A. Definition/what is transmitted (Arts.

774, 776, 781)

QUESTION: ELEMENTS FOR TRANSMISSION – It being conceded that death

marks the precise moment when the transmission of rights takes place,
the next question arises is: Is death the sole factor effecting the
transmission of rights?

DISCUSSION: There are other elements necessary for the transmission of

successional rights. To make a person succeed by mere fact of death of
the predecessor is to deny him the right to accept or repudiate the
inheritance. Express or tacit acceptance by the heir, devisee or legatee
is necessary to the perfection of the juridical relation in succession, and
indispensable to the transmission of successional rights. However, a
previous declaration of heirship is not necessary in order that an heir may
assert his rights to the property of the deceased.

REQUISITES FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS:

1) Express will of the testator, within the limits prescribed by law,

calling certain persons to succeed him, or in the absence of the
will, the provision of the law prescribing the presumed will of the
decedent (operation of law);
2) Death of the person whose succession is in question;
3) the acceptance of the inheritance by the person called to the
succession.

• Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., 100 Phil 388

FACTS:

Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H.

Hemady based on 20 different indemnity agreements
or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct
principal and by the deceased K.H. Hemady, a surety
solidary (guarantor) in all of them.

Luzon Surety prayed for allowance, as a contingent

claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had
executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and
further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums
and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with
12% interest thereon.
Upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s estate,
the Court of First Instance dismissed the claims of Luzon
Surety on two grounds. First, the CFI held that the
premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were
not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to
be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor
(Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after
the execution of the counterbonds

And second, the CFI held that whatever losses may

occur after Hemady’s death are not chargeable to his
estate, because upon his death he ceased to be
guarantor.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is

extinguished by his death. – NO.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Hemady’s liability as a

solidary guarantor is not extinguished by his death.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the

heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed
the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not
only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations.

Under the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the rights of

succession, are subrogated to all the rights and
obligations of the deceased (Art. 661) and cannot be
regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to
which the deceased was a party, touching the estate
of the deceased. The heirs take such property subject
to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him
from whom they derive their rights.
• Balus vs. Balus, 610 SCRA 178; GR No. 168970 (2010)

FACTS:

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as

security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of
Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a
result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose.

On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was executed

by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. On January
25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in
the Bank’s favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the
name of the Bank.

Subsequently Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On October 10,

1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of
them a specific one-third portion of the subject property
consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial
Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties
admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they
intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible
time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned land is part of the

Estate of Rufo.

HELD:

No. The subject lot is not part of the estate of Rufo. ART 777
provides that the rights to a person’s succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death. The inheritance
of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of
the succession. Rufo lost ownership of the subject property
during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
 death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the
subject lot from their father.

B. When succession occurs (Art. 777)

• Uson vs. Del Rosario, 92 Phil 530 (Effectivity of New Rights)

FACTS:
Plaintiff was the lawful wife of N who upon his death in 1945
left five parcel of lands. Defendant was a common law wife
of N with whom he had illegitimate children. Plaintiff filed an
action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of
lands claiming that when N died, defendant took possession
of said lands. Defendant contended that under the new Civil
Code which became in force in June, 1950, the illegitimate
children are entitled to the successional rights which the law
accords to the latter, and because these successional rights
were declared for the first time in the new Code, they shall
be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under prior legislation.
ISSUE:
W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law
wife have successional rights.

HELD:

No merit in the claim of Defendant. Right of ownership of plaintiff

over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death
of her late husband. It is so because of the imperative provision of
the law which commands that the right to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death. The new right recognized
by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of plaintiff over the lands in dispute

Alternate Answer:

No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given

retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested
rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the
death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new
Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

• In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO

ABADIA vs Abadia, 95 Phil 627 (1954)

FACTS:

The deceased Father Sancho Abadia executed a

holographic will in his own handwriting, numbered and
signed by the testator himself and attested by three (3)
witnesses on September 6, 1923. He died on January 14,
1943 in Cebu. The will was admitted to probate on January
24, 1952. Some of the cousins and nephews, who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.

ISSUE:

What law should apply as to the validity of the holographic

will: the old Civil Code when the will was executed or the
new Civil Code which could have validated the will?

