37

Chapter 3
From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s
Untangling of the Aquino Administration’s
Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
Renato Cruz De Castro

Since 2011, former President Benigno Aquino III pursued a balancing policy on China’s
expansive claim in the South China Sea. He challenged Chinese maritime expansion by
shifting the AFP’s focus away from domestic security to territorial defense, bolstering
closer Philippine-U.S. security relations; acquiring American military equipment;
seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT); and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. In late April 2014,
the Philippines signed the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
with its strategic ally—the U.S. Designed to constrain Chinese maritime expansion in
the South China Sea, the agreement allowed American forces a strategic footprint in
Southeast Asia through rotational presence in Philippine territory. By strengthening the
country’s security relations with the U.S. and Japan, the Philippines got involved again in
a traditional geo-political game among the great powers in East Asia.
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, however, is determined on undoing former
President Aquino’s geo-political agenda in the South China Sea. Less than three months
in office and after the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) land-mark award to the
Philippines in its territorial row with China in the South China Sea, President Duterte
launched a charm offensive to earn Chinese goodwill. He downplayed the South China
Sea dispute in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting in
Laos. President Duterte also declared that he wanted to distance the Philippines from the
United States, a move that will not only alter the region’s strategic balance but mark a
dramatic departure from his country’s long-standing policy of maintaining close security
ties with its only strategic ally. After this trip to Laos, he announced that the Philippine
Navy (PN) would stop joining the U.S. Navy in patrolling the South China Sea to avoid
upsetting Beijing. He also said that he wanted American Special Forces (SOF) supporting
the AFP in counter-terrorism operations in Mindanao to withdraw from the island.
President Duterte is seeking Chinese assistance for the construction of
drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents, soft loans for the construction
of railways in Mindanao, and even the acquisition of Chinese-made weapons for the
38 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

Philippine military and police. His goal is to foster closer economic and diplomatic
relations with China while distancing the Philippines from the U.S. President Duterte’s
policy of effecting a dramatic departure from the Philippines’ long-standing policy of
maintaining close security ties with its traditional and only strategic ally—the U.S.—has
also altered the regional balance of power in favor of China. It has also transformed the
Philippines’ approach in the South China dispute from challenging China’s expansion
in the South China Sea to an outright appeasement of this expansionist regional
power. Consequently, his pronouncements and actions eroded the Philippines’
influence in the ASEAN on the South China Sea issue and generated a major crisis in
the Philippine-U.S. alliance.
This article addresses a central question: how is the Duterte Administration
unraveling its predecessor’s geo-political agenda in the South China Sea dispute? It
also raises the following questions: 1) what are the foreign policy goals of the Dueterte
Administration? 2) How does the Duterte Administration pursue these goals? 3) In what
ways does the pursuit of these goals affect the Philippine-U.S. alliance? 4) And finally,
how does this affect the Philippines’ approach in the South China Sea dispute?

The Aquino Administration’s Geo-political Agenda

On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commissioned by
the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct natural gas exploration in the
Reed Bank (also called Recto Bank). The Reed Bank lies 150 kilometers east of the
Spratly Islands and 250 kilometers west of the Philippine island of Palawan. Stunned by
this maritime encounter which happened within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), the Aquino Administration filed a protest before the Chinese embassy in
Manila. A Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson commented that “the Philippines
is (simply) seeking an explanation for the incident.” Brushing aside the Philippine
complaint, a Chinese embassy official insisted that China has indisputable sovereignty
over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and their adjacent territory. Beijing then went on to
demand that Manila first seek Chinese permission before it could conduct oil exploration
activities even within the Philippines’ EEZ. Furthermore, China badgered the Philippines
and other claimant states into recognizing undisputable China’s sovereign claim over the
South China Sea.
With these incidents, the Aquino Administration hastened to develop the AFP’s
territorial defense capabilities. In June 2011, the executive branch of the Philippine
government and the AFP agreed on a multi-year, multi-billion peso defense
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
39

upgrade spending and military build-up. In its first 17 months in office, the Aquino
Administration spent Php33.596 billion (US$387 million) to boost the AFP’s internal
security and territorial defense capability.1 According to then Secretary Gazmin, the
DND-AFP signed 138 defense contracts that would be implemented in the next five
years to improve the AFP’s force protection, maritime surveillance, transportation, and
combat support system.2 In January 2012, the DND reduced the number of army and
marine battalions to divert resources and personnel for internal security and civil-military
operations to maritime and territorial defense priorities.3
The Philippines’ territorial defense goal was to establish a modest but “comprehensive
border protection program.” This task was anchored on the surveillance, deterrence, and
border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the PN, and the Philippine Coast Guard (PSG)
that extend from the country’s territorial waters to its contiguous and exclusive economic
zone (EEZ).4 This objective required enhancing the AFP’s capabilities, prioritizing its
needs, and gradually restructuring its forces for territorial defense. The long-term goal,
according to the 2011 AFP’s Strategic Intent, is to maintain a “credible deterrent posture
against foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while allowing
free navigation to prosper.”5
In building up the country’s territorial defense capabilities, the Aquino Administration
sank its teeth into challenging China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea as the
latter directly encroaches into the country’s EEZ. The Philippines’ territorial defense
goal was very modest—to develop a credible posture for territorial defense and maritime
security through building a competent force capable of defending the country’s interests
and the land features it occupies in the South China Sea.6

1
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Philippines Spends US$387 million on Armed Forces Upgrade,” BBC
Monitoring Asia-Pacific (16 January 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/916135970/
fulltext/1348...
2
Anonymous, “AFP Modernization Program in Full Swing-Gazmin,” The Philippines News Agency (18
March 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/928841133/1367BFEC0AABC...
3
BBC, “Philippines Mulls Reorganization of Military to Boost Territorial Defense,” BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific (02 January 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/913215230/fultext/1348735E9...
4
National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016 (Quezon City: National Security
Council, April 2011). p. 39.
5
Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City:
Camp Aguinaldo, 2011). p. 27.
6
Secretary of Defense, op. cit. p. 4.
40 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

