................................................................24
6.3.2 Support Programme Personnel ..................................................................................................................................................25
6.4 FLIGHT CREW PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ..................................................................................................... 30
6.4.1 Psychological Assessment ........................................................................................................................................................30
No person may serve as a crew member knowing that he has a physical deficiency or mental condition that would render
him unable to meet the requirements of his current medical certificate, to discharge his responsibilities to a safe standard
or could endanger the safety of the aircraft or its occupants. Crew members shall not undertake flying duties whilst under
the influence of alcohol, narcotics, drug or medicine like sleeping tablets. Any crew member who becomes ill or
incapacitated while on flight duty or during a stopover period at an outstation must report the matter to the Commander at
the earliest opportunity. A Commander shall be aware that a sudden deterioration in health might be an indication of the
onset of a dangerous or infectious complaint. Carriage of ill flight crew or cabin crew could prejudice the Company’s
position in several ways, including:
The Commander must therefore ensure that a doctor is called at the earliest opportunity to examine the crew member
concerned, and a certificate must be obtained stating whether the individual is fit for duty or, alternatively, for travel. The
Commander is authorized to arrange any tests necessary to ascertain the condition of the individual concerned. A written
report must be submitted by the Commander and the crew member as soon as practicable after return to the main base.
The Commander has an overall responsibility for ensuring that all of the crew are fit for duty, even if a report of sickness
is not received. Where any doubt exists, the Commander must ensure that a doctor sees the individual concerned and
that the report from that doctor is forwarded to the main base, if possible on the same flight or, failing this, at the earliest
opportunity. In the case of the Captain being incapacitated the normal devolution of command to the First Officer (or the
most senior pilot) applies.
All cases of illness on board aircraft (excluding cases of airsickness) and accidents must be reported by the Commander
on landing at an aerodrome. The details are to be given in the appropriate part of the Aircraft General Declaration. Cases
of ill crew or passengers disembarked must also be reported via Air Safety Report on arrival.
When a passenger on board shows symptoms which might indicate the presence of a major disease, the Commander of
an arriving flight must ensure that the aerodrome medical or health authority has been informed. It is the responsibility of
the airport medical or health authority to decide whether isolation of the aircraft, crew and passengers is necessary. On
arrival of the aircraft, nobody shall be permitted to board the aircraft or disembark or attempt to offload cargo or catering
until such time as authorized by the airport medical or health authority.
In case of a confirmed positive test result, ETF AIRWAYS shall inform its competent authority and the authority responsible
for the personnel concerned, such as the medical assessor of the licensing authority
Ref: (CAT.GEN.MPA.170)
Psychoactive substances mean alcohol, opioids, cannabinoids, sedatives and hypnotics, cocaine, other
psychostimulants, hallucinogens, and volatile solvents, except for caffeine and tobacco.
Crew members and safety-sensitive personnel shall not exercise their duties while under the influence of
psychoactive substances.
The following rules regarding consumption of alcohol shall be followed. A crew member shall not:
▪ Consume alcohol less than 8 hours prior to the specified reporting time for flight duty or the commencement of
standby duty
▪ Commence a flight duty period with a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.2 grams of blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) per liter of blood at the start of a flight duty period
▪ Consume alcohol during the flight duty period or whilst on standby
▪ Consume alcohol at any time when in uniform in public places.
Crew members shall be aware of the effect of alcohol consumption even in small quantities. These effects include
impaired reaction and judgement as well as reduced resistance to the strain of flight duty e.g., lack of oxygen,
acceleration and physical load.
Furthermore, the combination of alcohol and lack of sleep, or the combination of alcohol with sedatives, sleeping
pills or similar drugs are considered as especially harmful.
The effects of heavier alcohol consumption may last up to 48 hours.
Flight crew shall not consume alcohol while in uniform. Crewmembers shall remember that they represent the
Airline even after changing into civilian clothes during night stops. Any excessive misuse of alcohol would
therefore reflect upon the standing of the Airline and must be refrained from.
Furthermore, ETF Airways has a random testing programme in order to mitigate the risks associated with the
undetected misuse of psychoactive substances. (Chapter 6.2).
b) Narcotics
The use of narcotics is expressly forbidden at any times. All flight crewmembers who are identified as engaging
in any kind of use of psychoactive substances must be removed from safety-critical functions. ETF Airways shall
perform testing for narcotics as described in chapter 6.2.
Furthermore, ETF Airways has a random testing programme in order to mitigate the risks associated with the
undetected misuse of psychoactive substances. (Chapter 6.2).
c) Drugs
The use of drugs which have not been prescribed by a medical practitioner is expressly forbidden at any time,
further more aero-medical advice shall be sought before commencing or continuing with flying duties whenever
drugs have been prescribed.
d) Sleeping Tablets
The use of sleep inducing tablets which have not been prescribed by a medical practitioner is expressly
forbidden at any time, further more aero-medical advice shall be sought before commencing or continuing with
flying duties whenever any sleep inducing tablet’s have been prescribed.
e) Anti-Depressants
Written approval by an aero-medical expert is required and FOM and Commander must be notified.
f) Pharmaceutical Preparations
Before use of any pharmaceutical preparation, the crew member shall check the documentation to verify it does
not have any effect on driving or operating heavy machinery. If it does, and aeromedical expert shall be consulted.
Due to the conditions met in flight, or could be met in emergency situations, many adverse effects on the nervous
system are more marked in the air than on the ground.
The following are some of the types of medication in common use which may impair reactions. There are many
others, and when in doubt a pilot shall consult the aeronautical medical practitioner.
- Anti-histamines: All anti-histamines can produce side effects such as sedation, fatigue and dryness of
the mouth. Quite commonly they are included in medication for treatment of the common cold, hayfever and
allergic rashes or reactions. Some nasal sprays and drops may also contain antihistamines.
- Tranquillisers, Anti-depressants and Psychotic Drugs: All these types of drugs preclude crew
members from flight duties because of the underlying condition for which they are being used, as well as the
possible side effects resulting from them. Flight duties shall not be resumed until treatment with these types of
drugs has been discontinued and until the effects of the drugs have entirely worn off. This can take several days
in some instances.
- Antibiotics: The underlying condition for which antibiotics are being taken may prevent a pilot from
flying. Most antibiotics are compatible with flying, however. Obviously where any hypersensitivity is feared, the
suspect antibiotic must not be used. A pilot shall have previous experience of the antibiotic prescribed or,
alternatively, have a trial of it for at least 24 hours on the ground before using it during flight duties.
- Analgesics (pain killers): With a lot of analgesics and anti-inflammatory agents there is a risk of gastric
irritation or haemorrhage. Ideally a doctor’s advice shall be sought before using them.
- Steroids (Cortisone, etc.): Use of steroids, with few exceptions, precludes flight duties.
- Anti-malarial: Most anti-malarial preparations used for prevention and taken in recommended dosage
are considered safe for flight duties.
- Anti-diarrhoeals: As a lot of medications used in treating symptoms of gastritis and enteritis (diarrhoea)
may cause sedation, blurring of vision, etc., great care must be exercised in their usage by flight crew. In most
cases grounding for a time may be necessary.
- Appetite Suppressants: These preparations can affect the central nervous system and shall not be
taken during flight duties.
- Anti-hypertensives (drugs for treating blood pressure): Certain therapeutic agents are compatible
with flying activity. Only a doctor experienced in aviation medicine shall prescribe them, and sufficient time must
be allowed to assess suitability and freedom from side effects before resumption of flying duties.
g) Immunisation
Medical advice from an Aviation Medical Examiner is to be sought concerning the period to be observed before
returning to flying duties following immunization.
In case the area of operations requires immunization, it will be arranged by the Airline. The crewmembers are
responsible to notify, if the Airline has, by error, omitted the immunization, or re-immunization requirements.
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Health Regulations are used by many countries to
prescribe vaccination of crewmembers. It is the responsibility of each crewmember to keep himself informed of
any requirements for vaccinations and for keeping his vaccinations current.
• Typhoid vaccination is recommended at all times. (Validity from 7 days until 3 years after vaccination).
• Yellow Fever when flying to a zone in Africa or South America between 15° North and 15° South of the Equator.
(Validity from 7 days until 10 years after vaccination).
If any pain, fever or illness is felt after vaccination, the crewmember shall present himself for medical examination
in order to be declared fit, or unfit, for flight duty. The Airline will bear the cost of the required vaccinations.
Crew members whose sporting activities include deep sea diving to a depth exceeding 10 metres shall not fly
within 24 hours of completing such diving activity.
Flight Crew Members shall not normally act as blood or Bone Marrow donors.
If, for any reason, they have done so, they are to advise ETF Airways immediately following each donation. They
shall not undertake flying duties for at least 24 hours after they have given blood.
In the event that a Bone Marrow donation has been undertaken then aero medical advice is required prior to
further
flying duties.
To reduce the risk of incapacitation of flight crew members due to food poisoning, the crew members shall not
eat the same food before and during the flight. In addition, food types which are more likely to become bad (e.g.
seafood, eggs etc.) shall be avoided, especially during hot weather. In countries with questionable water quality,
ice for drinks shall not be used and fruits and vegetables which cannot be pealed shall not be eaten (e.g. apples,
tomatoes, strawberries)
Cases of acute food poisoning in the air continue to occur sporadically, and surveys of incapacitation of flight
crew in flight show that of these cases, gastrointestinal disorders pose by far the commonest threat to flight
safety. No other illness can put a whole crew out of action so suddenly and so severely, thereby immediately and
severely endangering a flight, as food poisoning.
Drinkable Water
It is recommended for the crew to drink only bottled water in all situations except when in home base.
Pipeline water can, in many countries, carry various diseases, parasites, etc.
Any food which has been kept in relatively high ambient temperatures for several hours after preparation shall
be regarded with extreme suspicion. This applies particularly to cream or pastry (cakes etc.), which is commonly
part of a set aircraft meal. The reheating process normally used in aircraft for the main course of a meal rarely
destroys food-poisoning organisms and the toxins they produce. These toxins are tasteless and cause no
unpleasant odours. The crew shall refrain from the food cooked on the street and in suspicious hygienic
conditions, which can be met in many countries.
Common-Sense Rules
Since the most acute forms of food poisoning frequently come on suddenly between one and six hours after
contaminated food is eaten, common sense rules shall be observed as far as practicable in respect of meals
taken within six hours of a flight. For any crew member, before and during flight it is essential to avoid eating
easily-perishable foods as well as foods and drinks served cold. This is most important with milk and cream
products, mayonnaise, sauces, salads, meat pies and other meat products. In order to eliminate, as far as
possible, the risk of food poisoning, the Captain and First Officer shall not partake of the same dishes before or
during a flight.
The character and severity of the symptoms depend on the nature and dose of the toxin and the resistance of
the patient. Onset may be sudden. Malaise, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, intestinal gurgling,
diarrhoea and varying degree of prostration may be experienced. Bed rest with convenient access to bathroom,
commode or bedpan is desirable. Severe cases shall be hospitalised. Treatment is mostly symptomatic and a
doctor shall see all cases.
Although the controls on flight and duty periods are intended to ensure that adequate opportunities are provided
for crew members to obtain rest and sleep, individuals shall ensure that proper advantage is taken of such
opportunities.
A crew member shall not perform duties on an aeroplane if he knows or suspects that he is suffering from fatigue,
or feels unfit to the extent that the flight may be endangered.
It is a well-established fact that the human body has a diurnal cycle or rhythm. This means that chemical,
psychological and physiological activities are high during normal waking hours and low during normal sleeping
hours. They reach the lowest point at about 4 a.m. Flying across time zones, that is either east-west or west-
east, may interrupt the diurnal cycle. To minimise the tiring effects of interruption to the day-night biological cycle
flight crew shall:
a. when away from home adhere as much as possible to home time for sleeping, eating and bowel
function;
l) Surgical Procedures
Aero-medical advice shall be sought prior to returning to flying duties following any surgical procedure
m) Pregnacy
Shall a Flight Crew Member become pregnant, the Director of Flight Operations will immediately be notified.
Flying shall not be undertaken whilst Pregnant.
n) Vision Correction
All flight crew members who are required by the competent authority to wear corrective lenses are required to
carry a second pair of spectacles with them on all occasions whilst operating under the privileges of their license.
o) Infectuous diseases
The flight crew of an en-route aircraft shall, upon identifying a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or other public
health risk, on board of the aircraft, promptly notify the ATS unit with which the pilot is communicating, the information
listed below:
a) Aircraft identification
b) Departure aerodrome
c) Destination aerodrome
d) Estimated time of arrival
e) Number of persons on board
f) Number of suspected case(s) on board; and
g) Nature of the public health risk, if known.
Key points:
Since an illness is not yet known to be contagious when symptoms first appear, treat any body fluids (such as diarrhea,
vomit, or blood) as potentially infectious. Once you identify a sick and potentially infectious passenger, use appropriate
infection control measures.
1. A fever (a measured temperature of 100.4 °F [38 °C] or greater, or feels warm to the touch, or gives a history of
feeling feverish) and one or more of these signs or symptoms:
o skin rash
o difficulty breathing
o persistent cough
o decreased consciousness or confusion of recent onset
o new unexplained bruising or bleeding (without previous injury)
o persistent diarrhea
o persistent vomiting (other than air sickness)
o headache with stiff neck, or
o appears obviously unwell;
OR
OR
• Treat all body fluids (such as diarrhea, vomit, or blood) like they are infectious.
• Handwashing is the single most important infection control measure.
o Wash hand often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds after assisting sick travelers or touching potentially
contaminated body fluids or surfaces. Also, wash hands when visibly soiled.
o Use alcohol-based hand rub (containing at least 60% alcohol) if soap and water are not available.
o Avoid touching your mouth, eyes, and nose with unwashed or gloved hands.
Facemasks
Hygiene
Drinking Water: Supply of pure drinking water is the exception in tropical and sub-tropical areas. Water from
the tap must be regarded as infected, even when it is merely used for brushing the teeth. A guiding principle shall
be not to drink any water which is not purified by boiling, or by chemical disinfection (chlorination). Common
water related infections are typhoid fever, paratyphoid fever and dysentery.
Recommended Drinks: Boiled drinks and beverages in bottles. Make sure the bottles are opened in your
presence.
Ice: Ice is very often contaminated. Do not use ice in your drink.
Fruit: Raw fruit without peel is to be avoided in favour of fruit that can be peeled. Safe fruit includes oranges,
bananas, mangoes, pineapples, etc. Wash fruit before peeling. Wash grapes before eating.
Salads and Raw Vegetables: Eating salads or raw vegetables runs the risk of worm infestation or amoebic
dysentery.
Meats: Only fresh meat which has been freshly cooked shall be eaten. Raw or cold meats are to be avoided.
Fish: Eat only fresh fish freshly cooked. Shellfish, especially oysters, are to be avoided.
Bathing: Use only purified pools or open sea. Fungus diseases are common in hot humid climates. When
bathing, it is advisable to plug ears with cotton wool to prevent fungus infection of ear canals. Shoes shall be
worn at poolside to avoid fungus infection of feet.
Tropical Diseases
Tropical diseases are not confined entirely to the tropics but can occur almost anywhere. However their incidence
and frequency are influenced by local factors. Tropical diseases are mainly transmitted in the following ways:
Disease-Transmitting Insects
a. mosquitoes transmit malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever and sandfly fever;
Protective measures against insects: Sleeping quarters shall be free of insects. Use mosquito nets over beds.
Nets shall be taut and shall not be in contact with the body, or use insecticide. Protect the skin by using an insect
repellent.
a. Bilharzia: Aquatic snails act as intermediaries. The larvae of worms pass from such snails into the water
and, on contact with the skin, into the human body.
b. Weil’s Disease: The germs of this disease are excreted in rats’ urine. They can penetrate the skin of
bathers.
c. Fungus Diseases: The fungus is present in tropical and sub-tropical inland waters, in shallow rivers and
lakes, but hardly ever in seawater.
Protective measures to avoid contagion through the skin: Avoid inland water. Bathe only in pools with purified
water or in the sea. Use cotton-wool earplugs. Wear shoes when walking around the pool.
Causative Parasite: Amoebiasis is due to the ingestion of a unicellular parasite, the Entamoeba Histolytica. This
is followed by an infection of the intestinal tract.
Distribution: Although most prevalent as an endemic disease of tropical and subtropical countries, unsanitary
disposal of excreta and primitive methods of water purification may result in its introduction into temperate zones.
Source of Infection: Water polluted by infected faeces is the commonest source of infection, hence the
prophylactic importance of safe drinking water. Other sources of infection are foods grown on soils manured by
infected excreta, flies and food handlers.
Clinical Features: Clinically the disease is characterised by an insidious onset, frequent febrile relapses and a
tendency to chronicity. Diarrhoea is the outstanding symptom, but it may be absent. There is abdominal pain with
blood and mucus in the stools.
Complications: Inflammation of the liver, liver abscesses and inflammation of the gall bladder and bile ducts.
Treatment: Rest, diet and a course of therapy which varies with the type of case.
Preventative Treatment: No vaccination or inoculation is available, nor is there any chemical preventative
treatment such as is used to prevent malaria. General hygiene measures.
Malaria
Transmission: Infection takes place through the bite of an infected anophetes mosquito and transmission of the
parasite into the human bloodstream.
Incubation Period: The incubation period usually ranges from 10 to 35 days, but can last for many months
Symptoms: An acute, sometimes chronic, often recurrent, febrile disease characterised by periodic paroxysms
of chills followed by high fever and sweating due to the presence of parasites in the blood. The early stage of the
illness can very easily be confused with many other infectious diseases, the more so if this occurs after return to
a temperate region where doctors may not think immediately of the possibility of malaria. Note: In order to get
infected, the time spent in the critical countries can be very short, just enough to get bitten by a mosquito. For
example, if, five months after visiting the country, a crewmember feels symptoms resembling to a big fever, or a
cold, the doctor must be notified of the possibility of malaria infection.
Preventative Treatment: Preventative measures include use of insect-repellent sprays to protect skin, screens
on doors and windows, mosquito netting in bedrooms, sufficient clothing to cover as much as the skin surface
as possible against mosquito bites (this is important after sundown). It is not possible to produce permanent
immunity either chemically or by the use of vaccines. Therefore chemical prophylactic drugs are only effective
as long as they are taken regularly.
Treatment: Under medical supervision, malaria can be fatal if treatment is delayed. Therefore after having been
in a malarial area, if you feel unwell or have an unusual temperature within four weeks of leaving the area, tell
your doctor. Don’t wait to be asked.
Although malaria prophylaxis is protection rather than immunization it is of great importance that crewmembers
flying to malaria infested areas use the appropriate medication. Protection against malaria consists mainly of
drug prophylaxis directed against the malaria parasite. When flying to an infected area these protective drugs
are supplied by the Airline. If there is any doubt of the need to take preventive measures against malaria, a
precautionary attitude shall be taken. The crew department shall be consulted before flying to an infected area
for drug type and dosage, which varies depending on the particular area. Note that the incubation of the disease
can last for many months. If a crewmember has returned from the infected area, and after several months’
experiences symptoms best described as the worst fever in their lives, they shall suspect malaria. Note that most
European doctors shall not suspect malaria unless they are told that there was a risk of exposure.
These are ingestion diseases characterised by high fever and intestinal symptoms.
Transmission: Typhoid fever is conveyed by water contaminated by sewage; by articles of food grown in or
gathered from water, e.g. shellfish and watercress; or by diary or cooking utensils washed in such water.
Paratyphoid fever is rarely water-borne; recorded epidemics are few. The disease is usually disseminated by
foodstuffs contaminated by carriers.
Geographical Incidence: The disease is likely to occur wherever the water supply is impure. Generally speaking,
the less satisfactory the sanitation, the more prevalent the enteric fever. However, with the use of adequate drugs
cases of death are now rare.
Symptoms: Vague symptoms of illness tending to increase in severity throughout the first week. Lassitude, frontal
headache, general aches and pains, disturbed sleep, anorexia and thirst, abdominal discomfort, temperature
rising to 40°C, diarrhoea with or without bleeding.
Preventative Treatment: By inoculation. The inoculation is not an international requirement for entry into any
country. Inoculation is strongly recommended when travelling to regions of poor general hygiene.
NOTE: Crew members shall not fly within 48 hours after inoculation. Inoculation may be followed by a slight
general feverish reaction.
Cholera
Geographical Distribution: Outbreaks of the disease usually are explosive and limited. Cholera is endemic in
many areas of Asia.
Transmission: Cholera is spread by the ingestion of water and foods contaminated by the excrement of patients.
Symptoms: Sudden onset. Initial symptoms are nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea, with variable degrees of fever
and abdominal pain. If diarrhoea is severe the resultant dehydration may lead to intense thirst, muscle cramps
and weakness.
Prognosis: In many cases the outlook depends largely on early and adequate therapy.
Preventative Treatment: Strict hygiene of food and drink. In many countries cholera has been controlled by the
purification of water supplies and proper disposal of human excrement.
Ebola
Geographical Distribution: Africa, especially West Africa (for example, but not limited to: Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria,
Senegal and Sierra Leone.)
Transmission: Transmission requires direct contact with blood, secretions, other body fluid or tissues of infected
persons, or with infected dead bodies or animals, all unlikely exposures for the average traveller. Travellers are
strongly advised to avoid all such contacts.
People are infectious as long as their blood and secretions contain the virus. Men who have recovered from the
disease can still transmit the virus through their semen for up to 7 weeks after recovery from illness.
Symptoms: The most common symptoms experienced by persons infected with the virus are the sudden onset
of fever, intense weakness, muscle pain, headache and sore throat. This is followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, rash,
impaired kidney and liver function, and, at an advanced stage, may include both internal and external bleeding.
Laboratory findings include low white blood cells and platelet counts and elevated liver enzymes.
Malaria, typhoid fever, shigellosis, leptospirosis, yellow fever, dengue and other viral haemorrhagic fevers are
among the differential diagnoses to consider in these patients
Preventative Treatment:
1. In affected countries: Avoid contacts with blood, secretions, other body fluids or tissues of persons or animals.
Avoid physical contact with dead or alive animals in affected countries. Avoid physical contacts with dead bodies
of persons, and avoid physical contact with suspected infected persons.
2. On the airplane: There is a possibility that a person who has been exposed to Ebola virus and developed
symptoms may board a commercial flight or other mode of transport, without informing the transport
company of his/her status.
Crew shall immediately apply precautionary and protective measures according to EVD protocol:
• Distancing other passengers if possible and reseating them away from the symptomatic passenger, placing
the ill traveller preferably near a toilet for his/her exclusive use;
• Covering the nose and mouth of the patient with a medical facemask (if tolerated), if there are respiratory
symptoms (e.g. coughing or sneezing). If the mask cannot be tolerated, the sick passenger shall be provided
with tissues and asked to cover his/her mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing and to perform hand hygiene
thereafter;
• Providing the sick passenger with a plastic bag for disposing used tissues and an air sickness bag, if
experiencing nausea or vomiting;
• Storing soiled items (used tissues, face masks, linen, pillows, blankets, seat pocket items, etc.) in a biohazard
bag if one is available. If not, using a sealed plastic bag and labelling it “biohazard”;
• Limiting contacts of the passenger to the minimum necessary. Only one (or two if a sick passenger requires
more assistance) cabin crew shall care for the ill passenger and preferably only cabin crew that have already
had contact with that passenger. This cabin crew member or anyone in direct contact with the sick passenger
shall be using the universal precaution kit. They shall wear gloves and perform hand hygiene after removing
them;
• Instructing crew members to perform hand hygiene by hand rubbing with an alcohol-based hand-rub solution
for about 20-30 seconds or hand-washing with soap and water for about 40-60 seconds if hands are visibly dirty,
after any direct contact with the sick passenger or with his/her personal belongings or any objects/surface
potentially contaminated with blood or body fluids from the sick passenger, and after removing gloves. If gloved
hands are visibly dirty with body fluids (e.g. vomit) gloves shall be removed at the site of the sick passenger and
hand hygiene performed immediately.
The possibility of transmission to other passengers and crew on board the aircraft shall be assessed by health
care providers on arrival. If the investigation concludes that the passenger has symptoms compatible with EVD
and has travelled and or stayed in a country that has reported at least one confirmed case of EVD within a period
of 21 days before the onset of symptoms, passengers and crew members may be at risk if they have had direct
contact with the affected individual or his/her body fluids or heavily contaminated objects.
COMMANDER SHALL ASK THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE HEALTH EXPERTS TO ASSIST
HYGIENE AND DISINFECTION FOR CREW AND PASSENGERS.
THE AIRPLANE WILL BE GROUNDED UNTIL DISINFECTED ACCORDING WHO GUIDELINES WHICH ARE
AVAILABLE ON E-KERMAS, - DOCUMENTATION – HEALTH PRECAUTIONS.
Dysentery
Definition: An acute infection of the bowel, characterised by frequent passage of stools accompanied by
abdominal cramps, malaise and fever.
Source of Infection: Excreta of infected individuals. Organisms are spread from individual to individual by the
direct faecal-oral route. Indirect spread by contaminated food and inanimate objects is common, but water-borne
disease is rare. Flies serve as carriers. Epidemics occur most frequently in overcrowded populations with
inadequate sanitation. It is particularly common in younger children living in endemic areas, whereas adults of
these regions are relatively resistant to infection and usually have less severe disease.
Symptoms: Depends on severity. May have painful colic diarrhoea. May also have a raised temperature and
vomiting. The disease usually shows great individual variation.
Preventative Treatment: There is no effective inoculation. Strict hygiene of food and drink.
Treatment: There are many effective medicines available for disinfection of the gastro-intestinal tract. It is advised
to consult a doctor.
Yellow Fever
Definition: An acute infectious virus disease occurring in tropical and sub-tropical zones.
Geographical Distribution: Particularly in tropical Africa and South and Central America. Unknown in Asia.
Causative Organism: The virus that causes the disease is transmitted by the bite of a female mosquito which
previously has become infected through feeding on the blood of a patient during the early stages of an attack.
Symptoms: Characterised by sudden onset of fever with relatively slow pulse, a flushed face, infected eyes,
congested gums, red and pointed tongue. Vomiting and constipation are common. Jaundice appears after the
third day.
Testing personnel shall inform the crew about the consequences of test refusal and in any case, the concerned crew
member shall not be allowed to continue his/her duty.
Follow up is the same as for a positive confirmation test.
6.2.1.4 Notification to National Competent Authority (NCA)
ETF AIRWAYS shall notify, in addition to CCAA, CAA of the crew positive test confirmed providing:
▪ the State of Licence issue; (only for flight crew)
▪ pilot’s licence number; (only for flight crew)
▪ medical certificate number; (if available)
▪ name of flight crew licence holder or name of cabin crew
▪ result of the breath alcohol concentration (BrAC) testing (the references of the device used for the measure) and the
time and date of the test, or
▪ the result of medical, clinical laboratory psychoactive substances test
▪ the limit of alcohol concentration (either BrAC or BAC) not complied with, and
▪ any other document required
A refusal of test is notified in the same way as a positive case, except for the result of test which is replaced by an indication
of the refusal.
6.2.1.5 Internal appeal process
A positively tested crew member or personnel is entitled to appeal the result.
Application for appeal shall be submitted to the Flight Operations Manager with medical documentation supporting the
appeal.
Appeal shall be evaluated by a commission made by:
▪ Safety Manager
▪ Flight Operations Manager
▪ person in charge of Human Resources
▪ An Aero-Medical Examiner (AME) or a professional with similar expertise
The result of the appeal process shall be communicated to the appealer and to Authorities.
When the result appears on the device display, the testing personnel shall inform the tested crew member of the result.
An initial alcohol test result is considered negative when the breath alcohol concentration (BrAC), measured by a breath
alcohol tester is lower or equal to the equivalent level of 0.2 grams of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) per litre of blood
or the national statutory limit, whichever is the lower.
An initial alcohol test result is considered positive when the breath alcohol concentration (BrAC), measured by a breath
alcohol tester is higher than the equivalent level of 0.2 grams of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) per litre of blood or the
national statutory limit, whichever is the lower.
Since, in case of positive first alcohol test a second test will be required, the exact time of the initial and confirmation test
shall be noted (if not automatically noted by testing device).
6.2.2.1 Negative test
In case of negative initial test, no further actions are required, and the tested crew member will be allowed to resume
her/his duties normally.
6.2.2.2 Positive test
In case of a positive result, a confirmation test shall be performed.
After an initial positive test, crew members may react emotionally due to disbelief, fear of loss of licence/certificate, fear
of loss of job, sense of shame, delays, sanctions, etc.
Aromatic beverages (e.g., fruit juices), alcoholic mouth sprays, medical juices and drops, and belching and vomiting may
corrupt the alcohol test results and trigger false positive. Therefore, in the case of a positive initial alcohol test, a
confirmation test will always be performed. The confirmation test shall be performed at least 15 minutes but not more than
30 minutes after the completion of the initial test. Confirmation testing shall be conducted as soon as possible after the
15-minute delay.
During this time the crew is still on duty but the testing personnel must observe the tested crew member to ascertain that
he/she does not eat or drink or ingest anything. If the crew member disregards this requirement in such a manner that it
prevents the conduct of the confirmation test within the 30 minutes, this can be considered as a lack of cooperation to the
test and could be considered as a refusal to the test.
Where compatible with the testing procedures, and if requested by the crew member, the crew member shall have the
option of asking a witness/work colleague to observe the test.
The general principles previously mentioned for the initial test remain.
▪ Selection of the location of the test (confidentiality criteria).
▪ The operational status and suitability of the device.
▪ The original packaging and opening procedures of the mouthpiece.
6.2.2.3 Confirmation test results
A confirmation test result is considered negative when the breath alcohol concentration (BrAC), measured by a breath
alcohol tester is lower or equal to the equivalent level of 0.2 grams of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) per litre of blood
or the national statutory limit, whichever is the lower.
A confirmation test result is considered positive when the breath alcohol concentration (BrAC), measured by a breath
alcohol tester is higher than the equivalent level of 0.2 grams of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) per litre of blood or the
national statutory limit, whichever is the lower.
6.2.2.4 Negative confirmation test
When an initial positive test is followed by a negative confirmation test, the overall result of the test shall be negative. No
further actions are required.
The tested crew member can resume her/his duties.
6.2.2.5 Positive confirmation test
As soon as the test result is known and is positive, the tested crew member shall be informed about the result and that
she/he shall not be permitted to resume her/his duties.
Positive tested flight crew have the possibility to ask for a test in a medical/clinical approved laboratory, which test shall
be evaluated by a professional taking into account the time delay from the initial positive test and the crew member will
not be allowed to resume duties even if this test result is negative.
6.2.2.6 Positive tests follow up
In case of positive test confirmation, testing personnel shall coordinate the immediate corrective actions before departure.
Such coordination shall be done with the representative of ETF AIRWAYS or, if not available, with the commander. In
case the commander is under the influence of alcohol, testing personnel shall inform the representative of ETF AIRWAYS
or, in his absence, ETF AIRWAYS’s Operations Control Center (OCC).
Upon a crew positive confirmation test Operations Control Center (OCC) shall:
▪ Remove the tested positive crew member from duties
▪ Inform Flight Operations Manager about the positive confirmation test
▪ Evaluate possible scenario for the flight (Replacement of crew member, restrictions on number of passengers, flight
cancellation, etc.)
Before they can be re-admitted for duty a crew member who tests positive shall:
▪ Have an interview with Support Program Manager, supported by a
professional, if needed, that will assess the condition of the crew member and decide if to release him/her for normal flight
duties or other actions.
All personnel involved in the program (Support Programme Manager, mental health professionals and peers) have signed
a confidentiality agreement and are trained on data protection law.
A culture of mutual trust and cooperation shall be maintained so that the flight crew is less likely to hide a condition and
more likely to report and seek help.
Disclosure of data may only be granted in an anonymised manner such as in the form of aggregated statistical data and
only for purposes of safety management so as not to compromise the voluntary participation in a support programme,
thereby compromising flight safety.
In the unlikely event that an idea or conduct is detected that motivates a demonstrable concern about the safety of one’s
own safety or that of other people, a psychological health professional with relevant knowledge of the aviation
environment, shall assess the need to renounce confidentiality, complying with its ethical and legal code.
6.3.3.2 Facilitation of Trust
Ref: (GM2 CAT.GEN.MPA.215)
Essential trust between management and crew is the foundation for a successful support programme.
Trust shall be continuously improved through all available means, in particular:
▪ regular Support Programme Meetings must be held with the participation (as a minimum) of Flight Operations Manager,
Human Resource Manager and Safety Manager. The agenda of the meetings shall include a review of DE-IDENTIFIED
data from programme, review of procedures, improvements to develop, etc. Representative of CAA are invited to
participate if deemed necessary by the Support Programme Manager
▪ clear and unambiguous agreement on the use and protection of data will be part of the contract agreement between
ETF AIRWAYS and the flight crew
▪ application by senior managers of the safety commitment and non-punitive policy of the Support Programme
▪ allocating the necessary resources in terms of personnel and a communication system that will protect the confidentiality
of personal data
▪ providing an internal communication system to promote the benefits of Support Programme including the possibility to
be temporary relieved from duties without fear of dismissal and access to loss of licence insurance plans, if available.
6.3.4 Elements of the Support Programme
Ref: (AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.215, GM4 CAT.GEN.MPA.215)
The goal of the Support Programme shall be to enable prevention and early detection of issues and adequate advice and
support to the concerned crew member with the aim to enable the crew to return into service.
Due to the clear correlation between flight crew health and flight safety the Support Programme shall be linked to the
Safety Management System provide that data is used for purposes of safety management and is anonymised and
aggregated to ensure confidentiality.
6.3.4.1 Flight crew access to Support Program
All flight crew shall receive initial training and education regarding self-awareness and facilitation of self-referral.
Flight crew shall consider accessing Support Programme:
▪ at any stage after detecting that he/she is not feeling well by contacting Support Programme.
▪ when he/she is aware that another crew member may need help from Support Programme
Flight crews have the option to contact the Support Programme Manager that will treat the case directly or ask for the help
of a peer of confidence.
Beside the protection and confidentiality of data, flight crew have the possibility to establish an anonymous conversation.
Ref: (GM6 CAT.GEN.MPA.215)
Joining a support programme does not remove the flight crew’s obligation to seek aero-medical advice in case of a
decrease in medical fitness in accordance with MED.A.020 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011.
6.3.4.2 Involvement of peers
Peers are volunteer pilots, carefully selected, and trained to tackle and accompany in complex situations. They are
persons with a high capacity for empathy and the ability to actively listen to anyone who seeks their help.
They are bound with the same level of confidentiality as any other medical professional.
Once a request is assigned to a peer, he/she will have access to contact information to be able to contact the flight crew
to begin the intervention. Only the assigned peer and the Support Programme Manager shall have access to flight crew
data.
6.3.4.3 Monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme
Support Programme Manager is responsible to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme. Monitoring
includes as a minimum the collection and analysis of following data:
▪ No. of applications received per quarter,
▪ No. of cases that were solved only by Peers,
▪ No. of cases that needed Mental Health Experts intervention,
▪ No. of encounters were needed between Peer and pilot to solve the cases,
▪ What kind of issues pilots are facing when they apply for support. This information must be given generalized – in general
categories that assure.
Data is maintained by Support Programme Manager and provided that, data is used for purposes of safety management
and is anonymised and aggregated to ensure confidentiality, may be presented to during support programme meetings.
6.3.4.4 Monitoring and support of the process of returning to work
In case a flight crew accessing the Support Programme has been relieved from flight duties, his/her return to flight duties
shall be approved by the Support Programme Manager.
6.3.4.5 Risks resulting from fear of loss of licence
The risk of losing the licence due to decreased medical fitness, even temporary, is recognised to be one of major obstacles
to access the Support Programme.
It’s ETF AIRWAYS’s commitment to manage this risk through the possibility to offer:
▪ voluntary loss of licence plans
▪ preference on hiring flight crew who lost medical fitness for other company position
6.3.4.6 Referral to an an aero-medical examiner
In the event of cases raising serious safety concern, the Support Programme Manager shall:
▪ immediately contact Flight Operations Manager for relieving the flight crew from flight duties
▪ ask, if deemed necessary, assistance from mental and psychological health professionals with relevant knowledge of
the aviation environment
▪ convene a Support Programme Meeting with the participation of Flight Operations Manager, Human Resource Manager
the Safety Manager and the mental or psychological health professional, if required
▪ if the mental and psychological health professional has recommended the deferral to an Aero-Medical Examiner (AME),
Flight Operations Manager of Human Resources Manager shall inform the concerned flight crew
▪ flight crew shall be relieved from any flight duty until he/she present a new valid medical certificate
6.3.5 Training and Awareness
Ref: (AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.170(b), AMC4 CAT.GEN.MPA.215, GM3 CAT.GEN.MPA.215)
ETF AIRWAYS promotes the access to the support programme for all flight crew.
Professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals, as well as trained peers involved in the support
programme, shall receive initial and recurrent training related to their role and function within the support programme.
6.3.5.1 Training elements – crew members
All crew members shall attend a training programme on the prevention of misuse of psychoactive substances.
In addition all flight crew shall attend an initial support programme training.
Training will be held by Support Programme Manager or a person considered by him/her adequate.
Flight Crew- Syllabus - Initial Duration
the effects of psychoactive substances on individuals and on flight safety Flight Crew and
ETF AIRWAYS’s procedures to prevent misuse of psychoactive substance Cabin Crew
individual responsibility of the crew member 1 hour CLASS
testing procedures or
VIRTUAL CLASS
assistance provided by the support programme
positive impacts of a support programme
awareness of job stressors and life stressors — mental fitness and mental health
coping strategies Flight Crew
medication use (prescribed and over-the-counter medication) to ensure the safe exercise of 3 hours CLASS
the privileges of the licence whilst taking medication or VIRTUAL CLASS
early recognition of mental unfitness
principles and availability of a support programme
data protection and confidentiality principles
cases where information shall be disclosed due to an immediate and evident safety threat and in
the interest of public safety
Psychological assessment structure and content once validate shall be considered valid unless the nominated
psychologist deems necessary to review and revalidate the test, following:
▪ company dimension change
▪ changes on the PC-based psychometric test
▪ any other factor at discretion of the nominated psychologist
Content:
7 FLIGHT TIME LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................... 2
7.1 FLIGHT AND DUTY TIME LIMITATIONS AND REST REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................... 2
7.1.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................................................................2
7.1.2 RESPONSIBILITIES ..........................................................................................................................................................................................5
7.1.3 CUMULATIVE DUTY HOURS AND FLIGHT TIMES ...........................................................................................................................................7
7.1.4 STANDARD REPORTING TIME .......................................................................................................................................................................7
7.1.5 OTHER THAN STANDARD REPORTING TIME .................................................................................................................................................7
7.1.6 DELAYED REPORTING TIME ...........................................................................................................................................................................8
7.1.7 MAXIMUM DAILY FDP FOR ACCLIMATISED CREW ........................................................................................................................................9
7.1.8 MAXIMUM DAILY FDP FOR CREW IN UNKNOWN STATE OF ACCLIMATISATION ..........................................................................................9
7.1.9 NIGHT DUTIES ...............................................................................................................................................................................................9
7.1.10 POSITIONING...............................................................................................................................................................................................9
7.1.11 EXTENSION OF MAXIMUM DAILY FDP ......................................................................................................................................................10
7.1.12 REST PERIOD .............................................................................................................................................................................................11
7.1.13 STANDBY, RESERVE AND DUTIES AT THE AIRPORT ...................................................................................................................................13
7.1.14 NUTRITION ................................................................................................................................................................................................14
7.1.15 RECORDS ...................................................................................................................................................................................................14
7.2 UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS – COMMANDER’S DISCRETION .................................................... 15
7.3 FATIGUE MANAGEMENT TRAINING .................................................................................................................................... 16
7.1.1 INTRODUCTION
ETF has established, implemented and maintain flight time specification scheme that is appropriate for ETF type of
operation. Scheme complies with Regulation (EC) No 2018/1139, Subpart FTL from Annex III of (EU) No. 965/2012,
Directive 2000/79/EC and certification specifications adopted by EASA.
This chapter prescribes ETF responsibilities, crew member responsibilities, flight and duty time specification scheme
with regards to flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements for ETF crew members.
7.1.1.2 USE OF LEON SYSTEM
Crew roster is prepared in accordance with this OM chapter and roster is always published in Leon system for the next
14 days.
Each crew member is provided with Leon system login credentials and crew members are obliged to check their roster
on a daily basis except when they are off.
All references to time, including dates, are based on Universal Time Coordinated (UTC).
The following abbreviations for crew member’s activities are used in roster:
Abbreviation Description
AS Airport Standby
S Other Standby
R Reserve
O Office
T Training
Sim Simulator
OFF Day Off, Requested Day Off
SL Sick Leave
H Vacation
7.1.1.3 DEFINITIONS
Term Definition
Acclimatised A state in which a crew member's circadian biological clock is synchronized to the time
zone where the crew member is.
A crew member is considered to be acclimatised to a 2-hour wide time zone surrounding
the local time at the point of departure.
Reference time Local time at the reporting point situated in a 2 hours wide time zone band around the
local time where a crew member is acclimatised.
Example: if a crew member is acclimatised to the local time in Helsinki and reports for
duty in London. The reference time is the local time in London.
Term Definition
Accommodation For the purpose of standby and split duty, a quiet and comfortable place not open to the
public with the ability to control light and temperature, equipped with adequate furniture
that provides a crew member with the possibility to sleep, with enough capacity to
accommodate all crew members present at the same time and with access to food and
drink.
Adequate furniture for crew member accommodation shall include a seat that reclines at
least 45° back angle to the vertical, has a seat width of at least 20 inches (50cm) and
provides leg and foot support.
Suitable For the purpose of standby, split duty and rest, a separate room for each crew member
accommodation located in a quiet environment and equipped with a bed, which is sufficiently ventilated,
has a device for regulating temperature and light intensity, and access to food and drink.
Break Period of time within a flight duty period, shorter than a rest period, counting as duty and
during which a crew member is free of all tasks.
Delayed reporting The postponement of a scheduled FDP by ETF before a crew member has left the place of
rest.
Disruptive schedule A crew member’s roster which disrupts the sleep opportunity during the optimal sleep
time window by comprising an FDP or a combination of FDPs which encroach, start or
finish during any portion of the day or of the night where a crew member is acclimatised.
A schedule may be disruptive due to early starts, late finishes or night duties.
ETF apply “early type” of disruptive schedule which means:
• for “early start” a duty period starting in the period between 05:00 and 05:59 in the
time zone to which a crew member is acclimatised; and
• for “late finish” a duty period finishing in the period between 23:00 and 01:59 in the
time zone to which a crew member is acclimatised;
If a crew member is acclimatised to the local time at his/her home base, the local time at
the home base shall be used to consider an FDP as ‘disruptive schedule’. This applies to
operations within the 2-hour wide time zone surrounding the local time at the home base,
if a crew member is acclimatised to the local time at his/her home base.
Night duty A duty period encroaching any portion of the period between 02:00 and 04:59 in the time
zone to which the crew is acclimatised.
Duty Any task that a crew member performs for ETF, including flight duty, administrative work,
giving or receiving training and checking, positioning, and some elements of standby.
Duty period A period which starts when a crew member is required by ETF to report for or to
commence a duty and ends when that person is free of all duties, including post-flight
duty. Standard time for post flight duties is 30 minutes.
Flight duty period A period that commences when a crew member is required to report for duty, which
(‘FDP’) includes a sector or a series of sectors, and finishes when the aircraft finally comes to rest
and the engines are shut down, at the end of the last sector on which the crew member
acts as an operating crew member.
Flight time The time between an aircraft first moving from its parking place for the purpose of taking
off until it comes to rest on the designated parking position and all engines or propellers
are shut down.
Term Definition
Home base Location assigned by ETF to the crew member, from where the crew member normally
starts and ends a duty period or a series of duty periods and where, under normal
circumstances, ETF is not responsible for the accommodation of the crew member
concerned.
Local day A 24-hour period commencing at 00:00 local time.
Local night A period of 8 hours falling between 22:00 and 08:00 local time.
Operating crew A crew member carrying out duties in an aircraft during a sector.
member
A person on board an aircraft is either a crew member or a passenger. If a crew member
is not a passenger on board an aircraft he/she shall be considered as ‘carrying out duties’.
Positioning Means the transferring of a non-operating crew member from one place to another, at
the behest of the operator, excluding:
• the time of travel from a private place of rest to the designated reporting place at home
base and vice versa, and
• the time for local transfer from a place of rest to the commencement of duty and vice
versa.
Rest facility A bunk or seat with leg and foot support suitable for crew members’ sleeping on board
an aircraft.
Reserve A period of time during which a crew member is required by ETF to be available to receive
an assignment for an FDP, positioning or other duty notified at least 10 hours in advance.
Rest period A continuous, uninterrupted and defined period of time, following duty or prior to duty,
during which a crew member is free of all duties, standby and reserve.
Rotation A duty or a series of duties, including at least one flight duty, and rest periods out of home
base, starting at home base and ending when returning to home base for a rest period
where ETF is no longer responsible for the accommodation of the crew member.
Single day free of duty For the purpose of complying with the provisions of Council Directive 2000/79/EC, a time
free of all duties and standby consisting of one day and two local nights, which is notified
in advance. A rest period may be included as part of the single day free of duty.
Sector The segment of an FDP between an aircraft first moving for the purpose of taking off until
it comes to rest after landing on the designated parking position.
Standby A pre-notified and defined period of time during which a crew member is required by the
operator to be available to receive an assignment for a flight, positioning or other duty
without an intervening rest period;
Airport standby A standby performed at the airport. Airport standby counts also as a duty period.
Other standby A standby either at home or in a suitable accommodation.
Window of circadian Period between 02:00 and 05:59 hours in the time zone to which a crew member is
low (‘WOCL’) acclimatised.
Term Definition
Fatigue A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from
sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload (mental and/or physical
activity) that can impair a crew member’s alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft
or perform safety related duties.
7.1.1.4 ACCLIMATISATION
A crew member remains acclimatised to the local time of his/her reference time during 47 hours 59 minutes after
reporting no matter how many time zones he/she has crossed.
When the local time at the place where a duty commences differs by more than 2 hours from the local time at the
place where the next duty starts, the crew member, for the calculation of the maximum daily flight duty period, is
considered to be acclimatised in accordance with the values in the following table:
<4 B D D D D
≥ 4 and ≤ 6 B X D D D
> 6 and ≤ 9 B X X D D
> 9 and ≤ 12 B X X X D
Where
- “B” means acclimatised to the local time of the departure time zone,
- “D” means acclimatised to the local time where the crew member starts his/her next duty, and
ETF will assign in Leon system single airport location as a home base for each crew member. In case of operational
needs, home base can be changed and in that case ETF will inform crew members at least 14 days in advance.
Before starting duty at the new home base, recurrent extended recovery rest period of at least 72 hours containing
three local nights shall be planned. Travelling time between the former home base and the new home base is
positioning.
Crew planning department will set assigned home base in Leon system for each crew member.
7.1.2 RESPONSIBILITIES
7.1.2.1 ETF RESPONSIBILITIES
• Crew planning department will publish duty rosters 14 days in advance in order to provide the opportunity for
crew members to plan adequate rest.
• Crew planning department is responsible to ensure that flight duties are planned in a way that enables crew
members to remain sufficiently free from fatigue so that they can operate to a satisfactory level of safety under
all circumstances. Flight Operations Manager is responsible for implementation / adoption of corrective actions
based on analysis and investigations.
• Specify reporting times that allow sufficient time for ground duties.
• Crew planning department takes into account the relationship between the frequency and pattern of flight duty
periods and rest periods and give consideration to the cumulative effects of undertaking long duty hours
combined with minimum rest periods.
• Crew planning department will allocate duty patterns in accordance with rules prescribed in this chapter which
shall avoid practices that cause as serious disruption of an established sleep / work pattern such as alternating
day-night duties.
• Crew planning department is responsible to comply with the provisions concerning disruptive schedules as
described in this chapter.
• Crew planning department will in accordance with this chapter provide rest periods of sufficient time to enable
crew members to overcome the effects of the previous duties and to be rested by the start of the following FDP.
• Crew planning department will plan recurrent extended recovery rest periods in accordance with this chapter
and notify crew members sufficiently in advance.
• Crew planning department will plan flight duties in order to be completed within the allowable flight duty period
taking into account the time necessary for pre-flight duties, the sector and turnaround times.
• Compliance Manager shall monitor that the actual operations does not exceed the maximum flight duty period
on more than 33 % of the flight duties in that schedule during the IATA seasonal period. In case that it is
exceeded, Compliance Manager shall initiate corrective / preventive actions process. FOM is responsible for
initiation and crew planning department is responsible for implementation of corrective/preventive actions.
• Compliance Manager monitors rotations and combinations of rotations in terms of their effect on crew member
fatigue and crew planning department adopts the rosters as necessary.
7.1.2.2 SCHEDULING
Scheduling has an important impact on a crew member’s ability to sleep and to maintain a proper level of alertness.
When developing a workable roster, ETF will strike a fair balance between the commercial needs and the capacity of
individual crew members to work effectively. ETF will develop roster in such a way that amount of work is evenly
distributed among those that are involved.
Schedules will allow for flights to be completed within the maximum permitted flight duty period and flight rosters
will take into account the time needed for preflight duties, taxiing, the flight- and turnaround times. Other factors
taken into consideration during roster preparation include:
1) Allocation of work patterns which avoid undesirable practices such as alternating day/night duties, alternating
eastward-westward or westward-eastward time zone transitions, positioning of crew members so that a serious
disruption of established sleep/work patterns occurs.
2) Scheduling sufficient rest periods especially after long flights crossing many time zones; and
3) Preparation of duty rosters sufficiently in advance with planning of recurrent extended recovery rest periods and
notification of the crew members well in advance to plan adequate pre-duty rest.
to ensure that the requirement for robust roster (maximum 33% of flights in exceedance) is observed.
7.1.2.4 CREW MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES
The crew member shall comply with all flight and duty time limitations (FTL) and rest requirements applicable to their
activities.
When undertaking duties for more than one operator, crew member shall maintain his/her individual records
regarding flight and duty times and rest periods as referred to in applicable FTL requirements and will provide each
operator with the date needed to schedule activities in accordance with the applicable FTL requirements.
The crew member shall not perform duties on an aircraft if he/she knows or suspects that he/she is suffering from
fatigue or feels otherwise unfit, to the extent that the flight may be endangered.
Crew members shall make optimum use of the opportunities and facilities for rest provided and plan and use their
rest periods properly.
If the travelling time from their residence to their assigned home base usually exceeds 90 minutes, crew members
shall make arrangements for temporary accommodation closer to their home base.
The total duty periods to which a crew member may be assigned shall not exceed:
• 60 duty hours in any 7 consecutive days;
• 110 duty hours in any 14 consecutive days; and
• 190 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days, spread as evenly as practicable throughout that period.
The total flight time of the sectors on which an individual crew member is assigned as an operating crew member shall
not exceed:
• 100 hours of flight time in any 28 consecutive days;
• 900 hours of flight time in any calendar year; and
• 1 000 hours of flight time in any 12 consecutive calendar months.
Standard reporting time and reporting locations are defined in below table:
Commercial flight with passengers and ferry flights 60 minutes Briefing room or airport of departure
When ground transportation is followed by operating sector, it will be planned in a way to allow minimum sufficient
time of 60 minutes for pre-flight duties.
a) Whenever cabin crew requires more time than the flight crew for their pre-flight briefing for the same sector
or series of sectors, the FDP of the cabin crew may be extended by the difference in reporting time between the cabin
crew and the flight crew. The difference shall not exceed 1 hour. The maximum daily FDP for cabin crew shall be based
on the time at which the flight crew report for their FDP, but the FDP shall start at the reporting time of the cabin
crew.
b) By decision of the operator – for some special flights, time required for cabin and/or cockpit preparation can
take longer than for normal flights and in that case Crew planning in coordination with Flight Operations Manager can
decide to define reporting time which will be earlier that standard reporting time.
ETF may delay reporting time in the event of unforeseen circumstances in accordance with procedures prescribed in
this chapter and will keep records of delayed reporting.
In case of delayed reporting time, crew members will be notified by Crew planning department or OCC by phone call,
e-mail or SMS about new reporting time. Each notification must be acknowledged by crew member directly by phone
or by sending e-mail or SMS confirmation message to OCC.
In case planned reporting time fall in the period between 22:00 and 08:00 local time, notification to crew members
will be sent approximately 1 hour before reporting time in order to avoid interference with crew members sleeping
patterns.
During period from 08:00 and 22:00, crew members will be informed as soon as delay information is available to OCC
and crew planning department.
When crew member is informed about delayed reporting time, the FDP is calculated as follows:
a) one notification of a delay leads to the calculation of the maximum FDP according to c) or d).
b) if the reporting time is further amended, the FDP starts counting 1 hour after the second notification or at the
original delayed reporting time if this is earlier;
c) when the delay is less than 4 hours, the maximum FDP is calculated based on the original reporting time and the
FDP starts counting at the delayed reporting time;
d) when the delay is 4 hours or more, the maximum FDP is calculated based on the more limiting of the original or
the delayed reporting time and the FDP starts counting at the delayed reporting time.
As an exception to a) and b) above, when ETF informs the crew member of a delay of 10 hours or more in reporting
time and the crew member is not further disturbed by ETF, such delay of 10 hours or more counts as a rest period.
In Leon system, delayed reporting time needs to be adjusted manually by using Crew duty and FDP section.
0600-1329 13:00 12:30 12:00 11:30 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00
1330-1359 12:45 12:15 11:45 11:15 10:45 10:15 09:45 09:15 09:00
1400–1429 12:30 12:00 11:30 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00 09:00
1430–1459 12:15 11:45 11:15 10:45 10:15 09:45 09:15 09:00 09:00
1500–1529 12:00 11:30 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00 09:00 09:00
1530–1559 11:45 11:15 10:45 10:15 09:45 09:15 09:00 09:00 09:00
1600–1629 11:30 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00 09:00 09:00 09:00
1630–1659 11:15 10:45 10:15 09:45 09:15 09:00 09:00 09:00 09:00
1700–04*59 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00 09:00 09:00 09:00 09:00
0500–0514 12:00 11:30 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00 09:00 09:00
0515–0529 12:15 11:45 11:15 10:45 10:15 09:45 09:15 09:00 09:00
0530–0544 12:30 12:00 11:30 11:00 10:30 10:00 09:30 09:00 09:00
0545–0559 12:45 12:15 11:45 11:15 10:45 10:15 09:45 09:15 09:00
When establishing the maximum FDP for consecutive night duties, the number of sectors is limited to 4 sectors per
duty.
ETF applies appropriate fatigue risk management to actively manage the fatiguing effect of night duties of more than
10 hours in relation to the surrounding duties and rest periods in accordance with the following:
• Avoiding long night duties after extended recovery rest periods
• Progressively delaying the rostered ending time of the FDPs preceding long night duties;
• Starting a block of night duties with a shorter FDP; and
• Avoiding the sequence of early starts and long night duties.
Experience in ETF operation as well as industry operational experience or bio.mathematical models may be applied to
the rostering of long night duties.
7.1.10 POSITIONING
Positioning after reporting but prior to operating shall be counted as FDP but shall not count as a sector. All time spent
on positioning shall count as duty period.
Maximum daily FDP can be extended not more than twice in any 7 consecutive days by using only one of the following:
• Extended FDP for acclimatised crew as defined in 7.1.11.1
• Split duty as defined in 7.1.11.2
When extensions are used for consecutive FDPs, the additional pre- and post-flight rest between the two extended
FDPs shall be provided consecutively.
The use of the extension shall be planned in advance, and shall be limited to a maximum of:
• 5 sectors when the WOCL is not encroached; or
• 4 sectors, when the WOCL is encroached by 2 hours or less; or
• 2 sectors, when the WOCL is encroached by more than 2 hours.
Extension of the maximum basic daily FDP without in-flight rest shall not be combined with extensions due to split
duty in the same duty period.
7.1.11.1 EXTENDED DAILY FDP FOR ACCLIMATISED CREW
Maximum daily FDP for acclimatised crew members with the use of extensions is defined in below table:
Table 1 Extended daily FDP for acclimatised crew:
Starting time of FDP 1–2 sectors (in hours) 3 sectors (in hours) 4 sectors (in hours) 5 sectors (in hours)
0600–0614 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0615–0629 13:15 12:45 12:15 11:45
0630–0644 13:30 13:00 12:30 12:00
0645–0659 13:45 13:15 12:45 12:15
0700–1329 14:00 13:30 13:00 12:30
1330–1359 13:45 13:15 12:45 Not allowed
1400–1429 13:30 13:00 12:30 Not allowed
1430–1459 13:15 12:45 12:15 Not allowed
1500–1529 13:00 12:30 12:00 Not allowed
1530–1559 12:45 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1600–1629 12:30 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1630–1659 12:15 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1700–1729 12:00 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1730–1759 11:45 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1800–1829 11:30 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1830–1859 11:15 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
1900–0359 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0400–0414 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0415–0429 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0430–0444 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0445–0459 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0500–0514 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0515–0529 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0530–0544 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
0545–0559 Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed
The maximum FDP specified in 7.1.7 can be extended due to break on the ground by up to 50% of the duration of the
break provided:
• Split duty which encroach period between 02:00 and 04:59 local time at which crew member is acclimatised is
limited to 10 hours.
• The break on the ground within the FDP has a minimum duration of three consecutive hours. The break count in
full as FDP.
• The break excludes time required for post and pre-flight duties as well as time required for travelling.
• Minimum time for post and pre-flight duties and traveling is 30 minutes (15 minutes before and 15 minutes after
break) as shown in figure below.
• Suitable accommodation is provided either for break of 6 hour or more or for a break that encroaches WOCL. In
other cases, accommodation shall be provided and in those cases any time of the actual break exceeding 6 hours
or any time of the break that encroaches WOCL doesn’t count for the extension of FDP.
• If traveling time to the adequate facilities or suitable accommodation exceeds one hour (total both directions),
any excess over one hour total is not considered as the break.
• Split duty shall not follow a reduced rest.
If a transition from a late finish/night duty to an early start is planned at home base, the rest period between the 2
FDPs will include 1 local night.
If crew member performs 4 or more night duties, early starts or late finishes between 2 extended recovery rest periods,
the second extended recovery rest period is extended to 60 hours.
7.1.12.2 MINIMUM REST PERIOD AT HOME BASE
The minimum rest period provided before undertaking an FDP starting at home base shall be at least as long as the
preceding duty period, or 12 hours, whichever is greater.
When ETF provides suitable accommodation to crewmembers at home base, minimum rest period defined in 7.1.12.3
will apply.
If transition from late finish or night duty to an early start is planned at home base, the rest period between the two
FDPs shall include one local night.
The minimum rest period provided before undertaking an FDP starting away from home base shall be at least as long
as the preceding duty period, or 10 hours, whichever is greater. This period shall include an 8-hour sleep opportunity
in addition to the time required for travelling and physiological needs.
The time allowed for physiological needs is 1 hour. Consequently, if the traveling time to the suitable accommodation
is more than 30 minutes, rest period will be incresed by twice the amount of difference of travelling time above 30
minutes.
7.1.12.4 RECURRENT EXTENDED RECOVERY REST PERIODS
The minimum recurrent extended recovery rest period shall be 36 hours, including 2 local nights, and in any case the
time between the end of one recurrent extended recovery rest period and the start of the next extended recovery
rest period shall not be more than 168 hours. The recurrent extended recovery rest period shall be increased to 2 local
days twice every month.
7.1.12.5 TIME ZONE DIFFERENCES
At home base, if rotation involves a 4 hour time difference or more, the minimum rest is as specified in the following
table:
Minimum local nights of rest at home base to compensate for time zone differences
Max time difference between reference Time elapsed [h] since reporting for the first FDP in a rotation involving at least 4
time and local time where a crew member hour time difference to the reference time
rests during a rotation < 48:00 48:00 – 71:59 72:00-95:59 ≥ 96:00
≤6 2 2 3 3
>6 and ≤ 9 2 3 3 4
>9 and ≤ 12 2 3 4 5
The time elapsed since reporting for a rotation involving at least a 4-hour time difference to the reference time stops
counting when the crew member returns to his/her home base for a rest period during which the ETF is no longer
responsible for the accommodation of the crew member.
Away from home base if FDP involves a 4 hour time difference or more, the minimum rest following that FDP is at least
as long as the preceding duty period, or 14 hours, whichever is greater.
When ETF provides suitable accommodation at home base, minimum rest defined in previous paragraph apply but is
limited to only once between 2 recurrent extended recovery periods.
The time elapsed since reporting at reference time refers to the time elapsed since reporting for the first time at home
base for a rotation.
In case of an Eastward-Westward or Westward-Eastward transition, at least three local nights of rest at home base
are provided between alternating rotations.
“Eastward-Westward and Westward-Eastward transition means the transition at home base between a rotation
crossing 6 or more time zones in one direction and a rotation crossing 4 or more time zones in the opposite direction”.
7.1.12.6 DAYS OFF
• At least 96 days in each calendar year which may include any rest period required by this chapter.
Standby, reserve or any other duty at the airport shall be planned in the roster.
Start and end time of standby or reserve period shall be defined and notified in advance to the crew members
concerned to provide them with the opportunity to plan adequate rest.
7.1.13.1 AIRPORT STANDBY
A crew member is considered on airport standby from reporting at the reporting point until the end of the notified
airport standby period. During that period, ETF will provide accommodation to the crew member.
16 hours is the maximum duration of airport standby or combined airport standby and assigned FDP as defined in
7.1.7 and 7.1.11.1.
For the purpose of calculation of rest period and cumulative duty hours, airport standby or any other duty at the
airport shall count in full as duty period.
FDP counts from the start of the FDP and maximum FDP is reduced by any time spent on standby in excess of 4 hours.
If not assigned to an FDP, airport standby is followed by applicable rest period as defined in 7.1.12.2, 7.1.12.3 or
7.1.12.4.
7.1.13.2 OTHER THAN AIRPORT STANDBY
When crew member is planned on other than airport standby, the following procedures apply:
• If other than airport standby encroach period between 22:00 and 08:00, crew members shall be at their homes
or at suitable accommodation provided by ETF. During that period crew member shall make optimum use of
opportunities and facilities for having rest and sleeping.
• When on other than airport standby, crew member shall be contactable.
• In case crew member is assigned to a duty within the period from 22:00 until 08:00, ETF will contact crew
members by phone not more than 1:30 hours before reporting time in order to reduce as much as possible
interference with sleeping period. All other assignments within mentioned period will be notified through Leon
system.
• It is shared responsibility of crew member and operator to ensure that combination of standby and FDP do not
lead to more than 18 hours awake time. Awake time is counted from 10:00 or from notification time whichever
is earlier. In case crew member was awake before 10:00 or before notification time, he/she needs to report this
to OCC or crew planning department. In that case maximum allowable FDP will be calculated in case by case
basis in order to ensure that combination of other than airport standby and FDP do not exceed 18 hours of
awake time.
• The maximum duration of other than airport standby is 16 hours.
• If minimum rest is provided between notification and reporting time, then this period is not counted as standby
for the purpose of calculation of cumulative duty time.
If minimum rest is not provided between notification and reporting time, then whole period from the start of standby
until reporting time counts as standby for the purpose of calculation of cumulative duty time.
25 % of time spent on standby other than airport standby counts as duty time for the purpose of calculation of
cumulative duty time.
Standby is followed by a rest period. If a crew member receives an assignment during standby other than airport
standby, the actual reporting time at the designated reporting point shall be used for the purpose of calculation of
minimum rest period.
If a minimum rest period is provided before reporting for the duty assigned during the other than airport standby, this
time period shall not count as standby duty.
Standby ceases when crew member reports at the designated reporting point.
a) If standby ceases within the first 6 hours or within the first 8 hours in case of FDP extension due to split duty,
the maximum FDP counts from reporting.
b) If standby ceases after the first 6 hours or after first 8 hours in case of FDP extension due to split duty, the
maximum FDP is reduced by the amount of standby time exceeding 6 hours or 8 hours in case of FDP extension due
to split duty.
c) If standby starts between 23:00 and 07:00, the time between 23:00 and 07:00 doesn’t count towards the
reduction of the FDP under a) and b) until the crew member is contacted by ETF.
Minimum response time between notification time and reporting time is 01:30 minutes
7.1.13.3 RESERVE
If crew member is assigned to a duty when on reserve, an assigned FDP counts from reporting time.
Reserve time doesn’t count as duty period for the purpose of calculation of:
• Minimum rest period
• Cumulative duty time
Maximum duration of reserve period is 16 hours and maximum number of consecutive reserve days is 6 provided
requirements for extended recovery rest period are met.
When on reserve, crew members will not be contacted in the period from 22:00 and 06:00 in order to protect 8 hours
sleep opportunity for crew members. Notification about assigned FDP will be sent to crew members by Crew planning
department or by OCC at least 10 hours before reporting time. Period from notification and reporting time may include
period between 22:00 and 06:00 during which crew is not contacted.
A crew member assigned to reserve must meet rest requirements for recurrent extended recovery rest period. Reserve
period that does not result in a duty period, cannot be retrospectively considered as part of recurrent extended
recovery rest period.
7.1.14 NUTRITION
ETF will ensure one meal opportunity for each FDP longer than 6 hours and two meal opportunities for each FDP longer
than 9 hours.
Whenever possible, meal opportunities of at least 15 minutes duration shall be provided during regular meal time
windows (ca. 11:00-14:00 for lunch, 18:00-21:00 for dinner), but taking into consideration possible shifts due to time
zone changes and individual crew members’ needs.
7.1.15 RECORDS
ETF shall maintain individual records of each crew member in accordance with below table:
Record Form and place Duration
Flight times Electronic – Leon system 36 months
Start, duration and end of each duty period Electronic – Leon system 36 months
and FDP including delayed reporting times.
Rest periods and days free of all duties Electronic – Leon system 24 months
Assigned home base Electronic – Leon system 24 months
Reports on extended flight duty periods and Electronic - iQSMS 60 months
reduced rest periods
When undertaking duties for more than one operator, ETF will maintain individual crew member records regarding
flight and duty times and rest periods for the period of 24 months .
Upon request, ETF Crew Planning Department will provide copies of individual records of flight times, duty periods
and rest periods to
• Each crew member
• Another operator, in relation to a crew member who is or becomes a crew member of the operator concerned.
The conditions to modify the limits on flight duty, duty and rest periods by the commander in the case of unforeseen
circumstances in flight operations, which start at or after the reporting time, shall comply with the following:
• the maximum daily FDP from table in 7.1.7 may not be increased by more than 2 hours
• if on the final sector within an FDP the allowed increase is exceeded because of unforeseen circumstances after
take-off, the flight may continue to the planned destination or alternate aerodrome
• the rest period following the FDP may be reduced but can never be less than 10 hours.
The following factors may decrease a crew member’s alertness and must be taken into consideration when
Commander’s discretion is used:
• WOCL encroachment;
• Weather conditions;
• Complexity of the operation and/or airport environment;
• Aeroplane malfunctions or specifications;
• Flight with training or supervisory duties;
• Increased number of sectors;
• Circadian disruption; and
• Individual conditions of affected crew members (time since awake, sleep-related factor, workload, etc.).
In case of unforeseen circumstances which could lead to severe fatigue, the commander shall reduce the actual flight
duty period and/or increase the rest period in order to eliminate any detrimental effect on flight safety.
Before deciding about extension of FDP or reduction of rest period, commander shall consult all crew members on
their alertness levels.
The exercise of commander’s discretion shall be considered exceptional and shall be avoided at home base or at
locations where standby or reserve crew members is available. ETF will assess on a regular basis the series of pairings
where commander’s discretion has been exercised in order to be aware of possible inconsistencies in rostering.
In case of unforeseen circumstances, responsibilities for commander’s discretion policy is shared among ETF
management, flight and cabin crew. Use of commander’s discretion is subject to non-punitive policy.
When an FDP is increased or a rest period is reduced at his or her discretion, commander shall submit a report to the
ETF. Where the increase of an FDP or reduction of a rest period exceeds 1 hour, a copy of the report, to which the ETF
shall add its comments, shall be sent by Compliance Manager to the CCAA not later than 28 days after the event.
All crew members, personnel responsible for preparation and maintenance of crew rosters and management
personnel concerned shall undergo initial and recurrent fatigue management training prescribed in OM-D.
Management personnel involves Accountable Manager, FOM, Ground Operations Manager, Head of OCC, Sales
Manager, Safety Manager and Compliance Manager.
Content
OPERATING PROCEDURES ................................................................................................................................. 3
8.0 GENERAL............................................................................................................................................................................... 3
8.0.1 BASIC OPERATING PRINCIPLES ......................................................................................................................................................................3
8.0.2 CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................................................................................3
8.0.3 HUMAN FACTORS IN DESIGNING PROCEDURES ...........................................................................................................................................4
8.0.4 COMMON LANGUAGE ..................................................................................................................................................................................4
8.0.5 STANDARD TERMINOLOGY ...........................................................................................................................................................................4
8.0.6 MULTI CREW CONCEPT – MCC......................................................................................................................................................................4
8.0.7 DESIGN AND USE OF PROCEDURES AND CHECK LISTS ..................................................................................................................................5
8.0.8 HIGH PRIORITY COMMUNICATION ...............................................................................................................................................................6
8.0.9 BRIEFINGS .....................................................................................................................................................................................................7
8.0.10 STANDARD CALLOUTS .................................................................................................................................................................................7
8.0.11 STERILE FLIGHT DECK CONCEPT ..................................................................................................................................................................8
8.0.12 CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT .........................................................................................................................................................................8
8.1 FLIGHT PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS .................................................................................................................................. 9
8.1.1 MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES ....................................................................................................................................................................10
8.1.2 CRITERIA AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DETERMING THE ADEQUACY OF AERODROMES TO BE USED ........................................................17
8.1.3 METHODS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ESTABLISHING AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA .....................................................................22
8.1.4 EN ROUTE OPERATING MINIMA FOR VFR FLIGHTS OR VFR PORTIONS OF A FLIGHT ..................................................................................44
8.1.5 PRESENTATION AND APPLICATION OF AERODROME AND EN-ROUTE OPERATING MINIMA .....................................................................46
8.1.6 INTERPRETATION OF METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION ...........................................................................................................................52
8.1.7 DETERMINATION OF QUANTITIES OF FUEL AND OIL CARRIED ...................................................................................................................54
8.1.8 MASS AND CENTRE OF GRAVITY .................................................................................................................................................................60
8.1.9 .AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES (ATS) FLIGHT PLAN .................................................................................................................................................67
8.1.10 OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN .....................................................................................................................................................................68
8.1.11 ETF AEROPLANE TECHNICAL LOG – TLB SYSTEM ......................................................................................................................................84
8.1.12 LIST OF DOCUMENTS, FORMS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE CARRIED ...................................................................................84
8.1.13 INFORMATION RETAINED ON THE GROUND ............................................................................................................................................87
8.1.14 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT CHECK .............................................................................................................................................................87
8.2 GROUND HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS .................................................................................................................................. 87
8.2.1 FUELLING PROCEDURES ..............................................................................................................................................................................87
8.2.2 AEROPLANE, PASSENGERS AND CARGO HANDLING PROCEDURES RELATED TO SAFETY ...........................................................................90
8.2.3 PROCEDURE FOR THE REFUSAL OF EMBARKATION ..................................................................................................................................112
8.2.4 DE–ICING AND ANTI–ICING ON THE GROUND ..........................................................................................................................................114
8.3 FLIGHT PROCEDURES ........................................................................................................................................................ 123
8.3.1 VFR/IFR POLICY .........................................................................................................................................................................................123
8.3.2 NAVIGATION PROCEDURES.......................................................................................................................................................................131
8.3.3 ALTIMETER SETTING PROCEDURES ...........................................................................................................................................................162
8.3.4 ALTITUDE ALERTING SYSTEM PROCEDURES .............................................................................................................................................164
8.3.5 GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM PROCEDURES (GPWS) / TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) ............................165
8.3.6 POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS) / AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE
SYSTEM (ACAS) ..................................................................................................................................................................................................166
8.3.7 POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR IN-FLIGHT FUEL MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................174
8.3.8 ADVERSE AND POTENTIONALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS ............................................................................................177
8.3.9 WAKE TURBULENCE ..................................................................................................................................................................................207
8.3.10 CREW MEMBERS AT THEIR STATIONS.....................................................................................................................................................216
8.3.11 USE OF RESTRAINT DEVICES FOR CREW AND PASSENGERS ....................................................................................................................218
8.3.12 ADMISSION TO FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT ......................................................................................................................................220
8.3.13 USE OF VACANT CREW SEATS .................................................................................................................................................................222
8.3.14 INCAPACITATION OF CREW MEMBERS ...................................................................................................................................................223
8.3.15 CABIN SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ...............................................................................................................................................................228
8.3.17 PROCEDURES FOR COSMIC OR SOLAR RADIATION DETECTION ..............................................................................................................258
8.3.18 POLICY ON THE USE OF AUTOPILOT AND AUTOTHROTLE ......................................................................................................................259
8.3.19 RUNWAY INCURSION PREVENTION ........................................................................................................................................................259
8.3.20 ISOLATED DESTINATION AERODROME AND PREDETERMINED POINT (PDP) PROCEDURES ...................................................................263
8.4 LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 269
8.4.2 OPERATIONAL APPROVAL .........................................................................................................................................................................274
8.4.3 CAT II / CAT IIIA APPROACHES...................................................................................................................................................................274
8.4.4 RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE ..........................................................................................................................................................................274
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8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
OPERATING PROCEDURES
8.0 GENERAL
ETF shall operate its flights along such routes or within such areas, for which:
1. Ground facilities and services, including meteorological services, are provided which are
adequate for the planned operation;
2. The performance of the aeroplane intended to be used is adequate to comply with minimum
flight altitude requirements;
3. The equipment of the aeroplane intended to be used meets the minimum requirements for the
planned operation;
4. Appropriate maps and charts are available
5. Adequate aerodromes are available within the time/distance limitations as specified in
B737 OM B chapters 4 and 5
6. Crew is qualified for airport of indeded use
Note: crew is obliged to asses above mentioned items prior to commencement or continuation of an
approach to a landing.
ETF conducts operations in accordance with conditions and limitations specified in the Air Operator
Certificate and any other restriction imposed by CCAA.
8.0.2 CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In all operating procedures ETF will apply to the maximum extent possible the Crew Resource Management
(CRM) concept. CRM goal is the maximization of effectiveness and safety through the effective utilization
of all available resources.
Resources in this context refers to hardware, software, printed materials, people power (your own and
that of others), the environment, time, fuel etc. Its purpose is to avoid the buildup of a fatal chain of
events. Consequently, crewmembers must use sound judgment and common sense in order to make
quality decisions after having accessed all required resources.
The CRM environment is one in which team members operate under time constraints and stress. The only
way to compensate for stress is its early recognition in oneself and in other crewmembers. This is of
particular important when it comes to problem solving and decision making in the cockpit.
Consequently, due consideration shall be given to the following:
(1) Management:
a) setting priorities
b) proper task distribution and delegation
c) time management
d) proper control of workload
(2) Communication:
a) with ATC
b) with the Cabin Crew
c) with Company Operations
d) passenger information
All flight crew, cabin crew members and other operational personnel are required to adhere to
the application of the above mentioned principles during line operations.
In case that operational reasons demands alteration of original document, specially check list, any
proposed change will be discussed among the experts, experience of other operator on the same type will
be checked and finally, risk assessment will be done before the change takes effect. Flight operations
manager (FOM) in close cooperation with Chief pilot(s)(when selected,in line with fleet increse) will take
care that above mentioned principles are obeyed at all times.
Appropriate use of checklists by the flight crew prior to, during and after all phases of flight operations and
in abnormal and emergency situations is mandatory to ensure compliance with procedures contained in
the ETF OM and provisions of the aeroplane certificate of airworthiness.
All required check lists are assembled in <ETF OM-B Ch.2> or FCOM as applicable and QRH.
8.0.8 HIGH PRIORITY COMMUNICATION
Due to the high priority of configuration changes and engine thrust settings pilots shall utilize a standard
phraseology to operate flaps and leading edge devices, landing gear as well as setting of engine thrust for
take-off, climb, cruise and go-around. When PF gives a command, PM assumes “responsibility of action” by
giving a verbal acknowledgement. After assessing the validity of the command PM performs the task. PF
shall monitor the correct execution of his/her command by checking the appropriate cockpit instrument
indication. As a minimum flight crewmembers shall crosscheck and confirm:
− aeroplane configuration changes (landing gear, wing flaps, speedbrakes);
− altimeter bug and airspeed bug settings, as applicable;
− altimeter subscale settings;
− altitude (window) selections;
− transfer of control of the aeroplane;
− changes to the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA)/Flight Management System (FMS) and radio
navigation aids during the departure and or approach phases of flight;
− performance calculations or inputs, including Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA)/ /FMS entries.
Execution of abnormal/non-normal and emergency procedures must also be crosschecked and verbally
confirmed by both crew members (dual response) before the actuation of any critical aeroplane system
controls such as:
− engine thrust levers;
− fuel master or control switches;
− engine fire handles or switches
− engine fire extinguisher switches;
− IDG/CSD disconnect switch
− All guarded switches
− IR’s
8.0.9 BRIEFINGS
8.0.9.A COMMANDER’S BRIEFING TO THE CABIN CREW
Before the flight, usually in the briefing room but can be done in other adequate space at the departure
aerodrome or in hotel, or if no other option, on the aeroplane, after checking all the relevant data and
after the Cabin crew briefing with the SCCM is finished, Commander shall brief the Cabin crew on the
following (as a minimum):
1. Introduce himself and the First officer to the Cabin crew
2. Confirm that the crew is legal to fly to the best of their knowledge
3. Confirm that all CCMs’ names are correctly written in the EFB application EFL – Electronic flight log
and they are present
4. Any significant technical issue, especially any defect related to the cabin
5. Flight time, delay (if any), significant wether
6. Expected cruising altitude and routing (if relevant)
7. Expected number of passengers and information on any special handling passenger if known
8. Security password
9. Any other relevant information or special instruction as deemed necessary
The phases of flight for which sterile cockpit concept refers to are:
• taxi-out (after cabin report) – unless the aircraft is not moving
• take-off
• following take-off until aircraft ascends to 10.000 ft.*
• below 10.000 ft. on descent after cabin report** or call from PM „cabin crew, 10000 ft“
• approach and landing
• taxi-in - unless the aircraft is not moving
* the cabin crew shall assume the end of a sterile cockpit concept for this phase of flight when “the
seat belts” sign has been switched OFF by the flight crew,
** the cabin crew shall prepare cabin for landing as soon as practicable after “the seat belts” sign
has been switched ON for descent
The cabin crew shall assume the beginning of the sterile cockpit concept after a cabin report has been
received by the Commander.
The concept calls for positively standard call-outs and no communication not related to the flight
phase between the flight crew during above-mentioned phases of the flight.
As in regards to the cabin crew the concept calls for no calling, knocking or entering the flight deck
except for emergency or other situations affecting the safety of the flight, crew or passengers during
the above mentioned phases of the flight. The SCCM must ensure that all messages to the flight
deck have been submitted and discussed with the Commander before the sterile cockpit concept period.
For more detailed procedure, refer to OM-B-2.1.7.6
EASA DEFINITION
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8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
Critical phases of flight’ in the case of aeroplanes means the take-off run, the take-off flight path, the final
approach, the missed approach, the landing, including the landing roll, and any other phases of flight as
determined by the pilot-in-command or commander.
8.1 FLIGHT PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS
The Flight Crew shall ensure a flight will not be commenced unless it has been ascertained, by every
reasonable means available, that conditions and ground facilities required for the flight are adequate for
the type of operation.