RULING:

It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which
took effect August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795: “The
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made.”
Here, the validity of the holographic will is to be judged not
by the law enforced at the time when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. When one executes a will which is invalid for
failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution, just like in this case, then upon his
death he should be regarded and declared as having
died intestate. This is because the general rule is that the
Legislature cannot validate void wills.
• Ibarle vs. Po, 92 Phil 72; GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS:

Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his

surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor
children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria
Canoy who later sold the same land to the plaintiff
Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment
as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2
of the land in question, which portion now belonged to
the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE:
Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to
the property?

HELD:

The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil

Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person
are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly
different language, this article is incorporated in the new
Civil Code as article 777.

The above provision and comment make it clear that

when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire
parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial
declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it
included the children's share.

On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having

been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not
been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were
necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the
plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own
opposition.
• Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil
531 (1921)

FACTS:

D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint

account association for the exploitation of the shipping
business, he being the owner of one-third of the
company's capital

On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da.

Petrona Reyes, now also deceased, executed before the
notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in
favor of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to
him one-half of her share in the one-third... part which
belonged to her husband in the shipping business of
Ynchausti & Co., a donation which was duly accepted by
the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said
document with the plaintiff.

The trial court rendered judgment in the case, declaring

that the 610 shares of stock in dispute and their dividends
belong to the plaintiff, and ordered the defendant Da.
Tomasa Osorio, administratrix of the estate of Da. Petrona
Reyes, to exclude them from the inventory and... her
accounts, and the other defendant "The Ynchausti
Steamship Co." to inscribe them in the name of the plaintiff
D. Leonardo Osorio, delivering to him the dividends
corresponding thereto, and denied the counterclaim for
the sum of P45,000, on the ground that said sum
represents... the dividends corresponding to the P94,000
adjudicated to Da. Petrona Reyes, in the partition of the
estate of D. Antonio Osorio, and donated by her to the
defendant in the counter claim.

ISSUE:

WON the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of

the plaintiff is valid under the law of succession,
particularly the law on future inheritance.
 HELD:
The donation is void. A donation cannot include future
property. By future property is understood that of which
the donor cannot dispose at the time of making the
donation.

It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes

is void because she donated on February 28, 1914, a
future property, such as the share in the business of the
deceased Osorio, which was adjudicated to her on May
10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right
to all or part of the share which her deceased husband
had in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.

Art. 365 of the Code defines future proprerties - They are

those of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of
making the donation. This definition in reality includes all
properties which belong to others at the time of the
donation, although they may or may not later belong to
the donor.

• Rodriguez vs. Borja, 17 SCRA 418 (1966)

FACTS:
In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an
intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to
settle the estate of a deceased person who died without
a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again
another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate
proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is
settled if that person has left a will. We are confronted
here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the
other.

ISSUE:
Which proceeding should be preferred?
 RULING:
As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and
even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred.
The will should be probated. The will should be given
effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the
wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be
given such preference first. Probate of the will is needed
in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed
valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance
with the formalities required by law and whether or not the
testator executed it with a sound mind.

If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not

to have validly executed, then you go to intestate
proceeding. But first you go to testate.

• Villanueva vs Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here

represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of
land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte and collect damages.
Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere, who, in turn,
bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970.
Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax
purposes soon after acquiring it.

Respondents similarly claimed ownership over the

Property through purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia
Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May
1965. The trial court rejected respondents' claim of
ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis
causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the
Property to Vere in 1970.
 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to
respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, where
the CA found that the Deed as a testamentary disposition
was instead a donation inter vivos. Accordingly, the CA
upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents,
and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo's
lack of title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and

Rodriguez was a donation or a devise.

HELD:

The petitioner cannot capitalize on Rodrigo's post-

donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her
retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in
interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal
uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will
give license to rogue property owners to set at naught
perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on
liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest
of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing
such practice.

Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title

over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,Rodrigo "cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another. "Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation
sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right
than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the
Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title
which they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.

Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by
operation of law.
QUESTION: Can succession be conferred by contracts or acts inter vivos?
There can be no contractual succession, for inheritance cannot be
transmitted by mere agreement.
MANRESA: Art. 1374 of the Code, which provides in its second
paragraph – “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance,
except in cases expressly authorized by law.