Balancing an Emergent China: The U.S. and Japanese Factors

The Aquino Administration also decided to enhance its security ties with the United
States—the country’s longtime strategic ally—and to foster a security partnership with
Japan. In mid-June 2011, it publicly acknowledged the exigency of U.S. diplomatic and
military support. Aware of its military inadequacies, Manila asked for an unequivocal
U.S. commitment to Philippine defense and security as provided for in the 1951 MDT,
specifically American naval/air support in the Spratlys. Philippine officials rationalized
that an armed attack on Philippine metropolitan territory and forces anywhere in the
Pacific, including the South China Sea, should trigger an automatic U.S. armed response.
American position regarding this matter, however, is ambiguous for two reasons:7
On the one hand, the U.S. tried its best to address legitimate Philippine concerns about
the absence of a clear guarantee of military support in case of an armed confrontation in
the South China Sea. On the other hand, the U.S. avoided giving an explicit and carte
blanche security guarantee that could tempt the Philippines to act provocatively against
China based on its broad interpretation of its sovereignty over the islands it controls in
the South China Sea and on a mistaken assumption about the prospect of an automatic
American armed response in case of an outbreak of armed hostilities in the disputed
waters. Fortunately for the Philippines, an increasing number of U.S. policy-makers
shared the Philippines’ view that the archipelago is a strategic bellwether of China’s
maritime expansion in the West Pacific and at the same time, the natural barrier to check
China’s expansionism.8 Hence, the U.S. should assist in developing the Philippines’ naval
capabilities to counter China’s efforts at power-projection in the Asia-Pacific.9
Aside from strengthening its alliance with the U.S, the Philippines also promoted
a security partnership with Japan, China’s main rival in East Asia. In July 2011, then
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda met with President Aquino to bolster security relations
between Japan and the Philippines. After President Aquino’s third visit to Japan, Tokyo
and Manila held high-level talks on maritime and oceanic affairs, exchanges between
Filipino and Japanese defense and maritime officials, as well as Japan’s capacity-building
training of the 3,500-strong PCG.
In July 2012, then Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his Filipino
7

See Sheena Chestnuts Greitens, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines: Challenges and Opportunities,”
U.S. Alliances and Partnership at the Center of Global Power (Eds) Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M.
Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (Seattle and Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research,
2014). p. 144.
8
Ibid. p. 128.
9
Ibid. p. 128.
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
41

counterpart, former Defense Secretary Gazmin, inked a bilateral agreement on maritime

security. The agreement calls for high-level dialogues between defense officials and
reciprocal visits by the MSDF chief-of-staff and the PN flag commander. It also features
various security-related activities such as the Multinational Cooperation Program in the
Asia-Pacific (MCAP), Multilateral Logistic Staff Talks (MLST), Training Exchanges and
Subject Matter Exchanges on HADR and Logistics, and Exchange Visits and Student
Exchanges in the two countries’ respective staff colleges. A few days later, then Philippine
Foreign Affairs Secretary Del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the
PCG with ten 40-meter boats as part of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines by the end of the
year. Newspapers also reported that two additional bigger vessels were being considered
for transfer to the Philippine government under a grant.

Pursuing Strategic Balancing: The EDCA

During the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off between a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
vessel and several Chinese civilian ships, then President Aquino asked former President
Barack Obama for a definite security guarantee when the two met in the Oval Office on 8
June 2012. Then President Obama assured him that the U.S. would honor its obligations
under the 1951 MDT. In a press conference, former President Aquino also sought the
Pentagon’s assistance to upgrade the AFP’s capabilities to patrol the country’s extensive
coastlines and requested the deployment of the U.S. Navy P-3C Orion and Global Hawk
drones in the Philippines. He also expressed interest in acquiring U.S.-made land-based
radars for the AFP to monitor the expanse of the South China Sea.
In the aftermath of the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, and later, China’s occupation
of the shoal made it urgent for Manila to negotiate the “Framework Agreement on
Increased Rotational Presence (IRP) and Enhanced Agreement” with Washington. The
agreement facilitates the deployment of American troops and equipment on a rotational
basis, thus skirting the controversial issue of re-establishing U.S. bases in the country.
Curiously, the negotiation was conducted against the backdrop of recurring tension
between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea. With its small and weak
naval force and an almost non-existent air force, the Philippine military relies on the
U.S. for technical assistance through joint training, humanitarian missions, and disaster
response operations.
After two years of mulling over the concept of rotational U.S. troop presence
in the country, Manila finally decided to negotiate with Washington. On 28 April
2014, former Philippine Defense Secretary Gazmin and then U.S. Ambassador to the
42 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

Philippines, Philip Goldberg, signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

(EDCA) a few hours before then President Obama arrived in Manila for his first state
visit. Actually, EDCA is not a new security pact; it is merely an updated version of
the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.10 This executive agreement provides the framework
by which the Philippines and the U.S. can develop their individual and collective
(defense) capabilities. Such a task could be accomplished through the rotational
deployment of American forces in Philippine bases.11 Although the EDCA allows
American forces to utilize AFP owned and controlled facilities, the Philippine base
commander has unhampered access to these locations. Likewise, American-built or
improved infrastructure inside these installations can be used by the AFP. Furthermore,
any construction and other activities within the Philippine bases require the consent of
the host country through the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) and Security Engagement
Board (SEB).
During the Sixth Annual Bilateral Security Dialogue (BSD) held in Washington
D.C. on March 18, 2016, American and Philippine defense officials announced that
U.S. forces would be allowed access to five AFP bases: Antonio Bautista Air Base in
the westernmost island of Palawan, Base Air Base and Fort Magsaysay in the main
island of Luzon, Lumbia Air Base in northern Mindanao, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen
Air Base in the central Philippine island of Cebu. The two allies’ utilization of these
AFP facilities would protect their respective security interests by expanding their joint
military exercises/training and, more significantly, would enable the U.S. to deploy again
a credible deterrent force (withdrawn in 1992) in Southeast Asia on a rotational basis.

Fostering a Strategic Partnership with Japan

The Chinese occupation of the Scarborough Shoal further pushed the Philippines
closer to Japan. The Philippines and Japan conducted several high-level meetings and
consultations to solidify their security cooperation and counter China’s assertiveness. In
December 2013, former President Aquino discussed with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
in Tokyo, China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the
East China Sea. He was worried that China might extend the zone into the South China

10
Jim Garamone, “U.S.-Philippine Pact Expands Defense Cooperation,” Targeted News Service (28 April 2014).
p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1519453450/17CC0F621D4441CBPQ/55?accountid=...
11
Philippine News Agency, “New Defense Agreement Enhances Philippine, U.S. Alliance on Security
Challenges—DND Chief,” The Philippines News Agency (28 April 2014). p. 1. http://search.proquest.
com/docview/1519443096?accountid=28547
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
43

Sea adversely affecting Philippine security.12 Prime Minister Abe assured then President
Aquino that Japan would not tolerate China’s attempt to change the status quo in the
region by force, and would cooperate with the Philippines to ensure that the freedom of
flight and navigation is respected. To help build up the PCG’s capability, Prime Minister
Abe approved the yen-based soft loan to finance the Philippines’ acquisition of ten
40-meter long multi-purpose patrol boats from Japan.13
In June 2014, then President Aquino again met PM Abe in Tokyo to discuss ways
and means to further Philippine-Japan security relations. Tackled in particular are areas
of possible cooperation to enhance the recently forged Philippines-Japan Strategic
Partnership. He followed up on the PCG’s request for 10 patrol boats to be acquired by the
Philippines through a US$184 million soft loan from Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA). PM Abe assured former President Aquino that three of the vessels would
be delivered in 2015, while the remaining seven will be ready for delivery in 2016. The
PCG needs the patrol boats to secure the waters around the seven islands claimed and
occupied by the Philippines in the Spratlys. The boats would also monitor foreign naval
presence in the several reefs and shoals within the country’s EEZ currently occupied by
Chinese forces. For the PCG’s maritime domain awareness operations, Japan promised
to provide VSAR and Inmarsat communication systems.
More significantly, then President Aquino endorsed Prime Minister Abe’s initiative
to expand Japan’s security role in the region. In the light of the Sino-Japanese dispute
over the Senkaku Islands, Prime Minister Abe has pushed for the reinterpretation of
the pacifist 1947 Japanese Constitution to accommodate the Japan Self-Defense Forces’
(JSDF) right of “collective self-defense,” allowing the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) to assist allies such as the U.S., even if Japan is not attacked. Former President
Aquino declared that expanding the JMSDF’ role and cementing bilateral economic and
security ties between the Philippines and Japan would ensure regional security.14
In June 2015, then President Aquino discussed with PM Abe the strengthening
of their countries’ strategic partnership in the face of China’s aggressive behavior in the

12
Jiji Press English News Service, “Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on China’s Air Defense Zone,” Jiji Press
English News Service (13 December 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467745056?
13
Gulf News, “Aquino and Abe Discuss Maritime Disputes,” Gulf News (25 June 2014). p. 1. http://
search.proquest.com/docview/1539577105?accountid=28547
14
Kwan Weng Kin, “Aquino Backs Japan’s Bid to Widen Defense Role,” The Strait Times (25 June 2014).
p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1539737436?accountid=28547
44 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

South China Sea.15 In the first day of his visit, he signed a contract with the Japan Marine
United Corporation for the acquisition of ten patrol vessels for the PCG. Funded by the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Marine United Cooperation
would build ten 40-meter long multi-role response vessels (MRRVs) to be delivered to
the PCG starting in 2016. With their top speed of 16 knots and a range of 1,500 miles,
the MRRVs would be deployed in the Coast Guard Districts across the country including
in the island of Palawan—the country’s westernmost part that faces the South China Sea.
The deal also included the supply of standard spare parts and tools, crew training, ocean
transportation, and marine insurance.
The following day, then President Aquino and PM Abe signed “A Joint Declaration
on A Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Goals
of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and beyond.” The five-page document
provided a strategic vision to the Philippines-Japan evolving security partnership. The
declaration affirmed the strategic partnership based on the long-standing friendship
between the peoples of both countries and their shared goals of ensuring peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, promoting regional economic growth, and addressing
international challenges. It also contained their commitment to ensure maritime safety
and security, their serious concern about unilateral actions to change the status quo in the
South China Sea including large-scale reclamation and building of outposts.16 This was
directed against China’s construction of artificial islands in the contested area.
On 5 June, former President Aquino announced forthcoming talks on a Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow the JSDF access to Philippine military
bases.17 In a press briefing in Tokyo, he revealed that Japanese and Filipino officials
explored the possibility of a SOFA since both countries have boosted their security
relationship significantly over the past few years. In early June 2013, then Secretary
Gazmin raised the possibility of allowing ships and planes of the JMSDF access to the
former American military facilities in the Philippines if Tokyo is interested in negotiating
and signing an access agreement with Manila. The possible use of the JSDF of Philippine

15
The Philippines News Agency (PNA), “Japan Shares Philippines Serious Concern over China’s
Reclamation Activities in West Philippines Sea,” The Philippines News Agency (5 June 2015). p. 1.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1686051792?accountid=28547
16
The Philippines News Agency (PNA), “Japan Shares Philippines’ Serious Concern over China’s
Reclamation Activities in the West Philippine Sea,” The Philippines News Agency (PNA) (05 June
2015). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1686051792?accountid=28547
17
Priam Nepomuceno, “VFA Possible with Japan Due to Robust Relationship with the Philippines,” The
Philippine News Agency (24 June 2015). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1690936480
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
45

bases on a limited and rotational basis is useful for Japan as it actively pursues a policy of
Pro-Active Contribution to Peace in East Asia. With refueling and basing facilities in the
Philippines, units of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and JMSDF can conduct
joint patrols with their American counterparts for a longer period of time and over a
larger area of the South China Sea.

President Duterte’s Agenda: Undoing the Geo-Political Agenda

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte was highly
critical of the Aquino Administration’s geo-strategic agenda in the South China Sea. He
proposed joint exploration of the South China Sea’s natural resources with China.18 He
also declared that he would keep silent about the dispute if Beijing would build railroads
in the troubled island of Mindanao.19 He was also open to bilateral negotiations and
was willing to downplay the sovereignty dispute if China would stop insisting on its
sovereignty claim.20 He likewise disparaged the Philippine-U.S. alliance saying he had
little confidence that the U.S. would honor its treaty commitment to the Philippines
relative to the South China Sea dispute.
In the first months after assuming office, however, President Duterte seemed to
be pursuing his predecessor’s geo-political agenda of challenging China’s expansion
in the South China Sea. A few days after the presidential inauguration, Defense
Secretary Delfin Lorenzana assured the AFP and the Filipino public that the Duterte
Administration would pursue the modernization of the Philippine military.21 He stressed
the fact that territorial defense is one of the priorities of the Duterte Administration
because “it is very important as we need to protect our territories against encroachment
by other parties.”22 He said that the 15-year AFP modernization program will continue
as scheduled. Secretary Lorenzana, however, clarified that there will be some “redirection”
as the Duterte Administration is determined to deal decisively with criminality, especially
the Abu Sayyaf, which gives the Philippines a bad name due to its series of kidnappings

18
Dan Steinbock, “Could Duterte’s Ascent Mean Cooler Philippine Ties with U.S.,” CNN Wire Service
(10 May 2016). p. 1.
19
Ibid. p. 1.
20
Aileen Baviera, “President Duterte’s Foreign Policy Challenges,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, 2
(2016). p. 203.
21
Jaime Laude, “Duterte to Continue AFP Modernization Program,” The Philippine State (2 July 2016). p. 1.
22
Philippine News Agency, “AFP Modernization Will Continue as Scheduled Under Duterte
Administration,” Philippine News Agency (2 July 2016). p. 1.
46 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

of Malaysians and Indonesian sailors off the Sulu Sea.23

After a three-year wait, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague
in the Netherlands decided on the maritime dispute between the Philippines and China
on 12 July 2016. The five-judge PCA unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines on
almost all of its claims against China. It determined that China’s claim to historic rights
through its nine-dash line in the South China Sea is contrary to international law.24 The
court noted that none of the Spratlys are legally islands because they cannot sustain a stable
human community or independent economic life.25 Finally, it found China of guilty of
damaging the marine environment by building artificial islands, and of illegally preventing
Filipinos from fishing and conducting oil explorations in the Philippines’ EEZ.26
Despite the Philippines’ overwhelming legal triumph over China, the Duterte
Administration met the eagerly anticipated decision with sober, cautious, and even muted
reaction. Its response was ultra-low key as it neither flaunted the victory nor taunted China
with the favorable ruling. Although the domestic reaction was overwhelmingly positive
and jubilant, then Foreign Secretary Yasay merely said that he welcomed the ruling and
called on the Filipinos to exercise restraint and sobriety. During the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting in Laos, former Secretary Yasay withdrew the country’s motion to
include the PCA decision in the ASEAN Joint Communique after Cambodia objected to
its inclusion. Designated as the country’s special envoy to China, former President Fidel
Ramos, suggested that the PCA award be set aside as the Duterte Administration pursues
bilateral negotiations with China. Clearly, the government is adopting an appeasement
policy on China despite the PCA ruling favorable to the Philippines.
In the aftermath of the 12 July PCA award to the Philippines, Defense Secretary
Lorenzana underscored the urgent need for the Philippines to upgrade the PCG, PN,
and PAF to prevent other countries from encroaching on its maritime territory.27
He remarked that the “15-year modernization program of the AFP will continue as
schedule.”28 He further said that “in the long run, we will still follow our modernization

23
Ibid. p. 2.
24
Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines
versus the People’s Republic of China),” Press Release (The Hague, 12 July 2016). p. 1.
25
Ibid. p. 1.
26
Ibid. p. 1.
27
Priam Nepomuceno, “Need to Upgrade Coast, Navy, Air Force Now More Urgent—DND Chief,”
Philippine News Agency (20 July 2016). p. 1.
28
News desk, “AFP Modernization Remains A Priority of New DND Leadership,” News Desk (18 July
2016). p. 1.
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
47

(program) because you know it jibes with what our long-term plans (of ) having credible
deterrence to secure our territory (especially) maritime plan.”29 These developments
signified that despite its earlier pronouncement about reviving the bilateral negotiations
with China and conducting joint developments in the South China Sea, the Duterte
Administration was still pondering on its predecessor’s geo-political agenda of
challenging China’s expansive claim in the disputed waters. In fact, one prominent
Filipino academic observed: “Duterte’s foreign policy will not only depend on his
personal preferences and inclinations, but like his predecessors will be defined by other
internal and external factors.”30
President Duterte, however, changed gears after the Obama Administration became
critical of his domestic agenda of waging a so-called war on drugs and criminality that
had claimed more than 3,000 lives since May 2017. His current pronouncements and
decisions point to his foreign policy agenda of distancing the Philippines from the U.S.
At the same time, he forges cordial and closer relations with China despite the PCA’s
ruling and the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels around the Scarborough Shoal
and the Mischief Reefs, which are within the Philippines EEZ.
During the two ASEAN Summits and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in Laos,
President Duterte made remarks that were interpreted as insulting to former President
Barack Obama. This caused the cancellation of the scheduled bilateral meeting between
the two heads of states. President Duterte also skipped the U.S.-ASEAN Summit
and instead of reading his prepared speech on the PCA award to the Philippines, he
denounced American atrocities committed against the Filipino Muslims in Mindanao
in the early 20th century. This was President Duterte’s overreaction to Washington’s
condemnation of human rights violations resulting from his anti-narcotics/anti-criminal
campaign in the Philippines.31

From Balancing to Appeasement

On 12 September 2016, President Duterte suddenly announced that U.S. Special
Operations Forces in Mindanao must leave the country. He argued that there could
be no peace in this southern Philippine island as long as American troops are operating

29
Ibid. p. 1.
30
Baviera, op. cit. p. 206.
31
Oxford Daily Brief Service, “Philippines: New Foreign Policy may be Destabilizing,” Oxford Analytica
(16 September 2016). p. 1.
48 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

there.32 He also warned that U.S. troops are prime targets of Abu Sayyaf bandits who
could kidnap them for ransom or outright kill them, thus complicating the prevailing
problem of peace and order in Mindanao.33 The following day, he announced that the
PN would terminate joint patrol with the U.S. Navy in the Philippines’ EEZ to avoid
upsetting China.34 Former Foreign Secretary Yasay explained that “the inadequately
armed Philippine military cannot fight China in any battle, thus, President Duterte
ordered the Navy not to conduct joint patrols in the South China Sea with the U.S.
Navy.”35 He commented that Philippine-U.S. patrols in the South China Sea could be
perceived by China as a provocative act, making it more difficult to peacefully resolve the
two countries’ territorial dispute.36 Accordingly, rather “than worry over a possible war in
the South China Sea,” President Duterte admonished the military “to focus on domestic
security challenges such as fighting drug lords and traffickers and insurgents.”37
During his two-day official visit to Vietnam in late September 2016, President Duterte
announced that the Philippine-U.S. Amphibious Landing Exercise (Phiblex) 2016, that
was taking place from 4-12 October 2016, would be the last military exercise between
the two allies during his six-year term.38 Though he promised to honor the long-standing
defense treaty with the U.S., he said that China opposes joint U.S.-Philippine military
drills in the country. This left him no choice but to serve notice to the U.S.39 President
Duterte’s announcement on the termination of joint Philippine-U.S. military exercise
was considered as the strongest indication of a slow but definite break-down in the
alliance that the Obama Administration was trying to shore up in the light of the U.S.
strategic rebalancing to Asia.
While creating a wide diplomatic and strategic cleavage between the Philippines
and the U.S., President Duterte conducts a calibrated foreign policy characterized by