The Commander shall not commence a flight unless he is satisfied that:
• an OFP is completed and available on board the aeroplane is airworthy;
• the aircraft is duly registered and that appropriate certificates with respect thereto are aboard the aircraft;
• the aeroplane configuration is in accordance with the Configuration Deviation List (CDL);
• instruments and equipment required for the execution of the flight are installed in the aircraft and are operative,
unless waived by the applicable Minimum Equipment List (MEL);
• those parts of the operations manual which are required for a conduct of the flight are available;
• the documents, additional information and forms required to be available by 8.1.12 “Documents, forms to be
carried on board” are on board;
• current maps, charts and associated documentation or equivalent data are available to cover the intended
operation of the aircraft including any diversion which may reasonably be expected;
• this shall include any conversion tables necessary to support operations where metric heights, altitudes and flight
levels must be used. Also latest information about destination and alternates (PIB-Notams).
• space-based facilities, ground facilities and services required for the planned flight are available and adequate (e.g.
Navigation aids, curfews, lighting, RFFS, towing);
• the provisions specified in the operations manual in respect of fuel, oil, oxygen, minimum safe altitudes,
aerodrome operating minima and availability of alternate aerodromes, where required, can be complied with for
the planned flight;
• the weight of the aircraft and centre of gravity location are such that the flight can be conducted within limits
prescribed in the airworthiness documentation;
• the mass of the aircraft at the commencement of the take-off roll will be such that the flight can be conducted in
compliance with all performance limitations of the aircraft including Minimum Flight Altitudes;
• all cabin baggage, hold luggage and cargo is properly loaded and secured;
• the external surfaces of the aircraft are clear of frost, ice and snow or any deposit which might adversely affect
the performances and/or the controllability of the aircraft except as permitted in the AFM;
• all overflight permits, landing authorizations and PPRs have been obtained or granted;
• runways, taxiways, ramp areas are adequate for planned operations;
• all required flight deck and cabin safety systems and equipment are available, accessible and serviceable in
accordance with OM B and CCM.
• signalling devices and lifesaving equipment, (including means of sustaining life) required by the States concerned
when flying across land areas designated as areas in which SAR would be especially difficult, are on board;
• all necessary briefings have been performed;
• any additional operational limitation can be complied with; the operations are conducted over a route that does
not contain points further from an adequate aerodrome more than 60 minutes flight time in still air at the one
engine inoperative cruise speed;
• the aircraft is suitably equipped and the Flight Crew qualified if a flight is planned within airspace requiring special
authorisation/approval (i.e. BRNAV, P-RNAV, MNPS, RVSM);
• for planning purposes, at destination and alternate aerodrome, considers wind direction and speed without gust.
The route of flight will be along waypoints situated within 60 minutes of flight from the nearest alternate
airport with one engine inoperative unless ETF has ETOPS approval with a diversion period greater than 60
minutes and the aircraft is authorized for such a flight in accordance with Operations Specifications
included in Air Operator Certificate (AOC).
When operating over water away from land suitable for making an emergency landing,at distance:
- greater than 120 minutes at cruising speed or
- 400 NM, whichever is the lesser
airplane shall be equiped with:
1. life-rafts in sufficient numbers to carry all persons on board, stowed so as to facilitate their ready use
in an emergency, and being of sufficient size to accommodate all the survivors in the event of a loss
of one raft of the largest rated capacity;
2. a survivor locator light in each life-raft;
3. life-saving equipment to provide the means for sustaining life, as appropriate for the flight to be
undertaken; and
4. at least two survival ELTs (ELT(S)).
The onboard navigation database is appropriate for the region of intended operation and includes the
navigation aids, waypoints, and coded terminal airspace procedures for the departure, arrival and
alternate airfields.
The crew has NOTAM information, with emphasis on items related to the necessary navigation
environment such as the availability of DME and VOR stations.
The availability of the onboard navigation equipment necessary for the route to be flown has been
confirmed.
The availability of RAIM and the required number of satellites for the time of PBN operation +/- 15 minutes
has been confirmed. The availability of RAIM may be provided by the ANSP (Air Navigation Services
Provider) or services such as Eurocontrol AUGUR.
The impact of technical deficiencies as accepted by the approved MEL with regard to the used Airspace
(e.g.deficient navigation sensors) has been checked.
8.1.1 MINIMUM FLIGHT ALTITUDES
The selection of cruising altitudes/flight levels shall be based on:
• the ETF operating policy,
• the specified terrain clearances to ensure safety on the route to be flown,
• ATC requirements,
• the noise abatement policy
All required information about minimum flight altitude can be obtained from the Flight Deck Pro Manual
Except during IFR approach or departure when on track with a published minimum altitude on airport
charts, the minimum altitude must not be lower than the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA).
If a subsequent route segment has a higher MOCA or MORA, this new altitude must be obtained before
passing the checkpoint, so that the entire route segment is flown at or above its new altitude.
Similarly, no descent below the MOCA or MORA may be initiated before passing the intervening
checkpoint.
Since ATC objectives generally do not include prevention of collision with terrain, it is the full responsibility
of the Commander to ensure compliance with all ETF regulations with regard to terrain clearance.
The published Minimum Altitudes shall be used conservatively whenever difficulties in respect to
navigation accuracy are anticipated, e.g. unreliability of navigation aids, detours due to weather, etc.
Minimum height for Turns after Take-Off
Except in case of Engine Failure Procedure (EFP), Special Engine Failure Procedure (SPECIAL EFP) or SID
requiring an early turn, no turn is to be started before the aircraft is climbing through 400 Ft AGL.
8.1.1.A MINIMUM ALTITUDES/FLIGHT LEVELS FOR VFR FLIGHTS
Except when necessary for take-off or landing, or except by permission from the competent authority, a
VFR flight shall not be flown:
• over the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements or over an open-air assembly of persons at a height less
than 300 m (1 000 ft) above the highest obstacle within a radius of 600 m from the aircraft;
• elsewhere at a height less than 150 m (500 ft) above the ground or water, or 150 m (500 ft) above the highest
obstacle within a radius of 150 m (500 ft) from the aircraft.
Except where otherwise indicated in air traffic control clearances or specified by the competent authority,
VFR flights in level cruising flight when operated above 900 m (3000 ft) from the ground or water, or a
higher datum as specified by the competent authority, shall be conducted at a cruising level appropriate to
the track
8.1.1.B MINIMUM ALTITUDES/FLIGHT LEVELS FOR IFR
The commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated shall not fly below specified
minimum altitudes except when:
• necessary for take-off or landing; or
• descending in accordance with procedures approved by the competent authority.
Except for take-off/departure or approach, all ETF aeroplanes will be operated at altitudes which clear all
obstacles by at least:
2 000 ft vertically over high terrain or in mountainous areas, and
1 000 ft vertically over terrain elsewhere than as described in point above.
When deviating from the centerline of an airway or ATS route during normal flight operations, the
applicable minimum flight altitude shall be the Grid MORA containing the aeroplane’s position. Deviation
from ATS routes is not permitted during normal flight operations where the GRID MORA is not published,
unless a specific minimum flight altitude has been issued by the ETF for that route and flight. If deviating
from an airway or ATS route for emergency reasons (i.e. decompression or drift down), the minimum flight
altitude shall be the Grid MORA, unless a lower mandatory altitude is published on a specific Escape Route
Chart produced for the route being flown.
During its flight operations, ETF shall use minimum altitudes as published in Jeppesen Flight Deck Pro
manual.
MINIMUM SECTOR ALTITUDE (MSA)
As per ICAO, the lowest altitude which may be used and which will provide a minimum clearance of 300m
(1000ft) above all objects located in an area contained within a sector of a circle of 46km (25NM) radius
centered on a radio aid to navigation.
MINIMUM OBSTRUCTION CLEARANCE ALTITUDE (MOCA)
The lowest published altitude in effect between radio fixes on VOR airways, off airway routes, or route
segments which meets obstacle clearance requirements for the entire route segment
When Severe turbulence is forecasted,published minimum flight altitude shall be increased by 2000ft.
When operating within 20 NM of terrain whose maximum elevation exceeds 2000 feet AMSL, Commander have to
increase the standard MORA according to the wind speed over the route by the amounts given in the following table.
The gradient of the en-route net flight path shall be positive at least 1 000 ft above all terrain and
obstructions along the route within 9,3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track.
The en-route net flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue flight from the cruising altitude to an
aerodrome where a landing can be made. The en-route net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2
000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the route within 9,3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended
track, taking into account the following elements:
1. the engine is assumed to fail at the most critical point along the route;
2. account is taken of the effects of winds on the flight path;
3. the aerodrome, where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure, shall meet the following criteria:
a. the performance requirements for the expected landing mass are met;
b. weather reports or forecasts and runway condition reports indicate that a safe landing can be accomplished at
the estimated time of landing;
In cases when navigational accuracy does not meet at least navigation specification RNAV 5, width margins
provided above shall be increase from 9,3 km (5 NM) to 18,5 km (10 NM).
Note: MEA or MORA normally provide the required 2000 ft obstacle clearance for drift down.
However, at and below 6000 ft altitude, MEA and MORA cannot be used directly as only 1000
ft. clearance is ensured.
Routes which needs special considerations will be analised according the procedure explained in <OM A
2.3.2> and special briefings shall be available and distributed according ETF procedures before
commencing the flights.
8.1.1.E DECOMPRESSION OVER HIGH TERRAIN
On routes crossing areas of high terrain, emergency descent escape route will be established to be
followed in case of rapid decompression. Emergency escape routes will ensure fastest possible descent to a
pressure altitude of 13 000 ft with required terrain clearance based on published altitudes (MEA, MORA as
applicable).
Routes which needs special oxygen considerations will be analised according the procedure explained in
<OM A 2.3.2> and special briefings shall be available and distributed according ETF procedures before
commencing the flights.
During an off-route arrival, flight may only be accepted at or above respective MSA. An aeroplane being
radar vectored for approach may be flown below the MSA if the flight crew is able to monitor its position
by use of:
• GPS/IRS navigational equipment certified for primary means of navigation, or
• radio navigational aids and terrain / obstacle clearance can be assured.
8.1.1.F.1. FLIGHT AT AN ALTITUDE LOWER THAN MSA
IFR flight in the region of the airport must be conducted at an altitude no lower than the published MSA,
unless it is performed:
• At or above the Minimum Radar Altitude (MRA), or
• Along a published route or is a part of an instrument approach, or
• In conditions allowing constant visual contact with the ground, ensuring sufficient clearance over obstacles in
the approach area.
8.1.1.F.2. TAKE-OFF OBSTACLE CLEARANCE
The B737 must fulfill all requirements of Class A performance.
ETF ensures that the climb profile after takeoff clears all obstacles by:
a) 35 feet or,
b) by a horizontal distance of at least 90 m + (0,125 × D), where D is the horizontal distance covered by the aircraft
from the end of TODA or the end of the takeoff distance, if a turn is predicted before the end of TODA.
For the procedure for calculation of take-off and landing performance data, refer to OM-B-4.
8.1.1.G EN-ROUTE MINIMUM ALTITUDE
8.1.1.G.1. NORMAL OPERATIONS
An IFR flight along an airway must be conducted at an altitude not lower than the published MEA. The
MEA value is equal to the MORA or MOCA, depending on what is higher and published in the Flight Deck
PRO.
Following the above procedure by the ETF crew is mandatory, unless one of the situations described below
occurs.
8.1.1.G.2. EMERGENCY SITUATION
In the event of an emergency situation along the route of flight, the crew shall act in accordance with the
scenario given in the Operational Flight Plan (see 8.1.10), in order to reach an alternate airport or safe
altitude as soon as possible. Critical scenarios are based on the calculation of the Equal Time Point (ETP),
from which, in the forecasted weather conditions, it will be possible to reach one of two designated
alternate airports or descent to 10,000 ft within the same time.
For a given route segment, the OFP designates the most critical, safetywise, scenario taking into account
one of the emergency situations as listed in pts. a) and b) below.
a) Engine Failure In the event of an engine failure enroute and continuing the flight with one engine inoperative, it is
assumed that the alternate airport must be reached within 60 minutes of flight in no-wind conditions.
b) Rapid Depressurization In the event of a depressurization, the descent to a safe altitude (full compensation of
oxygen) must be started immediately, taking aircraft performance limitations into account. It is assumed that
within 12 minutes the aircraft will descend from cruising altitude to 13,000 ft and then, after a maximum of 30
minutes, will descend to 10,000 ft.
8.1.2 CRITERIA AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DETERMING THE ADEQUACY OF AERODROMES TO BE USED
8.1.2.A GENERAL
ETF shall ensure that operations are only conducted along routes, or within areas, for which:
• space-based facilities, ground facilities and services, including meteorological services, adequate for the planned
operation are provided;
• the performance of the aircraft is adequate to comply with minimum flight altitude requirements;
• the equipment of the aircraft meets the minimum requirements for the planned operation; and
• appropriate maps and charts are available.
The ETF shall ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with any restriction on the routes or the areas of
operation specified by the competent authority.
Aerodrome selected as departure, destination or alternate aerodrome will be evaluated and categorized
by the ETF. The aerodrome evaluation is done by Flight Operations department on following bases:
• general evaluation for adequacy;
• categorization of the aerodrome;
• performance requirements, and
• operations concerned (commercial and other criteria).
Principal responsibility for evaluation of the aerodrome rests with the FOM who will coordinate his
activities with the OCC Manager.
Aerodrome categorization shall be done by email taking into consideration all relevant data required for
calculation.
Once categorized, airport category will be inserted in Leon System and in OM C.
General Rules
ETF conducts operations only to aerodromes that are qualified as adequate in accordance with the
provisions of this Manual.
Aerodrome evaluation, route evaluation and statistical weather data is as well used to determine possible
payloads for the purpose of sales and long term planning
8.1.2.B AERODROME ADEQUACY (AA)
Adequate aerodrome means an aerodrome on which the aircraft can be operated, taking account of the
applicable performance requirements and runway characteristics and which at the expected time of use is
available and equipped with:
• necessary ancillary services such as air traffic services (ATS),
• sufficient lighting,
• communications,
• weather reporting,
• navigation aids and
• emergency services.
8.1.2.B.1. RUNWAY CHARACTERISTIC
Minimum RWY length required will be based on Performance analyses.
RWY width of less than 45 meters is considered as narrow RWY and special approval and training of flight
crew shall be completed before operating on such a RWY.
Operation on Narrow RWY is limited to CPT as PF only.
For specific conditions related to narrow runway operation refer to OM-B-1 (Limitations) and OM-B-4
(Performance).
RWY with width of less than 30 meters are considered as Unsuitable for ETF operations.
23.06.2022. Rev. 05 Page 17 of 295
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
Maximum RWY slope depends on Aircraft Type and can be find in respective FCOM Limitations Chapter.
Runway bearing strength will be evaluated (certain overload may be acceptable with derogation obtained
from Airport Authority).
The ACN [Aircraft classification number] and PCN [Pavement classification number] of a particular airport is
reviewed prior operations by Flight Operations department.
8.1.2.B.2. LIGHTING AND NAVIGATION AIDS
Information about lighting system can be found on navigation charts in Jeppesen Flight Deck PRO or in
published airport NOTAMs.
Airport lighting system has effect on applicable minima.
Runway lightings are required in certain conditions (i.e. night operation or in LVO).
For day operations, no lighting system is required and for night operation at least runway edge, threshold
and runway end lights must be available.
8.1.2.B.3. COMMUNICATIONS AND WEATHER REPORTING
Aerodromes must be equipped with VHF or HF radio transceivers.
Aerodromes must be equipped with weather reporting.
Reffer to OM-C 1.1.c and 1.1.f concerning Communication.
8.1.2.B.4. AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES (ATS)
Aerodromes must have Air traffic Control or air Traffic advisory service except in exceptional cases (VFR
portion of flight).
8.1.2.B.5. EMERGENCY SERVICE
Recommended RFFS for AIRCRAFT TYPE B737-800 is CAT 7.
Aerodrome rescue and fire fighting categories have been developed and recommended for use by ICAO
(Doc 9137-AN/898 Part 1: Airport Services Manual, Rescue and fire fighting) for the purpose of providing
information concerning the availability of rescue and fire-fighting services at aerodromes.
Aerodrome Fire fighting categories depending upon:
• The aeroplanes overall length.
• The maximum fuselage width.
• The number of movements of individual aeroplane types.
• B737-800 over-all-lenght is 39,5m and maximum fuselage width is 3,8m
The responsibility for the provision of rescue and fire-fighting services rests solely with the State and/or
Airport Authority concerned.
In principle, the published RFFS category for each of the aerodromes used for a given flight shall be equal
to or better than the aeroplane RFFS category. But in practice some of the aerodromes currently used may
not meet these requirements.
For this reason ICAO Annex 6 specifies the minimum acceptable aerodrome category for Rescue and Fire
Fighting that an operator can use as guidance to determine the acceptable level of RFFS needed for its
operations.
Remark: In flight, the pilot-in-command may decide to land at an aerodrome regardless of the RFFS
category if, in the pilot’s judgement after due consideration of all prevailing circumstances, he considers
that it is safer than to divert to another airport.
The provisions for reduction of Required RFFS according ICAO Anex 6 are given in table below.
• AIP
• ETF aerodrome briefing sheet
• Other available and approved sources
By signing the EFL, Captain acknowledges that he was briefed properly regarding the applicable airport.
The completion of the briefing shall be recorded in Leon system.
This recording may be accomplished after completion or confirmed by the pilot-in-command/commander
before departure on a flight involving category B aerodrome(s) as destination or alternate aerodromes.
Validity of the aerodrome and the route competence qualification is 1 Year after the initial qualification
and is maintenaned by operating to the aerodrome at least once within a 12-month period.
8.1.2.C.3. CATEGORY C
An aerodrome which requires additional considerations to a Category B aerodrome.
Prior to operating to a Category C aerodrome, the commander shall be briefed and:
• visit the aerodrome as an observer and/or
• undertake instructions in a Flight simulator approved by the Authority for that purpose.
The “ETF Airport C categorization form” from OM-C-10 must be filled out and shall be signed by TRI/E, LTC
or Commander in case of observer flight.
Validity of the aerodrome and the route competence qualification is 1 Year after the initial qualification
and is maintenaned by operating to the aerodrome at least once within a 12-month period.
8.1.2.D SELECTION OF AERODROMES
8.1.2.D.1. GENERAL
Any aerodrome selected as departure, destination or alternate must be categorized.
Safety is the predominant factor when selecting destination and alternate aerodromes. The most
important points to be considered are:
a) aerodrome infrastructure (e.g. runway system, lighting system, navigation aids, etc.);
b) meteorological situation and ATS services;
c) customs and immigration facilities/regulations, emergency services;
d) possibilities of onward transportation for passengers, dead load and crew.
Selected aerodromes shall be specified in Operational Flight Plan (OFP).
DATABASE SUITABILITY
The flight crew shall check that any navigational database required for PBN operations includes the routes and
procedures required for the flight.
DATABASE CURRENCY
The database validity (current AIRAC cycle) shall be checked before the flight.
Navigation databases shall be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight,
the flight crew shall follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data,
including the suitability of navigation facilities used to define the routes and procedures for the flight.
ETF procedure.Flight crew shall select appropriate database (keeping current or selecting next one) considering:
1. Alert OCC.
2. Verify status and suitability of navigation facilities used to define route of flight using established procedures.
3. Verify navigation fixes prior to dispatch with current aeronautical charts.
4. Manually tune and identify approach navigation radios.
An expired database may only be used if the following conditions are satisfied:
• flight crew shall ensure by crosschecking with navigational charts or ATC that the parts of the database which are
intended to be used during the flight and any contingencies that are reasonable to expect are not changed in the
current version;
• any NOTAMs associated with the navigational data are taken into account;
• maps and charts corresponding to those parts of the flight are current and have not been amended since the last
cycle;
• any MEL limitations are observed; and
• the database has expired by no more than 28 days.
8.1.2.D.2. TAKE-OFF ALTERNATE
When operational performance or meteorological conditions preclude return to departure aerodrome (i.e. weather
conditions do not fulfill applicable minima for approach and landing), a take-off alternate aerodrome must be selected.
For an aerodrome to be selected as a takeoff alternates the following conditions must be met:
• the appropriate weather reports or forecasts or any combination thereof indicate that, during a period
commencing one hour before and ending one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome, the
weather will be at or above the applicable Aerodrome operating minima;
• when the only approaches available are non-precision and/or circling, the cloud ceiling must be taken into account;
• any limitation related to one engine inoperative operations must be taken into account;
• for twin engine aeroplanes, the specified take off alternate is equivalent to a range of one hour flying time at an
one engine inoperative cruising speed in still air standard conditions based on the actual take-off mass. Refer to
OM-B-2.3.2.1.7
8.1.2.D.3. DESTINATION ALTERNATE
At least one destination alternate will be selected for each IFR flight unless:
a) The duration of the planned flight from take-off to landing is less than 6 hours, and
b) Two separate runways are available and useable at the destination and the appropriate weather or forecast for
the destination aerodrome or the combination thereof indicates that for the period from one hour before until
one hour after the expected time of arrival at destination the ceiling will be at least 2000ft or circling height
+500ft, whichever is greater, and the visibility will be at least 5 km.
At least two destinations alternates will be selected when:
a) The appropriate weather reports or forecast for the destination, or any combination thereof, indicate that
during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, the weather
conditions will be below applicable planning minima, or
b) No meteorological information is available.
8.1.2.D.4. EN-ROUTE ALTERNATE
En-route alternate(s) will be evaluated along the route flown.
An aerodrome will not be selected as an en-route alternate aerodrome unless the appropriate weather
reports or forecasts, or any combination thereof, indicate that, during a period commencing one hour
before and ending one hour after the expected time of arrival at the aerodrome, the weather conditions
will be at or above applicable Aerodrome operating minima.
The distance of a en route alternate from the route flown shall not to exceed the specified distance in the
table below:
AEROPLANE TYPE MAXIMUM DISTANCE
B737-800 378 NM
ETF has determined a speed of 378 KTS for the calculation of the maximum distance to an adequate
aerodrome. Determined speed doesn’t exceed VMO (maximum operating speed) based upon the true
airspeed that the aeroplane can maintain with one engine inoperative.
En route aerodrome shall be located within a circle having a radius equal to 20 % of the total flight plan
distance, the centre of which lies on the planned route at a distance from the destination aerodrome of 25
% of the total flight plan distance, or at least 20 % of the total flight plan distance plus 50 NM, whichever is
greater. All distances shall be calculated in still air conditions as shown below:
• the equipment available on the aircraft for the purpose of navigation and/or control of the flight path during the
take-off, the approach, the flare, the landing, rollout and the missed approach;
• for the determination of obstacle clearance, the obstacles in the approach, missed approach and the climb-out
areas necessary for the execution of contingency procedures;
• the obstacle clearance altitude/height for the instrument approach procedures;
• the means to determine and report meteorological conditions; and
• the flight technique to be used during the final approach.
Aerodrome Operating Minima for ETF aeroplane take offs and landings are established for all departure,
destination and alternate aerodromes. They are declared in Jeppesen Flight Deck Pro manual.
Aerodrome Operating Minima are always increased in those cases where the applicable Authority requires
so.
The minima for a specific approach and landing procedure shall only be used if all the following conditions
are met:
• the ground equipment shown on the chart required for the intended procedure is operative;
• the aircraft systems required for the type of approach are operative;
• the required aircraft performance criteria are met based on the latest available meteorological or runway state
report, preferably not more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time; and
• the crew is appropriately qualified.
The Commander may accept an ATC clearance to deviate from a published departure or arrival route,
provided obstacle clearance criteria are observed and full account is taken of the operating conditions. In
any case, the final approach shall be flown visually or in accordance with the established instrument
approach procedures.
8.1.3.B TAKE-OFF MINIMA
Take-off minima shall be expressed as visibility or runway visual range (RVR) limits, taking into account all relevant
factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics. Where there is a specific need to see and
avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, shall be specified.
The commander shall not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of departure are
equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome unless a weather-permissible take-off
alternate aerodrome is available.
When the reported meteorological visibility (VIS) is below that required for take-off and RVR is not reported, a take-
off shall only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway is equal to
or better than the required minimum
When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take-off shall only be commenced if the commander
can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.
The take-off minima shall be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a
rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine.
For night operations, ground lights shall be available to illuminate the runway and any obstacles
As by procedures set in this OM, all flights will be planned so that performance is such that in the event of
a power loss at any point during take-off, the aeroplane can either stop or continue to a height of 1500
feet above the aerodrome while clearing all obstacles by the required margins. Taking that in
consideration, the take-off minima will not be less than those given in the table below.
For a low visibility take-off (LVTO) the following provisions shall apply:
a) for an LVTO with a runway visual range (RVR) below 400 m the criteria specified in Table bellow:
b) for an LVTO with an RVR below 150 m but not less than 125 m:
• high intensity runway centre line lights spaced 15 m or less apart and high intensity edge lights spaced 60
m or less apart that are in operation;
• a 90 m visual segment that is available from the flight crew compartment at the start of the take-off run;
and
• the required RVR value is achieved for all of the relevant RVR reporting points;
*: The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot
assessment.
**: Multi-engined aeroplanes that in the event of an engine failure at any point during take-off can either
stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the
required margins.
***: The required RVR value to be achieved for all relevant RVRs
A takeoff must not commence unless:
• the visibility or RVR is equal or better than the required take-off visibility or RVR limits;
• the weather conditions at the departure aerodrome are equal or better than the applicable minima
for landing at that aerodrome or at a suitable take-off alternate refer to planning minima <ETF OM-A
Ch. 8.1.3>.
When the reported meteorological visibility is below that required for take-off and RVR is not reported, a take-off
may only be commenced if the commander can determine that the actual visibility along the take off runway is
equal or better than the required minimum.
Destination aerodrome shall be selected only when the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that,
during a period commencing one hour before and ending one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the
aerodrome, the weather conditions will be at or above the applicable planning minima or two destination alternate
aerodromes are selected.
The pilot-in-command shall ensure that sufficient means are available to navigate and land at the
destination aerodrome or at any destination alternate aerodrome in the case of loss of capability for the
intended approach and landing operation.
8.1.3.D TAKE-OFF ALTERNATE
The operator shall only select an aerodrome as a take-off alternate aerodrome when the appropriate
weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that, during a period commencing one hour before and ending
one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome, the weather conditions will be at or above
the applicable landing minima.
The ceiling shall be taken into account when the only approach operations available are non-precision
approaches (NPA) and/or circling operations. Any limitation related to OEI operations shall be taken into
account.
8.1.3.E DESTINATION ALTERNATE AND EN ROUTE ALTERNATE
An adequate aerodrome may be suitable for destination or en-route alternate if the weather reports or
forecasts indicate that, during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated
time of arrival at the aerodrome, the weather conditions will be in accordance with table below.
For the calculation of maximum distance to enroute alternate, refer to 8.1.2.D.4
PLANNING MINIMA
TYPE OF APPROACH
(RVR/visibility required and ceiling if applicable)
CAT II and CAT III CAT I RVR Minima
Non-precision approach minima
Cat I
(RVR/ceiling at or above MDH)
APV NPA or CAT I minima, depending on the DH/MDH;
Non-precision approach minima plus 200 ft/1000 m
Non-precision
(RVR/ceiling at or above MDH)
Circling Circling minima
If meteorological and operational conditions permit, departure and arrival aerodrome may be considered
as an intermediate airport. If any point on the planned route exceeds a distance of one hour still air flight
time at the one-engine-inoperative cruising speed in ISA to the departure or arrival airport, an
intermediate airport has to be chosen, which fulfils this requirement.
During briefing, NOTAMs and weather for the intermediate airport will be checked and added to the Flight
Briefing Package.
For the selection of an intermediate airport, an aerodrome must be from the list of Approved Airports in
OM C.
8.1.3.F CONVERSION OF MET VISIBILITY TO RVR/CMV
Conversion table below can be used for converting reported metrological visibility to RVR/CMV, where
CMV is defined as Converted Meteorological Visibility which is a value (equivalent to an RVR) which is
derived from the reported meteorological visibility, as converted in accordance with this table.
RVR/CMV =
LIGHTING ELEMENT IN OPERATION VISIBILITY multiplied by
DAY NIGHT
HI approach and runway lighting 1.5 2.0
Any type of lighting installation other than above 1.0 1.5
No lighting 1.0 N/A
PROCEDURE OPERATION
Chart Minima box Type (A or
Type of operation Minima
identification label B)
2D MDA/H
NDB RWY XX NDB 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
VOR RWY XX VOR 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
ILS RWY XX or
LOC 3D (CDFA with positive A
LOC RWY XX Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
RNP RWY XX LNAV 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
RNP RWY XX LP 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
RNP RWY XX LNAV/VNAV 3D DA/H A
RNP RWY XX (AR) RNP 0.X 3D DA/H A
RNP RWY XX LPV 3D DA/H A or B
CAT I
ILS RWY XX CAT II 3D DA/H A or B
CAT III A/B/C
CAT I
MLS RWY XX CAT II 3D DA/H A or B
CAT III A/B/C
GLS RWY XX CAT I 3D DA/H A or B
Before commencing an approach to land, the commander shall:
• be satisfied that, according to the information available to him or her, the weather at the aerodrome and the
condition of the runway intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach,
having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual (OM)
• carry out a landing distance assessment in accordance with OM-B-4.3.2.1
The minimum descent height (MDH) for an NPA operation flown without the CDFA technique shall not be
lower than the highest of:
Table 1: MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM APPLICABLE RVR/CMV FOR ALL INSTRUMENT APPROACHES DOWN TO CAT I
MINIMA
RVR/CMV
Facility/conditions Aeroplane cat C
(m)
ILS, MLS, GLS, PAR, GNSS/SBAS, Min According to table below
GNSS/VNAV Max 2400
NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, Min 750
LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA,
GNSS/LNAV
with a procedure that fulfils the Max 2400
criteria in 8.1.3.I.2 point 2
For NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, Min 1200
LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA,
GNSS/LNAV According to table above if flown using CDFA
not fulfilling the criteria in in 8.1.3.I.2 technique, otherwise an add-on of 200/400 m
Max
point 2 or with a DH or MDH ≥1 200 applies to the values in that table but not to result
ft in a value exceeding 5000 m.
The minimum RVR/CMV/visibility will be the highest of the values derived from tables “RVR/CMV vs. DH/MDH” and
“Minimum and maximum applicable RVR/CMV for all instrument approaches down to Cat I minima” below but not
greater than the maximum values shown in the second table where applicable. For night operations or for any
operation where credit for runway and approach lights is required, the lights must be on and serviceable except as
provided for in table showing failed or downgraded equipment effect on landing minima.
The minimum required RVR/CMV specified in the tables,shall be achieved for the touchdown zone.
However, if separate midpoint and stop-end RVR measurements are available, these shall be above 250m (125 m if
centreline lights available and servicable or min T/O RVR specified by the Airport Authority if higher).
Stop-end RVR may be disregarded in case the length of the first 2/3 of the runway is equal to or longer
than the required landing field length with consideration to the actual landing mass, runway characteristics
and meteorological situation.
Min 1200
NDB, NDS/DME, VOR,
VOR/DME, LLZ, According to table above if flown using CDFA
LLZ/DME, RNAV/LNAV technique, otherwise an add-on of 400 m applies
Max
(2) to the values in that table but not to result in a
value exceeding 5000 m.
Notes:
(1) Applicable when flown using the CDFA technique with a nominal vertical profile, up to and not including
3,77° for Category C aeroplanes, unless other approach angles are approved by the Authority where the
facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LLZ, LLZ/DME or RNAV/LNAV, with a final approach
segment of at least 3 Nm, which also fulfill the following criteria:
▪ final approach track is offset by not more than 5° for Category C aeroplanes; and
▪ FAF or another appropriate fix where descent is initiated is available, or distance to THR is available
by FMS/RNAV or DME; and
▪ if the MAPt is determined by timing, the distance from FAF to THR is £ 8 NM.
(2) Not fulfilling criteria of Note (1) above or with a DH or MDH ³ 1200 ft.
CAT II operations
For CAT II operations the following provisions should apply:
1. The ILS / MLS that CAT II operation should be an unrestricted facility with a straight in course (≤ 3° offset) and the
ILS should be certified to class II/D/2.
Single ILS facilities are only acceptable if level 2 performance is provided.
2. The DH for CAT II operation should not be lower than the highest of:
• the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
• the minimum height to which the precision approach aid can be used without the specified visual reference;
• the applicable OCH for the category of aeroplane;
• the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or
• 100 ft.
3. The following visual aids should be available:
• standard runway day markings and approach and the following runway lights: runway edge lights, threshold
lights and runway end lights;
• for operations in RVR below 450 m, additionally touch-down zone and/or runway centre line lights;
• for operations with an RVR of 400 m or less, additionally centre line lights.
Note: This visual reference must include a lateral element of the ground pattern, i.e. an approach lighting
crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone lighting
1. Where the DH and RVR do not fall within the same category, the RVR should determine in which category the
operation is to be considered.
2. For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should not be lower than:
• the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
• the minimum height to which the precision approach aid can be used without the specified visual reference;
or
• the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate.
3. Operations with no DH should only be conducted if:
• the operation with no DH is specified in the AFM;
• the approach aid and the aerodrome facilities can support operations with no DH; and
• the flight crew is qualified to operate with no DH.
4. The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in table below
CAT III operations minima - RVR vs. DH and rollout control/guidance system
CAT DH (ft) * Rollout control/guidance RVR (m)
system
IIIA Less than 100 Not required 200
*: Flight control system redundancy is determined under CS-AWO by the minimum certified DH.
DECISION HEIGHT
For operations in which decision height is used, the decision height shall not be lower than:
• The minimum decision height specified in the AFM, if stated
• The minimum height to which the precision approach aid can be used without the required visual reference or
• The decision height to which the flight crew is authorized to operate.
VISUAL REFERENCE
For Category IIIA the pilot may not continue an approach below the decision height determined in
accordance with the above unless a visual reference containing a segment of at least 3 consecutive lights
being:
• The centre line of the approach lights, or
• Touchdown zone lights, or
Automatic landings are to be planned for all CAT II and CAT III approaches. Manual landings are only
permitted if a failure or other exceptional circumstance occurs after adequate visual criteria has been
acquired.
approach chart to the pilot by depicting the nominal slope or range/distance vs height. Approaches with a
nominal vertical profile are considered to be:
• NDB, NDB/DME;
• VOR, VOR/DME;
• LOC, LOC/DME;
• VDF, SRA; and
• GNSS/LNAV.
Stabilised approach (SAp) is defined in Annex I to the Regulation on Air Operations.
(i) The control of the descent path is not the only consideration when using the CDFA technique. Control of
the aeroplane’s configuration and energy is also vital to the safe conduct of an approach.
(ii) The control of the flight path, described above as one of the requirements for conducting an SAp, shall
not be confused with the path requirements for using the CDFA technique.
(iii) The predetermined approach slope requirements for applying the CDFA technique are established by
the following:
(A) the published ‘nominal’ slope information when the approach has a nominal vertical profile; and
(B) the designated final-approach segment minimum of 3 NM, and maximum, when using timing
techniques, of 8 NM.
(iv) An SAp will never have any level segment of flight at DA/H or MDA/H, as applicable. This enhances
safety by mandating a prompt missed approach procedure manoeuvre at DA/H or MDA/H.
(v) An approach using the CDFA technique will always be flown as an SAp, since this is a requirement for
applying CDFA. However, an SAp does not have to be flown using the CDFA technique, for example a visual
approach.
All approaches shall be flown as stabilised approaches unless otherwise approved by the competent
authority for a particular approach to a particular runway.
Non-precision approaches
1. The continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique shall be used for all non-precision approaches.
2. Notwithstanding (1), another approach flight technique may be used for a particular approach/runway
combination if approved by the competent authority. In such cases, the applicable minimum runway visual range
(RVR):
a. shall be increased by 400 m for category C and D aeroplanes; or
b. for aerodromes where there is a public interest to maintain current operations and the CDFA technique
cannot be applied, shall be established and regularly reviewed by the competent authority taking into
account the operator’s experience, training programme and flight crew qualification.
CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA)
Flight techniques:
The CDFA technique shall ensure that an approach can be flown on the desired vertical path and track in a
stabilised manner, without significant vertical path changes during the final segment descent to the
runway. This technique applies to an approach with no vertical guidance and controls the descent path
until the DA/DH. This descent path can be either:
a) a recommended descent rate, based on estimated ground speed;
b) a descent path depicted on the approach chart; or
c) a descent path coded in the flight management system in accordance with the approach chart descent path.
ETF provide charts which depict the appropriate cross check altitudes/heights with the corresponding
appropriate range information. Generally, the MAPt is published on the chart.
The approach shall be flown as an SAp.
The required descent path shall be flown to the DA/H, observing any step-down crossing altitudes if
applicable.
This DA/H shall take into account any add-on to the published minima as identified by the operator’s
management system and shall be specified in the OM C 1.1.b (aerodrome operating minima).
During the descent, the pilot monitoring shall announce crossing altitudes as published fixes and other
designated points are crossed, giving the appropriate altitude or height for the appropriate range as
depicted on the chart. The pilot flying shall promptly adjust the rate of descent as appropriate.
ETF has established in OM-B procedure to ensure that an appropriate callout is made when the aeroplane
is approaching DA/H. If the required visual references are not established at DA/H, the missed approach
procedure is to be executed promptly.
The descent path shall ensure that little or no adjustment of attitude or thrust/power is needed after the
DA/H to continue the landing in the visual segment.
The missed approach shall be initiated no later than reaching the MAPt or at the DA/H, whichever comes
first. The lateral part of the missed approach shall be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the
approach chart.
Flight techniques conditions:
The approach shall be considered to be fully stabilised when the aeroplane is:
• tracking on the required approach path and profile;
• in the required configuration and attitude;
• flying with the required rate of descent and speed; and
• flying with the appropriate thrust/power and trim.
The aeroplane is considered established on the required approach path at the appropriate energy for
stable flight using the CDFA technique when:
• it is tracking on the required approach path with the correct track set, approach aids tuned and identified as
appropriate to the approach type flown and on the required vertical profile; and
• it is at the appropriate attitude and speed for the required target rate of descent (ROD) with the appropriate
thrust/power and trim.
Stabilisation during any straight-in approach without visual reference to the ground shall be achieved at
the latest when passing 1 000 ft above runway threshold elevation. For approaches with a designated
vertical profile applying the CDFA technique, a later stabilisation in speed may be acceptable if higher than
normal approach speeds are required by ATC procedures or allowed by the OM. Stabilisation shall,
however, be achieved not later than 500 ft above runway threshold elevation.
For approaches where the pilot has visual reference with the ground, stabilisation shall be achieved not
later than 500 ft above aerodrome elevation. However, the aeroplane shall be stabilised when passing 1
000 ft above runway threshold elevation; in the case of circling approaches flown after a CDFA, the aircraft
shall be stabilised in the circling configuration not later than passing 1 000 ft above the runway elevation.
To ensure that the approach can be flown in a stabilised manner, the bank angle, rate of descent and
thrust/power management shall meet the following performances:
• The bank angle shall be less than 30 degrees.
• The target rate of descent (ROD) shall not exceed 1 000 fpm and the ROD deviations shall not exceed ± 300 fpm,
except under exceptional circumstances which have been anticipated and briefed prior to commencing the
approach; for example, a strong tailwind. Zero ROD may be used when the descent path needs to be regained
from below the profile. The target ROD may need to be initiated prior to reaching the required descent point,
typically 0.3 NM before the descent point, dependent upon ground speed, which may vary for each type/class of
aeroplane.
• The limits of thrust/power and the appropriate range shall be specified in the OM Part B or equivalent document.
• The optimum angle for the approach slope is 3 and shall not exceed 4.5 .
• The CDFA technique shall be applied only to approach procedures based on NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC,
LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV and fulfil the following criteria:
Barometric vertical navigation (baro-VNAV).- Is a navigation system that presents to the pilot computed
vertical guidance referenced to a specified vertical path angle (VPA), nominally 3°. The computer-resolved
vertical guidance is based on barometric altitude and is specified as a VPA from reference datum height
(RDH).
Boeing airplanes have uncompensated Baro-VNAV systems and are prohibited from using LNAV/VNAV
minima on approach charts when operating outside of published temperature restriction limits. However,
if cold temperature altitude corrections are applied as described in the Cold Temperature Operations
Supplementary Procedures chapter of the FCOM, descent to the corrected LNAV (MDA) minima is allowed.
There is no procedure for hot temperature corrections
8.1.3.M COMMENCEMENT AND CONTINUATION OF APPROACH
The commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated may commence an
instrument approach regardless of the reported RVR/VIS.
If the reported RVR/VIS is less than the applicable minimum the approach shall not be continued:
• below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome; or
• into the final approach segment in the case where the DA/H or MDA/H is more than 1 000 ft above the
aerodrome.
Where the RVR is not available, RVR values may be derived by converting the reported visibility.
If, after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome, the reported RVR/VIS falls below the applicable minimum,
the approach may be continued to DA/H or MDA/H.
The approach may be continued below DA/H or MDA/H and the landing may be completed provided that
the visual reference adequate for the type of approach operation and for the intended runway is
established at the DA/H or MDA/H and is maintained.
The touchdown zone RVR shall always be controlling. If reported and relevant, the midpoint and stopend RVR shall
also be controlling. The minimum RVR value for the midpoint shall be 125 m or the RVR required for the touchdown
zone if less, and 75 m for the stopend.
8.1.3.N VISUAL REFERENCES FOR CONTINUATION AF APPROACH BELOW DA/H OR MDA/H FOR NPA, APV AND CAT
I OPERATIONS
At DH or MDH, at least one of the visual references specified below shall be distinctly visible and identifiable to the
pilot:
1. elements of the approach lighting system;
2. the threshold;
3. the threshold markings;
4. the threshold lights;
5. the threshold identification lights;
6. the visual glide slope indicator;
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AEROPLANE CATEGORY
A B C D
MDH [ft] 400 500 600 700
Minimum meteorological visibility [m] 1500 1600 2400 3600
IFR flights may be cleared to execute a visual approach provided the pilot can maintain visual reference to
the terrain and the reported ceiling is not below the approved initial approach level for the aircraft so
cleared, or the pilot reports that they are able to carry out a visual approach and landing.
Separation shall be provided between an aircraft cleared to execute a visual approach and other arriving
and departing aircraft.
1. Be satisfied that, according to the information available to him, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the
runway intended to be used will not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach, having regard to the
performance information contained in the operations manual.
2. Carry out a Landing Distance at Time of Arrival (LDTA) assessment, where required, in accordance with 8.1.3.2.2
1. The in-flight landing distance assessment should be based on the latest available weather report and
runway condition report (RCR) or equivalent information based on the RCR.
2. The assessment should be initially carried out when the weather report and the RCR are obtained,
usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow the flight crew to carry
out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure.
3. When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the
assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction
characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing.
4. The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that
they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable.
No approach to land shall be continued unless the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway
is at least 115% of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the
performance information for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA).
Performance information for the assessment of the LDTA shall be based on approved data contained in the
AFM.
Continuous descent final approach (CDFA). A specific technique for flying the final-approach segment of a
non-precision instrument approach procedure as a continuous descent, without level-off, from an
altitude/height at or above the Final Approach Fix altitude / height to a point approximately 15 m (50 feet)
above the landing runway threshold or the point where the flare maneuver shall begin for the type of
airplane flown;
Stabilized approach (SAp). An approach which is flown in a controlled and appropriate manner in terms of
configuration, energy and control of the flight path from a predetermined point or altitude/height down to
a point 50 feet above the threshold or the point where the flare maneuver is initiated if higher;
Head-up display (HUD). A display system which presents flight information into the pilot’s forward
external field of view and which does not significantly restrict the external view;
Converted meteorological visibility (CMV). A value (equivalent to an RVR) which is derived from the
reported meteorological visibility, as converted in accordance with the requirements in this subpart;
Separate runways. Runways at the same aerodrome that are separate landing surfaces. These runways
may overlay or cross in such a way that if one of the runways is blocked, it will not prevent the planned
type of operations on the other runway. Each runway shall have a separate approach
procedure based on a separate navigation aid.
Approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV). Instrument approach which utilizes lateral and vertical
guidance, but does not meet the requirements established for precision approach and landing operations,
with a decision height (DH) not lower than 250 ft and a runway visual range (RVR) of not less than 600 m.
GBAS landing system (GLS). Approach landing system using ground based augmented global navigation
satellite system (GNSS/GBAS) information to provide guidance to the aircraft based on its lateral and
vertical GNSS position. It uses geometric altitude reference for its final approach slope.
Isolated aerodrome. The destination aerodrome can be considered as an isolated aerodrome, if the fuel
required (diversion plus final) to the nearest adequate destination alternate aerodrome is more than the
amount of fuel required to fly for two hours at normal cruise consumption above the destination
aerodrome, including final reserve fuel. 3 % ERA. An en-route alternate aerodrome selected for the
purposes of reducing contingency fuel to 3 %.
Operating minimums. A term associated with meteorological conditions existing at a particular airport.
The minimums are the value of minimum visibility (horizontal or vertical) required for takeoff or landing at
that airport. Operational minimums are categorized: aircraft, airport, company, and flight crew. Depending
on the phase in question, they are classified as planning minimums or operating minimums.
ETOPS diversion time. During ETOPS flight planning, the flight time to the suitable en-route alternate
airport, in the event of engine failure at the single-engine cruising speed in no-wind conditions. ETOPS
diversion distance. During ETOPS flight planning, the distance that an aircraft will cover with one engine
inoperative in the border time.
Weather-permissible aerodrome. Adequate aerodrome where, for the anticipated time of use, weather
reports, or forecasts, or any combination thereof, indicate that the weather conditions will be at or above
the required aerodrome operating minima, and the runway surface condition reports indicate that a safe
landing will be possible.
8.1.4 EN ROUTE OPERATING MINIMA FOR VFR FLIGHTS OR VFR PORTIONS OF A FLIGHT
Commercial flights by ETF will be operated under IFR only. Certain non-revenue flights, when and if
authorised in th OM-C,or with special permission of FOM,may be operated as a VFR flight provided that
appropriate clearance from ATC is received and:
1. VFR flights are conducted in accordance with the Visual Flight Rules and in accordance with the Table below.
2. Special VFR flights are not commenced when the visibility is less than 3 km and not otherwise conducted when
the visibility is less than 1·5 km.
All route flights shall be operated fully in accordance with IFR and a flight plan shall be filed. No cancellation of an IFR
flight plan is authorised. Non-cancellation of an IFR flight plan does not preclude the use of a clearance subject to
maintain VMC for a limited and specified portion of a flight as IFR flight under VMC clearance.
The above minima were established as an absolute minimum. The „see and avoid“ policy becomes rather
difficult in case of a traffic mix (high speed/low speed airplanes) and/or in areas of a high traffic density.
8.1.4.A VFR OPERATING MINIMA FOR VISUAL DEPARTURES OR APPROACHES
As traffic density is increasing, such VMC flights shall be carried out very cautiously and the situation must
be analysed very carefully in every case. Additionally, during this phase of a flight, pilots must keep a sharp
lookout, monitor ATC communications and carefully check the position and flight path continuously by
means of instruments and radio aids. Radar assistance shall be requested whenever available for traffic
information. A VMC clearance may only be requested or accepted if all of the following conditions are met:
- weather conditions for the entire intended flight path are at least equal to the minimums specified in table
above
- without VMC clearance, a fuel penalty or delay would result;
- the VMC operation is temporary only, i.e. for a short phase of climb, descent or approach;
- restrictive traffic can be analysed properly (knowledge of position, altitude, direction, etc.);
- the flight is able to establish its exact position and to maintain proper terrain clearance;
- a flight level/altitude must be assigned;
- at night‚ shall not be accepted, unless it is the only means of approach to a particular airport/runway; and
- clearances or advice to maintain “VMC on top” in lieu of cruising level shall not be accepted
- visual contact continually maintained with ground
- speed limited to 250 kt below 10,000ft;
8.1.5 PRESENTATION AND APPLICATION OF AERODROME AND EN-ROUTE OPERATING MINIMA
ETF shall ensure that operations are only conducted along routes, or within areas, for which:
• space-based facilities, ground facilities and services, including meteorological services, adequate for the planned
operation are provided;
• the performance of the aircraft is adequate to comply with minimum flight altitude requirements;
• the equipment of the aircraft meets the minimum requirements for the planned operation; and
• appropriate maps and charts are available.
For presentation of aerodrome and en-route minima, refer to Jeppesen Flight Deck Pro
Aerodrome and enroute minima are applicable if:
- the ground equipment shown on the respective chart required for the intended procedure is operative
- the aeroplane systems required for the type of approach are operative
- the required aeroplane performance criteria are met
- the crew is qualified accordingly
8.1.5.A AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA
Except in emergencies, strict adherence to following is mandatory:
1. Each minimum published on the Approach Charts (OM-C) is the lowest permissible for the particular type of
operation and no reduction below the published values is authorised.
2. Whenever any requirement of the OM-A or the OM-B (FCOM) governing the application of a published minimum
(e.g. availability of ground facilities or airborne equipment components, crosswind limitation, crew qualification)
cannot be met, the published minimum shall be increased accordingly.
For planning purposes, an aerodrome shall be considered to be below minimum if:
• the visibility or RVR is below the applicable minimum, or
• for non-precision approaches or circling approaches, ceiling or vertical visibility is below the applicable MDA/H
(for ILS Cat I ceiling or vertical visibility may be disregarded); or
• the crosswind component exceeds the prescribed limits.
Pre-flight planning rules (planning minima) shall govern the selection of destinations and/or alternates
while the flight is still in the planning phase.
Once a flight has actually commenced, the actual conditions at the aerodrome shall be governing with
respect to the application of landing minima.
Furthermore, the Commander may decide to apply special increments to minima for other reasons, e.g. if
the physical condition (e.g. undue fatigue) of any flight crewmember so requires.
8.1.5.A.1. TAKE OFF ALTERNATE
The operator shall only select an aerodrome as a take-off alternate aerodrome when the appropriate
weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that, during a period commencing one hour before and ending
one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome, the weather conditions will be at or above
the applicable landing minima.
The ceiling shall be taken into account when the only approach operations available are non-precision
approaches (NPA) and/or circling operations. Any limitation related to OEI operations shall be taken into
account.
8.1.5.A.2. DESTINATION AERODROME
ETF shall only select the destination aerodrome when:
the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that, during a period commencing one hour
before and ending one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome, the weather conditions
will be at or above the applicable planning minima as follows:
• RVR/visibility (VIS) specified in accordance with chapter 8.1.3 and
• for an NPA or a circling operation, the ceiling at or above MDH;
or
• two destination alternate aerodromes are selected.
8.1.5.A.3. DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME, ISOLATED DESTINATION AERODROME, FUEL ERA AND ERA
AERODROME
ETF shall only select an aerodrome for one of these purposes when the appropriate weather reports
and/or forecasts indicate that, during a period commencing one hour before and ending one hour after the
estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome, the weather conditions will be at or above the planning
minima as follows:
Type of approach Planning minima
CAT II and III CAT I RVR
CAT I NPA RVR/VIS
Ceiling shall be at or above MDH
APV NPA or CAT I minima, depending on the DH/MDH;
NPA NPA RVR/VIS + 1 000 m
Ceiling shall be at or above MDH + 200 ft
Circling Circling
8.1.5.B EN ROUTE OPERATING MINIMA
Refer to 8.1.1.A Minimum Flight Altitudes
8.1.5.C APPLICABILITY
On IFR flights the commander shall only:
• commence take-off; or
• continue beyond the point from which a revised ATS flight plan applies in the event of in-flight replanning,
when information is available indicating that the expected weather conditions, at the time of arrival, at the
destination and/or required alternate aerodrome(s) are at or above the planning minima.
On IFR flights, the commander shall only continue towards the planned destination aerodrome when the
latest information available indicates that, at the expected time of arrival, the weather conditions at the
destination, or at least one destination alternate aerodrome, are at or above the applicable aerodrome
operating minima.
On VFR flights, the commander shall only commence take-off when the appropriate weather reports
and/or forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the part of the route to be flown under
VFR will, at the appropriate time, be at or above the VFR limits.
In addition to above, on IFR flights, the commander shall only continue beyond:
• the decision point when using the reduced contingency fuel (RCF) procedure; or
• the pre-determined point when using the pre-determined point (PDP) procedure,
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when information is available indicating that the expected weather conditions, at the time of arrival, at the
destination and/or required alternate aerodrome(s) are at or above the applicable aerodrome operating
minima.
It is the commander’s duty and responsibility to respect the application of takeoff, enroute, approach and
landing operating minima.
As the published operating minima may not be established taking into account all possible operating
situations, the best judgment must be applied in all circumstances to guarantee flight safety.
Commander may decide, whenever he deems it necessary, to increase the minima values for the purpose
of flight safety.
Table 3: Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima for operation without LVO approval
Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima for operation with LVO approval.
TEMPO improvement:
In cases where a weather improvement from conditions below to conditions above minima at or near ETA is expressed
as a PROB or as a TEMPO variation, the aerodrome shall be considered below minima for flight planning purposes.
TREND forecast:
The above policy also applies to TREND forecasts. Where available, the TREND forecast overrules the aerodrome
forecast (TAF/TAFOR) for 2 hours following the time of issue
APPLICATION OF AERODROME FORECAST (TAF & TREND) TO PRE-FLIGHT PLANNING (ref to ICAO Annex
3)
1. APPLICATION OF INITIAL PART OF TAF
a) Applicable time period: From the start of the TAF validity period up to the time of applicability of the
first subsequent “FM…*” or “BECMG” or, if no “FM” or “BECMG” is given, up to the end of the validity
period of the TAF
b) Application of forecast: The prevailing weather condition forecast in the initial part of the TAF shall be
fully applied with the exception of the mean wind gusts (and crosswind) which shall be applied in
accordance with the policy n the column “BECMG AT and FM” in the table below. This may however
be overruled temporarily a “TEMPO” or “PROB” if applicable acc to the table below.
2. APPLICATION OF FORECAST FOLLOWING CHANGE INDICATORS IN TAF AND TREND
FM
BECMG (alone),
(alone) TEMPO (ALONE), TEMPO FM, TEMPO TL,
BECMG FM; BECMG PROB
and TEMPO FM…TL,
TL, BECMG FM…TL, In TEMPO
BECMG PROB 30/40 (alone)
case of:
AT:
Improvem
Deterioration
TAF or ent
TREND for Persistent
Transient/Sh
AERODRO Conditions
ower
ME In
Deteriorat conditions in Deteriorat
PLANNED connection
ion and Deteriora Improvem connection ion and
as: with e.g.
Improvem tion ent with short- in any Improvem
haze, mist,
ent lived weather case ent
fog,
phenomena
dust/sandst
e.g.
orm,
thunderstorm
continuous
s, showers…
perception
Applicabl Applicabl Not Deteriorat
DESTINAT Applicabl Applicable
e from e from applicable ion may
ION e from Shall be
the start the time be
At ETA +/- the time disregard
of the of the disregard
1 HR of the ed
change end of the ed;
start of
change Improvem
o Alternate fuel
o Final reserve fuel
o Additional fuel
Extra fuel, tinkering fuel and company fuel can be added additionally to minimum required fuel.
Where two destination alternate aerodromes are required, alternate fuel shall be sufficient to proceed to
the alternate aerodrome which requires the greater amount of alternate fuel.
8.1.7.G FINAL RESERVE FUEL
It includes fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1500 ft above aerodrome elevation in standard conditions,
calculated with the estimated mass on arrival at the destination alternate aerodrome or the destination aerodrome,
when no destination alternate aerodrome is required.
Commander has full authority to reduce or completely withdraw company fuel if needed for performance limitations
or for other safety reasons.
When tankering fuel is planned, special attention shall be taken to performance limitations at destination / alternate
airports taking into account weather forecast and runway surface conditions.
Final decision about amount of tankering fuel rests with Commander.
8.1.7.L IN FLIGHT REPLANNING - REDUCED CONTINGENCY FUEL (RCF) PROCEDURE
Reduced contingency procedure is used for pre-flight planning to a destination 1 aerodrome (commercial
destination) using a decision point along the route and a destination 2 aerodrome (refuel destination).
The amount of usable fuel, on board for departure, shall be the greater of A or B
A scenario B scenario
Taxi fuel Taxi fuel
Trip fuel Destination 2 aerodrome via the decision point Trip fuel to Destination 1 aerodrome, via the decision
point
5 % contingency fuel from departure aerodrome to the Contingency fuel equal to not less than 5 % of the
destination 2 aerodrome estimated fuel consumption from the decision point to
the destination 1 aerodrome
Alternate fuel, if a Destination 2 alternate aerodrome is Alternate fuel, if a destination alternate is required
required
Final reserve fuel Final reserve fuel
Additional fuel, if required Additional fuel, if required
Extra fuel if required by the commander Extra fuel if required by the commander
8.1.7.M IN FLIGHT REPLANNING - PREDETERMINED POINT (PDP) PROCEDURE
Where the distance between the destination aerodrome and the destination alternate aerodrome is such that a flight
can only be routed via a predetermined point to one of these aerodromes, predetermined point procedure can be
used in which case the amount of usable fuel, on board for departure, shall be the greater of C or D
C scenario D scenario
1. Taxi fuel 1. Taxi fuel
2. Trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to the 2. trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to the
destination aerodrome, via the predetermined point destination alternate aerodrome, via the
3. Contingency fuel predetermined point
4. Additional fuel sufficient for 2 hours at normal cruise 3. Contingency fuel
consumption above the destination aerodrome 4. Additional fuel sufficient for 30 minutes at holding
5. Extra fuel if required by the commander speed at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the destination
alternate aerodrome elevation in standard
conditions. This shall not be less than final reserve
fuel
5. Extra fuel if required by the commander
8.1.7.N OIL
Adequate oil quantity to cover the requirements of trip, contingency, alternate, reserve and taxi must be
loaded prior departure.
The minimum oil quantity requested for any flight is equal to the minimum quantity specified for a
particular engine, plus the estimated oil consumption.
The estimated oil consumption shall cover the flight time the aeroplane can be operated with the quantity
of fuel requested by the fuel planning plus 15 minutes.
The hourly oil consumption is determined by the maintenance.
The minimum and maximum oil quantities and the maximum average estimated oil consumption (if no
data from maintenance available) are indicated in FCOM.
8.1.7.O FUEL AND OIL RECORDS
Records of loaded and burned fuel will be entered into Operational Flight Plan and Electronic Flight Log for
every ETF flight. These records will be stored in the Flight Operations Department.
Data about loaded and burned oil will be entered into the Electronic Flight Log.
8.1.8 MASS AND CENTRE OF GRAVITY
8.1.8.A DEFINITIONS
Term Definition
Adult A passenger of an age of 12 years or above
Child A passenger of an age of 2 years and above but who is less than 12 years of age.
Dry Operating Total mass of the aircraft ready for a specific type of operation, excluding usable fuel and
Mass traffic load.
DOM includes crew and their baggage, catering, catering equipment, removable passenger
service equipment, flight kit, tank water and lavatory chemicals. For detailed DOM
specifications, refer to OM-B-6
Holiday charter means a charter flight that is part of a holiday travel package. On such flights the entire
passenger capacity is hired by one or more charterer(s) for the carriage of passengers who
are travelling, all or in part by air, on a round- or circle-trip basis for holiday purposes. The
holiday charter mass values apply provided that not more than 5 % of passenger seats
installed in the aircraft are used for the non-revenue carriage of certain categories of
Term Definition
passengers. Categories of passengers such as company personnel, tour operators’ staff,
representatives of the press, authority officials, etc. can be included within the 5% without
negating the use of holiday charter mass values.
Infant A passenger who is less than 2 years of age.
Landing Mass (LM) The mass at landing. It is equal to take-off mass minus trip fuel.
Loadsheet A common name for the Load & Trim Sheet. It is a form that represents mass &
balance documentation. It specifies the load and its distribution and enables the
commander to determine that the load and its distribution is such that the mass and
balance limits of the aeroplane are not exceeded. For detailed description of the
form refer to ch. 6 of the respective OM-B.
Manufacturer’s The mass of the structure, power plant, furnishings, systems and other items of the
Empty Mass (MES) equipment that are considered an integral part of the aeroplane. It is essentially a “dry” mass,
including only those fluids contained in closed systems (e.g. hydraulic fluid).
Mass/weight Although in the OM the term “mass” is used, there are some publications, system or forms
which use the term “weight”. Within ETF they are considered to have the same meaning.
Take-off fuel The mass of the fuel on board at take-off.
Take-off Mass The mass at take-off. It is equal to the addition of the zero fuel mass (ZFM) and take-off fuel.
(TOM)
Total traffic load The total mass of passengers, baggage and cargo, including any non-revenue loads.
Trip fuel The mass of the fuel necessary to cover the normal leg without reserves.
Zero Fuel Mass The mass obtained by addition of the total traffic load and the dry operating mass.
(ZFM)
8.1.8.B METHODS, PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PREPARATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF MASS AND
CENTRE OF GRAVITY CALCULATIONS
In ETF one of the following methods can be used for load and trim calculation:
- Manual loadsheet prepared by trained ETF flight crew by using load and trim sheet form as described in OM-
B-6.
- EFB calculation prepared by trained ETF flight crew by using OPT application.
- Computerized loadsheet prepared by approved handling agent in accordance with ETF AHM 560.
For all methods, ETF will use Loading Instruction Form. The person supervising the loading of the aircraft
shall confirm by hand signature or equivalent that the load and its distribution are in accordance with the
mass and balance documentation given to the commander. The commander shall indicate his/her
acceptance by hand signature or equivalent. All details are given in OM Part B, chapter 6.
When persons other than operating crew occupy crew seats (ie. CAA inspector, additional crew member,
miscellaniuos company staff), for the purpose of mass and balance calculation, their mass shall be included in crew
composition and note shall be inserted in loadsheet remark section
Example: for one additional person in cockpit and one in cabin with crew configuration 2/4, calculate mass and
balance with crew configuration 3/5 and insert remark “1 PAD in cockpit” and “1 MEC on aft/fwd cabin crew seat”.
During any phase of operation, the loading, mass and centre of gravity (CG) of the aircraft shall comply with the
limitations specified in the AFM, or the operations manual if more restrictive.
ETF has established the mass and the CG for each aircraft by actual weighing prior to initial entry into service and
thereafter at intervals of four years. The accumulated effects of modifications and repairs on the mass and balance
shall be accounted for and properly documented. Aircraft shall be reweighed if the effect of modifications on the
mass and balance is not accurately known.
The weighing shall be accomplished by the manufacturer of the aircraft or by an approved maintenance
organisation.
ETF has determined the mass of all operating items and crew members included in the aircraft dry operating mass by
weighing or by using standard masses. The influence of their position on the aircraft’s CG shall be determined.
ETF has established the mass of the traffic load, including any ballast, by actual weighing or by determining the mass
of the traffic load in accordance with standard passenger and baggage masses.
ETF has determined the mass of the fuel load by using the actual density or, if not known, the density calculated in
accordance with a method specified in the operations manual.
ETF has ensured that the loading of:
• its aircraft is performed under the supervision of qualified personnel; and
• traffic load is consistent with the data used for the calculation of the aircraft mass and balance.
ETF comply with additional structural limits such as the floor strength limitations, the maximum load per running
metre, the maximum mass per cargo compartment and the maximum seating limit
All ETF Commanders and copilot’s are qualified and allowed to prepare the Loadsheet. Guidelines for
manual Load & Trim sheet preparation are given <OM-B Ch.6>.
If maximum take-off or landing mass are limited due to performance, it is Commander responsibility to take limitation
into account when preparing mass and balance documentation. If mass and balance documentation is prepared by
third party (ie. handling agent) loadsheet agent needs to be informed about performance limitations as early as
possible.
The loading shall take into account additional structural limits such as the floor strength limitations, the maximum load
per running metre, the maximum mass per cargo compartment, and/or the maximum seating limits as well as in-flight
changes in loading
ETF shall verify the integrity of mass and balance data and documentation generated by a computerised or EFB mass
and balance system, at intervals not exceeding 6 months.
Integrity check will be done by comparing results obtained by a computerized or EFB system (DCS or OPT) with results
obtained with manual loadsheed. Integrity check will be done by OCC Department.
Flight operations department is responsible to check that amendments of input data are incorporated properly in the
system and that the system is operating correctly on a continuous basis.
- For passengers: primarily standard masses shall be used. Alternatively in case of transportation of significant
numbers of passenger whose masses including hand baggage are suspected to significantly deviate from the
standard mass values, actual masses shall be used
- For baggage: if available, actual masses shall be used. Otherwise, standard masses shall be used.
- For cargo: actual masses shall be used
8.1.8.D THE METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PASSENGER, BAGGAGE AND CARGO MASS
For standard mass - values in table 8.1.8.E.2 shall be used.
Passengers
For actual mass - mass shall be determined by weighing.
For standard mass - values in table 8.1.8.E.2 shall be used.
Baggage
For actual mass - mass shall be determined by weighing.
Freight/cargo must always be weighed
8.1.8.E THE APPLICABLE PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE MASSES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF OPERATIONS AND AIRCRAFT
TYPE
8.1.8.E.1. OPERATING CREW
STANDARD WEIGHTS CREW MEMBER WEIGHT [kg]
FLIGHT CREW or other persons occupying flight
compartment seat. Mass also includes their hand 85
luggage.
CABIN CREW or other persons occupying cabin crew
75
seats. Mass also includes their hand luggage.
CREW ADDITIONAL BAGGAGE
20 (if applicable)
(other than hand baggage)
When persons other than operating crew occupy crew seats (ie. CAA inspector, additional crew member,
miscellaniuos company staff), for the purpose of mass and balance calculation, their mass shall be included in crew
composition and note shall be inserted in loadsheet remark section
Example: for one additional person in cockpit and one in cabin with crew configuration 2/4, calculate mass
and balance with crew configuration 3/5 and insert remark “1 PAD in cockpit” and “1 MEC on aft/fwd cabin
crew seat”.
Dry operating mass shall be corrected to account for any additional baggage as per above table. The
position of this additional baggage shall be accounted for when establishing the centre of gravity of the
aeroplane.
Male 88 kg 83 kg
84 kg 76 kg
Female 70 kg 69 kg
Child 35 kg
Infant 0 kg
Domestic 11 kg
Other than European region1 13 kg
hand
baggage Intercontinental2 15 kg
All other 13 kg per pax or 13 kg per baggage count
Note 1 Flights within the European region are flights conducted within the following area:
— N7200 E04500
— N4000 E04500
— N3500 E03700
— N3000 E03700
— N3000 W00600
— N2700 W00900
— N2700 W03000
— N6700 W03000
— N7200 W01000
— N7200 E04500
Note 2. Intercontinental flight,other than flight within the European region,mean a flight with origin and
destination in different continents.
Note 3 Holiday charter: means a charter flight that is part of a holiday travel package. On such flights the entire
passenger capacity is hired by one or more charterer(s) for the carriage of passengers who are travelling, all or in part
by air, on a round- or circle-trip basis for holiday purposes. The holiday charter mass values apply provided that not
more than 5 % of passenger seats installed in the aircraft are used for the non-revenue carriage of certain categories
of passengers. Categories of passengers such as company personnel, tour operators’ staff, representatives of the press,
authority officials, etc. can be included within the 5% without negating the use of holiday charter mass values.
Information about the type of flight is contained in Electronic Flight Log under type of flight field.
Baggage that has actually made it to the cabin and is found to be oversized for hand baggage (e.g. by cabin
crew) is taken from passengers at aircraft, put into a cargo hold. Delivery at aircraft ( DAA) is unloaded first
and returned to passengers as they disembark.
No trim sheet corrections are required for total DAA mass within LMC value.
`
Calculation provided and contents of electronic Load & trimsheet forms is checked and approved by ETF. Every
individual Load & trimsheet has to be checked and approved by a Commander.
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8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
8.1.8.F GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION OF MASS AND BALANCE
DOCUMENTATION
After verifying the loadsheet the commander shall sign the loadsheet. By signing, the commander also
verifies that he has received the NOTOC (in case cargo is carried on board).
The person supervising the loading of the airplane must confirm by signature or equivalent that the load
and its distribution are in accordance with the mass and balance documentation. The commander shall
indicate his/her acceptance by hand signature.
Prior to signing the commander must verify the load sheet as follows:
- the load sheet must contain all of the details listed above
- the fuel figures on the load sheet must correspond to those specified on the OFP and the actual quantities
loaded into the aircraft
- the actual weights for zero-fuel, take-off and landing shall not exceed maximum allowances (structural or
performance, whichever is more restrictive) noted on the load sheet
- takeoff and zero-fuel C.G. positions are within their operational C.G. envelopes
Note: It is not mandatory to check landing C.G. position against its operational C.G. envelope. ETF designs
operational envelopes in such way that this requirement is automatically fulfilled if both the takeoff and zero-
fuel C.G. positions are within their defined limits.
- the indicated number of crew shall correspond to the actual crew complement
- the indicated number of persons on board shall not exceed prescribed seating limitations with due regard to
seat belts, oxygen masks, and the number of emergency exits according to the respective OM-B
- the actual seating of passengers shall be in accordance with the seating conditions stated on the load sheet
- the required stabiliser setting shall be within prescribed limits
- the load sheet is signed by person who prepared the load sheet (electronic signatures can be accepted where
they have been approved)
The Commander shall request that he shall be provided with the certified (signed) Loading Instructions for
the given flight. When presented, the Commander shall verify that the actual aircraft loading corresponds
to the values and distribution stated on the prepared load sheet.
ETF will use the same flight designator for both ATS flight plan and announcement of flight to airport slot coordination
office. However, in case there is a difference between flight designator used in ATS flight plan and flight designator
announced to airport, OCC is responsible to inform airports about the flight designator used in ATS flight plan in order
to allow airports to match.
All ATS flight plans shall be filled in accordance with Eurocontrol IFPS and ATFCM manuals which are available in OCC.
In case of non compliance with ATFM measures, FOM will submit a report to ATFM central unit. Report must contain
details of the circumstances that resulted in missing flight plan as well as corrective actions taken.
ATS flight plans shall normally be submitted at least 60 minutes before the estimated departure time and more time
may be required in accordance with local procedures.
For flights within EUR region, when flow control is in effect, ATS flight plans shall be submitted 3 hours before
estimated departure time.
The Commander shall verify that the ATS flight plan is available at the ATS facility by requesting for the ATC clearance
at the earliest possible time, in accordance with local procedures. If the ATS flight plan is not available, the Commander
shall contact OCC or the handling agent, as appropriate and request for re-submission of the ATS flight plan.
In case any change is required to already submitted flight plan, OCC is responsible to inform the crew about the change
and to update ATS flight plan accordingly.
8.1.10 OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN
Updated operational flight plan shall be prepared in the following case:
- If take off weight is changed by more than 1000 Kg
- If routing or selected aerodromes are changed
- If flight is delayed and there are significant changes in fuel figures (i.e. APU usage, greater fuel consumption
etc.) or enroute weather
- If requested by commander
- If aircraft status is changed (i.e. due to open MEL item etc.)
An Operational Flight Plan shall be prepared by the OCC Department for every ETF flight except for training
and test flights with the departure and arrival aerodrome being the same and no en-route flying (e.g. zone
training).
The Operational Flight Plan serves as flight/radio log, which is an officially required document.
The position reporting column shall be used as far as practicable depending on work load, trip length, etc.
The Commander shall sign Operational Flight Plan for each flight. By signing the Operational Flight Plan, the
Commander certifies that the flight has been planned in accordance with the valid regulations and policies
as stipulated in the ETF OM, AFM / FCOM and other applicable documents, that he has performed a
general check of the calculation and he has performed a self briefing for Route and Airports selected in
OFP.
Every Operational Flight Plan is based on a specified route from the aerodrome of departure to the
aerodrome of destination and then on to the alternate aerodromes.
Additionally to all route instructions, every ETF flight has to be planned and executed concerning route and
altitude so as to reduce the disturbance by aeroplane noise as much as possible. Therefore the published
noise abatement procedures must be strictly adhered to.
In ETF the Operational Flight Plan is obtained through a computerized process with two possible options:
1. Zero Wind (Operational) Flight Plan
2. Actual Weather (Operational) Flight Plan.
8.1.10.A ZERO WIND OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN
An Operational Flight Plan using no wind predictions along the route, thus optimizing the altitude of the
flight for the minimum fuel consumption at an average aeroplane weight. Fuel/time correction tables are
supplied for deviation from the aeroplane weight and altitudes stated in the flight plan.
Zero Wind Flight Plans are prepared as a back-up solution, in case that Operational Flight Plan cannot be
prepared due to Flight Planning Software failure. In case of dispatching a flight with a zero wind flight plan,
crew shall be warned by OCC staff, that the wind correction has to be done manually.
Zero Wind Flight Plans shall always be prepared with max possible payload (taking into account
performance limitations).
On top of the OFP there are log number, ETF OCC contact number and free text which can be inserted by
flight dispatcher.
EOSID: field to insert engine out departure procedure which can be obtained from OPT application.
V1, VR, V2: fields to insert take off speeds which can be obtained from OPT application.
Alternate summary section contain information about destination alternate airports as well as about ERA
alternate airport if it is planned. Information for destination alternates are ICAO and IATA code, ETF airport
category, Distance between destination and each alternate, flight time between destination and alternate
airport, fuel from destination to alternate airport and flight level planned.
For ERA alternate, only ICAO, IATA and ETF airport category is displayed.
Note: If flight is planned without alternate airports and / or ERA alternate, this section will remain empty.
Correction section contains information about average wind component, flight time in minutes, trip fuel,
additional weight penalties and direct cost.
Planned flight level is marked with vertical line and adjacent levels are shown below and above planned
flight level.
ATC routing section contains route informaiton from ICAO flight plan item 15.
Signature section contain three letter code of commander and dispatcher name. Commander needs to sign
OFP next to his code.
Enroute winds
ARR ATIS: Section for flight crew to insert ATIS information for arrival airport.
Arrival ATC clearance: Section for flight crew to insert ATC clearance information.
From the Aviator Briefing module, you can review the flight plan and other information included in the flight
package.
The Briefing menu, which appears on the left side of the page, displays flight plan details, dispatch weather
information, NOTAMs, and other files that were downloaded with the flight folder.
Aviator Briefing module consists of:
• FLIGHT PLAN SECTION
a) Flight Summary
b) Time Summary (the only part used in Briefing module during the flight, for OFF, T/O, LDG, ON times recording.)
c) Fuel & Weights
d) Alternates
e) Performance
• DISPATCHED WEATHER
• NOTAMS
• Important Files
NOTE: Under the Important files there is still available PDF version of the OFP available for reference.
1. To sign the flight plan:
From the Briefing module, tap Sign next to FLT PLAN in the Briefing menu.
To insert ATIS, click on the relevant airport. For example, if on flight BIKF-LDZA pilot wants to insert ATIS for
departure BIKF airport, they should access “Actions” menu by pressing icon three dots for BIKF airport.
4. Engine Out SID routing
EO SID by using is recorded by “Insert Remark” function.
To Insert Remark, you must access Actions menu where Insert Remark will be found.
5. ATC Clearance
To Insert ATC Clearance, you must access Actions menu where Insert ATC Clearance will be found.
To do RVSM Check on Ground, Insert RVSM Check must be selected from the Origin Actions menu. For example, for
flight BIKF-LDZA, to record RVSM check on ground, pilot must access BIKF Actions menu and Insert RVSM Check from
there.
7. Fuel check
Fuel check values can be inserted through each waypoint, as shown at image below.
You can close a flight from the Flights page. When you close a flight, Aviator moves it to the Closed tab on the Flights
page.
To close a flight folder, tap Flights on the Aviator global header bar. The page opens on the Schedule tab.
CAUTION: If CLOSE function does not appear, that means that all required fileds were not filled. Check if: Time
Summary,Fuel and Weights, Navlog have been filled.
Confirmation of closed flight:
For more information as well as for instructions for use, refer to “TLB System manual” which is available on EFB devices
and in ETF Library.
The documents mentioned below are kept in the cockpit and the cabin in a special plastic folder
(certificates and licenses), ETF style plastic folders (manuals, forms) and in the Flight Deck Pro type
briefcase (other). An aeroplane without valid documents can be considered as not being in conformity with
international regulations and can therefore be grounded by any aerodrome authority.
Documents, manuals and forms must be kept up to date and made readily available to any Authority
representative on request.
8.1.12.A DOCUMENTS:
1. Certificate of Registration – original
2. Certificate of Airworthiness – original
3. Noise Certificate – original or copy
4. Air Operator Certificate – original or certify true copy
5. Operations specifications relevant to the aircraft type (issued with the AOC) - original or certify true copy
6. Aircraft Radio Licence – original
7. All Insurance Certificates, including Third Party Liability – original or copy
In case of loss or theft of below listed documents, the operation may continue until the flight reaches its
destination or a place where replacement documents can be provided:
1. The Certificate of Registration;
2. The Certificate of Airworthiness;
3. Noise Certificate – original or copy
4. Air Operator Certificate – original or certify true copy
5. Operations specifications relevant to the aircraft type (issued with the AOC) - original or certify true copy
6. Aircraft Radio Licence – original
7. All Insurance Certificates, including Third Party Liability – original or copy
8.1.12.B MANUALS:
1. Operations Manual – Part A: General/Basic – on EFB
2. Operations Manual – Part B: Airplane Operating Matters – on EFB
3. Operations Manual – Part C: Ad and Rte Operating Instructions and Information together with Flight Deck
Pro EFB application – on EFB
4. Operations Manual – Part D: Training
5. Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM) - electronic on EFB
6. Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) electronic on EFB
7. Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) – paper
8. Normal check list – paper
9. Cabin Safety Procedures Manual (CSPM) – electronic and paper
Note: these manuals cover relevant crew duties and are easily accessible to the crew on board the aircraft
8.1.12.C ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND FORMS:
1. Operational Flight Plan –paper or electronic on EFB
2. Electronic Flight Log – electronic on EFB
3. Technical Log - paper
4. Minimum Equipment List / Configuration Deviation List (CDL) – electronic on EFB
5. Emergency Equipment List
6. Hold Items List (HIL) / Deferred Item List (DIL) booklets – electronic on EFB
7. Dent & Buckle Chart / Structural Repair Mapping - paper
8. Filed ATS Flight Plan –contained on OFP
9. NAT track message (if fligth is planned within NAT HLA)
10. Procedures and visual signals information for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft -on EFB
11. Information concerning search and rescue services for the area of the intended flight –on EFB
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8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
SECURITY FORMS
6 WRITTEN WARNING - UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR ON BOARD THIS AIRCRAFT
7 Aircraft security search check list
8. Smoking violation, paper, non mandatory
9. Passenger Disturbance Report For The Authority
10 Security seals list, paper, mandatory
OTHER
11. Cabin Safety Procedures Manual (CSPM), paper / EFB, mandatory
12. Cabin Log Book (CLB), paper, mandatory
The responsibility for updates of aircraft documents lies on operating crew members.
8.1.13 INFORMATION RETAINED ON THE GROUND
ETF shall ensure that information relevant to the flight and appropriate for the type of operation is
retained on the ground.
The following information shall be retained on ground before each flight:
- Copy of the operational flight plan
- Technical status of aircraft from TLB system
- Route-specific NOTAM documentation if specifically edited by ETF
- Dispatch release with fuel figures (via Aviator application)
- Mass and balance figures (via OPT application)
- Special loads notifications
In case above information cannot be retained in electronic form due to problem with EFB, crew shall fill
manually loadsheet results on “mass and balance result form”.
8.1.14 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT CHECK
All Cabin Emergency Equipment has to be checked for availability, accessibility and serviceability before
each flight whether it is round trip or a stopover flight. Checks of Cabin emergency equipment is performed
by a Cabin crew and shall be checked according the Emergency Checklist. Any discrepancies with the
Emergency Checklist shall be reported to the Commander and recorded into the Cabin Log Book (CLB) held
by the SCCM.
Each CCM is responsible for his station and the emergency equipment at each station.
Emergency equipment in the Cockpit shall be checked for availability, accessibility and serviceability by the
Flight crew when taking over the aeroplane and when aeroplane has been left unattended for any period
of time.
8.2 GROUND HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
The fuel generally is not easily ignitable, but the risk of fire is increased when the fuel is sprayed (leakage,
disconnecting pipe, etc.) and in the presence of fuel vapor, especially when low flash point fuels are used.
Therefore, the following precautions apply during any fuelling operation:
Fuelling safety zone shall be established during every fuelling operation. Fuelling safety zone extends at least 3 meters
(or as per local regulations) from fuel filling and venting points on the aeroplane, fuelling equipment and hydrant pits.
No smoking, open flame or portable electronic devices are allowed within fuelling safety zone. Positioning of servicing
and other non-essential equipment shall be avoided in fuelling safety areas.
8.2.1.B REFUELLING WHEN PASSENGERS ARE EMBARKING, ON BOARD OR DISEMBARKING
GENERAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
In addition to safety procedures laid down in OM-A 8.2.1.A, additional measures are to be adhered to.
Re/de-fuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking is allowed only with Jet A or Jet A1
type fuel.
Whenever re/de-fuelling is to be carried out with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking, the
Crew, all operating personnel and passengers must be informed. The Flight Crew shall relay the message to
the SCCM and inform of the beginning and termination of such fuelling.
In case when passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking, necessary precautions must be taken
and the aeroplane shall be properly manned by qualified personnel ready to initiate and direct an
evacuation of the aeroplane by the most practical and expeditious means available.
Close coordination with Airport Authorities via Handling Agent or ATC shall be established in order to
Comply with any special Airport or State procedure.
The deployment of integral aircraft stairs or the opening of emergency exits as a prerequisite to refuelling
is not necessarily required, but ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide
deployment areas shall be kept clear.
Ground servicing activities and work inside the aeroplane, such as catering and cleaning, shall be
conducted in such a manner that they do not create a hazard and that the aisles and emergency exits are
unobstructed.
Passengers approaching the aeroplane shall be instructed not to pass through Fuelling safety zones, as
defined in OM-A chapter 8.2.1.A.
The airport’s Fire Brigade shall be informed of the re/defueling with passengers (either through the ETF
handling agent or the appropriate ATC frequency).
Provision shall be made, via at least two of the main passenger doors, (or the main passenger door plus
one emergency exit when only one main door is available) and preferably at opposite ends of the
aeroplane, for the safe evacuation of passengers in the event of an emergency.
These doors shall be constantly manned by a CCM throughout the fuelling operation, it shall be ensured
that the ground area beneath that exit and the slide deployment area is kept clear of all external
obstructions.
When a Loading Bridge is in use, no additional sets of Aeroplane Passenger Steps need be provided.
However, either the left or right rear door shall be manned constantly by a member of Cabin Crew, and
shall be prepared for immediate use as an emergency escape route, using the Automatic inflatable Slide.
If presence of fuel vapor is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard occurres during re/de-
fuelling, the Commander shall be informed and fuelling shall stop immediately
RESPONSIBILITIES
The following procedures apply:
The flight crew shall ensure that:
1. At least one Flight crew member is present on the flight deck (capable of handling emergency procedures
concerning fire protection and fire fighting, handling communications and initiating and directing an
evacuation);
2. At least one person qualified for the re/de-fuelling of the type of aeroplane (the Station mechanic or the Flight
crew member) is at the re/de-fuelling point (in contact with the flight deck) ready to promptly stop the process
if required;
3. The SCCM is informed of the beginning and ending of aeroplane fuelling;
4. A two-way communication is established and remains available by the aeroplane’s inter-communication system
or other suitable means between the crew member supervising the refueling and the flight deck;
5. The aeroplane main engines are shut down;
6. NO SMOKING signs are ON and passengers shall refrain from smoking;
7. FASTEN SEAT BELT signs are OFF and passengers shall be instructed to unfasten their seatbelts;
8. Interior lightning is set to adequate intensity (preferably to highest setting) to enable rapid identification of
evacuation pathways.
The Cabin crew shall ensure that:
1. Minimum required number of cabin crew is on board (as per ETF CSPM Ch. 2.5.7.B.1 / Ch. 2.5.7.B.3 / Ch.
5.1.10.O) at their assigned stations;
2. SCCM informs other Cabin crew via Interphone of the beginning and ending of aeroplane fuelling;
3. Passengers are informed (by appropriate PA announcements or other applicable means) that fuelling operations
are to take place (are in progress);
4. Passengers do not smoke;
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8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
The aspect of safety shall govern the handling, i.e., servicing, of the aeroplane on the ramp, the
embarkation and disembarkation of the passengers and the loading and unloading of baggage, cargo and
mail.
EMBARKATION / DISEMBARKATION
Before embarking/disembarking passengers, ground staff/flight crew must brief them on all relevant safety
aspects (e.g. "No Smoking") to be observed whilst boarding/leaving the aeroplane. When jetways are in
use, ground staff must be positioned at appropriate locations to provide supervision and assistance. When
passengers are required to walk on the ramp they shall be escorted by ground staff to/from the aeroplane
or their approved transport. Passenger routes shall be clear of oil, ice, snow and other hazards and shall be
selected in such a way as to prevent damages and accidents.
Boarding shall not commence until clearance has been given by the commander or his representative.
Disembarkation shall not commence until the crew has received confirmation from the ground staff that
passenger steps/jetways are safely in position and that ground equipment will not be a hazard, and until
seatbelts sign is set to off.
For embarkation/disembarkation when refueling/defueling is in progress, refer to <ETF OM-A Ch. 8.2.1.B>.
Only in exceptional cases, and with the consent of the commander, is embarkation / disembarkation
permissible with one engine of the aeroplane running. In such a case, passengers shall - under appropriate
supervision by crew and ground staff - leave/enter the aeroplane on the side opposite to the running
engine.
In case a passenger is missing, his checked baggage must be unloaded. The Commander shall request
aerodrome security assistance shall any unidentified baggage remain.
ALLOCATION OF SEATS
The allocation of seats to passengers by ground staff depends upon the aeroplane type, its seating version,
aspects of mass and centre of gravity and the class of transportation (if any) held by the individual
passenger. The operator shall establish procedures to ensure that passengers are seated where, in the
event that an emergency evacuation is required, they are able to assist and not hinder evacuation of the
aircraft.
In general, the following rules apply:
1. Each person to be carried who is 2 years of age or older shall be allocated a separate seat or berth, equipped
with a proper safety belt/harness.
2. Multiple occupancy of a seat by one adult and one child less than 2 years of age is permitted only if a
supplementary loop belt or other restraint device for each child is being made available; in such a case, and
when oxygen dispensing units are prescribed, one unit each shall be installed and available for both the adult
and the child.
3. Passengers shall be seated where - in the event of an emergency evacuation they may best assist and not hinder
evacuation.
4. Only those persons who appear reasonably fit and strong shall be seated adjacent to self-help exits.
Persons who shall be seated where they will not obstruct access to emergency equipment or exits or
otherwise impede the crew in carrying out their duties include:
• Persons who are physically or mentally handicapped to the extent that they would have difficulty in moving
quickly if asked to do so;
• Persons whose sight or hearing is impaired to the extent that they might not readily become aware of
instructions given to begin evacuating the aeroplane;
• Children and infants, whether or not they are accompanied by an adult;
• Persons in custody and those who are being deported;
• Persons whose physical size would prevent them from being able to move quickly.
SEATING ALLOCATION OF SCPs
PAX SEAT
AGE SEATING MAX
CATEGOR RESTRICTION PREFERENC
(years) RESTRICTION No.
Y E
NO FIRST/LAST
ROW
NO ROW FWD/AFT
OF EXIT ROW
Can travel accompanied or
UM 5 - 12 NO EXIT ROWS 10
unaccompanied
MTC 5 - 12 More than 10 UMs: minimum crew (4) NO EXIT ROWS
MTC
18 + 1 per 10 UMs (not a CCM) NO EXIT ROWS AISLE
ESCORT
WCH WITH
Not limited per flight NO EXIT ROWS WDO / AISLE
ESCORT
Max number of unaccompanied WCHR/S
WCHR/S NO EXIT ROWS WDO / AISLE 5
per flight
Max number of unaccompanied WCHC
WCHC NO EXIT ROWS WDO / AISLE 2
per flight
STCR Not accepted on ETF Airways flights N/A 0
BLND /
Can travel accompanied or
MUTE / NO EXIT ROW WDO / AISLE 0
unaccompanied
DEAF
Up to 28th week: no med cert required NO EXIT ROWS
EXPECTAN
28th-35th week: med cert required NO FIRST/LAST
T MOTHER
After 35th week: not accepted on flight ROW
INAD Number per flight not limited NO EXIT ROWS LAST ROWS
Max number per flight (families with
DEPU NO EXIT ROWS LAST ROWS 2
children up to 17 years of age excepted).
NO EXIT ROWS
PET Weight up to 8 kg with container NO FIRST/LAST 2
ROW
SCPs shall not be allocated, nor occupy, seats that permit direct access to emergency exits or where their
presence could:
• Impede crew members in their duties;
• Obrstruct acess to emergency equipment; or
• Impede the emergency evacuation of the aircraft.
The commander shall be notified in advance when SCPs are to be carried on board.
The acceptance for transportation of sick, disabled and handicapped passengers is restricted in the interest of their
own safety and that of other passengers. A person with reduced mobility (PRM) is understood to mean a person whose
mobility is reduced due to physical incapacity (sensory or loco-motory), an intellectual deficiency, age, illness or any
other cause of disability when using transport, and whose situation requires special attention and the adaptation, to
his needs, of the service made available to all passengers. The ETF Airways therefore, is entitled to insist upon the
production of a written report on fitness for travel, issued by a medical doctor.
• The parents or guardians must be informed that they are to remain in the check in vicinity until the aeroplane
has taken off and the Commander has reported “Ops Normal”. In case of delays or AOG, they are to be
reachable by the ground staff
• The SCCM and the Commander must be informed of the presence of the UM. Information of the UMs must
be included in the Passenger Manifest.
Information has to be sent to the destination aerodrome‘s Supervision and Handling Companies. This
message must specify the following info:
- Child‘s name
- Age
- Flight number/date
- Destination
- Name/s, contact number/s and address of parents or guardians meeting the child at destination
- Name/s, contact number/s and address of parents or guardians that released the child in our care at the origin
station.
The UMs must be escorted, by ground staff, from the time they are released by the parent or guardian’s
custody, until they board the aeroplane and are left in the care of the SCCM. They are never to be left
unattended.
An INAD who is considered to be a harmless does not require an escort. the number of harmless INAD’s is
not limited.
If an inadmissible passenger physically resists boarding, he shall be excluded from the flight. The handcuffs
/ shackles shall be untied before boarding. If during flight, an INAD shows unruly behaviour he is to be
treated as an unruly passenger.
The following persons may escort an INAD passenger:
• a government official;
• a guard service company.
The seats of INAD and their escorts on the aeroplane shall be in the last row.
Procedures for acceptance of INAD, DEPA/U and persons in custody on flight
ETF and Commander (who shall be notified by handling agent prior to departure of the intended carriage
of inadmissible passengers, deportees or persons in custody and of the reason for carriage) have not only
the right, but the duty to refuse transportation of such passengers if their carriage poses any risk to the
safety of the aeroplane or its occupants.
Therefore, the ETF and the commander are entitled to be informed of the reason for the deportation and,
if necessary, to insist on the passenger being escorted during the flight by a representative of the deporting
country, with a ticket at the applicable fare being provided for such representative by the deporting
authority.
In particular, inadmissible passengers or deportees who:
• will physically resist carriage, or
• have already been denied transportation by another company, or
• might endanger the safety of the aeroplane or of its load, of other passengers or of the crew, or
• are deported after execution/suspension of a sentence for a crime of violence, shall be carried only under
escort of a government official, or of a properly trained staff member of the company, or of a similiarly trained
guard provided by a commercial agency.
The relevant Authority will determine in coordination with the ETF Fligt Operations Manager if a deportee
requires an escorting official or guard, and they will also determine how many escorting officials or guards
are required to guarantee the safety of the flight. Whenever it has been determined that the passenger
requires an escort, such escorting person shall be prese duty when the passenger is checked in and shell
remain so until the ETF relinquishes responsibility for the passenger after transportation.
The commander upon notification by handling agent shall, prior to departure, brief his entire crew
accordingly.
Whenever feasible, such passengers shall be boarded prior to other passengers in order to provide utmost
discretion; if, at this stage, a deportee physically resists boarding the aeroplane he shall be refused
embarkation and transportation.
Information on the carriage and reason for such carriage must be forwarded by telex, telefax or phone to
the ground staff or handling agent at the respective-down line station who, in turn, shall confirm receipt of
this information and shall inform the local authorities.
The seating of deportees and their escorts on the aeroplane is also defined in the GOM and contracted
handling agencies are notified on that Individuals identified as requiring in-flight supervision based on risk
assessment, which are brought to the point of embarkation in the custody of the deporting State shall be
escorted on the flight by qualified escort personnel.
Deportees requiring physical restraints shall be boarded with their escort(s) in such a manner as to reduce
the possibility of drawing undue attention.
RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES
Prior to presenting a deportee to the ETF flight for outbound transportation, the deporting State shall
ensure that all official travel documentation, or at least that which is required by the transit and/or
destination State for transit/entry clearance, has been obtained or otherwise arranged.
ETF will not be responsible for refusal by a connecting operator or the State of destination or transit. All
reasonable costs to the ETF resulting from such refusals and/or occurrences related to the conduct of the
deportee will, except where contrary to national legislation, be borne by the deporting State.
If entry into the destination (or transit) State is refused for any reason, ETF shall not be penalized or face
other obligations or liabilities associated with the return of the deportee. The deporting State shall, if no
other solution is found within the time available, at its own expense arrange for transportation of the
deportee back to the deporting State.
Prior to his or her acceptance for boarding, all decision related to an escorted deportee will be the
responsibility of the deporting State.
At the point of the deportee’s boarding, the Pilot-in-Command of the aeroplane, in accordance with
domestic law and international conventions, shall assume full authority in respect of the deportee. That
authority may extend to refusing to accept an escorted or unescorted deportee for transportation when
he/she considers that action to be in the best interest of flight safety.
Such refusal shall be based on objective reasons related to the passenger and his/her action or behavior
being exhibited at the time of boarding or at a subsequent time.
ETF shall, when so requested by the deporting State, provide reasons in writing for any instance in which
transportation for a deportee is denied. Where necessary for the purpose of clarification, the response
shall explain what additional requirements are to be met to enable transportation to occur.
The deporting State shall ensure that the delay of a deportee at a transit point remains as short as possible.
Any costs incurred as a result of a longer than necessary transit period between flights shall be borne solely
by the deporting State.
The deporting State will continue to be responsible for the deportee until admission to the State of final
destination (or other State authorizing entry) has been granted. Permissible Size and Weight of Hand
Baggage
Where, in exceptional cases, a passenger is prepared to pay for an extra seat in order to carry extremely
valuable baggage (e.g., antique musical instruments, works of art etc.) acceptance is only permitted if the
safety and comfort of other passengers will not be impaired and if the size of such baggage permits it to be
secured on the seat.
• baggage and cargo placed in lockers must not be of such size that they prevent latched doors from being closed
securely;
• baggage and cargo must not be placed where it can impede access to emergency equipment; and
• checks must be made before take-off, before landing, and whenever the Commander illuminates the Fasten
Seat-belts signs (or otherwise so orders) to ensure that baggage is stowed where it cannot impede evacuation
from the aeroplane or cause injury by falling (or other movement) as may be appropriate to the phase of flight.
SECURING OF LOAD (HOLDS)
All individual items of load which by their nature, shape or density may constitute a hazard shall be restrained.
Restraint can be achieved by filling the compartment, net section, or ULD volumetrically, or by tie-down.
Compartments, net sections and ULDs which are filled up to three-quarters of their height are considered to be
volumetrically full. Whenever the available volume of the, compartment/net section is not completely used, additional
securing is necessary for:
• Small pieces with high individual weight;
• Load which is sensitive against jolts;
• Planks, machinery etc.
Heavy items with an individual weight of 150 kg or more as well as wet freight shall allways be tied. Load in
the "individual net sections is secured by compartment separation nets; after completion of loading the
nets shall be fastened to the corresponding attachment fittings and tightened. On the main deck, the crash
net – where applicable - shall be properly installed. Securing of ULDs against acting forces is effected either
by a restraint system or the compartment floor, or by means of the reinforced overall compartment shell.
Tie-down straps, steel cables, other lashing equipment and lashing rings shall conform to the standards laid
down by the GOPH and be acceptable to the Authority.
BAGGAGE ON THE SEAT
Items which require a special seat shall be placed in the following way:
• all items must be secured in such a way that any movement to all directions is prevented by the use of safety
belts, extra safety belts, or other airline accepted slashing material and permanent fixtures of the cabin.
• items must not restrict the access to the emergency exits and to the aisle.
• load on one seat must not exceed 75 kg
• cabin windows shall, when necessary, be protected to avoid damage.
• the passenger view of “Fasten Seat Belt/No Smoking and Exit” signs must not be blocked.
• any damage to the interior of aeroplane is to be avoided.
• such items must not prevent seats in front from reclining.
• the items shall be placed and fastened in a logical a practical way to avoid any damage to them, and, preferably
close to the owner.
Items carried in passenger or crew compartment (e.g., hand baggage of crew or passenger, each item of
galley equipment, each serving cart not in use, any medical or other apparatus providing in flight medical
aid for a passenger) shall be secured in such a way as not to become a hazard by shifting under the
appropriate load factors corresponding to the ultimate inertia forces specified in the emergency landing
condition, of type certification.
Cargo may only be carried in a passenger compartment if it is stowed and secured on an approved cargo
bin or seat container certificated to withstand specific load factors; the bin shall be attached to the seat
tracks/floor structure, the scat container to the passenger seat; maximum loading limits shall be observed.
Installations are not permitted in a position that obscures any passenger's view of any required "seat belt"
or "no smoking" or "exit" sign, nor in a location that restricts access to or use of any required emergency
exit, or of the aisle.
SPECIAL LOADS
Applicable EU regulations excepts the carriage of articles and substances which would be otherwise classed
as dangerous goods from the provisions of Chapter 9 to the extent specified in the "ICAO Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air" (ICAO Doc 9284).
ONE COPY OF SPECIAL LOAD DOCUMENT SHALL BE LEFT BEHIND AT THE DEPARTURE AERODROME
Note: Articles and substances intended as replacements for those listed under the first point above
shall be transported on an aeroplane as specified in the Technical Instructions.
BATTERY OPERATED WHEELCHAIRS
Before loading a wheelchair it shall be ascertained:
• that the battery is securely attached to the wheelchair,
• that the battery is disconnected,
• that the battery terminals are insulated in order to prevent short-circuits.
Wheelchairs which cannot be loaded, stowed, secured and unloaded in an upright position must have the
battery removed; the removed battery shall be carried in strong, rigid packaging:
packaging must be leak tight and impervious to battery fluid,
batteries must be protected against short circuits, secured upright in their packaging and surrounded by compatible
material sufficient to absorb their total liquid contents,
packaging must be marked "BATTERY, WET, WITH WHEELCHAIR" and be labeled "corrosive",
packaging must be stowed/secured in accordance, with the provisions of <ETF OM-A Ch.9>.
The commander shall be informed, by Special Loads Notification of the location of the battery aboard. The
ground handling staff shall send a message to the destination or transfer station indicating the passenger's
name/seat number and the location of wheelchair/battery.
Note: Battery driven Wheelchairs with dry, cell batteries or non-spillable wet cell batteries are rare;
they may be carried as "checked baggage" in a baggage/cargo compartment provided that the
battery has been , disconnected and is securely attached to the wheelchair and that the poles
have been insulated.
WET CARGO
"Wet Cargo" designates shipments containing liquids or which, by their nature, may produce liquids and
which are not subject to the Dangerous Goods regulations:
• shipments of liquids in watertight containers,
• shipments of wet materials not packed in such containers, e.g., fish packed in wet ice, fresh meat, casings
(fresh animal guts), wet hides, skins, goods which may produce liquids.
Watertight containers shall meet the specifications of the ICAO Technical Instructions. They shall be able to
withstand the variations in atmospheric pressure and temperature encountered in the course of flight,
without rupture or leakage. Other containers shall be of high quality waterproof material. Containers with
cargo which may produce liquids shall be leak proof or contain sufficient absorbent material. Packing shall
allow the maximum angles of roll and bank the aeroplane may encounter during flight without release of
the liquid containers.
Containers shall be secured in an upright position.
For wet cargo in containers which are not watertight or waterproof, secondary measures shall be taken to
ensure that any spillage is contained, by placing the shipment in a basin of sufficient volume to contain any
spillage, and turning up the edges of the tarpaulin against the aeroplane's/ULD's walls or against other
cargo so as to create a second waterproof basin around the shipment.
All load devices used for carriage of meat or similar organic material shall be cleaned and disinfected
immediately after unloading.
Handling staff shall, by Special Loads Notification, inform the commander of such cargo before departure
and, by appropriate message, the down line station(s).
LIVE ANIMALS
General
Carriage of live animals in the cabin is limited by considerations of passengers safety and comfort and by the size of
the cabin (separation of individual animals from each other). Carriage in cargo compartments may require
pressurization, ventilation, heating, lighting.
The following general guidelines have been developed:
• CABIN
- With the exception of guide dogs for blind passengers, only small pets weighing 5 kg or less may be carried in the
cabin;
- Prior ETF approval must have been obtained;
- Such approval will stipulate that the pet shall be carried in a suitable leak-proof container or bag size 45x35x20
cm and must stay in the container/bag, on the floor, for the duration of the flight;
- The passenger, under whose care the pet travels, must be in possession of all documents required by the
authorities at destination;
- Carriage of rodents is only permitted by prior permission of Flight Operations;
- The commander and handling staff shall ensure that no animal is carried in the cabin which might impede an
emergency evacuation.
A trained guide dog for a blind or a trained assistance dog for a handicapped person may be carried in the
cabin when accompanying a passenger who is dependent upon it. The dog shall be properly harnessed. The
passenger and the dog will normally be seated where sufficient floor space for the dog is available,
excluding bulkheads and emergency exits. The assistance dog is not included in the “pet in cabin” count.
The Commander shall be notified by ground staff when live animal(s) are carried on board. In special cases
the Commander may give permission for more than one trained dog (military-dogs, search-dogs, etc.) to be
carried in the cabin with an accompanying passenger.
• CARGO COMPARTMENTS
The carriage of live animals in cargo compartments shall take the specific needs of the animals into account. The basic
environmental requirements shall be ascertained from all sources available. The temperature range and oxygen
requirements must be matched by the heating and ventilation capability of the cargo compartment provided. Feeding
requirements must be met; e.g., for carriage of birds on long-haul flights the cargo compartment lights shall be left
switched on to enable the birds to feed during flight.
Stowage and loading of animals shall follow the principles outlined in <ETF OM-A Ch.8.2.2.12> and the
following additional guidelines shall be taken into account:
- containers shall be stowed in such a manner as to guarantee sufficient air circulation,
- containers shall be accessible, without needing to be offloaded when care of the animals is required at transit
stations,
- in the event of excessive delays, special care - according to shipper's instructions - shall be taken of the animal(s),
containers shall normally not be loaded directly in front of/below air ventilation outlets or internal lighting,
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8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
- animals which are natural enemies shall not be loaded in close proximity to each other,
male and female animals shall be stowed as far apart as possible,
in general, live animals shall not be loaded in close proximity to any other load which might have a negative effect on
their well-being or health.
The handling staff shall, by Special Loads Notification, inform the commander before departure of all live animals,
their requirements and their location; the commander will brief the cabin crew on all animals carried in the cabin.
The handling staff will inform all down line stations by appropriate messages. All devices used in carriage shall be
thoroughly cleaned and disinfected immediately after unloading.
PERISHABLE CARGO
Perishable goods are those whose condition or suitability may deteriorate if exposed to undue changes in
temperature or humidity, or delay in carriage. They shall only be accepted for carriage when it is
reasonably certain that they will reach destination in good condition. Therefore, it is mandatory that the
shipper provides instructions as to the maximum acceptable duration of transportation and any required
special handling.
This will enable the ETF to make appropriate en-route arrangements.
The temperature range and ventilation requirements of such cargo must be matched by the capabilities of
the cargo compartment provided. Perishable cargo shall be accessible, without needing to be offloaded,
whenever any handling is required at a transit or the destination station.
Perishables refrigerated with wet ice or containing fluid or moisture which could leak out shall be treated
as wet cargo. Perishables refrigerated with dry ice fall under the provisions of Chapter 9.
Foodstuffs shall not be loaded together with poisons, infectious substances nor in close proximity of live
animals and non-cremated human remains.
The handling staff shall, by Special Loads Notification, inform the commander before departure of all
perishables carried and their location. All down line stations shall be informed by appropriate messages.
Where necessary, the devices used in carriage shall be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected immediately
after unloading.
HUMAN REMAINS
Non-cremated human remains shall be contained in a hermetically sealed inner coffin of lead or zinc inside
a wooden coffin. The wooden coffin may be protected by outer packing and shall be covered by canvas or
tarpaulins in such a way that the nature of its contents is not apparent. Such human remains shall not be
loaded in close proximity to food for human or animal consumption or edible materials.
The commander, by Special Loads Notification, and the down line stations shall be informed.
Note: Mourning ceremonies on the apron shall be avoided.
CARRIAGE OF MAIL, VALUABLES AND WEAPONS
The carriage of mail, valuables and unloaded weapons, per se, have no other relevance to the safety of the
aeroplane, its occupants and load than any other neutral cargo.
In order to secure mail, valuables and weapons against damage, pilferage or theft the ETF will discuss and
agree appropriate provisions for storing, loading, transport, unloading and, again, storage with the shipper
and, where necessary, the recipient.
The commander shall be appropriately briefed prior to departure orally, and by "Special Loads
Notification". The down line station will be informed appropriately, i.e., where necessary by coded
messages, receipt of which shall be confirmed/ascertained before arrival of the aeroplane at the down line
station.
DANGEROUS GOODS
Refer to <ETF OM-A Ch.9 – Dangerous Goods>.
Table below shows Ground Servicing Connections and Capacities for B737-800 model:
MAX
DISTANCE DISTANCE FROM
HEIGHT
AFT OF AIRPLANE CENTERLINE
ABOVE
SYSTEM MODEL
NOSE LH SIDE RH SIDE GROUND
FT-
FT-IN M FT-IN M M FT-IN M
IN
CONDITIONED AIR
ONE 8-IN (20.3 CM) 737-800 49 - 7 15.1 0 0 0 0 3-10 1.2
PORT
ELECTRICAL ONE
CONNECTION - 60 KVA,
737-800 8-6 2.6 - - 3-1 0.9 6-4 1.9
200/115 V AC 400 HZ, 3-
PHASE EACH
FUEL ONE
UNDERWINGPRESSURE
CONNECTOR ON RIGHT 737-800 63 - 0 19.2 - - 25 - 3 7.2 9-5 2.9
WING (SEE SEC 2.1 FOR
CAPACITY)
FUEL FUEL VENT ON
UNDERSIDE
UNDERSIDE OF BOTH 737-800 75 - 4 22.0 48 - 3 14.7 48 - 3 14.7
OF WING
WINGTIPS
LAVATORY ONE
CONNECTION FOR 737-800 94 - 9 28.9 2-7 0.8 - - 5 - 11 1.8
VACUUM LAVATORY
PNEUMATIC ONE 3-IN
(7.6-CM) PORT FOR
ENGINE START AND 737-800 51 - 5 15.7 - - 3-0 0.9 4-3 1.3
AIRCONDITIONING
PACKS
POTABLE WATER ONE
SERVICE CONNECTION 737-800 100 - 1 30.5 - - 1-0 0.3 6-5 2.0
0.75-IN (1.9 CM)
Notes:
- Distances rounded to the nearest inch and 0.1 meter.
- Data from above table are based on document “737 Airplane Characteristics for Airport Planning”
The ground equipment shall not approach the aeroplane until all engines have been cut or propellers
stopped and the aeroplane's parking brakes have been set or the chocks are in position.
Note: When, in exceptional cases, one engine must be kept running (e.g., when no APU available)
ground equipment shall only approach that side of the aeroplane where all engines have been
cut. The commander and the ground handling staff shall be forehand, have agreed on the
course of action to be followed.
Steps/passenger jetways and catering trucks shall principally be positioned at the aeroplane prior to
opening the respective cabin doors. Sufficient distance between ground equipment and the aeroplane
shall be maintained in order to avoid damage caused by vertical movement of wings/fuselage during
unloading/loading/refueling/defueling. Utmost care shall be taken in shifting ground equipment in the
aeroplane's vicinity.
Fuel hoses and connections shall never be run over by ground equipment. Loading and servicing
equipment shall not be positioned or maneuvered under the wings. With the exception of fuel trucks,
mobile equipment shall not be positioned within the venting areas during fuelling/defueling.
Equipment when parked away from, or positioned at, the aeroplane shall have parking brakes set.
Equipment approaching, or maneuvering at or leaving the aeroplane shell not be driven faster than at
walking speed. Aeroplanes and pedestrians have the right-of-way. Equipment shall never move across the
path of taxiing aeroplanes or of embarking/disembarking passengers. Personnel shall not ride on elevating
platforms of moving ground equipment.
8.2.2.E OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT DOORS
Aeroplane type specific normal, abnormal and emergency procedures, concerning the operation of the
cabin and compartment doors, are specified in FCOM.
The following general guidelines shall be observed:
Normally, cabin and compartment doors, upon arrival, shall not be opened until all engines have been cut or propellers
stopped and the aeroplane's parking brakes have been set or the chocks are in position.
Conversely, all doors shall be closed and locked before start of engines.
Note: When, in exceptional cases, one engine must be kept running (e.g., when no APU available)
doors may only be opened at the aeroplane's side where all engines have been cut and
propellers stopped. The commander and the ground staff shall, beforehand, have agreed on the
course of action to be followed.
All cabin, i.e., passenger and service, doors shall normally be opened and closed by members of the
operating crew only, i.e., from inside, or, in exceptional cases, by trained handling staff from in or outside.
When opening such a door from outside, the respective staff member shall ascertain by knocking at the
door that nobody is standing in the danger area on the inside. Whenever steps/passenger jetways or
catering trucks are used the design of which does not permit opening or closing the doors when the
equipment is in position, the respective doors shall only be opened immediately prior to the positioning of
the equipment and closed immediately after the equipment has been removed.
Cargo and lower compartment doors shall normally be operated by the handling staff.
Operation of Manually Operated Doors does not require special training, but shall have been
demonstrated to the staff concerned before they are permitted to operate such doors.
No person shall operate Electrically, Pneumatically or Hydraulically operated doors without having
received prior theoretical/practical training by properly qualified staff.
Note: For the operation of aeroplane doors in strong winds refer to the FCOM which specifies
maximum permissible wind speeds and other particulars to be observed. If difficulties occur
when attempting to close doors in strong winds, the aeroplane shall be moved in order to
position the doors concerned on the downwind side.
8.2.2.F SAFETY ON THE RAMP, INCLUDING: FIRE PREVENTION, BLAST AND SUCTION AREAS
The provisions of <ETF OM-A Ch.8.2.1 and Ch.8.2.2> have all been developed in order to secure the safety
on the ramp of all aeroplanes, crews, passengers, staff and load.
Note: It is strongly recommended that all personnel, while on the ramp at night, wear high visibility
clothing.
The responsible staff member in charge shall ensure that the security zones around the suction and blast
areas of the individual aeroplane are observed and that no personnel or equipment are within such zones
when the signals for engine start-up are given (for safety distances refer to FCOM).
During fuelling/defueling no vehicles (except fuel trucks) shall be positioned within the venting areas. In
addition, whenever fuels other than Jet A1 are being uplifted, no electrical appliances shall be connected
or disconnected within the venting areas. For details see Aerodrome Operating Minima.
Whenever fuel has been spilled, fuelling/defueling shall be stopped immediately. It shall be removed or
dried up immediately in the presence of the fire service.
Certain systems of the aeroplane shall not be operated on the ramp (e.g., weather radar, or while
fuelling/defueling, HF). Refer to respective FCOM and ETF OM-B.
PROTECTIVE CLOTHES AND BREATHING EQUIPMENT
Hydraulic fluid leakage under high pressure (3000 psi) may result in serious injury and contamination.The use of
protective clothes and protective breathing equipment is recommended whenever fighting an aeroplane emergency.
Carbon fibers and other composite materials used in airframe structure and cabin furniture require the use of
protective breathing equipment whenever fighting any aeroplane fire.
BRAKE OVERHEAT OR FIRE
Landing gear shall be approached from forward or aft when fighting wheel fire, never abeam the wheel as wheels and
tires may explode. In case of smoke, protective breathing equipment shall be worn because the dense smoke
generated by tire rubber results in major and irreversible lung damage. Fuse plugs melting shall result in tires deflating
and shall prevent tires and wheels bursting.
In case of brake overheat, without evidence of material melting or fire, brakes shall be cooled down by
spraying water using a high-pressure (10 to 12 bar) turbo-nozzle (multi-jet/multi-flow).
In case of brake fire or evidence of melting material, only a specific powder for use on metal fire shall be
sprayed.
In case of hydraulic fire, multi-purpose foam or powder may be used.
Carbon brakes and steel brakes are to be treated using same techniques and agents.
CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE
If a cargo compartment smoke warning occurs with cargo door closed, the ground crew shall be informed not to open
the door of the affected cargo compartment unless passengers have disembarked and fire services are present. If the
smoke warning is displayed on ground with cargo compartment door open, any aeroplane system extinguishing agent
(where installed) shall not be discharged. Ground crew shall be requested to investigate and to fight the smoke source.
Multi-purpose or specific foam or type B or type C powder or water, as a function of the burning cargo material (as
known), shall be used.
Note: If foam is used first, do not use powder afterwards. If powder is used first, foam may be used in
addition, if required.
ENGINE OR APU COMPARTMENT FIRE
The appropriate flight-crew procedures are given in the aeroplane FCOM or ETF OM-B as applicable.
ENGINE TAILPIPE FIRE
External fire agents can cause severe corrosive damage and therefore shall only be considered if fire persists after
flight-crew procedure application, or if no bleed air source is available to motor the engine. In such a case, Halon or
CO2 shall be sprayed in engine exhaust nozzle.
For blast zones refer to relevant <ETF OM-B Ch.1> and FCOM.
ENGINE MOTORING BY THE FLIGHT CREW IS THE NORMAL AND MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION.
8.2.2.G START-UP, RAMP, DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL PROCEDURES
The marshaller's signals specified, by ICAO Annex 2 are depicted in Jeppesen FliteDeck Pro X manual.
Signals for engine start-up shall only be given after the staff member in charge has ascertained that the
security zones around the suction and blast areas have been cleared and after he has given "clearance for
start-up".
When departing from the ramp, local procedures for start-up and taxi clearance are to be followed. Engine
start is not to be initiated until all passengers or freight have been loaded, the aeroplane doors and
hatches are closed, and all ground equipment, except for a ground power unit or ground air starter when
used, has been removed from the vicinity of the aeroplane. Depending on the type of aeroplane, the
ground to cockpit communication shall normally be performed by means of a headset. If that is impossible,
the hand signals of the RM shall be used. After disconnection of the headset, hand signals only apply. For
type-specific procedures and provisions see FCOM.
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OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
Normally, engines starting during pushback and towing is permitted. The procedures for push and start etc.
are described in <ETF OM-B Ch.2>.
After arrival at ramp position parking brakes shall not be released until all engines have been shut down
and until the cockpit personnel have ascertained that chocks have been inserted, and that the aeroplane is
not moving. The flight deck personnel shall carefully evaluate the situation around the aeroplane,
particularly the distances to other aeroplane and objects, select an adequate taxi speed and handle
throttles accordingly to minimize blast effects and noise, particularly on start of taxi-roll from standstill.
A high degree of awareness is required for all low visibility taxi operations. In order to render the
aeroplane visible to other traffic, display of all lights (including strobe lights) is recommended unless own
vision is thereby impaired. However, care shall be taken not to blind other traffic or ground handling staff.
Note: ETF ensures that its aeroplanes are taxied on the movement area of an aerodrome only by a
person:
▪ Authorized and found competent by the ETF; and
▪ Competent to taxi the aeroplane and to use the required means of communication, and instructed
in respect to aerodrome layout, routes, signs, marking, lighting, ATC instructions, and all applicable
procedures.
USE OF HEADSETS
Each flight crew member required to be on flight deck duty shall wear a headset with the boom microphone whilst:
1. On the ground:
The ETF's handling agent shall provide warning when the removal of waste at a specific aerodrome is not
ensured. Such information shall be relayed, by Ground Operations, to the flight deck and cabin crew.
OXYGEN
Special safety provisions shall be observed when oxygen bottles of the aeroplane are being filled or exchanged:
- No passenger shall be on board,
- No ground power unit shall- be connected or disconnected,
- The FCOM specifies which electrical systems shall be "off" or, alternatively, shall not be operating,
- No fuelling/defueling is permitted,
- Filling/exchanging is not permitted during a thunderstorm.
CLEANING OF CABIN
AS A RULE ETF AIRWAYS CABIN CREW MEMBERS WILL CLEAN THE CABIN.
In exceptional cases according to ETF Airways policy (at Commander discretion) and where available,
contracted cleaning will be used.
Cleaning shall have been finished, and cleaning personnel shall have left the aeroplane before passenger
embarkation. If passengers stay on board during transit, cabin cleaning shall be performed in such a way as
not to disturb the passengers.
ETF Tehnical department will prepare and organize one trolley placed in rear galley for cleaning equipment
and tools. Checking of mentioned trolley rests with SCCM.
The flight deck may only be cleaned under supervision of an authorized employee of ETF.
8.2.2.I DOCUMENTS AND FORMS FOR AEROPLANE HANDLING
Refer to <IATA “Aerodrome Handling Manual”>.
8.2.2.J SPECIAL LOADS AND CLASSIFICATION OF LOAD COMPARTMENTS
Special loads are termed "special" if their nature requires: 1. Special precautions to protect the aircraft, the
personnel handling the shipment, other shipments or the shipment itself, or 2. Special attention and care
to avoid inconvenience or discomfort to passengers, when shipments are loaded into passenger aircraft, or
3. Special procedures to be followed on acceptance, loading, carriage and delivery.
Special loads can be considered as:
• Wet cargo;
• Live animals;
• Mail, valuables, fragile goods, heavy cargo;
• Non revenue cargo – COMAT;
• Dangerous Goods (refer to Chapter 9.)
According to FAA aircraft certification standards, lower deck load compartments on B737-800 are classified
as class C (comprehensive fire protection that includes fire detection and suppression systems).
ETF Airways refuses to carry or remove any passenger, when in the exercise of reasonable discretion, the
handling staff or the Commander (cabin staff shall refer such matters to him) decides that such action is
necessary in the interest of safety of the aeroplane or its occupants or such action is necessary to prevent
violation of laws, regulations or decrees of any country to be flown from, into or over.
Such persons could include:
• persons who cause discomfort or make themselves objectionable to other passengers;
• persons who present any hazard or risk to themselves or to other persons or property;
• persons who fail to observe instructions of the crew;
• persons who render themselves incapable of caring for themselves without special assistance of cabin crew;
• persons suspected of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs to an extent that is likely to endanger the
safety of the aeroplane or its occupants;
• passengers suffering from any form of mental or physical illness which could put the remaining passengers at
risk (see Note below).
Note: In the case of known or declared illnesses, arrangements shall be made for such sufferers to be
carried if prior medical approval has been given, and if qualified nursing or security personnel
accompany the patient(s). Procedures for such arrangements may be found in the Passenger
Handling Services (PHS) Manual.
Note: The above requirements imply, of course, that the cabin crew shall, in flight, be discreet in serving alcoholic
beverages to passengers. No such beverages shall be served to passengers who appear to be on the verge
of intoxication, or to inadmissible/deported passengers or their escorts or to passengers or other persons
admitted to the flight deck.
Boarding passengers who might be under influence of psychoactive substances could pose a threat to the
aircraft, persons on board and himself/herself.
The first line of defense is the check in counter and the second one is the gate itself. During check in and at
the gate, and later during the boarding process, the ground staff / cabin crew as appropriate shall observe
the physical and mental state of the passengers. Although it is not easy to accurately determine the risk,
the crew shall look for the following signs, which may show that boarding this passenger may be dangerous
to the passengers, crew or the aircraft:
- inability to perform basic motoric skills (walking, carrying objects)
- behavior which is not appropriate for the situation
- disregard to other passengers, the commands of the crew or general order in the aircraft,
- lack of response to several verbal challenges
- not being aware of the surroundings and the situation
- any other behavior or state which might develop into a hazard
Shall ground staff notice such a state, at check in:
- they shall refuse check in only in obvious and extreme situations
- in all other cases, they shall inform the gate
At the gate, the staff shall inform the Commander as soon as possible and only allow boarding if the
Commander agrees.
In case such a person boards the airplane, the CCM shall notify the SCCM.
SCCM shall check if the passenger suffers from any illness and inform the Commander. It is the final
decision of the commander whether to accept or remove such a person from the flight.
No person shall be allowed to drink any alcoholic beverages unless staff of the ETF Airways has served that
beverage to him.
In order to assist the Commander in the proper exercise of this authority, all ETF Airways personnel
engaged in passenger handling and loading, including other crew members, handling agents and check-in
personnel, shall alert the Commander if at any time they consider that the condition of particular
passengers could jeopardize the safety of a planned flight.
If difficulty is encountered in dealing with such passengers, particularly those who may require physical
restraint, the assistance of the aerodrome or local police must be requested.
Local authorities must be notified if any passenger has been refused embarkation or disembarked.
Note: For more details, see <ETF OM-A Ch.10> and the <ETF Security Programme>.
DUTY TO ALERT THE COMMANDER
In order to assist the Commander in the proper exercise of this authority, all ETF Airways personnel
engaged in passenger handling and loading, including other crew members, handling agents and check-in
personnel, shall alert the Commander if at any time they consider that the condition of particular
passengers could jeopardize the safety of a planned flight.
DIFFICULTY IN DEALING WITH CERTAIN PASSENGERS
If difficulty is encountered in dealing with such passengers, particularly those who may require physical
restraint, the assistance of the aerodrome or local police must be requested.
PASSENGERS REFUSED EMBARKATION OR DISEMBARKED
Local authorities must be notified if any passenger has been refused embarkation or disembarked.
De/anti-icing procedures shall be carried out exclusively by personnel trained and qualified on this subject. Both initial
and annual recurrent training for flight crew shall be done according to ETF training program as described in ETF OM-
D.
The various local rules concerning aeroplane cold-weather operations are very specific and shall be strictly adhered
to.
DEFINITIONS
De-icing
The procedure by which frost, ice, slush or snow is removed from an aeroplane in order to provide clean surfaces.
De-icing Fluid
• Heated water;
• Type I fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type I fluid;
• Type II or Type IV fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type II or Type IV fluid.
Anti-icing
A precautionary procedure that provides protection against the formation of frost or ice and accumulation of snow or
slush on treated surfaces of the aeroplane for a limited period of time (holdover time).
Anti-icing Fluid
• Type I fluid (if heated to minimum 60°C at the nozzle);
• Mixture of water and Type I fluid (if heated to minimum 60°C at the nozzle);
• Type II fluid or Type IV fluid;
• Mixture of water and Type II or Type IV fluid.
Anti-icing fluid is normally applied unheated on clean aeroplane surfaces, but may be applied heated.
De/Anti-icing
A combination of the procedures described above. It may be performed in one or two steps.
Holdover Time (HOT)
Estimated time for which an anti-icing fluid will prevent the formation of frost or ice and the accumulation of snow on
the protected surfaces of an aeroplane, under certain weather conditions.
Clear ice A coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets. It forms on exposed objects, the
temperatures of which are at, below or slightly above the freezing temperature, by the freezing of super-cooled drizzle,
droplets or raindrops.
Contamination
This implies all forms of frozen or semi-frozen moisture such as frost, snow, ice or slush.
Frost/Hoar Frost
Ice crystals that form from ice-saturated air at temperatures below 0°C (32°F) by direct sublimation on the ground or
other exposed objects.
Active Frost
Active frost is a condition when frost is forming. Active frost occurs when an aeroplane’s surface temperature is at or
below 0°C (32F) and at or below dew point.
Freezing Fog (FZFG)
A suspension of numerous minute water droplets that freezes on impact with the ground or other exposed objects,
generally reducing the horizontal visibility at the earth’s surface to less than 1 km (5/8 mile).
Snow (SN)
Precipitation of ice crystals, most of which are branched, star-shaped or mixed with unbranched crystals. At
temperatures higher than -5°C (23°F) the crystals are generally agglomerated into snowflakes.
Snow Grains (SG)
Precipitation of very small white and opaque particles of ice that are fairly flat or elongated with a diameter of less
than 1 mm (0.04 in.). When snow grains hit hard ground, they do not bounce or shatter.
Note: For holdover time purposes treat snow grains as snow.
Snow Pellets (GS)
Precipitation of white, opaque particles of ice. The particles are round or sometimes conical; their diameter ranges
from about 2 mm to 5 mm (0.08 to 0.2 in.). Snow pellets are brittle, easily crushed; they do bounce and may break on
hard ground.
Level of quality and safety during de/anti-icing operations greatly depends on the de/anti-icing fluids. The de/anti-
icing fluids effect aeroplane performance, in accordance with their types and characteristics. General knowledge of
these effects is required for maintaining quality and safety levels during de/anti-icing operations.
Type I Fluids are un-thickened de-icing fluids on a glycol base. Such fluids mainly provide protection when
no precipitation occurs. Under continuous precipitation the protection provided by Type I fluids may
diminish very rapidly because the fluid film on the aeroplane surface is diluted by the precipitation and
possibly washed off. Type I fluids are coloured orange.
Note: All de-icing fluids meeting the Military specification MIL-A -8243 are Type I fluids.
Type II, III and IV fluids are thickened de/anti-icing fluids, which are thickened by the addition of a
thickening agent. Such fluids provide protection against re-freezing also under continuous precipitation
because the thickening agent considerably improves the adhesion of the fluid film to the aeroplane
surface. Type II fluid is usually colorless, type III is colored light yellow and type IV fluid color is emerald
green.
Type I de/anti-icing fluids (un-thickened) have no adverse effect on aeroplane performance due to the fact that they
flow away in the air-stream in early stages of the take-off roll leaving surfaces clean before Vr.
Type III fluids meet aerodynamic performance requirements applicable to aeroplane with low rotation
speed or short take-off run.
Type II/IV de/anti-icing fluids (thickened) start to flow away at higher speeds, and do not completely leave
the surfaces until well into the flight. Nevertheless, the effect on the lift and drag of the aeroplane is
negligible according to the flight tests done by the aeroplane and fluid manufacturers.
Refer to <ETF OM-B> for de/anti-icing procedures and performance limitations for relevant aeroplane type.
8.2.4.D HOLDOVER TIMES
For holdover times refer to applicable document FAA Holdover Time Guidelines (annual publication) which
is available in EFB Aviator application.
Holdover protection is achieved by a layer of anti-icing fluid remaining on and protecting aircraft surfaces
for a period of time. With an one-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the HOT begins at the
commencement of de-icing/anti-icing. With a two-step procedure, the HOT begins at the commencement
of the second (anti-icing) step. Whenever in doubt of which HOT to use, use the more conservative one.
The holdover protection runs out either:
• at the commencement of the take-off roll
• when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, thereby indicating the loss of
effectiveness of the fluid.
Caution: Heavy precipitation rates or high moisture content, high wind velocity or jet blast may reduce
holdover time below the lowest time stated in the range. Holdover time may also be reduced
when aeroplane skin temperature is lower than OAT. Therefore, the indicated times shall be
used only in conjunction with a pre take-off check.
8.2.4.E PRECAUTIONS DURING USAGE OF DE/ANTI-ICING FLUIDS
These procedures specify the recommended methods for de-icing and anti-icing of aeroplane on the ground to provide
an aerodynamically-clean aeroplane.
When aeroplane surfaces are contaminated by frozen moisture, they shall be deiced prior to dispatch.
When freezing precipitation exists and there is a risk of contamination of the surface at the time of dispatch, aeroplane
surfaces shall be anti-iced. If both deicing and anti-icing are required, the procedure may be performed in one or two
steps. Depending upon the severity of the weather, de-icing/anti-icing procedure must be applied either:
• In one step, via the single application of heated and diluted deicing/anti-icing fluid: This procedure provides a
short holdover time, and shall be used in low moisture conditions only. The holdover time starts from the
beginning of the application of the fluid.
• In two steps, by first applying the heated deicing fluid, then by applying a protective anti-icing fluid. These
two sprays must be applied consecutively. The holdover time starts from the beginning of the application of
the second fluid.
Where holdover time is critical, a two-step procedure using undiluted fluid for the second step shall always
be considered.
Pre-step de-icing can be considered in order to remove large amounts of frozen deposits with a purpose of
reducing de-icing fluid consumption and to shorten de-icing treatment time. It can be accomplished by
various means such as brooms, heated water, heated air, etc. (taking account of aircraft type-specific
provisions). It will not provide a “clean wing” for take-off and shall be followed by application of de-icing
fluid.
When performing two-step de/anti-icing, the freezing point of the fluid used for the first step shall not be
more than 3°C (5°F) above ambient temperature.
The freezing point of the Type I fluid mixture used for either one-step de/anti-icing or as a second step in
the two-step operation shall be at least 10°C (18°F) below the ambient temperature.
Caution: Type I fluids supplied as concentrates for dilution with water prior to use shall not be used
undiluted. For exceptions refer to the fluid manufacturer’s documentation.
Type II and Type IV fluids used as de/anti-icing agents have a lower temperature application limit of -25°C
(-13°F). The application limit may be lower, provided a buffer of 7°C (12.6°F) is maintained between the
freezing point of the neat fluid and outside air temperature. In no case shall this temperature be lower
than the lowest operational use temperature as defined by the aerodynamic acceptance test.
Under no circumstances shall an aeroplane that has been anti-iced receive a further coating of anti-icing
fluid directly on top of the contaminated film. If an additional treatment is required before flight, a
complete de/anti-icing shall be performed. Ensure that any residues from previous treatment are flushed
off.
Caution: The repeated application of Type II or Type IV fluid may cause residues to collect in
aerodynamically-quiet areas, cavities and gaps. The application of hot water or heated Type I
fluid in the first step of the de/anti-icing process may minimize the formation of residues.
Residues may re-hydrate and freeze under certain temperatures, high humidity and/or rain conditions and
may block or impede critical flight-control systems. These residues may require removal.
Note: When checking for residues, their visibility may be facilitated by misting with water.
As for aeroplane-related limitations, the application of de/anti-icing fluid shall be in accordance with the
requirements of the airframe and engine manufacturers.
The correct fluid concentration shall be chosen with regard to desired holdover time and is dictated by
outside air temperature and weather conditions. The second step shall be performed before first-step fluid
freezes (typically within 3 min.), if necessary area by area. Where re-freezing occurs following the initial
treatment, both first and second steps must be repeated.
Caution: Wing skin temperatures may be lower than OAT. A stronger mix (more glycol) can be used
under these conditions.
Aeroplane shall be treated symmetrically, that is, left-hand and right-hand side shall receive the same
treatment. Aerodynamic problems could result if this requirement is not met.
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During anti-icing and de-icing, the moveable surfaces shall be in a position as specified by the aeroplane
manufacturer. Engines are normally shut down, but may remain running at idle during de/anti-icing
operations.
Air-conditioning and/or APU air shall be selected OFF, or as recommended by the airframe and engine
manufacturer. De/anti-icing fluids shall not be sprayed directly onto brakes, wheels, exhausts or thrust
reversers.
De/anti-icing fluid shall not be directed into the orifices of pitot heads, static ports or directly onto
airstream direction detector probes and angle-of-attack airflow sensors. All reasonable precautions shall
be taken to minimize fluid entry into engines, other intakes and outlets and control surface cavities. Fluids
shall not be directed onto flight-deck or cabin windows, as this can cause crazing of acrylics or penetration
of the window seals.
Caution: Anti-icing fluids may not flow evenly over wing leading edges, horizontal and vertical stabilizers. These
surfaces shall be checked to ensure that they are properly coated with fluid.
Prior to the application of de/anti-icing fluids all doors and windows shall be closed to prevent:
• Galley-floor areas being contaminated with slippery de-icing fluids;
• Upholstery becoming soiled.
Note: Doors shall not be closed until all ice or snow has been removed from the surrounding area.
Any forward area from which fluid can blow back onto windscreens during taxi or subsequent takeoff shall
be free of residues prior to departure.
If Type II or Type IV fluids are used, all traces of the fluid on flight-deck windows shall be removed prior to
departure, with particular attention being paid to windows fitted with wipers. De/anti-icing fluid may be
removed by rinsing with an approved cleaner and a soft cloth.
Landing gear and wheel bays shall be kept free from build-up of slush, ice or accumulations of blown snow.
Snow shall be removed from wings and stabilizer surfaces forward towards the leading edge, and from
ailerons and elevators back towards the trailing edge.
Ice can build up on aeroplane surfaces when the aeroplane is descending through dense clouds or
precipitation during an approach. When ground temperatures at the destination are low, it is possible for
flaps to be retracted and for accumulations of ice to remain undetected between stationary and moveable
surfaces. It is therefore important that these areas are checked prior to departure and any frozen deposits
are removed.
Under freezing fog conditions, the rear side of the fan blades shall be checked for ice build-up prior to
start-up. Any deposits discovered shall be removed by directing air from a low-flow, hot-air source, such as
a cabin heater, onto the affected areas.
A flight control check shall be considered according to aeroplane type (see relevant manuals). This check
shall be performed after de/anti-icing.
PRE-DEPARTURE CHECKS
An aeroplane shall not be dispatched after a de/anti-icing operation until the aeroplane has received a final check by
a trained and qualified person, called Post-treatment check:
• POST-TREATMENT CHECK
An external check of the aircraft after de-icing and/or anti-icing treatment accomplished from suitably
elevated observation points (e.g. from the de-icing/anti-icing equipment itself or other elevated equipment)
to ensure that the aircraft is free from any frost, ice, snow, or slush.
Immediately before takeoff, either the Pre-Takeoff Check or the Pre-Takeoff contamination check shall be completed
(as appropriate):
Any contamination found shall be removed by further de/anti-icing treatment and the check repeated. The anti-icing
code (see Communication and procedures – Anti-icing codes section) shall not be transmitted before the post-de/anti-
icing check has been completed.
COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCEDURES
DE/ANTI-ICING OPERATION
An aeroplane shall not be dispatched for departure after a de/anti-icing operation until the flight crew has been
notified of the type of de/anti-icing operation performed. Commander is responsible for establishing of and adhering
to holdover time, taking into account environmental situation.
The standardized notification performed by qualified personnel indicates that the aeroplane’s critical parts
are checked free of ice, frost, snow and slush, and in addition includes the necessary do/anti-icing code as
specified below under “Anti-icing Codes” to allow the flight crew to estimate the holdover time to be
expected under the prevailing weather conditions with reference to <ETF OM-A Ch 8.2.4.D>.
ANTI-ICING CODES
The following information shall be recorded and communicated to the flight crew by referring to the last
step of the procedure and in the sequence provided below:
1. The fluid type, i.e. Type I, II or IV;
2. The concentration of fluid within the fluid/water mixture, expressed as a percentage by volume;
Note: No requirement for Type I fluid.
3. The local time (hours/minutes) at the beginning of the final de/anti-icing step;
4. The date (written as day, month, year).
Note: Required for record-keeping, optional for crew notification.
Transmission of elements (1), (2), and (3) to the flight crew confirms that a post de/anti-icing check has
been completed and the aeroplane is clean (refer to Pre-departure checks section of this paragraph).
If two different companies are involved in the de/anti-icing treatment and post de/anti-icing check, it must
be ensured that the anti-icing code is not given before this check is completed.
Anti-icing codes shall be noted on aeroplanes technical log.
EXAMPLE: A de/anti-icing procedure whose last step is the use of a mixture of 75% of a Type II fluid
and 25% water, commencing at 11:10 local time on 21 January 2019, is recorded as
follows:
TYPE II/75 11:10 (21 JANAURY 2019).
ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL
The flight crew shall receive a confirmation from the ground crew that all de/anti-icing operations are
complete and that all personnel and equipment are clear before reconfiguring or moving the aeroplane.
PILOT TECHNIQUES
RECEIVING AEROPLANE
When arriving at the aeroplane, local advice from ground maintenance staff may be considered because
they may be more familiar with local weather conditions. If there is nobody available or if there is any
doubt about the ground maintenance staff’s knowledge concerning de/anti-icing aspects, flight crew shall
determine the need for de/anti-icing by themselves.
De/anti-icing methods are described in ETF OM-A Ch. 8.2.4.E.
If the prevailing weather conditions call for protection during taxi, flight crew shall try to determine off-
block time (TOBT) to be in a position to get sufficient anti-icing protection regarding holdover time.
This message shall be passed to the de/anti-icing units, the ground maintenance, the boarding staff,
dispatch office and all other units involved.
FLIGHT-DECK PREPARATION
Before treatment, avoid pressurizing or testing flight control systems, Try to make sure that all flight
support services are completed prior to treatment, in order to avoid any delay between treatment and
start of taxiing.
During treatment, observe that:
• engines are shut down or at idle;
• APU may be used for electrical supply, bleed air OFF;
• air conditioning shall be OFF;
De-icing on Ground Checklist is provided in ETF OM-B.
Consider whether communication and information with the ground staff is or has been adequate. A
specific item included in the normal flight-deck preparation procedures is recommended.
The minimum requirement is to receive the anti-icing code in order to figure out the available protection
time from the holdover timetable. The information given in the holdover timetables must not be
considered as precise. There are several parameters influencing holdover time.
TAXIING
During taxiing, the flight crew shall observe the intensity of precipitation and keep an eye on the aeroplane
surfaces visible from the flight deck. Ice warning systems of engines and wings or other additional ice
warning systems must be considered.
Sufficient distance from the preceding aeroplane must be maintained as blowing snow or jet blast can
degrade the anti-icing protection of the aeroplane.
The extension of slats and flaps shall be delayed, especially when operating on slushy areas. However, in
this case slat or flap extension shall be verified prior to take-off.
TAKE-OFF
Recommendations given in FCOM of individual aeroplane types regarding performance corrections or
other procedures applied when operating in icing conditions shall be considered. Refer to relevant <ETF
OM-B/FCOM>.
GENERAL REMARKS
In special situations flight crew must be encouraged not to allow operational or commercial pressures to
influence decisions. The minimum requirements have been presented here, as well as the various
precautions. If there is any doubt as to whether or not the wing is contaminated, the decision must be not
to go on.
AS IN ANY OTHER BUSINESS, THE KEY FACTORS TO KEEP PROCEDURES EFFICIENT AND SAFE ARE
AWARENESS, UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNICATION. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT OR QUESTION AT ALL,
GROUND AND FLIGHT CREWS MUST COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER.
All commercial flights will be conducted under IFR and in accordance with an IFR clearance, irrespective of
the forecast and actual weather conditions for the route.
Accordingly, an IFR Flight Plan will be filed for every flight with the exception of certain short non-revenue
or ferry flights, which may be dispatched under VFR with approval from the FOM.
The Flight crew shall determine differences, in rules and procedures, for any airspace of intended use, to
include the differences between prevailing or local airspace rules and ICAO airspace rules. Air Traffic
Services are used for all flight.
ETF will ensure that in-flight operational instructions involving a change to the air traffic flight plan shall,
when practicable, be coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit before transmission to an aeroplane.
8.3.1.A RESTRICTION OF FLIGHT
No ETF flight shall knowingly infringe:
- A Prohibited Area.
- A Danger Area.
- A Restricted Area.
- Uncontrolled airspace.
As a rule in regular operation ETF shall not operate to or from uncontrolled aerodromes.
Operation in Uncontrolled Airspace is prohibited unless special authorization is granted by ETF Flight
Operations Manager. Flight crew are obliged to pay special attention to the airport briefing charts if
available.
SPECIAL ATTENTION: It is of utmost importance to gather by flight crew as much information as possible on
the reported traffic. If any doubt exists on the clearances received, disambiguation shall be made.
Pending flight condition, a visual lookout is mandatory. Special attention shall be paid to traffic situation
when a transition from controlled to uncontrolled airspace and vice versa is made.
8.3.1.B NOISE ABATEMENT
All ETF aeroplane on departure shall whenever applicable fly SID procedures in accordance with NADP 1 or
NADP 2 as applicable and/or local noise restrictions. Type of procedure being flown shall be included in
Departure briefing.
The flight crew must select immediately after main landing gear touch down reverse thrust to REV MAX or
REV IDLE. If safety permits use of IDLE reverse is preferred for noise abatement.
However, noise reduction shall never have priority over safety and it is up to commander discretion in a
best interest of safety of the aeroplane its occupants and the third parties to decide whether to follow
what is written above or not.
8.3.1.C DESCENT
8.3.1.C.1. MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE RATE OF DESCENT
1. During descent down to 10.000 ft. above the minimum safe flight altitude there are no limitations with
regard to the rate of descent.
2. During descent below 10.000 ft. above the minimum safe flight altitude', the rate of descent shall, for
safety reasons not exceed the following values:
a) 5,000 ft./min. down to an altitude 5,000 ft. above the terrain
b) 4,000 ft./min. down to an altitude 4,000 ft. above the terrain
c) 3,000 ft./min. down to an altitude 3,000 ft. above the terrain
d) 2,000 ft./min. down to an altitude 2,000 ft. above the terrain
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50 ft above the threshold or the point where the flare maneuver is higher. Exceptions to this could be approved by the
Authority for a particular approach to a particular runway.
All flights must be stabilized by 1,000 feet above aerodrome elevation in instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) and by 500 feet in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
NOTE: VMC = Cloud base above 1,000 feet AGL and met reported visibility more than 5 km.
During a circling approach wings shall be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport
elevation (Landing gate for circling approach is still 500 feet AGL).
Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a
stabilized approach require a special briefing.
An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1,000 feet above aerodrome elevation in IMC or 500 ft
in VMC requires:
AN IMMEDIATE GO AROUND!
8.3.1.D.3. VISUAL APPROACH
Definition A visual approach is an approach when either part or all of an instrument approach procedure is
not completed and the approach is executed with visual reference to the terrain.
ACCEPTANCE OF CLEARANCE
Accepting an air traffic control clearance for a visual approach or requesting a visual approach shall be
balanced carefully against the following:
Ceiling and visibility conditions;
Darkness;
Weather:
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→ Wind, turbulence;
→ Rain or snow; and/or
→ Fog or smoke;
Crew experience with aerodrome and aerodrome environment:
→ Surrounding terrain; and/or
→ Specific aerodrome and runway hazards (obstructions, etc,);
Runway visual aids:
→ Type of approach light system (ALS); and,
→ Availability of visual approach slope indicator (VASI) or precision approach path indicator (PAPI).
VISUAL APPROACH AT NIGHT
During a visual approach at night, fewer visual references are usable, and visual illusions and spatial
disorientation occur more frequently. Visual illusions (such as the "black-hole effect”(1)) affect the flight
crew's vertical situational awareness and horizontal situational awareness, particularly on the base leg and
when turning final.
PM will use EGPWS on terrain display during night approaches.
A visual approach at night shall be considered only if:
• Weather is suitable for flight under visual flight rules (VFR)
• A close-in pattern is used (or a published visual approach is available)
• A pattern altitude is defined and
• The flight crew is familiar with aerodrome hazards and obstructions. (This includes the availability of current
NOTAMS)
At night, whenever an instrument approach is available (particularly an ILS approach), an instrument
approach shall be preferred to a visual approach. If a precision approach is not available, select an
approach supported by VASI or PAPI.
Note1: The black-hole effect typically occurs during a visual approach conducted on a moonless or
overcast night, over water or over dark, featureless terrain where the only visual stimuli are
lights on and/or near the aerodrome. The absence of visual references in the pilot's near vision
affect depth perception and cause the illusion that the aerodrome is closer than it actually is
and, thus, that the aeroplane is too high. The pilot may respond to this illusion by conducting an
approach below the correct flight path (i.e., a low approach).
REFERENCES
Visual approaches shall be conducted with reference to either:
• a published visual approach chart for the intended runway or
• the visual approach procedure and pattern (altitude, aeroplane configuration and airspeed) published in the /ETF
OM-B/FCOM/.
TERRAIN AWARENESS
When selecting or accepting a visual approach, the flight crew shall be aware of the surrounding terrain
and man-made obstacles. For example, at night, with an unlighted hillside between a lighted area and the
runway, the flight crew may not see the rising terrain.
PM will use EGPWS on terrain display during night approaches
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS
Automated systems (autopilot, flight director, auto throttle) shall be adapted to the type of visual
approach (i.e., visual approach chart or ETF OM B/FCOM/QRH visual approach procedure/ pattern) and to
the ATC environment (radar vectors or crew navigation).
During the final phase of the approach, the crew shall disconnect the autopilot, maintain the auto throttle
in speed mode (if applicable).
INITIAL/INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
The flight management system (FMS) may be used to build the teardrop outbound leg or the downwind
leg, for enhanced situational awareness. This shall be done when programming the FMS before reaching
the top-of-descent point. As applicable, set Navaids for the instrument approach associated with the
landing runway (for monitoring and in case of loss of visual references).
Review the primary elements of the visual approach and the primary elements of the associated
instrument approach.
Review the appropriate missed approach procedure.
Extend slats (if applicable) and fly at the corresponding maneuvering speed.
Barometric-altimeter and radio-altimeter bugs may be set (per ETF SOPs) for enhanced terrain awareness.
OUTBOUND/DOWNWIND LEG
To be aligned on the final approach course and stabilized at 1,000 feet above aerodrome elevation, the
crew shall intercept typically the final approach course at three nautical miles from the runway threshold
(time the outbound leg or downwind leg accordingly, as a function of the prevailing airspeed and wind
component).
Maintain typically 1,500 feet above aerodrome elevation (or the charted altitude) until beginning the final
descent or turning base leg.
Configure the aeroplane per SOPs, typically turning base leg with approach flaps, landing gear extended
and ground spoilers armed.
Do not exceed a 30-degree bank angle when turning onto base leg.
BASE LEG
Resist the tendency to fly a continuous closing-in turn toward the runway threshold.
Before turning final (depending on the distance from the runway threshold), extend landing flaps and
begin reducing to the target final approach speed.
Estimate the glide-path angle to the runway threshold based on available visual references (e.g.: VASI,
PAPI) or raw data 3° descent/glide path (ILS glide slope or altitude/distance).
Note: Glide slope indications and VASI indications are reliable only within 30 degrees of the final
approach course.
Do not exceed a 30-degree bank angle when tuning final.
Anticipate the crosswind effect (as applicable) to complete the turn correctly established on the extended
runway centerline with the required drift correction.
FINAL APPROACH
Plan to be aligned with the runway (wings level) and stabilized at the final approach speed by 1,000 feet
above aerodrome elevation.
Monitor groundspeed variations (for wind shear awareness) and call altitudes and excessive flight-
parameter deviations as for instrument approaches.
Maintain visual scanning toward the aiming point (typically 1,000 feet from the runway threshold) to avoid
any tendency to inadvertently descend below the final approach path (use raw data or the VASI/PAPI, as
available, for a cross-check).
VISUAL APPROACH FACTORS
The following factors often are cited when discussing unstabilized visual approaches:
• Pressure of flight schedule (making up for delays); Crew-induced circumstances or ATC-induced circumstances
resulting in insufficient time to plan, prepare and conduct a safe approach;
• Excessive altitude or excessive airspeed (e.g., inadequate energy management) early in the approach;
• Downwind leg too short (visual pattern) or interception too close (direct base-leg interception);
• Inadequate awareness of tail-wind component and/or crosswind component;
• Incorrect anticipation of aeroplane deceleration characteristics in level flight or on a three-degree glide path;
• Failure to recognize deviations or failure to adhere to excessive-parameter-deviation criteria;
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• Belief that the aeroplane will be stabilized at the minimum stabilization height or shortly thereafter;
• Excessive confidence by the pilot not flying (PM) that the pilot flying (PF) will achieve a timely stabilization, or
reluctance by the PM to challenge the PF;
• PF/PM too reliant on each other to call excessive deviations or to call for a go around;
• Visual illusions,
• Inadvertent modification of the aeroplane trajectory to maintain a constant view of visual references; and,
• Loss of ground visual references, aerodrome visual references or runway visual references, with the PF and the
PM both looking outside to reacquire visual references.
UNSTABILIZED VISUAL APPROACHES
The following deviations are typical of unstabilized visual approaches:
• Steep approach (high and fast, with excessive rate of descent);
• Shallow approach (below desired glide path);
• Ground-proximity warning system (GPWS)/terrain awareness warning system (TAWS) activation:
o Mode 1: "sink rate";
o Mode 2A: "terrain" (less than full flaps);
o Mode 2B: "terrain" (full flaps);
• Final-approach-course interception too close to the runway threshold because of an inadequate outbound
teardrop leg or downwind leg;
• Laterally unstabilized final approach because of failure to correct for crosswind;
• Excessive bank angle and maneuvering to capture the extended runway centerline or to conduct a side-step
maneuver;
• Unstabilized approach with late go-around decision or no go-around decision and,
• Inadvertent descent below the three-degree glide path.
SUMMARY
The following shall be discussed and understood for safe visual approaches:
• Weighing the time saved against the risk;
• Awareness of all weather factors;
• Awareness of surrounding terrain and obstacles;
• Awareness of aerodrome environment, aerodrome and runway hazards;
• Use of a visual approach chart or FCOM/QRH procedures/pattern;
• Tuning and monitoring all available Navaids;
• Optimizing use of automation with timely reversion to hand-flying;
• Adhering to defined PF/PM task-sharing (monitoring by PM of head-down references [i.e., instrument references]
while PF flies and looks outside);
• Maintaining visual contact with the runway and other traffic at all times; and,
• Announcing altitudes and excessive flight-parameter deviations, and adhering to the go-around policy for
instrument approaches.
8.3.1.D.4. INSTRUMENT APPROACH
All non-precision final approaches will be flown using the continuous descent final approaches (CDFA) technique, that
is to say as a continuous descent, without level-off, from an altitude/height at or above the Final Approach Fix
altitude/height to a point approximately 50 ft above the landing runway threshold or the point where the flare
maneuver shall begin for the type of aeroplane flown.
Exceptions to this could be approved by the Authority for a particular approach to a particular runway.
8.3.1.D.5. APPROACH VISUAL REFERENCES
CATEGORY I, APV AND NON-PRECISION APPROACH
No pilot may continue an approach below the DA/DH or MDA/MDH unless at least one of the following
visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable by the pilot:
• elements of the approach lighting system;
• the threshold, or its markings or lights or identification lights;
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Before every flight, crew must check validity of the all navigation data bases as applicable for the type of the aeroplane,
and if any database is out of date engineering shall be advised and flight will be postponed until problem is resolved.
When inserting the route into the FMS, particular care is to be taken in ensuring that the correct numerical
sequences are programmed when entering data, via the keyboard, from the OFP into the FMS. One pilot
shall read aloud the co-ordinates, tracks and distances he has entered into the FMS while the other pilot
checks the OFP as a crosscheck of their accuracy. In flight, navigation aids shall be selected periodically, to
confirm the accuracy of the FMS, and to be readily available for use if the primary equipment gives
indications of inaccuracy or malfunction. Above all, flight crews must remain alert to the possibility of
errors in programming or performance, and be prepared to revert to a lower level of navigation equipment
and procedure.
Continuous monitoring of the equipment's performance and behavior is of the utmost importance during
all phases of the flight. Special care must be taken to detect any automatic cut-out that, if not immediately
noticed, could lead to a dangerous situation.
Optimum use of all available equipment shall be made.
The Flight Crew must perform navigation system accuracy check and verify current position (If ACFT does
not have GPS primary and Accuracy High displayed) at least:
• before takeoff (navigation system accuracy check);
• at TOC - every 30 minutes in cruise;
• at TOD;
• at 50NM before touch down;
• at 20NM before touchdown current position shall be verified by use of conventional radio aids indications.
Some of the equipment used is herein partially described as required by the regulation EU 965/2012. The
proper use of equipment and associated procedures not mentioned here could be found in the FCOM and
applicable ETF OM-B manual.
Navigation shall always be performed with double-checks, i.e. the most suitable combination of
independent navigation aids and equipment shall be used.
The Pilot Flying shall always inform the Pilot non-Flying in due time about the setting/checking of
navigation aids and equipment for en-route navigation. Changes to settings of navigation aids and
equipment shall only be made upon order or with consent of the Pilot Flying.Pilot flying shall requlary
monitor navigation performance,verify present position and if applicable,maintain a particular RNP.This
can be achieved by cross checking all available navigational sources.
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Unless used in connection with RNAV, any navigation aid shall be positively identified by its aural
identification signal before any use is made of it. The Pilot setting/checking navigation aids shall always
announce the completion and shall inform the other Pilot whenever the reliability of a selected navigation
aid is doubtful.
It is the duty of the Pilot Flying to verify the correct setting of navigation aids in use. Whenever an
indication does not correspond with the estimated position, a recheck with other available means shall be
made and the reliability of the navigation aid verified.
A navigation aid shall not be used for navigation purposes if:
a) it is reported to be "on maintenance", "unreliable", "flight/ground checked only" or "on test",
b) proper identification is not received.
In all such cases the respective navigation aid may only serve as additional information. The Landing
Minima are based on the unrestricted availability of approach aids. In addition, such inadequacies shall be
reported to the Authority responsible without a delay.
Outside the coverage area of navigation aids, their signals are not necessarily reliable. They may be false or
unsteady, although instrument indications seem to be normal and no warning appears.
The coverage area of en-route navigation facilities such as NDB's or VOR's varies depending on power
output, sitting and mutual interference. These en-route navigation facilities are expected to provide
reliable indication from at least half way between the navigation aids of the published route structure.
Locators in TMA normally provide proper guidance signals within 25 Nm only.
The ILS localizer coverage sector extends to 17 NM within ±35° and 25 NM within ± 10°of the front course
(typical value).
The ILS glide path coverage sector extends to at least 17 NM within 8° of the front course and within
approximately +2°/-1.5° from the nominal glide path angle (typical value).
The ILS may suffer from false beams outside the coverage sectors due to the radiation characteristic
and/or reflections from terrain and/or obstacles. For that reason the ILS signals shall be considered
unreliable outside these sectors, although a flag warning may not appear. The ILS beams may be subject to
fluctuations due to reflections from moving vehicles and aeroplane in the vicinity of the transmitting
antennas. Such fluctuations, even if within established tolerances, may adversely affect the aeroplane
system performance in the approach mode. The ILS beams are automatically and continuously monitored
to ensure radiation within prescribed tolerances.
Since the ILS coverage sector is limited, it is essential that navigation in a terminal area is carried out on
available VOR, VOR/DME, NDB, RNAV or by radar vectoring until a position is established where
unambiguous ILS signals are received. Autopilot and/or Flight Director systems shall not be armed for ILS
until such a position has been verified.
In case that a “back course ILS” is used, the same procedure as for front beam shall be followed. When
using the Visual Approach Slope Indicator System (VASIS) or Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) the
glide path defined by a standard system shall be closely followed. Due to system tolerances as well as
differences in eye-to-wheel height of various aeroplane types, deviation from the ideal glide path might
occur close to the ground. Standard VASIS/PAPI shall therefore not be used below 200 ft/GND (for
aeroplane specific details refer to RM and FCOM)
When an ILS glide path is available VASIS/PAPI shall be disregarded as these two glide path information
aids might not be compatible. Under certain weather condition (smog, haze, dust) the red light
propagation might be reduced and the white output might dominate.
DME information on route documentation may be used for position fixing or terrain clearance
requirements. If the DME is combined with VOR/ILS it is required that:
8.3.2.B.2. DEFINITIONS
Term Definition
Performance- Area navigation based on performance requirements for aircraft operating along an
based ATS route, on an instrument approach procedure or in a designated airspace.
navigation Note.— Performance requirements are expressed in navigation specifications in terms
of accuracy,integrity, continuity and functionality needed for the proposed operation
in the context of a particular airspace concept.
Availability of GNSS SIS or some other NAVAID infrastructure is considered within the
airspace concept in order to enable the navigation application
Term Definition
Area navigation . A method of navigation which permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path
within the coverage of ground or space-based navigation aids or within the limits of
the capability of self-contained aids, or a combination of these.
Note.— Area navigation includes Performance-based Navigation as well as other
RNAV operations that do not meet the definition of Performance-based Navigation.
Area navigation An ATS route established for the use of aeroplane capable of employing area navigation.
route
RNAV 5 (B- A European RNAV navigation specification with a required track keeping accuracy of
RNAV) ±5 NM for at least 95% of the flight time. B-RNAV capability can be achieved using
inputs from VOR/DME, DME/DME or GNSS and/or INS.
Migration path to RNAV 5
The requirements of B-RNAV are identical to RNAV 5. National regulatory material is
expected to take this equivalence into account. No additional migration path is
required. This does not relieve the operator of the responsibility, in relation to all
operations, to consult and comply with regional and national specific procedures or
regulations.
Critical DME A DME facility that, when unavailable, results in a navigation service which is
insufficient for DME/DMEbased or DME/DME/IRU-based operations along a specific
route or procedure.
-Operational mitigations such as pilot monitoring of the RNAV system’s navigation
updating source(s), or time-intensive programming/deselection of multiple DME
stations, shall be performed before any workload-intensive or critical phase of flight.
Note.— Deselecting single facilities listed by NOTAM as out-of-service and/or
programming route-defined “critical” DME is acceptable when this mitigation requires
no pilot action during a critical phase of flight. A programming requirement also does
not imply the pilot shall complete manual entry of DME facilities which are not in the
navigation database.
Navigation The detailed capability of the navigation system (such as the execution of leg transitions,
Function parallel offset capabilities, holding patterns and navigation databases) required to meet the
Airspace Concept.
Note: Navigational functional requirements are one of the drivers for selection of a particular
navigation specification.
Navigation A navigation specification is a set of aeroplane and flight crew requirements needed to
Specification support Performance Based Navigation operations within a defined airspace. There are two
kinds of navigation specification:
RNAV X. A navigation specification designation that does not include requirement for
on-board performance monitoring and alerting.
RNP X. A navigation specification designation that includes requirements for on-
board performance monitoring and alerting.
Note: For both RNP X and RNAV X, the expression ’X’ refers to the lateral navigation
accuracy in nautical miles that is expected to be achieved at least 95 per cent of the
flight time.
Overlays The use of RNAV systems to fly instrument flight procedures that are themselves based on
conventional ground navigational aids and can be flown without the use of an RNAV system.
Term Definition
Pseudorange A term used to describe the complex signals transmitted by GNSS satellite vehicles,
which contain both range and additional information from each satellite vehicle in
view to a receiver. Once processed by the GNSS receiver, ranges from each satellite
vehicle are extracted enabling an accurate position to be determined. In addition, this
processing also extracts accurate time.
Approach An instrument procedure which utilizes lateral and vertical
procedure with guidance but does not meet the requirements established for precision approach and
vertical landing operations.
guidance (APV).
RNAV 1 /RNAV A European RNAV navigation specification with a required track-keeping accuracy of
2 ±1 NM for at least 95% of the flight time, together with advanced functionality and a
(P-RNAV) high integrity navigation database. P-RNAV capability can be achieved using inputs
from DME/DME or GNSS and/or INS.
RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 specifications constitute harmonization between European
Precision RNAV (P-RNAV) and United States RNAV (US-RNAV) criteria. Aircraft
approved for RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 operations are automatically approved to operate
within the United States or airspace of the Member States of ECAC. An operator
approved against the criteria for RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 operations is eligible to operate
on US-RNAV RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 and European P-RNAV routes; no further approval
is required.
Existing terminal airspace concepts, which include arrival and departure, are
supported by RNAV applications and RNP used in the European (EUR) Region, the
United States and, increasingly, elsewhere. The European terminal airspace RNAV
application is known as P-RNAV (Precision RNAV) though this is expected to migrate
to A-RNP. Although the RNAV 1 specification shares a common navigation accuracy
with P-RNAV, this regional navigation specification does not satisfy the full
requirements of the RNAV 1 specification. As of the publication of this manual, the
United States terminal airspace application formerly known as US RNAV Type B has
been aligned with the PBN concept and is now called RNAV 1. RNP 1 has been
developed primarily for application in non-radar, low-density terminal airspace. In
future, more RNP applications are expected to be developed for both enroute and
terminal airspace.
Receiver RAIM-. means a technique whereby a GNSS receiver/processor determines the
Autonomous integrity of the GNSS navigation signals using only GNSS signals or GNSS signals
Integrity augmented with altitude. This determination is achieved by a consistency check
Monitoring among redundant pseudo-range measurements. At least one satellite in addition to
(RAIM) those required for navigation has to be in view for the receiver to perform the RAIM
function.
When PBN relies on GNSS systems for which RAIM is required for integrity, its availability
shall be verified during the preflight planning. In the event of a predicted continuous loss of
fault detection of more than five minutes, the flight planning shall be revised to reflect the
lack of full PBN capability for that period
Term Definition
RNAV (GNSS) Basic approach operations in designated European airspace. Initially designed as 2-D
Approach RNAV (GNSS) with no vertical guidance, i.e. non-precision. Baro-VNAV approach
operations procedures are classified by ICAO as APV. Referred to as RNP APCH in the draft ICAO
PBN Manual as the application requires on-board performance monitoring and
alerting. RNP approach (RNP APCH) procedures include existing RNAV (GNSS)
approach procedures designed with a straight segment. RNP approach (RNP APCH)
procedures include existing RNAV(GNSS) approach procedures conducted down to LP
or LPV minima.
Approach navigation specifications cover all segments of the instrument approach.
RNP specifications are designated using RNP as a prefix and an abbreviated textual
suffix, e.g. RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH. There are no RNAV approach specifications.
GNSS approach mode (e.g. LP, LPV, LNAV/VNAV, lateral navigation)
NOTE- • As a transition, until 30 November 2022, approach charts depicting
procedures that meet the RNP APCH navigation specification criteria must include
either the term RNP or RNAV (GNSS) in the identification (e.g. RNP RWY 23 or RNAV
(GNSS) RWY 23). However, from 1 December 2022, only the term RNP will be
permitted.
RNAV Aeroplane operations using an area navigation system for RNAV applications. RNAV
Operations operations include the use of area navigation for operations which are not developed
in accordance with the PBN Manual.
RNAV System A navigation system which permits aeroplane operation on any desired flight path
within the coverage of station-referenced navigation aids or within the limits of the
capability of self-contained aids, or a combination of these. An RNAV system may be
included as part of a Flight Management System (FMS).
Accuracy ‘Accuracy’ means, in the context of PBN operations, the degree of conformance
between the estimated, measured or desired position and/or the velocity of a
platform at a given time, and its true position or velocity. Navigation performance
accuracy is usually presented as a statistical measure of system error and is specified
as predictable, repeatable and relative.
Aircraft based ‘Aircraft-based augmentation system (ABAS)’ means a system that augments and/or
augmentation integrates the information obtained from the other GNSS elements with information
system (ABAS) available on board the aircraft. The most common form of ABAS is receiver
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM).
PBN availability Availability’ means, in the context of PBN operations, an indication of the ability of
the system to provide usable service within the specified coverage area and is
defined as the portion of time during which the system is to be used for navigation
during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot or
other system managing the flight of the aircraft.
Space based Space-based augmentation system (SBAS)’ means a wide coverage augmentation
augmentation system that augments and/or integrates the information obtained from the other
system (SBAS) GNSS elements with information from a satellite-based transmitter. The most
common form of SBAS in Europe is the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay
Service (EGNOS).
8.3.2.B.3. GENERAL
The performance-based navigation (PBN) concept specifies that aircraft RNAV and RNP system
performance requirements be defined in terms of the accuracy, integrity, availability, continuity and
functionality required for the proposed operations in the context of a particular airspace concept, when
supported by the appropriate NAVAID infrastructure. The PBN concept represents a shift from sensor
based to performance-based navigation. Under PBN, generic navigation requirements are defined based
on operational requirements. Performance requirements are identified in navigation specifications, which
also identify the choice of navigation sensors and equipment that may be used to meet the performance
requirements. A navigation specification is a set of aircraft and aircrew requirements needed to support
performance-based navigation operations within a defined airspace
There are two kinds of navigation specification:
For both, RNP X and RNAV X designations, the ‘X’ (where stated) refers to the lateral navigation accuracy
(total system error) in NM, which is expected to be achieved at least 95 % of the flight time by the
population of aircraft operating within the airspace, route or procedure. For RNP APCH and A-RNP, the
lateral navigation accuracy depends on the segment.
PBN may be required on notified routes, for notified procedures and in notified airspace.
8.3.2.B.4. PBN OVERVIEW
ETF ensures that, when performance-based navigation (PBN) is required for the route or procedure to be
flown:
a) the relevant PBN navigation specification is stated in the AFM or other document that has been approved by the
certifying authority as part of an airworthiness assessment or is based on such approval and
b) the aircraft is operated in conformance with the relevant navigation specification and limitations in the AFM or
other document referred above.
For operations where a navigation specification for performance-based navigation (PBN) has been
prescribed and no specific approval is required in accordance with SPA.PBN.100, ETF has:
• established operating procedures specifying:
o normal, abnormal and contingency procedures as prescribed in OM-B;
o electronic navigation database management; and
o relevant entries in the minimum equipment list (MEL);
• specified the flight crew qualification and proficiency constraints and ensured that the training programme for
relevant personnel is consistent with the intended operation; and
• ensured continued airworthiness of the area navigation system.
Area navigation systems evolved in a manner similar to conventional ground-based routes and procedures.
The early systems used very high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) and distance measuring
equipment (DME) for estimating their position in domestic operations, and inertial navigation systems
(INS) were employed in oceanic operations. In most cases a specific area navigation system was identified,
and its performance was valuated through a combination of analysis and flight testing. In some cases, it
was necessary to identify the individual models of equipment that could be operated within the airspace
concerned. Such prescriptive requirements resulted in delays in the introduction of new area navigation
system capabilities and higher costs for maintaining appropriate certification. The PBN concept was
developed with globally applicable performance requirements, detailed in accompanying navigation
specifications, in order to avoid these high costs and delays.
The PBN concept requires that the aircraft area navigation system performance be defined in terms of the
accuracy, integrity, availability, continuity and functionality necessary to operate in the context of a
particular airspace concept. Appropriate positioning sensors are also identified; these may include
VOR/DME, DME/DME, GNSS and/or inertial systems. Performance is detailed in a navigation specification
in sufficient detail to facilitate global harmonization.
The navigation specification not only lays out the aircraft system performance requirements but also the
aircrew requirements in terms of crew procedures and training, as well as any appropriate maintenance
requirements, such as the provision of navigation databases.
The RNP system also includes the on-board performance monitoring and alerting function. Operators and
flight crew are responsible to ensure that the system is capable of meeting the operational requirements
for the whole flight within the airspace, en-route or procedure.
Approach
Approach navigation specifications cover all segments of the instrument approach. RNP specifications are
designated using RNP as a prefix and an abbreviated textual suffix, e.g. RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH. There
are no RNAV approach specifications.
The NOTAMS must advise lack of availability of any navigation aid that might affect navigation
infrastructure required for the intended operation, including any non-RNAV contingencies, and must be
confirmed by the crew for the period of intended operation. For operational use of RNAV/RNP and
respective crew qualification procedures, ref. To FCOM/AOM/OM-B and OM-C (RM).
RNAV SPECIFICATIONS
A1 RNAV 10 (RNP 10) B1 RNAV 5 all C1 RNAV 2 all D1 RNAV 1 all
permitted sensors permitted sensors permitted sensors
B2 RNAV 5 GNSS C2 RNAV 2 GNSS D2 RNAV 1 GNSS
B3 RNAV 5 C3 RNAV 2 D3 RNAV 1
DME/DME DME/DME DME/DME
B4 RNAV 5 C4 RNAV 2 D4 RNAV 1
VOR/DME DME/DME/IRU DME/DME/IRU
B5 RNAV 5 INS or IRS
B6 RNAV 5 LORANC
RNP SPECIFICATIONS
L1 RNP 4 O1 Basic RNP 1 all S1 RNP APCH T1 RNP AR APCH
permitted sensors S2 RNP APCH with with RF (special
O2 Basic RNP 1 BARO-VNAV authorization
GNSS required)
O3 Basic RNP 1 T2 RNP AR APCH
DME/DME without RF (special
O4 Basic RNP 1 authorization
DME/DME/IRU required)
Where a failure or degradation results in the aircraft being unable to meet required functionality and
accuracy requirements before departure, the appropriate designator shall not be inserted under « PBN/ «
in the field 18 of the flight plan. Subsequently, for a flight plan already submitted, an appropriately revised
flight plan shall be re-submitted.
e) it must be confirmed that a suitable RNP value has been selected, if appropriate, and the navigation
performance is adequate for the procedure;
f) the contingency procedures must be reviewed.
After-flight procedures
The required reporting of navigation errors or malfunctions shall be completed as applicable.
RNAV routes are defined by the Waypoints (WP) which are defined by the coordinates. Flight plan can
connect any sequence of the WP (in accordance with standard rules) and is not constrained by the position
of the ground based NAVAIDS.
The aeroplane position is determined by the on board RNAV systems using:
• VOR/DME
• DME/DME
• GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System)
• INS (with radio update) or
• IRS (Inertial Reference System)
8.3.2.B.8.1 RNAV
RNAV and RNP systems range from single-sensor-based systems to systems with multiple types of
navigation sensors.
The RNAV or RNP system may also be connected with other systems, such as auto-throttle and
autopilot/flight director, allowing more automated flight operation and performance management.
Despite the differences in architecture and equipment, the basic types of functions contained in the RNAV
systems are common.
RNAV and RNP systems are designed to provide a given level of accuracy, with repeatable and predictable
path definition, appropriate to the application. RNAV and RNP systems typically integrate information from
sensors, such as air data, inertial reference, radio navigation and satellite navigation, together with inputs
from internal databases and data entered by the crew to perform the following functions :
a) navigation;
b) flight plan management;
c) guidance and control; and display and system control.
8.3.2.B.8.2 Naming of the waypoints
The ICAO provision:
ICAO global standards require that a waypoint be designated a '5 letter pronounceable name code', e.g. BARNA,
XOLTA, LOGDA...
Alphanumeric waypoint naming
Certain European States employ alphanumeric waypoint naming, e.g. DM424 where letters DM presents last two
letters of aerodrome ICAO code (ie. EDDM).
8.3.2.B.8.3 PATH-TERMINATOR
The following path terminators are used for RNAV operations:
IF Initial Fix
TF Track between Two Fixes
CF Course to a Fix
FA Course from a Fix to an Altitude
DF Direct to a Fix
They describe to navigation avionics a path to be followed and the criteria that must be met before the
path concludes and the next path begins.
8.3.2.B.8.4 NAVIGATION DATABASE
The on-board navigation database must be current and adequate for the intended operation. The database
must contain the NAVAIDs, waypoints, and relevant coded ATS routes for departure, arrival, and alternate
airports if PBN departures/arrivals are planned to be used. Navigation Database updates are maintenance
task and shall be performed by certifying staff of the maintenance organization. Prior to flight, pilots must
verify their aircraft navigation system is current, operating correctly and the correct runway and
departure/arrival procedure (including any applicable en-route transition) are entered and properly
depicted.
For RNAV1 , RNAV2, RNP1, RNP2 and RNP APCH, the flight crew shall neither insert nor modify waypoints
by manual entry into a procedure (departure, arrival or approach) that has been retrieved from the
database. User-defined data may be entered and used for waypoint altitude/speed constraints on a
procedure where said constraints are not included in the navigation database coding. For RNP 4
operations, the flight crew shall not modify waypoints that have been retrieved from the database. User-
defined data (e.g. for flex-track routes) may be entered and used. Flight crew will not revise lateral and
vertical definition of the flight path between the FAF and the missed approach point (MAPt) retrieved form
the databased. The crew must not modify the procedure that is loaded from the navigation database,
unless instructed to do so by the ATC. The allowed means of modification are “DIR TO”, radar vectoring, or
insertion of waypoints loaded from the navigation database.
The packed navigation databases is usualy delivered to ETF one week prior to the AIRAC effective date. ETF
ensures that:
a) the correct version of the navigation database is loaded on the aircraft;
b) any database errors/omissions reported by the suppliers are addressed expeditiously by flight crew
briefing/removal of procedures, etc.;
c) any database errors/omissions reported by the flight crew are addressed expeditiously by flight crew
briefing/removal of procedures and reported back to the database suppliers;
d) the version of the loaded navigation database is checked for validity by the flight crew prior to departure;
e) prior to use after being loaded into the area navigation system, the procedure is checked against the chart, by
the flight crew, for waypoint sequence, waypoint transition, leg length, magnetic bearing, altitude constraint and
speed constraint.
When an IFR flight is being radar vectored by ATC or is given a direct routing off an ATS route, the radar controller shall
issue clearances such that the prescribed obstacle clearance exists;
must assign levels in ATC clearances consistent with MFAs.
If Minimum Radar Vectoring Altitudes (MRVAs) are to be used by ATC as the basis for assigning levels in
conjunction with RNAV clearances/instructions, a Radar Minimum Altitude Chart – ICAO shall be published
to allow pilots to comply with their responsibilities with regard to terrain avoidance.
Be aware that RNAV 'DIRECT TO' instructions are not radar vectors.
If pilots are unable to comply, they will probably request radar vectors.
Large turns close to the waypoint or at high speed, may result in the aeroplane overshooting the next leg.
With the introduction of a variety of PBN vertically guided approaches which are not precision approaches
(for example, the APV baro-VNAV approach and satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) APV-I
approach) there is no longer a simple relationship between the approach procedure and the type of
operation.
From an operational perspective, the classification of different instrument approach procedures into
precision, non-precision, etc., is no longer relevant. The important classification is whether the approach is
operated as 2D or 3D.
There are two methods for flying instrument approach operations, 2D and 3D. In a 2D approach operation,
only lateral guidance will be displayed to the pilot, for example, in the form of a very high frequency
omnidirectional radio range (VOR) needle or ILS lateral deviation scale. A 3D approach operation will also
provide vertical guidance in the form of a vertical deviation scale.
The nature of the instrument approach operation depends on both the instrument approach procedure
and the technique used to fly the procedure.
Operations using a CDFA technique may be considered to be 3D or 2D depending on how the vertical
profile is determined and on the guidance provided to the pilot. (See 2.5 for more information.)
3D APPROACH OPERATIONS
A 3D instrument approach operation uses lateral and vertical navigation guidance.
Lateral and vertical navigation guidance refers to the guidance provided either by:
a) a ground-based radio navigation aid such as an ILS or microwave landing system (MLS); or
b) computer-generated navigation data from ground-based, space-based or self-contained navigation aids, or a
combination of these.
Manually calculated rate/angle of descent is not considered vertical guidance, therefore this is not
considered to be a 3D approach operation.
3D operations are conducted to a DA/H, which allows for height loss after the commencement of the
missed approach.
3D approach operations can be either:
a) Type A with a DH of 75 m (250 ft) or above; or
b) Type B with a DH less than 75 m (250 ft).
2D APPROACH OPERATIONS
A 2D instrument approach operation uses lateral navigation guidance only.
2D operations are conducted to an MDA/H, below which the aircraft shall not descend without adequate
visual references.
2D approach operations can only be Type A with an MDH of 75 m (250 ft) or above.
The below section contains guidance material for flight crews and ground personnel for the preparation
and execution of RNAV (GNSS) approaches.
ETF is certified to perform two types of RNAV (GNSS) approach procedures:
• LNAV (RNP APCH without BARO VNAV guidance)
• LNAV/VNAV (APV BARO-VNAV).
CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA) TECHNIQUE
The CDFA technique can support either 2D or 3D approach operations and is a method of flying a
nonprecision approach. This is described in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.8.2 of this section.
There are two methods of flying the CDFA:
a) using a manually calculated descent profile (rate/angle of descent); and
b) using a descent profile calculated by the on-board equipment such as baro-VNAV or SBAS.
In the case of a descent profile calculated manually by rate of decent/angle of descent, the lack of positive
guidance means the operation shall be considered to be 2D and shall be operated to an MDA/H as normal.
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Where on-board equipment, such as a baro-VNAV system or SBAS receiver, is used to generate the descent
profile and associated positive guidance, the operation shall be considered to be 3D. In this case the
following shall be confirmed prior to operation:
a) a derived DA/H shall be calculated to ensure the aircraft does not descend below the published MDA/H;
b) the pilot shall verify that the descent profile satisfies all the requirements for SDFs, as indicated on the approach
chart;
c) the system in use (e.g. baro-VNAV, SBAS) shall be certified for use for the intended operation; and
d) in the case of a baro-VNAV system, operations shall only be flown with a current local altimeter setting source
available, and the QNH/QFE, as appropriate, set on the aircraft’s altimeter. Procedures using a remote altimeter
setting source cannot support the use of the baro-VNAV function.
PROCEDURE OPERATION
Chart Minima box Type (A or
Type of operation Minima
identification label B)
2D MDA/H
NDB RWY XX NDB 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
VOR RWY XX VOR 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
ILS RWY XX or
LOC 3D (CDFA with positive A
LOC RWY XX Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
RNP RWY XX LNAV 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
2D MDA/H
RNP RWY XX LP 3D (CDFA with positive A
Derived DA
guidance)
RNP RWY XX LNAV/VNAV 3D DA/H A
RNP RWY XX (AR) RNP 0.X 3D DA/H A
RNP RWY XX LPV 3D DA/H A or B
CAT I
ILS RWY XX CAT II 3D DA/H A or B
CAT III A/B/C
CAT I
MLS RWY XX CAT II 3D DA/H A or B
CAT III A/B/C
GLS RWY XX CAT I 3D DA/H A or B
Flight planning
Flight crews and flight dispatchers shall pay particular attention to the possibility of accounting for RNAV
approaches at the flight planning stage:
NOTE: The implication of the MEL on the ability to conduct RNAV (GNSS) approaches shall be checked.
• For RNP APCH operations to LNAV minima, the flight crew shall consider the effect of temperature on terrain and
obstacle clearance in all phases of flight, in particular on any step-down fix.
Sensor and lateral navigation accuracy selection
• For multi-sensor systems, the flight crew shall verify, prior to approach, that the GNSS sensor is used for position
computation.
• Flight crew of aircraft with RNP input selection capability shall confirm that the indicated RNP value is appropriate
for the PBN operation.
8.3.2.B.9.3 MANAGAMENT OF THE NAVIGATION DATABASE
• For RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1, RNP 2, and RNP APCH, the flight crew shall neither insert nor modify waypoints by
manual entry into a procedure (departure, arrival or approach) that has been retrieved from the database. User-
defined data may be entered and used for waypoint altitude/speed constraints on a procedure where said
constraints are not included in the navigation database coding.
• The lateral and vertical definition of the flight path between the FAF and the missed approach point (MAPt)
retrieved from the database shall not be revised by the flight crew.
8.3.2.B.9.4 DISPLAYS AND AUTOMATION
• For RNAV 1, RNP 1, and RNP APCH operations, the flight crew shall use a lateral deviation indicator, and where
available, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode.
• The appropriate displays shall be selected so that the following information can be monitored:
o the computed desired path;
o aircraft position relative to the lateral path (cross-track deviation) for FTE monitoring;
o aircraft position relative to the vertical path (for a 3D operation).
• The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator (e.g. CDI) shall ensure that lateral deviation indicator
scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the
procedure.
• The flight crew shall maintain procedure centrelines unless authorised to deviate by air traffic control (ATC) or
demanded by emergency conditions.
• Cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft-
computed position) shall normally be limited to ± ½ time the RNAV/RNP value (i.e. 0.5 NM for the initial and
intermediate segment, 0.15 NM for the final approach and 0.5 NM for the missed approach procedure) associated
with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard (e.g. overshoots or undershoots during and immediately
after turns) up to a maximum of 1 time the RNAV/RNP value shall be allowable.
• For a 3D approach operation, the flight crew shall use a vertical deviation indicator and, where required by AFM
limitations, a flight director or autopilot in vertical navigation mode.
• Deviations below the vertical path shall not exceed 75 ft at any time, or half-scale deflection where angular
deviation is indicated, and not more than 75 ft above the vertical profile, or half-scale deflection where angular
deviation is indicated, at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. The flight crew shall execute a missed approach
if the vertical deviation exceeds this criterion, unless the flight crew has in sight the visual references required to
continue the approach.
8.3.2.B.9.5 VECTORING AND POSITIONING
• ATC tactical interventions in the terminal area may include radar headings, ‘direct to’ clearances which bypass the
initial legs of an approach procedure, interceptions of an initial or intermediate segments of an approach
procedure or the insertion of additional waypoints loaded from the database.
• In complying with ATC instructions, the flight crew shall be aware of the implications for the navigation system.
• ‘Direct to’ clearances may be accepted to the IF provided that it is clear to the flight crew that the aircraft will be
established on the final approach track at least 2 NM before the FAF.
• ‘Direct to’ clearance to the FAF shall not be acceptable. Modifying the procedure to intercept the final approach
track prior to the FAF shall be acceptable for radar-vectored arrivals or otherwise only with ATC approval.
• The final approach trajectory shall be intercepted no later than the FAF in order for the aircraft to be correctly
established on the final approach track before starting the descent (to ensure terrain and obstacle clearance).
• ‘Direct to’ clearances to a fix that immediately precede an RF leg shall not be permitted.
• For parallel offset operations en route in RNP 4 and A-RNP, transitions to and from the offset track shall maintain
an intercept angle of no more than 45° unless specified otherwise by ATC.
8.3.2.B.9.6 ALERTING AND ABORT
• Unless the flight crew has sufficient visual reference to continue the approach operation to a safe landing, an RNP
APCH operation shall be discontinued if:
o navigation system failure is annunciated (e.g. warning flag), an RNAV malfunction is indicated (i.e. FMS
goes into deadreckoning mode). There is a warning concerning navigation system errors (i.e. UNABLE
REQD NAV PERF, GNSS malfunction).
o lateral or vertical deviations exceed the tolerances. The VNAV trajectory is not in accordance with
altimeter and vertical speed indications. The missed approach shall be performed in accordance with the
procedure on the approach chart.
o loss of the on-board monitoring and alerting system. There is no function of RNP/ANP alerting (i.e. loss of
RAIM).
• Discontinuing the approach operation may not be necessary for a multi-sensor navigation system that includes
demonstrated RNP capability without GNSS in accordance with the AFM.
• Where vertical guidance is lost while the aircraft is still above 1 000 ft AGL, the flight crew may decide to continue
the approach to LNAV minima, when supported by the navigation system.
Malfunction of main RNAV system components (FMS, CDU, GPS receiver)
• Before starting the approach – abandon the procedure and use a different instrument or visual approach, and if
not available – divert to the alternate airport;
• During the approach – conduct a missed approach procedure with the use of other navigation aids or in the
deadreckoning mode if other navigation aids are not available, or land if required visual references are maintained.
Malfunction of systems impacting Flight Technical Error (FTE) (Flight Director, Autopilot)
Continue and monitor the deviation from the desired flight track. If the deviation is greater than described,
abandon the approach or conduct a missed approach.
Loss of RAIM or required accuracy
• Before starting the approach – abandon and conduct another instrument approach; or
• Conduct a visual approach – if not available, divert to the alternate airport.
• During approach – conduct a missed approach procedure or land if the crew has established the required visual
references. The crew must inform ATC about any problems with the RNAV system which causes a loss of capability
for conducting an RNAV approach.
8.3.2.B.9.7 CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES
• The flight crew shall make the necessary preparation to revert to a conventional arrival procedure where
appropriate. The following conditions shall be considered:
o failure of the navigation system components including navigation sensors, and a failure effecting flight
technical error (e.g. failures of the flight director or autopilot);
o multiple system failures affecting aircraft performance;
o coasting on inertial sensors beyond a specified time limit; and
o RAIM (or equivalent) alert or loss of integrity function.
• In the event of loss of PBN capability, the flight crew shall invoke contingency procedures and navigate using an
alternative means of navigation.
• The flight crew shall notify ATC of any problem with PBN capability.
• In the event of communication failure, the flight crew shall continue with the operation in accordance with
published lost communication procedures.
8.3.2.C IN-FLIGHT RE-PLANNING
Refer to 8.1.7
It is important to Note that loss of RVSM capability shall be reported without delay but there is no need to
rush with subsequent actions.
After entering RVSM airspace contingency procedures are as follows:
The pilot shall notify ATC of contingencies (equipment failures, weather) that affect the ability to maintain the cleared
flight level and coordinate a plan of action appropriate to the airspace concerned. The pilot shall obtain to the guidance
on contingency procedures is contained in the relevant publications dealing with the airspace.
Examples of equipment failures that shall be notified to ATC are:
→ failure of all automatic altitude-control systems aboard the aeroplane;
→ loss of redundancy of altimetry systems;
→ loss of thrust on an engine necessitating descent; or
→ any other equipment failure affecting the ability to maintain cleared flight level.
The pilot shall notify ATC when encountering greater than moderate turbulence.
If unable to notify ATC and obtain an ATC clearance prior to deviating from the cleared flight level, the pilot shall follow
any established contingency procedures for the region of operation and obtain ATC clearance as soon as possible.
If the pilot is notified by ATC of a deviation form an assigned altitude exceeding ±90 m
(±300 ft.) then the pilot shall take action to return to cleared flight level as quickly as possible.
POST-FLIGHT PROCEDURES
In making technical log entries against malfunctions in height-keeping systems, the pilot shall provide
sufficient detail to enable maintenance to effectively troubleshoot and repair the system. The pilot shall
detail the actual defect and the crew action taken to try to isolate and rectify the fault.
The following information shall be recorded when appropriate:
primary and standby altimeter readings;
altitude selector setting;
subscale setting on altimeter;
autopilot used to control the aeroplane and any differences when an alternative autopilot system was selected;
differences in altimeter readings, if alternate static ports selected;
use of air data computer selector for fault diagnosis procedure; and
the transponder selected to provide altitude information to ATC and any difference noted when an alternative
transponder was selected.
8.3.2.E.5. REPORTING OF ERRORS
The following errors shall be reported to ATC, and then to the Authority via the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting
Scheme:
1. TVE greater than +/- 300 ft
2. ASE equal to or greater than +/-245 ft
3. AAD equal or greater than +/- 300 ft.
4. failure of all automatic altitude-control systems aboard the aircraft
5. loss of redundancy of altimetry systems
6. loss of thrust on an engine necessity descent
7. any other equipment failure affecting the ability to maintain cleared flight level
If such an event happened due to a technical reason, maintenance shall be notified.
8.3.2.E.6. RVSM HEIGHT MONITORING
All operators of aircraft approved to fly with a 1,000 ft vertical separation in RVSM airspace are required to
participate in the global RVSM height monitoring program established by the European Regional
Monitoring Agency (EUR RMA).
ETF operates with the B737-800 aircraft in the EUR RVSM and NAT RVSM regions and is subject to height
monitoring programs.
Note: for operators registered or approved within the EUR RVSM region or States accredited to the North
Atlantic RVSM Region Central Monitoring Agency, a confirmation of height monitoring results is available,
only if a valid RVSM approval is listed in the EUR RMA approvals database for the aircraft/operator.
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ETF will monitor the confirmation of height monitoring results for all aircraft operated in the RVSM regions
and the compliance with monitoring interval time limits, as applicable for each region.
Note: Any aircraft transmitting an ICAO 24-bit aircraft identifier, flying between FL 290 and FL 410 within
the operational coverage area of the HMUs will be detected by the HMU systems. If it is intended to fly an
aircraft over a HMU specifically for RVSM monitoring purposes, check EUR RMA information for
applicability of Prior Permission Required (PPR) and associated reporting and overfly procedures.
ETF will promptly initiate corrective actions when informed by the EUR RMA, NAT CMA or CCAA about
measurements that give cause for concern.
Note: Longitudinal separation minimum are expressed in clock minutes. Devices intended
to be used to indicate waypoint-passing time must be accurate and synchronized to
UTC time signal before commencing flight in NAT HLA.
Minimum equipment requirements are available in MEL Annex I..
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
Pilots are required before conducting operation into NAT HLA airspace to self-brief on NAT HLA requirements and
procedures. Flight crew training and qualification for NAT HLA operations is described in OM-D 2.1.14.
Note: Route plotting will only be necessary when operating on random route containing non-alphabetic WPTs
designated by their geographical coordinates only (with or without radar/navaid coverage).
NAT HLA SEPARATION
Within the NAT HLA separations are based upon 60 NM lateral separation, a 10 minute time longitudinal separation
and 1000 feet vertical separation minimum between FL290 and FL410 (For RVSM procedures refer to OM-A 8.3.2.E).
Note:
‐ When under positive radar control, lateral and longitudinal separation may be reduced to 10nm.
‐ Oceanic Air Traffic Control may assign flight levels disregarding the semi-circular rule in and outside the organized
track system during peak hours.
‐ In order to maintain longitudinal separation Mach number technique is applied with the required Mach number
issued with the oceanic ATC clearance. It is mandatory that the assigned Mach number is strictly adhered to and any
change due to turbulence etc, must be immediately communicated to ATC.
‐ After leaving oceanic airspace assigned Mach number must be maintained in domestic controlled airspace to the
final position contained in the oceanic clearance unless the appropriate ATC unit authorizes a change.
‐ When outside Radar control and/or upon ATC request, ETA’s within the NAT HLA area and/or the ETA for the
Oceanic Control Area entry point should be monitored and if there is a change greater than three minutes ATC
should be advised.
‐ Requests for step-climbs may be cleared by ATC whenever possible. Pilots should maintain their last assigned Mach
number during step-climbs in NAT HLA. If not possible, ATC should be advised at the time of the request.
STANDARD LATERAL OFFSET PROCEDURE (SLOP)
This procedure allows the aircraft flying an oceanic flight to fly self-selected lateral offsets to avoid wake turbulence,
increase separation, etc.- but only to the right of the centreline. It provides an additional safety margin and helps
mitigate the risk of a traffic conflict. Collision risk is significantly reduced along a route or a track where there is a
possibility of an offset.
Offset must not exceed 2nm right and must not be made to the left of the centreline. Aircraft able to perform offsets
in tenths of nautical mile are allowed to do so. Pilots may coordinate offsets between themselves over 121,5 or
123,45MHz.
Standard procedure in NAT HLA airspace even under radar coverage:
‐ fly on the centreline of the airway, or 1 or 2nm right of centreline.
- return to the centreline shall be done prior to oceanic exit point
Note: It is not necessary to inform ATC when applying the above procedure.
THE ORGANIZED TRACK SYSTEM - OTS (NAT TRACKS)
Routes used by ETF Airways will avoid OTS, but in case of a diversion to Scottish airports, diversion route may
penetrate OTS. In such a case and if ATC does not agree to cross OTS routes consideration should be taken to
descent below NAT HLA airspace when crossing OTS routes. In any case NAT track message will be part of briefing
package for flights within NAT HLA.
Note: Additional information about organized track system (OTS) may be found NAT Doc 007
NORMAL PROCEDURES
- ATC FLIGHT PLAN
ATC flight plan is filled by OCC. Additional codes shall be used to include NAT HLA approval. Additionally, the
following shall be indicated on the ATC flight plan:
• cruising True Airspeed (TAS)
• oceanic entry point and cruising Mach number
• oceanic landfall and cruising speed in knots
• each point at which a change of Mach number or FL is planned must be specified by
geographical co-ordinates or as a named waypoint.
The crew shall check that the ATC FPL contains the following identifiers in the field 10a:
- "X" which denotes the ability for flights in the NAT- HLA airspace;
- "W" which denotes the ability for flights in the RVSM airspace;
- “R” which denotes the ability of PBN which is complemented with the following identifiers in the field 18 behind
PBN/:
- “A1” which denotes the ability of RNP 10;
- “L1“ which denotes the ability of RNP 4 (if necessary);
- “G” corresponding to appropriate long-range NAV (letters “G”-GPS, “I”-IRS) and COMM equipment (letters “H”-
HF);
MASTER DOCUMENT
Navigation procedures include the establishment of master working document to be used on the flight deck. This
document is based on the flight plan which lists sequentially the waypoints defining the route, the track and distance
between each waypoint, and other information relevant to navigation along the cleared track. For more details refer
to OM-B.
OCEANIC ATC CLEARANCES
Pilot should request oceanic clearance as early as possible from the ATC unit responsible for the first oceanic area
within which the aircraft will operate. Such clearances, although in most cases obtained some time before reaching
the oceanic boundary/entry point, are applicable only from that boundary/entry point.
The request for clearance should include:
1. Call sign.
2. Oceanic Control Area entry point and ETA.
3. Present FL
4. Requested FL and Mach number.
5. Any change to the filed flight plan for the Oceanic Control Area segment of the flight.
An abbreviated clearance will be issued when the aircraft is cleared to operate along the whole length of an OTS
route. An abbreviated clearance will include the following:
1. Clearance limit
2. Cleared track identified by the track code letter.
3. Cleared FL(s).
• enter the table with Airport Temperature and with “height above altimeter reference source”. Read the
correction where these two entries intersect. Add the correction to the published minimum altitude to be flown
to determine the corrected indicated altitude to be flown. To correct an altitude above the altitude in the last
column, use linear extrapolation (e.g., to correct 6000 feet or 1800 meters, use twice the correction for 3000
feet or 900 meters, respectively.) The corrected altitude must always be greater than the published
• minimum altitude
• do not correct altimeter barometric reference settings.
An altitude correction due to cold temperature is not needed for the following conditions:
• While under ATC radar vectors
• When maintaining an ATC assigned flight level (FL)
• When the reported airport temperature is above 0°C or if the airport temperature is at or above the minimum
published temperature for the procedure being flown.
Note: Regulatory authorities may have other requirements for cold temperature altitude corrections.
Aerodrome Altitude Above Altimeter Source Elevation (ft) - normally destination elevation)
Temp°C 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1500 2000 3000 4000 5000
oo 20 20 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 90 120 170 230 280
-10° 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 150 200 290 390 490
-20 ° 30 50 60 70 90 100 120 130 140 210 280 420 570 710
-30° 40 60 80 100 120 140 150 170 190 280 380 570 760 950
-40° 50 80 100 120 150 170 190 220 240 360 480 720 970 1210
-50° 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 450 590 890 1190 1500
Example: Aerodrome elevation : 1000 ft.; Reported temperature: 0ºC
Fix Published altitude Height above aerodrome elevation Correction Indicated altitude
IAF 5000 4000 230 5230
FAF 4000 3000 170 4170
MDA 1400 400 30 1430
Conversions metric/imperial (ft.)
The proper computation in cases for barometric altimeter readings that require metric/imperial
(ft.) conversions, has to be check and confirm from each flight crew member. Use Jeppesen
Book 1, chapter “Tables and codes”.
8.3.3.D RADIO ALTIMETER
The radio altimeter shall be used for determining the decision height (DH) during CAT II and III operation
and shall be set to RA value stipulated in approach chart.
Radio altimeter setting for CAT I and non-precision approaches shall be set to zero since minima (m)DA is
identified by barometric altimeter.
8.3.4 ALTITUDE ALERTING SYSTEM PROCEDURES
8.3.4.A GENERAL
The purpose of the system is to alert the flight crew by the automatic activation of a visual and/or an aural
signal when the aeroplane is about to reach or is leaving the pre-selected altitude/FL. The system and the
manner in which it’s operated shall ensure an accurate altitude adherence during all flight phases.
Where available, the use of this system is compulsory, however, for approach the setting of altitudes lower
than intermediate approach altitude is not authorized. Only cleared altitudes shall be used with the system
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and it is not to be used as a reminder device for transition levels or reporting altitudes. During approach
phase of the flight, after aeroplane has been established on a final vertical track, the missed approach
altitude must be set in the system.
It must be assured that the system is operated in the mode which gives the best protection against an
inadvertent climb/descent through the cleared FL/altitude.
The use of the altitude alerting system does not in any way release the flight crew from the responsibility
of ensuring that the aeroplane levels off or will be leveled off at the correct altitude or flight level.
Refer to relevant ETF OM-B for additional and operational instructions on altitude alerting system.
(refer to FCOM/Systems description/warning system/Altitude Alert)
8.3.4.B ALTITUDE AWARENESS
During all phases of the flight utmost care shall be taken to prevent any altitude/FL related errors (miss
setting of altitude/FL, altitude/FL bust, etc.). In order to fulfill this, crew is requested to follow applicable
SOP and to:
• verify that altitudes/FL assigned by ATC are above applicable minimums (Minimum safe altitude, Minimum sector
altitude)
• crosscheck set altitude/FL:
o if Automatic flight, PF shall set assigned altitude and PM shall check and acknowledge
o if Manual flight, PM shall set assigned altitude while giving read back and PF shall check and acknowledge
o if due workload of other crew member above written is not followed (PM checking ATIS or similar) altitude
setting must be crosschecked. Pilot setting altitude shall point to altitude window and other pilot shall check
and acknowledge.
• call 1000 to altitude/FL
• double check with ATC if in doubt about any assigned altitude/FL (odd/even, confusion with call sign, etc.)
• report cleared altitude on a first contact with new ATC station.
8.3.5 GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM PROCEDURES (GPWS) / TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WARNING SYSTEM
(TAWS)
The Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) is designed to alert pilots that the aeroplane position in
relation to terrain is abnormal and, if not corrected, could result in a collision.
The system must be operational during all phases of the flight and may not be intentionally deactivated (by
pulling the circuit breaker or use of the relevant switch) unless specified so by the approved procedures.
A warning from the GPWS in IMC or at night‚ shall always be followed by an immediate aggressive terrain
avoidance procedure (TAP) or missed approach procedure.
Warnings in visual ground contact conditions do not necessarily call for a TAP if the flight crew considers
continuation of approach to be safe in respect to aeroplane configuration and terrain/obstacles in the
approach path.
Due possibility of GPWS system failure pilot not flying shall monitor flight path during takeoff, approach,
and landing, and alert the pilot flying if any of the following conditions exist:
1. Excessive descent rate.
2. Excessive terrain closure rate.
3. Altitude loss after takeoff or go-around.
4. Unsafe terrain clearance when not in landing configuration.
5. Deviation from glide slope.
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is a major hazard in aviation. Most CFIT accidents occur in the final
approach segment of non-precision approaches. The use of stabilised-approach criteria on a continuous
descent with a constant, predetermined vertical path is seen as a major improvement in safety during the
conduct of such approaches.
23.06.2022. Rev. 05 Page 165 of 295
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
8 – OPERATING PROCEDURES
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the complete control of the
pilot is inadvertently flown into terrain, water, or an obstacle. The pilots are generally unaware of the
danger until it is too late.
Many CFIT accidents occur because of loss of situational awareness, particularly in the vertical plane, and
many crash sites are on the centreline of an approach to an airfield. Lack of familiarity with the approach
or misreading of the approach plate are common causal factors, particularly where the approach features
steps down in altitude from the initial approach fix to the final approach fix.
Effects
• Collision with the ground resulting in Hull Loss and fatalities/injuries.
Defences
• Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
• Terrain Avoidance Warning Systems (TAWS).
• Situational awareness in relation to terrain
For additional system and operational information refer to relevant <ETF OM-B Ch.12>, <ETF OM-B Ch.3>
and FCOM.
For maximum permissile rates of descent refer to 8.3.1.C.1
8.3.6 POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS) / AIRBORNE
COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (ACAS)
For detailed system description see relevant <ETF OM-B Ch.12> / FCOM;
and for pilot procedure and technique see relevant <ETF OM-B Ch.3> / FCOM.
8.3.6.A GENERAL
Flight crews are advised to remain particularly vigilant regarding traffic which may potentially pose a
collision threat. A proper ATC listening watch, use of external lights in accordance with SOP and exercising
good "see and avoid" practices will reduce the threat of collision. It is possible that some aeroplane in the
areas that ETF flights operate may not be operating in accordance with air traffic control clearance or be in
contact with an air traffic control unit.
The Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) which is in ICAO terminology referred to as
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is intended to provide flight crews with an independent means
of detecting proximity to other traffic.
The system provides the flight crew with visual and, if necessary, aural information on proximity of other
traffic (Traffic advisories). It further provides the flight crew with avoidance maneuver guidance
(Resolution advisories). It is recommended that TCAS is set to provide Resolution advisories while flying
climb, enroute and initial descent (TA/RA mode), and to provide Traffic advisories only when flying initial
climb from, or approach to the parallel runways due to possibility of nuisance warnings at traffic congested
aerodromes (TA ONLY mode).
The use of TCAS is mandatory within the area covered by ETF flights. Therefore, the system is to be used
constantly.
8.3.6.B REGULATIONS
Use of ACAS is regulated by ICAO Doc 9863 and by PANS-OPS-Doc. 8168:
Nothing shall prevent pilots-in-command from exercising their best judgment and full authority in the
choice of the best course of action to resolve a conflict".
The pilot shall use ACAS information in accordance with the following safety considerations:
• The pilot shall not manoeuvre on the sole basis of a TA
• During a RA, the pilot shall visually monitor the airspace where the intruder is indicated
• The deviation from the ATC clearance shall be the minimum required, and the pilot shall, after being advised
"clear of conflict", promptly return to the current clearance
• The pilot shall inform the ATC about the RA as soon as possible
For the system to achieve its designed safety benefits, flight crews must operate the system and respond to ACAS
alerts in a manner compatible with the system design. Many ACAS alerts will involve more than one ACAS-equipped
aeroplane. In these coordinated encounters, it is essential that each flight crew respond in a predictable manner.
The guidelines given in Doc 9863 define the knowledge of the system and its operation that shall be included in pilot
training programmes and include information on system performance, proper use of ACAS controls, and proper
responses to ACAS alerts.
The guidelines require both academic training and maneuver training conducted in either aeroplane simulators or
other computer-based trainers.
Flight crews must be tested to ensure they are wholly familiar with ACAS procedures, capabilities and limitations and
are able to respond correctly to ACAS indications.
Role of the ATC is defined by PANS-RAC – Doc. 4444:
The controller is responsible for establishing and maintaining the relevant ATC separation as long as no RA is being
followed by the aircrew.
When a pilot reports a maneuver, due to a RA, the controller shall not attempt to modify the aeroplane trajectory, but
shall provide relevant traffic information (if possible).
8.3.6.C OPERATIONAL IMPACT FOR PILOTS
Inhibits
INCREASE DESCENT RAs are inhibited below approximately 1,500 feet radio altitude.
DESCEND RAs are inhibited below approximately 1,100 feet radio altitude.
RAs are inhibited below approximately 1,000 feet radio altitude. Below 1,000 feet when the TA/RA mode is
selected on the transponder panel, TA only mode is enabled automatically and the TCAS message TA
ONLY displays on the ND.
All TCAS voice annunciations are inhibited below approximately 500 feet radio altitude.
All TCAS alerts are inhibited by GPWS and windshear warnings.
Note: Even if TAs and RAs are suspected of being nuisance or false advisories, they shall be treated as
genuine. It is also very important to realize that, during visual identification, other aeroplane may be falsely
identified as the threat aeroplane, so visual identification does not give you the right to ignore a Resolution
Advisory.
bearing of the other airplane. Altitude and vertical motion are included with the symbol if the other airplane
is using transponder mode S or C.
RAs are indicated by one or more aural listed in the RA aural table. The TRAFFIC annunciation and RA
symbol which depicts the traffic’s relative bearing, range, altitude, and vertical motion are on the navigation
display similar to the TAsymbol.
Additional symbols are proximate traffic and other traffic. Proximate traffic is within six miles and 1200 feet
vertically, but is not expected to cause a TA or RA alert. Other traffic is beyond the six mile and 1200 feet
vertical criteria. Traffic symbols are revised as the TCAS system constantly reevaluates the motion of other
airplanes. If the range of the navigation display does not permit the display of a TA or RA an OFFSCALE
annunciation appears on the navigation display.
TA or RA traffic detected by TCAS which do not provide a bearing generate a no– bearing text block
beneath the TRAFFIC text on the navigation display. The text block contains distance, altitude, and vertical
motion information.
Vertical motion information is indicated by an arrow depicting a climb or descent if a change of greater than
500 feet per minute is detected.
Whenever an aeroplane has departed from an air traffic control clearance in compliance with an RA, the
pilot is to report the circumstances to the ETF and/or authority.
• TCAS detects and processes all transponding aeroplane, even if not displayed to ATC.
• If the tracks are not displayed to ATC, this may cause surprise to controllers.
• TCAS logic tries to avoid crossing RAs
• Horizontal avoidance instructions by ATC do not adversely affect compliance with RAs.
• TCAS “sees” the vertical situation much more accurately than the controller does on his radar display.
• Pilots must follow their RA whatever the controller’s instruction. When it is done, a good vertical separation at
CPA is likely to be achieved.
• TCAS II is very effective even at low altitude and on the approach.
• An RA during final approach often results in a go-around.
• TCAS alert times are very short at low altitude to permit compatibility with ATC. Therefore it is important that
RAs are followed without delay.
• To minimize deviations, pilots must follow weakening RAs. It may also avoid a further conflict with a third
aeroplane.
• Visual separation clearance may be incompatible with the safety net TCAS
• Pilots must follow the RAs even if traffic information is provided by ATC.
• Even if an aeroplane cannot achieve the vertical rate demanded by a "Climb" RA, initiating a climb in response
to the RA is a positive action.
• TCAS-TCAS coordination is always efficient. It is hazardous to maneuver contrary to the RA.
• The aeroplane you see may not be the one which causes the TA or RA.
• VFR traffic being legally separated from IFR traffic may cause an RA.
• During close parallel runway operations a TA or RA may appear.
• The system cannot provide coordinated RAs between TCAS equipped aeroplane if one of them makes an evasive
action opposite to the RA instructions. This may be the situation over e.g. Russia because of local rules of the
air.
• Incorrectly operating altitude reporting transponder may cause misleading advisories.
• During RVSM operations, max rate of climb 1000 ft before level off is 1000 fpm, to avoid unnecessary Ras.
• A TA may not always precede RA.
• The flight crew shall comply with the vertical speed limitations off 1000ft per min during last 2000ft of a climb
or descent. It will help prevent level busts that could lead to conflict with aeroplane above or below the cleared
flight level especially in RVSM airspace.
Before flight, a self test of the TCAS system shall be performed as applicable (on some aeroplane types it
may be MNT task). Initiate the test with the appropriate switch, and monitor the system for correct
display. If the TCAS test is not OK, call maintenance. If the maintenance is not available, check for obvious
reasons (C/B’s, altimeter / altitude reporting system errors etc.), and proceed according to MEL.
8.3.6.E OPERATIONAL USE
ACAS indications are intended to assist pilots in the avoidance of potential collisions and the active search
for, and visual acquisition of, conflicting traffic. For ACAS to work as designed, immediate and correct crew
response to ACAS advisories is essential. Delayed flight crew response to an RA or reluctance to maneuvers
the aeroplane in response to an RA for whatever reason can significantly decrease or negate the protection
afforded by ACAS. Therefore, there shall be a clear understanding among the flight crew of their respective
responsibilities when an ACAS advisory occurs. Flight crews are expected to respond to ACAS indications in
accordance with the following guidelines.
Respond to TAs by attempting to establish visual contact with the intruder aeroplane and other aeroplane
that may be in the vicinity. Coordinate to the degree possible with other crew members to assist in
searching for traffic. Do not deviate from an assigned clearance based only on TA information. For any
traffic that is acquired visually, continue to maintain safe separation in accordance with current regulations
and good operating practices. Pilots shall not make horizontal maneuvers based solely on information
shown on the traffic display. Slight adjustments in vertical speed while climbing or descending, or slight
adjustments in airspeed while still complying with the ATC clearance are acceptable.
When an RA occurs, the PF (Pilot Flying) shall respond immediately by looking at the RA displays and
maneuvering as indicated, unless doing so would jeopardize the safe operation of the flight.
The pilot’s instinctive reaction shall always be to respond to RAs in the direction and to the degree
displayed, without delay. If a decision is made not to respond to an RA, the flight crew negates the safety
benefits provided by its own ACAS. A decision to not respond also decreases the safety benefits to all other
aeroplane involved in the encounter. Maneuvers or lack of maneuvers that result in a vertical speed
opposite to the sense of the RA could result in a collision with the threat aeroplane.
The threat may also be equipped with ACAS, and it may maneuvers in an unexpected direction while
responding to a complementary RA that has been coordinated with own aeroplane’s ACAS.
Under RA crew shall not try to identify intruder visually. Visual perception of the encounter may be
misleading. It is difficult to visually determine the vertical displacement of other aeroplane especially when
ground reference information is unreliable or at cruise altitudes where the earth’s horizon is obscured.
Respond to RAs by disconnecting the autopilot and by using prompt, smooth control inputs; maneuvers in
the direction and with the vertical rate ACAS requires. To achieve the required vertical rate (normally 1 500
ft per minute) on aeroplane where the RA is displayed on a vertical speed indicator (VSI), it is
recommended that the aeroplane’s pitch be changed using the guidelines shown in the table on the page
191. Referring to the VSI or vertical speed tape, make any further pitch adjustments necessary to place the
vertical speed in the green area.
For ACAS to provide safe vertical separation, the PF is expected to initiate the appropriate RA maneuvers
within 5 seconds of when the RA is first displayed. Deviations from assigned altitude, when responding to
an RA, typically will be no more than 300 to 500 ft. RA maneuvers shall use vertical speeds within the green
areas, or the indicated vertical speeds.
With AP disconnected, PM shall disconnect FDs too in order to:
1. To ensure autothrottle speed mode (as applicable)
2. To avoid possible confusion between FD bar orders and, TCAS aural and VSI orders.
PM will not try to see intruder but shall monitor reaction of the PF to confirm he is following RA.
Stall warning, wind shear and Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) alerts take precedence over
ACAS RAs. Pilots shall respond to these alerts instead of RAs.
All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft. AGL for Version 7. As a result, TAs issued below 500
ft. AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan.
When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective
RA which requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft.
at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft. at high altitude.
When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a
preventive RA which does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation
varies from 600 to 800 ft.
For type specific system description and operating procedures refer to relevant ETF OM-B /FCOM /FCTM.
8.3.6.E.3. GENERAL PROCEDURE
EVENT PF PM
Continue flying and prepare for a
possible RA Try to identify the target and asses
TA occurrence (call “I HAVE CONTROLS” to the threat.Set LDG lts ON and
emphasise who is ready to react on seatbelts sign ON.
possible RA)
Switch the autopilot off, call
“AUTOPILOT OFF” and start a
maneuver according to RA. The Check that the AP is off and that the
RA occurrence
maneuver has to be started within 5 response to the RA is correct.
s from the RA announcement and
with usual .25 g.
Adjust the maneuver and be
prepared for a modified RA.
Monitor that the maneuver is
Action to the modified RA must be
During RA adequate and call ATC according to
accomplished within 2 s, and with
the text below.
.35 g for increase rate for reversal
RAs and .25 g for weakening RAs.
Call ATC according to the text
«Clear of conflict» Return to the assigned clearance below.LDG lts OFF and Seatbelts sign
OFF.
The following phraseology shall be used in communication with the ATC when maneuvering according to
the RA:
SITUATION PILOT ATC
Report to ATC RAs causing a
deviation from the current [callsign] TCAS RA (pronounced Tee-
clearance as soon as workload Cas-Ar-Ay)
permits:
[callsign] CLEAR OF CONFLICT,
There is no specific phraseology for
After “Clear of Conflict” return to (assigned FL clearance) RESUMED
the ATC controller, who simply
the last clearance and notify ATC or [callsign] CLEAR OF CONFLICT,
acknowledges.
seek alternative ATC instructions: RETURNING TO (assigned FL
clearance).
In case ATC issues conflicting
instruction while maneuvering [callsign] UNABLE, TCAS RA
according to RA:
1. Fuel checks shall be carried out at intervals not exceeding one hour
2. Fuel remaining shall be based on the totalizer value, unless a totalizer is considered to be unreliable.
3. Fuel remaining shall be recorded on the OFP and shall be evaluated to:
a) Compare actual fuel consumption with planned fuel consumption.
b) Check that the remaining fuel is sufficient to complete the flight.
Minimum amount of fuel after landing at destination alternate must be equal to the:
If fuel is consumed during a flight for purposes other than originally intended during preflight
planning, PIC shall ensure such flight is not continued without re-analysis and sufficient fuel
remains to complete the flight safely
8.3.7.C IN-FLIGHT FUEL MANAGEMENT
If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check, the expected fuel remaining on arrival at destination is less than the
required alternate fuel plus final reserve fuel, the commander shall take into account the traffic and the
operational conditions prevailing at the destination aerodrome, along the diversion route to an alternate
aerodrome and at the destination alternate aerodrome, when deciding to proceed to destination or divert
in order to land with no less than final reserve fuel.
However, without any failure or fuel leak, some discrepancies may exist due to:
• APU consumption that is not recorded by FU
• FQI errors on block fuel and on FOB
• FU indication tolerance
If in-flight fuel monitoring shows a tendency towards reaching minimum fuel requir
ements
stated below (diminishing extra fuel), the Commander shall consider the following:
• decrease aircraft speed (to the Max Range Speed)
• try to coordinate a more direct routing through ATC
• fly closer to the optimum altitude (taking the wind into account)
• select a closer alternate aerodrome if possible
• land and refuel.
When entering a holding pattern or any other delay procedure, PIC shall request delay information form
ATC and calculate how much fuel is available for delay. Advise ATC using phrase MINIMUM FUEL when the
remaining fuel has reached a state where, all planned aerodrome options have been reduced to a specific
aerodrome of intended landing, and any change to the existing clearance may result in landing with less
than planned final reserve fuel.
This is not an emergency situation but just an advisory that indicates an emergency situation is possible
shall any undue delay occur.
A minimum fuel advisory does not imply a need for traffic priority.
Monitoring of fuel consumption during minimum fuel operation is of outmost importance. If at any time the
remaining usable fuel suggests that the minimum fuel requirements stated above cannot be met any longer
(comparing the required trip fuel and minimum as specified above in OM A 8.3.7.2) a Low fuel emergency
shall be declared by the Commander broadcasting MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, FUEL and the
remaining fuel in terms of endurance shall be reported.
8.3.7.D DIVERSION PROCEDURES
If a flight cannot be operated to the planned destination for any reason, a diversion shall be made to the
most suitable alternate aerodrome providing the best available operational and passenger handling
service.
The flights may divert enroute for reasons including but not limited to the following:
Operational conditions at planned destination being prohibitive or rendering a landing very unlikely.
Technical defects detected in flight requiring immediate landing at next suitable aerodrome.
Passengers on board of flight requiring immediate medical assistance.
Meteorological conditions encountered or reported en-route requiring alteration of intended routing.
The responsibility to divert en-route rests entirely with the Commander.
8.3.7.E MINIMUM FUEL VS FUEL EMERGENCY
The Commander shall advise ATC of a minimum fuel state by declaring MINIMUM FUEL when, having
committed to land at a specific aerodrome, the pilot calculates that any change to the existing clearance to
that aerodrome may result in landing with less than planned final reserve fuel.
The declaration of MINIMUM FUEL informs ATC that all planned aerodrome options have been reduced to
a specific aerodrome of intended landing and any change to the existing clearance may result in landing
with less than planned final reserve fuel. This is not an emergency situation but an indication that an
emergency situation is possible shall any additional delay occur.
Pilots shall not expect any form of priority handling as a result of a “MINIMUM FUEL” declaration. ATC will,
however, advise the flight crew of any additional expected delays as well as coordinate when transferring
control of the aeroplane to ensure other ATC units are aware of the flight’s fuel state.
As highlighted in ICAO Doc 9976, it is ‘important to note that although the coordinated escalation process
(with ATC) related to the protection of final reserve fuel typically occurs in three steps, each situation is
different and may be resolved at any stage in the process. The three steps in the escalation process for
protecting final reserve fuel in accordance with Annex 6, Part I, 4.3.7 are:
1. Request delay information when required (in accordance with 4.3.7.2.1).
2. Declare MINIMUM FUEL when committed to land at a specific aerodrome and any change in the existing clearance
may result in a landing with less than planned final reserve fuel (in accordance with 4.3.7.2.2).
3. Declare a fuel emergency when the calculated fuel on landing at the nearest suitable aerodrome, where a safe
landing can be made, will be less than the planned final reserve fuel (in accordance with 4.3.7.2.3).’
The Commander shall declare a situation of fuel emergency by broadcasting
MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, FUEL
when the calculated usable fuel predicted to be available upon landing at the nearest aerodrome where a
safe landing can be made is less than the planned final reserve fuel.
Fuel Emergency shall be used only when all opportunities to protect final reserve fuel have been exploited and in
the judgment of the Commander, the flight will now land with less than final reserve fuel remaining in the tanks.
8.3.8.A THUNDERSTORMS
Flights through known or forecast thunderstorm areas shall be avoided whenever possible, because of the
various hazards involved, e.g. turbulence, windshear, hail, lightning strikes etc.
Do not take-off during heavy thunderstorm activity over the departure aerodrome.
Delay the approach or divert to an alternate aerodrome rather than attempt to penetrate a severe
thunderstorm in a letdown area, and provided that the recommended techniques are employed such flight
may be carried out where no alternative course of action is possible.
8.3.8.A.1. LIGHTNING STRIKES
A Lightning Strike must be documented in the technical log book and reported as a safety report by the
crew. The maintenance personnel has to perform an airworthiness check after a lightning strike and to sign
the technical log book accordingly. In commercial aviation adverse weather conditions mostly happen
underneath cruising altitudes. But even on lower flight levels they are rarely a big issue because every
modern commercial airliner is equipped with weather radar. These systems help the flight crew to identify
storm fronts in the flight path of the airplane and give hints to circle around the bad weather. But sometimes
an airplane might have to fly right through adverse weather regions because there is not enough time to
avoid the detected hailstorms or thunderstorms. The latter are not uncommon in this case to scare the
passengers with a bright flash of light and loud bang, mostly followed directly by an announcement from the
cockpit: “Lightning strike”. These incidents are very rare in modern air travel, even frequent flyers only
have a very low chance to witness a lightning strike on one of their flights. A commercial aircraft however is
struck several times during its whole service life. In such a case, the airplane acts like a lightning rod. Its
metal structure provides the lowest resistance for the electrical discharge on its way between the clouds and
the ground. It is not uncommon that the airplane is thereby struck by a complete series of discharges, mostly
between three and five, in exceptional cases up to 25. Since an airplane in flight has no form of grounding,
the lightning first enters the structure and leaves it again a split second later. The principle behind this
occurrence is known by most people from physics lessons in school. The airframe acts as a so called
“Faraday cage”. Like an automobile body the aluminium structure, when struck by a lightning, passes the
electric energy around the interior and keeps the passengers safe. The crucial technical equipment is thereby
also kept safe from the high voltage and the aircraft can, in most cases, proceed normally with its flight. But
to play it safe every lightning strike is documented by the cockpit crew and the aircraft is treated with a
special inspection routine on its next check. The myth that a lightning always strikes at the highest elevation
is in the air as false as on the ground. Not the high tailfin is the favourite point of impact, at most aircraft
types the lightning enters the airframe at the edge of the cockpit windows or the leading-edge of the wings.
The favourite exit points for lightning turned out to be the winglets or the tips of the aircraft’s control
surfaces. Scorch marks caused by electrical discharge are also often found at the border of rivets and the
trailing edge of the wings, where so called “electrostatic dischargers” are mounted. These thin sticks, which
normally return the natural electrostatic charge the airplane collects through atmospheric friction, provide
one of the easiest exits for lightning energy. Sometimes these parts get even completely burned away by a
lightning strike, which sounds dramatic but has no negative effect on the safety of the aircraft The structure
of a commercial airplane is hence well protected against lightning strikes, even if the surface is wetted by
rain. Much more problematic are water ingressions inside the airframe structure, which can lead to problems
with aluminium as well as composite structures. The high energy of a lightning strike can evaporate the
water within a split second which causes a sudden expansion that can in some cases damage the structure.
But since commercial aircraft are regularly checked for water ingressions because of corrosion protection
issues, such a case is highly unlikely. Another component in need of protection is the avionics equipment,
comprising all electronic devices of the aircraft. Although its main parts are, like the passengers and the
crew, protected by the airframe’s Faraday cage, the avionics equipment can as well be affected by a
lightning strike, for example through necessary external sources like antennas. All electronic devices on
board are therefore protected by an overvoltage arrester and designed as redundant, so that in case of a
malfunction a backup system will quickly take over. The protective systems successfully proved to be
working. The safety of a modern commercial airliner is hence normally never be affected by such incidents.
8.3.8.A.2. AVOIDANCE
Mutual information on the development and positions of thunderstorms by Pilots and ATC as well as a
careful weather watch are of great importance for the early and adequate avoidance of such severe
weather areas.
With thunderstorms in the vicinity of the aerodrome, request radar vectoring through thunderstorm-free
areas and arrange the climb to provide ample safety distance from active CB-clouds. Use all available
information such as airborne weather radar, Pilot reports, etc. It shall be Noted that ATC cannot always
issue detours in congested areas due to other traffic and also due to technical limitations of the ground
radar.
During cruise, thunderstorms shall be avoided:
visually by staying well clear of CB-clouds,
by using the airborne weather radar,
by requesting vectors from ATC radar.
Whenever possible avoid:
flight in cirrus clouds if thunderstorm activity is reported along the route as they may hide anvil tops and reduce the
effectiveness of the airborne weather radar;
flight at or near the freezing level where the heaviest icing and hail must be expected;
altitudes between 10'000 ft and 25'000 ft as they will provide the roughest ride even outside active storm centers;
flying below the overhang of CB-clouds; this is the area where heavy hail fall must be expected.
Strong echoes shall be avoided by 10 NM or more.
This is most important at FL 200 and above and for circumnavigation of echoes which have prominent
scallops or other protrusions.
Avoid strong echoes upwind. Hail can be carried down for more than 20 NM.
8.3.8.A.3. PREPARATION
When flying in a thunderstorm area is anticipated or unavoidable, the following preparations shall be made.
1. Monitor the airborne weather radar closely.
2. Advise Flight Attendants about the presence of adverse weather conditions and switch on Seat
belts on sign.
3. Switch on cockpit lighting to high intensity to avoid dazzle by lightning,
4. Reduce to turbulence speed according to ETF OM-B
5. Operate anti-icing equipment as required.
8.3.8.A.4. CROSSING
Use the airborne weather radar to find the most suitable corridor. Follow the instructions for flight in turbulence <ETF
OM-A Ch.8.3.8.3.C>.
After crossing a thunderstorm area, the various aeroplane systems shall be checked functionally as far as
possible, i.e.:
flight and engine instruments,
pitot and static heating,
radio and navigation equipment,
readings of compasses,
electrical system including circuit breakers.
In order to ensure that a technical inspection for damage is carried out when the aeroplane structure has
been exposed to abnormal stresses, e.g. severe turbulence, lightning strikes, static discharges, etc., a
report shall be made in the Aeroplane Technical Log.
8.3.8.A.5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR USE OF WEATHER RADAR
A knowledge of the radar principle is essential in order to accurately interpet the weather radar display.
Weather Radar Detection Capability
The weather radar only detects precipitation droplets.How much it detects depends upon the size,
composition and number of droplets. Water particles are five times more reflective than ice particles of the
same size.
The radar does detect:
• Rainfall
• Wet hail and wet turbulence
• Ice crystals, dry hail and dry snow. However, these three elements give small reflections, as explained
below.
The radar does not detect:
• Clouds, fog or wind (droplets are too small, or no precipitation at all)
• Clear air turbulence (no precipitation)
• Windshear (no precipitation except in microburst)
• Sandstorms (solid particles are almost transparent to the radar beam)
• Lightning.
Reflectivity
Radar echo returns are proportional to droplet size, and therefore, precipitation intensity. Droplets that
are too small (fog droplets) will return no echo, whereas heavy droplets (thunderstorm droplets) will
return the majority of radar waves (picture below).
Reflectivity of precipitation not only depends on the intensity of the precipitation, but also on the type of
precipitation. Precipitation that contains water will return a stronger return than dry precipitation. Dry hail,
for example, will reflect far less than wet hail (figure below)The upper level of a thunderstorm, that
contains ice crystals, provides weaker returns than the middle part, that is full of water or wet hail.
Some shapes are good indicators of severe hail and signify strong vertical drafts.Fast changing shapes,
whatever form they take, also indicate high weather activity.
cruise altitude shall be considered turbulent. In cruise, all cells with green or stronger returns shall be
avoided by 20 NM at least
• Turbulence
Most of weather radars are fitted with a turbulence display mode. This function (the TURB function) is
based on the Doppler effect and is sensitive to precipitation movement. Like the weather radar, the TURB
function needs a minimum amount of precipitation to be effective. To help make safe flight path decisions,
and especially when the weather ahead is represented as dense, the turbulence display mode shall be
used. An area of light rainfall, depicted in green in normal mode, is shown in magenta when there is high
turbulence activity.
The TURB function is only active within a range of 40 NM (Doppler measurement capability) and can only
be used in wet turbulence.
Note:
Clear air turbulence and dry turbulence cannot be detected by the weather radar.
When flying towards a cell, the flight crew can get an estimate of the vertical expansion of the cloud
above/below the aircraft altitude with the following formula:
h (feet) ~ d(NM) x Tilt (degrees) x 100
Tilt represents the tilt selected so that the cell image disappears from the display. For example, an echo
disappearing at 40 NM with 1o tilt down has a top located 4 000 ft below the aircraft level.
Antenna tilt shall be adapted to the ND range selection. In most cases in flight, the adequate antenna tilt
setting shows some ground returns at the top edge of the ND. However, at takeoff, or in climb, the tilt shall
be set up if adverse weather is expected above the aircraft. The antenna tilt must be adjusted as the flight
progresses, in relation to the aircraft’s altitude, the expected weather and the ND range selection.
In order to avoid overscanning or underscanning, the antenna tilt shall be changed periodically when
changing altitude, unless the weather radar is fitted with an auto-tilt function.
This is not the case for weather echoes. Some weather radars are fitted with a Ground Clutter Suppress
(GCS) function that suppresses the ground return from the display, when turned ON.
Upper levels of a Cb may contain ice, and therefore may return radar images that do not represent the
severity of its activity. In order to get a better weather detection, weather radar antenna shall be pointed
toward lower levels, where water can still be found, i.e. at levels that are below freezing (figure below). If a
red area is found at a lower level, the antenna tilt shall be reduced to scan the area vertically. Presence of
yellow or green areas at higher altitude, above a red cell, is an indication of a very turbulent area.
Display Range
To avoid a large storm, the flight crew must make decisions while still 40 NM away from it. Therefore, the
flight crew shall select adequate ranges on the NDs:
• PM adequate ranges to plan long-term weather avoidance course changes (in cruise, typically 160 NM
and below)
• PF adequate ranges to tactically avoid adverse weather, and monitor its severity (in cruise, typically 80
NM and below).
Course changes to avoid adverse weather, shall be determined using both higher and lower ranges. This
technique prevents the “blind alley” effect: A course change that may seem safe when using a low range
ND display may reveal a blocked passage when observed at a higher range.
Gain
The GAIN knob on the weather radar panel adjusts the receiver sensitivity. In the AUTO position, the gain is
in the optimum position to detect standard thunderstorm cells.
A manual setting is available and can be used to analyze the weather. In general, the AUTO position shall
be used, except for cell evaluation. If gain is used manually for in-depth weather analysis, it must be reset
to CAL (AUTO) when analysis is complete
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Gain Reduction
At lower altitudes, cells are more reflective and the weather radar display may have a tendency to show a
lot of red spots. This can also be the case at higher altitude with severe Cbs. In this case, decreasing gain:
• Can help to judge the relative intensity between two cells
• Can help to highlight turbulent cells, because the turbulence display is not affected by gain in turbulence
display mode
• Can be useful for finding embedded cells, in heavy stratus rain
• Can render attenuation more visible, helping to identify very active cells.
Gain reduction allows the detection of the strongest part of a cell, displayed in red on the ND. By slowly
reducing the gain, most red areas slowly turn yellow, the yellow areas turn green and the green areas
slowly disappear. The remaining red areas, the red areas that are the last to turn yellow are the strongest
parts of the cell and must be avoided at the greatest distance possible
Effect of Gain
Reduction
Gain Augmentation
At high altitudes, water particles are frozen and clouds are less reflective. Gain may be increased for storm
evaluation purposes.
Prevention Strategies
A weather radar is a tool for detecting and avoiding adverse weather and turbulence. As with any other
tool, adequate skills are needed in order to use it efficiently. Each type of radar has its own particularities,
and does not display a given weather situation in the same way as another type of weather radar. These
particularities are outlined in the weather radar user guide. It is therefore necessary to study the
manufacturer’s user guide, in order to gain a good knowledge of the weather radar capabilities and
limitations.
The shape of radar echoes, as well as their color, shall be observed to identify storms containing hail. The
gain function shall be used for deeper analysis, but shall then be reset to the CAL or AUTO position. The
TURB function can be used when closing in on active weather to identify the most turbulent area.
The flight crew shall periodically scan:
• Vertically, using the antenna tilt function
• Horizontally, using the range change.
As a general rule, the following prevention strategies apply:
• Use the weather radar to detect/analyze/avoid significant weather
• The shape/colour/size of returns are factors that shall be considered to interpret the weather
• Effective management of the antenna tilt along with an appropriate ND range selection, are key tools to
obtaining an informative weather radar display on the ND
• Gain is used in CAL/AUTO mode for detection and initial evaluation of displayed weather: Manual gain
control is used to analyze the weather
• Wet turbulence can be detected up to 40 NM with the TURB function.
Caution shall be exercised when flying over mountainous terrain, particularly during icing conditions.
Remember that the altitude indication of the pressure altimeter can be up to 15% higher than the true
altitude in extreme low air temperatures. When flying at minimum altitudes/flight levels the terrain
clearance shall be checked.
8.3.8.B.2. APPROACH AND LANDING
When ice has accumulated, stalling speeds are considerably higher than normal and a stall may be entered without
warning. Therefore, in such a condition it is recommended to increase the airspeed according to commander’s
discretion, taking into account all related factors, in particular the available runway length.
Make wider turns than normally if it is suspected that there is ice on the aeroplane. If possible, a straight-in
landing shall be made.
If freezing rain is reported at the landing aerodrome, special attention shall be paid to potential ice
accumulation on the aeroplane, braking conditions and subsequent take-off.
Great caution must be exercised after a changeover from the instruments to flying with visual guidance,
especially in weather conditions with swirling snow, when partial loss of orientation (altitude, direction of
aeroplane) may occur.
In fog or in falling or blowing snow, landing lights shall be used with Caution as the reflected light may
actually reduce the effective visibility and even cause a false impression of drift during flare and roll-out.
Blowing snow can considerably reduce visibility, particularly when using reverse thrust after touchdown.
Snow cover on the airfield can reduce the ability to assess accurately the runway threshold and end as well
as the centreline, thus inducing the Pilot to an off-centreline landing or too short a touchdown.
Special attention shall be paid to the following points:
perform a long, straight, final approach.
land on the centreline.
aim for a firm touchdown.
In case of directional problems during landing, especially in crosswind conditions on a wet and rubber-
contaminated runway, the following guidelines shall be taken into consideration:
1. The partial crab landing technique appears to provide optimum conditions as compared to the
sideslip landing during which an important initial lateral displacement takes place if the cornering
friction coefficient is poor over an extended length of the runway,
2. the full crab landing where use of reverse can become hazardous and where the lateral thrust
vector diminishes with gradual thrust reduction causing the aeroplane to drift off the runway
centreline in the crosswind direction.
3. Modulated use of wheel brakes is an effective means of regaining cornering capability and thereby
directional control, but will increase the stopping distance.
4. Use idle reverse as soon as possible after touchdown, only if no directional control problems are
encountered during the landing roll.
8.3.8.C TURBULENCE
Turbulence is defined as a disturbed, irregular flow of air with embedded irregular whirls or eddies and
waves. An aeroplane in turbulent flow is subjected to irregular and random motions while more or less
maintaining its intended flight path.
Intensity specifications for turbulence reporting have been defined as follows
INTENSITY AEROPLANE REACTION INSIDE AEROPLANE
Turbulence that momentarily causes slight, Occupants may feel a slight strain against seat
erratic changes in altitude and/or attitude. belts or shaller straps. Unsecured objects may
LIGHT be displaced slightly. Food service may be
conducted and little or no difficulty is
encountered in walking.
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Turbulence and wind shear present a potential hazard during take-off/climb out and approach/landing.
With strong shear, aeroplane can experience large fluctuation of airspeed and lift in a very short time.
Pilots shall be most cautious about possible wind shears. Immediate corrective actions to avoid high sink
rates close to the ground are of vital importance.
8.3.8.C.3. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
At maximum cruise altitude, the margin between low speed and high speed buffet is rather small and any increase in
g-loads, whether caused by maneuvering or by turbulence, may lead to serious difficulties. This shall be considered
when trying to top a turbulence region. Therefore do not select maximum cruise altitude.
Allow altitude to vary. Large altitude variations are possible in severe turbulence. Sacrifice altitude in order
to maintain the desired attitude and airspeed
DO NOT CHASE ALTITUDE
Large and persistent altitude variations may be corrected smoothly by only small elevator inputs and
appropriate power corrections. Large speed fluctuations and difficulties in instrument reading are to be
expected due to yawing and head-on gusts, therefore
DO NOT CHASE AIRSPEED
Maintain the recommended turbulence speed as a target speed. Set thrust as required and then do not
change it unless required by large and/or persistent airspeed or altitude variations.
The aeroplane's real airspeed will remain within reasonable limits as long as thrust is set properly, while
avoiding large and rapid throttle movements, and a reasonably constant altitude maintained.
If caught unaware by turbulence, do not slow down the aeroplane hurriedly.
Control pitch attitude with smooth control inputs to the elevator. Closely monitor the ADI/FDT as it is the
only correct indication while all other instruments may be seriously erratic.
MAINTAIN CONSTANT ATTITUDE
Trimming in severe turbulence (if auto trim is inop) can lead to stabilizer settings which can cause serious
control problems, especially during recovery. Therefore trim the stabilizer for turbulence speed and then
DO NOT CHANGE STABILISER TRIM
Since the autopilot will not be subject to false attitude interpretations or difficulties in erratic instruments,
its use in the appropriate mode is strongly recommended.
The Flight Director can effectively reduce the workload and is therefore recommended for use in control about all axes
and will further call for proper control inputs.
Shall control be partially lost due to severe turbulence, resulting in a steep dive, the following
recommendations may be helpful for a successful recovery:
Use speed brakes to prevent a rapid speed build-up. The pitching effect caused thereby is secondary to the need to
keep the speed at a reasonable value.
Do not retract speed brakes until recovery is achieved.
Elevator forces can become very heavy as speed increases, thus being a safeguard against excessive g-loads. If stabilizer
trim is used for recovery, use it with the utmost Caution so as to avoid heavy loads and a possible over-trim which
could result in a renewed loss of control.
After crossing a thunderstorm or turbulence area, the various aeroplane systems shall be checked
functionally as far as possible, i.e.:
flight and engine instruments,
pitot and static heating,
radio and navigation equipment,
readings of compasses,
electrical system including circuit breakers.
8.3.8.C.4. TURBULENCE DURING APPROACH AND LANDING
During approach, good monitoring of thrust, attitude, vertical speed and IAS as well as prompt action are the best
insurance against the effects of wind shear/downburst. Always be alert for differences of INS/RNAV/FMS readouts,
where available, compared to reported surface winds. Be prepared to make a second power and attitude change to
maintain the proper approach path as soon as the initial correction has taken effect. Initiate a missed approach if
sudden speed increments exceeding 20 kt below 500 ft/ground are encountered.
A critical case is an approach encountering an initially increasing headwind while approaching a shower or
"virga". This could indicate an approach to the downburst centre of a microburst which will be reached
while correcting down to the glide slope. Here a down flow and tailwind can hit the aeroplane. Therefore,
whenever such a condition is reported or anticipated, proper action must be taken immediately.
If sudden speed loss and/or downburst is encountered or if there is any doubt about the ability to re-
establish a correct approach path execute a missed approach.
If the sink rate does not stop, increase pitch and follow SRS orders(if necessary,the flight crew may pull the
sidestick fully back) and use full thrust by moving the throttles to the mechanical limits to avoid ground
contact. In addition, the recommendations mentioned above apply accordingly.
Whenever any significant turbulence, particularly below 500 ft/GND, is encountered, ATC shall be informed
immediately giving position, altitude, wind velocity and direction above and below the shear level, if
available, or observed airspeed changes, etc. The same applies if an issued warning is not encountered.
In order to ensure that a technical inspection for damage is carried out when the aeroplane structure has
been exposed to abnormal stresses, e.g. severe turbulence, lightning strikes, static discharges, etc., an
entry shall be made in the Aeroplane Log, also stating gear position in the case of a lighting strike. If the
engine power limitation has been exceeded, this also must be Noted in the Aeroplane Log.
8.3.8.D WINDSHEAR
Windshear is meteorologically defined as a local variation of wind velocity in a given (but changeable)
direction.
Wind shear in aviation is the time variation of wind velocity along the path of an aeroplane. The influencing
factors on an aeroplane regarding an existing wind system are the nature of the wind system, its
development and the aeroplane's flight path penetrating the system.
Windshear, with or without turbulence, alters the lift force acting on an aeroplane, resulting in a significant
sinking or rising motion. Therefore wind shear may be categorized as:
1. increased performance shear caused by increasing head wind or decreasing tailwind component or
vertical updrafts,
2. decreasing performance shear caused by decreasing head wind or increasing tailwind component
or vertical down drafts.
8.3.8.D.1. CLASSIFICATION OF WIND SHEAR
THUNDERSTORMS
The flow of air beneath thunderstorm cells is rather complex: strong down-drafts in the centre of the cell
transport cooled air downwards which then spreads outwards over the surface of the terrain. Around the
cell there is warm air flowing up and into the cell at a direction opposite to that of the cold air. The
distance from cell to the "leading edge" of the shear may be up to 15 NM and there the greatest shears can
be found. Shears may also exist on other sides of a thunderstorm cell.
DOWNBURST
Is severe downward rush of air and its outburst of damaging winds on or near the ground. It has been
classified into macro burst and microburst.
Macro burst and microburst are downbursts of different sizes with a radial outflow at the earth's surface
lasting between 3 and 20 minutes. The meteorological parameters of microbursts are relatively
complicated and prediction based on upper air and surface observations has not been very promising yet.
Microbursts are downbursts of less than 4 km in diameter which originate and descend from the base of
"parent" clouds (AC, CU, CB). They sometimes occur under "virga" conditions, which means down flow
precipitation evaporating before reaching the ground. The air rushes down towards the earth's surface at
high speed. High total pressure at the centre then accelerates the air outwards, in the course of which the
velocity reaches values up to 35 - 40 kt, often confined to within 100 ft above the ground. At the outer
boundary air moves up again in a rotational movement and forms a vortex ring. The time period over
which wind speeds exceed half the peak value may last from 1 to 8 minutes. Depending on the movement
and the height of the base of parent cloud, microbursts may occur as stationary or moving, surface or mid-
air, wet or dry.
FRONTAL SHEAR
Is present in both cold and warm fronts, but exists in a different relative location in each type of front.
Because the cold front boundary slopes back behind the frontal surface, the wind shear line also slopes
back. However, in the case of the warm front the frontal boundary slopes upwards ahead of the surface
front, so the wind shear does likewise. Significant wind shear can be expected if there is a large surface
temperature difference (>6°C) exists across the front and if the front is moving rapidly (>30 kt).
LEE WAVE, ROTOR SHEAR
This type of wind shear is associated with mountain wave systems which produce strong vertical and
horizontal wind shears. Frequently, a second rotor will form up to 100 NM from the lee side of the
mountain, producing original wave action. Depending on moisture of the air, lenticular ("lens-shaped")
clouds may be present.
Temperature inversions may be associated with wind shear near the ground.
Ground effects – terrain irregularities or buildings which interrupt the wind flow can produce significant
wind shear close to the ground.
All these are indicators of the existence of wind shear. If based on this information or actual reports wind
shear must be expected after take-off, the following precautions shall be considered:
selection of a more favorable runway considering length, obstacles and climb-out direction;
use of full take-off thrust;
use of higher climb-out speed;
delayed take-off.
If encountering wind shear or downburst after take-off, consider the following recovery technique:
Avoid pitch-down when airspeed decreases unexpectedly and hold pitch until reaching V 2. If descent is
unavoidable and risk of ground contact exists, DO NOT CHASE AIRSPEED, instead increase pitch attitude
smoothly and progressively follow SRS orders.
Loss of lift is caused not only by loss of airspeed but also by a decrease in angle of attack, which in turn
reduces lift. This means that lowering the pitch attitude in order to gain airspeed in a tailwind/down-flow
wind shear could result in a loss of lift and a subsequent heavy sink rate. Use full thrust by moving the
throttles to the mechanical limits if the rate of descent cannot be stopped otherwise. Do not trim the
aeroplane to facilitate recovery.
Release the attitude as soon as a positive rate of climb is evident. Watch for a return to "normal
conditions" to avoid overcorrecting when flying out of a wind shear zone or downburst.
Radio altimeter, ground proximity warning system and flight path vector are the best indicators of climb
and descent in these conditions.
Furthermore, the procedure mentioned under “Turbulence” above applies to windshear also, since
windshear is always associated with at least some degree of turbulence. Refer to the “Turbulence” section
above for more recommendations.
8.3.8.E JET STREAM
Jet streams are narrow bands with extreme high wind speeds up to 300 kt. They can extend up to several
thousand miles, the width can be several miles.
Avoid flying along the edge of jet streams due to possible associated turbulence.
Pilot shall also be aware of the effect of increased fuel consumption due to unexpected significant head
wind components that can be encountered.
8.3.8.F VOLCANIC ASH CLOUDS
Terminology
The following levels of contamination have been defined by ICAO, however as with all modelled data they
are subject to a level of uncertainty and the differing concentration levels may not be used worldwide.
Area of Low An airspace of defined dimensions where volcanic ash may be encountered at
Contamination concentrations
equal to or less than 2x10-3 g/m3, but greater than 2x10-4 g/m3.
These are shown on the Met Office charts in Cyan (Light Blue) and annotated as 200-
2000 micrograms percubicmetre.
Area of Medium An airspace of defined dimensions where volcanic ash may be encountered at
Contamination concentrations greater than 2x10-3 g/m3, but less than 4x10-3 g/m3. These are
shown on the Met Office charts as Grey and the lateral and vertical extent of these
areas will be defined by published NOTAM, they are annotated on the chart as 2000-
4000 micrograms per cubic metre.
Area of High An airspace of defined dimensions where volcanic ash may be encountered at
Contamination concentrations equal to or greater than 4x10-3 g/m3, or areas of contaminated
airspace where no ash concentration guidance is available.
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These are shown on Met Office charts as Red and a temporary danger area (TDA) is
established to cover these areas. The lateral and vertical extent of the high
concentration areas will be defined by published NOTAM and designated as
Temporary Danger Areas (TDAs), and are annotated on the chart as areas with
>4000 microgramsper cubic metre.
The colours used have been selected in order that they can also be identified when
printed in black and white.
Operations into areas forecast to be or aerodromes known to be contaminated with volcanic ash are
prohibited.
OCC will endeavor to ensure that flight plans will not be submitted through TDA’s for departure, en-route
and descent, however because of the restrictions of our planning system and also possible human error in
such planning, it is CREW responsibility and MUST CHECK that the OFP does not inadvertently route them
into these areas, and if they are unsure shall contact OCC for further clarification.
Crews shall check Notams for FIR’s, departure, destination and any required destination and en-route
alternates to ensure they are suitable for use.
It is the Commanders responsibility to ensure their flights are not planned to fly through areas forecaster
to be contaminated.
Flight operation
Operations through TDA’s are prohibited.
Crews are advised that ATC will only advise them of their proximity to a TDA and crews must decline any
routing through them.
In the event that crews suffer an inadvertent volcanic ash encounter they shall exit the ash cloud as quickly
as possible and divert to land as soon as possible. During this manoeuvre the crew shall advise ATC of their
intentions as soon as possible and make maximum use of TCAS to ensure separation from other aircraft.
Overflight
Overflight of an area of HIGH concentration is permitted, however prior to departure the VAAC charts shall
be reviewed to establish the extent of overflight of the HIGH zone, and the maximum HIGH zone altitude.
Flights shall be planned to be operated at least 2000ft above this level. Prior to overflight, consideration
shall be given to system failures requiring immediate descent such as a pressurisation failure.
Pressurisation failure:
In the event of pressurisation failure, crews shall fly the published procedure while turning to clear the high
zone using the shortest possible route.
In order to ensure sufficient oxygen supply the following conservative restriction applies to the maximum
allowable distance over an area of HIGH concentration:
Top of HIGH zone 2000 ft 15000 ft 10000 ft.
Distance 50 NM 200 NM 500 NM
Other failures:
Other situations requiring immediate descent, e.g. single engine failure, shall be carried out in accordance
with the Standard Operating Procedure ‘’ONE ENGINE OUT DURING CRUISE FLIGHT ( OBSTACLE STRATEGY
)’’, aiming to remain as far above the anticipated volcanic ash levels.
In summary - for overflight of a HIGH concentration zone:
1. Review routing to ensure compliance with maximum overfly distance. In the event of descent above a no fly
zone.
2. Manoeuvre as required to clear no fly zone ASAP. This may require a 180 Degree descending turn.
If no fly zone is entered apply QRH procedure for volcanic ash encounter.
Underflight
The operation of flights under areas of HIGH concentration is permitted, however a margin of at least
2000ft shall be maintained between the base of the layer shown on the chart and the highest level at
which the aircraft operates.
For example if the chart covers airspace from FL200 to FL350 the aircraft may not fly underneath the HIGH
zone above FL180.
Crews must remain aware of the extent of the area of HIGH concentration and ensure the flight remains
clear of that area.
Flying through an ash cloud shall be avoided by all means due to the extreme hazard for the aeroplane.
Volcanic ash can cause extreme abrasion to all forward facing parts of the aeroplane, to the extent that
visibility through the windshields may be totally impaired, airfoil and control surface leading edges may be
severely damaged, airspeed indication may be completely unreliable through blocking of the pitot heads
and engines may even shut down.
Here within are given general recommendation related to best practices and operational procedures
defined by the ETF for flights within an area with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination.. Type
specific procedures and peculiarities shall be found in FCOM .
These recommendations and procedures are in variable extent applicable through three distinctive phases
related to volcanic activity; Pre-eruption, Start of eruption and On-going eruption.
8.3.8.F.1. PREVENTION STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
Prevention strategies and safety risk mitigation measures are developed to address the risk and potential
consequences of volcanic ash encounter.
FLIGHT CREW AWARENESS
Adequate Flight crew awareness is paramount in all the efforts to minimize the risk reduce the potential
consequences of Volcanic activity in the area of flight operation. In ETF Crew awareness is enforced in
general through regular training activities and dissemination of subject related information.
When it comes to potential threat, among other functions that are established within the ETF Volcanic
Watch Function is of particular importance for early dissemination of safety critical information and proper
Risk assessment.
The Volcanic Watch Function consists in collecting, compiling, processing and up-dating detailed
information regarding the active and pre-eruptive volcanoes likely to affect the ETF area of operation.
This function in ETF is assigned to the OCC in coordination with Accident Prevention Advisor.
So as to assess the volcanic threat for each ETF route and/or destination the following information sources
and communication links will be used:
Air Information Service (AIS), for active NOTAM's
Meteorological Watch Offices, Aerodrome Offices and Regional Area Forecast Centers for active SIGMET's
On-site Aviation Authorities for additional information, such as data and maps related to the ash cloud observed and
forecasted extension
During normal exterior walk around before each flight, the flight crew shall visually check that there is no
indication of volcanic ash contamination. If the check provides evidence of contamination It shall be
reported to maintenance personnel, reported in TLB before the flight and ASR and Voyage report filled in.
Operation from or to aerodromes contaminated with volcanic ash shall be avoided, if possible.
Reports from ATC made to aircraft of ash clouds shall be treated in the same way as other hazardous
weather phenomena such as windshear or turbulence information to improve the awareness of crew and
to assist with avoidance.
Shall volcanic ash exposure be unavoidable, the following recommendations and procedures shall be
applied:
a) Whenever an aeroplane is planned to stay over at an aerodrome contaminated with volcanic ash,
engine inlet covers as well as other protective covers and plugs shall be installed
b) Have the aeroplane cleaned before departure
c) Ash layer may contaminate the lubricated parts, penetrate the seals or enter the engines gas path,
air conditioning system, air data probes and other aeroplane orifices.
d) Dry crank the engines
e) Before starting the engines, ventilate them by dry cranking at maximum motoring speed for two
minutes.
f) Do not use windshield wipers for ash dust removal.
g) Restrict ground use of APU to engine starts
h) Do not use APU for air conditioning and electrical power supply. Use external pneumatic supply for
starting the engines, if it is available.
i) Keep bleed valves closed for taxiing
j) Taxi with minimum thrust
k) Advance the levers smoothly to the minimum required for breakaway. Avoid making sharp or high-
speed turns. All engines taxi shall be preferred, to minimize thrust level on each engine.
l) Allow ash and dust (if present) to settle on runway before starting the takeoff roll
m) Use the rolling takeoff technique if possible
n) Consider the runway as wet (for dry ash) or contaminated with slush (wet ash) for takeoff/landing
performance calculation
o) Braking efficiency may be degraded by the layer of ash on the runway.
In certain cases there might be possibility for departure below volcanic ash cloud where the crew shall
carefully access all the parameters and make adequate decision considering as a minimum following:
a) Routing for departure below the cloud and MSA along the route
b) Weather along the planned route especially winds
c) Forecast for volcanic ash movement covering as a minimum time frame of one hour before and
one hour after the scheduled departure time
d) Increased fuel consumption and necessary flight plan adjustment
e) Contingency strategies in case of volcanic ash encounter
In case of low to medium altitude volcanic ash cloud there might be possibility for flying over it. In this
case, during the flight preparation, area of volcanic ash cloud area shall be considered as a mountainous
terrain. If this temporary danger area (TDA) is well defined and flying over it possible in accordance with
ETF risk assessment, contingency measures in case of engine failure or cabin depressurization shall be
considered and evaluated. These contingency measures (strategies) shall enable the aeroplane to stay
away of the TDA, maintaining either adequate vertical distance from the volcanic ash cloud, or having
adequate diversion routing out of TDA.
Following any inadvertent encounter of the HIGH contamination zone crew shall divert to the
nearest suitable airfield.
During flight, crews shall be alert for any visual sign of volcanic ash and avoid areas of high ash
concentration.
The following indications are associated with flight through volcanic ash and may occur during day or night
operations and in VMC or IMC:
Odour
When encountering a volcanic ash cloud flight crews usually notice a smoky or acrid odour that can smell
like electrical smoke, burned dust or sulphur. In extreme cases use of crew oxygen in accordance with the
appropriate procedure may be considered. Be reminded that odour on the flight deck may not be volcanic
ash and crew shall use all available information to determine the source.
Haze
Most flight crews, as well as cabin crews or passengers, see a haze develop within the aircraft. Dust may
settle on surfaces.
Airspeed
If volcanic ash fouls the pitot tube the indicated airspeed can decrease or fluctuate erratically.
Pressurisation
Cabin pressure can change, including possible loss of cabin pressurisation.
Static Discharges
A phenomenon similar to St Elmo’s Fire or glow can occur. In these instances, blue coloured sparks can
appear to flow up the outside of the windscreen or a white glow can appear at the leading edges of the
wings.
If any of these indications are seen refer to the appropriate QRH Volcanic Ash procedure and advise ATC.
Post flight
A post-flight monitoring program by ETF Maintenance will be in place.
Following flight in the MEDIUM Zone (GREY), crews shall make a note in the aircraft TLB.
IMPORTANT: any encounter, or suspected encounter, with volcanic ash shall be noted in the aircraft
technical log and an ASR and Voyage Report filed.
It is mandatory that Maintenance staff are advised face-to-face prior to leaving the aircraft.
Additionally, the appropriate ATC and Company Operations (via VHF or ACARS) shall be
notified as soon as practicable.
IN FLIGHT/EN-ROUTE INFORMATION UP-DATING
The activity of an erupting volcano usually features series of eruptions sometimes separated by only a few
hours. En-route updating of the pre-flight briefing information is therefore of paramount importance to
minimize the potential for volcanic ash cloud encounter.
ETF flight crews and OCC shall use all the means available to obtain timely up-dated information on the
volcano eruptive activity including:
Shall the volcanic ash encounter be unavoidable, the following general recommendations apply:
a)Make an 180o turn
b)Pilots shall exit the cloud as quick as possible. Generally, an 180o turn will result in the fastest cloud
exit, due to the possible extension of such clouds over hundreds of nautical miles
c) Decrease the thrust
d) High thrust settings increase the risk of glass particles melting and associated ash deposit buildup
in the turbine chamber. Thrust shall therefore be decreased, if conditions permit.
e) Don the crew oxygen masks (100%)
f) Report to the ATC
g) Any observation of volcanic activity or any encounter with a volcanic ash cloud shall be reported by
immediate radio transmission or/and by filling the ICAO special air-report of volcanic activity form
(model VAR). Keep in mind that you might be the first to see the eruption and thus your report
might be extremely valuable.
h) Increase bleed demand (wing and engine anti-ice ON)
i) Increasing the bleed demand aims at increasing the fuel/air ratio in the engine combustor to limit
the possibility of an engine surge and/or flameout.
j) Start the APU
k) The APU GEN will be available to supply the electrical network in case of engine flameout.
l) Monitor engine parameters and airspeed indications
m) The crew shall be aware that volcanic ash may render airspeed indications unreliable.
SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS
It is important to note the following key points:
1. ETF will provide exhaustive and updated information to crews flying in regions likely to be affected
by volcano activity
2. Flight crews shall exercise due vigilance to continue updating of the preflight information when en
route
3. Flight Crews shall report to the ATC any observation of volcanic activity or any encounter with a
volcanic ash cloud
4. In accordance with standard ETF reporting procedure and subject to Mandatory Occurrence
Reporting (MOR) the crew shall report the event following the instruction and using the form given
in the <ETF OM-A Ch.11>.
If encounter with volcanic ash cannot be avoided, the flight crew shall immediately applied the procedure
recommended by the Boeing’s documentation.
For detailed volcanic ash avoidance procedure refer to QRH.
‘contaminated runway’ means a runway of which a significant portion of its surface area (whether in
isolated areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one or more of the
substances listed under the runway surface condition descriptors;
Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard to runway
friction and contaminant drag and, therefore, to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during
take-off, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance
information is based. In the case of a contaminated runway, the first option for the commander is to wait until the
runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may consider a take-off, provided that he/she has applied the
applicable performance adjustments, and any further safety measures he/she considers justified under the
prevailing conditions.
8.3.8.G.1.1 major aspects
Inherent risks to aeroplane operation when ice, snow or slush sticks to or impinges upon the aeroplane such as:
a) blocking of flight controls and trim devices;
b) disturbance of airflow over wings, stabilizer and fuselage causing loss of lift and increase in drag;
c) damage to engine compressors/fans by ice detaching from the airframe.
Significant degradation of aeroplane take-off and landing performance subject to type and extent of
contaminants:
slower acceleration on runways covered by standing water, slush or snow as a result of dynamic drag acting on the
landing gear wheels and of spray impingement drag on the airframe. Spray patterns can also cause engine ingestion
problems. Large quantities of snow or slush, usually containing sand or other anti-skid substances may be thrown into
the engines, static ports and onto the airframe. The clearance must be watched when the runway is cleared and the
snow is banked at the sides of runways or taxiways. Refer to applicable OM-B / FCOM for limitations.
reduced tire/surface friction which degrades aeroplane braking action and cornering capability for directional control.
extreme slipperiness in the form of viscous aquaplaning at the onset of the first rainfall on runways exposed to long
periods of dry weather, which applies in particular to runways located in arid zones (sand, dust, salt);
considerable slipperiness must be anticipated within the rubber-affected portion of a runway (touchdown area),
whenever the surface is damp or wet or otherwise covered with a fluid deposit;
proper operation of the anti-lock braking system may be impaired on slippery runway surfaces due to inadequate
wheel spin-up on touchdown. Positive touchdown and immediate deployment of spoilers may facilitate wheel spin-
up;
the use of reverse thrust requires Caution in crosswind conditions or asymmetric modes, because directional control
may be lost due to the component effect of the thrust vector or induced yawing moments.
8.3.8.G.1.2 Reduced visibility and optical illusions during precipitation, e. g. blowing snow.Nature and forms of
aquaplaning
Aquaplaning occurs when direct contact between tire and runway surface and therefore friction is partially
or completely lost due to vertical water pressures equal to or exceeding the tire inflation pressure. This is
the reason why aquaplaning (viscous and dynamic combined) must be expected at high speeds on standing
water, slush and wet snow with a measured depth of more than 1 mm. The factors and conditions which
can cause high water pressures in the tire footprint area are manifold. Three typical forms of aquaplaning
can be distinguished as follows:
Viscous The viscosity of water or a lubricant mixture of water with a contaminant (dust,
aquaplaning fine sand, etc.) is of such magnitude that the penetration of even thin films
requires contact pressures well in excess of the tire inflation pressure. Accordingly,
direct contact between tire-tread and runway surface can only be established
through local peak pressures developed at sharp aspirates of the surface texture.
Therefore, runways with smooth surfaces which lack adequate sharpness will
generally be prone to viscous aquaplaning under damp or wet conditions. Viscous
aquaplaning, once onset, can persist to very low speeds.
Dynamic The inertia of a measurable depth of standing water is such that with increasing
aquaplaning speed the resistance to displacement increases. As a result, water pressure
develops progressively and reaches, at a critical rolling speed, a magnitude
sufficient to lift the tire off the surface.
Reverted rubber Provided a tire is sliding for a prolonged period of time (i.e. no wheel spin-up),
aquaplaning considerable heat is generated in the tire footprint area. As a result, the outermost
layer of the tire tread melts, thereby sealing the tire footprint. The entrapped
water is converted to high-pressure steam causing complete loss of contact
between tire and surface. Once onset, this kind of planning can persist down to
taxi speeds. When landing on compact snow and ice-covered runways, aeroplane
braking ability may drop significantly as the speed decreases. This phenomenon is
attributed to melting of the ice due to tire contact pressure, which can lead to
viscous aquaplaning.
8.3.8.G.1.3 Reporting of braking conditions
Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as that reported by the
aerodrome operator in the runway condition report (RCR), the commander shall notify the air traffic services (ATS) by
means of a special air-report (AIREP) as soon as practicable.
The role of the flight crew in the runway surface condition reporting process does not end once a safe landing has
been achieved. While the aerodrome operator is responsible for generating the RCR, flight crew are responsible for
providing accurate braking action reports.
The flight crew braking action reports provide feedback to the aerodrome operator regarding the accuracy of the RCR
resulting from the observed runway surface conditions.
ATC passes these braking action reports to the aerodrome operator, which in turn uses them in conjunction with the
RCAM to determine if it is necessary to downgrade or upgrade the RWYCC.
During busy times, runway inspections and maintenance may be less frequent and need to be sequenced with arrivals.
Therefore, aerodrome operators may depend on braking action reports to confirm that the runway surface condition
is not deviating significantly from the published RCR.
Since both the ATC and the aerodrome operator rely on accurate braking action reports, flight crew should use
standardised terminology in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 ‘PANS ATM’.
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The following Table 1 shows the correlation between the terminology to be used in the AIREP to report the braking
action and the RWYCC.
AIREP
Description RWYCC
(braking action)
N/A 6
Braking deceleration is normal for the wheel braking effort applied AND
GOOD 5
directional control is normal.
GOOD TO MEDIUM Braking deceleration OR directional control is between good and medium. 4
Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced for the wheel braking effort applied
MEDIUM 3
OR directional control is noticeably reduced.
MEDIUM TO POOR Braking deceleration OR directional control is between medium and poor. 2
Braking deceleration is significantly reduced for the wheel braking effort
POOR 1
applied OR directional control is significantly reduced.
Braking deceleration is minimal to non-existent for the wheel braking effort
LESS THAN POOR 0
applied OR directional control is uncertain.
An AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, in accordance with one of the following specifications, as applicable:
In some cases, the differences between two consecutive levels of the six braking action categories between ‘Good’
and ‘Less than Poor’ may be too subtle for the flight crew to detect. It is therefore acceptable for the flight crew to
report on a more coarse scale of ‘Good’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Poor’.
Whenever requested by ATC, or if the braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as previously reported
by the aerodrome operator in the RCR, pilots should provide a braking action report. This is especially important and
safety relevant where the experienced braking action is worse than the braking action associated with any RWYCC
code currently in effect for the portion of the runway concerned.
When the braking action experienced during landing is better than that reported by the aerodrome operator, it is also
relevant to report this information, which may trigger further actions for the aerodrome operator in order to update
the RCR.
If an aircraft-generated braking action report is available, it should be transmitted, identifying its origin accordingly. If
the flight crew have a reason to modify the aircraft-generated braking action report based on their judgement, the
commander should be able to amend such report.
A braking action AIREP of ‘Less than Poor’ leads to a runway closure until the aerodrome operator can improve the
runway condition.
An air safety report should be submitted whenever flight safety has been endangered due to low braking action.
When variable braking conditions (FC or BA) are reported along a runway, the lowest value affecting the
required runway length shall be used for take-off and landing weight calculations.
For determination of maximum acceptable crosswind, the lowest reported FC/BA – value along/within the
required runway length shall be used. The crosswind limitations stipulated in the OM-B part must be
strictly adhered to, whereas recommended restrictions shall be followed within small tolerances.
8.3.8.H SANDSTORMS
Avoid flying in active sandstorms whenever possible. When on ground, aeroplane shall ideally be kept
under cover if dust storms are forecast or in progress. Alternatively , all engine blanks and cockpit covers
shall be fitted, as well as the blanks for the various system and instrument intakes and probes. They shall
be carefully removed before flight to ensure that accumulations of dust are not deposited in the orifices
which the covers are designed to protect.
8.3.8.I MOUNTAIN WAVES
Also referred to as Orographic turbulence. Under certain conditions of atmospheric stability and wind
speed, the airflow creates a standing wave pattern to the lee of a mountain ridge and is known as
"mountain waves" which may cause severe turbulence. Typical tell-tale signs are lenticular clouds, rotor
clouds and clouds with a "waterfall" appearance. The strongest turbulence may be found in the rotor
clouds.
Special procedures or recommendations are indicated in Jeppesen FliteDeck Pro X Charts manual on
aerodrome charts when appropriate. They must be taken into account by the flight crews for the choice of
the landing or take off runway.
8.3.8.J SIGNIFICANT TEMPERATURE INVERSION
Occur most markedly during wintertime around sunrise. The main negative performance factor is caused
by the decrease in engine power resulting from the temperature rise which may have a very negative
effect on takeoff and go-around performance particularly at high operation mass. The maximum cruising
altitude capability can be reduced if a temperature inversion exists in the upper levels.
In accordance with RECAT-EU, aircraft types are grouped into six categories as follows:
• Super Heavy – 100,000 kg or more, wing span above 72 m;
• Upper Heavy – 100,000 kg or more, wing span between 60 m and 72 m;
• Lower Heavy – 100,000 kg or more, wing span below 52 m;
• Upper Medium – less than 100,000 kg but more than 15,000 kg, wing span above 32 m;
• Lower Medium – less than 100,000 kg but more than 15,000 kg, wing span below 32 m;
• Light – 15,000 or less, no wing span criterion.
It is required to maintain the speed assigned by ATC on final approach. If, for any reason this is not
possible, ATC shall be notified immediately. Flight crew members are also requested to minimize runway
occupancy time. It is required to vacate the runway as early as possible in order to maintain runway
capacity.
Lift is generated by the creation of a pressure differential over the wing surfaces. The lowest pressure
occurs over the upper surface and the highest pressure under the wing. Air will want to move towards the
area of lower pressure.
This causes the air to move outwards under the wing and curl up and over the upper surface of the wing.
This starts the wake vortex. The pressure differential also causes the air to move inwards over the wing.
Small trailing edge vortices, formed by outward and inward moving streams of air meeting at the trailing
edge, move outwards to the wingtip and join the large wingtip vortex.
Swirling air masses trail downstream of the wingtips. Viewed from behind the left vortex rotates clockwise
and the right vortex rotates counter- clockwise. They spread laterally away from the aeroplane and
descend 500 to 900 feet at distances of up to five miles behind it.
These vortices tend to descend 300 to 500 feet per minute during the first 30 seconds.
Light crosswinds may cause the vortices to drift, and crosswinds in excess of five knots tend to cause them
to break up behind the aeroplane. Atmospheric turbulence generally causes them to break up more
rapidly.
The intensity or strength of the vortex is primarily a function of aeroplane weight, wingspan and
configuration (flap setting, etc).
The strongest vortices are produced by heavy aeroplane flying slowly in a clean configuration. For example,
a large or heavy aeroplane, which must reduce its speed to 250 knots below 10,000 feet, while flying in a
clean configuration is producing very strong wake vortices while it descends.
Viewed from behind the generating aeroplane, the left vortex rotates
clockwise and the right vortex rotates counter-clockwise. They
spread laterally away from the aeroplane and descend 500 to 900
feet at distances of up to five miles behind it. Vortices tend to
descend 300 to 500 feet per minute in the first 30 seconds.
Helicopters also produce wake turbulence. Helicopter wakes
may be of significantly greater strength than those from fixed-
wing aeroplane of the same weight. The strongest wake
turbulence can occur when the helicopter is operating at
lower speeds (20 to 50 knots). Some mid-size or executive
class helicopters produce wake turbulence as strong as that of
heavier helicopters. Two- blade main rotor systems produce
stronger wake turbulence than rotor systems with more
blades.
8.3.9.A WAKE TURBULENCE DURING TAKEOFF AND LANDING
While there have been instances where wake turbulence
caused structural damage, the greatest hazard is induced roll
and yaw. This is especially dangerous during takeoff and landing, when there is little height for recovery.
Wake turbulence-induced roll rates can be extreme. Countering roll rates may be difficult or impossible,
even in high performance aeroplane with excellent roll control authority. In fixed-wing aeroplane, wake
vortices begin as the nose is rotated for takeoff and continue throughout flight until the nose wheel
touches down on the runway once again. The vortices can cause problems for aeroplane crossing behind or
below leading aeroplane. Low approaches, touch-and- goes and go-around can also cause problems for
taxiing or departing aeroplane. During takeoff and landing, the vortices sink toward the ground and move
laterally away from the runway when the wind is calm. A crosswind of 3 to 5 knots will tend to keep the
upwind vortex in the runway area and may cause the downwind vortex to drift toward another runway.
Wake vortices sometimes bounce, diverge and dissipate more rapidly in ground effect. Wake turbulence
separation is provided by Air Traffic Control (ATC) to all aeroplane which may be affected by wake
turbulence, except in the case of IFR aeroplane making a visual approach or VFR aeroplane arrivals. In
these cases it is the pilot’s responsibility to provide adequate spacing from preceding, arriving or departing
aeroplane. Pilots shall follow the guidelines below and ATC will make allowance when sequencing.
Wherever practicable, aerodrome controllers will advise pilots of the likelihood of wake turbulence by
using the phrase, “Caution – wake turbulence”.
8.3.9.B ICAO CATEGORIES VS EU RECAT
The AIRBUS A380 marked a milestone in the ATM world, since it meant a new approach for design of wake
turbulence separations. The traditional ICAO provisions were subjected to revision, as the new A380
overtook the largest passenger aircraft generating greater vortices than those from the ‘HEAVY’ category.
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Tackling this problem has brought out a much more precise categorisation in Europe:
RECAT-EU. It divides the current HEAVY and MEDIUM categories into two sub-categories and creates a new
SUPER HEAVY one for the AIRBUS A380.
RECAT-EU presents the European wake turbulence categories and separation minima on approach and
departure, available for operational deployment.
The demand is high for airport capacity and efficiency at some European airports, and in particular for
increased runway throughput.
During recent years, knowledge about wake vortex behaviour in the operational environment has
increased thanks to measured data and improved understanding of physical processes. It is mainly for this
reason that it was possible to revise wake turbulence categorisation and corresponding separation minima.
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), in consultation with its
Stakeholders, has developed a re-categorisation of ICAO wake turbulence longitudinal separation minima
on approach and departure, called “RECAT-EU”.
The RECAT-EU scheme is based on a set of principles, comparing the wake generation and wake resistance
between aircraft types, and splitting ICAO HEAVY and MEDIUM categories into ‘Upper’ (‘Larger’) and
‘Lower’ (‘Smaller’). This split has been based on aircraft type characteristics.
This allows reduction of separation minima for some traffic pairs of aircraft, enabling runway throughput
increase, whilst maintaining acceptable levels of safety.
Safety benefits are also delivered for some smaller aircraft types, by increasing their separation minima
and/or change of category grouping, hence reducing the risk of wake turbulence-induced accidents for the
most vulnerable types.
The Airbus A380-800 (A388), with a maximum take-off mass in the order of 560 000 kg, is the largest
passenger aircraft ever entered into revenue service. The aircraft is in the HEAVY wake turbulence
category, which has no defined upper limit. For the A380-800, an ICAO State guidance released in 2008
recommends an increase in relation to the wake turbulence separation minima published in the ICAO Doc
4444 PANS-ATM.
When a wake turbulence restriction is not required, then separation reverts to radar separation minimum
(MRS): as prescribed by ICAO as minimum radar separation (MRS) being 3NM (or 2.5NM under given
conditions described in Doc 4444), or; as prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority.
For the purpose of assessing wake turbulence separation, aeroplane are divided into the following wake
turbulence categories of Maximum Certificated Takeoff Weight (MCTOW):
EU RECAT ICAO
• Super Heavy – 100,000 kg or more, wing • Light - Aeroplane types of less than 7,000 kg
span above 72 m; MCTOW. Some of the heavier examples of
• Upper Heavy – 100,000 kg or more, wing these are: Bandeirante, Cessna 402 and 421,
span between 60 m and 72 m; Islander, Nomad, Piper Navajo and Beech 99
• Lower Heavy – 100,000 kg or more, wing • Medium - Aeroplane types of more than
span below 52 m; 7,000 kg and less than 136,000 kg MCTOW.
• Upper Medium – less than 100,000 kg but Some examples of these are: Boeing B727,
more than 15,000 kg, wing span above 32 B737 and B757*, Fokker Friendship, Metro 4
m; , BAe–146, Dash 8, ATR–72, Hercules, DC–3
• Lower Medium – less than 100,000 kg but and Saab 340.
more than 15,000 kg, wing span below 32 • Heavy - All aeroplane types of 136,000 kg
m; MCTOW or more. Some examples of these
• Light – 15,000 or less, no wing span are: Boeing B777, B767, B747, A380,
criterion McDonnell Douglas DC–8, MD–11, and DC–
10.
*B757 aeroplane are categorized as ‘heavy’
(H) aeroplane for the purpose of assessing
wake turbulence experienced by following
aeroplane.
8.3.9.C DEPARTURE
After takeoff, avoid headings which cross below and
behind the path of larger aeroplane.
These are elaborated on, and there are further standards listed, in the AIP Planning Manual - such as
opposite direction runway operations and crossing runways.
Remember wake turbulence separation is not provided to landing VFR arrivals, nor to IFR on visual
approach. In these cases it is up to the pilot to provide adequate spacing from preceding arriving or
departing aeroplane.
8.3.9.D.3. PILOT OPTIONS
If a pilot considers the wake turbulence separation standards inadequate, an increased separation may be requested
by specifying the spacing required. Conversely, if pilots indicate that they will take responsibility for their own wake
turbulence separation then they may request exemption from these separations. This option shall be treated with
Caution.
8.3.9.D.4. JET BLAST
Another hazard to bear in mind, particularly for light aeroplane, is jet blast and propeller slipstream. Beware of passing
close or landing directly behind aeroplane with engines running, particularly large jets. Jet blast and propeller
slipstream can produce localized wind velocities of sufficient strength to cause damage to other aeroplane, vehicles,
personnel and buildings. Some years ago a B727 on engine tests blew in a hangar door - clear testimony to the force
which can be exerted.
TAKING OFF BEHIND LARGER AEROPLANE
Ensure you can rotate before the
preceding aeroplane's rotation point. A
climb above its flight path is also
necessary, until you can turn clear. If this
is not possible, delay your takeoff.
8.3.9.D.5. EN ROUTE
Because wake turbulence is nearly always invisible, pilots need to anticipate where it might be. Air traffic
controllers issue "Caution - wake turbulence" warnings only and are not responsible for anticipating the
existence or effect of the condition.
SAME RUNWAY
Stay at or above the larger aeroplane's
final approach flight path. Note its
touchdown point and land beyond it.
CROSSING RUNWAY
Cross above the larger aeroplane's
flight path.
8.3.9.D.7. HOW TO AVOID WAKE
TURBULENCE
Pilots shall remember three basic warnings
concerning wake turbulence:
1. Do not get too close to the lead
aeroplane.
2. Do not get below the lead aeroplane's
flight path.
3. Be particularly wary when light wind
conditions exist.
The following avoidance procedures
shall be followed at all times:
1. Takeoff. If you think wake turbulence
from the preceding aeroplane may be a factor, wait about 2 or 3 minutes before taking off. Before taking the
active runway, tell the tower that you want to wait. Plan to lift off prior to the rotation point of the lead
aeroplane, and use full takeoff power or thrust.
2. Climb. If possible, climb above the lead aeroplane's flight path. If you can't out- climb it, fly slightly upwind and
climb parallel to the lead aeroplane's course. Avoid headings that cause you to cross behind and below the
aeroplane in front.
3. Crossing. If you must cross behind the lead aeroplane, try to cross above its flight path or, terrain permitting, at
least 1,000 feet below.
4. Trailing. Endeavour to stay either on or above the leading aeroplane's flight path, or upwind, or, terrain
permitting, at least 1,000 feet below.
5. Approach. Maintain a position on or above the lead aeroplane's flight path with adequate lateral separation.
6. Landing. Ensure that your touchdown point is beyond the lead aeroplane's touchdown point. Land well before
a departing aeroplane's rotation point.
7. Crossing Approaches. When landing behind another aeroplane on crossing approaches, cross above the other
aeroplane's flight path.
8. Crosswinds. Remember crosswinds may affect the position of wake vortices. Adjust takeoff and landing points
accordingly.
9. Helicopters. Remember that their wake vortices may be of significantly greater strength than those of fixed-
wing aeroplane of the same weight. Avoid flying beneath the flight paths of helicopters.
10. Visual Approach. When making a visual approach, do not assume that the aeroplane you are following is on the
same or lower flight path. The flight crew of the lead aeroplane may have flown a steep approach (typical of
cargo operations). Stay above and at least 3 miles behind the normal flight path (at least 4 miles behind a B757).
Wake turbulence is one of the factors that pilots and air traffic controllers must avoid to ensure safe
flights. It takes co-operation, awareness and an understanding of each other's requirements to safely avoid
aeroplane-generated wake.
It is your responsibility as flight crew or pilot in command to anticipate the likelihood of encountering
wake turbulence and to alter your flight path accordingly, or, if necessary, request an alternative clearance
from ATC. Do not rely on others to provide warnings.
• If it is necessary for one pilot to leave his station while on cruise FL the remaining pilot shall: have unobstructed
access to the flight controls,
• put on headset and shaller harnesses until the other pilot returns to his duty station
• maintain alertness and situational awareness
Flight crew members, shall not vacate their aircraft control seats after TOD for the purpose of transferring
duties to another pilot flight crew member.
8.3.10.A.1. CONTROLLED REST DURING FLIGHT
Controlled rest (CR) is intended as a last resort to relieve unexpected, excessive tiredness in flight. It does
not absolve the flight crew member of their responsibility to be sufficiently rested before a flight. CR shall
be used in conjunction with other on board fatigue management countermeasures such as physical
exercise, bright cockpit illumination at appropriate times, balanced eating and drinking, and intellectual
activity.
It may be used on flights where experience has shown or where it is expected that crew alertness may be
improved, especially for the final part of the flight.
With regards to its application, the following points have to be observed:
• Controlled rest may be used at the discretion of the commander to manage both sudden unexpected fatigue and
fatigue which is expected to become more severe during higher workload periods later in the flight. It cannot be
planned before flight.
• Controlled rest shall only take place during a low workload part of the flight.
• Controlled rest periods shall be agreed according to individual needs and the accepted principles of CRM; where
the involvement of the cabin crew is required, consideration shall be given to their workload.
• The commander shall ensure that the other flight crew member(s) is (are) adequately briefed to carry out the
duties of the resting crew member. One pilot must be fully able to exercise control of the aeroplane at all times.
Any system intervention which would normally require a cross check according to multi crew principles shall be
avoided until the resting crew member resumes his duties.
• SCCM must be informed about the CR, to avoid interruption during the PM‘s rest time. If it is known that CR will
be utilized prior to the flight, the SCCM shall be advised to allow for planning of the On Board Service. Otherwise
the Captain must inform the SCCM just prior to the start of CR;
• PF must call the cabin every 20 minutes to advise they are still awake. If they fail to do so, the SCCM will call the
flight deck;
• Only one flight crew member at a time shall make use of CR;
• During this time all flight crew members have to stay at their stations, including the resting flight crew member;
• CR shall only be used during the cruise phase and shall terminate at least 30 minutes prior to top of descent;
• A period of at least 20 minutes shall be planned as a “post–rest period” to let the effects of “sleep inertia" wear
off before the crew member resumes their duties;
• The maximum time for an individual rest period shall not exceed 40 minutes. This time limitation serves the
purpose of avoiding deep sleep, with resulting increased sleep inertia;
• Only one rest period is permitted per individual flight crew member per sector;
• Personal equipment, which may facilitate rest, is permitted (eye shades, neck supports, earplugs);
• The harness shall be used and the seat positioned rearwards to minimize the risk of unintentional interference
with the controls;
• PF must wear their headset for the full length of CR with the volume properly adjusted. 121,5 only must be set on
the second radio. PF is not to listen to any other stations (i.e. VOLMET/ATIS/Handling agent);
• PF must continue to note frequency changes, timings, fuel checks as required on the OFP;
• PF shall remain alert, concentrate only on flying duties and avoid distractions;
• Finally the PF shall let the PM rest and avoid interrupting the rest unless any abnormal situation occurs such as
(but not limited to) Master Warning/Caution, cabin
INOP
AC TYPE REASSIGNED TO SEAT NOTE 1
REQUIRED SEATING POSITION
SCCM: jump seat 1R
1L
CCM3: PAX seat 2D or available AFT jump seat
1R CCM3: PAX seat 2D or available AFT jump seat
B737-800 4L CCM2: jump seat 4R
4R CCM4: jump seat 4L
1L & 1R NO GO
4L & 4R NO GO
c) CCM jump seats with direct view of passenger cabin on the B737-800 are: 1L & 1R
During other phases of the flight, each flight crew member in the flight crew compartment shall keep the assigned
station safety belt fastened while at his/her station.
Before take-off and landing, and during taxiing, and whenever deemed necessary in the interest of safety, the
commander shall be satisfied that each passenger on board occupies a seat or berth with his/her safety belt or restraint
system properly secured.
ETF shall make provisions for multiple occupancy of aircraft seats that is only allowed on specified seats. The
commander shall be satisfied that multiple occupancy does not occur other than by one adult and one infant who is
properly secured by a supplementary loop belt or other restraint device.
8.3.11.B CREW MEMBERS
Active flight crew members shall always have their seat belts fastened, unless duty requirements prevent this
temporarily. The shaller harness must be worn for taxi, take-off and landing.
All other crew members must be secured:
• during take-off,
• during all flying in very turbulent air or when heavy turbulence can be excepted,
• during landing.
Any person who is in the cockpit must be secured with seat belts fastened all the time. The shaller harness must be
worn for taxi, take-off and landing,or when the “Fasten Seat Belts” sign is ON.
The Commander shall inform the Purser of expected turbulence and the necessity of using seat belts.During
turbulence,in addition,a crew must make an appropriate PA announcement requiring the passengers to fasten their
seat belts.
Unless otherwise briefed by the Commander, the “seat belt” sign does not indicate a requirement for flight attendants
to be seated.
8.3.11.C PASSENGERS
As a general rule, passengers shall have their seat belts fastened each time the SEAT BELT sign is illuminated, and cabin
crew shall make frequent checks that they remain fastened.
The SEAT BELT sign is to be selected “ON” prior starting the engines until passing FL 100 / 10000 ft in a climb, and from
TOD in descent until engines have been shut down.
When in cruise and no turbulence encountered, the SEAT BELT signs may be switched “OFF”. However, announcement
shall be made advising passengers that, although the seat belt sign has been switched off, they shall keep their seat
belts fastened whenever they are in their seats. When turbulence is anticipated or encountered. the crew must make
an appropriate PA announcement requiring the passengers to fasten their seat belts.
When a passenger is seen to unfasten his seat belt or attempts to leave his seat, the passenger shall be asked to remain
seated and strapped in. As a matter of a policy, if a passenger insists on moving, he shall not be prevented, but shall
be warned by cabin crew to take particular care and that he is moving about the cabin at his own risk.
8.3.11.D PROCEDURE IN CASE OF TURBULENCE
When turbulence conditions are likely to be encountered, the Commander shall endeavour to give early warning by
switching the “seat belts” sign “ON”. Flight Crew will do PA announce in case of strong/severe turbulence „CABIN
CREW TAKE YOUR SEART“.
Appropriate announcement is then made as well by the cabin crew.
In order to distinguish the switching of the “seat belts” sign “ON” for turbulence conditions from the “seat belts” sign
“ON” as a beginning of descent, in case of turbulence the signs will be switched “ON-OFF-ON” (two audio signals are
heard in the cabin).
The SCCM will then report to the flight deck to receive information about the severity and duration of the turbulence
condition, and to report that all passengers have conformed to the Commander’s instructions on fastening of seat
belts.
The Commander must instruct the SCCM at that time whether catering and bar service may continue or whether cabin
staff must fasten their own belts.
4 COMM HEADSET Location of the communication headset and instruction how to use it.
5 EMERGENCY EXIT Location of exits and evacuation paths.
EMERGENCY
6 Standard procedure before, during and after evacuation.
EVACUATION
7 LIFE VEST Location of the life vest and instruction how to use it.
SUPPLEMENTAL
8 Location of the oxygen mask and instruction how to use it.
OXYGEN
Location of the fire extinguisher instruction how to use it.
9 FIRE EXTINGUISHER NOTE: Briefing shall be given on standard task sharing in cockpit in
order to prevent confusion in case of fire.
Sterile flight deck concept shall be explained.
10 TALKING NOTE: Exception would be to bring a safety flight situation to the crew
attention if not spotted by them.
Cockpit door operation and security procedures for opening/closing cockpit
11 COCKPIT SECURITY
door.
8.3.12.3 NO CONTACT PERIOD
Difference between Sterile Cockpit and No Contact Period
Sterile cockpit applies during pushback/towing, during engine start, at any time an engine is running on
the ground, in flight below FL100 or MSA whichever is the higher, whilst flying in a holding pattern,
whenever the seat belt signs are illuminated and at any time during abnormal and emergency operations.
During a sterile cockpit, pilots will only engage in activities that are operationally necessary and
communications with the cabin crew will be restricted to matters directly relating to the operation of the
aircraft. Extraneous conversation between the pilots and activity that is not related to the operation of the
aircraft is prohibited. No paperwork shall be filled other than OFP essential entries, such as clearances,
changes to cleared altitudes or flight levels, fuel monitoring and noting of essential weather information.
Procedures defining sterile cocpit concept;
The phases of flight for which sterile cockpit concept refers to are:
• taxi-out (after cabin report) – unless the aircraft is not moving
• take-off
• following take-off until aircraft ascends to 10.000 ft.
• below 10.000 ft. on descent after cabin report or call from PM „cabin crew, 10000 ft“
• approach and landing
• taxi-in - unless the aircraft is not moving
No-Contact Period
During No-Contact Period, there shall be no communications attempts from Cabin Crew to Flight Crew. No-
Contact periods are:
• on Take-off: From the information from the Flight Crew via PA: „CABIN CREW , PREPARE FOR
DEPARTURE” (“Fasten Seat Belt” sign OFF-ON as an alternative method) meaning the start of take-off roll
(engine noise, acceleration) until the landing gear is retracted, and
• on Landing: From the information from ;
the extension of the landing gear prior to landing (increased cabin noise) or from call from the Flight Crew
via PA:“CABIN CREW,PREPARE FOR LANDING“,wichever first happened,until the completion of the landing
roll (vacating the runway). IMPORTANT: No exceptions to this
communication rule.
The occupancy of a vacant crew seat on the flight deck is stipulated in OM-A-8.3.12.
Usage of crew seat in the cabin by a person who is not member of the operating flight or cabin crew is
permitted provided:
• the person is not wearing complete ETF uniform in order not to be confused by the passengers with the
operating crew members
• the person is not occupying the seat which is assigned to the minimum cabin crew member
• the person will not impede operating cabin crew members in their duties
• any applicable limitation is observed (SCPs –Special Category Passengers)
The vacant crew seats may also be used by members from wet lease partner airlines ensuring
following:
• such crew member is considered as observer (OBS) and will not perform any safety related operational duties,
• For mass and balance calculation, mass of the passenger occupying vacant crew shall be calculated in accordance
with 0
8.3.14 INCAPACITATION OF CREW MEMBERS
Medical examinations ensure that crew members are physically and mentally able to do their job. From
experience however, we learn that incapacitation of crew members (either flight or cabin crew) is not an
uncommon cause of incidents and can occur in all age groups and all phases of flight. Since incapacitation
may be either obvious or subtle, the most important preventive measure is to maintain a high standard of
ALERTNESS. Routine adherence to standard operating procedures and cockpit and cabin discipline is
stressed because a procedural deviation might provide the first indication of arising problems. A good
means of detection is to follow the TWO COMMUNICATION RULE, i.e. any time a crew member does not
respond appropriately to two verbal communications, or any time a crew member does not respond to any
verbal communication associated with a significant deviation from the intended flight path or cabin
procedure, incapacitation must be suspected. Some other symptoms of the beginning of an incapacitation
are: incoherent speech, strange behavior, irregular breathing, pale fixed facial expression or jerky motions
that are either delayed or too rapid.
In case of any flight crew member incapacitation during approach, Missed approach shall be executed.
In case of Incapacitation of cabin crew members a report shall be submitted to CCAA after completion of
the flight.(ASR)
8.3.14.A TYPES OF INCAPACITATION
Obvious incapacitation‚ means total functional failure and loss of capabilities. It will generally be easily
detectable and of prolonged occurrence. Among the possible causes are heart disorders, severe brain
disorders, severe internal bleeding, etc.
Subtle incapacitation‚ is considered a more significant operational hazard, because it is difficult to detect
and the effects can range from partial loss of function to complete unconsciousness. Among the possible
causes might be minor brain seizures, hypoglycemia (low blood sugar), other various medical disorders or
preoccupation with personal problems. Because a crew member may not be aware of or capable of
rationally evaluating his situation, this type of incapacitation is the more dangerous one.
8.3.14.B ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF CREW MEMBER INCAPACITATION
For details see <ETF OM-B Ch.3 – Crew Incapacitation> and applicable chapters of the FCOM.
8.3.14.B.1. FLIGHT CREW INCAPACITATION
Flight crew tasks:
Whenever incapacitation must be suspected or is obvious the following steps shall be taken:
1. Assure a safe condition of flight:
• Take over controls (flight crew) or cabin crew duty (cabin crew).
• Engage the auto pilot.
• Check that all important switches are in proper position
• Declare an emergency.
• Remove the incapacitated flight/cabin crew member from his seat whenever possible to prevent
obstruction of flight controls and/or switches. Depending on the circumstances and the aeroplane type,
the help of persons other than flight crew members (e. g. Cabin Attendants and/or passengers) may be
required.
• Move the incapacitated flight/cabin crew member to a place where first aid will be given, possibly out of
sight of (most) passengers.
2. Take care of the incapacitated crew member:
3. Try to administer first aid.
4. Arrange a landing as soon as possible after consideration of all relevant factors. Request medical assistance after
landing, giving as many details as possible about the condition of the crew member.
5. Prepare the cockpit for landing:
• Do not press for a hasty approach.
• Perform the approach check earlier than normal.
• Request radar vectoring whenever possible.
• Fly the aeroplane from your respective position, do not change seats.
6. Organize your work after landing:
• Get the incapacitated crew member off-loaded and to an ambulance as quickly as possible.
• Arrange parking of the aircraft.
It is mandatory requirement that cabin crew members must know how to immobilize and secure a cockpit
crew member shall they totally incapacitated at the flying controls.
Cabin crew tasks:
PROCEDURE FOR PILOT INCAPACITATION
In case of cockpit crew member incapacitation, the remainning crew member shall as soon as
practicable call the SCCM by PA: „Attention purser to the cockpit“ or 3 calls
SCCM Proceeed to the cockpit
SEAT Move the seat completely AFT away from the controls (before taking this action
on the capt seat, the observer's seat shall be removed for its towage)
SEAT BACK Recline
LAP BELT / SHALLER Fasten – if not already fastened
HARNESS
THE COCKPIT CREW WILL ALWAYS HAVE THEIR SEAT BELTS FASTEN IN FLIGHT
SHALLER HARNESS TIGHTEN AND MANUALLY LOCK
ARMREST LIFT
FEET TAKE THE PILOTS FEET OF THE RUDDER PEDALS
ARMS CROSS HS ARMS IN A FIGURE OF EIGHT AND SECURE BEHIND THE SHALLER
HARNESS
FIRST AID MEASURES ADMINISTER FIRST AID IF NECESSARY; SUPPLY WITH OXYGEN IF REQUIRED
THE REMAINING PILOT SHALL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THE INCAPACITATED PILOT SHALL BE
REMOVED FROM HIS SEAT
INCAPACITATED REMOVE IF POSSIBLE (RAUTEK GRIP)
PILOT
ALL FURTHER STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IN CO-ORDINATION WITH REMAINING PILOT
CCM IF ASKED, REMAINS IN COCKPIT TO TAKE CARE AND OBSERVE THE
INCAPACITATED PILOT
MEDICAL REQUEST
ASSISTANCE
CHECK IF QUALIFIED COMPANY PILOT IS ON BOARD TO REPLACE TH INCAPACITATED PILOT
CCM COULD BE REQUIRED TO READ THE LANDING CHECK LISTS AND SHALL TAKE FIRST OBSERVER'S
SEAT. AFTER THE PILOT REQUEST THE ITEMS SHALL BE REALY CLEARLY. MOVE ON TO THE NEXT ITEM OF
THE CHECK LIST ONLY AFTER RESPONSE TO THE PREVIOUS ONE HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. AFTER A
RESPONSE TO THE LAST CHECK LIST ITEM, THE CABIN CREW MEMBER SHALL SAY „CHECK LIST
COMPLETE“
THE PILOT WILL EXPLAIN ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE HE MAY REQUIRE
In case another pilot is assisting/augmenting the "standard minimum crew" and holds a current license
with type rating and the privileges to act as pilot-in-command, that pilot will take over the command in
case of an incapacitation of the designated commander after having been informed by the second pilot
and having acknowledged the overall situation and this until the normal chain of command can be re-
established
8.3.14.B.2. SCCM INCAPACITATION
‘Incapacitation’ means a sudden degradation of medical fitness that occurs during flight duty period either
in-flight or during a flight transit of the same flight duty period away from operator’s base and that
precludes the senior cabin crew member or cabin crew member from performing his/her duties.
Incapacitation prior to dispatch of the aircraft from ETF base does not substantiate a reduction of the cabin
crew complement below the minimum required.
If, in unforeseen circumstances, the number of cabin crew members is reduced below the applicable
minimum required number, for example in the event of incapacitation or unavailability of cabin crew, the
procedures established for this purpose in the operations manual shall take into consideration at least the
following:
• reduction of passenger numbers;
• reseating of passengers with due regard to doors/exits and other applicable limitations; and
• relocation of cabin crew taking into account the factors specified in AMC1 ORO.CC.100 and any change of
procedures.
In some instances, for example in the event of incapacitation or other unforeseen circumstances, the crew
might have to face the problem concerning the unavailability of the SCCM. In such a situation, a
Commander may temporarily promote the crew member 2 (only) into the SCCM under the following
conditions:
• the condition is only allowed for the completion of the assigned duty, but the flight shall not leave the home
base or a station where a SCCM can be added
• a thorough review of all relevant safety/emergency provisions shall be held during the crew Briefing
Replacement of incapacitated or unavailable senior cabin crew member by another senior cabin crew
member
To ensure that another senior cabin crew member is assigned without undue delay, ETF shall take
appropriate measures. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
• to ensure that a flight or series of flights do not depart from an aerodrome where a senior cabin crew member is
available or can be made available, ETF may:
o appoint a senior cabin crew member originally assigned to another flight and who is available at the
concerned base or stopover (layover) point if the reporting time for that flight provides sufficient time to
find a replacement or
o assign a senior cabin crew member who is on standby to operate the flight or to position to the
destination where the nominated senior cabin crew member has become incapacitated or unavailable to
operate;
• ETF shall utilise another senior cabin crew member if he/she is among the operating crew on the same flight:
• In case of unavailable senior crew member, the operator shall use the available time and resources to replace
him/her at the stopover (layover) point with another senior cabin crew member
• ETF shall consider including the identification of the most appropriately qualified cabin crew member in pre-
flight briefings
Take care of LIFE - THREATENING situations first, THEN SEEK HELP. If several people are available, one can
go for help while others help you to give first aid. Do not leave a person who requires urgent care to get
help. In some cases, one does not have to hurry. Medical attention may be required, but not urgently. Your
role will therefore be to prevent further injury, seek medical help and keep the victim calm.
Sudden illness or accidents often occur when last expected. Remember therefore:
• TO KEEP CALM
• CONSIDER THE CASE
• USE COMMON SENSE
• GIVE THE CORRECT FIRST AID
• KEEP OTHER PASSENGERS AWAY
8.3.14.C.2. CABIN CREW ACTIONS
Cabin Crew shall follow instructions as set out in Cabin Crew Operation Manual (CSPM Ch. 2.4.6 / Ch. 4.2.9.A / Ch.6 /
Ch. 6.4).
8.3.14.C.3. FLIGHT DECK CREW ACTIONS
FIRST ACTIONS
Upon first notification of the medical situation, the flight deck crew shall:
• Note the time and the information passed from the Cabin Crew on the OFP;
• Assess the current situation against the guidelines in the list of medical emergencies below and if the warranted,
plan a diversion to a suitable aerodrome;
• Direct the CA1 to assign a Cabin Crew Member to act as a liaison between the involved cabin crew and the flight
deck crew.
CONTINUING ACTIONS
As the situation develops, flight deck crew shall:
• Continuously assess the situation against the guidelines below and if the warranted, plan a diversion to a suitable
aerodrome;
• Determine, with the Cabin Crew, whether medical assistance is required at destination;
• Record all updated information on the OFP.
LANDING PREPARATIONS
If an unscheduled landing or medical assistance at destination is required, liaise with Cabin Crew to
determine:
• Patient information (sex, age, any known medical history, symptoms);
• If professional medical assistance has been given;
• The current status of the patient;
• Any treatment given so far;
• The location of the patient on the aeroplane and the exits to be used to disembark the patient;
• Whether the patient is ambulatory or if a stretcher or other assistance to disembark will be required.
APPROACHING THE AERODROME
• If an emergency ambulance is required to meet the aircraft on the ground, this will be provided by the local
ambulance service. This is arranged by transmission of an “Medical Emergency” call on contact with ATC.(flight
crew shall inform ATC about sick passeneger status,seat number and location regarding to aicraft entry door)
• -commander shall receive personal details about the sick passengers (from ID/passport and flight seat number)
• On leaving the aircraft, the sick passenger becomes the responsibility of the airport medical staff or reaching
ambulance service and then the receiving hospital as necessary.
Only medical staff can diagnose illness.
8.3.15 CABIN SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
8.3.15.A CABIN PREPARATION
Before the flight, a briefing shall be conducted by the CMDR. During the pre-flight briefing, the CMDR has
the opportunity and authority to discuss procedures, preferably emergency procedures that have to be
performed in time critical situations. The CMDR informs Crew of particulars (duration of the flight,
meteorological conditions, etc.) and events pertinent to the operation of the flight.
The CMDR shall also inform his crew of any useful information such as deficiency of cabin/safety
equipment, special passengers/load, special procedures e.g. de-icing.
The Senior cabin crewmember (SCCM) is responsible to the CMDR for cabin safety from the time the
aircraft is accepted for flight, until all the passengers have been offloaded at the end of the flight. The SCCM
must also ensure, and report to the CMDR that relevant emergency equipment is on board, operative, and
properly located.
Unless the weight and balance for the flight and passenger category will be such that the random occupation
of seats is permissible, passengers will be shown or conducted to their allocated seats.
After arming procedure is completed and prior aircraft movement, SCCM shall advise CMDR that all slides
are armed, passengers are seated and cabin is ready by entering the flight deck and reporting to the CMDR
“Slides armed, passengers seated, cabin ready”. SCCM shall close the flight deck door on leaving the
cockpit.
Before take-off and landing the cabin preparation must be completed as follows:
(a) doors closed and slides armed
(b) passenger announcements carried out
(c) demonstration carried out
(d) all passengers are seated with their seatbelts fastened
(e) passengers seated in exit rows meet the exit row criteria
(f) passengers are present at OW emergency exits and briefed
(g) all seatbacks and tables are in upright position
(h) window shades open
(i) infants secured with loop belt seated in their parent’s lap
(j) pets placed in their special container on the floor
(k) smoking rules observed
(l) hard loose objects and bulky electronic devices securely stowed
(m) overhead bins closed and the emergency equipment therein is freely accessible
(n) baby cradles stowed away and secured
(o) all service articles stowed away and galleys, containers and trolleys secured with brakes,
(p) curtains pulled aside and secured
(q) lavatories doors closed and locked
(r) all exits and aisles clear
(s) all electronic devices in “flight mode”
(t) lights in dim position during darkness
After cabin has been secured for take-off / landing SCCM shall call the flight deck and report to the CMDR:
“CABIN SECURED”.
The CMDR assumes that all other cabin crew are seated at their stations at the time when a cabin report is
received and that it takes about 30 seconds for the SCCM to be seated and secured at hers/his station. If the
above is not the case at the time when cabin report is given, the deviations and appropriate action taken (a
timescale of how long is needed to complete cabin preparation) shall be mentioned in the cabin report.
When turbulence conditions are likely to be encountered, the CMDR shall endeavour to give early warning
by switching the “seat belts” sign “ON”. The crew will make a PA announcement to the passengers
instructing them to return to their seats and fasten their seatbelts. CMDR shall inform SCCM after switching
the “seat belts” sign ON about any forecast and further possible cabin service.
In case of severe turbulence CMDR will announce over PA: “Cabin crew take your seats” and all CCMs
shall seat down immediately and fasten the seat belt.
TURBULENCE
INTENSITY FSB PA ACTION
COKCPIT / - turbulence PA
LIGHT ON CABIN - cabin check
CREW - service may be continued
- turbulence PA
COCKPIT /
- cabin check
MODERATE ON CABIN
- SCCM to establish communication with cockpit
CREW
- service may be continued at SCCM’s discretion
- cockpit to make PA “Cabin crew take your seats”
COCKPIT / - take assigned or nearest available seat
- turbulence PA to passengers
SEVERE ON CABIN - cockpit to make PA “Cabin crew resume your duties” when severe turbulence is over
CREW - cabin check
- establish communication with cockpit
In order to distinguish the switching of the “seat belts” sign “ON” for turbulence conditions from the “seat
belts” sign “ON” as a beginning of descent, in case of turbulence the signs will be switched “ON-OFF-ON”
(FSB cycle - two audio signals are heard in the cabin).
The SCCM will then report to the flight deck to receive information about the severity and duration of the
turbulence condition, and to report that all passengers have conformed to the CMDR’s instructions on
fastening of seat belts. The CMDR must instruct the SCCM at that time whether service may continue or
whether cabin staff must fasten their own belts.
Just as the Flight Crew is usually in a position to know and inform the Cabin Crew of impending turbulence,
very often it is the Cabin Crew that has first-hand knowledge of the situation in the back and can inform
the Flight Crew to switch the ‘’seat belt’’ sign ON. Many pilots are not aware of the degree of turbulence
that is felt in the aft section of their aircraft. In some cases, SCCM may have to make an immediate
decision to secure the cabin without being told to by the Flight Crew.
When the level of turbulence so requires, and in the absence of any instructions from the flight crew, the
SCCM is entitled to discontinue non-safety related duties and advise the flight crew of the level of
turbulence being experienced and the need for the fasten seat belt signs to be switched on.
This shall be followed by the cabin crew securing the passenger cabin and other relevant areas.
As long as the “seat belts” signs are illuminated, cabin crew shall make frequent checks that passenger’s
seat belts remain fastened and that baggage is well stowed not to cause injury by moving. When a
passenger is seen to unfasten his seat belt or attempts to leave his seat, the passenger shall be asked to
remain seated and strapped in. As a matter of a policy, if a passenger insists on moving, he shall not be
prevented, but shall be warned by cabin crew to take particular care and that he is moving about the cabin
at his own risk.
8.3.15.B PASSENGERS SEATING POLICY - EXIT ROW
Exit row – only the row of seats from which passengers may go directly to an exit without entering an aisle.
Seats are not considered part of an exit row if the exit is behind the passenger seat or the exit is located on
the other side of a closet, galley or partition.
The exit row seating regulation requires that only persons who are able to operate an emergency exit and are
able to take the additional actions needed to ensure safe use of that exit are seated in an exit row seat.
If for some reasons such seats are assigned to these specific passenger categories, it is the duty of the cabin
crew to reseat them. The seating policy shall be explained to the passenger who is being re-seated. If a
passenger refuses to move to an unrestricted seat cabin crew member will advise the CMDR via SCCM
The exit row must be clear of any obstacles (no baggage, no clothes, no newspapers). Passenger may hold a
hand-held PED during take-off and landing and turbulence. PED that are not considered hand-held (i.e.
laptops etc.) must be stowed in the overhead compartment for take-off, landing and turbulence.
The objective of the exit row regulation is to maximise the fastest possible safe opening of emergency exits
followed by the fastest possible movement of passengers through those exits and toward safety.
During boarding, cabin crew will visually check if passengers with exit row seats meet the exit row criteria
and will make sure baggage and other personal belongings are properly stowed. Any passenger not meeting
the exit row criteria must be re-seated before closing of the aircraft’s doors. Explain the seating policy to the
passenger being re-seated. If he/she refuses to move to an unrestricted seat, advise the CMDR.
Passenger shall occupy a seat at least on each side in a seat row with direct access to an emergency exit
during taxiing, take-off and landing unless this would be impracticable due to a low number of passengers or
might negatively impact the mass and balance, etc.
Before landing, cabin crew must visually check exit rows. The same requirements as during boarding must
be met. If necessary, re-seat the passengers who may have moved into an exit seat during the flight.
Embarkation
Once cabin is ready for boarding SCCM shall report to the CMDR “CABIN READY FOR BOARDING”.
Ground personnel will start embarkation only after having received “cabin ready for boarding” message by
the SCCM or the CMDR. The time of boarding shall be coordinated between CMDR and SCCM.
Before boarding, flight crew shall set parking brakes ON. Smoking is not permitted.
A minimum of one flight crew member must be on the flight deck of any ETF Airways aircraft from the
time the first passenger has boarded until the last passenger has left (except during an emergency evacuation
procedure).
All relevant safety aspects must be completed by the ground personnel before boarding. Ground personnel
will ensure and supervise that passengers are going around restricted wing area while boarding (when no
jetway is used). Ground personnel and cabin crew must prevent congestion in exit areas.
Cabin crew will monitor passenger’s baggage during the boarding process and if items are too large to be
safely stowed in aircraft’s cabin advise ramp agent to put the baggage in the cargo hold. A solution shall be
found between the SCCM and the CMDR when stowage locations are full.
If the right-hand side engine is running, passengers will be supervised by ground personnel to enter the
aircraft on the side of aircraft opposite of the running engine (all doors on the side of the running engine
must be closed anyway).
An aircraft must have electrical power for passenger boarding to commence. In the event there is no aircraft
power, a flight crewmember must assure that the power is restored. If a power cannot be restored in a
reasonable amount of time, passengers must be deplaned.
Disembarkation
Cabin crew will start disembarkation only after having received ready message by the ground personnel
(verbally or non-verbally by i.e. thumbs-up gesture). “Ready” means that passenger stairs or jetway is safely
in position, that loading and servicing equipment are positioned so as not to endanger passengers, that the
ramp surface is checked for and clear of any hazard and that the transportation to the airport’s terminal
building is ready (where appropriate).
After landing in preparation for disembarkation, passengers are briefed by the cabin crew to remain seated
until the “seat belts” signs have been switched OFF, about the safety measures while opening overhead bins,
no smoking and which exits to use. Smoking is not permitted.
Cabin crew and ground personnel must prevent congestion in exit areas.
If the right-hand side engine is running, passengers are supervised by cabin crew and ground personnel to
leave the aircraft on the side opposite of the running engine (all doors on the side of the running engine must
be closed anyway).
During transit stops with some passengers remaining on board a passenger entry door must be open at all
times and the minimum number of cabin crew for the flight must be on the aircraft. Smoking is not
permitted and cabin crew and passengers are not to be allowed to wait on the ramp for continuation of the
flight.
8.3.15.D REFUELING AND DEFUELING WITH PASSENGERS EMBARKING, DISEMBARKING OR ON BOARD
Rigid enforcement of the “No smoking” rule is necessary. The procedure is already described in chapter
OM-A Ch.8.2.1.B – Refuelling and defueling with passengers embarking, disembarking or on board.
Passenger(s) who light a cigarette must be reminded that the flight has been designated as a no smoking one.
Passenger(s) who refuse to extinguish their cigarette or are suspected of smoking in the lavatory or
suspected of tampering with smoke detector in the lavatory are to be reported to the CMDR. The cabin crew
will not engage in personal confrontations with person refusing to comply with the no smoking regulation. If
a confrontation arises or escalates, the CMDR may take action at his/her discretion. The CMDR’s action
shall depend on severity of incident or confrontation and in the worst-case scenario could be requesting
police help upon landing (either at destination or enroute alternate) and pressing charges for endangering the
safety of the flight.
8.3.15.G HANDLING OF SUSPECTED INFECTIOUS DISEASES
If a member of the crew becomes aware or suspects that a person onboard is suffering from an infectious
disease, he/she must notify the CMDR.
The flight crew of an en-route aircraft shall, upon identifying a suspected case(s) of communicable disease,
or other public health risk, on board the aircraft, promptly notify the ATS (Air Traffic Service) unit with
which the pilot is communicating, with the information listed below:
a) aircraft identification;
b) departure aerodrome;
c) destination aerodrome;
d) estimated time of arrival;
e) number of persons on board;
f) number of suspected case(s) on board; and
g) nature of the public health risk, if known.
The ATS unit, upon receipt of information from a pilot regarding suspected case(s) of communicable
disease, or other public health risk, on board the aircraft, shall forward a message as soon as possible to the
ATS unit serving the destination/departure, unless procedures exist to notify the appropriate authority
designated by the State and the aircraft operator or its designated representative.
When a report of a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or other public health risk, on board an
aircraft is received by an ATS unit serving the destination/departure, from another ATS unit or from an
aircraft or an aircraft operator, the unit concerned shall forward a message as soon as possible to the public
health authority (PHA) or the appropriate authority designated by the State as well as the aircraft operator or
its designated representative, and the aerodrome authority.
8.3.15.H AIRCRAFT INTERIOR LIGHTING
Aircraft interior lighting shall reflect the time of day, weather and the service in the passenger cabin. Cabin
and entry areas shall never be in total darkness, except during night take-off and landing. Cabin, entry and
galley lights shall always be set to the same intensity. Cabin lighting has the priority which shall be
followed. The primary cabin illumination comes from ceiling lights, therefore, for passengers’ safety and
comfort, use window lights cautiously, especially during night flights. Generally, window lights shall be
turned OFF when ceiling lights are dimmed.
Cabin lights shall be switched ON only after arrival at the gate or parking position. Upon arrival at the gate
or parking position, cabin lights shall be switched to the bright setting to ensure safe passenger
disembarkation. If transit passengers are staying on board, cabin lights may be dimmed after the majority
of passengers have deplaned.
Cabin lights shall be at least in the DIM 1 position during cabin safety checks (turbulence, take-off, landing).
During in–flight emergencies (cabin preparation procedure, firefighting, decompression etc.) all cabin lights
shall be switched to maximum light intensity (BRT). Before landing, all cabin lights shall be adjusted.
During night take-off, lights shall be switched to OFF after giving the “Cabin secured” report to the CMDR,
and be switched to ON after gear-up. Lights for night landing shall be switched OFF after gear down and
switched to ON again when reaching parking position.
Must be set on the same intensity as all cabin lights. Entry lights shall be in bright position for passenger
embarkation and disembarkation. Ensure entry lights have been dimmed or switched OFF on all night flights
before entering the cockpit to prevent glare
8.3.15.H.3. READING LIGHTS
The master switch shall be ON at all times.
8.3.15.H.4. LAVATORY LIGHTS
The master switch shall be ON at all times.
8.3.15.I PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES (PED)
Current regulations prohibit the use of certain types of Portable Electronic Devices (PED) on board
commercial flights, due to potential interference with navigational and communications equipment.
Non-approved PEDs
On ETF Airways flights it is prohibited to use the following electronic devices:
1. T-PED (any PED capable of transmitting and receiving) without “Flight Mode” function
2. Commercial two-way transmitters (e.g., walkie-talkies; amateur radio transmitters; citizen band (CB)
transmitters; 49 - MHz transmitters, devices designed to radiate RF energy on a specific frequency.
3. Peripheral devices for computers or computer games.
Passengers seated in the emergency exit rows are advised not to wear noise cancelling headphones during
take-off and landing.
8.3.15.J PROCEDURES AND CHECKLIST SYSTEM
Procedures and checklist system for use of cabin crew must at least take into account the following items:
OPERATIONAL PHASE
DUTIES PRE IN- PRE POST
TAKEOFF FLIGHT LANDING LANDING
1. Briefing of cabin crew by the SCCM prior to
commencement of a flight or series of flights
●
2. Check of safety and emergency equipment in
accordance with emergency equipment checklist
●
3. Security checks: searching for concealed
weapon, explosives or other dangerous devices
● ●
4. Supervision of passenger embarkation and
disembarkation
● ●
OPERATIONAL PHASE
DUTIES PRE IN- PRE POST
TAKEOFF FLIGHT LANDING LANDING
5. Securing of passenger cabin (i.e. seatbelts, cabin
cargo/baggage)
● ●
6. Securing of galleys and stowage of equipment ● if required ●
7. Arming of door slides ●
8. Safety information to passengers ● ● ● ●
9. ’Cabin secured’ report to flight crew ● if required ●
10. Operation of cabin lights ● if required ● ●
11. Cabin crew at assigned crew stations for take-
off, landing and post-landing
● if required ● ●
12. Surveillance of passenger cabin ● ● ● ●
13. Prevention and detection of fire in the cabin
(including galleys and lavatories) and ● ● ● ●
instructions for actions to be taken
14. Actions to be taken when turbulence is
encountered
●
15. Actions to be taken in case of in-flight incidents
(e.g. medical emergency, pressurization failure ●
etc.)
16. Actions to be taken in the event of emergency
situations
● ● ● ●
17. Disarming of door/exit slides ●
18. Reporting of any deficiency and/or un-
serviceability of equipment and/or any incident
● ● ● ●
General duties
Duties of all members of the crew for the rapid evacuation of an aircraft and the handling of the passengers
in the event of a forced landing, ditching or other emergency.
F/O duties:
F/O leaves in the flow of passengers through 1L or 1R, assists the evacuation from the outside (at the bottom
of the slide) and directs passengers in the safe direction/distance away from the aircraft.
CMDR duties:
CMDR assists the evacuation from inside, stands in front of the cockpit door and directs passengers towards
1L and/or 1R. After all passengers and the rest of the crew have left, CMDR checks the cabin (seat rows and
toilets) as much as possible for passengers that still remained and need help (not visible from emergency
stations). Ideally, when cabin check is completed, CMDR has reached the back of the cabin, and leaves
through the exit 4L/4R. If the situation precludes from reaching the back of the cabin (fire/smoke), the cabin
check is done to as far possible and CMDR leaves through the nearest convenient/suitable exit.
The Flight Crew assumes command outside.
Because of their special duties and the rapidity of an evacuation, the cockpit crew may not be able to assist
in evacuation of passengers. In an accident, once the aircraft comes to a complete stop, the vital factor is
time. It is limited and uncontrollable. Generally, the evacuation on 50% of usable exits with maximum
passengers on board shall not last for more than 90 seconds. The most expeditious evacuation is achieved by
the crew knowing the basic procedures and equipment so thoroughly that not a second is lost. Crew must
never underestimate the seriousness of a situation.
EVACUATION PROCEDURE
EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT…..Take
Ditching only:
SLIDE ............…………………..Disengage slide from the aircraft
LANDING
SEAT BELTS OFF, LEAVE EVERYTHING, GET OUT
Evacuation command to PAX
OTKOPČAJ POJAS, OSTAVI SVE, IZLAZI
JUMP AND SLIDE, RUN AWAY
Command to PAX at slides
SKOČI, SKLIZNI, BJEŽI
STEP THROUGH, GET OUT, RUN AWAY
Command to PAX at overwing exits
PREKORAČI, IZLAZI, BJEŽI
DITCHING
SEAT BELTS OFF, PUT ON YOUR LIFEVEST,
Unprepared ditching LEAVE EVERYTHING, GET OUT
Evacuation command to PAX OTKOPČAJ POJAS, NAVUCI PRSLUK, OSTAVI SVE,
IZLAZI
“SEAT BELTS OFF, LEAVE EVERYTHING, GET
Prepared ditching
OUT
Evacuation command to PAX
OTKOPČAJ POJAS, OSTAVI SVE, IZLAZI
OPEN THAT EXIT
Initiate opening of overwing exits
OTVORI TAJ IZLAZ
INFLATE LIFE VEST, GET OUT
Command to PAX at doors
NAPUŠI PRSLUK, IZLAZI
STEP THROUGH, INFLATE LIFE VEST, REMAIN
Command to PAX at overwing exits ON THE WING
PREKORAČI, NAPUŠI PRSLUK, OSTANI NA KRILU
AT EXITS
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Procedure:
• notify cockpit immediately
• use PA to stop an unauthorised evacuation (if necessary)
“Stay back, stand back!”
“Return to your seats!”
• move into cabin area and assertively take command
• use commands to establish control and reduce panic and confusion
“Remain seated!”
“Stay calm!”
1. • if passengers manage to evacuate the aircraft, notify CMDR immediately
8.3.15.K.5. EMERGENCY LANDING / DITCHING
Emergency landing / ditching may occur in two forms:
1. Prepared -those where there is warning to CCM from cockpit crew and certain period of time to
prepare cabin, PAX and crew according to the Cabin Preparation Procedure for emergency landing /
ditching and possible evacuation.
2. Unprepared emergencies immediately after take-off or before landing with or without warning:
With warning:
On the CMDR's order ‘’BRACE FOR IMPACT’’ all CCM shall shout to the PAX: "Heads down, stay
down!" and take up their brace position.
8.3.15.K.6. RAPID DISEMBARKATION
There may be incidents after which passengers have to leave the aircraft immediately as a precaution (e.g.
obvious bomb alert, annoying smell / smoke in the cabin). Such a case shall be described as a controlled
disembarkation, even if slides are used in lack of passenger stairs (Jet Bridge). It shall be taken in
consideration to deploy only a minimum number of slides in order to continue the flight. The CMDR will
inform the passengers and crew about the individual situation and nominates the exits to be used.
The SCCM shall receive information from the CMDR and advise of any SCPs on board so that assistance
can be requested for disembarkation. SCCM shall then inform the cabin crew and passengers about manner
how to perform rapid disembarkation. The passengers have to be informed if hand luggage shall remain on
board.
If CMDR deems it needed to perform a rapid disembarkation he will command over PA:
There will be a short delay between the two announcements to allow CCM to proceed to their stations.
When CMDR orders rapid disembarkation the SCCM will make the following P.A. announcement:
“Attention, this is an important announcement. All passengers must immediately disembark via the nearest
boarding door in a prompt and orderly manner.
(If slides are used):
Leave all personal items behind and do not open the overhead compartments”.
"Use forward door" "Use forward and AFT door" "Come this way" “Leave carry-on baggage
behind”
8.3.15.K.8. EVACUATION
Proper crew co-ordination and communication are essential for efficient evacuation. The CCM in an
emergency situation is primarily responsible for the safety of the PAX. CCMs are assigned the responsibility
of informing the CMDR immediately and at any time if they believe the crew, PAX or A/C are in jeopardy.
SCCM is responsible for coordinating with the cockpit crew. All communications with the cockpit shall be
coordinated through SCCM. Crew communication is of the utmost importance to ensure the safety of both
the PAX and the crew.
The evacuation has to be considered as a most risky procedure and therefore shall be carried out only if
definitely necessary.
8.3.15.K.9. FIRE FIGHTING
For any In-flight fire, smoke or smell of burning, it is vital that the CMDR and other crewmembers are
informed as rapidly as possible.
The CMDR will require (need) the following information which will enable an assessment to be made and
action to be taken:
a) location of affected area
b) what is burning (source of fire)
c) how much smoke there is, its color and how it is affecting the passengers
d) what action is being taken by the cabin crew
e) CMDR must be informed as the situation develops. Crew co-ordination and two-way communication
is essential
Note: If there is smoke in front of the cockpit door -do not enter -use interphone.
FIRE FIGHTER
Fire or smoke……………………………Find fire source and call communicator
Fire source……………………………….Fight immediately
PBE…………………………………………..Put on if necessary
COMMUNICATOR
Cockpit and cabin crew…………….Inform accordingly
ASSISTANT
Additional fire extinguishers……..Provide as spare
SCCM
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ASSISTANT DUTIES
Oxygen bottles near fire source…………… Remove
Electric switches in danger area.............. Switch off
Circuit breakers in danger area…............ Pull
Passengers near fire source…………......... Send away
Hand luggage near fire source……………… Remove
Smoke hood / PBE……………………….......... Provide as spare
Air vents near fire source………………………Close
Clothes / extinguishing liquids……………… Have ready
Protective gloves, crash axe…………………. Have ready
Announcement if smoke in cabin…………. Cloth over mouth and nose
Fire extinguished………………….................. Monitor fire source
Attention: In case of lavatory fire keep the door closed until smoke hood / PBE has been put on.
Note: When finished with duties laid out in the Cabin Fire Procedure, Communicator becomes the Assistant
firefighter.
1. Upon the alert call: "PURSER TO THE COCKPIT!" the SCCM shall proceed to the cockpit
immediately. The CMDR shall inform the SCCM about the situation using the NITS briefing format:
N Nature of the situation
I Intentions of the CMDR
T Time available
S Special instructions
2. SCCM shall read-back all the information received from the CMDR to acknowledge NITS briefing.
3. The SCCM shall brief CCMs about the situation using NITS briefing received from the CMDR.
4. On the alert call “Purser to the cockpit” cabin crew shall:
a) interrupt their duties
b) stow away any catering equipment
c) return to their stations
d) await NITS briefing from the SCCM
5. SCCM shall conduct NITS briefing with cabin crew members in two ways: via interphone or in
person. Each cabin crew shall read-back the information received from the SCCM to acknowledge NITS
briefing.
The command to cabin crew and PAX to take the brace position is called:
and is given from the cockpit via PA system 30 seconds before touch down.
"Station" means the assigned CCM station. This announcement shall be made - as early as cockpit actions
permit - in all emergency cases following landing (after CPP as well), to initiate an alert and to inform the
cabin crew that an order to evacuate might follow in a short time. Due to cockpit activities, the time between
the standstill of the A/C and further orders can be relatively long. This fact shall however not cause a CCM
to act with haste.
After the A/C has come to a complete stop, CCM shall open their seat belts, stand up and prepare
measures for a possible evacuation, (check outside conditions, check if slide is armed, review door
handling, take suitable position at the assigned emergency exit).
If an evacuation is not considered necessary, the CMDR will announce this by the wording:
‘’CABIN CREW AND PASSENGERS REMAIN SEATED’’
and will explain the steps to be taken next ("We will return to the ramp, crew stand by at station").
If the evacuation is necessary, the command from the cockpit for an immediate evacuation reads:
“EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE”
This means to start an emergency evacuation (i.e., to open exits and deploy slides) and to request PAX to
leave the A/C without delay. The whole evacuation order including possible restrictions shall be repeated, at
least, once
EVACUATION REQUIRED
CMDR shall give command via PA: “EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE”
Cabin crew shall:
• Check outside conditions
• Evacuate through all available exits
• A fire inside or outside the aircraft that is uncontained and getting worse
• Dense smoke in the cabin that is threatening life
• Ditching
• Obvious destruction of the aircraft
When making the decision to initiate an evacuation, cabin crew must evaluate the level of danger and the
consequences that a delay in decision-making may lead to. Smoke or fire that is out of control would
definitely require a rapid decision because of the danger presented to the occupants of the aircraft. Leaving
the runway without any obvious damage to the aircraft does not justify an immediate evacuation. When a
crewmember’s life is directly and imminently in danger, the cabin crewmember’s personal safety shall
always take priority.
If cabin crew consider that an evacuation may be required, they must attempt to contact the flight crew in
order to inform them of the situation and await instructions. If contact with the flight crew is not possible,
cabin crew shall initiate the evacuation. Evacuation is initiated by order via PA or megaphone:
“EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE”
Each CCM shall:
• Check outside for fire or any other obstacle and general condition
• Open emergency exit
• Check that the slide inflates - pull manual inflation handle
• If not redirect passengers
• Start evacuation without delay
8.3.15.K.13. EMERGENCY DESCENT
When initiating Emergency Descent The Flight Crew shall announce via PA:
‘’EMERGENCY DESCENT’’
The Flight Crew shall notify Cabin Crew, when a safe flight level after decompression has been reached and
when oxygen is no more needed via PA:
“SAFE ALTITUDE”.
Note:
Depending on the situation, CMDR may conduct a NITS briefing to the SCCM who shall brief the cabin
crew. Following a decompression and depending on the severity of the situation, there is a possibility of an
emergency landing or precautionary landing.
N-Nature
I-Intentions
T-Time available
S-Special instructions
On ground
To permit the CCM to take their
respective stations in time before
the evacuation signal is given.
After emergency landing
To inform the CCM that the
flight deck crew are still
operational and responsible for
activation of the evacuation
signal.
The CCMs shall:
Go to their stations and wait for
next order. Stand by your exit,
check the outside area.
Memorize emergency
procedures. Note the behaviour
of the passengers.
COCKP CABIN Passenger Address (PA) System: The cockpit crew gives this
IT "BRACE FOR IMPACT" order no later than 1 min before
impact. CCM shall continuously
or in case of PA failure: order to PAX: “HEADS
repeatedly flashing DOWN, STAY DOWN!” and
"FASTEN SEAT BELT" sign SCCM shall turn ON the
emergency lights.
Landing
“SEATBELTS OFF, LEAVE
EVERYTHING, GET OUT!”
Ditching
“SEATBELTS OFF, PUT ON
YOUR LIFEVEST, LEAVE
EVERYTHING, GET OUT!”
CABIN COCKPIT Passenger Address (PA) System: Used by the cabin crew, if
& there is no signal or order from
CABIN "EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE" the cockpit, and if it is
unmistakably clear that the
aircraft must be evacuated. Try
to notify cockpit that you have
initiated evacuation.
COCKPIT CABIN Passenger Address (PA) System: CCM shall order to PAX:
DECOMPRESSION
LANDING
SEAT BELTS OFF, LEAVE EVERYTHING, GET OUT
Evacuation command to PAX
OTKOPČAJ POJAS, OSTAVI SVE, IZLAZI
JUMP AND SLIDE, RUN AWAY
Command to PAX at slides
SKOČI, SKLIZNI, BJEŽI
Cockpit announcements:
PRE-DEPARTURE – announcement given by Commander after receiving information from the SCCM that
passengers boarded the plane.
IN-FLIGHT – standard cockpit announcement given by PF emphasizing flight and weather details as well as
expected landing time.
TURBULENCE – announcement given by PF in case of encountered or expected turbulence during the flight
IRREGULARITIES – As soon as the doors are closed, it is the full responsibility of the
Commander to inform passengers about all substantial irregularities, such as departure or
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approach delay, technical trouble, diversion to alternate or any deviations from the intended
plan of operation, which are of interest to the passengers.
The Commander may delegate PA to the First Officer, especially when the First Officer is planned for
upgrading to Commander in the near future or has knowledge of a specific language.
Announcements shall be co-ordinated with the SCCM in order to avoid duplication of information.
Care must be taken not to disturb passengers with routine announcements during the night.
Mental and technical preparation for making a PA announcement is important. Good mental
preparation assures that the speaker clearly knows what he/she is going to say before actually starting
the announcement.
Technical preparation must assure that the flight positively maintains radio contact with ATC at all
times. Therefore, rather than being switched off, radio reception knobs and loudspeakers volume
controls shall be reduced to still audible levels. Since ATC transmissions are a part of a usual cockpit
environment, there is no harm if some of the transmissions occasionally come through the PA in the
background of the announcement.
It is preferable to make rather brief announcements, but to inform the passengers repeatedly. In order
to avoid monotony, announcements shall be varied as much as possible.
The following rules might be helpful:
- introduce yourself before the first announcement.
- stick to facts, use direct and simple expressions and well-known geographical names for position reports.
- do not use technical terms, which passengers might not understand.
- be cautious in using humour. Passengers might disagree on what is funny!
- avoid expressing opinions.
Expressions that could scare the passengers, such as "bad weather", "heavy turbulence", etc., shall
be avoided when forecasting weather conditions.
A delay shall not be mentioned repeatedly. After one announcement and one apology, further
information shall refer to "Remaining flight time" or "ETA" only.
The SCCM will automatically include an apology in the welcome speech if a flight is delayed substantially.
Suitable information shall, if possible, be transmitted before passengers start impatient inquiries, but not
before a sound explanation of the circumstances can be given.
In the event of a prolonged delay, the Commander shall inform the passengers through the SCCM of all
arrangements which concern them in such a way that absolutely no misunderstandings between the
CMDR, cabin crew and passengers can arise.
During extended ground stays in the event of irregularities, personal contact between the crew and
passengers may advantageously assist in handling the situation. It is of great importance that the
Commander and Station personnel are always informed of where the
Commander and Station personnel, other crewmembers and passengers can be contacted. Changes of
departure time shall be transmitted to these groups as soon as practicable by the Station personnel.
When a diversion becomes necessary, passengers shall be informed as soon as possible and be advised
that their onward transportation or accommodation will be arranged by ground personnel.
Pre-flight
LADIES AND GENTLEMAN, GOOD MORNING (AFTERNOON, EVENING).
THIS IS YOUR CAPTAIN SPEAKING. MY NAME IS ___________ AND I WOULD LIKE TO WELCOME YOU
ABOARD THIS( AC TYPE ) AIRCRAFT TO _______ ON BEHALH OF:
- ETF AIRWAYS
- ___ AIRLINES OPERATED BY ETF AIRWAYS
WE SHALL BE AIRBORNE SHORTLY. OUR FLYING TIME TODAY/TONIGHT IS _____________.
WE WILL GIVE YOU AN UPDATE ONCE WE ARE AT CRUISE ALTITUDE.
In-flight
“GOOD MORNING (AFTERNOON / EVENING) LADIES AND GENTLEMAN!
THIS IS YOUR (CAPTAIN / FIRST OFFICER) SPEAKING. MY NAME IS ...............(it can be skipped if the
announcement is given by captain since he/she has been introduced in PRE-FLIGHT announcement).
HERE ARE SOME INFORMATION ABOUT OUR FLIGHT.
WE ARE OVERFLYING ........ AT ALTITUDE OF ..........m AND WITH SPEED OF ......km/h.
THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE ON THIS ALTITUDE IS ........ °C.
ON OUR ROUTE TO ....... (dest.), WE SHALL OVERFLY ................. AND ............
WE ARE ESTIMATING TO LAND AT ........... (dest.) AT ..........h LOCAL TIME.
ACCORDING TO THE LATEST MET REPORT, THE WEATHER AT ........(dest.) AIRPORT WAS.......
I HOPE THAT YOU HAVE A PLEASANT FLIGHT.
THANK YOU FOR FLYING WITH ETF AIRWAYS (or ____ AIRLINES OPERATED BY ETF AIRWAYS) AND
GOODBYE.”
Turbulence
WE ARE APPROACHING/ENTERING/OVERFLYING AN AREA OF TURBULENT WEATHER, PLEASE FASTEN
YOUR SEAT BELTS.
It is of special importance that the Commander performs the passenger briefing personally. He shall
explain the situation in a calm and professional manner so as to encourage the passengers to have
confidence in the crew's ability to cope with the emergency. Only if conditions prevent the Commander
from informing the passengers himself, he may designate and brief another crewmember to perform this
duty.
The detailed briefing by the CCMs shall include instructions, as appropriate, depending on the
circumstances. For detailed emergency announcements performed by the Cabin Crew, refer to CSPM
CSPM Ch. 4.2.5.B / Ch. 4.2.5.B.2 / Ch. 4.2.5.B.5 / Ch. 4.5.1 / Ch.4.5.2 / Ch. 4.5.3 / Ch. 4.5.5 / Ch. 4.5.6.
8.3.17 PROCEDURES FOR COSMIC OR SOLAR RADIATION DETECTION
Cosmic or solar radiation detection equipment is only required if an aeroplane is operated above 15.000 m
(49.000 ft). ETF operations are limited to 39 000 ft so this requirement doesn’t apply.
In order to meet requirements for crew radioation assessment, the effective radiation dose is calculated
using data received from FAA CARI – 7 tool which is integrated with Leon system.
Hours at latitude
Altitude [ft] Kilometre equivalent Hours at equator
60° N
27000 8,23 630 1330
30000 9,14 440 980
33000 10,05 320 750
36000 10,97 250 600
39000 11,89 200 490
42000 12,8 160 420
Hours at latitude
Altitude [ft] Kilometre equivalent Hours at equator
60° N
45000 13,72 140 380
48000 14,63 120 350
Considering typical ETF’s flights, altitude of 33000 ft and latitude of 60°N are chosen as referral. In the
table above, 320 flight hours is estimated as exposure for effective dose of 1 millisievert (mSv). Considering
average flight time of ETF crews it is unlikely that overall yearly exposure will be significantly higher than 2
mSv.
However, based on industry standards (refer to UK Department of Transport: “Protection of air crew from
cosmic radiation: Guidance material”) ETF considered effective doses up to 4 mSv as acceptable for the
purpose of the operational planning.
Estimated dose is calculated for all ETF routes twice per year for the Sun positions in apogee (21.12. aprox)
and perigee (21.06. aprox). Average of these two values is used in daily calculations. If extreme solar
activity is announced additional calculation for all routes will be performed.
Sample of three routes per month is used for variation check and if difference is bigger than 10% compared
to average, all the routes are recalculated. Result of daily assessment will be taken in consideration for
planning further activities of flight crew member. Value of 2.0 mSv is used as awareness value and 3.0 mSv
as warning value. If crew member reaches 3.0 mSv further flight activities will be planned on routes with
lowest estimated dosage so that total exposure is kept up to maximum of 4 mSv. Special care shall be
taken in case of pregnant cabin crew member. In this case proactive approach to rostering will be activated
so that exposure dose of 1 milisievert (mSv) is not reached until the end of pregnancy.
For this purpose, simulation of exposure based on EPCARD results for the same routes will be used with
addition of safety margin of 10% for variations in solar activities over the year.
Crew members will be informed quarterly on estimated dose and data are available upon request at any
time. Appropriate awareness training will be given with other Aero-medical topics.
b) take some time to study the aerodrome layout. Very often some system can be identified for the
naming of taxiways;
c) remember to review the latest NOTAM for both the departure and arrival aerodrome for
information concerning construction or taxiway/runway closures. Visualize this information on the
charts;
d) standard taxi routes are used more often at busy aerodromes. Review the routes expected to be
used. If not cleared for the expected taxi route, take adequate time to become familiar with the
new routing even if it requires stopping to do so;
e) pay special attention to the location of hot spots. These are locations on the aerodrome movement
area where there is an increased risk of collisions. Know what runways will be encountered
between departure and final destination;
f) plan the timing and execution of checklists so that no distractions occur when approaching and/or
crossing runways, i.e. all eyes outside during this phase; and
g) conduct detailed briefings especially during night and low visibility operations, i.e. include “extra
eyes” where available.
8.3.19.B CLEARANCE
Any taxi instruction, no matter how short shall be written down, especially at complex or unfamiliar
aerodromes, and the instructions shall be cross-checked against the aerodrome chart. Any uncertainties
about clearance or position on the aerodrome shall be clarified before the start of taxi or after vacating the
runway. When unsure of taxi instructions, the pilot shall stop, request clarification from ATC and continue
taxiing only when the required taxi routing has been confirmed. In case of doubt, the pilot shall ask for
clarification.
Both flight crew members shall monitor the clearance for taxi, take-off and landing, and they must be kept
informed at all times when runway operations are in progress.
TAXI CLEARANCE SHALL BE READ BACK.
All read backs require a hear backs. In order to complete this “communication loop”, the read back must
be complete and clear. The full clearance, including the call sign and runway designator, must be read
back. “Roger” is not considered to be a read back.
When a clearance to taxi to a point beyond a runway is received, it must include the authorization to cross
that runway. A runway shall never be crossed unless an explicit ATC clearance has been received.
8.3.19.C COMMUNICATION
Both the pilot flying and the pilot not flying shall monitor the frequency and agree upon the acceptance of
a clearance to taxi, cross a runway, take-off or land on a runway. Any misunderstanding or disagreement
shall be resolved immediately by contacting ATC for clarification.
The pilot shall listen on the frequency at all times and try to visualize the other traffic in the vicinity. The
pilot shall know what runways will be encountered between the aeroplane’s current location and final
destination. Particular attention shall be paid to all clearances and instructions issued to traffic involving
those runways.
Extra attention is required when other aeroplane with similar call signs are on the frequency.
An instruction to follow other traffic does not automatically include clearance to enter or cross a runway.
Each aeroplane requires a specific clearance to enter or cross any runway. If in doubt, clarification shall be
sought.
If an aeroplane has been cleared to “line up and wait”, then only a short delay on the runway shall be
anticipated. If in this position for an extended period, the pilot shall so advise ATC and seek clarification.
The pilot shall state the position of the aeroplane on the aerodrome whenever making initial contact with
any ground or aerodrome controller, regardless of whether it was previously stated to a different
controller.
The audio box and volume adjustment shall be checked whenever a frequency change is made. All flight
crew shall be on the appropriate frequency until all runways have been vacated after landing.
THE “STERILE COCKPIT” RULE DURING THE TAXI PHASE SHALL BE IN FORCE.
- If comfortable with the time, a short welcome to passengers shall be done before start.
- No announcement is to be done as long as the aircraft is moving on ground except announcements at the
holding point (only in case of abnormally long delay).
All available surveillance means shall be used to check for traffic (left and right), e.g. all eyes to be used.
Check of TCAS specially during low visibility is mandatory.
When cleared to line up and/or when crossing any runway, the aeroplane shall be positioned at a right
angle to the runway where possible, in order to better observe other traffic, both arriving and departing.
Pilots shall not accept an ATC clearance that would require them to enter or cross a runway from an
obliquely angled taxiway.
If lined up on the runway and held more than 90 seconds beyond anticipated departure time, pilots shall
contact ATC and advise that they are holding on the runway.
A head-down situation during taxi shall be limited to the minimum amount of time possible. Before
undertaking head-down actions, the other pilot shall be so advised so that the navigating pilot can place
added emphasis on maintaining navigational accuracy and situational awareness.
Heading displays or compasses shall be used to confirm runway or taxiway alignment with the information
available from the charts. If available, the ILS centre line guidance system shall be used to confirm correct
runway alignment.
Scenario A Scenario B
Taxi fuel Taxi fuel
2. Trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to 2. trip fuel from the departure aerodrome to
the destination aerodrome, via the the destination alternate aerodrome, via the
predetermined point predetermined point
3. Contingency fuel 3. Contingency fuel
4. Additional fuel sufficient for 2 hours at 4. Additional fuel sufficient for 30 minutes at
normal cruise consumption above the holding speed at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the
destination aerodrome destination alternate aerodrome elevation in
5. Extra fuel if required by the commander standard conditions. This shall not be less than
final reserve fuel
5. Extra fuel if required by the commander
PDP is specified in the OFP as one of the waypoints. The route from PDP to the alternate aerodrome and its
breakdown together with the distances, flight levels, speeds, times and fuel figure is also specified in OFP. The route
from PDP to ALTN should be preferentially planned via published ATC routing system (not a direct to…).
OFP remark
PDP fuel requirements are described in OM-A chapter 8.1.7.M. The required additional fuel is shown as XXX in the
OFP. Isolated airport planning minima are described in OM-A chapter 8.1.5.A.3.
Minimum equipment
To fly on an isolated aerodrome the aircraft shall be equipped with at least 1 systems for long range communication
which means 1xHF. In addition, SELCAL with 1 HF channel must be working as well. The corresponding MEL item is as
follows:
- HF 23-11B
- SELCAL 23-06A/23-06B
The equipment must be functional from dispatch until reaching PDP. If the equipment stops working before reaching
PDP, flight should not continue to destination.
Communication
The most important points to know:
- Monitor 121,5 MHz
- Guard SELCAL on a suitable frequency to ensure quick Ground-to-Air or vice versa Transmission
OCC/NAV responsibilities
There will be one OCC dispatcher dedicated just for the provision of flight monitoring and managing. He shall
monitor the flight very carefully and check NOTAMs and WX forecast for the route, destination and alternate
aerodromes at least each half an hour. If any new relevant NOTAM appears and/or a WX is changed, OCC shall
inform the crew in a timely manner using ACARS. This procedure is an extra layer of safety helping crew in assessing
situation at PDP. If the flight crew does not receive ACARS message by PDP, they will get necessary information
before PDP (NOTAM change, airport status and weather) through VHF channel from ATC,VOLMET and or ATIS.
If the aircraft needs to divert to any unplanned airport, OCC dispatcher shall check the opening hours, ATS
availability, NAVAID, weather etc. and inform the crew if any problem is found. OCC shall recalculate the OFP two
hours after departure on actual weather conditions from the nearest reasonable WPT with respect to the actual
aircraft position and check the fuel figures. If there is a difference more than 500kg, OCC dispatcher shall inform the
crew (using ACARS) about new fuel figures to support their decision-making. Flight crew even if they don’t receive
new fuel figures from OCC will monitor fuel status and if there is difference of 500kg or more make a thorough
assessment to continue or divert before reaching PDP.
Procedures
FMS pre-flight set up:
- Enter FMS RES from OFP (fuel for 2 hrs of flight in cruising level)
- Enter wind forecast for every WPT in the planned FLs.
Minima:
Throughout the flight the crew shall check latest weather forecasts (incl. crosswind limits) and minima for the
destination and the relevant alternate aerodrome(s) either using reports from OCC or by any other means available
(e.g., asking ATC, using ACARS, etc.). The crew should proceed according to OM-A chapter 8.1.5.A.:
- Dispatch until reaching PDP = use planning minima (OM-A chapter 8.1.5.A.3);
- After PDP (both in direction to DEST and ALTN) = use standard OM-A 8.1.5.A considering pilot’s qualification and
NAVAID availability.
In-Flight Fuel Management
Crew shall carefully monitor fuel consumption during the whole flight as described in OM-A chapter 8.3.7. except of
the OM-A chapter 8.3.7.E. concerning the protection of Final Reserve Fuel (FRF) procedures where a difference for
flights to isolated aerodrome exists. The procedures for declaring MINIMUM FUEL and FUEL EMERGENCY during the
flight on an isolated aerodrome are described below. As stated before the additional fuel required by OM-A chapter
XXX (PDP planning) is shown as FRES on the OFP.
Picture 2: OFP sample
This value should be used as a trigger value for the decision making from take-off until reaching PDP. This high value
should assure that the crew is warned by an FMS message “USING RESERVED FUEL” as the last measure to warn that
there is a problem with fuel status for flight continuation behind PDP. After passing PDP crew should change FMS
reserve value in FMS according to the OFP (and the table XYZ below). Those are the conservative values for the 30
min. flight at 1500ft over the destination aerodrome (on ISA conditions, MZFW + corresponding fuel). The logic is to
avoid a situation when the crew in any time after passing PDP can accept the fact that it is consuming the reserve
fuel set on the high value and there will be no further automatic trigger of low fuel status in case of high workload in
the later stage of flight.
Picture 3: OFP sample
Declare MINIMUM FUEL (as per OM-A, chapter 8.3.7.E) when committed to land at a specific aerodrome and any
change in the existing clearance may result in a landing with less than the value specified in the table XYZ above (the
value is mentioned as FMS RES after PDP in OFP).
Declare a FUEL EMERGENCY (as per OM-A, chapter 8.3.7.E.) when the calculated fuel on landing at the nearest
suitable aerodrome, where a safe landing can be made, will be less the value specified in the table XYZ above (the
value is mentioned as FMS RES after PDP in OFP).
Flight Performance Progress Monitoring
Shortly before reaching PDP:
- Crew shall check weather conditions/minima (incl. crosswind limits) at the destination and availability of the
destination aerodrome/NAVAIDs.
- In the event of an unforeseen deterioration of meteorological conditions, reduction in NAVAID availability, RWY
condition, if RWY is in operation (airport not closed), airplane system failure* or any other event that increases
the risk of not achieving a safe landing, crew shall take the appropriate action and proceed to the nearest
aerodrome where a safe landing can be carried out.
- Crew shall make a fuel check considering any differences in flight plan against the reality e.g. different flown flight
level, wind, temperature, different routing etc. In case of any differences with negative impact on fuel
consumption, the crew should contact OCC to recalculate flight plan and fuel figures for the precise
determination of the minimum required fuel at PDP. If the recalculation is not possible and the CMD has doubts
about the sufficient fuel on board then the decision to divert shall be made at PDP.
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Note*. By airplane system failure is meant any failure of a communication system which will leave just 1 system
operational, any failure which is leading to QRH advice “land at nearest suitable aerodrome” and any other failure
which CMD consider as a significant risk for the safe completion of the flight. If time permits and CMD consider it
useful, crew should contact OCC/MCC via ACARS for consultation.
At PDP
(1) Crew shall perform a fuel check and verify that the minimum required fuel (see below) for the flight to
destination is still on board, which means a FOB (actual fuel on board) is equal or higher than the amount mentioned
in the OFP.
(2) Crew shall consider the diversion to the alternate aerodrome planned for this purpose in case of:
- An unforeseen deterioration of meteorological conditions;
- Any increase in fuel consumption;
- Any unforeseen operational restriction at the destination aerodrome, reduction in NAVAID availability, an
airplane system failure (as specified above) or any other event that increases the risk of not achieving a safe
landing;
- Reduction of the FMS reserve in FMS (according to the value in the table XYZ and as specified in the OFP ).
The minimum required fuel remaining at the PDP is at least the total of:
(1) trip fuel from the PDP to the destination aerodrome;
(2) contingency fuel from the PDP to the destination aerodrome; and
(3) additional fuel which means FMS reserve from the OFP.
During determination of the minimum required fuel, consider the actual situation like e.g.: actual winds (in
comparison with OFP) or actual flown flight level or expected flight level over destination in comparison with OFP. If
any of those figures do not fit, then it is necessary to consider it for determination of the min. req. fuel. As well there
is possibility to ask OCC for recalculation of the OFP for the most current conditions for some relevant enroute point.
Reasons for a decision at PDP not to continue to destination:
(1) Unusual fuel consumption, irregularities with the negative impact on the flight;
(2) Airplane system failure (LRCS, QRH, other CMD’s considerations);
(3) WX deterioration below the planning minima or unexpected significant negative trend
change;
(4) NAVAID availability reduced below minimum required or affecting safe operation;
(5) Significant new NOTAM affecting safe operation;
(6) Any other event that increases the risk of not achieving a safe landing.
After passing PDP:
- OCC still shall continue in monitoring WX and NOTAMs in half an hour intervals.
- The crew shall continue in the monitoring of WX (ATC, ACARS, HF) and fuel status.
Abnormal and Contingency Procedures
In the event of an unforeseen deterioration of meteorological conditions or/and increase in fuel consumption, OCC
shall recalculate the fuel figures based on the most current weather and provide them to the crew. The crew shall:
1. consider the tendency of weather
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5. consider declaring any fuel status defined by OM-A 8.3.7.E (based on the values given in the Table 1 or in the
OFP);
In the event of any unforeseen operational restriction at the destination aerodrome, reduction in NAVAID
availability, an airplane system failure or any other event that increases the risk of not achieving a safe landing, the
crew shall:
6. continue towards destination aerodrome;
7. consider if your fuel remaining on board is sufficient for a flight to any other closest airport;
8. inform OCC and ATC;
9. take the safest course of action based on the actual situation.
The procedures should not be interpreted in any way that would prejudice the final authority and responsibility of
the pilot-in-command for the safe operation of the airplane.
ETF Airways shall only conduct the following Low Visibility Operations (LVO) on the Boeing 737-800 aircraft when
approved by the CCAA:
• Low visibility take-off (LVTO) operation;
• Standard category II (CAT II) operation;
• Standard category IIIA (CAT IIIA) operation
8.4.1.B LVTO
A Low visibility take-off (LVTO) is a take-off with an RVR lower than 400 m but not less than 125 m.
8.4.1.B.1. LOW VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF (LVTO)
A Low Visibility Take-Off is a take-off on a runway where the RVR is less than 400m.
LVTO shall be performed by the CM 1.
For Low visibility Take Off non derated thrust shall be used.
8.4.1.B.2. SELECTION OF AERODROMES
When checking aerodrome requirements, always use and check all sources of information: Flight Deck Pro
manual, NOTAMs and, when applicable, the table - Effect of temporarily failed or downgraded ground
equipment on landing minima (available in OM A and QRH SUPPLEMENT).
Prior to commencing a low visibility take-off, the Commander shall satisfy himself that appropriate Low
Visibility Procedures (LVP) are in force according to information received from Air Traffic Services (either
through an ATIS broadcast or an Air Traffic Services Controller transmission)
There are a number of aerodromes which are not approved for Category II or III operations and at which
no Low Visibility Procedures have been established – but there may be instances when ETF Airways may
need to perform a Low Visibility Take-Off (LVTO) at such an aerodrome.
In such cases, ETF Airways shall make every reasonable effort to verify that Low Visibility Procedures are
substituted as follows:
• precautionary measures exist which ensure that only one aircraft at a time is allowed on the maneuvering area
and
• that vehicle traffic on the maneuvering area is controlled and restricted to the absolute minimum
*: The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot
assessment.
Note: Assessment of RVR by the commander is not allowed (measurement of all RVR values required) for:
• Cat C aeroplane if required RVR < 150m
• Cat D aeroplane if required RVR < 200m
**: Multi-engined aeroplanes that in the event of an engine failure at any point during take-off can either
stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the
required margins.
***: The required RVR value to be achieved for all relevant RVRs
TDZ: touchdown zone, equivalent to the initial part of the take-off run
MID: midpoint
Important notes:
• There is no formal requirement to check the consistency between actual and reported RVR by
counting centreline lights (which might be missing in case of take-off before displaced threshold). The
assessment can be done using any available means (edge lights, runway markings etc.);
• Required RVR value must be achieved for all of relevant RVR reporting points (relevant distance
covers both a discontinued take-off [RTO] and a continued take-off after engine failure – the relevant
distance is consequently the calculated ASDA.
8.4.1.C.3. TAKE-OFF ROLL
• Rolling take-off is not permitted in LVO conditions (RVR <400m);
• Use the centreline lights and/or markings for directional guidance. As speed increases, the streaming effect of
these improves and directional control becomes easier;
• In case of loss of visual reference during take-off roll at significant high speed, consider continued take-off (use
localizer guidance );
• In addition to an automatic change to Radar frequency which might be instructed, an R/T call “ETFxxx, airborne”
is requested in some countries (refer to Flight Deck Pro Manual).
• If airspeed > 50 KT when centerline changes to continuous red (300m from runway end): apply full
reverse until full stop.
8.4.2 OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
To obtain an LVO approval from the competent authority, ETF shall demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of this Subpart SPA.LVO.
• LANDING
RVR for that part of the runway used during the high speed phase of the landing run down to a speed of
approximately 60kts.
CONTROLLING RVR-APPROACH
The touchdown RVR is always controlling for any instrument approach. If reported and relevant, the
midpoint and stop-end RVR are also controlling.
If in an emergency the Commander finds it necessary to continue an approach below 1 000 ft above the
aerodrome without the required RVR he must file an ASR (Air Safety Report) detailing the circumstances
behind such a decision. Additionally, the Commander shall notify ATC that he is filing a report through the
internal reporting channels.
The pilots should have a clear understanding of the relationships between those points on the aircraft
which constitute the datum for glide-path and radio altimeter inputs, and the geometry of the aircraft
which dictates the Cockpit Cut-off Angle, thus determining the pilot’s visual segment.
Note: It is very important to know that a small displacement from the correct eye position will significantly
reduce the visual segment. For example, a displacement of only 1(one) cm below the correct eye position
will reduce the visual segment by 10m. Prior to the approach, care should be taken to adjust the seat
position to achieve the correct eye position.
-EFL- Check tech log if there are any HILs or open MEL items that affect aircraft Autoland capability
-That aircraft meets all requirements according the published MEL and AFM AUTOLAND requirements as
described in AFM/ AFDS / ILS APPROACH/ AUTOLAND FAIL PASSIVE.
Before commencing approach, flight crew will include LVO checklist as part of their approach briefing
where they will conduct final check that aircraft technical status meets AFM requirements.
After obtaining the initial approval, low visibility approach operations shall be continuously monitored by
ETF Airways in accordance with AMC3 SPA.LVO.105. Flight crew reports shall be used to ensure this
monitoring.
1) the total number of approaches, by aircraft type, where the airborne CAT II or III equipment was
utilised to make satisfactory, actual or practice, approaches to the applicable CAT II or III minima and
2) reports of unsatisfactory approaches and/or automatic landings, by aerodrome and aircraft
registration, in the following categories:
Unsuccessful actual/practice low visibility approach/autoland reports are analyzed by the Safety Pilot.
Unsuccessful approaches may be excluded from the analysis due to the following factors:
• ATS factors. Examples include situations in which a flight is vectored too close to the final approach fix/point for
adequate localiser and glide slope capture, lack of protection of ILS sensitive areas, or ATS requests the flight to
discontinue the approach
• Faulty navaid signals. Navaid (e.g. ILS localiser) irregularities, such as those caused by other aircraft taxiing,
overflying the navaid (antenna)
• Other factors. Any other specific factors that could affect the success of CAT II/ III operations that are clearly
discernible to the flight crew should be reported.
In case if more than 5% of the low visibility approaches/autolands is unsuccessful, the safety action group
will be immediately notified and an adapted response will be decided after consultation with the authority.
Following an unsuccessful autoland due to aircraft defect, no further autoland must be performed until
technical status of the aircraft has been clarified and documented (TLB) by the maintenance. Open an TLB
entry and describe the event and consequential behaviour of the system as precisely as possible.
Furthermore, unsuccessful approaches/autolands shall be reported on a dedicated form and by filling ASR.
The form is available in EFB suite and illustrated below.
8.4.9.B CREW ACTIONS IN CASE OF AUTOPILOT FAILURE AT OR BELOW DH IN FAIL PASSIVE CATIII OPS
For operations to actual RVR values less than 300 m, a missed approach procedure is assumed in the event
of an autopilot failure at or below DH. This means that a missed approach procedure is the normal action.
However, approach may be continued in accordance with visual references required for the approach. In
conclusion, it is not forbidden to continue the approach and complete the landing when the pilot-in-
command/commander determines that this is the safest course of action.
The crew should, at no stage below 1000ft AGL, hesitate or discuss whether a go-around is required or not.
Normally a go-around will be dual channel, however if the autopilot fails or an engine failure occurs a
manual, single channel go around will be required.
If a manual go-around is initiated below 400ft, crew should expect the aircraft to be trimmed nose up and
therefore take care not to over rotate.
8.5 ETOPS
8.6.1 GENERAL
Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is a document established by ETF on the basis of manufacturers Master MEL
(MMEL), customized as a function of ETF operational policies and requirements which are not less restrictive than
MMEL
It is approved by Croatian CAA.
The Configuration Deviation List (CDL) is a document approved at aeroplane’s certification and is included
in the Aeroplane Flight Manual.
ETF will amend the MEL after any applicable change to the MMEL within the acceptable timescales.
Subject to CCAA approval, ETF may use a procedure for the one time extension of category B, C and D
rectification intervals, provided that:
o the extension of the rectification interval is within the scope of the MMEL for the aircraft type;
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o the extension of the rectification interval is, as a maximum, of the same duration as the rectification interval
specified in the MEL;
o the rectification interval extension is not used as a normal means of conducting MEL item rectification and is
used only when events beyond the control of ETF Airways have precluded rectification
o a description of specific duties and responsibilities for controlling extensions is established by ETF
o CCAA is notified of any extension of the applicable rectification interval; and
o a plan to accomplish the rectification at the earliest opportunity is established.
ETF shall establish the operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MEL taking into account the
operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL. These procedures shall be part of the ETF
manuals or the MEL.
ETF shall amend the operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MEL after any applicable change to
the operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL.
Subject to a specific case-by-case CCAA approval, ETF may operate an aircraft with inoperative instruments, items of
equipment or functions outside the constraints of the MEL but within the constraints of the MMEL, provided that:
• the concerned instruments, items of equipment or functions are within the scope of the MMEL
• the approval is not used as a normal means of conducting operations outside the constraints of the approved
MEL and is used only when events beyond the control of the operator have precluded the MEL compliance;
• a description of specific duties and responsibilities for controlling the operation of the aircraft under such
approval is established by the operator; and
• a plan to rectify the inoperative instruments, items of equipment or functions or to return operating the aircraft
under the MEL constraints at the earliest opportunity is established.
These documents allow operations with certain items, systems, equipment, instruments or components
inoperative or missing at the commencement of a flight as it has been demonstrated that an acceptable
level of safety is maintained by appropriate operating limitations, by the transfer of the function to another
operating component(s) or by reference to other instruments or components providing the required
information.
Whilst operating within the limits of the MEL / CDL the aeroplane is deemed to be airworthy and capable
of operating within the specified environment.
The MEL does not list parts or systems which are obviously indispensable for the airworthiness (such as
control surfaces, engines, etc.) or not concerning flight safety (such as equipment for the various on--board
services, etc.). Nevertheless, if the lack of a component not listed in the MEL could adversely affect flight
safety, that component must be operative.
If an item, for which the inoperative condition is granted by the MEL, is deemed, in the view of the
Commander, to be indispensable because of particular actual conditions, this decision overrides the MEL.
On the contrary, the Commander is not allowed to accept more inoperative items than granted in the MEL.
Various levels of redundancy designed into aircraft, operation of every system or installed component may
not be necessary when the remaining operative equipment can provide an acceptable level of safety. The
intention of the MEL/CDL is to utilize this redundancy by approving operations with certain equipment
inoperative for a limited period of time, in order to improve aircraft utilization and thereby provide more
convenient and economic air transportation for the public.
All aircraft equipment, related to the airworthiness and the operating regulations, must be operative if not
listed in the MEL/CDL. For defects beyond MEL only ferry flight to location, where the repairs can be made,
may be performed, provided the ferry flight is approved in accordance with Technical ferry flight
procedure described in CAME.
In case of multiple defects, their possible mutual influence must be taken into consideration. Suitable
conditions and limitations in placards form, maintenance procedures, crew operating procedures and
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other restrictions as necessary are specified in the MEL/CDL and must be accomplished to ensure that an
acceptable level of safety is maintained.
It is upon the Pilot in Command (PIC) to make the final decision for aircraft operation with defects,
permissible per MEL/CDL. Based on his judgment and good airmanship, the PIC may decide not to perform
the flight even when the equipment defects comply with the MEL/CDL requirements.
If a failure occurs between the commencement of the flight and the start of the take-off, PIC may reffer to
the MEL before any decision to continue the flight is taken.
Any decision to continue the flight is subject to PIC judgement and good airmanship.
The MEL/CDL preparation revisions, and approval process is responsibility of ETF Engineering and
maintenance department and is described in CAME.
8.6.2 AMENDMENTS TO THE MEL FOLLOWING CHANGES TO THE MMEL — APPLICABLE CHANGES AND ACCEPTABLE
TIMESCALES
• The following are applicable changes to the MMEL that require amendment of the MEL:
• a reduction of the rectification interval;
• change of an item, only when the change is applicable to the aircraft or type of operations and is more
restrictive.
• An acceptable timescale for submitting the amended MEL to the competent authority is 90 days from the
effective date specified in the approved change to the MMEL.
• Reduced timescales for the implementation of safety-related amendments may be required if the Agency and/or
the competent authority consider it necessary.
In case a defect cannot be fixed immediately and MEL is applicable, engineering personnel will certify in
the Aeroplane Technical Log adjacent to the appropriate defect the MEL / CDL subject title, system and
item number. At the completion of any engineering tasks associated with the particular MEL item
engineering personnel will placard the inoperative equipment.
When applicable, operational flight plan, take-off and landing performance and fuel requirement penalties
must be taken into account due to inoperative equipment or component.
When a MEL / CDL item is rectified, engineering personnel will make an entry in the Technical Log
identifying the item and details of the rectification, including a statement that the MEL / CDL item has been
removed. Appropriate MEL placards will then be removed from the cockpit.
8.6.6 MEL CATEGORIES
Each MEL/CDL category implies a repair deadline according to the table below.
CLASS TYPE OF DEADLINE REPAIR DEADLINE
Flying hours and / or number of cycles and Varies depending on the limits given in the box
A
/ or calendar days « remarks or exceptions » of the approved ETF
B Calendar Days 3 calendar days
C Calendar Days 10 calendar days
D Calendar Days 120 calendar days
NOTES:
1) For Category A, the repair deadline in flight hours and / or the number of cycles is calculated starting
from the first departure following the reporting of the defect in the ATL.
2) When the repair deadline is expressed in calendar days, it starts from the next day at Zero hours
following the reporting of the defect in the ATL.
EXAMPLE:
Category B defect is entered at 10 o’clock on 26th January, the 3 day interval will start on 27th January at
zero hours and end on 29th January at midnight.
In all cases UTC time shall be used.
Pre-flight Check, or Release to Service shall not be signed if the specified time limits is expired, unless
extension of the MEL limit is obtained in accordance with One time MEL rectification period extension
procedure described in CAME Manual.
8.6.9 RECTIFICATION INTERVAL EXTENSION (RIE) — ETF PROCEDURES FOR THE CCAA APPROVAL AND NOTIFICATION
TO THE CCAA
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• ETF procedures to address the extension of rectification intervals and ongoing surveillance to ensure compliance
shall provide the competent authority with details of the name and position of the nominated personnel
responsible for the control of the operator’s rectification interval extension (RIE) procedures and details of the
specific duties and responsibilities established to control the use of RIEs.
• Personnel authorising RIEs shall be adequately trained in technical and/or operational disciplines to accomplish
their duties. They shall have necessary operational knowledge in terms of operational use of the MEL as
alleviating documents by flight crew and maintenance personnel and engineering competence. The authorising
personnel shall be listed by appointment and name.
• ETF shall notify CCAA within 1 month of the extension of the applicable rectification interval or within the
appropriated timescales specified by the approved procedure for the RIE.
• The notification shall be made in a form determined by CCAA and shall specify the original defect, all such uses,
the reason for the RIE and the reasons why rectification was not carried out within the original rectification
interval.
8.6.10 OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
• The operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MEL shall be based on the operational and
maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL. Modified procedures may, however, be developed by the
operator when they provide the same level of safety, as required by the MMEL. Modified maintenance
procedures shall be developed in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014.
• Providing appropriate operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MEL, regardless of who
developed them, is the responsibility of the operator.
• Any item in the MEL requiring an operational or maintenance procedure to ensure an acceptable level of safety
shall be so identified in the ‘remarks’ or ’exceptions’ column/part/section of the MEL. This will normally be ‘(O)’
for an operational procedure, or ‘(M)’ for a maintenance procedure. ‘(O)(M)’ means both operational and
maintenance procedures are required.
• The satisfactory accomplishment of all procedures, regardless of who performs them, is the responsibility of the
operator.
8.6.11 OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES — APPLICABLE CHANGES
• Changes to the operational and maintenance procedures referenced in the MMEL are considered applicable and
require the amendment of the maintenance and operating procedures referenced in the MEL when:
o the modified procedure is applicable to the operator’s MEL; and
o the purpose of this change is to improve compliance with the intent of the associated MMEL dispatch
condition.
• An acceptable timescale for the amendments of maintenance and operating procedures, shall be 90 days from
the date when the amended procedures referenced in the MMEL are made available. Reduced timescales for the
implementation of safety related amendments may be required if CCAA considers it necessary.
The following elements shall be taken into consideration for preparation of non-commercial operations
with an increased level of risk:
• pre-flight briefing;
• duties and responsibilities of the flight crew members involved, task sharing;
• special operating procedures;
• manoeuvres to be performed in flight, minimum and maximum speeds and altitudes for all portions of the
flight;
• operational limitations;
• potential risks and contingency plans;
• adequate available airspace and coordination with the air traffic control (ATC);
• selection of flight crew members; and
• additional flight crew training at regular intervals to ensure recency (considering also a flight of a similar risk
profile in the simulator, if needed)
8.7.A.2 DIFFERENCES TO COMMERCIAL OPERATION
As an exemption from aerodrome qualification requirements stipulated in OM-A-5.2.1, and when there are
no suitable means to qualify first Pilot in Command for a category C airport, i.e. simulator training device
can not be configured for the particular airport, a non-commercial flight may be organized to gain
qualification, providing:
• both pilots are otherwise qualified to conduct flight, and
• Pilot in Command is briefed in accordance with OM-C- 1.3, and
• all other procedures and limitations for commercial flight remain applicable, except as stipulated bellow.
As a general rule carrying of persons during non revenue flights, other than those connected with specific
flight as underlined later, is not allowed. However, when persons not connected with flight duties are
carried on board they are considered supernumeraries.
Supernumeraries are considered:
a) Flight crew members (other than operating flight crew),
b) Cabin crew members (other than operating cabin crew if applicable),
c) licensed technicians,
d) other Flight Operations personnel if applicable as well as all the other persons that may be carried on board
during Non revenue flights like for example ETF management representatives for delivery flights.
Supernumeraries, in general, shall be familiar with emergency and safety equipment on board and
emergency and safety procedures. Nevertheless, it is commander responsibility to assure that all persons
on board (including supernumeraries):
a) are seated so to have ready access to emergency oxygen in case of necessity
b) are briefed on procedures in emergency and use and location of emergency equipment to include:
• use of emergency oxygen
• location and use of emergency exits and slides (if applicable)
• use of life jackets
• use of slides as life rafts (if applicable)
c) are briefed about safety belt use and smoking regulations
d) are seated with seat belts fastened during taxi, take off, landing and whenever Fasten Seat Belt sign is on.
e) are briefed on restrictions in use of Portable Electronic Devices (PED)
f) are briefed not to interfere with qualified crew members in the performance of their duties.
Commander is further responsible:
a) that all Cabin Emergency Equipment is checked for availability, accessibility and serviceability before each flight
whether it is round trip or a stopover flight and that Cockpit emergency equipment is checked in same manner
before taking over the aeroplane or if the aeroplane has been left unattended for any time
b) that persons seated next to over-wing emergency exits (if applicable) are briefed about procedure for opening
emergency exit in case of necessity
c) that that all baggage is stowed and all compartments in cabin and galleys are closed and locked (as applicable)
before takeoff,
d) that all the persons are briefed about applicable procedures related to cabin readiness prior first aeroplane
movement, take off and landing,
e) that all persons are familiar with requirements of Sterile flight deck concept and Critical phases of flight
definition.
f) that slides (where applicable) are armed and disarmed in accordance with applicable procedure.
Commander may delegate this duty to the First officer or one Supernumerary (as applicable) who is trained
on use of emergency equipment and emergency procedures.
In case of expected or actual turbulences, other adverse weather encounter, abnormal or emergency
situations, crew will inform persons on board in accordance with given briefing using PA system or other
means as applicable.
Prior first aeroplane movement, before takeoff and landing, flight crew will advise persons on board in
usual manner in accordance with given briefing.
In case of emergency evacuation, general duties and responsibilities of the flight crew members are
defined in applicable chapters of ETF OM-B/FCOM. Difference in case of flight without SCCM or other
adequately trained CC member on board are given bellow (not all possible situations are, or can be
described here, thus in performing their duties flight crew shall always use common sense and best
judgment in accordance with actual situation!).
In case of evacuation on the runway after RTO, FO will, after accomplishing his tasks according to
Emergency evacuation check list, proceed to cabin and facilitate evacuation.
In case of expected crash landing/ditching FO or adequately trained Supernumerary will (as applicable and
if circumstances permit):
• Locate emergency briefing card and perform emergency briefing of the persons on board
• Secure the cabin and ensure emergency lighting is ON
• Before impact (as applicable), shout: “BRACE FOR IMPACT”
• After the impact, in accordance with actual situation, Flight crew shall proceed with standard duties given in OM-
B/FCOM as applicable.
In case of flight with adequately trained CC member, duties and responsibilities are given in applicable ETF
OM-B/FCOM and CSPM 2.18.
When flight is operated without operating cabin crew members, maximum number of supernumeraries is
19.
Maintenance check flight (‘MCF’)’ means a flight of an aircraft with an airworthiness certificate or with a
permit to fly which is carried out for troubleshooting purposes or to check the functioning of one or more
systems, parts or appliances after maintenance, if the functioning of the systems, parts or appliances
cannot be established during ground checks and which is carried out in any of the following situations:
• as required by the aircraft maintenance manual (‘AMM’) or any other maintenance data issued by a design
approval holder being responsible for the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft;
• after maintenance, as required by the operator or proposed by the organisation responsible for the continuing
airworthiness of the aircraft;
• as requested by the maintenance organisation for verification of a successful defect rectification;
• to assist with fault isolation or troubleshooting;
For a “Level A” maintenance check flight, a task specialist or additional pilot is required in the flight crew
compartment to assist the flight crew members, unless the aircraft configuration does not permit it or the
operator can justify, considering the flight crew members workload based on the flight programme, that the
flight crew members does not require additional assistance.
LEVEL A
Pilot in Command conducting LEVEL A Maintenance Check Flight (full and/or reduced) must have
completed training according to the “Maintenance Check Flight Manual” for
the full and/or reduced LEVEL A Maintenance Check Flight.
Only qualified crew shall perform full and/or reduced Maintenance Check Flight on airplane without
approved and signed certification for release to service.
Training program for the Flight Crew conducting LEVEL A Maintenance Check Flight will be explained
in OM-D.
For PIC Experience and recency requirements reffer to OM-D
LEVEL B
FOM shall delegate respective crew for the purpose of LEVEL B Maintenance Check Flight
on aircraft with approved and signed certificate for release to service.
.
SPECIFIC PROCEDURES
Specific preparation for a maintenance check flight (MCF) is essential. In addition to the standard considerations
before a typical flight (weather, aircraft weight and balance, pre-flight inspection, checklists, etc.), the pilot shall:
(a) inform ATC of the particular MCF;
(b) if needed, agree on the appropriate airspace;
(c) understand the airworthiness status of the aircraft;
(d) assess the complexity of the flight; and
(e) develop appropriate strategies to mitigate potential risks.
ETF,when planning to conduct an MCF, shall develop checklists for the in-flight assessment of the unreliable systems,
considering relevant abnormal and emergency procedures. When developing the checklists,ETFwill consider the
applicable documentation available from the type certificate holder or other valid documentation.
The pilot-in-command shall only allow on board the persons needed for the purpose of the flight and brief
the crew and task specialist on abnormal and emergency procedures relevant for the MCF.
8.7.D DELIVERY FLIGHTS
Delivery flight is flight where the aircraft is moved from one location to another, e.g. from the
manufacturer, refurbishment location, previous owner, lessor/lessee, long-term storage to the operator’s
base.
A delivery flight of an aeroplane from the manufacturer, the seller or the lessor to the ETF or vice versa,
may carry non-revenue passengers provided:
a) This is not excluded in the certificate of airworthiness or certificate of registration.
b) Full insurance coverage is assured.
c) (Crew complement and emergency equipment requirements for commercial flights are met.
Delivery flights may be combined with training flights provided:
a) The commander is a qualified flight instructor.
b) Only the persons mentioned in <ETF OM-A Ch.8.7.2.6> above are carried onboard.
On delivery flights where all requirements for commercial flights in the ETF OM are met, even revenue
passengers may be carried provided:
a) All insurance coverage for commercial operations are met.
b) The airplane’s registration is not removed from the AOC until after arrival at the final destination.
8.7.E FERRY FLIGHTS
Ferry flight if flight where the aircraft is moved to and from a maintenance base. The aircraft may be
operated under the permit-to-fly conditions.
Examples of ferry flights are as follows:
• unpressurised flight,
• gear-down flight,
A certified aeroplane shall not be operated if malfunctions are observed during its operation which are
impairing or likely to impair the airworthiness of the aeroplane or if reasonable doubts exist concerning the
airworthiness except for the purpose of flight testing.
ETF may be granted permission by the Croatian CAA to ferry aeroplanes in exceptional cases with impaired
airworthiness (e.g. below MEL requirements) to an aerodrome where repair facilities permit the aeroplane
to be restored to a fully airworthy condition. Such ferry flights may only be conducted if:
a) the required repairs cannot be performed locally and
b) the safe conduct of the ferry flight is assured
In case where such a flight must be conducted in accordance with the VFR provisions of the <ETF OM-A
Ch.8.3.1> apply.
For the conduct of ferry flights the following minimum requirements shall be adhered :
• The airworthiness certificate of the aeroplane has not been withdrawn by the Croatian CAA.
• Neither an airworthiness directive nor a mandatory inspection are opposed to the ferry flight.
• The causes of the malfunctions and their possible effects on other components or systems are known.
• ETF shall under cooperation with the Part 145 approved maintenance organization, Maintenance and Flight
Operations departments, assure and guarantee that the ferry flight can be carried out safely. All appropriate
measures shall be initiated. The required maintenance measures shall be performed by qualified maintenance
personnel and certified in the "Technical Log Book" (TLB).
• The technical measures shall, to the extent possible, be supplemented by flight operational measures.
• During the ferry flight the only persons allowed on board shall be those required for the operation and handling
and, if necessary, inspection and repair of the aeroplane at the aerodrome of repair. Cargo and/or mail is only
permitted on board to the extent needed to balance the centre of gravity.
• The operating weight of the aeroplane shall be kept as low as possible, taking into account the fuel quantities
required in accordance with OM.
• The flight shall be conducted in compliance with relevant procedures and regulations of the ETF OM
• The Commander shall be comprehensively informed about:
o the technical status of the aeroplane
o the possible effects of the malfunctions, and
• the required technical and flight operational measures including additional emergency procedures which might
be necessary.
• The final and independent decision about the conduct of the ferry flight rests solely with the Commander
• The obligation to comply with other aeronautical rules and regulations remains unaffected by the above
requirements.
Special authorization from the FOM, must be given.
Ferry flights shall be reported to the Croatian CAA within one week. The message shall contain the
following information:
1. aeroplane concerned
2. aerodromes of departure and destination incl. times
3. nature of the malfunction(s)
4. measures taken
5. special occurrences during flight
All records which were relevant for the decision shall be retained by the Technical department.
8.7.F DEMONSTRATION FLIGHTS
The commander shall ensure that flight crew members engaged in performing duties essential to the safe
operation of an aircraft in flight use supplemental oxygen continuously whenever the cabin altitude
exceeds 10 000 ft for a period of more than 30 minutes and whenever the cabin altitude exceeds 13 000 ft.
8.8.1 CONDITION UNDER WHICH OXYGEN MUST BE PROVIDED AND USED
Adequate breathing oxygen must be provided to the crew and passengers for sustenance in case of
depressurization, smoke or toxic gas emission.
Additional “First Aid Oxygen” is required for passengers when the flight is planned to fly above 25000 ft.
This First Aid Oxygen must still be available after a depressurization.
8.8.2 SPECIFICATION OF OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
To operate a pressurized aeroplane above 10000 ft, the quantity of supplemental oxygen on board for
sustenance must be established for the most critical point of the flight from the standpoint of oxygen need
in case of depressurization.
The cabin pressure altitude being considered the same as the aeroplane altitude following a cabin
depressurization. The quantity of required supplemental oxygen is given in the table below.
SUPPLY FOR: DURATION AND CABIN PRESSURE ALTITUDE
Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude exceeds 13
000 ft and entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude
exceeds 10 000 ft but does not exceed 13 000 ft after the first
Occupants of flight crew compartment 30 minutes at those altitudes, but in no case less than:
seats on flight crew compartment duty a) 30 minutes for aeroplanes certificated to fly at altitudes not
exceeding 25 000 ft (2)
b) 2 hours for aeroplanes certificated to fly at altitudes more than 25
000 ft (3).
Entire flight time when cabin pressure altitude exceeds 13 000
ft but not less than 30 minutes (2), and entire flight time when
All required cabin crew members
cabin pressure altitude is greater than 10 000 ft but does not
exceed 13 000 ft after the first 30 minutes at these altitudes.
Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude exceeds 15
100% of passengers (5)
000 ft but in no case less than 10 minutes.(4)
Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude exceeds 14
30% of passengers (5)
000 ft but does not exceed 15 000 ft.
Entire flight time when the cabin pressure altitude exceeds 10
10% of passengers (5) 000 ft but does not exceed 14 000 ft after the first 30 minutes at
these altitudes.
Notes:
(1) The supply provided must take account of the cabin pressure altitude and descent profile for the routes
concerned.
(2) The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant rate of descent from the
aeroplane maximum certificated operating altitude to 10 000 ft in 10 minutes and followed by 20 minutes
at 10 000 ft.
(3) The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant rate of descent from the
aeroplane maximum certificated operating altitude to 10 000 ft in 10 minutes and followed by 110 minutes
at 10 000 ft. The oxygen required in CAT.IDE.A.245 may be included in determining the supply required.
(4) The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant rate of descent from the
aeroplane maximum certificated operating altitude to 15 000 ft in 10 minutes.
(5) For the purpose of this table ‘passengers’ means passengers actually carried and includes infants.
Note (B737-800): When in idle thrust, high speed and speed brake extended, the rate of descent is
approximately 7 000 ft/min. To descend from FL 390 to FL 100, it takes approximately 4 min and 40
nm. The crew will be aware that MORA displayed on ND (if available) is the highest MORA within a
80 nm circle round the aircraft.
Refer to OM-B Ch 2.5.1.3 for the procedures to check quantity of oxygen before flight.
8.8.2.A FLIGHT CREW OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
The quantity of oxygen required for each cockpit crewmember must be enough to supply them with
oxygen for:
- the entire flight time when the cabin altitude exceeds 13000 ft and
- the entire flight time when the cabin altitude exceeds 10000 ft but not exceed 13000 ft after the first 30 minutes
at those altitudes, but in no case less than 2 hours for B737-800*
* - The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant rate of descent from
the aeroplane’s maximum certificated operating altitude to 10000 ft in 10 minutes and followed by 110
minutes at 10000 ft.
8.8.2.B CABIN CREW OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
The quantity of oxygen required for each cabin crewmember must be enough to supply them with oxygen
for:
- the entire flight time but not less than 30 minutes when the cabin altitude exceeds 13000 ft * and
- the entire flight time when cabin pressure altitude is greater than 10000 ft but does not exceed 13000 ft after
the first 30 minutes at these altitudes
* - The required minimum supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant rate of descent from
the aeroplane’s maximum certificated operating altitude to 10000 ft in 10 minutes and followed by 20
minutes at 10000 ft.
8.8.2.C PASSENGER OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
The quantity of oxygen required for Passengers must be enough for sustenance during the flight entire
time when the cabin pressure altitude:
- exceeds 15000 ft for 100% of passengers but not less than 10 minutes.
- exceeds 14000 ft but does not exceed 15000 ft for 30% of passengers.
- exceeds 10000 ft but does not exceed 14000 ft after the first 30 minutes at these altitudes for 10% of
passengers.
“Passengers” above refers to passengers actually carried and includes infants. When operating above
25,000 ft, the total number of dispensing units and outlets in the cabin shall exceed the number of seats by
at least 10%.
8.8.2.D FIRST-AID OXYGEN
For flights above 25000 ft, a quantity of oxygen required as First-aid must be carried. This First-aid oxygen
is intended for passengers who, for physiological reasons, might require oxygen following a cabin
depressurization. The amount of oxygen required is calculated using an average flow of 3 litres Standard
Temperature Pressure Dry (STPD)/minute/person and provided for the entire flight after cabin
depressurization at cabin altitudes of more than 8000 ft for at least 2% of passengers carried, but in no
case for less than one person.
The amount of First-aid oxygen required for a particular flight depends on route to be flown (MEA
restrictions).
The oxygen equipment used must be able to generate a mass flow to each user of at least 4 litres per
minute, STPD. Means may be provided to decrease the flow to not less than 2 litres per minute, STPD, at
any altitude.
8.8.2.E CREW PROTECTIVE BREATHING EQUIPMENT (PBE)
Each flight crew member while on flight deck duty, must be provided with equipment to protect the eyes,
nose and mouth, and to provide oxygen for a period of not less than 15 minutes. On ETF aeroplane, this
flight crew protective breathing equipment is provided through use of masks, goggles and standard flight
crew oxygen.
All required cabin crew members will be supplied with portable protective breathing equipment to protect
the eyes, nose and mouth and supply of oxygen for not less than 15 minutes. PBE intended for cabin crew
use must be installed adjacent to each required cabin crew member duty station.
8.9 PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE USE OF TYPE B EFB APPLICATIONS
Dangerous goods (DG) are articles or substances which are capable of posing a hazard to health, safety,
property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the ICAO in Annex 18
and in the ICAO Technical Instructions for the safe Transport of Dangerous goods DOC 9284AN/905 (referred
as Technical Instructions in this chapter) or which are classified according to those Regulations.
The following international and national regulations, standards and recommended practices have been
taken into account in designing ETF policies, procedures and instructions with regard to dangerous goods
transportation:
IMPORTANT
ETF AIRWAYS IS NOT APPROVED FOR TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS GOODS
All ETF Airways personnel included in flight operations must be properly trained in order to recognize any
DG that might be carried on board an aircraft, intentionally or unintentionally, which may impose a risk to
safety. Training shall be conducted in accordance with ETF Airways OM-D, chapter 2.4.1.
The competent national authority in the Republic of Croatia for DG Regulations is:
This section contains all terms, definitions, abbreviations and codes related to dangerous goods allowed fo
carriage by passengers or crew. Other terms and definitions are listed in OM-A-00 and other abbreviations
in OM-A-00.
Dangerous goods accident means an occurrence associated with and related to the transport of dangerous
goods by air which results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property damage.
Exception means a provision in the ICAO TI which excludes a specific item of dangerous goods from the
requirements normally applicable to that item.
Lithium battery means two or more cells which are electrically connected together and fitted with devices
necessary for use, for example, case, terminals, marking and protective devices.
A single cell lithium battery is considered a “cell” and must be tested according to the testing requirements
for “cells” for the purposes of these Regulations and the provisions of the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria
(see also the definition for “lithium cell”). The term “lithium battery” refers to a family of different
chemistries, comprising many types of cathodes and electrolytes.
For the purposes of the Dangerous Goods Regulations they are separated into two types:
(a) Lithium metal batteries are normally primary (non-rechargeable) batteries that have lithium
metal or lithium compounds as an anode. The most common type of lithium cell used in consumer
applications uses metallic lithium as anode and manganese dioxide as cathode, with a salt of lithium
dissolved in an organic solvent;
(b) Lithium-ion batteries (sometimes abbreviated Li-ion batteries) are a type of secondary
(rechargeable) battery commonly used in consumer electronics. Also included within lithium-ion
batteries are lithium polymer batteries.
Lithium cell means a single encased electrochemical unit (one positive and one negative electrode) which
exhibits a voltage differential across its two terminals. Under Dangerous Goods Regulations and the UN
Manual of Tests and Criteria, to the extent the encased electrochemical unit meets the definition of “cell”
herein, it is a “cell”, not a “battery”, regardless of whether the unit is termed a “battery” or a “single cell
battery” outside of Dangerous Goods Regulations and the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria.
Matches, safety (book, card or strike-on box) are matches which are only ignited when struck on a prepared
surface.
Matches, strike-anywhere or fuse are matches which are readily ignited by friction on almost any dry
surface.
Not restricted means not subject to or restricted by ICAO TI, except as otherwise stated.
Pilot-in-command (PIC) means the pilot designated as being in command and charged with the safe conduct
of the flight. For the purpose of commercial air transport operations, the ‘pilot-in- command’ shall be termed
the “commander”.
Serious injury means an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and which:
(a) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the date
the injury was received; or
(b) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose); or
(c) involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage; or
(d) involves injury to any internal organ; or
(e) involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 % of the body
surface; or
(f) involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation.
Technical Instructions (ICAO TI) means the latest effective edition of the Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, including the Supplement and any Addenda, approved and published
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Watt-hour rating of lithium ion battery is calculated by multiplying the rated capacity in ampere- hours (Ah)
by its nominal voltage (V) and is expressed in Watt-hours (Wh).
ABBREVIATIONS
Term Description
CAO Cargo Aircraft Only
COMAT Company materials
DG Dangerous goods
DGD Shipper's Declaration for Dangerous Goods
EBI Lithium ion batteries excepted as per Section II of PI 965
EBM Lithium metal batteries excepted as per Section II of PI 968
ELI Lithium ion batteries as per Section II of PI965 (CAO) and PI966–967 (PAX A/C OK)
ELM Lithium metal batteries as per Section II of PI968 (CAO) and PI969–970 (PAX A/C OK)
ERG Emergency Response Guide
GHS Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals
ICAO TI ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air [ICAO
doc 9284]
ICE Carbon dioxide, solid (dry ice)
IMP Interline Message Procedure
kg kilogram
L litre
MAG Magnetized Material
N/A Not applicable
PG Packing Group
PI Packing Instruction
POC Portable oxygen concentrator
Term Description
RBI Lithium ion batteries as per Section IA and IB of PI 965 (CAO)
RBM Lithium metal batteries as per Section IA and IB of PI 968 (CAO)
RCL Cryogenic Liquid
RCM Corrosive
RCX Explosives 1.3C
RDS Biological Substance, Category B (UN 3373)
REQ Dangerous Goods in Excepted Quantities
REX Reserved for normally forbidden Explosives, Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4F, 1.5 and 1.6
RFG Flammable Gas
RFL Flammable Liquid
RFS Flammable Solid
RFW Dangerous When Wet
RGX Explosives 1.3G
RIS Infectious Substance (UN 2814 or UN 2900)
RLI Lithium ion batteries as per Section I of PI 966–967 (PAX A/C OK)
RLM Lithium metal batteries as per Section I of PI 969–970 (PAX A/C OK)
RMD Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods
RNG Non-Flammable Non-toxic Gas
ROP Organic Peroxide
ROX Oxidizer
RPB Toxic substance
RPG Toxic Gas
RRE Excepted Packages of Radioactive Material
RRW Radioactive Material Category I-White
RRY Radioactive Material Categories II-Yellow and III-Yellow
RSB Polymeric Beads/Plastics Moulding Compound (Packing Instruction 957)
RSC Spontaneously Combustible
RXB Explosives 1.4B
RXC Explosives 1.4C
RXD Explosives 1.4D
RXE Explosives 1.4E
RXG Explosives 1.4G
RXS Explosives 1.4S
S.P. Special Provision
SDS Safety Data Sheet
TI Transport Index (Radioactive material)
UN UN number
The responsible person for coordinating all matters relating to dangerous goods transportation on ETF
Airways services is the Ground Operations Manager.
Operational Contact:
ETF Ground Operations
Phone: +385 997370002 (Monday to Friday 09:00 to 17:00 hours)
e-mail: ground@etfairways.com
For exceptions listed below, an approval referred to in chapter 9.1. is not required therefore, these
dangerous goods can be accepted on board ETF aircraft:
a) Aircraft equipment: Articles and substances which would otherwise be classified as dangerous goods
but which are required to be aboard the aircraft in accordance with pertinent airworthiness
requirements and operating regulations or for the health of passengers or crew or that are authorized
by the State of the operator to meet special requirements such as batteries, fire extinguishers, first-aid
kits, insecticides, air fresheners, life rafts, escape slides, life-saving appliances, portable oxygen supplies,
tritium signs, smoke hoods, passenger service units, alcohol-based sanitizers and cleaning products;
b) Consumer Goods: aerosols, alcoholic beverages, perfumes, colognes, liquefied gas lighters and portable
electronic devices containing lithium metal or lithium ion cells or batteries provided that batteries meet
the provisions of Table 9-1, Item 1 carried aboard an aircraft by ETF for use or sale on the aircraft during
the flight or series of flights, but excluding non-refillable gas lighters and those lighters liable to leak
when exposed to reduced pressure;
c) Dry ice intended for use in food and beverage service aboard the aircraft;
Note:
Dangerous goods intended as replacements for those referred to in ETF OM-A 9.1.A. a), b) and c) above
may not be carried without the approval referred to in ETF OM-A 9.1. and unless consigned by ETF
Airways and accepted for transport in accordance with the ICAO Technical Instructions.
d) Electronic devices, such as electronic flight bags, personal entertainment devices, and credit card
readers, containing lithium metal or lithium ion cells or batteries and spare lithium batteries for such
devices carried aboard an aircraft by the operator for use on the aircraft during the flight or series of
flights, provided that the batteries meet the provisions of Table 9-1, Item 1). Spare lithium batteries must
be individually protected so as to prevent short circuits when not in use. Conditions for the carriage and
use of these electronic devices and for the carriage of spare batteries must be provided in the operations
manual and/or other appropriate manuals as will enable flight crew, cabin crew and other employees to
carry out the functions for which they are responsible.
e) Medical Aid for a Patient
Appropriate national authority approval is not required for dangerous goods carried by an aeroplane to
provide medical aid to a patient when those dangerous goods:
1. are placed on board an aeroplane with the approval of ETF Airways; or
2. form part of the permanent equipment of the aeroplane when it has been adapted for specialized
use, to provide, during flight, medical aid for a patient, such as gas cylinders, drugs, medicines, other
medical material (e.g. sterilizing wipes) and wet cell or lithium batteries, providing:
i. the gas cylinders have been manufactured specifically for the purpose of containing and
transporting that particular gas;
ii. the drugs and medicines and other medical matter are under the control of trained
personnel during the time when they are in use;
iii. the equipment containing wet cell batteries is kept, and when necessary secured, in an
upright position to prevent spillage of the electrolyte; and
iv. proper provision is made to stow and secure all the equipment during take-off and landing
and at all other times when deemed necessary by the commander in the interests of safety.
These dangerous goods must be under the control of trained personnel during the time when they are in
use on the aeroplane and may be carried on a flight made by the same aeroplane to collect a patient or after
that patient has been delivered when it is impracticable to load or unload the dangerous goods immediately
before or after the flight, subject to the following additional conditions:
a) the dangerous goods must be capable of withstanding the normal conditions of air transport;
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OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
9 – DANGEROUS GOODS AND WEAPONS
These dangerous goods may also be carried on flights made by the same aircraft for other purposes (e.g.
training flights and positioning flights prior to or after maintenance) subject to the conditions a) to i).
Note:
The dangerous goods carried may differ from those identified above due to the needs of the patient. These
provisions apply both to dedicated air ambulances and to temporarily modified aircraft.
f) Veterinary Aid
Appropriate national authority approval is not required for dangerous goods which are carried for use in
flight as veterinary aid or as a humane killer for an animal. Such dangerous goods must be stowed and
secured during take-off and landing and at all other times when deemed necessary by the pilot-in-command.
The dangerous goods must be under the control of trained personnel during the time when they are in use
on the aircraft.
Carriage of veterinary aid is subject to the same additional conditions as defined in OM-A 9.1.A. e).
An approval is not required for dangerous goods contained within items of excess baggage being sent as
cargo provided that:
With the aim of preventing dangerous goods, which a passenger is not permitted to have, from being taken
aboard an aircraft in excess baggage consigned as cargo, any organization or enterprise accepting excess
baggage consigned as cargo should seek confirmation from the passenger, or a person acting on behalf of
the passenger, that the excess baggage does not contain dangerous goods that are not permitted and seek
further confirmation about the contents of any item where there are suspicions that it may contain
dangerous goods that are not permitted.
An approval is not required for those dangerous goods which, according to the ICAO TI, can be carried by
passengers or crew members.
Notwithstanding any additional restrictions that may be implemented by States in the interests of aviation
security, passengers or crew are forbidden to carry dangerous goods, either as or in carry-on baggage,
checked baggage or on their person, unless the dangerous goods are permitted in accordance with Table 9-
1. “Provisions for DG carried by passengers or crew” below, and:
Note:
For the items for which the approval of the operator is required, it is considered that ETF Airways grant
approval provided that contracted handling agent or airport operator confirms that all conditions and
requirements prescribed in TI are met. In case of additional questions, please contact ETF Airways Ground
Operations Department.
If passenger’s carry-on baggage cannot be accommodated in the cabin and is converted to DAA (Delivery at
Aircraft) baggage to be loaded in aircraft cargo compartment, the passenger must remove from such DAA
baggage all items that are not permitted in or as checked baggage including all spare (loose) lithium batteries
and carry them in the cabin.
Location
Approval of the
operator(s)
is required
Checked
baggage
Carry-on
baggage
Dangerous Goods Restrictions
Batteries
1) Lithium batteries Yes Yes (see c) and a) each battery must be of a type which meets the requirements
(including portable (except for g) d)) of each test in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, Part III,
electronic devices) and h)) subsection 38.3;
c) each battery may exceed 100 Wh but not exceed 160 Wh Watt-
hour rating for lithium ion with the approval of the operator;
Location
Approval of the
operator(s)
is required
Checked
baggage
Carry-on
baggage
Dangerous Goods Restrictions
2) Non-spillable wet, nickel- Yes Yes No a) for a non-spillable battery:
metal hydride, and dry i. must meet the requirements of Special Provision A67;
batteries ii. each battery must not exceed a voltage of 12 volts and a
Watt-hour rating of 100 Wh;
iii. each battery must be protected from short circuit by the
effective insulation of exposed terminals
iv. no more than two spare batteries per person may be
carried; and
v. if contained in equipment, the equipment must be either
protected from unintentional activation, or each battery
must be disconnected and its exposed terminals
insulated;
b) for a dry battery or nickel-metal hydride battery, each battery
must comply with Special Provision A123 or A199,
respectively; and
c) batteries and heating elements must be isolated in battery-
powered equipment capable of generating extreme heat, by
removal of the heating element battery or other components
3) Battery-powered No Yes No a) if powered by lithium batteries, each battery must comply with
portable electronic restrictions of 1) a), b) and g);
smoking devices
(e.g. e-cigarettes, ecigs, b) the devices and/or batteries must not be recharged on board
ecigars, epipes, personal the aircraft; and
vaporizers, electronic c) measures must be taken to prevent unintentional activation of
nicotine delivery the heating element while on board the aircraft.
systems)
4) Mobility aids (e.g. Yes (see e)) Yes a) for use by passengers whose mobility is restricted by either a
wheelchairs) powered disability, their health or age, or a temporary mobility problem
by: (e.g. broken leg);
spillable batteries; b) the passenger should make advance arrangements with each
non-spillable wet operator and provide information on the type of battery
batteries; installed and on the handling of the mobility aid (including
dry batteries; instructions on how to isolate the battery);
nickel-metal hydride c) in the case of a dry battery or nickel-metal hydride battery,
batteries; or each battery must comply with Special Provision A123 or
lithium ion batteries A199, respectively;
d) in the case of a non-spillable wet battery:
i. each battery must comply with Special Provision A67; and
ii. a maximum of one spare battery may be carried per
passenger;
e) in the case of a lithium ion battery:
i. each battery must be of a type which meets the
requirements of each test in the UN Manual of
Tests and Criteria, Part 111, subsection 38.3;
ii. when the mobility aid does not provide adequate
protection to the battery:
• the battery must be removed in accordance with
the manufacturer's instructions;
• the battery must not exceed 300 Wh;
• the battery terminals must be protected from
short circuit (by insulating the terminals, e.g.
by taping over exposed terminals);
• the battery must be protected from damage
(e.g. by placing each battery in a protective
pouch); and
• the battery must be carried in the cabin;
iii. a maximum of one spare battery not exceeding 300
Wh or two spare batteries not exceeding 160 Wh
each may be carried. Spare batteries must be
carried in the cabin..
Location
Approval of the
operator(s)
is required
Checked
baggage
Carry-on
baggage
Dangerous Goods Restrictions
Flames and fuel sources
5) Cigarette lighter No (see b)) No a) no more than one per person;
Location
Approval of the
operator(s)
is required
Checked
baggage
Carry-on
baggage
Dangerous Goods Restrictions
d) each fuel cell and each fuel cell cartridge must conform to IEC
62282-6-100 Ed. 1, including Amendment 1, and must be
marked with a manufacturer’s certification that it conforms to
the specification. In addition, each fuel cell cartridge must be
marked with the maximum quantity and type of fuel in the
cartridge;
i) fuel cells must be of a type that will not charge batteries when
the portable electronic device is not in use and must be durably
marked by the manufacturer: “APPROVED FOR CARRIAGE
IN AIRCRAFT CABIN ONLY” to so indicate; and
Location
Approval of the
operator(s)
is required
Checked
baggage
Carry-on
baggage
Dangerous Goods Restrictions
13) Cartridges of Yes Yes Yes a) no more than four cartridges per person; and
Division 2.2 with no
subsidiary hazard for b) the water capacity of each cartridge must not exceed 50 mL.
other than a self-inflating
personal safety device Note.— For carbon dioxide, a gas cartridge with a water
capacity of 50 mL is equivalent to a 28 g cartridge.
14) Cartridges and cylinders Yes Yes Yes a) no more than one avalanche rescue backpack per person;
of Division 2.2 with no
subsidiary hazard b) the backpack must be packed in such a manner that it cannot
contained in an be accidentally activated;
avalanche rescue
backpack c) may contain a pyrotechnic trigger mechanism which must not
contain more than 200 mg net of Division 1.4S; and
ii) the net weight of dry ice or an indication that the net
weight is 2.5 kg or less.
19) Cartridges in Yes No Yes a) no more than 5 kg gross mass per person;
Division 1.4S
(UN 0012 or UN 0014 b) must be securely packaged;
only)
c) must not include ammunition with explosive or incendiary
projectiles; and
Location
Approval of the
operator(s)
is required
Checked
baggage
Carry-on
baggage
Dangerous Goods Restrictions
20) Permeation devices Yes No No Instructions on how to package permeation devices for calibrating
air quality monitoring equipment are found in Special Provision A41.
21) Non-infectious Yes Yes No Instructions on how to package and mark specimens are found in
specimens in flammable Special Provision A180.
solutions
22) Refrigerated liquid Yes Yes No Must be contained in insulated packagings (e.g. dry shippers) that
nitrogen would not allow the build-up of pressure and be fully absorbed in a
porous material so that there is no free liquid that could be released
from the packaging.
For items listed in the Table 9-1. which are permitted only with the operator’s approval, and listed below:
4) Battery powered mobility aids (e.g. wheelchairs);
9) Cylinders of oxygen or air required for medical use;
12) Cartridges of Division 2.2 with no subsidiary hazard fitted into a self- inflating personal safety device such
as a life-jacket or vest;
13) Cartridges of Division 2.2 with no subsidiary hazard for other than self- inflating personal safety device;
14) Cartridges and cylinders of Division 2.2 with no subsidiary hazard contained in an avalanche rescue
backpack;
18) Dry ice;
Cartridges in Division 1.4S (UN 0012 or UN 0014);
23) Dangerous goods incorporated in security-type equipment, such as attaché cases, cash boxes, cash bags,
etc.
If case-by-case consideration is considered appropriate for items requiring operator approval, the Ground
Operations Manager or role within the operation that may grant approval for the carriage of such items
and the basis upon which approvals will be granted should be stated.
Information to ETF personnel including its Ground Service providers to carry out their responsibilities with
regard to dangerous goods is provided:
• for Flight Crew and Cabin Crew in OM-A, OM-B, CSPM and PHM;
• for Passenger Handling Staff and Aircraft Handling Staff in PHM and AHM;
• for Cargo Handling Staff in CHM;
• for other Staff in OM-A, PHM and AHM.
INFORMATION TO PASSENGERS
ETF and its handling agent must inform passengers about dangerous goods that passengers are forbidden to
transport aboard an aircraft. The notification system must ensure that where the ticket purchase and/or
boarding pass issuance can be completed by a passenger without the involvement of another person (e.g.
via internet or automated check-in facility), the system must include an acknowledgement by the passenger
that they have been presented with the information. The information may be provided in text or pictorial
form, electronically, or verbally and must be provided to passengers at the point of ticket purchase or, if this
is not practical, made available in another manner to passengers prior to boarding pass issuance and at
boarding pass issuance, or when no boarding pass is issued, prior to boarding the aircraft.
ETF Airways or its handling agent and the airport operator must ensure that information on the types of
dangerous goods which are forbidden for transport aboard an aircraft is communicated effectively to
passengers. This information must be presented at each of the places at an airport where tickets and
boarding passes are issued, passenger baggage is dropped off, in aircraft boarding areas and at any other
location where passengers are issued boarding passes and checked baggage is accepted. This information
must include visual examples of dangerous goods forbidden from transport aboard an aircraft and should be
prominently displayed in sufficient numbers also in baggage claim areas.
ETF Airways publish on its website information on those dangerous goods which may be carried by
passengers in accordance with Table 9–1. “Provisions for DG carried by passengers or crew”. ETF Passenger
Handling Ground Service Providers are informed about provisions for carriage of Dangerous Goods by
passengers and crew and they shall have it available at each location where passengers are processed.
ETF Passenger Handling Agent check-in staff must be adequately trained to assist them to identify and detect
dangerous goods carried by passengers other than as permitted in ICAO TI. Check-in staff should seek
confirmation from any passenger where there are suspicions that an item of baggage may contain dangerous
goods that are not permitted. Provision of information to passengers including information on those
dangerous goods which may be carried by passengers is published in ETF Passenger Handling Manual (PHM).
Passenger handling staff shall alert passengers that certain items of dangerous goods are specifically
prohibited from being in checked baggage, e.g. spare lithium batteries and must be removed from baggage
where items of carry-on baggage cannot be accommodated in the cabin. ETF Passenger Handling Agents are
obliged to download the most recent revision of PHM and have it available at each location where passenger
check-in and or boarding operations are conducted. In addition they shall have available last effective edition
of ICAO TI including any addenda.
Articles and substances meeting the dangerous goods classification criteria are assigned a ‘UN Number’
under the United Nations classification system. This consists a four-digit number preceded by the capital
letters ‘UN’. Packages of dangerous goods must be marked with the UN Number(s) applicable to their
contents.
Packages containing dangerous goods can also be identified by labels indicating the hazard of the goods by
their class or division or by the presence of certain handling labels/markings.
Note:
As no approval for the transport of dangerous goods is held, packages bearing any of the following labels in
table 9-2. “Hazard labels” must not be loaded on an aircraft.
FLAMMABLE GASES (Division Any gas which, when mixed with air
2.1) in certain proportions, forms a
flammable mixture. Cargo IMP
Code: RFG Minimum dimensions:
100 x 100 mm Symbol (flame): Black
or White Background: Red
Example: Butane / Hydrogen /
Propane / Acetylene / Lighters.
NON FLAMMABLE, NON TOXIC Any non-flammable , non toxic gas
GASES (Division 2.2) or lowtemperature liquefied gas.
Cargo IMP Code: RNG or RCL for
Cryogenic liquids Minimum
dimensions: 100 x 100mm Symbol:
Black or White Background: Green
Example: Carbon dioxide, Neon,
Fire extinguisher, liquefied
Nitrogen or Helium.
TOXIC GASES (Division 2.3) Gases known to be toxic or
corrosive to humans and known to
pose a health risk. Cargo IMP Code:
RPG Minimum dimensions: 100 x
100 mm Symbol (skull and
crossbones): Black Background:
White Example: Aerosols of low
toxicity, tear gas devices; most toxic
gases are forbidden for carriage by
air.
CLASS 3
FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS Any liquid having a closed cup flash
point of 60° or below. Cargo IMP
Code: RFL Minimum dimensions:
100 x 100 mm Symbol (flame): Black
or White Background: Red
Example: Paint, Alcohols, some
Adhesives, Acetone, Petrol etc.
CLASS 4
FLAMMABLE SOLID (Division Any solid material, which is readily
4.1) combustible, or may cause or
contribute to fire through friction.
Cargo IMP Code: RFS Minimum
dimensions: 100 x 100 mm Symbol
(flame): Black Background: White
with seven vertical stripes Example:
Matches, Sulphur, Celluloid etc.
Some are self-reactive.
SPONTANEOUSLY Such substances are liable to
COMBUSTIBLE (Division 4.2) spontaneous heating or to heating
up in contact with air and then
liable to catch fire. Cargo IMP Code:
RSC Minimum dimensions: 100 x
100 mm Symbol (flame): Black
Background: Upper half White,
lower half red Example: White or
Packages of dangerous goods may also bear labels providing handling information:
CRYOGENIC CARGO
LIQUIDS – RLC AIRCARFT
ONLY –CAO
RADIOACTIVE PACKAGE
MATERIAL – ORIENTATION
EXCEPTED
PACKAGE – RRE
HANDLING LABEL
FOR BATTERY-
POWERED
WHEELCHAIRS
OR MOBILITY
AIDS
The following is a list of general descriptions that are often used for items in cargo or in passengers’ baggage
and the types of dangerous goods that may be included in any item bearing that description.
Aircraft on ground (AOG) spares — may contain explosives (flares or other pyrotechnics), chemical oxygen
generators, unserviceable tyre assemblies, cylinders of compressed gas (oxygen, carbon dioxide or fire
extinguishers), fuel in equipment, wet or lithium batteries, matches.
Automobile parts/supplies (car, motor, motorcycle) — may include engines (including fuel cell engines),
carburettors or fuel tanks that contain or have contained fuel, wet or lithium batteries, compressed gases in
tyre inflation devices and fire extinguishers, air bags, flammable adhesives, paints, sealants and solvents, etc.
Battery-powered devices/equipment — may contain wet or lithium batteries.
Breathing apparatus — may indicate cylinders of compressed air or oxygen, chemical oxygen generators or
refrigerated liquefied oxygen.
Camping equipment — may contain flammable gases (butane, propane, etc.), flammable liquids (kerosene,
gasoline, etc.) or flammable solids (hexamine, matches, etc.).
Cars, car parts — see automobile parts, etc.
Chemicals — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods, particularly flammable
liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, toxic or corrosive substances.
COMAT (Company Materials) — such as aircraft parts, may contain dangerous goods as an integral part, e.g.
chemical oxygen generators in a passenger service unit (PSU), various compressed gases such as oxygen,
carbon dioxide and nitrogen, gas lighters, aerosols, fire extinguishers, flammable liquids such as fuels, paints
and adhesives, and corrosive material such as batteries. Other items such as flares, first aid kits, life-saving
appliances, matches, magnetized material, etc.
Consolidated consignments (groupages) — may contain any of the defined classes of dangerous goods.
Cryogenic (liquid) — indicates refrigerated liquefied gases such as argon, helium, neon, nitrogen, etc.
Cylinders — may contain compressed or liquefied gas.
Dental apparatus — may contain flammable resins or solvents, compressed or liquefied gas, mercury and
radioactive material.
Diagnostic specimens — may contain infectious substances.
Diving equipment — may contain cylinders of compressed gas (e.g. air or oxygen). May also contain high
intensity diving lamps that can generate extreme heat when operated in air. In order to be carried safely,
the bulb or battery should be disconnected.
Drilling and mining equipment — may contain explosive(s) and/or other dangerous goods.
Dry shipper (vapour shipper) — may contain free liquid nitrogen. Dry shippers are only not subject to these
Instructions when they do not permit the release of any free liquid nitrogen irrespective of the orientation
of the packaging.
Electrical/electronic equipment — may contain magnetised materials, mercury in switch gear, electron
tubes, wet or lithium batteries or fuel cells or fuel cell cartridges that contain or have contained fuel.
Electrically-powered apparatus (wheelchairs, lawn mowers, golf carts, etc.) — may contain wet or lithium
batteries or fuel cells or fuel cell cartridges that contain or have contained fuel.
Expeditionary equipment — may contain explosives (flares), flammable liquids (gasoline), flammable gas
(camping gas) or other dangerous goods.
Film crew and media equipment — may contain explosive pyrotechnic devices, generators incorporating
internal combustion engines, wet or lithium batteries, fuel, heat-producing items, etc.
Frozen embryos — may be packed in refrigerated liquefied gas or dry ice (solid carbon dioxide).
Frozen fruit, vegetables, etc. — may be packed in dry ice.
Fuels — may contain flammable liquids, flammable solids or flammable gases.
Fuel control units — may contain flammable liquids.
Hot-air balloon — may contain cylinders with flammable gas, fire extinguishers, engines (internal
combustion), batteries, etc.
Household goods — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods. Examples include
flammable liquids such as solvent-based paint, adhesives, polishes, aerosols (for passengers, those not
permitted under ICAO Technical Instructions 8;1.1.2), bleach, corrosive oven or drain cleaners, ammunition,
matches, etc.
Instruments — may conceal barometers, manometers, mercury switches, rectifier tubes, thermometers,
etc. containing mercury.
Laboratory/testing equipment — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods,
particularly flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, toxic or corrosive substances,
lithium batteries, cylinders of compressed gas, etc.
Machinery parts — may contain flammable adhesives, paints, sealants and solvents, wet and lithium
batteries, mercury, cylinders of compressed or liquefied gas, etc.
Magnets and other items of similar material — may individually or cumulatively meet the definition of
magnetised material.
Magnets or other items of similar material — may individually or cumulatively meet the definition of
magnetized material.
Medical supplies/equipment — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods,
particularly flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, toxic or corrosive substances,
lithium batteries.
Metal construction material, fencing and piping — may contain ferro-magnetic material, which may be
subject to special stowage requirements due to the possibility of affecting aircraft instruments.
Parts of automobiles and motorcycles — may contain wet batteries, etc.
PASSENGERS BAGGAGE — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods. Examples
include fireworks, flammable household liquids, corrosive oven or drain cleaners, flammable gas or liquid
lighter refills or camping stove cylinders, matches, ammunition, bleach, aerosols, etc.
Pharmaceuticals — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods, particularly
radioactive material flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, toxic or corrosive
substances.
Photographic supplies/equipment — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods,
particularly heat-producing devices, flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, toxic
or corrosive substances, lithium batteries.
Racing car or motorcycle team equipment — may contain engines (including fuel cell engines), carburettors
or fuel tanks that contain fuel or residual fuel, wet and lithium batteries, flammable aerosols, nitromethane
or other gasoline additives, cylinders of compressed gases, etc.
Refrigerators — may contain liquefied gases or an ammonia solution.
Repair kits — may contain organic peroxides and flammable adhesives, solvent-based paints, resins, etc.
Samples for testing — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods, particularly
infectious substances, flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidisers, organic peroxides, toxic or corrosive
substances.
Semen — may be packed with dry ice or refrigerated liquefied gas (see also dry shipper).
Ship’s spares — may contain explosives (flares), cylinders of compressed gas (life rafts), paint, lithium
batteries (emergency locator transmitters), etc.
Show, Motion picture, Stage and Special effects equipment — may contain flammable substances,
explosives or other dangerous goods.
Sporting goods/sports team equipment — may contain cylinders of compressed or liquefied gas (air,
carbon dioxide, etc.), lithium batteries, propane torches, first aid kits, flammable adhesives, aerosols, etc.
Swimming pool chemicals — may contain oxidising or corrosive substances.
Switches in electrical equipment or instruments — may contain mercury.
Tool boxes — may contain explosives (power rivets), compressed gases or aerosols, flammable gases
(butane cylinders or torches), flammable adhesives or paints, corrosive liquids, lithium batteries, etc.
Torches — micro torches and utility lighters may contain flammable gas and be equipped with an electronic
starter. Larger torches may consist of a torch head (often with a self-igniting switch) attached to a container
or cylinder of flammable gas.
Unaccompanied passengers’ baggage/personal effects — may contain items meeting any of the criteria for
dangerous goods not permitted for carriage by passengers and crew.
Note: Excess baggage carried as cargo may contain certain dangerous goods (see 9.1.3.4).
Vaccines — some vaccines themselves can be dangerous goods. In addition to this, data loggers and cargo
tracking devices installed in vaccine packaging can be powered by lithium batteries and vaccines can be
packed in dry ice.
Dangerous Goods Accident: An occurrence associated with and related to the transport of dangerous goods,
which results in fatal or serious injury to a person or major property or environmental damage.
Dangerous Goods Incident: is an occurrence other than a dangerous goods accident associated with and
related to the transport of dangerous goods by air, not necessarily occurring on board an aircraft, which
results in injury to a person, property or environmental damage, fire, breakage, spillage, leakage of fluid or
radiation or other evidence that integrity of the packaging has not been maintained. Any occurrence relating
to the transport of dangerous goods which seriously jeopardizes an aircraft or its occupants is also deemed
to be a dangerous goods incident.
ETF shall report to the appropriate authorities, Croatian Civil Aviation Agency (see details below) and the
State of Origin any occasion when:
• DG are discovered to have been carried when not loaded, segregated, separated and secured as per
prescribed procedure;
• DG are discovered to have been carried without information having been provided to the Pilot -in-
Command as per prescribed procedure;
• Undeclared or mis-declared DG are discovered in cargo;
• DG are discovered either in the baggage or on the person of passenger or crew members which are
not permitted under the Table 9-1. “Provisions for DG carried by passengers or crew”
To report a dangerous goods accident / incident, the Dangerous Goods Occurrence Report shall be used in
addition to provisions stated in ETF Airways OM-A 11.4.1.2.
In the event of DG accident or incident, as defined in OM-A chapter 9.1.C, commander shall carry out the
emergency procedures in accordance with Abnormal and Emergency Checklist for the aircraft type
concerned, consider using appropriate fire/smoke/fume removal procedures.
After completition of Abnormal and Emergency Checklist for the aircraft type concerned, use ICAO Doc 9481
AN/928 “Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods” (“Red Book”) to
find information for proper response to in flight emergency situations. ETF Ground Operations Manager will
make sure that current edition of ICAO Doc 9481 AN/928 is available on ETF aircraft.
Flight Crew shall use sections 3.1 or 3.2 to find a proper checklist in order to deal with the DG
accident/incident.
Cabin Crew shall use sections 3.3 or 3.4 to find a proper checklist in order to deal with the DG
accident/incident.
Persons involved in such incidents should stay on premises until their names have been noted in case of a
later medical examination. If possible, the owner of the item/substance should be determined.
Any piece of baggage or package which appears to be damaged or leaking must be removed from aircraft
and safe disposal arranged in accordance with handling company, airport or government procedures of
particular station.
Particular attention shall be given to the safety and health of all passengers and crew in the event of DG
accident or incident.
1.) Keep the flight deck door locked for security reasons;
2.) Consider landing at a suitable airport;
3.) Identify the Dangerous goods;
4.) Evacuate and secure the area if possible;
5.) Notify the DG coordinator/OCC;
6.) If there are injuries call an ambulance or provide first aid;
7.) Inform nearest Fire brigade/Police department if on ground;
8.) Notify the airport authority if emergency is at the airport;
9.) Inform the State Authorities.
REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation & restriction of Chemicals) is a European Union regulation
controlling chemicals in Europe. REACH requires for many substances and mixtures, a Safety Data Sheet (SDS)
to be provided either before or at the time of first delivery. Section 14 of the EU format SDS provides basic
classification information, i.e. UN number, proper shipping name, Class/Division and Packing Group.
Some everyday household items bear consumer warning labels which may or may not indicate they are
classified as dangerous goods in air transport. All over the world there are different laws on how to identify
the hazardous properties of chemicals (called ‘classification’) and how information about these hazards is
then passed to users (through consumer supply labels and safety data sheets for workers). This can be
confusing because the same chemical can have different hazard descriptions in different countries. For
example, a chemical could be labelled for supply as ‘toxic’ in one country, but not in another. For this reason,
the UN brought together experts from different countries to create the Globally Harmonized System of
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS).
GHS LABLES
9.1.D.1 Products bearing the following GHS labels ARE classified as dangerous goods:
Note:
A product bearing the GHS corrosive label (depicted far right above) is NOT classified as dangerous goods if
the signal word ‘Danger’ and hazard statement ‘causes serious eye damage’ applies.
9.1.D.2 Products bearing the following GHS labels (and none of the above) are NOT classified as
dangerous goods:
Personnel interfacing with passengers must be alert to indications that forbidden dangerous goods are
carried by passengers. Baggage may contain items meeting any of the criteria for dangerous goods (e.g.
fireworks, flammable liquids) but particular types of passenger may warrant special attention, e.g. camera
crews may be carrying items such as explosive pyrotechnic devices, generators incorporating internal
combustion engines, wet batteries, fuel, heat-producing items, etc.
Note:
The discovery of forbidden dangerous goods in baggage must be reported to the CCAA and/or the Authority
of the State in which the discovery was made.
ETF Airways will utilise suitably qualified personnel of a handling agent at the various aerodromes of the
operation.
The following table shows duties associated with the carriage of dangerous goods:
Persons handling • Ensuring that the provisions concerning passengers and dangerous goods
passengers are complied with.
• Ensuring that notices are displayed in sufficient number and prominence at
each of the places at an airport where tickets are issued, passengers checked
in and aircraft boarding areas maintained, and at any other location where
passengers are checked in.
• With the aim of preventing dangerous goods which passengers are not
permitted to have from being taken on board an aircraft in their baggage,
seeking confirmation from a passenger about the contents of any item
where there are suspicions that it may contain dangerous goods.
• Ensuring that the discovery of prohibited dangerous goods (after a
passenger has checked in) is reported to the appropriate Authority.
Cabin Crew • Ensuring that the provisions concerning passengers and dangerous goods
are complied with.
• Responding to a dangerous goods incident or accident in the cabin.
• Ensuring that a dangerous goods incident or accident in the cabin, or the
discovery of prohibited dangerous goods (after a passenger has boarded), is
reported to the appropriate Authority. For more information refer to OM-A-
11.3.
Operations Personnel • If there is a dangerous goods incident or accident, or if undeclared
dangerous goods are detected, a report is made to the appropriate
Authority.
Trainers • Provision of initial and recurrent dangerous goods training commensurate
with the responsibilities of the personnel concerned.
Compliance • Ensuring that activities are monitored for compliance with dangerous goods
Monitoring Manager, requirements and that these activities are carried out properly under the
Auditors and Safety supervision of the relevant head of functional area.
Manager • Ensuring the initiation and follow-up of internal occurrence / accident
investigations.
In practice, a ground handling agent may carry out some or all of the functions related to the carriage of
cargo, passengers and their baggage. In order to ensure that ground handling agents are provided with
sufficient information to enable the operator’s policies and procedures to be followed, ETF Airways will make
available its policies to handling agents.
9.2. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WEAPONS, MUNITIONS OF WAR AND SPORTING WEAPONS MAY
BE CARRIED
Note:
ETF Airways is not approved for carriage of weapons and munitions of war.
Sporting weapons and ammunition for such weapons may be carried without an approval from the CCAA,
provided they are stowed in a place on the aircraft which is inaccessible to passengers during flight and, in
the case of firearms, unloaded. A firearm, which is not a weapon of war or munitions of war, should be
treated as a sporting weapon for the purposes of its carriage on an aircraft.
When transporting sporting weapons, all due regard to relevant legislation of country of departure, transit
and destination must be taken into account by ETF Airways personnel and passengers.
Content:
10. SECURITY .......................................................................................................................................... 2
10.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................................................. 2
10.1.1. Security Policy ................................................................................................................................................................................................2
10.1.2. Responsibilities ..............................................................................................................................................................................................3
10.1.3. Reporting system ...........................................................................................................................................................................................4
10.2 MAJOR TREATS ................................................................................................................................................................... 4
10.2.1. UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AVIATION ........................................................................................................................................4
10.2.2. Characteristics and objectives of the potential attacker ...............................................................................................................................4
10.2.3. Occurring modes of acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation .......................................................................................................5
10.2.4. The basic reasons making civil aviation an attractive target for terrorist acts ..............................................................................................6
10.2.5. The most common motives of a perpetrator of an unlawful interference with civil aviation .......................................................................6
10.3 SECURITY TREATS ................................................................................................................................................................ 6
10.3.1. Bomb Threats ................................................................................................................................................................................................6
10.3.2. Hijacking/unlawful seizure of an aeroplane ................................................................................................................................................16
10.4 DESCRIPTION OF PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES ......................................................................................................... 25
10.4.1. General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................25
10.4.2. Security and safeguarding ...........................................................................................................................................................................25
10.4.3. Control of access to aircraft .........................................................................................................................................................................25
10.4.4. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE FLIGHT DECK COMPARTMENT DURING FLIGHT AND ON GROUND ...........................................................30
10.4.5. AIRCRAFT SECURITY SEARCH .......................................................................................................................................................................37
10.4.6. PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES ...................................................................................................................43
10.4.7. Security measures during flight ...................................................................................................................................................................68
10.4.8. SECURITY Screening and searching persons other than passengerS and their cabin and hold baggage .....................................................69
10.5 SECURITY OF CARGO AND MAIL ........................................................................................................................................ 71
10. SECURITY
10.1 GENERAL
This chapter is in compliance with ETF Airways Airline Security Program (ASP) and will follow as strictly as possible the
following regulations:
a) ICAO Annex 17- Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference;
b) ICAO Doc 8973, Aviation Security Manual
c) ICAO Doc 9811 (Security Provisions of Annex 6”
d) ECAC.CEAC Doc 30, Part II: ECAC Policy Statement in the Field of Civil Aviation Security;
e) Regulation (EC) No: 300/2008, No:2015/1998 and Commission Implementing Decision C(2015)
8005 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing common rules in the field of civil
aviation security; and
f) National Aviation Security Program.
ETF Airways Crew Members shall be aware that in some States different security regulations may apply.
The scope of the Security Program is to regulate and standardize the security forms and procedures in a way to
minimize the possibility of acts of unlawful interference and prevent them.
The Airline Security Program is written in accordance with the appropriate regulations for aviation security. Its forms
and subjects are mandatory prescribed by EU authorities and CAA. Only the visual forms, storage media, hard copies
forms and minimum text variations are free for a choice.
Security is the one of the first priorities in all our activities. We are committed to implementing, developing and
improving strategies, management and processes to ensure that all our activities uphold the highest level of security
performance and meet national and international standards.
b) Clearly define for all staff their accountabilities and responsibilities for the development and delivery of
aviation security strategy and performance;
c) Minimize the risk associated with aircraft operations to a point that is as low as reasonably practicable /
achievable;
d) Ensure that externally supplied systems and services that impact upon the security of our operations meet
appropriate security standards;
e) Actively develop and improve our security processes to confirm to world-class standards;
f) Comply with and, wherever possible, exceed legislative and regulatory requirements and standards;
g) Ensure that all staff are provided with adequate and appropriate aviation security information and training,
are competent in security matters and are only allocated tasks commensurate with their skills
h) Ensure that sufficient skilled and trained resources are available to implement security strategy and policy;
i) Establish and measure our security performance against realistic objectives and/or targets;
j) Achieve the highest level of security standards and performance in all our activities;
l) Conduct safety and management reviews and ensure the relevant action is taken; and
Ensure that the application of effective aviation security management system is integral to all our aviation activities,
with the objective of achieving the highest level of security standards and performance.
Stjepan Bedić
Accountable Manager
10.1.2. RESPONSIBILITIES
Accountable Manager (CEO) is responsible for overall level of security in the airline.
Security Manager is responsible for ensuring the implementation and maintenance of the Security Program. He is the
focal point for security management on behalf of ETF. The ETF Security Manager is responsible for the contents,
issuance, amendments and revisions of ETF ASP.
Security Manager must be provided with the appropriate background information about revisions and possible
revisions identified in the manuals. Background information shall also be referenced or retained as a record.
Security Manager has to supervise and control ETF ASP to be in accordance with ETF standards and CCAA and to
provide a point of contact to the governmental and other security agencies.
Security Manager has a direct access to
the Accountable Manager. All major issues are additionally processed within ETF Safety Review Board.
Security Manager will keep the OCC informed of all relevant security matters. The OCC staff on duty is responsible for
informing Security Manager of any security matter. They are also responsible for ensuring that all airplane
commanders are kept fully informed, at all times, of any security matter related to that airplane commander’s current
operation and/or duty.
ETF Security contacts:
Security Department: +385 99 737 0006
OCC Department:+385 99 737 0014
Reporting of all incidents, and/or security related occurrences, must be done to the Croatian Civil Aviation Authority
in accordance with the Regulations on Reporting of Events Associated with Safety in the Air Transport (National
Gazette No 57 of the year 2013).
Security Manager shall investigate all occurrences of security breaches after receiving report from the crew or other
staff. All facts and actions during the investigation must be documented and secured by the Security Manager.
ETF Airways implemented the reporting procedures as follows (according to Treat Level) :
- at level 1 - Verbal Warning - Passenger stops disturbance - no other action needed.
- at level 2 the Form Written Warning must be field and signed (Written Warning or Smoke Violation and if applicable
Passengers Disturbance Report- applicable section)
- at level 3 and 4 the Form Passengers Disturbance Report for the Authorities must be filled and signed
In addition:
- at level 1 and 2 a In Service Difficulties Report must be written
- at levels 3 and 4 ASR must be written.
ETF Airways use following in-company forms for recording and reporting of security occurrences.
2. Individuals
a) Criminals /extortionists
b) Psyhotics/mentally deranged
c) Refugees
Dissatisfied employee; religious; nationalistic fanatic
Techniques:
- Infiltration into baggage/freight/stores
- Collusion with airport/airline staff
- Subterfuge (unsuspecting dupe)
Goals
1. advertise existence and cause
2. Intimidate public to gain support for advertised cause
3. Undermine/discredit authorities
4. Provoke repressive counter-measures
10.2.4. THE BASIC REASONS MAKING CIVIL AVIATION AN ATTRACTIVE TARGET FOR TERRORIST ACTS
1. Very familiar/commercial value/prestigious
2. Impact on economy
3. Significant incidents cause a government reaction
4. Vulnerability due to high level of passenger traffic
5. Limited risk to terrorists
6. Use of an aircraft as a weapon for mass destruction
10.2.5. THE MOST COMMON MOTIVES OF A PERPETRATOR OF AN UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL
AVIATION
Any information or warning about an attempt upon the safety of an aeroplane by explosive or other means must
immediately be reported to the station manager or his deputy, who will by his/her side immediately contact ETF
Airways OCC and local security staff and transfer the information.
The ETF Airways OCC will immediately apply a prescribed security procedure. Local security staff are authorised to
implement security measures according to approved national aviation security programme.
At airports where ETF Airways is not represented through own personnel, the commander shall be responsible to
direct and supervise the necessary security measures. LA4-A2-18 shall be filled on every threat/terror call.
If the bomb warning is received in ETF business premises, the recipient shall proceed due to separately published
procedure “Bomb Threat Call”.
In the case of warnings not indicating a specific aeroplane or route it must be endeavoured to ascertain more details
about the alleged attempt by assuring the informant that all information will be treated strictly confidential. If no
details can be ascertained no measures are to be initiated. The information, however, shall immediately be passed on
to the Operation Control Centre and, through the ETF Airways OCC, to Security Manager, where assessment shall be
conducted.
According to Croatian NASP Bomb Warning Assessment the following subjects must coordinate together in a case of
bomb assessment on the ETF Airways flights, facilities, equipment and aeroplanes:
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10 – SECURITY
Assessment of the risk posed by a bomb warning is the responsibility of the airline, airport, cargo agent and Police
against which the warning has been issued.
The Bomb Warning Assessment Team will decide about warning assessment and decide of classification: Green,
Amber, and Red. Final decision shall be made by Ministry of Interior representative.
Green a warning, which may not identify a target or a specific group of targets, or which otherwise lacks credibility.
Amber a warning that can be related to one or more targets but where there is doubt about its credibility or about the
effectiveness of existing countermeasures.
Red a specific warning where the threat is of a nature which permits identification of a specific target, or where the
caller has positively identified himself or the organization involved and is judged credible.
Bomb warnings discovered on board aeroplane in flight are likely to be spurious, but each one shall be considered on
its merits in order to assess the risk involved.
In dealing with a bomb threat directed against an aeroplane in flight, it may be necessary for some or all of the
following actions to be taken:
a) evaluation of the threat;
b) response/decision, including whether reaction will be overt or covert;
c) conduct bomb search procedures in flight according to applicable procedure;
d) evaluation of possible effects of pressurization or pressure equalization;
e) establishment of the order of search (e.g. public areas first);
f) arranging of search assignments for flight crew;
g) announcement of the threat by the pilot-in-command to the passengers;
h) arranging for possible passenger participation in search;
i) establishment of emergency procedures once a suspect explosive device is located; and
j) determination of flight routing, and landing and deplaning procedures.
The Commander shall assess the risk and decide upon course of action taking into consideration the following:
a) The circumstances surrounding the warning to determine if it originated before the airplane
departure or during the flight. A commander shall consider whether the warning could have been
discovered during the pre-flight search or check of the airplane, or at an earlier stage in flight. If he
concludes that the author of the warning is on board and would be affected by explosion, the
warning is likely to be a hoax. A person whose motivation is extreme, such as terrorism or insurance
fraud is unlikely to give notice of his intentions.
b) The precise wording of the warning, determine whether it suggests there is a credible reason for
the warning having been given. A warning is most likely to be genuine if there is a reason for it,
such as a desire to avoid the causalities that would result from an explosion. It is likely that a person
issuing such a warning will seek to ensure that it gets through and that there is time to react to it.
Where no clear reason for the warning can be adducted, the warning is likely to be genuine;
c) Whether is any person on board (e.g. a political figure or other well known person) who might
attract a threat;
d) Whether there are passengers on board who might be responsible for a warning (e.g. a potentially
disruptive passenger, deportee or inadmissible, young people or rowdy passengers);
e) Whether the airline's operations center can be contacted by radio, to establish whether this is an
isolated incident or one of a series of similar events affecting the airline;
f) If the commander is not satisfied that the incident is a hoax, he shall seek information through the
airline's operation center about:
1. the current threat to the airline's interest at airport of departure, with a view to establishing
whether there are credible motives for attacking the airplane or disrupting the flight;
2. The quality of security measures at airport of departure, i.e. where there is/are:
- Effective screening and searching of passengers and baggage;
- Procedures to ensure that passengers who have checked-in baggage have actually
joined the flight;
- Supervision of baggage between check-in and the airplane;
- Security measures in respect of catering supplies;
3. Control of access to airplane; which shall have made it more difficult to place a bomb on
board and militate against the warning being genuine.
4. Cargo and unaccompanied baggage on board that may have presented someone with an
opportunity to infiltrate an explosive device on board the airplane.
NOTIFICATION:
a) Operations Control Centre, which in turn will immediately initiate alarm by informing all persons,
departments, offices and authorities as listed in the MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL – PART 8
(EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS) and:
→ the police;
→ the Croatian CAA; and
→ ETF Airways Security Manager.
→ Airport authorities
b) They will assess the warning or threat but final decision is brought up by Ministry of Internal Affairs
Representative. They will also decide about warning assessment and decide of classification: Green,
Amber or Red.
c) Incident reporting shall be according to ASP.
d) Notification of all persons, other station departments/offices and local authorities according to the
station alarm procedure.
e) Dispatch of an alarm message, preferably by telephone; the message shall in any case be confirmed
by telex.
f) Passengers: Passengers shall disembark immediately. They shall be requested to take their entire
cabin baggage with them. An evacuation of the airplane will only be initiated if deemed necessary
on account of the prevailing circumstances, and only by the Commander.
g) Positioning of the airplane: The competent security authorities and/or the airport authority will
assign the remote parking position to be used by the threatened airplane. This will generally be the
isolated parking position far away from terminal, building designated for that purpose.
The respective airport company is responsible to take the aeroplane to the designated parking position. In the case of
a warning being received while the aeroplane is operating, ETF Airways is responsible to take the aeroplane to the
designated parking position.
Note: The aeroplane is considered to be operating when the crew is on board and the doors are closed.
Necessary towing of the aeroplane will be performed by personnel normally concerned with this duty either without
or - unless a different procedure has been agreed with the airport authority - with an operator in the cockpit depending
on whether a GHM/AM tractor respectively a conventional tractor (with tow bar) is used.
ABROAD:
When a bomb warning is associated with an airplane on the ground, and once the warnings have been assessed, the
following actions shall be considered by airline representatives (and, where appropriate, airplane Commander) in
consultation with Airport Authorities (that must be immediately informed):
a) Disembark passengers and crew with all hand baggage by steps or jetties. Escape slides shall only
be used in extreme emergencies.
b) Remove the airplane to a remote location;
c) Unload baggage;
d) Unload Cargo and Mail. The entire cargo must be retained and may only be released for further
transportation after the scheduled time of arrival of the flight concerned at the final destination.
Mail shall be handed over to the local post office for inspection.
e) Thorough search the airplane using Security Search Checklist as applicable.
h) Require passengers to identify their baggage, which may then be screened or searched before it is
re-loaded; Baggage, which cannot be identified, shall be isolated and handed over to the police. All
passengers and their belongings shall be screened again. Higher percentage of random checks of
passengers shall be performed.
f) Check the integrity of catering supplies;
g) Re-load cargo, diplomatic bags and courier mail only if they have been in the airline's custody for
24 hours or they have been screened and searched.
If the time of the occurrence is included in the warning and the remaining time is insufficient to search the airline, the
examination shall only start after the time specified.
If a suspicious object is found the examination with ETF Airways personnel shall immediately be discontinued. The
appropriate authorities shall immediately be informed.
NOTIFICATION:
a) Operations Control Centre, which in turn will immediately initiate alarm by informing all persons,
departments, offices and authorities as listed in the MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL – PART 8
(EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS)
→ the police;
→ the Croatian CAA; and
→ ETF Airways Security Manager.
b) Notification of all persons, other station departments/offices and local authorities according to the
station alarm procedure.
c) Dispatch of an alarm message, preferably by telephone; the message shall in any case be confirmed
by telex.
1. When a bomb warning is associated with an airplane in flight, and once the warning has been assessed, ETF
Airways or its agent shall consider contacting the airplane commander, directly or through the air traffic control
service, to provide him with information about the warning and device about how to respond. On receipt of the
information, the commander shall require a discreet search of the airplane, insofar as this is possible in flight.
2. When, having received a bomb warning, ETF Airways or the commander thinks it unlikely that there is a bomb
on board the airplane but wish to be prudent-before committing, for example, to a longer flight -the airplane
shall be diverted to an airfield at which it can land safely. Once it has landed, consideration shall be given to
taking further actions as for aircraft on ground procedure
3. When the commander has reasonable grounds for believing that there is a bomb on board his airplane, he shall
consider the potential effects of an explosion on board the airplane on people on the ground, particularly within
densely populated areas. He shall be guided by the following:
a) An emergency shall be declared stating the nature of the emergency, and the airplane shall be diverted to
the nearest airfield at which it can land safely, either civil or military. Ideally such an airfield will be
equipped to permit disembarkation of passengers and crew in an orderly fashion, without necessitating
the use of escape slides. Identification of an appropriate airfield shall be arranged with the ATC.
b) When the airplane is not over a densely populated area, it shall be flown to the nearest suitable airfield,
avoiding such areas.
c) When the airplane is making an approach to land over a densely populated area, it shall be permitted to
land at that airport in accordance with current emergency procedures. Its time in the air shall not be
prolonged in order to divert to another airfield.
d) If an immediate landing cannot be made, consideration shall be given to seeking expert advice by
communicating on HF single sideband (SSB) radio with a ground station which will, in turn, provide a
landline link with police. The commander may also consider making discreet inquiries to establish whether
any passenger has bomb disposal (BD) or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise. Only the initials for
these skills shall be used in order to reduce the likelihood of alarming other passengers.
4. In addition to the advice in paragraph 3 above, if a suspicious item is discovered on board an airplane, the
commander shall direct that:
a) It shall not be moved, touched or opened;
b) Passengers shall be moved as far away as possible and instructed to keep their heads below the tops of
the seat backs;
c) Portable oxygen, bottles of alcohol and a first aid kids shall be removed from the vicinity. Fire extinguishers
shall be readily available.
5. If an immediate landing can be made, the item shall be left in place, covered with polythene and then packed
around with pillows, blankets, coats and other blast absorbent materials. The item itself must be kept dry hence
the politeness) but surrounding materials shall be wet in order to reduce the risk of fire. Brief Cabin Crew to be
prepared for possible emergency landing. Prepare for possible use of crew oxygen/smoke masks. If operationally
possible, reduce the cabin differential pressure to zero by descending the aircraft to the cabin altitude. Do not
raise the cabin altitude. Maintain this cabin altitude until top of descent. When Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA)
and range considerations permit, descent aircraft to below 10,000 feet. Minimized maneuvers and try to avoid
turbulence. Consider carefully the choice between flying fast to minimized airborne time and flying softly to
minimized air loads and damage in the event of fuselage rupture. In most cases, the turbulent air penetration
speed will be a reasonable compromise. Consider establishing landing configuration as soon as possible. On
contacting the airfield of landing, request details of remote parking requirements and immediate availability of
passenger steps. Advise airfield of need to remove passengers from the vicinity of the aircraft to at least 200 m
in an upwind direction as quickly as possible.
6. If an immediate landing cannot be made, the commander shall take expert advice in paragraph 3.d) above and
consider moving the item, especially if its position poses a real threat to the airplane, to the type-specific Least
Risk Bomb Location (LRBL), as described below.
7. It is most unlikely that a bomb on an airplane will be fitted with any anti-handling device. Nevertheless, if it is to
be moved:
a) it shall not be opened;
b) a check shall be made to ensure that it is free to move- i.e. that there is, for example, no thread joining it
to the airplane structure;
c) it shall be moved gently and kept in the same attitude in which it was found;
d) it shall be placed, in the same attitude, in the prepared LRBL, packed around as described at paragraph
(6) above, and suitably restrained against movement during flight or during deceleration or landing.
8. If no suspicious item has been found and an immediate landing cannot be made, the commander shall consider
the following:
a) Although a bomb warning may have been received and assessed as RED, the likelihood of an explosive
device being on board is low. The airplane shall be flown as normally as possible, striking a balance
between the need of a rapid landing and the risk arising from undue haste.
b) Declare an emergency and divert to the nearest suitable airfield. The choice of airfield shall take into
account landing performance requirements, approach aids, emergency facilities and the proximity of
approach paths to densely populated areas.
c) Keep a traffic control fully briefed on flight intentions so that appropriate ground measures can be initiated
at the airfield of intended landing.
d) Brief Cabin Crew to be prepared for possible emergency landing.
e) Prepare for possible use of crew oxygen/smoke masks.
f) If operationally possible, reduce the cabin differential pressure to zero by descending the airplane to the
cabin altitude. Do not raise the cabin Altitude. Maintain this cabin altitude until top of descent. When
Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) and range considerations permit, descent airplane to below 10,000 feet.
g) Minimize maneuvers and try to avoid turbulence.
h) Consider carefully the choice between flying fast to minimize airborne time and flying softly to minimize
air loads and damage in the event of fuselage rupture. In most cases, the turbulent air penetration speed
will be a reasonable compromise.
i) Consider establishing landing configuration as soon as possible.
j) On contacting the airfield of landing, request details of remote parking requirements and immediate
availability of passenger steps. Advise airfield of need to remove passengers from the vicinity of the
airplane to at least 200 m in an upwind direction as quickly as possible.
9. When an airplane lands following receipt of a bomb warning that has been Assessed other than GREEN, provision
shall be made to disembark passengers and crew with a minimum delay (with their hand baggage when
circumstances permit), to provide the emergency services necessary to preserve life and prevent injury, and to
place the airplane where it will not hazard people or premises in the event of an explosion;
10. Decision affecting resumption of the airplane operations are the responsibility of ETF Airways Accountable
Manager.
11. When a warning is judged to be spurious or current security measures are considered adequate to meet the
degree of risk involved, no action need to be taken, although Croatian CAA shall be alerted.
12. ETF Airways will arrange (if possible) for commanders to communicate with adequate police services in order to
obtain advice about potential explosive devices discovered on board airplane in the air.
Captain shall consider moving the item to the Least Risk Bomb Location which is RH aft cabin door in the following
circumstances:
- It is not possible to immediately divert to the nearest suitable airport
FLIGHT CREW
1. Execute procedure to equalize pressure inside the aircraft with the outside to minimize damage in the event
of the detonation and to ensure conditions for device to be relocated at LRBL. Rapid descend to cabin altitude
or MSA without rising cabin altitude and without G-loads, if fuel permitting.
2. When within landing range of suitable airport reduce speed and put the aircraft in landing configuration. Lower
flaps and landing gear to minimize structural load to airframe should device detonate.
4. Landing field pressure altitude shall not be higher than present cabin altitude.
CABIN CREW:
1. Clear the route from device to LRBL.
3. Prepare the LRBL for the device by packing it with soft material (blankets, cousins,…)
5. Slide the safety card underneath to check for anti-handling device. If such a device is founded, the IED shall
not be moved.
6. Refrain from:
7. When moving the device, put it on the rigid flat surface (such as tray).
10. Secure device against moving during descend and lending (tape it).
11. Device shall be covered with polythene and then packed around with pillows, blankets, coats and other blast
absorbent materials. If you are using bags make sure any metal object are removed to avoid shrapnel being
thrown when IED explode. It shall be protected against moving during descend and lending. The item itself
must be kept dry (hence the polythene) but surrounding material shall be wet in order to reduce the risk of
fire.
13. Ensure seat backs ant tray tables are in the upright and locked position. Persons without seats are to sit in
seats with other passengers. For landing, require all passengers to lean forward and hold their heads as closed
as possible to their knees.
NOTE:
A package or article shall not be jettisoned from an aircraft in flight. Tests have shown that such a course of action will
subject the object to severe buffeting by the airflow. This could cause the explosion in close proximity to the fuselage,
or engine of the aircraft, resulting in a loss of control and possible consequential destruction of the aircraft.
In event of suspected bomb threat on the ground or in the flight the aircraft shall be searched in according to ” Bomb
search checklist”. This checklists are located in ”Aircraft Documents” folder on board of B738.
(1) During in flight emergency, CCM (with mechanic if is on board) shall search the cabin, and Flight Crew shall search
the cockpit.
a) The search shall be conducted with flashlights.
b) Equipment areas shall be searched carefully. It is not necessary to search some areas if door, compartment
or piece of equipment is properly sealed or secured and there is no evidence of tampering.
c) Commander shall advise the passengers via an announcement in a calm, matter-of fact manner, the reason
of search.
d) Commander shall ask passengers to inspect their personal baggage and the immediate area around their
seat and the seat pocket in front of them for any unusual items.
e) If the suspected object is found proceed with procedure for discovered suspect object on the board
(2) If there is on the ground emergency, the flight crew and CCM (also the ETF mechanics if they are present) shall
conduct the search according the ”Bomb search checklist”.
a) If necessary, the checklist shall be handed over to the government officials concerned.
b) If a suspicious object is found the examination with ETF personnel shall immediately be discontinued. The
ETF HA shall immediately inform the appropriate authorities. They are responsible for all further instructions
and action to be taken.
c) If ETF is not represented at the airport by an own office or a handling agent under contract necessary
measures shall be initiated through the airport management.
d) ETF Safety Review Board and the Commander may in well-founded individual cases, also in deviation from
the assessment of the warning by the appropriate authorities and the relevant decisions taken, demand
additional measures to be performed.
a) The Security manager/FOPH/OCC will release the aeroplane to continue its flight after the examination has
ended without findings.
All persons, organizational units and agencies to which the bomb scare was announced shall be informed immediately
about the cancellation of the alarm.
FLIGHT DECK
1. Seats, including pouches and containers in seat back
2. Pedestal
3. Log book and flight manual stowage
4. Crew oxygen mask stowage
5. Entire floor including area forward of rudder pedals and beneath all flight deck seats
6. Ceiling, side and rear walls
7. Life jacket stowage
8. Crew coatroom and luggage stowage area
9. Third Crewman's position table and drawer
10.Other locations
ELECTRONIC COMPARTMENT
1. Electrical power distribution panels
2. Radio, radar and electronic racks
3. Interior of compartment and area below floor
4. Landing gear emergency extensions mechanisms
5. Forward cargo hold if accessible during flight
6. Other locations
TOILETS
1. Remove soiled and waste material
2. Remove and inspect container under sink
3. Inspect sink and area around sink
4. Towel container
5. Tissue dispenser
6. Toilet seat and lid
7. Mirror and compartments
7. Stewardess seat
9. Door
10. Walls, ceiling and floor
11. Oxygen mask stowage
12. Open and inspect access to drinking fountain
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10 – SECURITY
PASSENGER CABIN
1. Overhead bins
2. Space under the seats
3. Life vests, emergency equipment
4. Landing gear periscope (not pressurized!)
5. Areas at exits (slides, tail-cone area)
GALLEYS
1. All compartments incl. coffee makers etc.
2. Catering, incl. cabinets
3. Trash bins
WINGS
1. Leading edge flaps and leading edge cavities
2. Wing rear spar areas
3. Trailing edge flaps
4. Ailerons and hinges
5. Fueling stations
6. Other location
LANDING GEAR
1. Wheels and brakes
2. Shock struts and retract mechanism
3. Hydraulic installations
4. Flight control mechanism in wheel wells
5. Wheel well doors and mechanism
6. Other locations
FUSELAGE EXTERIOR
1. Air conditioning bays
2. Hydraulic bays
3. Potable water and toilet service panels
4. Other locations
EMPENNAGE
1. Horizontal stabilizer and elevator mechanism
2. Vertical stabilizer and rudder mechanism
3. Rear fuselage compartment
4. APU compartment if applicable
5. Other location
ENGINES
1. Inlet cowl
2. Engine accessories under side cowls
3. Engine mounts
4. Exhaust area
5. Hydraulic bays
6. Pylon interior
7. Other location
CARGO COMPARTMENTS
1. Cargo handling mechanism
2. Cargo compartment floor and behind side panel
3. Oxygen bottle installations
4. Diplomatic mail locker
5. Potable water installations
6. Other locations
As the circumstances surrounding a hijacking/unlawful seizure of an aeroplane are highly variable it is not possible to
provide specific information to flight crews.
However, the safety of the aeroplane and its occupants must be the paramount consideration and any occurrence
must be dealt with in accordance with the commander's judgement of the prevailing circumstances. Unlawful seizure
or interference with an aeroplane in service is a crime wherever it occurs and as such will be dealt with by the police
or security forces in the same manner as any crime of violence.
When a hijacked aircraft has landed in a Member State, the competent authorities shall detain the aircraft on the
ground and take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander.
Commanders should anticipate that the police or security forces who have the necessary powers of arrest and entry
on premises and property without warrant, will begin to exercise their powers and their authority to control the future
course of events as soon as the incident is reported.
The responsibility of the Commander begins to diminish at this point and he becomes subject to the instructions of
the relevant authorities. Until this point is reached, the Commander solely in command and his actions should be
conditioned by the requirements of the hijacker in a manner, which does not exaggerate the situation or increase risks
to the passengers and crew.
It is the Commander's responsibility to adhere to the lawful instructions of the police or security forces to the extent
that he considers this to be consistent with the safety of the passengers and crew.
A) Hijacker Profile
Hijack usually occur whilst airplane is airborne, although there have been instances where an airplane has been seized
whilst on the ground
The motivation of hijackers varies. The seizure of an airplane may be carried out:
a) by terrorists to publicize their cause and/or to expert political blackmail on a target government;
b) by criminals for peculiarly gain; or
c) by mentally disturbed individuals; and
d) by refugees from an oppressive regime.
A mentally disturbed individual may harbour a desire to die under spectacular circumstances. He may seem to be
confused. He may fail or refuse to name a destination or persist in ordering the flight to a destination that it is
impossible to reach. He may create highly unstable situations, changing orders as the flight progresses.
The crew should attempt to determine the hijacker's intended destination. A hijacker with no firm destination or a
clearly impossible destination in mind may be considering suicide. This person creates a high-risk situation. A hijacker
with a firm, reasonable destination in mind probably creates a situation of less immediate risk.
Hijackers may use or threaten to use firearms, explosives or inflammable liquids. They may even produce replica
firearms or other simulated weapons in order to seize an airplane. Whatever the circumstances, whatever the
motivations of the hijackers or the nature of the weapons they possess or claim to possess, a hijack situation is
dangerous and shall, whenever possible, be handled in accordance with the recommendations detailed in this section.
If information is received that a suspected or declared hijacker is on board before take-off, the aeroplane should be
returned to the terminal. The crew will not attempt to evaluate or search suspicious persons. Trained security
personnel will do this.
Once the hijacker(s) has made his intentions known, the flight attendant should endeavour to keep him away from
entering the cockpit.
The cabin crewmember should immediately advise the Commander on the interphone system of a hijacker(s) presence
in the cabin by using the international hijack code words "Mister Captain I must come at the cockpit immediately."
If the hijacker(s) is in the cockpit, crew should endeavour to communicate the situation to ATC. Generally, hijackers
are aware of the need for communication although they may be suspicious and demand that communications are
monitored. He should be informed that no resistance would be offered, although he should be instructed not to touch
any aeroplane controls, systems or instruments. If the hijacker(s) requests are unreasonable and will place the flight
in danger the consequences of such actions should be explained in a manner, which does not aggravate the situation.
Crewmembers shall never let the hijacker into the cockpit no matter what.
Full account should be taken of the probability of the hijacker(s) being in a highly emotional state of mind. Pilots are
advised to refrain from unnecessary conversation or actions, which may irritate the hijacker(s).
The Commander should endeavour to land the aeroplane using the pretext of fuel, weather, etc., as a reason.
Crewmembers should not disagree with the hijacker(s); rather every endeavour should be made to relieve his anxiety
in order to maintain an effective dialogue.
It is important to try and establish that the hijacker(s) does in fact have a weapon. Some hijackings have been
attempted without a weapon.
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Crewmembers should not attempt to use force unless it is certain that such action will be successful.
After landing the Commander should attempt to stall for time and try to negotiate the disembarkation of the
passengers and flight attendants.
CREW ACTION
- Keep him from entering the cockpit. - Do not open the cockpit door under any
circumstance.
- Inform Flight Crew of situation using
internal communication system. - Maintain control of the aircraft.
B) Hijackers take control of the cabin – NO attempt is made to access the flight deck
Cabin Crew Flight Crew
- Inform Flight Crew of situation using - Do not open the cockpit door under any
internal communication system. circumstance.
- Try to maintain control of the cabin. - Provide the ATC with any necessary
information which can be useful to the
- Prepare for the prolonged hostage authorities.
situation.
- Except the interception by military aircraft
- Discreetly dispose of all alcoholic and monitor frequency 121.5.
beverages.
• Crew members shall not disagree with the hijacker(s); rather every endeavour shall be made to relieve his anxiety
in order to maintain an effective dialogue.
• The cabin crew main duty is to calm the hijackers by talking to them in non-aggressive manner, becoming a
neutral friend and encouraging the hijackers to talk and asking them many questions in an attempt to force them
to thing and get confused.
• It is important to try and establish that the hijacker(s) does in fact have a weapon. Some hijackings have been
attempted without a weapon. If they do not have any weapon the incident might end at this point. If the weapon
is present, a clear description should be sent as soon as possible to the cockpit.
• Crew members shall not attempt to use force unless it is certain that such action will be successful.
• After landing, the Commander shall attempt to stall for time and try to negotiate the disembarkation of the
passengers and flight attendants.
• Local law enforcement authorities, ATC-unit, other competent airport authorities and the Commander shall
be informed. If possible, the Commander shall receive all the details about the threat.
• If information is received that a suspected or declared hijacker is on board, the Commander shall land at the
nearest suitable aerodrome. The crew will not attempt to evaluate or search suspicious persons. This will be
done by trained security personnel.
• Once the hijacker(s) has made his intentions known, the flight attendant shall endeavour to keep him from
entering the cockpit. According to the latest trends, the hijackers no longer want to take the aircraft to some
other country; the hijack is probably a suicide mission. The cockpit security procedure is classified.
• Maximum effort shall be made to contact the Commander. The Commander shall not open the cockpit door
under any circumstance, and he shall report all actions to the ATC.
10.3.2.2. On ground:
• Local law enforcement authorities, ATC-unit, other competent airport authorities shall be informed. The
Commander shall be informed by the OCC if there is a threat, or if there is a suspicion that the aircraft if being
hijacked.
• If information is received that a suspected or declared hijacker is on board before take-off, the aircraft shall be
returned to the terminal. The crew will not attempt to evaluate or search suspicious persons. This will be done
by trained security personnel.
• Once the hijacker(s) has made his intentions known, the flight attendant shall endeavour to keep him from
entering the cockpit. According to the latest trends, the hijackers no longer want to take the aircraft to some
other country; the hijack is probably a suicide mission. In this light, the Flight crew shall do everything in their
power to return the aircraft to the stand, or an isolated position, to disable the aircraft from taking off and to
initiate an evacuation. Situation depending, an immediate stop and evacuation order can be effective.
• After all the persons have left the aircraft, the security check of the aircraft and payload shall be the same as
for the bomb threat, with special attention given to weapons usable for hijack – knives, sharp objects, guns,
etc.
a) respond to hijack calmly, and, insofar as is possible, apply themselves to the safe operation of the airplane and
the comfort of passengers;
b) if they are able, inform ground control by RT that a hijack has occurred, and pass such additional information
as is possible: selection of mode 7500 on Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponders;
c) avoid using forces unless:
→ Petrol or other inflammable liquids are being distributed endangering the safety of the airplane and
there is no alternative;
→ The hijackers’ weapons are obvious fakes
Note: The Tokyo Convention provides for airplane commanders to request passengers to assist in restraining offenders.
a) comply with hijackers' instructions insofar as these are compatible with airplane safety;
b) accept air traffic services' instructions as to airport of landing provided the safety of the airplane is not further
endangered in so doing;
c) Endeavour to land the airplane as soon as possible;
d) demonstrate that all flight crew members are necessary for the safe operation of the airplane;
e) encourage the hijackers to make decisions to tax their energy and to avoid retribution in case a crew
suggestion is perceived to be trick;
f) maintain normality, insofar as is possible, for passengers; (NB. Alcoholic drinks should not be dispensed and
the consumption of such drinks in the possession of passengers shall be discouraged);
g) One member of the crew shall act as the principal point of communication with the hijackers to assist in
establishing a rapport with them;
h) avoid discussions with hijackers on politics or the credibility of their motives; communications shall be
focused on the safety of the airplane, wellbeing of passengers and crew, and on the concerns of the
dependents;
i) attempt to persuade the hijackers to leave the flight deck, in the interests of flight safety, particularly when
landing;
j) after landing, accept taxiing instructions to unfamiliar areas of the airport;
k) advice hijackers to accept fixed (secure) landline communications with the airplane;
l) encourage the hijackers to speak directly to the authorities on the ground rather than through themselves;
m) Endeavour to establish the number of hijackers and their weapons and direct attempt to pass this
information and any other relevant detail to the authorities without endangering their personal safety or
that of the passengers and crew;
n) propose the release of so many passengers as possible, especially the sick, elderly and children;
o) attempt to escape from the airplane when this can be achieved without undue risk and if not likely to result
in repercussions to their hostages;
p) inform the hijackers of airplane un-serviceability or crew sickness or exhaustion as a means of encouraging
acceptance of another airplane or replacement crew.
In the event you become a hostage due to hijacking of your aircraft by terrorists, (or kidnapping by a criminal or
terrorist gang), the following guidelines shall be followed:
GENERAL
Do not discuss religion, ideology or politics, particularly the latter, when dealing with the terrorists!!!
Keep track as best you can of sounds and movements, inside and outside of where you are held. Mentally note all
that you can about your captors-their dress, mannerisms, accents, titles, if any, etc. This type of information will
be helpful to law enforcement officials when the incident is over.
If the incident is lengthy, remember that the "Stockholm Syndrome" may come into play.
This phenomenon is named for a bank hostage situation that took place in Sweden. During the course of the
ordeal, the victim began to display strong positive feelings for the kidnapper. This has been attributed to the
tremendous psychological stress that victims are under and their overwhelming determination to survive the
incident, no matter what. This is not a problem and fortunately, is not permanent. The malady is very common,
particularly in long term hostage situations. When it occurs, the captors usually make note of it, and experience
shows they are less likely to harm the victims.
If your captivity is lengthy, it is imperative that you establish regular mental and physical exercise routines.
If space is provided, walk daily and do in-place exercises. If you are confined in close quarters, do isometrics or in-
place stretching exercises. Keep your mind active. Read if material is available. Do memory exercises. Keep a
mental calendar of what has happened to you. Do problem solving. Make up a story or write a novel in your mind
about your experience. Even daydream!
Consider escape attempts only as a last resort and only if chances of success are extremely high.
Escape attempts are not recommended and shall be a last resort. Remember that law enforcement officials are
negotiating for your release and these negotiations are the means by which your ordeal most likely will be ended.
Always remember that you are worth more alive than dead to the captors, because law enforcement negotiators
will not pay ransom unless they are given proof that you are alive. So have patience, and try to do the best you
can in your situation.
CREW RELATED
Maintain normal crew hierarchy and reporting procedures, if acceptable to your captors.
Do not take sides in your captor's internal quarrels or call attention to their failures and shortcomings.
Do not discuss religion, ideology or politics, particularly the latter, when dealing with the terrorists!!!!
When conducting service in the cabin, never use or leave trolleys in the aisle.
ETF Airways has staff instructions detailing their response to an aeroplane hijack situation. These instruction calls for
defined actions to be followed:
a) On receipt of information that one of its airplanes has been hijacked, ETF Airways will inform the
Croatian CAA and will continue to report developments;
b) Prepare to deploy a ETF Airways team to the point at which the airplane lands, preferably in an
airplane of a similar type to that hijacked, and in possession of information on the specifications
and characteristics of the hijacked airplane;
c) Identify the passengers and crew on board the hijacked airplane, their number, names, where they
joined the flight and their nationality;
d) collate information of the crew, their time on duty, experience of airplane type and area involved;
e) Establish the status of the airplane involved - e.g. fuel state, serviceability, support services etc.
Note: the ETF Airways team prepared for deployment or deployed on the airport at which the ETF Airways hijacked
aeroplane lands must consists of at least 3 (three) top management officers including the Accountable Manager (or his
deputy), and one operational officer in charge for a communications with ETF Airways OCC and Croatian CAA.
The initial notification should be sent to all security services and ATS units within an area of probability to be
determined in each case but avoiding unnecessary alerting on too wide a scale. Circumstances such as direction of
flight, range of airplane, proximity to the borders of other States or to other flight information regions, and the need
to provide any advance warning should all be considered.
This should be done, if possible, within at least one or two hours. As a minimum, all adjacent States along, or in the
proximity of, the projected flight path should be forewarned. It is desirable that all security services and ATS units
follow the same pattern as the flight progresses.
The State in which an airplane subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed shall pass information regarding
the landing to the State of Registry and the State of the Operator of the airplane, by the quickest possible means, and
not later than one hour after the airplane has landed. In every case, the recipient of a message should acknowledge
receipt so that the originator knows the message has been delivered.
As soon as circumstances indicate that special security precautions may be dispensed with, such information should
immediately be transmitted by the appropriate authority for security to the affected States, airports and operators.
The essential information that should be collected and transmitted progressively to those concerned should include:
a) the known or anticipated route of flight;
b) the known or suspected destination and the estimated time of arrival;
c) supplementary flight plan data such as fuel endurance (expressed in hours and minutes, if possible)
and number of crew and passengers on board;
d) the composition of the flight crew and its knowledge and experience of the anticipated route;
e) the presence of In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs) on board the airplane;
f) the availability on board the airplane of navigation charts and associated documentation; and
g) flight time limitations of the flight crew taking into account the number of hours already flown.
In addition, the following information should be forwarded, to the extent that it can be obtained:
a) the number, names and nationalities of passengers and, if possible of the offenders;
b) the number and condition of injured persons on board;
c) the number, type and any other information on weapons, explosives and incendiary material,
devices or other substances known or believed to be in the possession of the offenders; and
d) the physical condition of the flight crew and IFSOs if present on board.
Each State in which an airplane subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed is required to notify by the
most expeditious means the State of Registry of the airplane and the State of the operator of the landing and similarly
transmit by the most expeditious means all other relevant information to:
a) the State of Registry and the State of the Operator of the airplane;
b) each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries;
c) each State whose citizens are/were detained as hostages;
d) each State whose citizens are/were known to be on board the airplane; and
e) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and any other relevant
f) international/regional organizations.
Comply with the following when controlling an aeroplane that has been unlawfully seized:
a) be discreet in communications with the pilot and be responsive to the pilot’s requests;
b) monitor the airplane and use normal hands-off procedures without requiring transmissions or
responses by the pilot unless the pilot has established communication; and
c) if military airplane are dispatched to intercept and escort the unlawfully seized airplane, provide all
possible assistance to the intercepting airplane to aid in placing them in a position behind and
below the seized airplane.
10.4.1. GENERAL
Purpose of preventive security measures is to prevent prohibited articles which may be used to commit an act of
unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means
whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation.
In this chapter following preventive security measures are described:
- Security and Safeguarding
- Control of access to aircraft
- Flight deck security
- Aircraft Security Search
- Security of passengers and their cabin and hold baggage
- Security measures during flight
- Security screening of persons other than passengers
- Security of cargo and mail
Security (aviation security) is safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This is achieved by a
combination of measures and human and material resources.
The purpose and the objective of aeroplane's security measures are to prevent and to assure that no prohibited articles
(or any other article over which ETF Airways has concern) or unauthorized persons are present on any ETF Airways
aeroplane and that access to the flight deck compartment is effectively controlled.
All Items, after the required security controls have been applied to (baggage, cargo, mail, supplies) shall be protected
and safeguarded from unauthorized interference.
Items shall be considered as protected from unauthorized interference if:
they are physically protected so as to prevent the introduction of any article which might be used in an act of
unauthorized interference; or
they are not left unattended and access is limited to persons involved in the protection.
The purpose of these security measures is to prevent unauthorised access to ETF Airways aircraft. The aircraft may be
a place of great activity at any time when parked on ground. During these times, a lot of unknown persons enter the
aircraft and its vicinity, such as loaders, cleaners etc. Such situations may provide opportunities for illegal actions
against the aircraft. These security measures are designed to prevent such actions.
Access control to aeroplane is performed by checking the airport identification badge or valid boarding card (validated
for the date and flight in question) of any person seeking to approach or board the aeroplane. In addition, a stub
control has to be carried out by a ETF Airways crew member for aeroplane on remote parking spots.
Any person seeking access to an aeroplane as part of a statutory duty ( e.g. host state’s CAA security inspectors, custom
officers,... .) shall be required to produce documents sufficient to identify himself/herself and to establish his/her
authority before he/she is allowed access to the aeroplane.
The persons in charge (CCM, SCCM, Pilots) of controlling access to the aeroplane are responsible for:
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a) Challenging and checking the credentials (ID’s) of all persons seeking access to the interior and exterior
of the aeroplane and confirming that each has a legitimate requirements for that access;
b) Stopping and reporting to the pilot-in-command or representative any person suspected of seeking
unauthorized access to the aeroplane, checked or searched area of the cabin or holds and, where the
reason for requiring access is not known, establishing that there is a legitimate reason for such access.
During transit stops, a sufficient number of persons in charge of controlling access to the aeroplane
shall remain on board to ensure that no authorized person gains access.
10.4.3.1.1. Regardless of where an aircraft is parked at an airport, it shall be protected against unauthorized access
by:
a) ensuring that persons seeking to gain unauthorized access are challenged promptly; or
b) having its external doors closed. Where the aircraft is in a critical part, external doors that are not accessible
from the ground shall be considered closed if access aids have been removed and placed sufficiently far from
the aircraft as to reasonably prevent access; or
c) if possible, aircraft is not parked in close proximity of airport perimeter fence.
Additional measures to prevent unauthorized access to passenger aircraft may include:
• Parking aircraft in a well-lit area; adding security lighting, if necessary;
• When possible, parking aircraft in an observable area;
• Parking aircraft away from fences or buildings that might provide easier access;
• For aircraft parked overnight, depending on the assessed risk (done by Captain) at the location, applying a
tamperevident seal to all exterior doors or verifying the identity of all persons who access the aircraft to ensure a
legitimate reason for accessing the aircraft.
For aircraft parked remotely from a loading bridge measures shall include:
• Closing all exterior doors and exterior hatches of the aircraft;
• Removing all stairs;
• Ensuring no portable stairs, lift devices or passenger transfer vehicle are in the immediate vicinity
of the aircraft.
For aircraft parked with access to a loading bridge measures shall include:
• Closing all exterior hatches pf the aircraft;
• Closing all exterior doors of the aircraft not served by a bridge;
• Locking the door between the terminal and the bridge;
• Ensuring no portable stairs, lift devices or passenger transfer vehicles are in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft;
• Locking or keeping under constant surveillance doors that provide access to the bridge form the apron or retracting
the bridgehead from the aircraft and deactivating the bridgehead positioning controls.
10.4.3.1.2. Point 10.4.3.1.1. shall not apply to an aircraft parked in a hangar that is locked or otherwise protected
from unauthorized access.
10.4.3.1.3. Where external doors are closed and the aircraft is in a part other than a critical part, each external door
shall also:
a) have access aids removed; or
b) be sealed; or
c) be locked; or
d) be monitored.
Point (a) shall not apply for a door that is accessible from the ground.
10.4.3.1.4. Where access aids are removed for doors that are not accessible from the ground, they shall be placed
sufficiently far from the aircraft as to reasonably prevent access.
10.4.3.1.5. Where external doors are locked, only persons with an operational need shall be able to unlock these
doors.
10.4.3.1.6. Where external doors are monitored, the monitoring shall ensure that unauthorized access to the aircraft
is immediately detected.
10.4.3.1.7. For aircraft parked overnight, depending on the assessed risk (done by Captain in regards of airport lighting,
patrolling, CCTV, remote parking position, critical part of the airport) at the location, applying a tamper-evident seal
on all aircraft doors and hatches may be required.
Where external doors are sealed:
a) the seals shall be tamper-evident, individually numbered and controlled; and
b) seal numbers shall be recorded and kept at the station by the ETF Airways for 24 hours or the duration of the
flight, whichever is longer; and
c) prior to accessing the aircraft, the seals and seal numbers shall be inspected for signs of tampering. If
tampering is detected or suspected, the relevant parts of the aircraft shall be subjected to an aircraft security
search before boarding or loading.
Where external doors are sealed and the aircraft is then moved into a critical part, these requirements shall also apply
in the critical part.
10.4.3.1.8. The seals shall be applied by the mechanic. The flight crew may use these seals only if the aircraft has to
be left and no mechanic support is available. Instructions for usage of security seals are as per Security seals list on
next page:
Zone Doors and stickers Installation of security seal Removal of security seal
No position
No Signature Check Date/Time Signature
4 Forward service
door external latch
5 AFT Cargo door
7 Forward Electric
Compartment
8 Nose Compartment
door
Remarks: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
10.4.3.1.9. Security seals to be used must be sequentially numbered in order for the Security Manager to be able to
record exact series of seals in operational use.
Security Manager is responsible for ordering and releasing new seals into the operational use. New seals shall be hand
over to the Director Maintenance together with the Seals Release Form where the seals numbers shall be recorded.
Director Maintenance shall ensure seals distribution among aircraft.
Verification of the seals hand over shall be done by the Security Manager and Director Maintenance on the Seals
Release Form. One copy of Seals Release Form shall be kept by Security Manager and one copy by the Director
Maintenance at least for the period of time until current series of seals are in operational use.
10.4.3.1.10. Seals Release Form and seals used by ETF Airways are shown in the Annex A to this section.
10.4.3.1.11. While the aircraft is manned, ETF Airways staff maintains security control. Once the aircraft is not
manned, the airport provides adequate security.
Annex A
Date:
Manager Security
Technical Director
Supplementary Information
10.4.4. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE FLIGHT DECK COMPARTMENT DURING FLIGHT AND ON GROUND
All ETF Airways aeroplanes have secured (Intrusion-Resistant) flight deck doors that resist penetration by small arms
fire and grenade shrapnel, and resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. All doors are equipped with CCTV in
order for flight crew to be able to visually verify situation in the area in front of cockpit and in the cabin.
On board of the aircraft equipped with reinforced cockpit doors the following general rules related to the operation
of the door during the flight shall be applied:
• All the Crewmembers will receive secret emergency entry codes / password:
- Boeing 737-800: Emergency Entry Code. Code must be considered classified and known by
heart.
During that period the flight crew members and any other occupant of the flight deck must not leave the flight deck
except for the following reasons:
a) Health (including physiological needs);
b) Safety
The flight deck door may be opened when required for the purposes of the essential access to and egress from the
flight deck. Whether access or egress is essential is a matter of the sole discretion of the commander.
Before every flight, Commander shall perform pre-flight briefing which also include security matters.
Pre flight briefing shall include:
(1) Discreet communication between cabin and flight crew
(2) Entering procedures
(3) Unruly passengers-levels and use of warning forms
If flight deck door needs to be opened while the engines are running there must be two cabin crew members
positioned at the front of the cabin. One will enter the flight deck and the other must guard the door. Doors shall be
kept open minimum possible time.
The guard is required to stand at the front of the cabin, ideally thew should stand as close to the flight deck as possible,
facing the passengers and monitor the cabin at all times blocking/guarding/observing the hallway/cabin of any
unauthorized person willing to enter the flight-deck.
The other cabin crew member may then enter the flight deck. Before unlocking and opening the flight crew
compartment door, members of the ETF Airways operating flight crew will use the monitoring systems which all ETF
Airways aeroplanes are equipped with - camera and/or eye hole to identify any person seeking entry to the flight crew
compartment, and to detect suspicious behaviour or potential threat.
This procedure must also be followed when the cabin crew member wishes to leave the flight deck. Before opening
the flight deck door from the inside the CCTV or door viewer must be checked.
Before entering the flight deck during the hours of darkness, cabin crew must ensure that the galley and entry lighting
outside the flight deck is dimmed / switched off. This is to ensure that bright light does not affect the pilot vision.
The flight deck door must not be opened in-flight if there is any disruptive passenger incident taking place, or any
other potential security risk.
The flight crew may need to leave the flight deck for physiological reasons. When only one pilot is in the flight deck,
there should be no unnecessary calls in order to keep distraction to a minimum.
When Flight crew member needs to leave flight deck cockpit door shall be firmly closed after he leaves. Before coming
back Flight crew member has to use procedure described above.
During his absence one cabin crew member has to stay in the cockpit for the reason of visual check of situation in front
of the cockpit door facing cabin as in demo position. Doors shall be kept open minimum possible time.
General procedures for closed & locked flight deck door during normal operations refers to all ETF Airways aircraft:
SITUATION PROCEDURES
The flight deck door must be locked at latest after closure of passenger door.
Boarding Before execution "Before start check list" CMD shall engage red guarded door
switch to ON position
Flight deck Before entering the flight deck, cabin crew must call the flight crew to get
Entrance clearance to open and enter the flight deck door. The procedure is same as for
Procedure climb.
Taxiing SCCM to report “cabin secured” via interphone system
Not relevant as no entrance to flight deck or communication to flight crew is
Take Off
required.
Flight deck door will not be opened until the Commander authorizes it (e.g. when
Climb
the seat belt signs have been switched OFF)
If the flight deck door must be opened during the cruise the following procedure
shall be implemented:
5. Crew member entering the flight deck shall close the door behind. The door
shall be kept open minimum possible time.
6. The guard cabin crew member will stay in place until the remaining cabin crew
member exits the flight deck.
NOTE: Should any passenger leave their seats or should an incident of any kind
occur in the cabin, the SCCM shall immediately inform the CMD and the door
shall be closed immediately or left closed.
Flight deck door must not be opened after the seatbelt signs have been switched
Descent,
on or as briefed by the Commander. When reaching parking position before
Approach,
reading "Parking" check list CMD shall switch red guarded door switch to OFF
Taxiing
position.
NOTE: Flight deck door shall be closed prior to engine start for take-off and will be locked when required by security
procedures or by the Pilot in Command until engine shut down after landing, except when deemed necessary for
authorised persons to enter or egress in compliance with National security programme.
When reaching parking position and after engines shut down further communication cockpit-cabin may be performed
through the open door. Before doors opening, the SCCM will enter the cockpit reporting “slides disarmed” and he/she
visually verify on the ECAM door page the disarmed status of the slides. In this case the SCCM will digit the normal
cockpit door code without preventive interphone call.
Non normal procedure on Boeing 737-800 is procedure with door emergency access code. All crew members must be
familiar with door emergency access code. In case when there is no response from cockpit which may indicate flight
crew incapacitation or in case of normal access procedure failure procedure with an emergency code shall be used.
If flight deck don’t respond immediately, before applying non normal procedure, actual situation in the cockpit shall
be checked by interphone call. If there is no response incapacitation of the Flight crew can be suspected.
Cabin crew member (preferably SCCM) will in the cases described above insert the code and after 60 seconds it will
be possible to open the door. However if non normal code is used and cockpit crew is not incapacitated or was not
called from the cabin, hijack or some other security threat can be suspected and the procedure shall be cancelled by
putting door control switch in DENY position. In case of hijack or other security threats crew shall follow guidance
given in OM-A-10.
General procedures for closed & locked flight deck door during extra ordinary situation refers to all
ETF Airways aircraft:
SITUATION PROCEDURES
Abnormal situation in the
cabin e.g. any situation
Cabin crew will inform the flight crew via Interphone
which requires the
attention of the flight deck
The flight deck door remains locked until the situation has
completely been resolved. Crew to communicate via Interphone
Disruptive behaviour
system. In case of hijack ETF Airways Crew shall react according to
of passenger in the cabin
ETF Airways Aviation Security Program and Emergency Response
Plan Procedure.
The cabin crew to inform the flight crew via interphone system. All
necessary information which needs to be passed over to the flight
Medical Emergency
crew (e.g. in case medical advices are being gained by a ground
medical service) must be done via Interphone system also.
Pilot Incapacitation, failure
of normal procedure
(procedure is used under
SCCM shall punch door code and after 60 sec doors
command from flight deck
will be possible to open.
via interphone or if no
contact with common
sense of purser in charge)
Cabin crew will inform the flight crew via Interphone system.
Emergency Situation The Commander will take the decision to unlock the flight door to
e.g. Fire / smoke allow access only if really deemed necessary, as hijackers could be
using such means just to gain access onto the flight deck.
Emergency Situation The Commander will call the SCCM to the Interphone system (e.g.
declared by the alert call via PA) and carry out the necessary briefing via the
Commander. interphone system.
Cabin crew unable to If no interphone response from cabin, the CMD will utilize PA and
respond to Flight Deck request SCCM to answer the interphone.
ETF Airways, which is an aeroplane registered outside the UK and to which has been fitted with a flight crew
compartment door capable of being locked from the flight crew compartment shall have its flight crew compartment
door locked at all times when the aeroplane is:
a) within the airspace of the UK; or
b) on the ground in the UK with its engines running unless essential access to and egress from the
flight crew compartment is required and authorized in the sole discretion of the commander.
The commander shall retain the right to refuse entry into the flight crew compartment to any person. ETF Airways
shall ensure that when within UK airspace (SCD No. 1/2010) or on the ground in the UK with its engines running shall
comply with this security measures:
a) no passenger shall be permitted to enter or remain in the flight crew compartment
b) A re-deploying staff member permitted to travel in the flight crew compartment as a passenger
shall be permitted to remain in the flight crew compartment only if no seat is available in the
passenger compartment
c) Any occupant of the flight crew compartment, including any flight crew, shall not be permitted to
leave the flight crew compartment unless permitted by the commander, or where required for
safety or health reasons (including physiological needs), or for the taking of a crew rest period.
10.4.4.4. Enhanced Security Procedures for All Commercial Passenger Flights Overflying or Arriving to Israel FIR
which may be considered overriding safety of flight concerns include but are not limited to the
following:
→ visual inspections to confirm such things as a potential fuel leak, engine condition, visual
gear/flap configuration, inspection of contaminated surfaces;
→ safety/emergency procedures, such as pilot incapacitation or fire fighting;
→ abnormal or emergency landings where safety procedures requires that the door be open
for landing; and
→ to communicate essential information where there is no appropriate alternative under the
circumstances.
3. Advance cabin landing preparation (fasting of seat belts)
All passengers must be seated and belts fastened from before reaching the identification reporting point and until
after landing (approximately 5 to 10 minutes ahead compared to present time).
An aircraft not need to be subjected to an aircraft security check. It shall be subjected to an aircraft security search in
accordance with point 10.4.5.1.
ETF Airways shall, upon request, be notified by the airport operator whether or not its aircraft is in a critical part.
When this is not clear, it shall be assumed that the aircraft is in a part other than a critical part.
When an area is no longer considered to be a critical part because of a change of security status then the airport shall
inform ETF Airways.
ETF Airways aircraft shall at all times be subjected to an aircraft security search whenever there is reason to believe
that unauthorized persons may have had access to it.
When ETF Airways aircraft arrives at a critical part from a third country where security measures are not equivalent
to measures set out in the National Civil Aviation Security Program of the Republic of Croatia aircraft shall be subjected
to an aircraft security search any time after passenger disembarkation and/or the unloading of the hold.
If ETF Airways aircraft was accessible in a part other than a critical part and is then moved into a critical part shall be
subjected to an aircraft security search at any time before departure. If security search is carried out before moving
the aircraft into critical part, the areas of the aircraft searched shall be either locked, sealed or under constant
monitoring by persons responsible and trained for protecting aircraft, until the aircraft arrives in the critical part.
If ETF Airways aircraft arrives from a Member State where it was in transit after having arrived from a third country
where security measures are not equivalent to measures set out in the National Civil Aviation Security Program of the
Republic of Croatia aircraft shall be considered as an aircraft arriving from a third country and shall be subject to
aircraft security search.
ETF Airways aircraft is exempted from an aircraft security search if it arrives at a critical part from a Member State or
from a third country where security measures are equivalent to measures set out in the National Civil Aviation Security
Program of the Republic of Croatia (Those country are listed in the Attachment C).
ETF Airways aircraft in transit is exempted from an aircraft security search if it arrives from a third country where
security measures are not equivalent to measures set out in the National Civil Aviation Security Program of the
Republic of Croatia and one or more passengers disembark the aircraft then the following shall be undertaken:
a) reconciliation of the remaining passengers and baggage, and
b) verification that no articles were left in overhead bins and seat pockets by the disembarking passengers
An aircraft security search shall consist of an examination of the interior and exterior areas, when they are accessible
without the use of tools, keys, stairs, or other aids, and without breaking seals:
List of interior areas of aircraft to be examined:
• overhead bins
• cupboards and storage compartments, including crew storage areas
• toilet compartments
• galley areas
• seat pockets
• areas under seats, between seats and between the seat and the wall
• flight deck, if left unattended
• aircraft hold
• items contained within the hold
The examination of the areas shall be done by a hand search. A visual check may be used as an alternative method for
the examination of those areas that are empty.
Explosive detection dogs may be used as a supplementary method of examination and explosive trace detection (ETD)
equipment may be used as a supplementary method of examination.
During the examination of the areas in the cabin of the aircraft, no passengers shall be on board, unless the aircraft is
in transit.
Where an aircraft is in transit, the aircraft security search may be performed whilst passengers remain on board
provided that:
a) The passengers are in possession of their cabin baggage when the examination is performed; and
b) the passengers are under supervision of cabin crew in order to prevent movement through the aircraft when
the search is being performed.
Where an aircraft is in a critical part, the aircraft security search may be performed whilst service providers are on
board the aircraft.
Where an aircraft is in a part other than a critical part, the aircraft security search may be performed whilst service
providers are on board the aircraft provided that the service providers and their items carried are under supervision.
The following information on the aircraft security search of a departing flight shall be recorded and kept at a point not
on the aircraft for the duration of the flight or for 24 hours, whichever is longer:
a) flight number, and
b) destination, and
c) origin of the previous flight, and
d) an indication whether or not an aircraft security search was completed.
Where an aircraft security search was performed, the information shall also include:
e) date and time that the aircraft security search was completed, and
f) the name and signature of the person responsible for the performance of the aircraft security search.
Completion of the aircraft security search will be entered in the Electronic Flight Log by aircraft commander. EFL
sample is below. Time when aircraft security search was completed shall be inserted in the Comments section. If, for
any reason, electronic version of EFL cannot be used, then Aircraft security search form (Attachment B) shall be used.
For everyday operations Aircraft Security Search Check List (Attachment A) shall be used. It shall be kept in each
aircraft, one in the forward galley, one in the aft galley and one in the cockpit, on the place to which only crew can
gain access. All crew shall be familiar with the Aircraft Security Search Check List and trained to perform aircraft
security search.
If suspicious item located during the aircraft security search, commander and local police authority shall be informed
immediately. Suspicious item shall not be moved. Location of the suspicious item shall be marked, if possible.
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Bomb search checklist is located, together with other security forms, and instructions how to handle a suspicious
object, in a Security forms folder, which is located in folder containing aircraft documents. Bomb search check list shall
be used when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aircraft may be the object of an act of unlawful interference.
ATTACHMENT A
Cabin Crew
During the examination of the areas in the cabin of the aircraft, no passengers shall be on board, unless the aircraft
is in transit.
Where an aircraft is in a critical part, the aircraft security search may be performed whilst service providers are on
board the aircraft.
Where an aircraft is in a part other than a critical part, the aircraft security search may be performed whilst service
providers are on board the aircraft provided that the service providers and their items carried are under
supervision.
Completion of the aircraft security search will be entered in the Electronic Flight Log by aircraft commander.
NOTE:
If any suspicious item found Senior Cabin Crew Member shall immediately inform Aircraft Commander who will notify
ETF Airways representative or responsible handling agent and ETF Airways OCC. They shall notify security authority
immediately.
ATTACHMENT B
ATTACHMENT C
As regards aircraft security, the following third countries, as well as other countries and territories to which, in
accordance with Article 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Title VI of Part Three of that
Treaty does not apply, have been recognized as applying security standards equivalent to the common basic standards
on civil aviation security:
1. Canada,
2. Faroe Islands, in regard to Vagar airport,
3. Greenland, in regard to Kangerlussuaq airport,
4. Guernsey,
5. Isle of Man,
6. Jersey,
7. Montenegro,
8. Unites States of America,
9. Republic of Singapore, in regard to Singapore Changi Airport,
10. State of Israel, in regard to Ben Gurion International Airport
11. Republic of Serbia, in regard to Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport
The purpose of screening and searching is to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices which may
be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being
introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation.
ETF Airways shall ensure that all originating passengers, transit passengers and transfer passengers and their cabin
baggage are screened before entering into critical part of the security restricted area in order to prevent prohibited
articles from being introduced into critical part of security restricted areas and on board an aircraft.
In order to be granted access to security restricted area passenger shall present a valid boarding card or equivalent
which shall be checked before passenger is granted to security restricted area in order to reasonably ensure that it is
valid.
Transit passengers and their cabin baggage shall be exempted from screening if:
• they arrive from countries where security measures are recognized by the National Civil Aviation Security
Program of the Republic of Croatia
• from the airports within Republic of Croatia or
• remain on board aircraft
• do not mix with screened departing passengers other than those who board the same aircraft.
a) hand search; or
b) walk-through metal detection (WTMD) equipment; or
c) explosive detection dogs; or
d) ETD equipment (explosive trace detection); or
d) security scanner detection system which do not generate ionizing rays; or
e) ETD equipment in combination with hand held metal detection equipment (HHMD);
Where the screener cannot determine whether or not the passenger is carrying prohibited articles, the passenger shall
be denied access to security restricted areas or rescreened to the screener’s satisfaction.
Any person who refuses to undergo screening before boarding or entering an aircraft must be denied boarding, and
not allowed to pass the point of search.
A hand search shall be carried out in accordance with the following requirements, so as to reasonably ensure that the
passenger is not carrying prohibited articles.
A hand search shall consist of an examination of the body and clothing by running the hands over the body and clothing
in a systematic manner, back and front.
A hand search shall, where applicable, include a physical examination of:
• headgear
• upper body and clothing (back, collar, lapels, shallers, pockets, arms, tie or scarf, blouse, shirt, sweater or
cardigan, including pockets)
• lower body and clothing (trousers or skirts, inner and outer waistband, belt, pockets, turn-ups, hemlines)
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In addition, unusual or suspicious bulges shall be further examined. When performing a hand search, special attention
shall be paid to the possibility of concealed objects hidden behind collars, waistbands and belts, as well as within
footwear.
ETD screening in combination with HHMD can replace hand search above mentioned body parts if person who perform
screening considers that hand search is ineffective or undesirable.
When WTMD equipment alarms, the cause of the alarm shall be resolved. This shall be achieved by:
a) subjecting the passenger to a hand search; or
b) either screening the passenger again by WTMD equipment or shoe metal detection equipment
(SMD) where the alarm is only indicated on the bottom zone of WTMD equipment that is approved for use
with SMD equipment or
c) screening the passenger by security scanner
Where option b) is used between 10% and 20% of the passengers who caused an alarm shall also be subjected to a
hand search or screening with security scanner, EDD or ETD in order to detect prohibited articles. Such passengers
shall be selected on a continuous random basis.
Hand-held metal detection (HHMD) equipment may only be used as a supplementary means of screening. It shall not
replace the requirements of a hand search.
Before screening, coats and jackets of passengers shall be taken off and shall be screened as cabin baggage. The
screener can request the passenger to take off any other piece of cloth if appropriate.
The screening by explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment of passengers shall use samples taken from at least:
a) the palms and backs of the passengers hands or fastening (zips, buckles, buttons) of clothes or a personal item
recently handled by the person (wallet, purse, passport etc.); and
b) at least one of the following regions on the person’s body: the outer waistband of the person or the top of shoes
worn or the fastening of shoes worn.
When ETD equipment is employed in combination with SED equipment, the screening by ETD equipment of passengers
shall use samples taken from regions under point (a).
Where ETD equipment is used in combination with hand held metal detection (HHMD), for areas where hand search
is not possible or not desirable, if applicable, it shall be:
a) applied directly to the area; and
b) applied to the extremities/openings of plaster casts; and
c) applied to any area which appears to have been tampered with or raise concern.
For passenger with reduces mobility the nature of the passenger’s disability shall be taken into account when choosing
the method of screening. If a wheelchair, crutch, stick or stretcher is being used by the passenger, it shall, if possible,
be screened as cabin baggage.
Screening by ETD equipment of footwear shall use samples taken from at least the inside of the shoes.
ETF Airways shall ensure that all transfer passengers and their cabin baggage before entering into critical part of the
security restricted area are screened in order to prevent prohibited articles from being introduced into critical part of
security restricted areas and on board an aircraft.
Transfer passengers and their cabin baggage shall be exempted from screening if they arrive from the airports within
Republic of Croatia or from countries where security measures are the same as prescribed in the National Civil Aviation
Security Program of the Republic of Croatia.
Persons with reduced mobility shall be subject to screening in such a way as to ensure that no prohibited articles are
on or about the person being screened. The search shall be carried out as fully as the nature of the disability allows it.
If a wheelchair or stretcher is being used, that too shall be searched.
Hand-carried items shall be screened normally. Persons with reduced mobility shall be offered the opportunity of
being screened privately.
Special attention shall be given to check the true identity of people handing in the baby. The parent shall show the
appropriate airport staff that the baby does not carry unwanted objects. If situation demands, the check shall be done
in a separate room. Note that such parents may hide objects without intent of hijacking, but “smuggling” items ranging
from extra cigarette lighters to drugs. The pushchairs shall be screened as any other carry-on luggage.
Pregnant women shall be checked as any other person, but shall have priority and every effort shall be made to prevent
them from waiting in lines. If situation demands, the check shall be done in a separate room.
Disabled persons shall be checked as any other person. If situation demands, the check shall be done in a separate
room, and a document confirming that a person is disabled may be requested. Any aids shall be screened like any
other carry-on luggage, but every effort must be taken not to discomfort the person. Aids which replace body parts,
such as artificial arms and legs need not be taken off, but shall be screened and visually inspected.
When there is a passenger in the wheelchair, if situation demands, the check shall be done in a separate room, and a
document confirming that a person is disabled may be requested. Any aids shall be screened like any other carry-on
luggage, but every effort must be taken not to discomfort the person. Aids which replace body parts, such as artificial
arms and legs need not be taken off, but shall be screened and visually inspected.
When there is person with medical conditions, if situation demands, the check shall be done in a separate room, and
a document confirming that a person is disabled may be requested. Any aids shall be screened like any other carry-on
luggage, but every effort must be taken not to discomfort the person. Aids which replace body parts, such as artificial
arms and legs need not be taken off, but shall be screened and visually inspected.
Passengers with religious reasons that prevent the hand search of them or their baggage shall be asked to open the
baggage themselves and shall take off all suspicious clothes and put them in the screener, except for VIP passengers.
If situation demands, the check shall be done in a separate room.
Croatian Civil Aviation Agency issue Directive with passenger’s category exempted from screening and this Directive
CCAA must send to European Commission.
Subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomats and other privileged persons
and their personal baggage, other than those listed in paragraph 10.4.6.4., shall be liable to screening for security
purposes.
ETF Airways shall ensure that all originating, transfer and transit passengers and their cabin baggage are screened in
order to prevent prohibited articles from being introduced into security restricted areas and on board an aircraft.
Transfer and transit passengers and their cabin baggage shall be exempted from screening if they arrive from the
airports within Republic of Croatia or from countries where security measures are the same as prescribed in the
National Civil Aviation Security Program of the Republic of Croatia.
Before security screening, laptops and other large electrical items shall be taken out from cabin bag and shall be
screened separately, unless cabin baggage has been screened with EDS which has to be in accordance with standard
C2 or higher.
Before entering security restricted area (SRA) at every airport, security screening provider shall screen at least liquids,
aerosols and gels (LAGs) which are obtained at the airport or on board an aircraft and sealed in dedicated transparent
bag (STEB) in which is displayed satisfactory proof of purchase at the airside at an airport or on board aircraft, as well
as LAGS to be used during the trip for medical purposes or special dietary requirements, including baby food.
Before screening LAGs shall be removed from cabin baggage and shall be screened separately from other items of
cabin baggage, unless the equipment used for screening of cabin baggage is also capable of screening multiple closed
LAGs containers inside baggage.
Where LAGs have been removed from cabin baggage, the passenger shall present:
a) All liquids, aerosols and gels in individual containers which volume is not greater than 100 ml or equivalent, in one
transparent resalable plastic bag of capacity not exceeding 1liter, whereby the contents of the plastic bag fit
comfortably and the bag is completely closed; and
b) all other liquids, aerosols and gels separately, including STEBs containing LAGs.
ETF Airways and airports must provide passengers with appropriate information about LAGs security screening at their
airport.
a) a hand search; or
b) x-ray equipment; or
c) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment; or
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Explosive detection dogs and explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment may only be used as a supplementary means
of screening.
Subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, diplomatic bags are exempt from screening.
A hand search of cabin baggage shall consist of a manual check of the baggage, including its contents, as to reasonably
ensure that it does not contain prohibited articles.
The screening by ETD equipment which requires particulate sampling, of cabin bags shall use samples taken from at
least the following:
a) parts of outside of the baggage that are frequently handled, such as zips. Handles and clasps of the
baggage; and
b) the inside of the baggage including, where applicable, the inner lining of the baggage or the outside
the outside of any large items contained within baggage.
The screening, by ETD equipment which requires vapor sampling, of the cabin bags shall use samples taken from at
least the inside of the baggage.
LAGs shall be screened as cabin baggage. In addition, unless LAGs are exempted from screening with LEDS equipment
or unless LAGs are of a quantity no greater than 100 milliliters or equivalent and either are sealed in a STEB or are
required for medical purposes or special dietary requirement, including baby food, to be used during trip, screening
by LEDS equipment shall apply to:
a) LAGs carried by at least 40% of passengers carrying LAGs or to at least 40% of trays containing LAGs, selected on a
continuous random basis, who have presented such LAGs separately from other items of cabin baggage. The
appropriate authority may set the minimum percentage in this point to 50% and
b) LAGs carried by all passengers who did not present such LAGs separately from other items of cabin baggage
LAGs carried by passengers may be exempted from screening with LEDS equipment upon entry to the security
restricted area:
a) if the LAGs in individual containers with a capacity not greater than 100 ml or equivalent in one transparent
resealable bag of a capacity not exceeding 1 liter, whereby the contents of the plastic bag fit comfortably and
the bag is completely closed; or
LAGs carried into the security restricted area or on board an aircraft by persons other than passengers may be
exempted from screening.
List of prohibited articles which must never be carried on board aircraft or taken into the security restricted area of an
airport are shown in the Attachment I.
If article is not on the List of prohibited articles, but it is prohibited to carry in SRA or in the aircraft cabin, those articles
can be placed in hold baggage, under condition that passengers don’t have uncontrolled access to that baggage from
after check in till baggage claim on destination.
Security screening personal may denied access to SRA or aircraft cabin to passenger whose holding item which they
consider that can be used for unlawful interference, although item is not on the list of prohibited articles.
When buying his air-ticket and during check-in every passenger shall be informed on articles that are not allowed to
be carried onboard the aircraft and about procedure at the screening point. All consequences due to non-complying
with the said information are the liability of the passenger.
Diplomatic couriers and their personal baggage are not exempted from screening. Diplomatic bag (valise) is exempt
from screening. However, if there is a serious doubt that a consular valise contains articles prohibited on board an
aircraft, the opening of such a valise may be approved by an authorized agent of the sender state. If the above stated
cases prove existence of articles prohibited on board an aircraft, or the latter stated case results in refusal to opening,
transport of such diplomatic or consular valise on board the aircraft may be denied.
Passengers and their cabin baggage shall be protected from unauthorized interference from the point at which they
are screened until departure of the aircraft on which they are carried.
Screened departing passengers shall not mix with arriving passengers, unless
a) passengers arrive from the member state, and Commission or that state did not provide information that
arriving passengers and their cabin baggage is not screened to the common security standards
b) passengers arrive from third countries where security standards are recognized by the National Civil Aviation
Security Program of the Republic of Croatia
In the event of detected or suspected mixing of screened departing passengers and unscreened persons, the following
action shall be taken:
• those parts where mixing was detected or suspected shall be cleared and then a search shall be carried out to
reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles have been introduced to those parts; and
• departing passengers and their cabin baggage present in areas where mixing was detected or suspected shall
be screened again.
This also applies for an aircraft that is subjected to an aircraft security search.
Deportees
Deported persons are persons who previously had been admitted to the State or have entered the State illegally and
who have been, by the competent authorities, formally ordered to leave the State.
The competent authority shall provide an escort for such persons, unless ETF has not approved otherwise.
Inadmissible persons
Inadmissible persons are persons whose entry to State has been refused. Such persons shall normally
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be transported back to the State of departure, or to any other State willing to accept them, by the Air
Carrier on which they arrived.
Unruly passengers
Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to
the moment when it is reopened after landing:
(1) Act of assault, impairing, threat or negligence that can endanger order or security of people and property;
(2) Act of assault, impairing, threat to the aircraft crew, which prevents or decreases the possibility to perform duties;
(3) Act with the purpose of deliberate negligence or damage of aircraft and its equipment, which endangers order
inside the aircraft and security of the aircraft and persons;
(4) Take part in spreading and giving false information that can endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight
Special attention shall be given to the high risk passengers, such as deportees, inadmissible persons, persons under
custody, person under influence of alcohol, and various sport fan groups.
• Deportees (DEPO), persons who previously had been legally admitted to a State or had entered a State
illegally and who have now been formally ordered by the competent authorities to leave the State).
• Inadmissible persons (INAD), persons whose entry to a State is refused by the competent authorities.) Such
persons normally have to be transported back to their State of departure or to any other State where the
persons are admissible, by the airline on which they arrived).
• Persons in lawful custody, persons either under arrest or convicted by courts of law, who have to be
transported to another State for legal reasons. For the transport of persons in lawful custody, an escort has
to be provided by the competent authorities.
Although a person is involved in travel in response to a judicial or custodial order, while in flight he is under the control
of the pilot-in-command of the aircraft.
The Ministry of the Interior shall in due (at least 24 hours before) time notify the ETF Airways and the airport concerned
in writing when they plan to embark potentially disruptive passengers. It is the responsibility of the Ministry of the
Interior, upon agreement with ETF Airways, to decide whether an escort has to be provided or not. ETF Airways has
to inform the pilot-in-command of the respective aircraft accordingly.
The following information shall be provided to ETF Airways (and commander) and the involved airports:
• Identity and gender of the person; and
• Reason for transportation; and
• Name and title of escorts, if provided; and
• Risk assessment by the appropriate authority, including reasons to escort or not; and
• Prior seating arrangement, if required; and
• The nature of the available travel documents
The following supplementary safeguards for potentially disruptive passengers shall be observed:
• Detailed screening of passengers cabin and hold baggage;
• boarding prior to all other passengers, subject to coordination with the airline or pilot in command;
• dedicate seat at the rear of the aircraft, no occupancy of aisle seats or seats next to emergency exits;
• no access to alcohol;
• sufficient number of escorts, if deemed necessary in the risk assessment;
• escorts shall be able to converse with the aircraft crew;
• no public disclosure of the flight schedule for transporting potentially disruptive passengers; and
• restraining devices shall be provided if deemed necessary in the risk assessment.
ETF Airways shall be given prior notification by the Ministry of Interior, at least 24 hours before potentially disruptive
passengers are to be transported. Pilot in command must be provided with above information before passengers
embarkation.
Verification of acceptance of the inadmissible passenger, deportee or person in lawful custody at transit points and
final destination must be made by the authorities before transportation takes place.
A risk assessment must be carried out by the authorities for each passenger intended for transportation. The result
shall be notified to ETF Airways and aircraft commander. The assessment shall take account of the passenger’s history,
previous and current behaviour, media and/or activist activity and any other relevant factor which may indicate a
security risk. Based on the risk assessment, the authorities shall ensure escort.
The escorts must be provided to final destination. Escorts provided for deportees shall include a law enforcement
officer. If persons other than law enforcement officers act as deportee escorts, these persons shall:
• have the appropriate legal authority for the task;
• carry proper identification;
• have received appropriate training;
• possess the necessary physical and mental attributes for the task.
Seats must be allocated to the inadmissible, deportee or person in lawful custody and any escorts at the rear of the
aircraft, away from doors and over wing exits. Arrangements shall be made to embark either before or after the other
passengers, depending on whether or not the aircraft is on a jetway. The authorities shall ensure that the inadmissible
passenger, deportee or person in lawful custody and his/her cabin and hold baggage is thoroughly searched. The hold
luggage is to be loaded last in order to avoid delaying the aircraft’s departure in the event that the passenger does not
travel.
The use of restraining devices by the escort must be limited to actual need and must conform to the laws of the State.
Escorts shall be trained in the safe use of, and, subject to government regulation, have access to appropriate
restraining devices when accompanying an inadmissible passenger, a deportee or a person in lawful custody.
States that administer sedatives or other drugs to inadmissible passengers, deportees or persons in lawful custody
must ensure that a medical attendant is provided to the final destination, or that a suitably trained escort is provided
to administer the medication during travel.
The number of deportees and/or persons in lawful custody that may be transported on any one aircraft is normally
one, but may be increased by the Flight Operations Manager. The number of inadmissible persons that may be
transported on any one aircraft is normally three, but only if the persons are on board because of reasons not
connected with security, e.g. lack of documents to enter a country, etc. The number may be modified by the Flight
Operations Manager.
Documents of inadmissible passengers may be placed in the care of the crew, up to Commanders decision.
At the point of boarding, the aircraft commander, in accordance with domestic law and international conventions,
shall assume full authority in respect of such passengers. That authority may extend to refusing to accept an escorted
person in lawful custody or an escorted or unescorted inadmissible passenger or deportee for transportation when
he/she considers that action to be in the best interest of flight safety. Such refusal shall be based on objective reasons
related to the passenger and his/her action or behaviour being exhibited at the time of boarding or at a subsequent
time.
ETF Airways is concerned about the problem of unruly, disruptive and drunken passengers. Disorderly or drunken
behaviour at check-in, at the gate or on board the aircraft conflicts with our goal to be a safe and secure airline and
lowers the level of customer satisfaction felt by other passengers. It also places the additional and often unacceptable
burdens on crew members and ground staff. Unruly and disruptive behaviour can take a variety of forms. For example,
the use of threatening, abusive or insulting words towards a crew member or behaving in a threatening, abusive,
insulting or disorderly manner towards a crew member all constitute breaches security procedures, as well as
interference with the performance of the duties of a crew member, or ground staff.
ETF Airways recognizes the following levels of threats, regarding in-flight safety and security:
This type of threat can easily move to Threat Level 3 and shall be considered with great care.
Even duct tape or bare hands can be used as weapons for choking. The crew shall consider the matter carefully
whether a weapon has been revealed or not when the behaviour of the assailant is life –threatening. The hijack could
already have started!
Level 1
If disturbing passenger incident happens on the ground before ETF passenger passed the gate door the HA
representing the ETF will take appropriate steps:
On the ground –means during the time of passengers boarding the ETF aircraft and with the stairs lowered, aircraft
doors opened or closed.
Level 2
The HA representing ETF must give the misbehaving passenger instructions for regular behavior on board. If she/he is
not allowed to board, the HA representing ETF must inform airport police and Commander giving them all details of
what has been happened. Write ASR.
Level 3
The HA representing the ETF must refuse to board unruly passenger, inform the airport police and the Commander
immediately giving them all details of what happened.
Level 4
CCM must defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat.
Crew shall:
(1) Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs
(2) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from cabin crew and passengers
(4) Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat
(5) Commander shall advise ATC and ETF OCC and request the intervention of airport police
(6) Commander shall fulfil the Form (Attachment III), after airport security intervention, and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
Level 1
If disturbing passenger incident happens during aircraft's taxing the CCM has to intervene and
verbally warn the passenger.
Crew shall:
(1) Communicate with flight crew and other CCM
(2) Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population
(3) Initiate lockdown of flight crew compartment
(4) Attempt to defuse the situation verbally
(5) Commander to consider an announcement from the flight crew compartment
(6) Document all events In Service Difficulties Report (SCCM)
Level 2
(7) If unruly passenger does not accept verbal warning, SCCM, with Commander’s permission,
shall fulfil and give to the passenger Form 1 or 2 (Attachment II or II). If Commander decides to disembark passenger,
Commander shall fulfil Form - Attachment III. Write ASR.
Crew shall:
(1) Use separation techniques
(2) Communicate with the flight crew and other CCM
Level 3
In this case CCM with permission of Commander shall immobilize unruly passenger using the restriction measures
available on board. The person subjected to restriction can only remain in that state till the first landing stop. The
exemption of this case is in further cases:
(1) when the landing airport is in the territory of a State that has not underwritten the Tokyo convention and
where the authorities refuse to allow the unruly passenger to disembark or when the journey must continue
to hand over the interested party to other authorities
(2) when the aircraft does an emergency landing and the captain cannot hand the person over to the authorities
(3) when the person suffering restriction agrees to continue the journey in those conditions
Crew shall:
(1) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(2) Suspend traffic clear zone and block with trolleys
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from CCM and passengers
(4) Cabin crew provide information regarding perpetrators to Commander
(5) Use force to subdue assailant
(6) Commander shall advise ATC and request the intervention of airport police
(7) After airport security intervention, Commander shall fulfil the Form in Atachment III , and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
Level 4
Passenger is trying to breach in cockpit and will use any manner to be successful in that.
Crew shall:
(1) Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs
(2) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from cabin crew and passengers
(4) Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat
(5) Use commands and all available resources and necessary force to subdue assailant and eliminate threat
(6) Commander shall advise ATC and request the intervention of airport police
(7) After airport security intervention, Commander shall fulfil the Form in Attachemnt III, and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
Level 1
The CCM shall give verbal warning to the unruly passenger to call his/her attention to the correct
way to behave on board.
Crew shall:
(1) Communicate with flight crew and other CCM
Level 2
If the aggressive behavior should continue after verbal warning, crew shall:
(1) Use separation techniques
(2) Communicate with the flight crew and other CCM
(3) Initiate the lockdown of flight deck compartment
(4) Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population
(5) Suspend traffic in “clear zone”
Block “clear zone”
(6) Solicit help from cabin crew and passengers
(7) SCCM, with Commander’s permission, shall fulfil and give to the passenger Form 1 or 2 (Attachment II or III).
Unruly passenger can continue the flight with Commander’s permission.
(8) The Commander shall consider landing plan
(9) If not, Commander shall advise ATC and request the intervention of airport police, and then,
after intervention, fulfil the Form Attachment III and give it to them. Write ASR.
Level 3
If passenger still continues disturbance with aggressive behavior with external violence and/or other
deeds that could be prosecuted legally, crew shall:
(1) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(2) Suspend traffic clear zone and block with trolleys
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from CCM and passengers
(4) Cabin crew provide information regarding perpetrators to Commander
(5) Use force to subdue assailant
(6) Commander shall declare emergency and activate landing plan
(7) Squawk appropriate transponder code
(8) Prepare for possible rapid descent
(9) After landing, if possible, pull fire switches and disconnect generators
(10)After airport security intervention, Commander shall fulfil the Form Attachment III, and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
Level 4
Passenger is trying to breach in cockpit and will use any manner to be successful in that.
Crew shall:
(1) Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs
(2) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from cabin crew and passengers
(4) Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat
(5) Use commands and all available resources and necessary force to subdue assailant and eliminate threat
(6) Commander will declare an emergency and activate landing plan for nearest suitable airport
(7) Squawk appropriate transponder code
(8) As soon as operationally feasible initiate possible rapid descent
(9) After airport security intervention, Commander shall fulfil the Form Attachment III, and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
Level 1
The CCM shall give verbal warning to the unruly passenger to call his/her attention to the correct
way to behave on board.
Crew shall:
(1) Communicate with flight crew and other CCM
(2) Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population
(3) Initiate lockdown of flight crew compartment
(4) Attempt to defuse the situation verbally
(5) Commander to consider an announcement from the flight crew compartment
Level 2
If the aggressive behaviour should continue after verbal warning, crew shall:
Level 3
If passenger still continues disturbance with aggressive behaviour with external violence and/or
other deeds that could be prosecuted legally, crew shall:
(1) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(2) Suspend traffic clear zone and block with trolleys
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from CCM and passengers
(4) Cabin crew provide information regarding perpetrators to Commander
(5) Commander shall advise ATC and request the intervention of airport police
(6) After airport security intervention, Commander shall fulfil the Form Attachment III, and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
Level 4
Passenger is trying to breach in cockpit and will use any manner to be successful in that.
Crew shall:
(1) Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs
(2) Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
(3) Solicit help via the public address system from cabin crew and passengers
(4) Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat
(5) Use commands and all available resources and necessary force to subdue assailant and eliminate threat
(6) Commander shall advise ATC and ETF OCC and request the intervention of airport police
(7) After airport security intervention, Commander shall fulfil the Form Attachment III, and give it to the
Authorities. Write ASR.
E) PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Passengers are not allowed to consume their own alcoholic beverages on ETF Airways flights. ETF Airways encourages
alternatives (such as nicotine gum) for smokers. ETF Airways reviews its policy if
deemed necessary by past experience:
a) empower ground personnel and crew members to prevent drunken passengers from boarding the aeroplane;
b) empower crew members to refuse to serve further alcohol to passengers who are drunk or on the verge of
being drunk. The commander may decide to remove duty free alcohol for safe custody when safety would be
compromised if the passenger retained the alcohol. In this case, duty free items must be returned when the
passenger disembarks the aeroplane;
c) encourage prosecution by the police of drunken passengers when appropriate.
ETF Airways cabin crewmembers will inform passengers regarding the seriousness of inappropriate behaviour on
board an aeroplane and of failure to follow instructions from crew members.
When dealing with unruly, disruptive or drunken passengers the safety and security of the aircraft, the crew and other
passengers overrides all other considerations.
• support all reasonable steps taken by crew members in the interests of safety and security.
• support prosecutions of passengers for breaches of the criminal law committed on board the aircraft.
It is a criminal offence for a person to "negligently or recklessly" act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft or any
person in it. In addition, Croatian criminal law applies on Croatian registered aircraft in flight.
The handling of disorderly passengers in flights is at the discretion of the Commander and in co-ordination with the
senior cabin crew member. The discretionary action could range from a member of the flight crew talking to the
disorderly passenger(s), the refusal of flight attendants to serve alcohol, or to the physical restraint of the passenger.
If the passenger will not obey instructions from the crew, he/she shall be informed that an unplanned landing may be
carried out.
The Commander must decide whether to arrange for the police to meet the aircraft on landing.
In some foreign countries the local police may not have jurisdiction to arrest and detain passengers who have
committed crimes on board a Croatian registered aircraft. Little can then be done in such circumstances. However, the
problem shall be reported to the Security Manager as sometimes the passenger can be arrested on return to Croatia.
Where the police are called (whether in Croatia or foreign airports) the Commander must ensure that the crew will
give all support necessary in providing statements about the incident with a view to mounting a successful prosecution
of the disruptive passenger.
REPORTING PROCEDURES
In case of a serious incident with disorderly passenger(s) the Commander will request airport police, or security staff,
to meet the aircraft on arrival and, if necessary, charge the passenger(s) with an offence.
The appropriate sections of the PASSENGER DISTURBANCE REPORT are completed, and the relevant printed form
(WRITTEN WARNING), signed by the SCCM on behalf of the Commander, is handed to the passenger.
STAGE 3 - Appropriate Authorities notified (See Attachment III) (LEVEL 3 & 4 Treat)
The appropriate sections of the PASSENGER DISTURBANCE REPORT are completed by the Commander. The authorities
will be called to meet the passenger on landing for appropriate actions.
All forms are located in the aircraft cabin on the disposal of the cabin crew in order not to compromise cockpit
security.
Attachment II
PISANO UPOZORENJE / WRITTEN WARNING
PREKRŠAJ
NEPRIHVATLJIVO PONAŠANJE NA ZRAKOPLOVU
VIOLATION
UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR ON BOARD THIS AIRCRAFT
Već ste bili upozoreni od strane kabinskog osoblja da je vaše ponašanje na zrakoplovu neprihvatljivo. Bez
odlaganja morate poštivati upute posade. Ako ne poslušate, postoji mogućnost da sletimo na najbliži aerodrom i
iskrcamo Vas. Od Vas će se tražiti naknada za troškove dodatnog slijetanja, a vaša karta neće važiti za nastavak
putovanja.
You have already been told by the cabin crew that your behaviour on board this aircraft is unacceptable. You must
comply with the crew’s instructions with Immediate Effect. If you fail to comply, I may decide to land the aircraft at
the nearest available location and off-load you. Claims will be made against you for the diversion costs and your
ticket will be invalidated for further carriage.
Nakon slijetanja, prijavit ćemo detalje vašeg ponašanja policijskim vlastima radi moguće prijave.
On arrival, details of your conduct will be reported to the police authorities for possible prosecution.
Kabinsko osoblje Vas je upozorilo da je pušenje na zrakoplovu zabranjeno, a uključen je i znak zabrane pušenja. Ako
nastavite pušiti, ili pokušate pušiti ponovo, zahtjevat ću od policije da vas presretne na izlasku iz zrakoplova i
poduzme potrebne mjere. ETF Airways će prijaviti vaše ponašanje vlastima u svrhu istrage i moguće prijave. Od Vas
će se tražiti da namirite troškove koji se mogu pojaviti kao rezultat Vašeg ponašanja.
FINAL WARNING from the Captain of this aircraft. This is a non-smoking flight!
You have been told by the cabin crew not to smoke on board this aircraft and the ‘No Smoking’ sign is on. If you smoke
or attempt to smoke again, I will request the police authorities to meet this aircraft on arrival and take appropriate
actions. ETF Airways will report your conduct to the authorities for investigation and possible prosecution. Claims will
be made against you for any costs incurred as a result of your conduct.
Attachment III
Date: __________ Flt No: ________ STD (UTC): _________ A/C Type: ________
Captain: __________________________
Crew: ___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Stage 2 / Stage 3*
Written warning given to passenger
1. Location of Incident:
2. Nature of Incident:
5. Action Taken:
Witness 1
Witness 2
List of prohibited articles which are not permitted to carry into security restricted areas and on board an aircraft are
listed below.
Exemption of the above may be granted provided:
a) CCAA has given approval that the item can be carried
b) ETF Airways has been notified about passenger and item carried by him/her, before boarding an
aircraft
c) that applicable safety and security rules are met.
Those items are then placed on the aircraft in secure conditions.
If article is not on the List of prohibited articles, but it is prohibited to carry in SRA or in the aircraft cabin, those articles
can be placed in hold baggage, under condition that passengers don’t have uncontrolled access to that baggage from
after check in till baggage claim on destination.
Security screening personal may denied access to SRA or aircraft cabin to passenger whose holding item which they
consider that can be used for unlawful interference, although item is not on the list of prohibited articles.
Without prejudice to applicable safety rules, passengers are not permitted to carry the following articles into
security restricted areas and on board an aircraft:
(a) guns, firearms and other devices that discharge projectiles — devices capable, or appearing capable, of being
used to cause serious injury by discharging a projectile, including:
— firearms of all types, such as pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns,
— toy guns, replicas and imitation firearms capable of being mistaken for real weapons,
— component parts of firearms, excluding telescopic sights,
— compressed air and CO2 guns, such as pistols, pellet guns, rifles and ball bearing guns,
— signal flare pistols and starter pistols,
— bows, cross bows and arrows,
— harpoon guns and spear guns,
— slingshots and catapults;
(c) objects with a sharp point or sharp edge — objects with a sharp point or sharp edge capable of being used to
cause serious injury, including:
— items designed for chopping, such as axes, hatchets and cleavers,
— ice axes and ice picks,
— razor blades,
— box cutters,
— knives with blades of more than 6 cm,
— scissors with blades of more than 6 cm as measured from the fulcrum,
— martial arts equipment with a sharp point or sharp edge,
— swords and sabres;
(d) workmen's tools — tools capable of being used either to cause serious injury or to threaten the safety of aircraft,
including:
— crowbars,
— drills and drill bits, including cordless portable power drills,
— tools with a blade or a shaft of more than 6 cm capable of use as a weapon, such as screwdrivers and chisels,
— saws, including cordless portable power saws,
— blowtorches,
— bolt guns and nail guns;
(e) blunt instruments — objects capable of being used to cause serious injury when used to hit, including:
— baseball and softball bats,
— clubs and batons, such as billy clubs, blackjacks and night sticks,
— martial arts equipment;
(f) explosives and incendiary substances and devices — explosives and incendiary substances and devices capable, or
appearing capable, of being used to cause serious injury or to pose a threat to the safety of aircraft, including:
— ammunition,
— blasting caps,
— detonators and fuses,
— replica or imitation explosive devices,
— mines, grenades and other explosive military stores,
— fireworks and other pyrotechnics,
— smoke-generating canisters and smoke-generating cartridges,
— dynamite, gunpowder and plastic explosives.
Purpose of security measures is to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices which may be used
to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being introduced,
by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation All hold baggage shall be
screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft in order to prevent prohibited articles from being introduced into
security restricted areas and on board aircraft.
ETF Airways will try to ensure, through ETF Airways services and contracted handling agents that every passenger
travels on the same flight as their checked hold baggage. Where that it is not the case that hold baggage shall be
considered as unaccompanied baggage (RUSH BAG).
If a passenger checked in for a flight, who has placed baggage in custody of ETF Airways (or handling agent), is not
onboard the aeroplane, such hold baggage shall be removed from the aeroplane and shall not be carried on that flight.
Where the screener cannot determine whether or not the hold baggage contains any prohibited articles, it shall be
rejected or rescreened to the screener’s satisfaction.
A hand search shall consist of a thorough manual check of the baggage, including all its contents, so as to reasonably
ensure that it does not contain prohibited articles.
Transit hold baggage can be exempt from screening if it stays on board aircraft.
The CCAA may allow a diplomatic bag to be exempted from screening or to be subject to special security procedures
provided that requirements of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations are met.
All transfer hold baggage shall be screened prior to being loaded onto an aircraft in order to prevent prohibited articles
from being introduced into security restricted areas and on board aircraft except
• transfer hold baggage have been screened to the standards recognized by the National Civil Aviation Security
Program of the Republic of Croatia; or
• transfer hold baggage arrived from the countries where security standards are the same as common security
standards prescribed in the National Civil Aviation Security Program of the Republic of Croatia.
Hold baggage to be carried on an aircraft shall be protected from unauthorized interference from the point at which
it is screened or accepted into the care of the ETF Airways, whichever is earlier, until the departure of the aircraft on
which it is to be carried.
15.12.2020 Rev.0 Page 66 of 76
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
10 – SECURITY
Hold baggage that has not been protected from unauthorized interference shall be rescreened.
Passengers shall not be allowed access to screened hold baggage, unless it is their own baggage and they are
supervised to ensure that:
a) no prohibited articles are introduced into the hold baggage; or
b) no prohibited articles are removed from the hold baggage and introduced into the security restricted areas or
on board an aircraft.
Hold baggage that is in the critical part shall be considered as protected from unauthorized access.
Hold baggage that is in the part other than critical part shall be considered as protected from unauthorized
interference if:
a) it is secured baggage; or
b) it is not left unattended at the airports where alternative provisions apply in accordance with point 1.8, Part
2, of the National Civil Aviation Security Program of the Republic of Croatia.
Where secured baggage is handled by unscreened parsons, measures shall be taken to ensure that that baggage has
not been tempered with before being loaded onto an aircraft.
Access to the baggage make-up and storage areas shall be limited to those staff who have an operational requirement
to enter the area. These shall include those involved in the loading, unloading and protection of hold baggage and
persons authorised by the appropriate authority to be allowed access to the baggage make-up and storage areas.
Passengers are not permitted to carry the following articles in their hold baggage:
explosives and incendiary substances and devices — explosives and incendiary substances and devices capable of
being used to cause serious injury or to pose a threat to the safety of aircraft, including:
— ammunition,
— blasting caps,
— detonators and fuses,
— mines, grenades and other explosive military stores,
— fireworks and other pyrotechnics,
— smoke-generating canisters and smoke-generating cartridges,
— dynamite, gunpowder and plastic explosives.
As a general rule ETF Airways DOES NOT ALLOW to any person to carry on firearms or weapons on ETF Airways flights.
It is forbidden to bring in firearms, explosives or their components or any other arms or article that could be used for
unlawful interference to civil aviation operations unless there is an authorization for carrying arms on board aircraft.
As Croatian Air Transport Law approve the carriage of firearms and weapons on commercial flights only under very
stringent regulations and procedures. ETF Airways will allow transport according to National security programIn the
same time, depending of departure state of ETF Airways flights, ETF Airways will strictly respect all national laws,
regulations and procedures regulating transport of firearms and weapons.
ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE
The acceptance of such a payload must be coordinated with the Commander. Passenger must declare that he has a
weapon which he wants to carry in the hold baggage. It must be referred to supervisory personnel and/or the airport
police. After it has been determined that the possession of weapons and/or ammunition does not constitute a breach
of national law and if it is established that there is no criminal intent on the part of the passenger, the item(s) shall be
taken from the passenger and transported as hold baggage for which a standard claim tag is issued.
Carriage of firearms by armed individuals, on board ETF Airways aircraft is permitted only by request and after
authorization from the ETF Airways and Ministry of Interior of Croatia. The following must be observed:
• the weapon must be concealed at all times so the other passengers cannot obviously notice the weapon
• the flight crew and cabin crew have to be notified, and know the seating arrangement
• the prisoner/deportee is restrained
• if other armed individuals are on board, they must be notified of each other seating
• alcohol shall not be served to an armed individual on board ETF Airways flight
Carriage of firearms by air marshal, on board ETF Airways aircraft is permitted only after authorization from the ETF
Airways and Ministry of Interior of Croatia.
10.4.8. SECURITY SCREENING AND SEARCHING PERSONS OTHER THAN PASSENGERS AND THEIR CABIN AND HOLD
BAGGAGE
Purpose of security measures is to prevent prohibited articles from being introduced into security restricted areas and
on board aircraft.
Crew members must take good care of their baggage. One of the easiest ways to bring an unwanted device to the
aircraft is by tampering with the crews' baggage while the crew is in a hotel, at the airport, in the toilet etc. It is the
duty of the Commander and the SCCM to warn other crew members if they attend to their baggage in such a way that
unwanted object can be inserted without problems.
Crew members shall not accept sealed parcels from other persons. Any sealed package belonging to a crew member
shall at all times be carried by the crew member concerned onto the aircraft personally and shall not be entrusted to
any other crew members.
Crew shall be checked by the same standards as passengers and shall wear their crew ID.
Passengers shall be screened by:
a) hand search; or
b) walk-through metal detection (WTMD) equipment; or
c) explosive detection dogs; or
d) ETD equipment (explosive trace detection); or
d) security scanner detection system which do not generate ionizing rays; or
e) ETD equipment in combination with hand held metal detection equipment (HHMD);
Crew cabin baggage shall be normally checked by the same standards as for passengers.
Cabin baggage shall be screened by:
a) a hand search; or
b) x-ray equipment; or
c) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment; or
d) explosive detection dogs in combination with point a)
e) explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment
Crew hold baggage shall be normally checked by the same standards as for passengers.
The following methods shall be used to screen hold baggage:
a) a hand search; or
b) x-ray equipment; or
c) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment; or
d) explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment; or
e) explosive detection dogs.
Persons other than passengers shall not be permitted to carry into security restricted areas the articles listed below
(LIST OF PROHIBITED ARTICLES):
(a) guns, firearms and other devices that discharge projectiles — devices capable, or appearing capable, of being used
to cause serious injury by discharging a projectile, including:
— firearms of all types, such as pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns,
— toy guns, replicas and imitation firearms capable of being mistaken for real weapons,
— component parts of firearms, excluding telescopic sights,
— compressed air and CO2 guns, such as pistols, pellet guns, rifles and ball bearing guns,
— signal flare pistols and starter pistols,
— bows, cross bows and arrows,
— harpoon guns and spear guns,
— slingshots and catapults;
(b) stunning devices — devices designed specifically to stun or immobilise, including: — devices for shocking, such as
stun guns, tasers and stun batons,
— animal stunners and animal killers,
— disabling and incapacitating chemicals, gases and sprays, such as mace, pepper sprays, capsicum sprays, tear gas,
acid sprays and animal repellent sprays;
(d) any other article capable of being used to cause serious injury and which is not commonly used in security restricted
areas, e.g. martial arts equipment, swords, sabres, etc.
ETF Airways will not accept cargo from third countries which are not listed in Annex IV-6-6 of the National Civil Aviation
Security Program of the Republic of Croatia.
PURPOSE OF MEASURES
To prevent prohibited articles, which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing
of which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in
international civil aviation.
All cargo, courier and express parcels intended to be carried on passenger or all-cargo aircraft shall be subjected to
the security controls detailed hereunder before being placed on board aircraft. Before being loaded on board
passenger or all-cargo aircraft, consignments shall be either:
a) delivered as known cargo to the ETF Airways by regulated agents and/or known consignors; or
b) subject to screening.
All cargo and mail shall be screened by a regulated agent before being loaded on to an aircraft, unless:
a) the required security controls have been applied to the consignment by a regulated agent and the
consignment has been protected from unauthorized interference from the time that those security controls
were applied and until loading; or
b) the required security controls have been applied to the consignment by a known consignor and the
consignment has been protected from unauthorized interference from the time that those security controls
were applied and until loading; or
c) the required security controls have been applied to the consignment by an account consignor, the
consignment has been protected from unauthorized interference from the time that those security controls
were applied and until loading, and it is not carried on a passenger aircraft; or
d) the consignment is exempt from screening and has been protected from unauthorized interference from the
time that it became identifiable air cargo or identifiable air mail and until loading.
Where there is any reason to believe that a consignment to which security controls have been applied has been
tampered with or has not been protected from unauthorized interference from the time that those controls were
applied, it shall be screened by a regulated agent before being loaded on to an aircraft.
A hand search shall consist of a thorough manual check of the consignment, including all its contents.
Screening by explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment shall consist of the analysis of samples taken from both the
inside and the outside of the consignment and from its contents. The contents may also be subjected to a hand search.
A visual check shall consist of a thorough visual check of the consignment and shall only be allowed:
a) in combination with other methods; or
b) where all parts of the consignment can actually be seen, with or without aids; or
c) for live animals.
Accompanied baggage means any hold baggage which is placed in the custody of the air carrier by a passenger who is
carried on the same flight as that baggage.
Unaccompanied baggage means baggage which does not travel on the same aircraft as the passenger. There are
essentially three types of unaccompanied baggage:
a) Baggage which is presented to ETF Airways by a passenger or his/her agent to be transported unaccompanied
as cargo on an air waybill (e.g. personal effects etc.).
b) Baggage which never had a passenger associated with it and was not consigned legitimately as cargo (e.g.
rogue baggage).
c) Baggage which was accompanied initially but later became unaccompanied, for one of the following reasons:
i. a passenger does not travel on the flight on which he/she and his/her baggage was checked-in, either
because he/she failed to show, or because he/she was off-loaded;
ii. the baggage does not travel on the flight on which it and the passenger are checked-in to travel, e.g.
because the baggage was misrouted or loaded on the wrong aircraft.
Provenance is the history of an individual item of baggage from the time when the baggage was presented to ETF
Airways or its contracted agent for carriage. This includes the circumstances and reasons why an unaccompanied
baggage became separated from a passenger, the audit trail of the baggage and the passenger, including the current
whereabouts of the passenger.
Baggage which has been accepted as cargo by ETF Airways, at the outset without a passenger, must be considered as
unknown cargo, travel on an air waybill and be screened.
Unidentified baggage (which would include rogue baggage) must be treated as suspect. This baggage must not be
permitted for carriage unless a definite link can be established with a passenger and the baggage is screened.
Where a passenger fails to join the flight on which he/she has been checked-in to travel, or is off-loaded, the baggage
must be off-loaded from the aircraft and either:
a) the link with the passenger is re-established and the passenger and baggage rechecked-in on another flight,
so that the baggage becomes accompanied again; or
b) the baggage is subjected to screening before carriage.
Where a passenger travels on the flight on which he/she was checked-in but the baggage fails to meet the flight, and
becomes unaccompanied, determination of provenance can be an acceptable means of security control.
There are certain circumstances where there is major disruption to airport operations through some outside and
independent agency, which could not have been planned. These would include:
a) major weather disruption
b) an aircraft incident on the ground restricting runway capacity, or
c) a major failure of a key airport system, e.g. electrical power
d) a major failure of Air Traffic Control (ATC).
In such special circumstances, passengers may be reallocated to other flights at short notice and the matching of
baggage with the reallocated flights may be compromised. Determination of provenance can be an acceptable
method of security control for this type of baggage.
The guiding principle for the application of provenance is that the ETF Airways must be able to establish effectively
the detailed circumstances under which a baggage has become unaccompanied and that there is no possibility that
the unaccompanied status could have been contrived deliberately by a passenger or accomplice.
Provenance could be considered as an acceptable means of security control only under strict conditions and
procedures.
ETF Airways shall establish that a passenger did travel on the flight on which he/she was checked-in, or that a
passenger was re-routed on to a different flight solely by the ETF Airways, not at the passenger’s request.
In addition, the ETF Airways shall investigate the circumstances in which the baggage became separated from a
passenger. Provenance can be an acceptable method of security control in the following circumstances, which are
outside a passenger’s control:
a) The baggage was delayed in transfer between two flights due to unforeseeable reasons and missed the
departing flight.
b) There was a breakdown of the baggage system causing the baggage to be delayed and miss the flight.
c) The baggage was loaded on the wrong aircraft by the ETF Airways or ground handling agent.
d) A passenger is denied boarding an overbooked flight by ETF Airways. This does not apply where a passenger
volunteered to give up his seat.
e) A passenger was re-allocated to another flight by ETF Airways as a result of major disruption at the airport,
i.e. weather, ATC, an aircraft incident on the ground or a major failure of an airport system.
The foregoing considerations shall be recorded as an audit trail for each baggage by a properly trained and authorized
person of the ETF Airways or its contracted agent, before the baggage is loaded on to a flight.
ETF Airways accepting unaccompanied baggage from another air carrier must obtain a written record of security
controls carried out for this baggage before accepting it for carriage.
ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE
Mail carried on ETF Airways aircraft shall be subjected to security controls before being placed on board an aircraft.
As for Cargo, Mail shall be screened by at least one of the following methods:
h) hand search;
i) x-ray equipment;
j) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment;
k) explosive detection dogs;
l) explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment;
m) visual check.
n) Metal detection equipment
A hand search shall consist of a thorough manual check of the consignment, including all its contents.
Screening by explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment shall consist of the analysis of samples taken from both the
inside and the outside of the consignment and from its contents. The contents may also be subjected to a hand search.
A visual check shall consist of a thorough visual check of the consignment and shall only be allowed:
d) in combination with other methods; or
e) where all parts of the consignment can actually be seen, with or without aids; or
f) for live animals.
Additionally, the following shall apply:
Time-sensitive mail (i.e. up to 48-hour delivery) shall only be carried by air where the following security controls have
been applied:
a) the reception, processing and handling of mail is performed by properly recruited and trained staff;
b) mail shall be:
i. searched by hand or physical checks;
ii. screened by X-ray equipment;
iii. subjected to simulation chamber; or
iv. subjected to other means, procedural, technical and bio-sensory (e.g. sniffers, trace detectors,
explosive detection dogs, etc.) so as to reasonably ensure that the mail does not contain any
prohibited articles; and
c) flight details and aircraft routing on which the mail is to be carried shall remain confidential.
DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES
In order to ensure that consignments to which the required security controls have been applied are protected from
unauthorized interference during transportation:
a) The consignments shall be packed or sealed by the regulated agent, known consignor or account consignor so
as to ensure that any tampering would be evident; and
b) The cargo load compartment of the vehicle in which the consignments are to be transported shall be locked
or sealed or curtain sided vehicles shall be secured with TIR cords so as to ensure that any tampering would
be evident, or the load area of flatbed vehicles shall be kept under observation; and either
c) The haulier declaration as contained in Attachment 6-E of the Commission Regulation (EU) 1998/2015 shall be
agreed by the haulier who transports on behalf of the regulated agent, known consignor or account consignor,
unless the haulier is itself approved as a regulated agent. The signed declaration shall be retained by the
regulated agent, known consignor or account consignor for whom the haulier provides transport. On request,
a copy of the signed declaration shall also be made available to the regulated agent or air carrier receiving the
consignment or to the appropriate authority concerned; or
d) the haulier shall provide evidence to the regulated agent, known consignor or account consignor for whom it
provides transport that it has been certified or approved by an appropriate authority. This evidence shall
include the requirements contained in Attachment 6-E and copies shall be retained by the regulated agent,
known consignor or account consignor concerned. On request, a copy shall also be made available to the
regulated agent or air carrier receiving the consignment or to another appropriate authority.
Points above - (b) (c) and (d) shall not apply during airside transportation.
Consignments of cargo and mail that are in a critical part shall be considered as protected from unauthorized
interference.
Consignments of cargo and mail that are in a part other than a critical part shall be protected from unauthorized
manipulation until handed over to another regulated agent or ETF Airways. Consignments shall be placed in the parts
of regulated agent’s premises to which access is controlled, and if they are not placed in those parts, shall be
considered as protected from unauthorized interference if:
a) they are physically protected so as to prevent the introduction of any article which might be used in an act of
unauthorized interference; or
b) they are not left unattended and access is limited to persons involved in the protection and loading of cargo
and mail onto aircraft.
ETF Airways company mail and company material shall be subjected to all security measures prescribed in this
paragraph (10.5.). Implementation of these measures ensure:
a) Airport operator
b) ETF Airways
ETF Airways is required to ensure that all security measures are properly implemented.
ETF Airways company mail and company material shall be security screened and after that protected, until loading on
board the aircraft in order to prevent afterward insertion of prohibited articles.
Following category of ETF Airways company mail and company material is exempted from security measures:
1. company mail and company material which origin is security restricted area (SRA)
2. Aircraft spare parts, which are transported as ETF Airways company material, is exempted from security
screening if accompanied with supporting documentation which confirms airworthiness conformity with applicable
EU requirements. Such supporting documentation shall be checked before loading spare part into aircraft. Copy of
documentation shall be kept at a point not on the aircraft for the duration of the flight or for 24 hours, whichever is
longer.
In order to prevent unauthorized use, ETF Airways company material used in passenger and baggage handling, which
could jeopardize the security of air traffic, must be protected and under supervision.
Using of self check-in system and appropriate internet capabilities available to passengers, are considered as
authorized access to those materials.
Discarded ETF Airways company material which could be used to facilitate the unauthorized access of person or to
entry baggage into security restricted area (SRA) or on board the aircraft, must be destroyed or void.
PROHIBITED ARTICLES
Assembled explosive and incendiary devices that are not carried in accordance with the applicable safety rules shall
be considered as prohibited articles in consignments of cargo and mail.
Content:
11 HANDLING, NOTIFYING AND REPORTING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES AND USING
THE CVR RECORDING .............................................................................................................................. 2
11.1 DEFINITION OF ACCIDENT, INCIDENT AND OCCURRANCE .............................................................................................. 5
11.1.1 ACCIDENT ...............................................................................................................................................................................................5
11.1.2 SERIOUS INJURY .....................................................................................................................................................................................5
11.1.3 FATAL INJURY .........................................................................................................................................................................................5
11.1.4 INCIDENT ................................................................................................................................................................................................5
11.1.5 SERIOUS INCIDENT .................................................................................................................................................................................6
11.1.6 DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENT.............................................................................................................................................................6
11.1.7 DANGEROUS GOODS INCIDENT .............................................................................................................................................................6
11.1.8 OCCURRENCE .........................................................................................................................................................................................6
11.1.9 HAZARD ..................................................................................................................................................................................................6
11.2 OCCURENCE REPORTING FORMS ................................................................................................................................... 7
11.2.1 ELECTRONIC REPORTING SYSTEM ..........................................................................................................................................................7
11.2.2 OCCURENCE REPORTING PROCEDURE ...................................................................................................................................................7
11.2.3 ANALYSIS AND FOLLOW UP ....................................................................................................................................................................8
11.3 ACCIDENTS AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS NOTIFICATION ..................................................................................................... 9
11.3.1 REPORTABLE OCCURENCES ..................................................................................................................................................................10
11.3.2 OCCURRENCES RELATED TO TECHNICAL CONDITIONS, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR..........................................................................14
11.4 PROCEDURES FOR VERBAL NOTIFICATIONS TO ATS ..................................................................................................... 16
11.5 PROCEDURES FOR SUBMITTING WRITTEN REPORTS TO ATC ........................................................................................ 18
11.6 REPORTING PROCEDURES ............................................................................................................................................ 18
11.7 PRESERVATION OF RECORDINGS FOLLOWING A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE .............................................................. 18
ETF Airways crew members are encouraged to submit a written report to Safety and Compliance Department when
an occurrence that could potentially have an adverse effect on the safety of aircraft operations has been observed.
The method of collecting, recording and disseminating information obtained from occurrence reports has been
developed to protect, to the extent permissible by law, the identity of any employee who provides safety information.
ETF Airways management is committed to the non-punitive reporting and “just culture”.
The procedure in this chapter is intended for use by crew members. The corporate safety reporting procedure
applicable for all ETF Airways employees is given in Management System Manual.
NON-PUNITIVE POLICY
Internal reporting, as well as data collected for the purpose of the overall safety monitoring, including flight data
monitoring, are subject to the non-punitive policy. This policy encurages all employees to participate in improvement
of safety levels in all activities and to help minimize contribution to the risk of an accident as far as is reasonably
practicable, in accordance with the company Safety Policy.
The management is committed to protect confidentiallity, to the extent permitable, of collected data and will not
attribute blame or take other punitive actions to the source of the information or other personnel and organizations
involved.
Instances of gross-negligence and/or reckless acts or omissions to act that could endanger the safety of operation are
excluded from the non-punitive policy and culpability for such instances will be taken in account.
Notwithstanding the provision of non-punitive policy, all reasonable measures will be taken to ensure that:
(a) no person enters or is in an aircraft when under the influence of alcohol or drugs to the extent that the safety
of the aircraft or its occupants is likely to be endangered.
(b) no person recklessly or negligently acts or omits to act so as to endanger an aircraft or person therein, or cause
or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.
JUST CULTURE
A culture in which front-line operators or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by
them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, wilful violations and
destructive acts are not tolerated.
VOLUNTARY REPORTING
Voluntary reporting systems enable reporting of any occurrence or safety related information by individuals who are
not subject to mandatory reporting as indicated in this chapter.
For use of the company voluntary reporting system refer to Chapter 11.5.
Any person within the organization may submit voluntary report directly to the agencies in situation when potential
reporter is not confident in the reporting system of the organization.
In a situation where a reporter has transfered the report under Voluntary Occurence Reporting System (VORS),
Compliance and Safety Department may reclassify it into Manadatory Occurence Report (MOR) or vice-versa.
All occurrences collected by the organization (MOR and VOR) are subject to analysis and follow up requirements.
However not all of them (i.e. only reportable ones) are subject to further reporting obligations. Compliance and Safety
Department shall consult with the competent authorities to determine when an actual or potential safety risk is
considered identified out of analysis. Safety risk management processes described in the ETF Safety manual shall aplly
to consider and manage actual or potential safety risk.
g) cockpit voice and image recordings and their transcripts, as well as voice recordings inside air traffic control
units, ensuring also that information not relevant to the safety investigation, particularly information with a
bearing on personal privacy, shall be appropriately protected, without prejudice to paragraph 3*
NOTE:
Notwithstanding requirements stipulated above, the administration of justice or the authority competent to decide
on the disclosure of records according to national law may decide that the benefits of the disclosure of the records
referred to above for any other purposes permitted by law outweigh the adverse domestic and international impact
that such action may have on that or any future safety investigation. Member States may decide to limit the cases in
which such a decision of disclosure may be taken, while respecting the legal acts of the Union.
The organization shall only disseminate personal details within the organization in those cases where it is essential to
progress the investigation or to ensure the safety actions are properly taken.
*Member States cannot institute disciplinary, administrative or legal proceedings in respect of unpremeditated or
inadvertent infringements of the law which come to their attention only because they have been reported pursuant
to Regualtion 376/2014 unless where otherwise provided by applicable national criminal law.
In the cases where disciplinary or administrative proceedings have been instituted under national law, information
contained in occurrence reports cannot be used against the reporters or the persons mentioned in occurrence reports.
Employees and contracted personnel who report or are mentioned in occurrence reports shall not be subject to any
prejudice by their employer or by the organization for which the services are provided on the basis of the information
supplied by the reporter except in cases of unacceptable behaviour
In addition, the following records shall not be made available or used for purposes other than safety investigation, or
other purposes aiming at the improvement of aviation safety:
a) all communications between persons having been involved in the operation of the aircraft;
b) written or electronic recordings and transcriptions of recordings from air traffic control units, including reports
and results made for internal purposes;
c) covering letters for the transmission of safety recommendations from the safety investigation authority to the
addressee, where so requested by the safety investigation authority issuing the recommendation;
Flight data recorder recordings shall not be made available or used for purposes other than those of the safety
investigation, airworthiness or maintenance purposes, except when such records are de-identified or disclosed under
secure procedures.
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are
to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: adversely affects the structural strength, performance or
flight characteristics of the aircraft, and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected
component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories;
or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the
aircraft skin; or
NOTE:
The types of incidents which are of main interest to the International Civil Aviation Organization for accident
prevention studies are listed in Attachment C to Annex 13.
A list of examples of serious incidents is set out in the Annex to REGULATION (EU) No. 996/2010.
11.1.6 DANGEROUS GOODS ACCIDENT
An occurrence associated with and related to the transport of dangerous goods by air which results in fatal or serious
injury to a person or major property damage.
11.1.7 DANGEROUS GOODS INCIDENT
• an occurrence other than a dangerous goods accident associated with and related to the transport of dangerous
goods by air, not necessarily occurring on board an aircraft, which results in injury to a person, property damage,
fire, breakage, spillage, leakage of fluid or radiation or other evidence that the integrity of the packaging has not
been maintained,·
• any occurrence relating to the transport of dangerous goods which seriously jeopardises an aircraft or its
occupants.
11.1.8 OCCURRENCE
Any safety-related event which endangers or which, if not corrected or addressed, could endanger an aircraft, its
occupants or any other person and includes in particular an accident or serious incident;
11.1.9 HAZARD
A situation or an object with the potential to cause death or injury to a person, damage to equipment or a structure,
loss of material, or a reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function;
ETF Airways staff will use iQSMS reporting system as a primary way for reporting. Refer to SMS manual chapter 7 for
further instructions
11.2.2 OCCURENCE REPORTING PROCEDURE
Reports shall be analised by Safety Manager, and appropriate actions will be performed towards relevant authorities
within 72h of becoming aware of the occurence:
https://www.aviationreporting.eu/AviationReporting/
Additionally, for occurences in NAT HLA and RVSM airspace, Safety Manager will cooperate with the reporting OACC
in the compilation of appropriate documentation including the completion of an ‘Altitude Deviation Report Form’, as
illustrated at Attachment 2 of NAT Doc 007 current edition.
• While all occurrences collected by the ETF Airways Voluntary and Mandatory Occurence Reporting Systems are
subject to analysis and follow-up requirements as described in Chapter 11.5, only those which are reportable
are subject to further reporting obligations to the competent authority. For those occurrences, Regulation
376/2014 requires ETF Airways to transmit to the competent authorities (CCAA and AIN) the results of the
analysis performed, if any; and any action to be taken pursuant to that analysis. ETF Airways is required to report
preliminary results within 30 days from the date of notification of the occurrence by the reporter and to report
final results as soon as available but not later than three months after the notification, with possible exception
in the event of a complex investigation or where the services of a specialist investigator are required.
• The analysis and follow up of occurrences required under regulation 376/2014 is taking place in the context of
the safety risk management processes and policies described in the organization’s Safety Manual taking into
consideration non-punitive policy stipulated in Chapter 10 of the Safety Manual.
• The competent authorities may require ETF Airways to transfer information on the analysis and follow up of any
other reportable occurrences.
Following an RA event, or other significant ACAS II event, flight crews and controllers should complete an ACAS II RA
report. Aircraft operators and ATS authorities should forward completed reports through established channels.
It is the responsibility of every employee to report an occurrence which has jeopardized or might jeopardize
operational safety. The report shall be filled in through iQSMS internal reporting system and delivered to Safety &
Compliance Department not later than 72 hours from the occurrence. Employees may fill out a written report by
downloading the form from iQSMS internal documentation system only in case no internet connection is available.
NOTE:
This list is structured in such a way that the pertinent occurrences are linked with categories of activities during which
they are normally observed, according to experience, in order to facilitate the reporting of those occurrences.
However, this presentation must not be understood as meaning that occurrences must not be reported in case they
take place outside the category of activities to which they are linked in the list.
11.3.1.1 AIR OPERATIONS
11.3.1.1.1 Flight preparation
a. Use of incorrect data or erroneous entries into equipment used for navigation or performance calculations which
has or could have endangered the aircraft, its occupants or any other person.
b. Carriage or attempted carriage of dangerous goods in contravention of applicable legislations including incorrect
labelling, packaging and handling of dangerous goods.
11.3.1.1.2 Aircraft preparation
i. Continuation of an instrument approach below published minimums with inadequate visual references.
l. Hard landing.
11.3.1.1.4 Any phase of flight
a. Loss of control.
b. Aircraft upset, exceeding normal pitch attitude, bank angle or airspeed inappropriate for the conditions.
c. Level bust.
d. Activation of any flight envelope protection, including stall warning, stick shaker, stick pusher and automatic
protections.
e. Unintentional deviation from intended or assigned track of the lowest of twice the required navigation
performance or 10 nautical miles.
f. Exceedance of aircraft flight manual limitation.
g. Operation with incorrect altimeter setting.
h. Jet blast or rotor and prop wash occurrences which have or could have endangered the aircraft, its occupants or
any other person.
i. Misinterpretation of automation mode or of any flight deck information provided to the flight crew which has or
could have endangered the aircraft, its occupants or any other person.
k. Additionally, following occurences in the NAT HLA (either recorded, communicated or reported by the monitoring
agency):
i. erosions of longitudinal separation between aircraft, within the NAT HLA, of 3 minutes or
more;
vi. diversions or turnbacks, noting in particular whether the appropriate published contingency
procedure was correctly adopted.
vii. ACAS RA
Products, parts or appliances released from the production organisation with deviations from applicable design data
that could lead to a potential unsafe condition as identified with the holder of the type-certificate or design approval.
11.3.2.1.2 DESIGN
Any failure, malfunction, defect or other occurrence related to a product, part, or appliance which has resulted in or
may result in an unsafe condition.
Remark: This list is applicable to occurrences occurring on a product, part, or appliance covered by the type- certificate,
restricted type-certificate, supplemental type-certificate, ETSO authorisation, major repair design approval or any
other relevant approval deemed to have been issued under Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 (1).
(1)Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness
and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification
of design and production organisations
11.3.2.1.3 MAINTENANCE AND CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
(1) Serious structural damage (for example: cracks, permanent deformation, delamination, debonding, burning,
excessive wear, or corrosion) found during maintenance of the aircraft or component.
(2) Serious leakage or contamination of fluids (for example: hydraulic, fuel, oil, gas or other fluids).
(3) Failure or malfunction of any part of an engine or powerplant and/or transmission resulting in any one or more of
the following: (a) non-containment of components/debris; (b) failure of the engine mount structure.
(4) Damage, failure or defect of propeller, which could lead to in-flight separation of the propeller or any major portion
of the propeller and/or malfunctions of the propeller control.
(5) Damage, failure or defect of main rotor gearbox/attachment, which could lead to in-flight separation of the rotor
assembly and/or malfunctions of the rotor control.
(6) Significant malfunction of a safety-critical system or equipment including emergency system or equipment during
maintenance testing or failure to activate these systems after maintenance.
(7) Incorrect assembly or installation of components of the aircraft found during an inspection or test procedure not
intended for that specific purpose.
(8) Wrong assessment of a serious defect, or serious non-compliance with MEL and Technical logbook procedures.
(10) Any defect in a life-controlled critical part causing retirement before completion of its full life.
(11) The use of products, components or materials, from unknown, suspect origin, or unserviceable critical
components.
(12) Misleading, incorrect or insufficient applicable maintenance data or procedures that could lead to significant
maintenance errors, including language issue.
(14) Releasing an aircraft to service from maintenance in case of any non-compliance which endangers the flight safety.
(15) Serious damage caused to an aircraft during maintenance activities due to incorrect maintenance or use of
inappropriate or unserviceable ground support equipment that requires additional maintenance actions.
(17) Any occurrence where the human performance, including fatigue of personnel, has directly contributed to or
could have contributed to an accident or a serious incident.
(18) Significant malfunction, reliability issue, or recurrent recording quality issue affecting a flight recorder system
(such as a flight data recorder system, a data link recording system or a cockpit voice recorder system) or lack of
information needed to ensure the serviceability of a flight recorder system.
11.4.1.1 TCAS RA
All TCAS RAs will be reported to the ATC after avoiding maneuvres have completed and airplane is out of conflicting
situation and is resuming normal flight.
11.4.1.2 DANGEROUS GOODS
If an aeroplane, which is carrying Dangerous Goods, is involved in an accident, information about the Dangerous
Goods on board must be sent to the State where the accident occurred as soon as possible.
If an aeroplane which is carrying Dangerous Goods is involved in an incident, information about the Dangerous
Goods on board must be given to the State where the incident occurred on their request.
In the event of a Dangerous Goods accident/incident occurring, an initial report, which may be made by any means,
must be dispatched within 72 hours of the occurrence, to the Authority of the State:
Any type of accident or incident must be reported irrespective of whether the dangerous goods are in cargo, mail,
passenger's baggage or crew baggage.
In case or an accident or incident when Dangerous Goods are being carried, a usual reporting procedure is to be
carried out by the use of Dangerous Goods occurrence report found online at:
http://www.ccaa.hr/file_inline.php?file=741f4aded38d198f7e72cbdedca366f6c7
A special remark is to be included in all relevant reports indicating that dangerous goods were being carried. This is
regardless of whether dangerous goods were the reason for the accident/incident or not.
NOTE:
Dangerous Goods occurrence report, duly completed, must be sent as soon as possible, even if all the information is
not available. Copies of the relevant documents and any photographs taken must be attached to the report.
(1)If an in-flight emergency occurs and the situation permits the Commander must inform the appropriate Air Traffic
Services Unit of any Dangerous Goods on board. If an in-flight emergency occurs the Commander shall react in
accordance with applicable Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods (ICAO)
placed in the cockpit of the aircraft.
(2)Safety and Compliance Department shall report to the CCAA and AAIA undeclared or miss declared dangerous
goods discovered in cargo or passenger's baggage. A report shall be dispatched within 72 hours of the discovery
unless exceptional circumstances prevent this.
Following an act of unlawful interference on board an aeroplane the Commander or, in his/her absence the ETF
AIRWAYS, shall submit, without delay, a report of such an act to the designated local authority and the CCAA.
The operator shall have in place a system for investigating a reportable event to determine if it is due to an improperly
coded procedure or a navigation.
An ASR and a specific report if applicable shall always be submitted in addition to verbal notifications. Specific reports
shall be filled in through internal reporting system iQSMS as described in section 11.2.2 and delivered to Safety
Department not later than 72 hours from the occurrence.
11.6 REPORTING PROCEDURES
Primary reporting tool is iQSMS sowtware. Refer to SMS manual chapter 7 for further instructions.
After crewmember involved in occurance has filled ASR or relevant occurrence report, Safety department will analise
it, and provide feedback to the crewmembers involved. Further actions may be taken regarding the severity of the
situation reported.
11.7 PRESERVATION OF RECORDINGS FOLLOWING A REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
Following an accident, a serious incident or an occurrence identified by the investigating authority, the operator of an
aircraft shall preserve the original recorded data of the flight recorders for a period of 60 days or until otherwise
directed by the investigating authority.
All ETF Airways aircraft are equipped with CVRs capable of retaining the data recorded during at least the preceding 2
hours. The flight data recorder will record the last 25 hours of flight and EVENT button shall be depressed in case of
abnormal events during the flight.
The commander shall ensure that flight recorders are not disabled or switched off during flight
Furthermore, to avoid losing (overwriting) recorded content in the event of an accident or an incident that is subject
to mandatory reporting, commander shall ensure that CVRs:
precautionary measures to preserve the recordings of flight recorders are taken before leaving the flight
compartment: To avoid above stated please apply following procedures as applicable:
Commander shall deactivate the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) immediately after completion of the flight by pulling
associated C/B and inform MCC that the recording of CVR shall be preserved (quarantined) if applicable. From that
moment onwards, MCC is responsible for the CVR. Safety Manager shall be informed as well.
CVR and DFDR data shall be quarantined, packed and transported in secure process and shall prevent inadvertent
reactivation, test, repair or reinstallation by maintenance personnel or during maintenance or ground handling
activities performed by third parties.
ETF Airways maintenance personnel shall ensure that no CVR that might require subsequent investigation shall be
left on the device that undergoes maintenance or any kind of procedure that might erase data.
If CVR or data is required for internal analysis for the purpose of improving flight safety or to resolve any doubtful
situation that was reported to Safety department, the following procedure shall be applied:
31.05.2022. Rev. 04 Page 18 of 20
OPERATIONS MANUAL
PART A
11 – HANDLING, NOTIFYING AND REPORTING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES AND
USING THE CVR RECORDING
1. CVR analysis shall not commence without prior consent of the parties (crewmembers) involved.
2. Data will be downloaded from the CVR by MCC, or other qualified staff approved by Safety Manager.
3. Downloaded file will be converted into appropriate audio format and required information related to the event
will be analyzed, noted and discussed.
4. None of the crew private details shall be identified during this procedure.
5. After required information has been obtained and event was clarified, all data that was downloaded and noted
shall be destroyed.
ETF Engineering Department ensures continued serviceability of the recorders in accordance with approved Aircraft
Maintenance Programme.
After landing, ETF Engineering Department must be contacted. ETF Engineering Department shall coordinate with
approved maintenance organisation to ensure, to the extent possible, preservation of the original recorded data
pertaining to that accident, as retained by the recorders for a period of 60 days unless otherwise directed by the
Authority.
NOTE:
The phrase “to the extent possible” means:
• There may be technical reasons why all of the data cannot be preserved; or
• The aircraft may have been dispatched with unserviceable recording equipment as permitted by the MEL.
The preservation of the data mentioned above shall be done by downloading and storing the recorded data on a
secured data storage device, or if it is not possible by removing the recorders from the affected aircraft and keeping
them at a secured place. In any case the manner and location of the data preservation must be acceptable for the
Authority.
In case of an accident or serious incident ETF AIRWAYS shall preserve the original recorded data for a period of 60 days
or until otherwise directed by the investigating authority. ETF AIRWAYS Engineering Department shall assure
availability of the technical data necessary to convert the recorded data into engineering units. The associated flight
recorders are preserved and retained in safe custody pending disposition in accordance with the investigating
authority. ETF AIRWAYS shall, within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by CCAA, produce any recording
made by a flight recorder which is available or has been preserved.
ETF AIRWAYS saves the recordings for the period of operating time, for the purpose of testing and maintaining flight
data recorders, up to one hour of the oldest recorded material at the time of testing may be erased.
Except for ensuring the CVR serviceability, CVR recordings shall not be disclosed or used unless:
(i) a procedure related to the handling of CVR recordings and of their transcript is in place;
(ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent; and
(iii) they are used only for maintaining or improving safety.
When a CVR recording is inspected for ensuring the CVR serviceability, ETF AIRWAYS shall ensure the privacy of the
CVR recording and the CVR recording shall not be disclosed or used for other purposes than ensuring the CVR
serviceability.
The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder recordings may not be used for purposes other than for the
investigation of an accident or incident subject to mandatory reporting except when such records are:
Contents
12. RULES OF THE AIR ................................................................................................................................................. 2
General Airway Manual, Air traffic control, ICAO Rules of the air
Each country applies ICAO Annex 2 rules of the air, which can be found in General Airway Manual, ATC
section. Each country shall publish any differences, which can be found on individual country page (States
rules and procedures) For differences between SERA and Annex 2 refer to Air Traffic Control Data – Europe.
(f) Signals
General Airways Manual, ATC -> ICAO Rules of the air -> 3.4
(i) Visual signals used to warn an unauthorised aircraft flying in or about to enter a restricted, prohibited or
danger area
(j) Procedures for flight crew observing an accident or receiving a distress transmission
Flight crew shall imediatelly report to ATC any hazardous situation, incident, accident or receiving a distress
transmission.
(k) The ground/air visual codes for use by survivors, and description and use of signal aids
General Airways manual - > Emergency / Data – International Civil Aviation Authority Chapter 8.4.3.2.
Ground – air visual signal code for use by survivors
Contents
13. LEASING / CODE SHARE ...................................................................................................... 2
13.1 LEASING ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
13.1.1 ANY LEASE IN ...........................................................................................................................................................................2
13.1.2. LEASE OUT...............................................................................................................................................................................4
13.2 CODE SHARE ................................................................................................................................................. 4
13.1 LEASING
13.1.1 ANY LEASE IN
(a) Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, any lease agreement concerning aircraft used by ETF
Airways shall be subject to prior approval by the CCAA. For short term (maximum 5 days) wet lease, refer to
OM A 13.1.1.1
(b) ETF Airways shall not lease-in aircraft included in the list of operators subject to operational restrictions,
registered in a State of which all operators under its oversight are subject to an operating ban or from an
operator that is subject to an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.
GENERAL
(a) ETF Airways, when intending to lease-in an aircraft shall provide the CCAA with the following information:
(1) the aircraft type, registration markings and serial number, as soon as available;
(2) the name and address of the registered owner;
(3) a copy of the valid certificate of airworthiness;
(4) a copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial
arrangements; and
(5) duration of the lease.
(b) In case of wet lease-in, a copy of the AOC of the third-country operator and the areas of operation.
(c) The information mentioned above shall be accompanied by a statement signed by the lessee that the
parties to the lease agreement fully understand their respective responsibilities under the applicable
regulations.
When performing wet lease from an EU operator, ETF Airways shall ask for approval from the CCAA.
In case that ETF Airways is faced with immediate, urgent and unforeseen need for a replacement aircraft for
a period not exceeding 5 consecutive days, wet lease-in arrangement may become effective without CCAA
formal approval. In that case, ETF Airways will send the required information to the CCAA as described in
GENERAL (a) above. In case the CCAA would dispute this arrangement, it will send the notification to ETF
Airways. ETF Airways will cancel the agreement immediately upon receipt of such a message.
ETF Airways, when looking for the approval of the wet lease-in of an aircraft from a third-country operator
shall demonstrate to the CCAA all of the following:
(1) that the third country operator holds a valid AOC issued in accordance with Annex 6 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation;
(2) that the safety standards of the third country operator with regard to continuing airworthiness
and air operations are equivalent to the applicable requirements established by Regulation (EU) No
1321/2014 and this Regulation;
(3) that the aircraft has a standard CofA issued in accordance with Annex 8 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation.
ETF Airways shall maintain a record of occasions when lessors are used, for inspection by the State that
issued its AOC.
WET LEASE-IN AGREEMENT WITH A THIRD-COUNTRY OPERATOR
If ETF Airways is not intending to apply EU safety requirements for air operations and continuing
airworthiness when wet leasing-in an aircraft registered in a third country, we shall demonstrate to the CCAA
that the standards complied with are equivalent to the following requirements:
(a) Annex IV (Part-CAT);
(b) Part-ORO:
(1) ORO.GEN.110 and Section 2 of Subpart GEN;
(2) ORO.MLR, excluding ORO.MLR.105;
(3) ORO.FC;
(4) ORO.CC, excluding ORO.CC.200 and ORO.CC.210(a);
(5) ORO.TC;
(6) ORO.FTL, including related CS-FTL; and
(7) ORO.SEC;
(c) Annex V (Part-SPA), if applicable;
(d) for continuing airworthiness management of the third-country operator, Part-M1 Subpart-B, Subpart-C
and Subpart-G, excluding M.A.707, and M.A.710;
(e) for the maintenance organisation used by the third-country operator during the lease period: Part-1452;
(f) retroactive airworthiness requirements in accordance with Part-26; and
(g) the operator shall provide the competent authority with a full description of the flight time limitation
scheme(s), operating procedures and safety assessment demonstrating compliance with the safety
objectives set out in points (b)(1)-(6).
In anticipation of an operational need, ETF Airways may enter into a framework agreement with more than
one third-country operator provided that these operators comply with ORO.AOC.110(c). These third-country
operators shall be placed in a list maintained as a separate document by the Flight Operations Manager.
ETF Airways, when looking for the approval of the dry lease-in of an aircraft registered in a third country shall
demonstrate to the CCAA that:
(1) an operational need has been identified that cannot be satisfied through leasing an aircraft
registered in the EU;
(2) the duration of the dry lease-in does not exceed seven months in any 12 consecutive month
period;
(3) compliance with the applicable requirements of Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 is ensured; and
(4) the aircraft is equipped in accordance with the EU regulations for Air Operations.
Prior to the wet lease-out of an aircraft, ETF Airways shall notify the CCAA
(a) Without prejudice to applicable EU safety requirements for third country operators and aircraft, ETF
Airways shall enter into a code-share agreement with a third country operator only after:
(1) having verified that the third country operator complies with the applicable ICAO standards; and
(2) having provided the competent authority with documented information enabling such authority
to comply with ARO.OPS.105.
(b) When implementing the code-share agreement ETF Airways shall monitor and regularly assess the
ongoing compliance of the third country operator with the applicable ICAO standards.
(c) ETF Airways shall not sell and issue tickets for a flight operated by a third country operator when the third
country operator is subject to an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 or is failing to
maintain compliance with the applicable ICAO standards.
(a) In order to verify the third country operator’s compliance with the applicable ICAO standards, in particular
ICAO Annexes 1, 2, 6, Part I and III, as applicable, 8 and 18, the EU operator shall conduct an audit of the
third country operator, including interviews of personnel and inspections carried out at the third country
operator’s facilities.
(b) The audit shall focus on the operational, management and control systems of the operator.
(b) The third country code-share operator shall be audited at periods not exceeding 24 months. The
beginning of the first 24-month oversight planning cycle is determined by the date of the first audit and shall
then determine the start and end dates of the recurrent 24-month planning cycle. The interval between two
audits shall not exceed 24 months.
(c) ETF Airways shall ensure a renewal audit of each third country code-share operator prior to the audit
expiry date of the previous audit. The audit expiry date for the previous audit becomes the audit effective
date for the renewal audit provided the closing meeting for the renewal audit is within 150 days prior to the
audit expiry date for the previous audit. If the closing meeting for the renewal audit is more than 150 days
prior to the audit expiry date from the previous audit, then the audit effective date for the renewal audit is
the day of the closing meeting of the renewal audit. Renewal audits are valid for 24 consecutive months
beginning with the audit effective date and ending with the audit expiry date.
(d) A code-share audit could be shared by several operators. In case of a shared audit, the report shall be
made available for review by all duly identified sharing operators by any means.
(e) After closure of all findings identified during the audit, the EU operator shall submit an audit compliance
statement to the competent authority demonstrating that the third country operator meets all the
applicable safety standards.
THIRD-PARTY PROVIDERS
(a) The initial audit and/or the continuous monitoring may be performed by a third-party provider on behalf
of the EU operator in accordance with AMC2 ORO.GEN.205 on contracted activities.
(b) The use of a third-party provider for the initial audit or the monitoring of continuous compliance of the
third-country code-share operator does not exempt ETF Airways from its responsibility under ORO.AOC.115.
(c) ETF Airways shall maintain a list of the third country code-share operators monitored by the third-party
provider. This list and the full audit report prepared by the third-party provider shall be made available to
the competent authority upon request.