EXCEPTION: Sanchez Roman points to an exceptional case in which

succession may be conferred by contract: the marriage settlement, in
which persons are authorized to execute before the celebration of
marriage, stipulating conditions for the conjugal partnership with respect
to present and future property.
The donation with respect to future property in the marriage settlement
is thus, in reality a disposition mortis causa, but not executed in the form
of a will.

Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the

provision of a will or by operation of law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal
property are respectively given by virtue of a will.

DISCUSSION: The distinction between heir and legatee is not drawn with
precision, and yet the distinction is all important, for Arts. 854 (preterition)
and 918 (disinheritance) provide cases where the institution of heir is
void, but the legacies and devices remain valid. The Code omits to state
the fundamental difference: that heirs are instituted to the whole or to
an aliquot portion thereof, i.e., the whole or a fraction of the whole; while
a legatee or devisee is given individual items of property.
In other words, an heir still succeeds to the whole or to an aliquot portion
of the inheritance either by virtue of a will or by operation of law, while a
devisee or legatee still succeeds to individual items of property by virtue
of a will.

Art. 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal act; it cannot be left in
whole or in part to the discretion of a third person, or accomplished
through the instrumentality of an agent or attorney.
QUESTION: What is the rationale behind the prohibition on the delegation
of a making of a will?
ANS: It is to be noted that it is the making of the disposition, the expression
of the will of the testator, that is not subject to delegation.

In other words, the testator cannot substitute the mind or will of another
for his own. But the mere mechanical act of drafting the will may be
done by a third person, inasmuch as such act does not constitute of the
will or disposition.

Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass
thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will,
should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention.

Question: When shall the properties acquired by the testator, after the
making of the will but before his death, pass to the inheritance?
ANS: Property acquired by the testator after the making of a will shall
only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making
the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention
(Civil Code, Art. 793). This rule applies only to a devise/legacy because
an heir inherits everything upon testator’s death.

Art. 794. Every devise or legacy shall convey all the interest which the testator
could devise or bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears
from the will that he intended to convey a less interest.

QUESTION: In case of a devise or legacy, what is the extent of interest disposed

of by the testator?

ANS: Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest which the testator could
devise or bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears from
the will that he intended to convey a less interest. (Art. 794)

Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the
law in force at the time it is made.

Q: As to the time, what law governs the formal validity of the will?
ANS: The validity of a will as to it its form depends upon the observance of the
law in force at the time it is made. Thus, a will perfectly valid at the time of its
execution cannot be invalidated by a law enacted after the death of the
testator. Neither can a will totally void at the time of its execution be validated
by such legislation.

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

Q: The testator believes that he is morally bound to make a will to leave his
properties to charities. Does this affect the testamentary disposition?

A: No.

Q: The testator assigned a supernatural person sent by God to redeem the

world from its sins as a beneficiary. Is the testamentary disposition valid?

A: No.

Q: A cult leader, Pastor Quiboloy assigned the former President Duterte as

his beneficiary to receive the Panatag Shoal upon his death. Is the disposition
valid?

A: No.

DISCUSSION: Not every insane delusion will render one incapable of making a
will. But the testamentary disposition will be void when the delusion touches
the subject matter of the will; that is to say, when it pertains to the property, the
beneficiaries, or those who would succeed to the property if the will were not
made.

Q: What is the status of the will when a person, at the time of making his will
is suffering from delusions but upon his recovery he discovered the fact of such
will and did not revoked it?

A: Null.

DISCUSSION: The nullity of the will executed when the testator was of unsound
mind is not cured by the fact that the testator later recovers reason and fail to
revoke his will. Such will cannot be validated by lapse of time or by ratification,
although it may be republished by the testator after he has recovered reason.

• Suarez vs. CA, 213 SCRA 397 (Sep. 2, 1992)

CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF

THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. — The
legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but
through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore,
petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul
the auction sale to protect their own interest.

Facts:

Petitioners are brothers and sisters. One Marcelo Suarez died in

1955, leaving several Pasig lots to his children, petitioners 5
Suarezes. In 1977, petitioner’s widowed mother Teofista and Rizal
Realty lost a civil case and was ordered to pay 70K in damages
and with the judgment having attained finality, the CFI of Rizal
ordered the levying and execution of 5 Pasig lots with herein
private respondents being the highest bidder for94.1K. Before the
expiration of the 1-year redemption period, petitioners Suarezes
filed a reinvindicatory action or annulment of the auction sale
against the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal on the ground that they were
strangers to their mother’s civil case but the interest in their father’s
lots were impaired. Despite this, the Provincial Sheriff issued a final
deed of sale over 3 properties. The Suarezes now joined by their
mother questioned the Order to issue a final deed of sale but the
RTC of Pasig denied the same. By virtueof an Ex-parte MD by the
opposition, the annulment case was dismissed. Later, Teofistaand
the Suarezes were ordered to vacate the lots subject of the
judicial sale and give theduplicate copy of the Torrens title over
the lot.