32
David Cagahastian, “Malacanang Clarifies Duterte Statement on Kick out of U.S. Troops in
Mindanao,” BM News (13 September 2016). p. 3.
33
Ibid. p. 3.
34
Trefor Moss, “Philippine President’s Shift on U.S. Alliance Worries Military: His Willingness to Upend Alliance
with the U.S. has Dumbfounded even those in His Inner Circle,” The Wall Street Journal (16 September 2016).
http://www.wsj.com/articles/philippine-presidents-shift-on-u-s-alliance-worries-military-1474058666
35
Jose Katigbak, “Philippines Eyes Talks with China Sans Preconditions,” The Philippine Star (18
September 2016). p. 1. http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/18/1624973/philippines-eyes-
talks-china-sans-preconditions?utm_source=Arangkada+News+Clips&utm-campaign...
36
Ibid. p. 1.
37
Moss, op. cit. p. 2.
38
Julie M. Aurelio, “Duterte Out to End War games with the U.S.: Bilateral Relations Get More
Uncertain,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (30 September 2016). p. 1.
39
Ibid.
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
49

gravitating toward to China. He declared that he is open to direct bilateral negotiations

with China. In contrast, former President Aquino brought the South China Sea dispute
for international arbitration at the PCA. To earn China’s confidence, President Duterte
declared that the PCA award to the Philippines is purely a bilateral issue between the
Philippines and China and is not a concern of the ASEAN, echoing the Chinese position
on this matter.40 Then Foreign Secretary Yasay, even declared “that the relationship
between the two countries (China and the Philippines) was not limited to the maritime
dispute. There were other areas of concern in such fields as investment, trade, and tourism
and discussing them could open the doors for talks on the maritime issues.”41
In late September 2016, President Duterte announced that he would forge “new
alliances” with China and Russia to cushion the impact of the eventual withdrawal of
U.S. forces from the Philippines in 2017.42 Speaking in the province of Pampanga, he
urged the Filipinos to make a small sacrifice for his plan of proverbially crossing the
Rubicon in his ties with the U.S. as he is pursuing partnerships with rival countries
(China and Russia) or the countries on the other side of the ideological barrier.43 He
also announced his visits to Russia and China to chart an independent foreign policy
and “open (new) alliances” with these two major powers that have historic rivalries with
the U.S.
Intentionally, President Duterte is creating a diplomatic/strategic cleavage between
the Philippines and the U.S., while pivoting towards the U.S.’s geo-strategic rivals—China
and Russia.44 Accompanied by 250 Filipino businessmen, he visited China on 20-21
October to seek a new partnership at a time when tension between the Philippines and
the U.S. was mounting.45 President Duterte’s foreign policy agenda involves developing
and maintaining an independent and pro-active posture so he can adroitly balance
the major powers in East Asia. This is aimed to create a more positive and conducive

40
Oxford Daily Brief Service, op. cit. p. 2.
41
Katigbak, op. cit. p. 2.
42
Gil Cabacungan, “Duterte Seeks Alliances with China and Russia,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (28
September 2016). p. 1. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/145595/duterte-seeks-alliances-china-and-
russia?utm_source=Arangkada+News+Clips&utm-campaign=57936169b7-Aran...
43
Ibid. p. 1.
44
AFP, “Presidential Remarks on China, Russia Send Investors Fleeing,” Business World (28 September
2016). p. 1.
45
Neil Jerome Morales and Karen Lema, “The Philippines is Preparing a Major Pivot toward China
amid Tension with the U.S.,” Business Insider (11 October 2016). p. 1. http://www.businessinsider.
com/the-philippines-is-preparing-a-major-pivot-toward-china-2016-10?source=Arangkada+News+Cli
ps&utm_campaign=2df...
50 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

atmosphere in Philippine-China bilateral relations that can allow both sides to embark
on major infrastructure and investment projects, as well as other forms of cooperation to
restore mutual trust and confidence.46

Appeasing China
Ironically, despite President Duterte’s efforts win China’s confidence and gravitate toward
its orbit, Beijing initially did not trust him for two reasons. First, China was skeptical that
it could persuade the Philippines to cut its ties with the U.S. and Japan and totally side
with China the way Laos and Cambodia consistently do when forced to choose between
the two great powers.47 Many Chinese sensed that what President Duterte was doing
was playing the U.S. off against China and vice-versa, to hopefully earn the greatest
benefit for the Philippines.48 They suspiciously viewed President Duterte’s proposals to
buy arms from China and pronouncements about distancing the Philippines away from
the U.S. as mere posturing to please Beijing—which was infuriated by the Hague ruling
on the South China Sea—rather than a realistic plan.49 Second, China cannot offer any
substantial territorial concession to President Duterte, like allowing Filipino fishermen
access to Scarborough Shoal or recognize its occupation of some land features in the
South China Sea, because it would never yield what it considers its sovereign rights to
waters, reefs, and rocks in the disputed waters off the Philippine coast.50
To dispel China’s doubt about his appeasement policy and earn Chinese trust
and confidence, President Duterte undertook measure to accommodate Beijing’s
security interests at the expense of Manila’s alliance with Washington. Confronted by
the defense department’s and the AFP’s resistance to his policy of downgrading the
country’s alliance with the U.S., President Duterte opted to continue the conduct of
joint Philippine-U.S. military exercises. Nevertheless, he reduced the numbers of these
joint exercises from 28 to about 13. He redirected as well the focus of these military
exercises from territorial defense and maritime security to non-traditional security

46
Baviera, op. cit. p. 205.
47
New York Times News Service, “Prospect of Philippine Thaw Slows China’s Plans in the South
China Sea,” New York Times News Service (25 September 2016). p. 1. http://www.mb.com.ph/
prospect-of-philippine-thaw-slows-chinas-plans-in-south-china-sea/
48
Kristin Huang, “Just Empty Talk? Philippines Duterte is Playing China off Against U.S. on Arms
Purchases, Analysts Say Philippine President is Playing Washington against Beijing in Hopes of
Improving Position,” South China Morning Post (15 September 2016). p. 1. http://O-search.proquest.
com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/docive/1819240990/C9201BE5244CE4PQ/162?accountid=28547
49
Ibid. p. 2.
50
Ibid. p. 1.
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
51

concerns such as Humanitarian Assistance and Risk Reduction (HADR), cybersecurity,

anti-terrorism, and anti-narcotics operations.51
Most significantly, he cancelled the holding of joint naval and amphibious exercises
such as the PHILBEX and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).52 On
11 November, President Duterte admitted his dislike of the EDCA and he hinted that
he might eventually decide to scrap the agreement that allows the American forces access
to Philippine air bases.53 Nevertheless, he greenlighted the EDCA’s implementation
in which the defense department had already firmed up. In addition, and he did not
want to renege on the Philippine government’s legal obligation under an international
agreement.54 President Duterte also revoked an arms deal with the U.S. for the purchase
of 26,000 assault rifles for the Philippine National Police (PNP) after members of the U.S.
Senate announced their opposition to the arms deal because of allegations that large-scale
extra-judicial killings in the country are linked with the war on drugs. President Duterte
then turned to China which offered US$14 million worth of small arms and patrol boats
along with another US$500 million in soft loans for the Philippine military’s acquisition
of Chinese military equipment.55
In December 2016, Defense Secretary Lorenzana declared that it is unlikely that
the Philippines will allow the U.S. military to continue using the Philippines as a base
for its freedom of navigation (FONS) patrols in the South China Sea.56 Later, President
Duterte, in response to reports that China is installing weapons on islands deep inside
the Philippines’ EEZ, said that he would not protest these Chinese actions.57 In support,
former Foreign Secretary Yasay admitted that the Philippines is helpless in stopping
China’s maritime expansion and militarization activities on the disputed island in the
South China Sea.58 He declared that it was wiser to let other countries with special
concerns on China’s activities take action (themselves), citing the U.S. and Japan which

51
Fernan Marasigan, “Philippines, U.S. Set Talks on Reduced War Games,” TCA Regional News (09
November 2016). p. 1.
52
Ibid. p. 1.
53
Xinhua News Agency, “Philippine Duterte Says He is Against 2014 Defense Pact with the U.S.,”
Xinhua News Agency (10 November 2016). p. 1.
54
Ibid. p. 1.
55
Chin-Hao Huang and Robert Sutter, “Beijing Presses its Advantages,” Comparative Connections 18,
3, (January 2017). p. 7.
56
Ibid. p. 7.
57
Ibid. p. 7.
58
Jeannette I. Andrade, “Philippine Helpless versus China—Yasay,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (17
December 2016). p. 1.
52 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

have raised concern over the freedom of navigation and overflight operations.59 He added
that anyway “the Philippines has its own bilateral engagement with China to ensure no
further actions.”60
Later in December 2016, Mr. Yasay remarked that it will be beneficial for
the Philippines and the U.S. to reassess their relationship in the light of the current
geo-political realities.61 Clearly, he was referring to President Duterte’s earlier statement
“that China now is the power (in East Asia), and they (the Chinese) have military
superiority in the region.” Parroting China’s mantra on the South China Sea dispute,
he argued that “the present circumstances, such as the South China Sea (dispute), may
no longer require a strategy based on the old concept of the Cold War.”62 He said that
the Duterte Administration intends to utilize EDCA to give more emphasis on “coming
up with a rapid response during natural calamities, to address terrorism, and to enhance
Philippine law-enforcement capabilities.” He added that “joint military exercises will not
be given focus or just down-graded, at least.”63 In effect, the continued existence of the
Philippine-U.S. alliance depends on the Duterte Administration’s domestic agenda such
as the war on drugs, HADR, and counter-terrorism operations against Islamic militants
in Mindanao. This focus has essentially rendered the alliance useless in constraining
China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea.
The following year, President Duterte warned the U.S. that he would unilaterally
abrogate the EDCA because he had received information that the American forces
were building permanent arms depots in violation of the agreement and the Philippine
Constitution.64 President Duterte’s warning was followed by Defense Secretary
Lorenzana’s statement “that absent a U.S. guarantee of support to its ally, the Philippines
would consider scrapping the EDCA to avoid becoming entangled with the U.S. just in
case war breaks out in the South China Sea.”65 In late March 2017, President Duterte
continued his rant against the U.S. by focusing on the U.S. Navy’s FONS as he argued
that they (the FONs) risked a “miscalculation” that could trigger a conflict in the South

59
Ibid. p. 2.
60
Ibid. p. 2.
61
Ronron Calunsod, “Philippines Says Review of U.S. Relations Good for Both Sides,” Kyodo News
Service (22 December 2016). p. 1.
62
Ibid. p. 1.
63
Ibid. p. 1.
64
Sheldon Simon, “Mixed Messages,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian
Bilateral Relations, Vol 19, No. 1 (May 2017). p. 44.
65
Ibid. p. 44.
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
53

China Sea.66 He also accused the Obama Administration of pushing the Philippines to
provoke China without any guarantee of American support.67
The Duterte Administration’s appeasement policy on China stems from its
calculation that the U.S. will not assist the Philippines in case of an armed confrontation
with China in the South China Sea and that geography dictates that the country has no
choice but to co-exist and even cooperate with this emergent power in its own backyard.
Consequently, President Duterte’s appeasement of China expands Chinese clout in
Southeast Asia and might convince other Southeast Asian claimant states to negotiate
directly with China to manage or eventually resolve the territorial row. This will decrease
American (and even Japanese) status and influence in maritime Southeast Asia.

Maintaining the Philippine-Japan Security Partnership

Japan’s pressing diplomatic goal is to assist the Philippines to improve its maritime
surveillance capabilities in the light of increasing Chinese maritime activities in the
South China Sea and despite worsening Philippine-U.S. relations. Aware that strained
Philippine-U.S. relations benefit China, Japan is strengthening its relations with the
Duterte Administration by fostering periodic consultations between the two countries,
and strengthening the Philippine Navy’s and Coast Guard’s maritime domain awareness
capabilities. For the Philippines, keeping its security partnership with Japan intact is
necessary because it remains the country’s most important trading partner, its largest
investor, and the home of several thousands of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) and
the millions of dollars of remittance income they send home each year, an important
boost to the local economy.68 Moreover, Japan is the only country in the Western alliance
with a healthy and cordial relationship with the Philippines, making it an important
countervailing force to an expected increase in Chinese influence in the light of President
Duterte’s efforts to gravitate closer to China’s economic orbit.69
In January 2017, PM Abe went on a two-day state visit to Manila as the Philippines
became closer to China while taking a taking hostile posture towards the two countries’
common security partner—the U.S. PM Abe’s visit to the Philippines was his first stop in
a four-nation diplomatic swing as he pressed his efforts to boost Japan’s trade and security
66
Ibid. p. 44.
67
Ibid. p. 44.
68
See Anthony Rivera, “Simply by Design,” Business Mirror (28 June 2016). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.com.
lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/docview/1800132718/fulltext/C41F2428DA1E4763PQ/23?accountid=28547
69
Alastair Wanklyn, “Amid Duterte-U.S. Row, Attention Turns to Japan,” TCA Regional News (4 October
2016). p. 2. http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/printviewfile?accountid=28547
54 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

engagements amidst China’s increasing economic and diplomatic clout in Southeast

Asia. Upon his arrival, PM Abe mentioned that he chose the Philippines as his first
destination in his four-country tour to emphasize the importance of Philippine-Japan
bilateral relations.
During his talks with the Philippine president, he pledged one trillion Yen
(US$8.7 billion) in ODA package that would include government grants and public
investments for the Philippines over the next years for infrastructure development. This
is Japan’s bid to strengthen strategic ties with a key Southeast Asia state that is on the
path of China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea.70 PM Abe emphasized the
importance of Japan’s role in developing Philippine infrastructures as he announced
that Japan will leverage its “technology and know-how to the fullest extent to positively
cooperate for the improvement of Metro Manila and the whole of the Philippines.”71 The
two leaders then agreed to form a joint committee that will expedite Japan’s participation
in infrastructure development in the country.
The two leaders also discussed defense matters as they pledged to deepen maritime
security cooperation between their two countries. PM Abe emphasized that since both
the Philippines and Japan are maritime nations, Japan will support the Philippines’
capacity-building in the field of maritime security.72 For his part, President Duterte
expressed hope for the fast-track delivery to the Philippines of patrol vessels already in the
pipeline and the acquisition of new boats.73 Both leaders also reaffirm their commitments
to pursue a peaceful resolution to the long-standing South China Sea dispute. PM Abe
also stated Japan’s readiness to fully support President Duterte’s ASEAN Chairmanship
for a successful ASEAN-Related Summit Meetings and the East Asian Summit in
2017.74 Commenting on the high-profile visit by a Japanese head-of-government to
the Philippines, an American analyst observed that PM Abe’s 12-13 January 2017 visit
to the Philippines reflected “Japan’s goal to upset growing Chinese influence in the
geo-politically strategic Southeast Asian country by ensuring the steady flow of (Japanese)

70
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, “Japan, Philippines Agree to Enhance Maritime, Security Ties,” BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific (12 January 2017). p. 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1857584233?accountid=28547
71
Ibid. p. 1.
72
Catherin Valente, “Abe Offers PhP430 B Package,” TCA Regional News (13 January 2017). p. 2.
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1857825130?accountid=28547
73
Ibid. p. 2.
74
Asia News Monitor, “Japan/Philippines: Duterte, Abe Eye Higher Level of Philippines-Japan Relations,” Asia
News Monitor (16 January 2017). p. 2 http://search.proquest.com/dcoview/1858311749?accountid=28547
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
55

aid and investment to the Philippines.”75

On 28 March 2017, the first two former JMSDF Beechcraft King Air TC-90
reconnaissance planes were formally transferred to the PN. The two-donated aircraft
augmented the PN’s six 40-year old Britten-Norman Islanders that are used in maritime
patrol, surveillance and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and rapid
assessment missions. Along with PM Abe’s pledges of more grants and investment, the
lease of the TC-90 reconnaissance aircraft to the PN was part of Tokyo’s efforts in assisting
the Philippines economically and militarily to counter China’s growing influence on the
Duterte Administration.

From Tactical to Strategic Appeasement?

Current developments indicate the Duterte Administration is gravitating from a tactical
to an outright or strategic appeasement of China as shown by its pronouncements and
efforts. Instead of correcting the imbalance in the Philippines’ relations with the two
major powers, President Duterte plans to replace the U.S. with China as the Philippines’
most important strategic partner. In March 2017, President Duterte publicly admitted
that the Philippines cannot stop China’s reported plan to construct an environmental
monitoring station on the disputed Scarborough Shoal.76 Questioned by a journalist
about his view on the prospect of China building a radar station on the shoal, President
Duterte exposed his appeasement scheme vis-à-vis Chinese maritime expansion when
he answered: “We cannot stop China from doing this thing. So, what do you want
me to do…declare war on China? I can, but we’ll all lose our military and policemen
tomorrow.”77 Interestingly, President Duterte even wants Chinese ships “to pass or come
and dock” in the Philippines as long as “they will not do anything to the Philippine Coast
Guard as it patrols the country’s maritime waters.”78
President Duterte’s statements that he would not do anything to stop China from
building on a disputed shoal was based on the calculation that appeasing China has
its rewards in the form of US$6 billion dollars in deals including an agreement for

75
Ralph Jennings, “Japan Seeks to Limit China As Abe Visits Philippines,” Voice of America News/FIND;
Lanham (13 January 2017). p. 1.
76
Christina Mendez, “No One Can Stop China on Panatag-Duterte,” The Philippine Star (March 20,
2017). p. 1.
77
The American Interest, “Duterte: We Can’t Stop China at Scarborough Shoal,” The American
Interest (March 21, 2017) p. 1. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/03/20/duterte-we-cant-
stop-at-scarborough-shoal/
78
Mendez, op. cit. p. 2.
56 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

agricultural exports to China and loans for infrastructure projects such as railways and
hydroelectric dams. In March 2017, Chinese Third Vice Premier Wang Yang visited
Davao City and witnessed the exchange of letters between Philippine and Chinese officials
on the feasibility studies on infrastructure projects China will be financing.79 Mr. Wang
visited portions of the proposed Davao Coastline and Portland Development Project. He
was also briefed on the Davao City Expressway and the Mindanao Railway. Accordingly,
Premier Wang expressed China’s interest to finance the various infrastructure projects
presented to him while he was in Davao City.80
During Primer Wang’s visit to the country, the Philippines and China signed
a six-year economic cooperation agreement.81 The agreement commits China to
finance 15 big-ticket infrastructure projects such as the US$53.6 million Chico River
Pump Irrigation, the US$374 million New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam,
and the South Line of the North-South Railway.82 Interestingly, China also extended
to the Philippine government a credit package worth US$500 million for the AFP’s
procurement of Chinese-made military hardware.83 Under the initial part of this package,
China would extend to the Philippines US$144.4 million for the Philippine military’s
acquisition of small-arms, speedboats, and night-goggle vision to enhance its counter-
terrorism, counter-insurgency, and anti-narcotics capabilities.84 Historically, the AFP has
acquired its hardware from the U.S. However, under the Duterte Administration, the
Philippine military’s procurement pattern might change as President Duterte explores
the possibility of reducing the AFP’s dependence on the U.S. by procuring Chinese
made-weapons financed by Chinese loans over a 25-year period.85
Not surprisingly, President Duterte is alarmingly resigned to heightened Chinese

79
Philippine News Agency, “Chinese Leader’s Visit Brightens’ Realization of Mindanao Railway, 4 Other
Development Projects,” Philippines News Agency (March 21, 2017). p. 1. http://www.businessmirror.
com.ph/chinese-leaders-visit-brightens-re...
80
Ibid. p. 1.
81
Czeriza Valencia, “Philippines, China Sign Development Plan,” The Philippine Star (19 March 2017). p. 1.
82
Ibid. p. 2.
83
Jon Grevatt, “China Offers US$500 Million in Military Assistance to Philippines,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly: Horley 54, 8 (December 2016). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/
docview/1851029631/834095F0419D406CPQ12?accountid=28547
84
Peter Layton, “The Battle for Southeast Asia’s Soul,” Real Clear Defense (02 June 2017). http://www.
realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/06/02/the_battle-for_southeast_asias-soul_111504.html
85
Jon Grevatt, “China Offers US$500 Million in Military Assistance to Philippines,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly: Horley 54, 8 (December 2016). p. 1.

http://search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/docview/1851029631/834095F0419D406
CPQ12?accountid=28547
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
57

island-building activities in the South China Sea. Clearly, he has been lured by the
Chinese promise of trade concessions, grants, loans, and investment. Consequently, his
administration has adopted Beijing’s official line “that after several years of disruption
caused mainly by ‘non-regional countries (Japan and the U.S.),’ the South China Sea
has calmed with China and Southeast Asian countries agreeing to peacefully resolve
[their] disputes.”86
President Duterte’s objective of appeasing China at the expense of the Philippine-U.S.
alliance became apparent during the conduct of the joint U.S.-Philippines military
exercise Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) 2017. Unlike previous Balikatan that involved
massive combat drills directed at a hypothetical threat emanating from the South
China Sea, Balikatan 2017 was scaled down and was refocused on exercises involving
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster (HADR) and counter-terrorism, with the
usual visible live-fire components purposely removed. Balikatan 2016 entailed 11,000
Philippine and American forces conducting live-fire exercises geared toward territorial
defense and maritime security. This year’s joint military drill involved only 5,400
American and Filipino troops with the U.S. sending only 2,600 members.
To further assuage China that Balikatan 2017 was not a veiled warning from the
Philippine-U.S. alliance that Chinese expansion in the South China Sea would not go
unchallenged, the joint exercise followed a single-scenario involving a massive storm from
the Pacific, moving from the eastern part of the central Philippines to the main island of
Luzon.87 Observing President Duterte’s scheme of down-grading the Balikatan exercise
in particular, and the Philippine-U.S. alliance in general, an analyst notes: “Balikatan has
been one of the early victims of Duterte’s desire to rebalance Philippine foreign policy,
which has meant less dependence on its traditional ally the United States relative to
newer partners like China and Russia and has led to the cancellation of some drills and
the refocusing of others.”88

86
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, “Beijing Presses Its Advantages,” Comparative Connections 13,
3 (September-December 2017). p. 43.
87
Raul Dancel, “U.S. and Philippines Begin Scaled-Down Military Drills: This Year’s Exercise
Focuses on Disaster, and Terrorism, Instead of External Threats,” The Strait Times (19 May
2017). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/docview/1896611926/fulltext/
E16FA4E157914CCBPQ/15?accountid=28547
88
Prashanth Parameswaran, “How Significant is the 2017 U.S.-Philippines Balikatan Military
Exercise? TCA Opinion (16 May 2017). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/
docview/1898743286/A261FE21069D4E6EPQ/27accountid=28547
58 Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific

Unravelling the Geo-Political Agenda

From 2011 to 2016, former President Aquino pursued a balancing policy on China
as he promoted closer security cooperation with the U.S. This policy could be traced
back to 2011 when he stood up to China’s expansive claim and heavy-handed behavior
in the South China Sea. He ordered the AFP to focus on territorial defense, fostering
deeper Philippine-U.S. security arrangements, acquiring American military equipment,
and seek from Washington an unequivocal security guarantee under the 1951 MDT. The
most significant offshoot of this foreign policy is the EDCA, which provides American
forward-deployed forces strategic rotational presence in the Philippine territory, as well
as extensive access to Philippine military facilities. The agreement has been forged to
strategically constrain China, which has stepped up its territorial foothold in the South
China Sea.
President Duterte’s pronouncements and actions are reversing President Aquino’s
geo-political agenda of balancing China’s expansive claim in the South China Sea. He
distances his country from its long-standing treaty ally and gravitates toward an emergent
regional power bent on effecting a territorial reconfiguration in East Asia. This is shown
by his efforts to harness China for several major infrastructure and investment projects
in the Philippines and to resort to bilateral negotiations with Beijing. However, President
Duterte’s appeasement policy was initially hampered by two factors. First, Chinese
analysts and decision-makers cynically view President Duterte’s pronouncements as mere
posturing aimed to please Beijing rather than a realistic plan. Second, China’s refusal to
extend territorial concessions to the Philippines stems from its original and unwavering
position never yield what it considers its sovereign rights to waters, reefs, and rocks so
close to the Philippine coast.
Strategically, President Duterte shows his sensitivity to Chinese security interests. He
distances his country away from the U.S. by watering down the Aquino Administration’s
balancing policy on China. He terminated joint patrols in the South China Sea, limited
the scope and reduced the number of interactions between the Philippine and U.S.
militaries, and threatened to unilaterally abrogate the EDCA. Interestingly, President
Duterte finds it necessary to keep the Philippine-Japan security partnership intact. The
Philippines continues to accept Japanese security assistance to boost the capabilities of
the PN and the PCG. For the Philippines, keeping its security partnership with Japan
intact is necessary because it remains the country’s most important trading partner, its
largest investor, and the home of several thousands of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs)
and the millions of dollars of remittance income they send home each year, an important
 Chapter 3 From Balancing to Appeasement: President Duterte’s Untangling
of the Aquino Administration’s Geo-Political Agenda in the South China Sea
59

boost to the local economy. Furthermore, Japan is the only country in the Western
alliance that maintains a healthy and cordial relationship with the Philippines, making
it an important countervailing force to an expected increase in Chinese influence in the
light of President Duterte’s efforts to gravitate closer to China’s economic orbit.
Unfortunately, the Duterte Administration’s current pronouncements and actions
indicate a shift from a tactical to a strategic appeasement of China. Instead of correcting
the imbalance in the Philippine relations with the two great powers, President Duterte
aims to replace the U.S. with China as the country’s main strategic ally. This is reflected
in President Duterte’s statements expressing his sense of helplessness in the face of China’s
militarization of the rock and land features in the South China Sea, his continuing
tirades against the U.S., and recently, his efforts to rebalance Philippine foreign policy
by gravitating to the orbit of America’s strategic competitors like Russia and China while
at the same time, degrading the country’s traditional close security ties with the U.S.
If left uncheck by the U.S. and its East Asian allies such as Japan and Australia, the
combination of China’s growing economic importance and its demonstrated power
to militarize several land features in the disputed waters might cause the Philippines
to break its strategic relationship with the U.S. Eventually, the Philippines will end up
fostering mutual security and economic interests with its former adversary in the South
China Sea dispute—China.