The case was elevated to the CA by a petition for certiorari with

the CA ordering the issuance of alias summons against private
respondents. However, respondents again sought dismissal of the
annulment case and the CA granted the same. Hence, this
appeal.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the annulment of the auction

sale.
Held:

Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the annulment of the auction sale.

Under Art. 888 of the CC, legitimate children and descendants of
the deceased have a legitime of ½ of the hereditary estate of the
father and mother with A892 (2) providing that when there are two
or more legitimate children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled
to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate
children.

Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of

their mother but through their own right as children of their
deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way
from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their
own interest.

• Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

FACTS:

The testatrix Agripina Valdez was survived by seven compulsory

heirs, to wit, six legitimate children and a legitimate
granddaughter, who is the only legitimate child and heir of her son
who predeceased her. She left a last will naming the
abovementioned compulsory heirs together with seven other
legitimate grandchildren. In her will, she distributed and disposed
of all her properties among the heirs. The said will was allowed
probate. In her will, the testatrix “commanded that her property
be divided” in accordance with her testamentary disposition,
whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six
children and eight grandchildren. Marina Dizon, the proponent
and executrix, filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate
as follows: (1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis
Marina and Tomas are admittedly considered to have received in
the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the
other compulsory heirs received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to
complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other
hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they
received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to
complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren
remain untouched. On the other hand, oppositors submitted their
own counter-project of partition, proposing that the testamentary
disposition made by the testatrix should be reduced to the
amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and
devisees totalling one-half thereof while the other half of the
estate would be deemed as constituting the legitime.

The lower court sustained and approved the executrix’ project of

partition, ruling that “(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. The
proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of
the New Civil Code” adding that “the testatrix has chosen to favor
certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as
aforecited.”

With reference to the payment in cash principally by the executrix

to be paid to her five co-heirs to complete their impaired legitimes,
the lower court ruled that “(T)he payment in cash so as to make
the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in
respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion,
a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last
wishes of the testatrix.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in approving the

executrix’ project of partition.

HELD:

NO. In this case, the testatrix’ testamentary disposition was in the

nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third
paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all
her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral
and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid,
she expressly provided that “it is my wish and I command that my
property be divided” in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real
property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to
whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of
Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that “(S)hould a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs.” This right of a testator to partition
his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their
legitime. This was properly complied with in the executrix-
appellee’s project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-
appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia,
were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were
taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will
more than their respective legitimes.

Thus, the right of the oppositors in this case was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code
and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the
remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned
by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee. Neither may
they legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the
approved project of partition. The properties are not available for
the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and
distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far
as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest
wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. Orders appealed
from were affirmed.

• Baritua vs. CA, 183 SCRA 565 (1990)

FACTS:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven

by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay
San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident
with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned
and operated by... petitioner Jose Baritua.[3] As a result of that
accident Bienvenido and his passenger died,[4] and the tricycle
was damaged.[5] No criminal case arising from the incident was
ever instituted.

March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement

of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus' insurer--
Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for
brevity) -- Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de

Nacario, received P18,500.00.

In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on
March 27, 1980 a "Release Of Claim"... releasing and forever
discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising
from the accident.

Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she

formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case,
either civil or criminal, against... the petitioners.

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from

the date of the accident on November 7, 1979,... parents of
Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.

In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the

vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their
representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as
extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for... the death
of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof,
and for the damage to the tricycle the purchase price of which
they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim.

The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners

herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00
for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the
damaged... tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages.

Issues:
whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding
that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents
the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's...
compulsory heirs.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them
being by payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation
arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The
only question now is whether or not Alicia, the surviving spouse and
the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the
persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be
made.
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor
the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or
any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with
the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as
the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code
states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as
we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-
judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de
Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural
guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondents.