Central African Republic Small Arms

Small Arms Survey By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N.
Lombard
SMALL ARMS: A REGIONAL TINDERBOX

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
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f +41 22 732 2738
e sas@smallarmssurvey.org
w www.smallarmssurvey.org THE CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC AND SMALL ARMS
A REGIONAL TINDERBOX
‘The Central African Republic and Small Arms is the most thorough and carefully researched
By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N. Lombard

report on the volume, origins, and distribution of small arms in any African state. But it goes
beyond the focus on small arms. It also provides a much-needed backdrop to the complicated
political convulsions that have transformed CAR into a regional tinderbox. There is no better
source for anyone interested in putting the ongoing crisis in its proper context.’
—Dr René Lemarchand
Emeritus Professor, University of Florida and author of
The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa
’The Central African Republic, surrounded by warring parties in Sudan, Chad, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, lies on the fault line between the international
community’s commitment to disarmament and the tendency for African conflicts to draw in
their neighbours. The Central African Republic and Small Arms unlocks the secrets of the
breakdown of state capacity in a little-known but pivotal state in the heart of Africa. It also
offers important new insight to options for policy-makers and concerned organizations to
promote peace in complex situations.’
—Professor William Reno
Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies,
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University
Photo: A mutineer during the military unrest of May 1996. © Pascal Le Segretain/Corbis Sygma A Small Arms Survey publication
Small Arms Survey By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N. Lombard
SMALL ARMS: A REGIONAL TINDERBOX

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND
p +41 22 908 5777

f +41 22 732 2738
w www.smallarmssurvey.org THE CENTRAL AFRICAN
‘The Central African Republic and Small Arms is the most thorough and carefully researched

report on the volume, origins, and distribution of small arms in any African state. But it goes
beyond the focus on small arms. It also provides a much-needed backdrop to the complicated
political convulsions that have transformed CAR into a regional tinderbox. There is no better
source for anyone interested in putting the ongoing crisis in its proper context.’
—Dr René Lemarchand
Emeritus Professor, University of Florida and author of
The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa
’The Central African Republic, surrounded by warring parties in Sudan, Chad, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, lies on the fault line between the international
community’s commitment to disarmament and the tendency for African conflicts to draw in
their neighbours. The Central African Republic and Small Arms unlocks the secrets of the
breakdown of state capacity in a little-known but pivotal state in the heart of Africa. It also
offers important new insight to options for policy-makers and concerned organizations to
promote peace in complex situations.’
—Professor William Reno
Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies,
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University
Photo: A mutineer during the military unrest of May 1996. © Pascal Le Segretain/Corbis Sygma A Small Arms Survey publication
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN

A Small Arms Survey publication

Copyright
Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Geneva 2008
First published in December 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

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organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above
should be sent to the Publications Manager, Small Arms Survey, at the address
below.
Small Arms Survey

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ii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

The Small Arms Survey
The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Swit-
zerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs, and by sustained contributions from the Gov-
ernments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. The Survey is also grateful for past and current
project support received from the Governments of Australia, Denmark, France,
Germany, New Zealand, Spain, and the United States, as well as from differ-
ent United Nations agencies, programmes, and institutes.
The objectives of the Small Arms Survey are: to be the principal source of
public information on all aspects of small arms and armed violence; to serve
as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activ-
ists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-
governmental) on small arms; to support efforts to address the effects of small
arms proliferation and misuse; and to act as a clearinghouse for the sharing
of information and the dissemination of best practices. The Survey also spon-
sors field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected
states and regions. The project has an international staff with expertise in se-
curity studies, political science, law, economics, development studies, and so-
ciology, and collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions,
non-governmental organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.
Small Arms Survey

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The Small Arms Survey iii

About the Authors
Eric G. Berman is Managing Director of the Small Arms Survey. He began

this study as a consultant for the Survey while he was a Visiting Fellow at the
Thomas Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University in
Providence, Rhode Island. Previously, he worked for the United Nations in the
Department for Disarmament Affairs in New York, and subsequently served
as the Assistant Spokesman for the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia,
the Special Assistant to the Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva, and
the Political Affairs Officer for the UN International Commission of Inquiry
(Rwanda). He has published widely on UN and African security issues. His
next book, U.S. Policy Toward Peace Operations and Peacekeeping Capacity-building
in Africa, is to be published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College in early 2009.
Louisa N. Lombard is a University Scholar at Duke University, where she is

completing a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology. Her research focuses on conflict
and governance in Central Africa, particularly the region encompassing the
Central African Republic, Chad, and Sudan. She has conducted research in
CAR since June 2003, and has travelled widely in the country. She has worked
as a consultant for the Small Arms Survey, the World Bank, Human Rights
Watch, and other organizations. Her publications include articles on topics
such as armed groups, human security, disarmament, and international law.
She speaks English, French, Norwegian, conversational Arabic, and some
Sangho. She thanks everyone who helped bring this project to fruition, espe-
cially the many Central Africans whose expertise is reflected here.
iv The Central African Republic and Small Arms

Acknowledgements
This study has a long history. The decision to undertake it dates back to a July
2002 meeting in Geneva with my predecessor, Peter Batchelor, when I was a
Boston-based consultant to the Survey. We reviewed under-researched conflict
areas in Africa in which small arms flows probably merited greater attention,
and ultimately decided that I should go to Bangui. I appreciate Peter’s initial
interest, as well as the continued support of Keith Krause, the Survey’s Pro-
gramme Director. Thomas Biersteker, and the Watson Institute for International
Studies of which he was the Director, also merit mention here. Much of the
research for this book was undertaken while I was a Visiting Fellow at Watson,
and I very much enjoyed my time in Providence (and the reverse commute).
Shorter versions of this study have appeared in the Small Arms Survey 2005
and a Survey Special Report (in French) in 2006. This book is considerably more
detailed and includes a separate chapter that covers events up to June 2007. I
am indebted to the hard work, good humour, professionalism, and zeal of
Louisa Lombard, author of the Epilogue, whom I met at Brown University,
who travelled to the Central African Republic and the region with me, and who
has subsequently become an expert on the country in her own right. The entire
study is considerably richer because of her effort and perseverance.
Having worked for and with the United Nations, I know first-hand the
‘enthusiasm’ field offices have for researchers who visit them carrying little
more than a letter of introduction from Headquarters in New York and mak-
ing numerous logistical demands. If Lamine Cissé and his team at the UN
Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) had any reservations about
my repeated trips, they did not show it. They were unfailingly generous with
their time and logistical support. I am especially in debt to Maiga Sidi Mamoudou
and Saidou Nya.
There are several people in African and Western governments who sup-
ported me in this project but who asked not to be identified. Suffice it to say that
numerous visits could not have been undertaken, meetings held, or informa-
Acknowledgements v
tion retrieved without the interventions of many people who are not mentioned
here. I trust those who have asked for anonymity will remember my apprecia-
tion for their efforts on my behalf.
As for those whose names I can mention, I wish to thank Allard Blom, Ray
Boisvert, Marielle Debos, Jean-Jacques Demafouth, Fred Duckworth, Sandrine
Einhorn-Heiser, Robert Esposti, William Foltz, Alphonse Mombeka, Joseph
Ngozo, Patrice Sartre, Peter Swarbrick, Emmanuel Touaboy, Siemon Wezeman,
and Bob Winful. A special mention goes to Olivier Nyirubugara, who went out
of his way on numerous occasions to be helpful.
Thanks, too, to the Survey’s team of researchers, research assistants, and
publications staff, whose skill and dedication improved the manuscript, spe-
cifically Alessandra Allen, Nicolas Florquin, Samar Hasan, Tania Inowlocki,
and Stephanie Pézard. Several people who helped with logistics and contacts,
or who were especially generous with their time and in sharing their exper-
tise, also commented on sections of the text. Others who reviewed the manu-
script include Thierry Bingaba, Christophe Boisbouvier, Fabrice Boussalem,
Geraldine Faës, and Désiré Bango Sambia. The text is stronger because of their
inputs.
In any acknowledgments there is a chance that the author has forgotten to
thank some people who merited being singled out. This is more likely with
the passage of time. Apologies to those I have inadvertently offended.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Liz Umlas, and children, Rachel and Jonah,
for their encouragement and understanding.
vi The Central African Republic and Small Arms

Preface
The origins of this study date back to a meeting at the Small Arms Survey’s
offices in Geneva in early 2002. Peter Batchelor, my predecessor as Managing
Director, and I were discussing future research projects in Africa. We talked
about peace prospects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in-
cluding the challenges confronting the nascent Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the
expected security vacuums that would be created with the planned departure
of foreign troops from that country, and the United Nations (UN) peacekeep-
ing force’s limited mandate. We knew that many other organizations were
focused on these issues, too. We decided, therefore, in consultations with others
such as colleagues at the UN, to undertake field research in the Central Afri-
can Republic (CAR). CAR lay outside the international spotlight on DRC, and
was seen as unstable and a potential foil to the political and security gains
being made in its southern neighbour. Moreover, we were surprised by the
paucity of information and analysis that existed on CAR.
The initial research for this report was undertaken in 2003. That year I
made three trips to CAR and the region. In February I visited CAR and DRC.
I returned to CAR in June, at which time I also travelled to Gabon. The third
trip to CAR took place in December. The report also benefits from the work a
research assistant, Louisa Lombard, carried out in Cameroon and CAR in
June 2003. The security situation in CAR prior to the March 2003 coup d’état
did not permit me to venture much beyond the capital, Bangui. Subsequent
visits later that year were also limited to Bangui by time and logistical con-
straints. Additional research was undertaken in Chad, France, Nigeria, Swit-
zerland, and the United States.
The Survey has remained involved in CAR and the region, and this report
takes advantage of subsequent research. In particular, it benefits from the
experience and additional travels of Louisa Lombard. Since 2004 she has re-
turned to CAR routinely—both for the Survey and for others. She is responsible
for the Epilogue that was written during 2005 and 2006, and updated in early 2007.
Preface vii
Since 2006, new armed groups have sprouted and the coupeurs de routes or
zaraguinas that have acted brazenly for much of the past 20 years continue to
terrorize people and rob and pillage largely with impunity. The small peacekeep-
ing operation of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
(CEMAC), set to enter its seventh year, has made limited progress. In Septem-
ber 2008, the United Nations Security Council finally dispatched Blue Helmets
to CAR and Chad, but an insufficient number to meaningfully alter the secu-
rity environment.
The good news is that the international community has paid more attention
to CAR, as the (admittedly anaemic) UN Mission in the Central African Repub-
lic and Chad (MINURCAT) illustrates. In May 2008, the International Criminal
Court handed down an arrest warrant against former Congolese warlord and
presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba for alleged war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in CAR. The next day the government of Belgium
arrested him. And in June the UN Peacebuilding Commission formally placed
CAR on its agenda as a country meriting concerted and sustained interna-
tional aid.
The not-so-good news is that the Central African Republic remains a country
in trouble. The prevalence of small arms and armed groups throughout the
country, small and weak state security forces, porous borders, a tradition in
Central African policy of changing governments with bullets rather than by
ballots, neighbours in conflict, and the propensity of other countries’ leaders
to intervene militarily across borders using proxy forces are just some of the
challenges facing the government and the international community. Each of
these challenges on its own would require concerted effort to address suc-
cessfully. Taken together these concerns suggest that the citizens of the Central
African Republic will continue to experience armed violence and insecurity,
and that the government will remain susceptible to armed insurrection. The
findings in this volume are intended to assist those fashioning policies and
programmes that improve on previous performance to benefit the people of
that country.
The story of small arms and the Central African Republic clearly shows how
local conflicts, when left largely unattended, can affect and destabilize neigh-
bouring countries. It highlights the importance of targeting ammunition in
viii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

any disarmament or arms collection scheme—and how matériel recovered, if not
destroyed, often recirculates. The study further underscores the importance of
ensuring that former combatants are successfully reintegrated into society and
how failure to do this has regional ramifications.
Although the focus of this book is on a sparsely populated landlocked coun-
try that historically has registered limited international interest, the lessons to
be learned from this study are widely relevant.
Eric G. Berman
Geneva, October 2008
Preface ix
Contents
List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables .................................................................................................................................... xiii
List of Maps ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... xv
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................................................ xvi
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................... xxi
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
A brief history of CAR 1
The present study 6
PART I Availability and Distribution of Small Arms ........................................................................ 11

Governmental institutions issued with small arms 11
Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) 11
Gendarmerie 15
Presidential Guard 16
Police 18
Other 20
Armed groups 21
Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain 23
Karakos, Balawas, and Sarawis 24
Société centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance 26
‘Abdulaye Miskine’ 26
Mutineers 27
Self-defence units and vigilante groups 28
Other 29
Anti-poaching initiatives 30
x The Central African Republic and Small Arms

Stockpiles 33
Governmental institutions 33
Armed groups 37
PART II Small Arms Flows and Trafficking ....................................................................................................... 41

Direct transfers from states 42
France 42
Libya 47
Chad 49
China 50
Israel 52
Romania/Soviet Union 52
Indirect transfers from regional armies and armed groups 53
Chad 53
Sudan 57
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) 58
Republic of the Congo 63
Rwanda 64
Weapons generated within CAR 65
Indigenous production 65
Seizures from government forces 65
Weapons lost by African peacekeeping forces 66
PART III Effects and Impacts of Small Arms ................................................................................................... 69

Death and injury 70
Poaching 71
Mutinies and coup attempts 73
Armed robbery and armed attacks 75
Roadblocks 77
PART IV Arms Recovery and Disarmament Efforts ............................................................................ 81

Unilateral national initiatives 81
Contents xi
Internationally assisted initiatives 84
Anti-poaching efforts 84
MISAB and MINURCA programmes 86
National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration 92
Forces multinationales de la CEMAC (FOMUC) operations 99
Other 101
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 103
Epilogue by Louisa N. Lombard ...................................................................................................................................... 107

Introduction 107
The security situation in CAR 108
Bangui 108
Coupeurs de routes/Kidnappers 110
Ex-combatants 111
Rebellion in the north 112
Efforts to improve the security situation 116
Security sector reform 117
Forces Multinationales de la CEMAC (FOMUC) 121
Towards a national strategy for small arms control 121
Programme for Reintegration and Assistance
to Communities (PRAC) 122
Commission Against the Proliferation of Small Arms,
for Disarmament and Reintegration (CNPDR) 125
Tripartite Commission (CAR, Cameroon, Chad)
on Cross-Border Security 126
Conclusion 127
ANNEX Chronology of Key Events in CAR’s History ............................................................... 129
Endnotes .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 135
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 150
xii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables
Boxes
Box 1 Yaya Ramadan and his self-defence units in Vakaga Prefecture (p. 33)
Box 2 CAR, Chad, and man-portable surface-to-air missiles (p. 49)
Box 3 Mutinous FACA soldiers’ seizure of weapons and return of 5.56 mm
rifles (p. 61)
Box 4 Impacts of the 1996 mutinies on the Central African economy and
civil society (p. 74)
Box 5 Revenues lost from the downturn in hunting safaris in 2003 (p. 78)
Figures
Figure 1 Organizational chart of the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA),
as of 2000 (p. 14)
Figure 2 Organizational chart of the Central African Gendarmerie, as of
December 2003 (p. 16)
Figure 3 Organizational chart of the Central African Police, as of December
2003 (p. 19)
Figure 4 CAR’s diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan since indepen-
dence in 1960 (p. 51)
Figure 5 Organizational chart of the FACA, as of October 2005 (p. 118)
Tables
Table 1 Central African heads of state, 1960–2007 (p. 2)
Table 2 Private security companies in the Central African Republic, as of
December 2003 (p. 29)
Table 3 National ‘protected areas’ and foreign anti-poaching initiatives in
the Central African Republic (p. 32)
Table 4 Weapons in service with Central African state actors, as of 1 October
1963 (p. 35)
Table 5 Strengths of Central African state actors, as of 1 October 1963 (p. 36)
List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables xiii

Table 6 Strengths of Central African state actors and estimated stockpiles of
small arms and light weapons, as of September 2003 (p. 37)
Table 7 Estimated small arms and light weapons held by selected non-
state armed groups in the Central African Republic, as of November
2003 (p. 38)
Table 8 Weapons in service with Central African state actors, as of 1 October
1963 (p. 44)
Table 9 Weapons transfers from France to the Central African Republic,
1981–2003 (p. 45)
Table 10 Peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic, as of Decem-
ber 2006 (p. 66)
Table 11 Weapons recovered by the OCRB, 1 January–19 December 2003 (p. 82)
Table 12 Weapons and ammunition recovered by EU-funded eco-guards in
the Ngotto Forest, 1997–2003 (p. 85)
Table 13 Remuneration offered to individuals submitting weapons and ammu-
nition under official disarmament programmes, 1997–2002 (p. 87)
Table 14 Weapons recovered during MISAB (p. 88)
Table 15 Ordnance recovered during MISAB, as of 31 December 1997 (p. 89)
Table 16 Weapons recovered by PNDR, 23 January–31 May 2002, and 15 June
2002–14 May 2003 (p. 94)
Table 17 Ordnance recovered by PNDR, 23 January 2002–14 May 2003 (p. 96)
Table 18 Ordnance destroyed by PNDR, 22 July–2 August 2003 (p. 98)
Table 19 Matériel recovered by FOMUC, to 17 December 2003 (p. 100)
Table 20 Ex-combatants demobilized, by location, as of December 2006 (p. 123)
Table 21 Weapons collected by the PRAC, 30 June–31 December 2005 (p. 124)
xiv The Central African Republic and Small Arms

List of Maps
Maps
Map 1 Central African Republic (p. xx)
Map 2 Central African Republic and its neighbours (p. xxi)
Map 3 Bangui (p. 25)
Map 4 Indirect transfers of small arms into CAR from regional armies and
armed groups (p. 53)
Map 5 Chad (p. 54)
Map 6 Democratic Republic of the Congo (p. 60)
List of Maps xv
List of Abbreviations
AEF Afrique Equatoriale Française

AFDL Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-
Zaïre
APFC Association pour la protection de la faune de Centrafrique
APRD Armée pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie
ARRC Africa Rainforest and River Conservation
ASSOMESCA Association des œuvres médicales des églises pour la santé
en Centrafrique
BCAGS Bureau centrafricain de gardiennage et de surveillance
BMIA Batallion mixte d’intérvention et appui
BONUCA Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de
la paix en République Centrafricaine
BPSI Battalion de protection et de sécurité des institutions
CAFF Children associated with fighting forces
CAR Central African Republic
CEMAC Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale
CEN-SAD Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
CLD Comité local de désarmement
CMRN Comité militaire de redressement national
CNDDR Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation, et
réinsertion
CNPDR Commission nationale contre la prolifération des armes légères
et de petit calibre, pour le désarmement et la réinsertion
CNRI Centre national de recherche et d’information
CNS Compagnie nationale de sécurité
COOPI Cooperazione Internazionale
CTD Comité technique de désarmement
CTR Comité technique de réinsertion
xvi The Central African Republic and Small Arms

DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DGRE Direction générale de la documentation et des enquêtes
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOFAC Conservation et utilisation rationnelle des ecosystèmes fores-
tiers d’Afrique centrale
EU European Union
FAC Forces armées congolaises
FACA Forces armées centrafricaines
FAN Forces armées du nord
FANT Forces armées nationales tchadiennes
FAP Forces armées populaires
FAR Forces armées rwandaises
FAT Forces armées tchadiennes
FAZ Forces armées zaïroises
FCFA CFA franc
FDPC Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain
FIDH Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme
FOMUC Forces multinationales de la CEMAC
FORSDIR Force spéciale de défense des institutions républicaines
FPP Front patriotique pour le progrès
FROLINAT Front de libération nationale du Tchad
FSA Fusil semi-automatique
FUC Front uni pour le changement
GTZ German Technical Cooperation
GUNT Gouvernement d’union nationale de transition
ICC International Criminal Court
IDP Internally displaced person
IMF International Monetary Fund
MAMICA Manufacture militaire centrafricain
MANPADS Man-portable air defence system(s)
MCLN Mouvement centrafricain de libération nationale
MDD Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement
MECAR Mutuelles d’épargne et de crédit en appui à la réconversion
MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
List of Abbreviations xvii

MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and
Chad
MISAB Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui
MLC Mouvement de libération du Congo
MLPC Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain
MONUC United Nations Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies
en République Démocratique du Congo
MSF Médecins sans Frontières
MSG Multiservice Conseil Gerance
NGO Non-governmental organization
NIF National Islamic Front
OCRB Office central de répression du banditisme
PDRN Programme de développement de la région nord
PDZCV Programme de développement des zones cynégétiques
villageoises
PNDR Programme national de désarmement et de réinsertion
PRAC Programme for Reintegration and Assistance to Communities
RDC Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain
RoC Republic of the Congo
RPG Rocket-propelled grenade (launcher)
SAPL Société d’application des procédés Lefebvre
SCPS Société centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance
SDU Self-defence unit
SERD Section d’enquête, de recherche et de documentation
SPLA/SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement
SRI Section de recherche et d’investigation
SSR Security sector reform
UFDR Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement
UFR Union des forces républicaines
UN United Nations
UN Comtrade United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
xviii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UPDF Ugandan People’s Defence Forces
USD US dollar
USP Unité de la Sécurité Présidentielle
WFP World Food Programme
WWF World Wildlife Fund/ Word Wide Fund for Nature
ZCV Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises
List of Abbreviations xix

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Executive Summary
Between 1997 and 2006, the Central African Republic (CAR) hosted four inter-
national peacekeeping operations and witnessed conflicts in neighbouring
states that have routinely made international headlines. Yet relatively little
literature exists on the country. As will be shown, this study has relevance far
beyond the troubled, landlocked nation that is its subject. It challenges many
widely held assumptions about security sector reform (SSR) that have conti-
nental and global implications. The study also provides a richer context for
acquiring a better understanding of continuing threats to peace and security
throughout the region. It underscores how conflicts are interrelated and how
progress in one country can harm other countries if proper attention is not paid.
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Executive Summary xxi

CAR—a country spanning 623,000 square km (somewhat larger than Por-
tugal and Spain combined)—has fared poorly and experienced considerable
turmoil since gaining independence from France in 1960. Its 3.9 million citi-
zens are among the poorest people in the world. There have been four coups
d’état (and many more attempted coups), the latest on 15 March 2003, when
former military Chief of Staff Gen. François Bozizé overthrew elected President
Ange-Félix Patassé.
Despite these upheavals, the proliferation and use of small arms did not
play a prominent role in the country’s misfortune until 1982. It was then, after
a failed coup attempt, that non-state actors in CAR began to take receipt of arms
from abroad. The change in government in Chad in 1982 also had serious
ramifications for CAR, including the movement of armed personnel across
the border. The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a number of coup attempts,
suspected coup attempts, and relatively small-scale violence involving dissat-
isfied factions and the Forces armées centrafricaines (Central African Armed
Forces, FACA) (Kalck, 1992, pp. xliv–lv).
The situation deteriorated sharply after 1995. In 1996 elements of the FACA
mutinied, resulting in the looting of the arms depot at the Kassaï barracks in
the capital, Bangui. The following year many more thousands of weapons
flooded CAR when Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown. More
weapons entered CAR two years later when the Ugandan-supported rebel
group the Mouvement de libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation
of the Congo, MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba defeated the Forces armées congo-
laises (Congolese Armed Forces, FAC) of Mobuto’s successor Laurent-Désiré
Kabila, in the north of the DRC, along its border with CAR. Chad introduced
more weapons still into CAR by supporting former FACA Chief of Staff
François Bozizé in his 17-month struggle against Central African President
Ange-Félix Patassé. Bozizé succeeded in overthrowing Patassé in March 2003.
This book comprises four parts. The first examines small arms availability
and distribution with respect to state and non-state actors in CAR. The sec-
ond looks at small arms flows and trafficking, both direct transfers from
states and indirect transfers from states and armed groups. The third assesses
the impacts of small arms use and availability. The fourth analyses the various
disarmament efforts undertaken in CAR in recent years.
xxii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

Below are the main findings.
s Armed elements in CAR seriously outgun government forces (with the excep-
tion of the presidential guard), which are not prepared to counter them.
s The government, which in October 2003 claimed that around 50,000 small
arms were circulating nationally beyond its control, may have been under-
estimating the scale of the problem.
s Long-standing arms stockpile multipliers for the Central African Armed
Forces are extremely small. Consequently, past calculations of government
small arms holdings throughout Africa may be well below present estimates.
s Galil and M-16 assault rifles are not in broad use due to the scarcity of 5.56 mm
ammunition they require.
s Peacekeeping operations have not been a significant source of weapons.
s While regional states have supplied weapons to government forces and to
rebels seeking to acquire power, the type of hardware has been relatively
limited and has not included surface-to-air missiles.
s Non-state actors not only receive matériel and other kinds of support from
governments, but they can also play a crucial role in providing military aid
to governments.
s While rates of firearms-related deaths and injuries in CAR may be lower than
in other conflict zones in the region, the country suffers greatly from the eco-
nomic and psychological effects of small arms use and availability.
s Arms recovery programmes in CAR have been poorly designed and badly
implemented. In addition, they have been considerably less successful than
touted, and arguably have undermined national security.
s The safari hunting industry can play a positive role in countering the del-
eterious socioeconomic effects of poaching.
s While small arms proliferation has historically not been a problem in CAR,
it continues to increase.
It is hoped that the study’s findings will aid policymakers in devising new
security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programmes—both in CAR and elsewhere. For the challenges that the Central
African Republic faces—a weak central government, regional conflicts, the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, to name but a few—are not
unique to CAR.
Executive Summary xxiii

A mutineer during the military unrest of 1996.
© Desiray Minkoh/AFP
xxiv The Central African Republic and Small Arms

Introduction
Since the end of the cold war, armed conflict has consumed much of the African
continent. The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which at
one point involved no fewer than eight countries’ armed forces and a similar
number of non-state armed groups, exemplified the challenges to peace and
the threats to human security. The sometimes insatiable demand for small arms
and light weapons (SALW)1 seemed never to outpace supply. Firearms were
imported from willing overseas manufacturers and brokers, as well as from within
the region and the continent. Poor stockpile management, corruption, and sei-
zure exacerbate the situation: legal transfers of weapons often become illegal.
Numerous studies have been undertaken on particular countries or regions
to assess the problems associated with small arms proliferation and the illicit
trade of such weapons. The Central African Republic (CAR), however, has
received little attention even though it had found itself largely surrounded by
countries at war, and has suffered from political instability. Recognizing this
incongruity, the Small Arms Survey undertook this case study to learn more
about the effects of small arms use and availability on CAR and the region.
The challenges facing the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in
DRC, especially the volatile north-eastern region of that country and its prox-
imity to CAR, provided further impetus for undertaking this project. Similarly,
the humanitarian crisis since 2003 in Darfur, Sudan, which borders CAR, has
made an analysis of how conflict in CAR fits into the regional security picture
all the more pressing. CAR currently faces multiple armed groups intent on
changing power in Bangui, and small arms proliferation appears to be increas-
ing (see Epilogue). This study aims to provide a background for how such a
troubling state of affairs came about.
A brief history of CAR

CAR has experienced four coups d’état—and many more attempted coups—
since gaining independence from France in 1960 (see Table 1). The most recent
Introduction 1
Table 1
Central African heads of state, 1960–2007
President Tenure Ethnic group Birthplace/ Position prior Reason for

hometown to assuming leaving office
(prefecture) office (date)
David 1960–65 Ngbaka Bouchia Minister of Coup d’état

Dacko (Lobaye) the Interior, (31 December
Economy and 1965)
Trade1
Jean-Bédel 1966–79 Ngbaka Bobangui Chief of staff Ousted in

Bokassa (Lobaye) of the armed absence by
forces French troops
(20–21 Septem-
ber 1979)
David 1979–81 Ngbaka Bouchia Bokassa’s per- Coup d’état

Dacko (Lobaye) sonal adviser (1 September
1981)2
André 1981–93 Yakoma Kembé Chief of staff Election defeat

Kolingba (Basse-Kotto) of the armed (19 September
forces 1993)
Ange-Félix 1993–2003 Sara Paoua Former prime Coup d’état

Patassé (Ouham- minister (15 March
Pendé) 2003)
François 2003– Gbaya Bossangoa Former chief –

Bozizé (Ouham)3 of staff of the
armed forces
Notes:
1
CAR enjoyed substantial autonomy prior to independence.
2
Dacko handed over power to Kolingba peacefully in a bloodless coup that followed a disputed election.
3
President Bozizé was born in Mouila, Gabon, but grew up and has his roots in Bossangoa.
Sources: BBC (2005); Sangonet (2005); Telegraph (2003); Fundación CIDOB (2001a; 2001b); Kalck (1992); O’Toole (1986).
coup occurred in March 2003, when François Bozizé seized power. The presi-
dent at the time, Ange-Félix Patassé, had won multi-party elections in 1993 and
1999. The few presidential elections prior to that had largely fallen short of free
and fair. Bozizé2 had achieved power in the same manner as two former Central
African presidents: Jean-Bédel Bokassa and André Kolingba. Bokassa and
Kolingba had another thing in common besides being former chiefs of staff of
the armed forces: they had both overthrown David Dacko. Dacko had ruled
CAR from independence through 1965 and again from 1979 to 1981.
2 The Central African Republic and Small Arms

None of CAR’s presidents who
have been ousted in coups has been
killed, and all have fared considerably
better than those Central Africans
not fortunate enough to serve as head
of state. The landlocked country of
623,000 square km (somewhat larger
CAR President François Bozizé, March 2004. © Desirey Minkoh/AFP
than Portugal and Spain combined)

remains substantially undeveloped.
CAR’s 3.9 million citizens, comprising
some 80 ethnic groups, are among
the poorest in the world, earning on
average significantly less than a dollar
a day. According to a 2003 UN report,
CAR had the highest rate of maternal
mortality during childbirth, an in-
creasing HIV/AIDS rate, and a pop-
ulation that was largely unschooled
(UN OCHA, 2003c). The 2006 Human
Development Index, which measures
a series of socio-economic indicators from 177 countries, ranks CAR sixth from
last (UNDP, 2006, p. 286).
The pre-independence experience of the country certainly contributed to
its present-day challenges. It fared particularly badly as a French colony and
also from the Arab slave trade. As a part of Afrique Equatoriale Française
(French Equatorial Africa, AEF), Ubangi-Shari, as CAR was known from 1910
to 1958,3 received less attention and resources than the other AEF territories,
which are today known as the Republic of the Congo (RoC), Gabon, and
Chad. Thousands of inhabitants of Ubangi-Shari were forced to work on infra-
structure projects elsewhere in AEF that were of little economic benefit to CAR.
Moreover, during the Arab slave trade raids from what are today Chad and
the Sudan led to a severe decline in the population of large areas of present-
day CAR, with ramifications for development as well as ongoing ethnic and
religious tension.
Introduction 3
Native troops being trained as part of the Free French colonial army, 1941. © George Rodger/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images
Still, CAR has been relatively peaceful compared with the majority of its
neighbours. Of the five countries that border CAR, only Cameroon can say
the same. Chad, the DRC, the RoC, and Sudan have all endured civil wars
and insurgencies. Chad, a country twice CAR’s size and twice as populated,
has suffered decades of sporadic armed conflict. The Sudan, twice as large as
Chad, with a population of more than 35 million, reached a settlement with
its main southern insurgent group after more than 20 years of fighting, but is
presently involved in conflict in the western region of Darfur. DRC, formerly
Zaire, only slightly smaller than Sudan but with 50 per cent more people,
experienced armed conflict for most of the period between 1996 and 2003 and
is home to numerous armed groups. The RoC has experienced bouts of
bloody fighting (1993), a civil war (1997–99), and a round of renewed hostili-
ties (2002). Only Cameroon has been relatively stable, its single transfer of
presidential power, in 1982, having been peaceful.4 Unfortunately for CAR,
80 per cent of its 3,600 km international border abuts the three neighbouring
countries that have suffered the greatest political turmoil and received the
greatest levels of armament.
Small arms did not figure prominently in the country’s misfortune until
1982. It was then, after a failed coup attempt (Kalck, 1992, p. xlii), that non-
state actors in CAR began to take receipt of arms from abroad. The change in

government in Chad in 1982 also had serious consequences for CAR, includ-
ing the movement of armed personnel across the border. Subsequently, during
the remainder of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, CAR experienced a number
of coup attempts, suspected coup attempts, and relatively small-scale violence
involving dissatisfied factions and the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA)
(Kalck, 1992, pp. xliv–lv).
The situation deteriorated sharply in 1996, however, when elements of the
army mutinied. In all, there were three separate uprisings that year. The third
mutiny culminated in the looting of the country’s arms depot at the Kassaï
barracks in Bangui (McFarlane and Malan, 1998, pp. 49–51).5
In 1997, following the overthrow of Zairian (later the DRC) President Mobutu
Sese Seko, thousands more weapons flooded into CAR. A similar situation
arose two years later, when the Ugandan-backed Mouvement de libération du
Congo (MLC), a rebel group led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, defeated the FAC of
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Mobutu’s successor, in northern DRC. Bemba sent
hundreds of MLC soldiers to CAR in 2001 (in response to the Kolingba coup
attempt) to assist the beleaguered Patassé, leaving many small arms behind.
During 2002 and 2003 more weapons still entered CAR via Chad, which backed
Gen. Bozizé’s military campaign.6
The growing political instability in CAR during the 1980s and 1990s can
partly be traced to leaders’ manipulation of ethnic allegiances. Despite Dacko’s
ineffectiveness and Bokassa’s gross human rights abuses, CAR had been
spared serious ethnic tensions until Kolingba’s regime. The ethnic groups near
the Ubangui River—particularly the Ngbaka (M’baka), to which both Dacko
and Bokassa belonged,7 and the Yakoma—had received disproportionate
benefit from French colonial rule. These two ethnic groups, with similarly sized
populations, together represent less than ten per cent of the country’s citizenry.
The largest groups in CAR—the Gbaya (Baya), Banda, Mandja, and Sara—
live in the savannah areas north of the capital and comprise more than 80 per
cent of the population. (The largest of the more than 60 remaining ethnic groups
is the Mboum from the south-east.) Kolingba upset the status quo when he
infused his government, and particularly the army, with fellow Yakomas on
an unprecedented scale. Patassé, a Sara from the north, never trusted the
army. Instead of trying to reform it, he built up the presidential guard at the
Introduction 5
army’s expense. This dynamic helps explain the backdrop to the army muti-
nies in 1996 that led to a series of political crises culminating in Patassé’s
ouster in March 2003.
Equally important to understanding the descent into violence in the mid-
1990s was the country’s economic collapse. Under international pressure and
the prospect of increased aid, Patassé implemented a series of economic re-
forms, including the devaluation of the currency (by 50 per cent), which further
impoverished citizens. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescinded the
promised assistance programme in late 1995, citing government mismanage-
ment of the funds. During the two-year period 1994–96 external debt ballooned
by USD 120 million (from USD 824 million to USD 944 million), while economic
growth remained negligible. Even the national oil company proved unable to
pay its taxes, and civil servants’ tab of arrears swelled to several years’ worth
of pay (McFarlane and Malan, 1998, pp. 49; 58, n. 2). Frustration with the gov-
ernment became palpable, with frequent strikes and protest marches.
A young MLC soldier in Sibut, 2003. © Marco Longari/AFP

Regardless of Bozizé’s political skills and proclaimed reformist zeal, the
proliferation of small arms throughout CAR will further complicate an already
challenging situation. This study focuses on events between the years 1996 and
2003 that have affected the state’s ability to regulate weapons among civilians and
have led to a massive influx of arms into large parts of the country. Together,
they pose a clear threat to national security and to law and order. The pattern
of former leaders returning and making violent claims on the presidency
could become even more dangerous given these developments. Continuing
unrest in neighbouring countries, particularly Chad and Sudan, underscores
the regional risks of CAR’s poorly controlled, highly armed territory.
The present study

This study contains four parts.
Part I documents the availability and distribution of small arms in the coun-
try. It reviews weapons possessed by both state and non-state actors. Each
branch of the state security sector is considered separately, as is each armed
group. Anti-poaching initiatives, given their reliance on international fund-
ing and planning, are treated in a third section. Then the composition, strength,
structure, and armament possessed by each of these groups are documented.
While focusing on the years 1996–2003, the period of greatest change in the
small arms situation, this section also traces significant historical trends and
changes. An effort is made to determine the arms stockpiles held by the insti-
tutional actors.
Part II discusses small arms flows and trafficking and consists of three sec-
tions. The first section reviews weapons that have entered CAR from outside
the state and represent official government policies. This includes state-to-state
(legal) as well as state-to-non-state (illegal) transfers. The section concludes
with a rather unusual case in which a non-state actor has provided weapons
to a state actor. Weapons from regional armed forces that have transited
through or sought refuge in CAR are discussed in the second section. Even
though these weapons come from ‘outside’ CAR, they are treated separately
as they have arrived independent of political will. States sharing a common bor-
der with CAR are discussed as well as Rwanda. The third section reviews
Introduction 7
weapons that have been generated from within the state. Legal state-run enter-
prises as well as cottage industries and craft production are covered. The role
of Central African armed forces and police as sources of weaponry through
corruption, ill-discipline, and seizure is also examined. Similarly, peacekeeping
forces stationed in CAR are also reviewed in this section to discover whether
any of their weapons may have been seized, lost, or otherwise unaccounted
for. The section concludes with examples of routes used for the illicit traffick-
ing of small arms that pass through CAR.
The impacts of small arms’ use and availability are discussed in Part III. Efforts
are made to distinguish both direct and indirect effects of these weapons on
both humans and wildlife. Direct impacts include death and injury as well as
psychological trauma. The study also explores these weapons’ indirect politi-
cal, economic, and social effects on Central African society. Special attention
is paid to the ramifications of mutinies and coup attempts, armed robberies,
roadblocks, and poaching. Though the reasons for the difficulties of Central
Africans’ lives are manifold, small arms nevertheless emerge as central to many
of these challenges due to the instability their misuse promotes.
Part IV of the study documents and assesses the recent disarmament and
arms recovery programmes in the Central African Republic. It first examines
domestic arms collection programmes and the policies and procedures of the
state security sector agents charged with the task. It then continues with an
analysis of internationally-funded efforts, including anti-poaching projects as
well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes.
It describes the various programmes and attempts to account for what has
been collected. Just as importantly, it asks what has happened to the weapons
recovered. It seeks to identify the major challenges and successes. It evaluates
the relative importance of such factors as financial and human resources, pro-
gramme design, and political will.
This study provides the historical background—the domestic and regional
factors that led to the proliferation of small arms in CAR, a fairly recent phe-
nomenon—to understanding how the current state of affairs came about.
Through this investigation, we see how security sector reform and disarmament
can contribute to either an improvement or a deterioration, depending on how
such programmes are planned and carried out. Clear strategies for increased

effectiveness emerge. The creation of a national commission on small arms
and disarmament indicates the seriousness with which the CAR government
is working to address these issues, and the analysis contained herein will,
one hopes, serve as a resource for such efforts. It is hoped this study’s find-
ings will be of use to policy-makers in CAR, as well as beyond the country’s
borders. For the problem of illicit small arms proliferation is, unfortunately,
far from unique to CAR.
Introduction 9
FACA soldiers march in a parade in Bangui, March 2004.
© Desirey Minkoh/AFP

PART I
Availability and Distribution of Small Arms
Central African governments have relied on and supported different services

within the armed forces and security sector to varying degrees. For the first
20 years of independence, however, the state more or less effectively—and, at
times, ruthlessly—monopolized the coercive use of force.8 This changed in the
early 1980s, with the establishment of the first armed opposition groups.9
President Patassé never trusted the army given his predecessor Kolingba’s
decision to pack the force with his fellow Yakomas. Instead of trying to reform
the institution, Patassé built up the presidential guard at its expense. This atti-
tude largely explains why, in 1996, so many soldiers opted to mutiny. When
the presidential guard failed to provide him with the protection he sought,
Patassé created a succession of pro-government militias.
Patassé never exercised effective control over the weapons that his regime
distributed to such entities. These militias were relatively well armed, many
receiving Kalashnikov (or Chinese Type 56) assault rifles.10 By contrast, many
government soldiers possessed antiquated weapons, such as MAS-36 bolt-
action (single-shot) rifles.
Governmental institutions issued with small arms

Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA)
Attempted coups, mutinies, and politically motivated neglect—as well as se-
lective reward processes—have taken their toll on the FACA. After the 1996
mutinies, the FACA received little support. President Bozizé, though, has
shown interest throughout his career in reforming and strengthening the insti-
tution (Frères d’Armes, 2000, pp. 22–24).
The country’s first president, David Dacko, had deliberately kept the armed
forces small and weak. In the FACA’s early years, all the officers were French,
Part I Availability and Distribution of Small Arms 11

and Dacko largely left the development of the forces to a French military ad-
viser (Kalck, 1992, p. 13). Events elsewhere on the continent influenced his
decisions. Dacko was believed to have been unsettled by the military coup in
Togo in January 1963, which involved the murder of the first president of an
African country in the post-colonial period, as well as by the August 1963 res-
ignation of the RoC president in response to growing political unrest and to
stave off a potential civil war. Dacko suspended recruitment into the army
during 1963. And in a move tinged with irony, he appointed his cousin Jean-
Bédel Bokassa as his army chief of staff that year to strengthen his hold on
power (SHAT, 1963, p. 10).
Bokassa initially rewarded the armed forces. He raised their salaries, pro-
moted many officers, and procured additional arms for them. The defence
budget doubled between 1967 and 1969 alone (Decalo, 1989, p. 157).
The armed forces ultimately suffered greatly under Bokassa, however. As
time passed, he increasingly questioned their loyalty and sometimes killed
top officers, promoting others seemingly at random. Besides trying to estab-
lish a delicate balance of instilling both fear and greed, Bokassa deployed
most of the troops in Bouar and along the Sudanese border, far from the cap-
ital, and reportedly did not issue live ammunition to regular troops. By the
time Dacko resumed power in 1979, the FACA was one of the worst-trained
and least-equipped militaries in Africa (Decalo, 1989, pp. 157, 168).
The ethnic composition of the armed forces changed drastically during the
1980s. As CAR’s first non-Ngbaka president, Kolingba recruited and promoted
his fellow Yakoma in the FACA to unprecedented levels. Whereas Yakoma
comprise about five per cent of the population, they soon accounted for be-
tween a quarter and a third of the army as a whole and perhaps half of its
commissioned officers during Kolingba’s rule (Faltas, 2001, pp. 82–83).
Bozizé, with French assistance, is in the process of reforming and strength-
ening the army. After the 1996 mutinies, the army, which Patassé had not
trusted from the outset of his presidency, received little subsequent support.
Bozizé quickly integrated several hundred of his armed supporters into the
army after two months of basic training, but integration and demobilization
benefits have not come quickly enough to some of his former armed supporters,
and many have protested. And many former CAR soldiers who had fled to DRC

in the wake of Kolingba’s failed coup attempt in 2001 have returned to CAR and
have been offered the prospect of rejoining the army. Anicet Saulet, a govern-
ment official and a former leader of the 1997 army mutiny, said that some of
the delays in recruitment were caused by administrative difficulties, but added
that ethnic considerations were also a motivating factor (UN OCHA, 2003d).
The force has never been very large, and its strength peaked under Presi-
dent Jean-Bédel Bokassa. By the end of his tenure in September 1979, the armed
forces consisted of 7,500 soldiers (Decalo, 1989, p. 165). By the early 1980s,
however, the army’s strength was much reduced.
Kolingba, while promoting Yakoma interests, kept the army smaller than
under Bokassa, and assumed additional responsibilities for its oversight. After
seizing power he disbanded the government as it had been constituted and
created a 23-member Comité militaire de redressement national (Military
Committee for National Recovery, CMRN) in its stead (O’Toole, 1986, p. 68).
As president of the CMRN, he also held the position of chief of staff of the
armed forces and minister of defence. In his early years in power, the army at
one point consisted of a single infantry battalion and support units, with a
majority of the soldiers based in Bouar, far from the capital (see Keegan, 1983,
p. 100).
Kolingba relied to a large extent on France for his and his country’s security.
For example, the number of French troops stationed in the country increased
considerably under his rule. During the 1980s, French troops grew some
eightfold11 and were much more numerous than their Central African counter-
parts. Support for Kolingba was not, however, the primary impetus for France,
whose effort to check Libyan military activity in Chad and the sub-region (Bigo,
1988, p. 277) explained the greater numbers of French troops in CAR, from
which Kolingba nevertheless benefited.
France, however, closed its military bases in CAR during Patassé’s first term.
Although Paris had significantly reduced its military presence in CAR in the
1990s from 1980 levels (for example, Dumoulin records the number of French
troops in CAR to have been 1,500 [1997, p. 113]), the French military aided
Patassé during the 1996 and 1997 military unrest, and supported the ad hoc
African peacekeeping force known as the Mission interafricaine de surveillance
des accords de Bangui (Inter-African Mission for Monitoring the Bangui Accords,

MISAB) that deployed in the wake of the mutinies. But within two weeks
after the UN Security Council resolved on 27 March 1998 to establish the UN
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) to replace MISAB,
France closed its military bases in CAR and withdrew its troops, save for a few
hundred who remained to participate in and support the UN peacekeeping
operation.12
Considerably more is known about the FACA under Patassé, when it fared
particularly poorly. In 2000, according to then Central African Minister of
Defence Jean-Jacques Demafouth, 500 new recruits joined the FACA’s ranks
(Frères d’Armes, 2000, p. 19). Their addition, along with an influx of several
hundred presidential guard members, brought the strength of the FACA close
to 4,000. In 2000, the FACA was reported to consist principally of five infantry
battalions. (The strength of the average battalion appears to have numbered
around 400 men, though it varied depending on the number of companies the
battalion contained.) The navy and air force each had about 200 personnel.13
The sappers-fireman battalion, created in 1988, numbered 80 men in 2000, with
a planned recruitment that year designed to bring the unit’s strength up to
150. Some 300 soldiers served in the FACA’s health service in 2000. As part of an
agreed reform measure, the presidential guard (described separately below)
was brought under the command of the army chief of staff in 2000—at least
on paper. (See Figure 1 for the structure of the FACA in 2000.) Approximately
Figure 1
Organizational chart of the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA),
as of 2000
Armed forces
Chief of Staff
Presidential
Sappers- Military Health
Army Air Force Navy Security
fireman schools Unit
Unit
Sources: Frères d’Armes (2000); interviews and written correspondence

1,250 FACA soldiers reportedly fled to the DRC after Kolingba’s unsuccessful
coup attempt of May 2001.14 Another 300 apparently attached themselves to
Gen. Bozizé’s rebel force in November 2001.
It is difficult to ascertain the quantity and type of weaponry in service with
the FACA. In October 1963, shortly after independence, the army was lightly
armed, possessing 1,017 weapons. All but ten of these items were small arms.
The only rifle issued was the MAS-36, comprising nearly two-thirds of firearms
in the military’s inventory. Light weapons consisted of two 12.7 mm machine
guns, four 60 mm mortars, and four 81 mm mortars (SHAT, 1963, p. 38). The
introduction of Kalashnikov assault rifles and an assortment of light weapons
(for example, in 1977 the FACA’s arsenal was reported to include Soviet light
mortars and anti-tank rocket launchers—Clayton 1986, pp. 237, 240) over the
years has not changed the bottom line: the FACA is a lightly armed force.
Gendarmerie
Rather than complementing the army, the gendarmerie has historically com-
peted with it—or with other government security agencies—for the president’s
trust and support. Since it was officially created shortly after independence,
the gendarmerie has at times functioned independently and at other times
served under the chief of staff of the armed forces. Initially, Dacko had favoured
the gendarmerie over the army (Decalo, 1989, p. 145). Bokassa, as chief of staff
of the armed forces at the time of his coup, was understandably wary of the
gendarmerie, whose head, Commander John Izamo, had been selected by
France for his loyalty. The French were planning a coup in which Izamo would
take control of the country, but Bokassa acted first, arresting Izamo at the outset
of his own takeover (O’Toole, 1986, pp. 48–49). The gendarmerie had proved
itself loyal to Patassé during the army mutinies of 1996, but it remained rela-
tively weak during his tenure. Instead, Patassé relied primarily on the presiden-
tial guard, various militias, and international forces to protect him.
The strength of the gendarmerie has remained relatively constant. Report-
edly, there were 1,600 gendarmes in 1970, approximately 1,000 as of 1983, and
some 1,300 in 2000, with plans to increase the size of the force to 1,800 (Frères
d’Armes, 2000, p. 34; Keegan, 1983, p. 100). In June 2002, 200 new recruits (the
first since 1994) began a nine-month training course at the gendarmerie school

Figure 2
Organizational chart of the Central African Gendarmerie,
as of December 2003
Director General
Deputy Director
General Headquarters
Mobile Territorial Training

Battalion 1 Battalion 2 Battalion 3 Battalion 4
Legion Legion Centre
Source: Central African Gendarmerie
in Kolongo (Frères d’Armes, 2002, p. 40), suggesting that the force has yet to
realize its planned strength, or that intentions have changed. According to
President Bozizé, there were 1,310 gendarmes in 2003 (CAR, 2003b, p. 6).
Gendarmes are principally armed with pistols, MAT-49 sub-machine guns,
MAS-36 bolt-action rifles, and Kalashnikov assault rifles.15 In 2002 forces loyal
to Gen. Bozize ransacked many of their depots, and their armament in 2004
consisted mostly of MAS-36 rifles. Gendarmes dispersed throughout the country
find themselves outgunned by highway bandits who may carry Kalashnikovs
or light weapons (MCE, n.d.).
Presidential Guard
The force primarily responsible for protecting the president has had many
names over the years. Initially known as the Garde républicaine (Republican
Guard) after CAR was granted independence, it became the Presidential Guard
and then the Imperial Guard under Bokassa. To distance his presidency from
the record of the Imperial Guards’ human rights abuses, Dacko changed the
name to the Praetorian Guard. It was known as the Presidential Guard during

CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé is escorted by his guards in Bangui, May 1996. © Francois Mori/AP Photo
Kolingba’s rule, when it was placed under French command16 (Decalo, 1989,
p. 169). French influence remained strong for the first few years of Patassé’s
presidency, but in February 1997 Paris withdrew the 23 French technical advis-
ers charged with the president’s personal security (Kalck, 2005, p. lii).
Two things, however, have remained fairly constant concerning the unit
entrusted primarily to protect the Central African head of state: it has been
comparatively capably staffed, and it has been relatively well treated. Bokassa
reserved spots in the presidential guard for people from his home village
(Decalo, 1989, p. 157). Under President Patassé, the presidential guard alleg-
edly counted Chadian mercenaries among its forces (Africa Confidential, 2001),
although in 2004 sources close to Patassé disputed the assertion.17 As of 2006,
President Bozizé reportedly had a Chadian personal security contingent.18
In 1997 President Patassé undertook to transform the presidential guard into
the Force spéciale de défense des institutions républicaines (Special Force for

the Defense of Republican Institutions, FORSDIR), a process completed in early
1998 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999). In 2000, as part
of a package of negotiated reforms, President Patassé changed FORSDIR into
the Unité de la Sécurité Présidentielle (Presidential Security Unit, USP), and,
at least on paper, integrated it into the FACA. Although the USP was sup-
posed to report to the chief of staff of the armed forces and ultimately to be
accountable to the minister of defence, in reality it continued to report to, and
take orders directly from, the president and remained largely autonomous.19
At the end of 1999 the strength of FORSDIR was officially put at 642, but Sami
Faltas contends that its actual size was closer to 900 (Faltas, 2001, p. 92).
Furthermore, its members are better armed than colleagues serving with
other armed services and public security institutions in the country. For ex-
ample, under President Patassé presidential security personnel, whether in
uniform or not, could be identified by the personal firearms they carried. They
tended to be outfitted with Kalashnikov assault rifles, AA-52 light machine
guns, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs).20
Police
Police services in CAR have never enjoyed significant government support.
In 1963, for example, the police, which then numbered 315, possessed just 61
firearms: 6 pistols, 40 sub-machine guns, and 15 rifles. All of the latter were
bolt-action Mousquetons, first produced in the 19th century (SHAT, 1963, pp.
62–63). Subsequently, police officers were usually armed with French MAS-36s,
another bolt-action rifle, but of more recent (Second World War) vintage. By
2004, however, they were effectively unarmed. Most police depots were looted
during the mutinies and coup attempts of 1996–97 and 2001–02.
As with other state security forces the composition of the police force has
reflected the ethnicity of the executive in power. Bokassa, for instance, packed
the police with Ngbaka kinsmen (Decalo, 1989, p. 157).
The structure of the police uses the French system as a model (MCE, n.d.).
The police force in December 2003 was comprised of nine directions (divi-
sions)21 (see Figure 3). These were: the national security company; the national
police academy; the central counter-narcotics office; the central office for
counter-robbery; the office for air traffic, border control, emigration, and immi-

Figure 3
Organizational chart of the Central African Police,
as of December 2003
Director
General of
Police
DPAFEI DOCRB
DSPA DCNS
DENP DSPJ
DOCLAD DSP
8
DRHE FICU
Administrations
Notes:
DPAFEI: Direction de police de l’air, de frontière, d’émigration et d’immigration
(Air, Border, Emigration and Immigration Police Administration)
DSPA: Direction de service de police administrative (Police Administration)
DENP: Direction de l’école nationale de police (National Police School Administration)
DOCLAD: Direction d’office central de lutte anti-drogue (Counter-Narcotics Central Office Administration)
DRHE: Direction Resources Humaines et Equipement (Human Resources and Equipment Administration)
FICU: Force d’Intervention de Corps Urban (Urban Corps Intervention Force)
DOCRB: Direction d’office central de répression du banditisme (Central Office for Crime Suppression)
DCNS: Direction compagnie nationale de sécurité (National Security Company Administration)
DSPJ: Direction de service de police judiciare (Judicial Police Service Administration)
DSP: Direction de sécurité publique (Public Security Administration)

gration; the office for human resources and equipment; the office for public
security; the police administration; the judicial police; and the urban interven-
tion division. As of mid-2006, the director general of the police was working
with French technical experts to design a restructuring plan for the force (UNSC,
2006, para. 29).
The strength of the police in December 2003 stood at 1,685. According to
Controlleur Général Ernest Latakpi, the director general of the Central Afri-
can Police, there were 1,415 ‘uniformed’ police, 70 completing their training in
Cameroon, and another group of 200 at the initial stages of training in CAR.22
Only one police unit is well armed: the Central Office for the Repression of
Banditry (Office central de répression du banditisme, OCRB), charged with
combating banditry. Its members used to be armed with MAS-36s, but in
December 2003 all 45 of them were issued with a Kalashnikov assault rifle.23
This was possible because the OCRB is allowed to use some of the armaments
that it recovers from criminals (see Part IV).24
In December 2003 President Bozizé authorized a transfer of 50 Kalashnikovs
for the 1,685-strong police force and provided officers with 50 magazines and
1,500 additional cartridges.25 Latakpi gave each of the eight police commis-
sariats in Bangui two Kalashnikovs, except for the third arrondissement (dis-
trict), to which he gave three. He also gave ten Kalashnikovs to the Compagnie
nationale de sécurité (National Security Force, CNS). The remaining 23 Kalash-
nikovs were distributed throughout the rest of the force in ones and twos.26
Other
Outside of the police, gendarmerie, and armed forces (including the presiden-
tial guard), the state also provides arms to several smaller structures. According
to French military archives, in 1963 three such public forces possessed arma-
ments: forest guards, hunting guards, and diamond mine district personnel.27
In 2000 the state employed 70 guards to protect its natural resources—no new
recruits had been hired since the mid-1980s (Blom and Yamindou, 2001, p. 11).
In December 2003, the number stood at 51.28 Many of these functions are now
filled by private companies and ad hoc state-authorized (but apparently not
state-employed) initiatives discussed below. The state’s intelligence services
were also armed. Moreover, it is assumed that customs officials are armed,

but information on these bodies was especially difficult to obtain. They are
not believed to be numerous or well armed; indeed, the Port of Bangui relies
on (unarmed) guards from a private security company to patrol its facilities.29
It is difficult to document the firearms in service with other governmental
institutions outside of the armed forces and police. Back in 1963 the forest
guards and hunting guards were armed with MAS-36 rifles (50 and 30, re-
spectively), while the diamond mine district personnel were equipped with
24 pistols (SHAT, 1963, p. 65). The strengths of these three forces were not
listed, but it is likely that all three numbered fewer than 100 people. The
members of the state’s intelligence services are not believed to be particularly
numerous or well-equipped. The Centre national de recherche et d’information
(National Centre for Research and Information, CNRI) and the Section d’enquête,
de recherche et de documentation (Division for Investigation, Research, and
Documentation, SERD) with approximately 250 personnel, were officially dis-
mantled in 1997. The staff and arms (Kalashnikovs and AA-52s) of the CNRI,
the larger of the two agencies, were transferred to FORSDIR.30 According to
Thierry Maleyombo, CAR’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, SERD
was reportedly disbanded (again) in November 2003 following the convic-
tion of five SERD men for rape (UN OCHA, 2003f; UNHCR, 2005). However,
in 2005 SERD still existed; after dismantling it, Bozizé renamed it the Section
de recherche et d’investigation (Division for Research and Investigation, SRI)
(UNHCR, 2005, p.18). One informed observer put the force’s strength at the
time at 20–50 men and said all carried arms.31 The two names SERD and SRI
are often used interchangeably in popular discourse.
It is not believed that the current intelligence service, the Direction générale
de la documentation et des enquêtes (General Division for Documentation
and Investigations, DGRE), is particularly large or well armed.
Armed groups
In the early 1980s the proliferation of small arms throughout Central African
society was not a pressing concern. Indeed, as late as 1979 there is reason to
believe that relatively few arms were circulating outside of state actors in
Central African society. When the Bokassa government committed a second

series of large-scale killings of civilians in 1979,32 citizens fought back with
poisoned arrows (Kalck, 1992, p. xxxv). Given the level of violence to which
the government had resorted, it seems likely that those being attacked would
have used firearms to defend themselves if they had been available.
Civilians throughout the country now have greater access to small arms.
The number and types of weapons in circulation, however, differ markedly
from region to region. Though very little research has been conducted on the
extent to which individuals have armed themselves, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests some trends. In 2003, for example, according to an expatriate who lived
and worked in Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures for several years,
nearly every household in Vakaga is armed, with every person older than 30
years of age owning a weapon. These are not craft-production hunting rifles,
but commercial firearms. The Kalashnikov is most common, but there are
also quite a number of FN-FALs. G-3s are also widely used. Far fewer arma-
ments are circulating in Bamingui-Bangoran.33 Across the country in Sangha-
Mbaéré prefecture, more than 60 per cent of the population of the Kouapili
district of Salo reportedly possessed at least one firearm in 1998. These weap-
ons, however, tended to be rudimentary, locally produced hunting rifles
(Mogba and Freudenberger, 1998, p. 118). Manufactured shotguns are also in
plentiful supply. Russian 12-gauge shotguns made by Baikal are so prevalent
in that part of the country that locals use the term ‘Baikal’ to describe all such
weapons.34 Apparently, in the south-east of the country it is not uncommon
for three or four families in a ten-family village to own locally made weapons,
which they use for both protection and hunting.35
There are several indications that non-state groups began to arm them-
selves in the last months of 1979 and the early 1980s. The brutality of govern-
ment forces during Bokassa’s regime might have discouraged opponents from
taking up arms until then. There are reports that Dacko was forming a militia
made up from his Ngbaka ethnic group (O’Toole, 1986, p. 66), but little in the
literature substantiates such claims. It is known, however, that in the wake of
the 1981 national elections and the political upheaval that it caused, Patassé
began to receive arms in 1982.36
Government record keeping of weapons among its citizenry is deficient,
though this reportedly was not always the case. A law signed by André Kol-

ingba on 17 March 1984 (which remains on the books) stipulated that civil-
ians seeking to register their firearms had to obtain authorization first from
the ministry of the interior and then from the president himself. Any arms
found to be illegally held would be confiscated and sold, with the govern-
ment retaining the proceeds (CAR, 1984). According to a government official,
before the 1990s these laws were stringently applied. Authorities kept records
of gun ownership even at the village level. Those found in possession of non-
registered weapons could expect to have them confiscated and destroyed, as
the law stipulated. This was true even of home-made, traditional weapons.37
A number of factors help explain why government weapons regulation is
no longer so stringent. The deterioration of the civil service due to upheaval
and salary arrears, and the centralization of the state, both contribute to the
fact that few citizens register their guns. After Mobutu’s fall from power,
Central Africans believe, weapons became easily available from smugglers
piloting pirogues across the Ubangui River, the two countries’ highly perme-
able border.38 In addition, Patassé’s essentially cavalier attitude towards cre-
ating and arming militias has become one of his legacies, and as a result large
numbers of arms are unaccounted for.
Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain

Many members of President Patassé’s political party, the Mouvement de libéra-
tion du peuple centrafricain (Movement for the Liberation of the Central African
People, MLPC), were armed. President Patassé and his supporters first re-
ceived arms after his unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1981. Some MLPC
members remained armed even after President Patassé took office in 1993.
President Bozizé’s government has placed the strength of an armed ‘parallel
police force’ of MLPC members at 820 (CAR, 2003b, p. 7). It is unclear whether
this is the same as the ‘MLPC militia’ mentioned by some informed observers.
One source put the strength of this group at between 500 and 1,000 in 2003,
adding that each member was equipped with an automatic weapon and some
perhaps with crew-served armaments and grenade launchers.39
For the most part, it appears that other political parties’ supporters were
not armed as a widespread policy—certainly not to the extent of the MLPC.
Kolingba, for example, apparently did not arm supporters of his party,

Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain (Central African Democratic Rally,
RDC). A plausible explanation is that he felt he could comfortably rely for his
security on the French military as well as the country’s army, which, as ex-
plained above, he progressively staffed with members of his Yakoma ethnic
group during his rule. There is no evidence that other political parties, such
as Dacko’s Mouvement pour le démocratie et le développement (Movement
for Democracy and Development, MDD) or Goumba’s Front patriotique pour
le progrès (Patriotic Front for Progress, FPP), had armed their supporters.
The practice of arming political supporters has become more widespread
since the late 1990s, however. Rumours circulated before the 1999 presiden-
tial election that some political parties had armed themselves with weapons
that originated with ex-Forces armées zaïroises (ex-Zairian Armed Forces, ex-
FAZ) or FAC soldiers that crossed into CAR with their weapons when retreat-
ing from armed conflict in the territory south of the Ubangui River. Evariste
Konzale, the Central African Minister Delegate for Disarmament and Security
at the time, acknowledged the allegations but downplayed their significance,
saying that no evidence existed to support them (RFI, 1998).
Patassé apparently took the threat seriously—and had reason to do so. Patassé
was sufficiently concerned about reports that Kolingba’s son, Serge, was arm-
ing a Yakoma militia in Mobaye after the 1999 elections that he is alleged to
have sent government forces to intercept and kill a suspected collaborator (US
DOS, 2000).40 Eighteen months later, Kolingba sought to retake the capital by
force, but was defeated.41
Karakos, Balawas, and Sarawis

Following the mutinies of 1996, President Patassé, who had previously relied
primarily on the presidential guard and armed MLPC elements, now felt that
these forces were insufficient to guarantee his personal and political survival.
He thus established three Bangui-based militias known as the Karakos, Balawas,
and Sarawis. These neighbourhood militias would soon grow to encompass
some 1,500 individuals in total. They largely comprised young men whom the
president counted among his supporters.
Patassé drew support from northern ethnic groups, particularly among the
Kaba, the Sara, and the Gbaya. These groups are the most populous in the

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north-west, where he was raised. He was born in Ouham-Pendé prefecture in

the town of Paoua. His father was a member of the Suma sub-group of the
Gbaya ethnic group, while his mother was a Sara.42
Bangui has eight arrondissements, divided into quartiers (see Map 3), which
tend to be dominated by particular ethnic groups.43 At Patassé’s direction,
MLPC ministers created three militias following the second army mutinies in
1996 (Melly, 2002, pp. 21–22). The Karakos (‘peanut’ in the local dialect) militia
was based in the Boy-Rabe quartier, where mostly Gbaya reside (Leaba, 2001,
p. 172), in the fourth arrondissement. Subsequently, following an order from
the president, its members were to be officially integrated into the FACA, but
this proved partial and temporary.44 The Balawas (‘shea nut’ in the local dia-
lect) militia, comprising chiefly members of the Kaba ethnic group, was based
in the Combattant quartier in the eighth arrondissement. The Sarawis militia
was concentrated in the Sara quartier, named after the ethnic group residing
there in large numbers, in the fifth arrondissement. Sarawis militia members

were also present in large numbers in other quartiers of the fifth arrondisse-
ment, such as Malimaka, Miskine, Mustapha, and Ngouciment. Demafouth
said each militia peaked at a strength of around 500, and was armed mostly
with Kalashnikovs.45 Gen. Bozizé placed the three militias’ collective strength
at closer to 1,700 (CAR, 2003b, p. 7).
Société centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance

President Patassé subsequently created two more militias. In 1999 he estab-
lished the Société centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance (Central Afri-
can Protection and Surveillance Company, SCPS). Headed by his chauffeur,
Victor Ndoubabé (the son of a family friend), the SCPS was ostensibly a pri-
vate security company. While it did engage in commercial activities, it is best
seen as a standby militia force tasked with providing security to the president.46
President Patassé had been under substantial international pressure to reform
and scale down significantly the FORSDIR. Indeed, the SCPS would come to
count among its number former FORSDIR members (Leaba, 2001, p. 168).
Ndoubabé was killed in the March 2003 coup,47 and the SCPS ceased to exist
as a cohesive unit shortly thereafter. In early 2003 informed observers placed its
strength at between 1,000 and 1,500. According to President Bozizé, the number
of surviving ex-SCPS guards in November 2003 was 850 (CAR, 2003b, p. 7).
These guards were armed with Kalashnikovs.48
‘Abdulaye Miskine’
In 2000 President Patassé established yet another militia known alternately as
the Bataillon de Sécurité Frontalière (Border Security Batallion) or by the name
of its leader ‘Abdulaye Miskine’—whose birth name, according to President
Patassé, is Martin Koumta Madji. Chad has accused Miskine of being a Chad-
ian insurgent who killed another rebel leader. President Patassé maintained
that he was a Central African patriot who Chad had wrongly identified.49
Leaving aside his contentious background and objectives, there is consensus
that, at the time of Gen. Bozizé’s October 2002 coup attempt, the militia num-
bered between 300 and 350.50 President Patassé armed them with Kalashnikovs.51
Miskine departed CAR in November 2002,52 but later returned. Some of his
men joined other pro-Patassé forces, while others joined Bozizé’s cause. With

Bozizé’s successful coup, it was widely believed in 2004 that Miskine did not
have any armed troops under his command, though his men may have joined
other fighters or criminal groups.53 More recently, his name has again surfaced
as among the leaders of the armed rebellion in the north-west that emerged
in 2005.
Mutineers
The leaders of the 1996–97 mutinies also reportedly armed civilian support-
ers. The numbers were reported to be in the hundreds, with teenagers and
younger boys among those recruited (US DOS, 1998). Given that the muti-
neers were concentrated in the southern parts of the city, it would seem logical
that the civilians were from quartiers such as Ouango, N’garagba, and Petevo
in the seventh and eighth arrondissements.
Oversight of most of these initiatives was minimal. One interlocutor says
he personally saw a list of weapons and their recipients for at least one of
these original three militias. However, the list was lost after the May 2001
coup attempt.54 Others said no such records were kept. Whatever the case, all
agree that the government has long since lost control of the men and weapons.
Central Africans call for a peaceful resolution to the mutiny of May 1996. © Pascal Le Segretain/Corbis Sygma

It would appear from the context of the time that the mutineers’ oversight of
weapons they issued to civilians would have been limited to non-existent.
However, Anicet Saulet, a leader of the mutinies, says that while the muti-
neers did not keep detailed records of weapons they disbursed, they main-
tained effective control of the weapons they dispensed to supporters—mostly
MAS-36s as the mutineers used the better firearms, such as Kalashnikovs.
They retrieved most of these weapons when they agreed to return to the bar-
racks at the end of 1997.55
Self-defence units and vigilante groups

Other armed neighbourhood watch-type organizations, or vigilante groups,
are operating throughout CAR, although firearms and ammunition are often
not in plentiful supply. For example, villagers in Donzi, in Ouham prefecture,
formed a self-defence patrol in early 2004 after suffering repeated attacks
from highway bandits armed with Kalashnikovs. The 27 young men who
make up the Donzi group carry hunting rifles, but ammunition is often in very
short supply (UN OCHA, 2004b). Local defence groups have become prevalent
throughout the country. People refer to them as ‘archers’. They are generally
armed with traditional weapons such as bows and arrows, and have decapi-
tated captives.56
Sometimes these groups work closely with the government, sometimes
they do not. Haute-Kotto prefecture, also beset with highway robbers and
kidnappers, developed a network of local vigilante groups in December 2003.
Governor Serge Gabin Nakombo met with village leaders in Bria to plan the
establishment of village-based self-defence groups. These groups would not
supplant state security forces, but rather supplement them (UN OCHA, 2003j).
In Bangui, however, those participating in local security arrangements have
clashed with state security forces. In December 2003, for instance, three mem-
bers of a self-defence group based in the Cattin Nord quartier were killed and
another was seriously wounded, allegedly by members of SERD. The young
men had been arrested after exchanging automatic rifle fire with some at-
tempted robbers (AFP, 2003). As one FACA soldier told a reporter for ID+, a
Bangui news magazine, ‘It is very difficult to tell a robber from a self-defence
group member, especially if they are illegally armed’ (ID+, 2003).57

Other
Just as Patassé subcontracted his security to a variety of militia, many other
functions that were previously the sole responsibility of the state are now being
carried out by private companies and ad hoc state-authorized (but foreign-
funded) concerns. Several private security companies have been established
since 2003 in Bangui, but, with the exception of the SCPS, they are effectively
unarmed. Only a few companies have equipped their guards with pistolets
d’alarme (blank-firing pistols).
The first private security company in Bangui was King Security Services
(previously known as MSG for Multiservice Conseil Gerance), established in
1988.58 In December 2003 there were eight security companies with two—
Boxer and Powers—having received authorization since Bozizé assumed
power (see Table 2). Their clients include foreign embassies, the UN and other
international organizations, and private enterprises.
In December 2003 these companies employed about 750 guards, mostly in
Bangui. King and Fox were the largest employers, each accounting for about
one-third of the total. Four other companies together accounted for the other
Table 2
Private security companies in the Central African Republic,
as of December 2003
Name Year Number of Areas of operation Small arms and light

established guards weapons held
BCAGS 1998 98 Bangui and Blank-firing pistols

Nana-Mbaéré
Boxer 2003 50 Bangui and Vakaga None
Cobra 1992 32 Bangui Blank-firing pistols

and live-firing pistols
Fox 1993 245 Bangui Blank-firing pistols
Golf c.1992 0 N/A N/A
King 1988 260 Bangui None
Powers 2003 74 Bangui None
Secuveille c.2002 0 N/A N/A
Sources: BCAGS, Boxer, Cobra, Fox, King, and Powers

250 or so guards. According to industry insiders, Golf and Secuveille did not
have any current contracts as of December 2003, and therefore no employ-
ees.59 Only Bureau centrafricain de gardiennage et de surveillance (BCAGS)
and Boxer had guards working outside the capital at the end of 2003.60 Cobra
used to have guards stationed at airports in Bamingui-Bangoran and Haute-
Kotto prefectures.61
Private security company guards rely principally on walkie-talkies, hand-
cuffs, truncheons, dogs, whistles, and flashlights. Some employ anti-aggressor
devices such as chemical sprays and electric stun guns. Three companies—
BCAGS, Cobra, and Fox—use blank-firing pistols.62 The pistol Fox uses is
called the ‘Self Defender’, which it imports directly from the French manufac-
turer Société d’application des procédés Lefebvre (SAPL).63 Only Cobra says it
has authorization to equip its guards with live-firing pistols.64 According to
the private security companies, it is the ministry of the interior that provides
the necessary permits to both import and use these weapons.
Anti-poaching initiatives
The Central African government has authorized 15 protected areas through-
out the country in an effort to limit or prohibit activities that pose a threat to
flora and fauna.65 More than ten per cent of the country, or an area roughly
twice the size of Switzerland, is presently covered (see Table 3), and in 2003
the government was entertaining the possibility of creating additional zones.66
In 2000 70 guards were employed by the state to protect its natural resources;
no new recruits had been hired since the mid-1980s (Blom and Yamindou,
2001, p. 11). As of December 2003 the number had dwindled to 51.67 Such a
‘force’ would be hard-pressed to protect a single reserve or park. Indeed,
three reserves (Zemongo, Yata-Ngaya, and Nana Barya) lack any management.
Oversight at most others is poor (Blom, Prins, and Yamindou, 2004). (As one
Central African official explained, the policy is to have ‘at least one [guard]—
and sometimes none’ at each area.)68
Recognizing that the state was unable to protect national wildlife, in 1988 the
European Union (EU) launched the first of several anti-poaching initiatives
(complementing government efforts) that involved the recruitment of armed

guards. At the height of the programme in the early 1990s, the EU was fund-
ing 120 armed anti-poaching guards in CAR. By December 2003 there were
around half as many.69 The guards are armed with Kalashnikov rifles and two
AA-52 machine guns, which the ministry of defence issued to them. In addi-
tion, the teams retain some matériel seized from poachers.70 In 1990, following
the creation of two new protected areas in Sangha-Mbaéré prefecture, the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) also financed an anti-poaching initiative in CAR.
Initially ten eco-guards were recruited. By June 2003 there were 40, with plans
for more if funds become available. The government furnishes each guard
with a MAS-36 rifle. Teams also have access to a couple of automatic rifles.71
As of the end of 2003, no single government agency oversaw anti-poaching
initiatives and registry of weapons for the protection of wildlife. Apparently
it is necessary to negotiate agreements with the current office holder and not
simply the office. This creates additional confusion as ministries’ mandates
are frequently changed and ministers’ tenures can be relatively brief. Indeed,
there were three ministers in charge of environmental affairs within a one-year
period in the mid-1990s (Carroll, 1998, p. 201).
Stockpiles
Governmental institutions
The successful coup d’état in CAR on 15 March 2003 both clarified and ob-
scured the situation regarding the small arms and light weapons holdings of
government forces. As already noted, Gen. Bozizé and his supporters raided
many police and gendarmerie depots across the countryside after the failed
coup of October 2002. As of 2004 most of the weapons had not been returned,
and missing items had not been replaced.
Yet the government has entered into a dialogue with the World Bank in a
bid to garner international financial support for security sector reform (SSR).
As part of this endeavour it has recorded the strength of the FACA, the gen-
darmerie, and the police, as well as of various non-state armed groups. The
numbers provided are largely believed to be accurate in the case of the state,
although it is noteworthy that Bozizé did not provide figures on his presiden-
tial guard (which is not believed to be part of the figure he provided for the

Table 3
National ‘protected areas’ and foreign anti-poaching initiatives
in the Central African Republic, as of December 2003
Name Prefecture(s) Year est. Size Programme Armed

sq. km. under guards*
Réserve de Faune de Haut-Mbomou 1925 10,100

Zémongo
Réserve de Faune du Nana-Grébizi 1933 4,500

Gribungui-Bamingui
Parc National de Bamingui- 1933 17,400

Manovo-Gounda Bangoran
Saint-Floris
Parc National Bamingui- 1933 10,700

Bamingui-Bangoran Bangoran
ECOFAC 54
Réserve Naturelle Bamingui- 1933 860
Intégrale de la Bangoran
Vassoko-Bolo
Réserve de Faune de Vakaga 1925 4,800

la Ouandja-Vakaga
Réserve de Faune de Vakaga 1939 3,300

l’Aouk-Aoukale
Réserve de Faune du Nana-Grébizi 1940 1,100

Koukourou-Bamingui
Réserve de Faune de Vakaga and 1940 4,200

la Yata-Ngaya Haute-Kotto
Parc National Vakaga 1940 1,700

André Félix
Réserve de Biosphére Lobaye 1951 146

de Basse-Lobaye
Réserve de Faune de Ouham 1953 2,300

la Nana Barya
Parc Présidentiel Bamingui- 1968 1,700

d’Avakaba Bangoran
Dzanga-Sangha Sangha-Mbaéré 1990 3,159

Dense Forest Special
Reserve WWF 40
Parc National Sangha-Mbaéré 1990 1,200
Dzanga-Ndoki

Réserve Naturelle Lobaye 1996 867 ECOFAC 15
Intégrale de Mbaéré-
Bodingué
Totals 68,012
‘Chinko Basin Mbomou N/A N/A ARRC 5

Reserve’
‘Village-run Hunting Bamingui- N/A Approx. ECOFAC 0

Zones’ Bangoran and 40,000
Vakaga
* This table does not include 51 park guards hired by the state with outside financing or the 250–300 state-authorized self-
defence militia in Vakaga prefecture that undertake anti-poaching activities.
Note:
Official government statistics about national protected areas vary slightly.
Sources: ECOFAC, WWF, ARRC, and Central African Ministry of Water, Forests, Hunting, and Fishing officials
Box 1 Yaya Ramadan and his self-defence units in Vakaga Prefecture

In 1984 Yaya Ramadan established a self-defence initiative in Vakaga Prefecture. Yaya was the
village chief of Tiroungoulou, a respected religious leader in the region, and a former mayor of
Birao. He recognized the threat poaching posed to the region’s animals as well as to the well-
being of his fellow citizens. He believed that revenues from international hunting represented a
potentially lucrative and sustainable source of income.
The force, which received government approval, was relatively well armed. The support from
Bangui was political––not military––in nature, and did not include any weapons. The militia pro-
cured its weapons privately. Its members are armed with assault rifles: mostly Kalashnikovs, but
also G-3s, M-14s, and FNLs. In August 2003 these units numbered some 250–300 men.
In recognition of Yaya’s standing in the community and conservationist activities, the govern-
ment later appointed him its representative to the EU-funded anti-poaching programme in the
country’s north. Programme de développement de la région nord (PDRN) and its successor
Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (Village-run Hunting Zones, ZCV) have occasionally recruited
self-defence personnel for short periods of time to help track poachers. The numbers tend to be
small––two- to four-person teams.
Yaya’s murder in May 2002 incited bursts of violence, showing how explosive the situation is
in parts of CAR. He was ambushed while driving from Mossabio to Gordil. Cattle herders from
across Vakaga’s north-eastern border, whose livestock often grazed in CAR, were believed to have
been responsible. More than 100 people died during a spate of retaliatory raids. The situation
calmed by the end of 2002, but the incident caused people to arm themselves to an even greater
extent than before. Yaya’s death remains a turning point in how inhabitants relate their region’s
recent history.
Source: Interview with Olivier Feneteau, Technical Advisor, Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises component, Central African
Republic Office, ECOFAC, Paris, 2 September 2003.

FACA). As for former militias, Bozizé appears to have provided a defensible
estimate, although it is possible that he overestimated the size of some groups
in an effort to secure additional financing. The government has not offered
data on stockpiles of small arms and light weapons.
Historical analysis of inventories can help to shed light on current hold-
ings. Very good information is available on the weapons that were in service
with Central African state actors in the 1960s. The Government of France kept
detailed records of small arms and light weapons in the hands of numerous
Central African government services, as well as of their force strengths. Thus,
for 1963 it is possible to determine accurate multipliers. They range from a
high of 1.60 (the ratio of weapons to forces) for the gendarmerie to a low of 0.19
for the police 72 (see Tables 4 and 5). Based on subsequent events and available
information, the values of current multipliers (except for the presidential
guard) are probably in keeping with these figures. The ratios 1.25, 1.15, and
0.67 are used respectively for the FACA, the gendarmerie, and the police. The
rationale is that the weapons in service with the FACA and the gendarmerie
will have been reduced because of President Patassé’s policy of marginaliza-
tion and Gen. Bozizé’s looting.
Bozizé’s republican guard—or presidential guard—is reportedly well armed.
As previously mentioned, the Central African government conspicuously
chose not to disclose information on this unit when discussing its security
and disarmament needs and plans. Eyewitness reports, however, suggest a
ratio of 3.00, which is in keeping with information available on the ex-USP. The
strength of the unit is not known, although a figure of 1,000 men is thought to
be a conservative estimate.
It is also possible to calculate a multiplier for the FACA in 1996 with some
degree of specificity. According to the Government of CAR, in November
1996, at the time of the third army mutiny, 2,389 small arms and 127 light
weapons were stored at Kassaï barracks (UNSC, 1997a, para. 22). Demafouth
believes that government record keeping was adequate at the time, and that
the figures it provided to MISAB were largely accurate. The army’s other
depot was at Bouar, and contained around 800 weapons, mostly Kalashnikov
assault rifles. Very few light weapons were kept at Bouar.73 Demafouth adds
that the strength of the FACA was approximately 3,000–3,500 in 1996.74 This

Table 4
Weapons in service with Central African state actors,
as of 1 October 1963
Weapon Total By recipient
Category Model Army Gendar- Repub- Police Other*

marie lican
guard
Pistols and M1950 419 105 314 0 0 0

revolvers
MAB 7.65 30 0 0 0 6 24
Sub- MAT-49 367 221 126 20 0 0

machine
guns PM 38 30 0 0 0 30 0
Sten 10 0 0 0 10 0
Small arms
Rifles Mousqueton 338 0 0 323 15 0
MAS-36/51 1,630 636 359 555 0 80
M1949/56 60 0 60 0 0 0
(FSA)
Light Mle 1924/29 10 0 10 0 0 0

machine
guns AA-52 57 45 12 0 0 0
Bren 14 0 5 9 0 0
Heavy 12.7 mm 2 2 0 0 0 0
machine
Light weapons
guns
Mortars 60 mm 4 4 0 0 0 0
81 mm 4 4 0 0 0 0
Totals 2,975 1,017 886 907 61 104
*
’Other’ includes Gardes Forestiers with 50 MAS-36s, Gardes Chasses with 30 MAS-36s, and Personnels des circonsciptions
minièrs de diament with 24 7.65 mm pistols. It is assumed that this was the same MAB pistol as that used by the police.
Similarly, the 8 mm rifles in service with the police are assumed to be the same model, the Mousqueton, as those in service
with the Republican Guard. Grenade-launching MAS-36 rifles are included among the total number of such rifles. The army
had 58 such weapons and the gendarmes had 6.
Source: French Service Historique d’Armée de Terre

Table 5
Strengths of Central African state actors, as of 1 October 1963
Service French personnel Central African Totals

personnel
Army 110 651 761
Air Force 24 19 43
Gendarmerie 68 487 555
Republican Guard 2 670 672
Police 7 308 315
Totals 211 2,135 2,346
Source: French Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre
would put the ratio of weapons to soldiers at very close to 1.0. The govern-
ment, however, took weapons from Kassaï barracks and moved them across
town to the presidential guard’s armoury at Camp de Roux after the first
mutiny in April (McFarlane and Malan, 1998, p. 50). It was not possible to
ascertain how many weapons were removed and how many may have been
returned. But there is no reason to believe that the ratio of weapons to sol-
diers would have been higher for the army than it was for the presidential
guard at the time (which Demafouth put at around 1.3).75 Thus, the multiplier
for the FACA in 1996 would not have been very different from the 1963 multi-
plier of 1.34.
By March 2003 there had been no appreciable change in the FACA multi-
plier compared with 1996. President Patassé continued to starve the military
of funds and weapons, while aiding the presidential guard and other forces
on which he felt he could rely. Although they could not be verified, reports of
the army purchasing weapons from MLC rebels point to the dire straits in
which the institution found itself. The multiplier certainly would not have
increased under Patassé.
The FACA’s fortunes with regard to matériel may have changed in the wake
of the March 2003 coup, however. After seizing control of the capital, Bozizé
recovered 1,300 weapons, primarily with the help of the Chadian Army (UN
OCHA, 2003a) and, to a lesser extent, Communauté économique et monétaire
de l’Afrique centrale (Central African Economic and Monetary Community,

Table 6
Strengths of Central African state actors and estimated stockpiles
of small arms and light weapons, as of September 2003
Service Strength Estimated stockpiles of small

arms and light weapons
FACA 4,442 5,552
Gendarmerie 1,310 1,507
Police 1,600 1,072
Other* 250 250
Presidential guard 1,000 3,000
Totals 8,602 11,381
* Other includes intelligence (DGRE and SERD) and anti-poaching units.
Sources: Other: informed estimate; remainder: CAR (2003, pp. 6–7)
CEMAC) peacekeepers. But it is not clear how many of these weapons, if any,
were transferred to the FACA.
Stockpile multipliers for other Central African state actors are more diffi-
cult to ascertain, but they are expected all to be below that of the FACA. Some
details exist for the presidential guard as recently as 1996 (see Stockpiles section
on non-state actors), but those statistics have little relevance for present govern-
ment holdings in the wake of the March 2003 coup. Officials from the gendar-
merie and the police explain that their depots in much of the country were
looted between October 2002 and March 2003. In 2004 these stocks had not been
fully replenished. Multipliers of 1.2 and 0.8 are used to approximate the number
of arms in the possession of the gendarmerie and the police, respectively.
All told, it would appear that government security forces held fewer than
12,000 small arms and light weapons at the end of 2003 (see Table 6).
Armed groups
The ratios used to determine the stockpiles of non-state groups tend to be
higher than those employed for governmental bodies. It is assumed here that
the Balawas, Sarawis, and Karakos militias received approximately two weap-
ons for every three people recruited. Members of the MLPC, SCPS, and USP
are thought to have had access to arms in excess of their respective strengths.

In response to the May 2001 coup attempt, for example, MLPC officials were
widely reported to have dispensed weapons, including Kalashnikovs, to party
loyalists in Bangui in an effort to apprehend citizens who may have received
firearms from Kolingba supporters.76 During the March 2003 coup d’état, eye-
witnesses claim that thousands of weapons were looted from the home of
Gen. Bombayeke, the head of the USP, when Bozizé’s men arrested him.77
(Bombayeke was imprisoned for more than two and a half years before he
was released to house arrest, guarded by gendarmes; AFP, 2005a.)
We estimate that by the end of 2003 various armed groups in the Central
Africa Republic—in varying stages of cohesiveness—possessed small arms
and light weapons in quantities only slightly smaller than those in govern-
ment holdings (see Table 7).
Table 7
Estimated small arms and light weapons held by selected non-state
armed groups in the Central African Republic, as of November 2003
Service Estimated/Recorded strength Estimated holdings of small

arms and light weapons
Ex-Balawas1 510 340

1
Ex-Sarawis 600 400
1
Ex-Karakos 590 400
1
Ex-‘Border Security Battalion’ 300 300
1
Ex-SCPS 850 1,700
1
Ex-USP 1,345 4,050
Ex-MLPC1 820 1,650
‘Mutineers’1,2 1,900 1,000
‘Liberators’1,3 1,100 1,100
Totals 8,015 10,940
Notes:
This table does not include self-defence groups, private security companies, or coupeurs de route. Some estimates are
slightly rounded.
1
No longer a cohesive force.
2
Those who joined the May 2001 coup attempt.
3
The fighters who helped Bozizé take power have subsequently been referred to as ‘Liberators’ or ‘Patriots’. As of December
2003, 540 of them had been integrated into the state security sector and are not included in the figure given here. For more
information, see the Epilogue.
Sources: CAR (2003); various interviews in Bangui and informed estimates

More significantly, these groups are generally armed with weapons of
greater firepower and lethality than those in the possession of the state. Cer-
tainly, this is true of the gendarmerie and the police: the relatively few arma-
ments that remain in their hands include a large number of MAS-36 bolt-action
rifles. As noted above, President Patassé tended to arm his presidential guard
and various militias with assault rifles. There are numerous reports of forces loyal
to Patassé also having been equipped with light machine guns and RPGs.78
Additionally, there is reason to believe that civilians and armed groups can
more easily obtain assault rifles than before. As discussed below (see Part IV),
it is increasingly common for police and anti-poaching guards to recover Kalash-
nikovs. In the past they tended to collect and come into contact with rudimen-
tary and antiquated shotguns and hunting rifles.
The government’s calculation of the number of weapons in general circula-
tion may underestimate the scale of the challenge. According to Gen. Xavier
Yangongo (deputy minister of defence under Patassé), the Chairman of the
Commission de la défense et de la sécurité, a committee convened as part of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission convened in late 2003, up to 50,000
illegally held guns are in general circulation (UN OCHA, 2003i), although he
has provided no documentation or analysis to support the assertion. Many
people might be inclined to dismiss it, therefore, as little more than a negoti-
ating ploy on behalf of the government to extract resources from the World
Bank and the wider international donor community for yet another arms col-
lection programme. The number of guns in society, though, could be signifi-
cantly higher. It is not unreasonable to assume that the six known militias
and the SDU in Vakaga prefecture possess around 9,000 firearms in total. If
only one person out of every 100 in CAR (with an estimated population of 3.9
million citizens) was armed, this would add another 39,000 firearms to the pool.
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that significant sections of the popula-
tion are armed (although the quality of some of the weapons is suspect, and
many are rudimentary locally produced shotguns) and that the ratio of weap-
ons to people is certainly higher than 1:100. The situation has changed mark-
edly since citizens fought back with arrows against armed government troops
in 1979. The vast majority of weapons that have entered CAR in recent years
in ways other than direct state-to-state transfer supports the contention that
more than 50,000 weapons are circulating outside of government control.
Part II elaborates on this point.

Self-proclaimed Emperor of the
Central African Empire Jean-Bédel
Bokassa with his wife, 1977.
40 The Central African Republic and Small Arms © Christine Nesbitt/ AP Photo
PART II
Small Arms Flows and Trafficking
As noted in Part I, successive Central African governments kept their armed

forces and police relatively small and poorly armed. It is only in comparison
with other entities that a particular service could be described as ‘well armed’.
With few natural resources with which to barter, and essentially no role in the
cold war competition between the superpowers, direct transfers from states
have been rather limited. Indeed, Bangui had so few suitors that it is under-
standable that Kolingba decided to establish diplomatic relations with a fic-
tional country. (There is no indication, however, that the ‘state’ in question, the
Dominion of Melchizedek, supplied military equipment of any kind.)79
Direct government-to-government transfers do not account for a particu-
larly significant level of matériel. According to the United Nations Commodity
Trade Statistics (UN Comtrade) database, 20 countries provided small arms,
parts, and ammunition to the Central African Republic between 1962 and
2003.80 By far the most significant suppliers according to Bangui have been
the Republic of Congo, France, and Spain. But Bangui did not report to UN
Comtrade for 17 years in the period 1962 (the first year small arms were re-
ported in UN Comtrade) to 2004. Export data from UN Comtrade reveals that
CAR’s biggest suppliers of small arms, parts, and ammunition are Spain,
France, and Romania (with the Republic of Congo not reporting).81 In these
lists, hunting and sporting guns and their ammunition comprise a significant
component of both imports and exports, according to available UN Comtrade
data. There is significant discrepancy between CAR’s reported imports and
supplier countries’ reported exports for years for which both sides do report.
Moreover, UN Comtrade data does not capture all supplier countries provid-
ing small arms and ammunition to Bangui. Important exceptions include
China, Libya, and the former Soviet Union. This part thus reviews the top
suppliers of small arms, parts, and ammunition to CAR without limiting itself
to UN Comtrade reporting.
Part II Small Arms Flows and Trafficking 41

Of greater significance than government-to-government transfers of small
arms are indirect weapons transfers by defeated, demobilized, or ‘visiting’
armed forces of neighbouring states. The first wave of weapons to cross into
CAR came from Chad in the early 1980s. Additional firearms entered the
country from Sudan during the 1980s and 1990s. 1997 was the first year in
which a large transfer of weapons entered CAR from Zaire/DRC, with sub-
sequent transfers occurring in 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Both neighbouring
national armies and non-state armed groups account for this bounty. Although
figures are difficult to come by, arguably since the early 1980s indirect trans-
fers from neighbouring armed forces have accounted for the majority of small
arms entering the country.
Within CAR, recirculation of weapons from government stocks has proved
to be a major source of the arms that flow outside the hands of state actors.
Insurgents have ransacked depots during coup attempts or other periods of
insecurity, for instance. Those conducting conservation programmes have re-
ported that during anti-poaching operations they often capture weapons that
belong in government stocks. With the state security sector already less well
armed than armed groups, these penetrations of government stockpiles take
on an even greater importance.
Direct transfers from states

France
Not surprisingly, the colonial power, France, remained CAR’s primary mili-
tary supplier in the years following independence. CAR was the first newly
independent former French colony to sign a military cooperation agreement
with France, on 13 August 1960 (Gregory, 2000, p. 437, n. 8). In 1963, for in-
stance, most weapons in state inventories were French, and the few weapons
not French-made likely came from France. Equipment included French pistols
such as the 7.65 mm MAB PA-15, the 9 mm M1950, and the 9 mm Walther, as
well as the Manhurin MR 73 .38 revolver. The 9 mm MAT-49 sub-machine
gun was also issued. French rifles included the 8 mm Mousqueton and 7.5
mm MAS 36, as well as the more powerful 7.5 mm M1949/56 (also known
popularly as the FSA), which included smaller numbers of a version capable

French President François Mitterrand and CAR President André Kolingba on Mitterrand’s arrival in Bangui, 1984.
© Georges Gobet/AFP/Getty Images
of firing grenades. Light machine guns included a few examples of the 7.5
mm M1924/29 and the 7.5 mm AA-52. As of 1963 there were only a few crew-
served weapons: a couple of Browning 12.7 mm machine guns as well as a
handful of 60 mm and 81 mm mortars (SHAT, 1963, pp. 38, 51, 57, 63) (see
Table 8).
There were very few examples of non-French matériel in service with these
bodies in the early 1960s. Examples of non-French-made small arms in serv-
ice with CAR government forces at this time included the British 7.62 mm
Sten and 9 mm Italian PM 38 sub-machine guns, and the British 7.62 mm Bren
machine gun (SHAT, 1963, pp. 51, 57, 63) (see Table 8). It is not known how
CAR obtained these weapons, but, given the extremely close relationship be-
tween Bangui and Paris in this period, the lack of an appreciable relationship
between Bangui and London or Rome, and the large number of such weapons
produced during the Second World War, it seems likely that France provided
these weapons as well. According to France, the US government intended to
export ten pistols to Bangui for its police force, part of a programme that in-
cluded bringing a few police officers to the United States for training (SHAT,
1963, p. 23).

Table 8
Weapons in service with Central African state actors,
as of 1 October 1963
Weapon Total Recipient
Category Model Army Gendar- Repub- Police Other1

marie lican
guard
Pistols and MAC/MAS- 419 105 314 0 0 0

revolvers 1950
MAB 7.65 30 0 0 0 6 242
Sub- MAT-49 367 221 126 20 0 0

machine
guns MAS-38 30 0 0 0 30 0
Small arms
Sten 10 0 0 0 10 0
3
Rifles Mousqueton 338 0 0 323 15 0
MAS-36/51 1,630 636 359 555 0 804
MAS-49/56 60 0 60 0 0 0
Light FM-24/29 10 0 10 0 0 0
machine
guns AA-52 57 45 12 0 0 0
Bren 14 0 5 9 0 0
Heavy 12.7 mm 2 2 0 0 0 0
machine
Light weapons
guns
Mortars 60 mm 4 4 0 0 0 0
81 mm 4 4 0 0 0 0
Total 2,975 1,017 886 907 61 104
1
‘Other’ includes the Gardes forestiers with 50 MAS-36s, the Gardes chasse with 30 MAS-36s, and the Personnels des
circonscriptions minières de diamant with 24 7.65 mm pistols.
2
It is assumed that this is the same MAB pistol as the one used by the police.
3
The 8 mm rifles in service with the police are believed to be the same as the model (Mousqueton) used by the Republican Guard.
4
Grenade-launching MAS-36 rifles are included in the total. The army and the gendarmerie had 58 and 6 of these weapons,
respectively.
Source: SHAT (1963, pp. 38, 51, 58, 63, 65)

France remained CAR’s primary military patron until 1970, when relations
between the two countries sharply deteriorated, and France withdrew its
troops serving in the country. Nevertheless, France remained engaged with
CAR due to wider political considerations. These considerations, however,
changed by the late 1970s. Strategic considerations and concerns over human
rights drove France to curtail its military assistance and ultimately to decide
to orchestrate the overthrow of President Bokassa.82
After President Bokassa was removed from office, France re-engaged with
CAR militarily, shipping several consignments of small arms and light weap-
ons during the early years of the Kolingba presidency (see Table 9). France
Table 9
Weapons transfers from France to the Central African Republic,
1981–2003
Year of transfer Type of weapon Shipment value Number of

weapons
Category Manufacturer/
model(s)
1981 Automatic rifles Manurhin EUR 228,673 N/A

Défense
1981 Anti-tank LRAC 89 mm1 N/A 50

weapons
1983 Anti-tank LRAC 89 mm N/A 50

weapons
1984 Machine guns SFM/SFET2 EUR 76,225 N/A

3
1984 Assault rifles DAT (now GIAT) EUR 2,287 N/A
1994 Spare parts MAT-49, AA-52, EUR 15,245 N/A

pistols
1995 Spare parts MAT-49, AA-52, EUR 6,860 N/A

pistols
1
LRAC: Lance Rocket Antichar.
2
SFM: Société française des Munitions; SFET: Société française d’Equipements de Tir.
3
DAT: Direction des Armements Terrestres; GIAT: Groupement Industriel des Armements Terrestres.
Source: Written correspondence with French Ministry of Defence, 5 September 2003.

perhaps hoped that Kolingba would draw on his training as a graduate of
French military schools in Brazzaville and Fréjus (in France) and provide
sound oversight of the military. The presence of some 1,200–1,500 French troops
in CAR at the time likely also contributed to France’s sense that it would have
some oversight of the country’s military affairs (O’Toole, 1986, p. 67).83
France’s military support for CAR during the tenure of President Patassé
was largely indirect, via its own troops and then regional peacekeeping mis-
sions. Given the president’s long-standing open hostility towards France,
Paris was not favourably predisposed to the new president. Even so, the
French government pushed hard for President Kolingba to hold free and fair
democratic elections in September 1993, and it did so on the clear under-
standing that Patassé would almost certainly emerge victorious. When FACA
soldiers mutinied in April 1996, CAR-based French soldiers (backed up by
Gabon- and Chad-based French foreign legion companies) provided crucial
assistance to President Patassé, without which he certainly would not have
survived politically, and perhaps not corporeally, either (McFarlane and Malan,
1998, pp. 50–51). France backed the January 1997 peace accord and the estab-
lishment of MISAB. In 2002 France provided weapon systems and armaments
for troops serving with the CEMAC peacekeeping mission. This mission was
substantially smaller than the MISAB force assembled in 1997, and ultimately
proved ineffective in protecting Patassé.84
Direct transfers of French military equipment to President Patassé’s gov-
ernment, however, were very limited. CAR did receive some matériel, such as
vehicles, when France’s military base in Bouar formally closed in 1998, but no
small arms or light weapons were handed over.85 The arrival of French military
advisers to train four companies of the FACA during 2000 and 2001 included
the provision of some vehicles, communications equipment, and uniforms,86
but this did not include any small arms or light weapons.87 According to the
French government, the only small arms and light weapons Paris transferred
to CAR during the ten years President Patassé was in office were spare parts,
with the last exchange occurring in 1995 (see Table 9).
Allegations of French military support for the failed coup of May 2001 are
unfounded. President Patassé accused France publicly of involvement, and
displayed weapons that he claimed his forces had retrieved from Kolingba’s

residence (see, for example, Jones, 2001). France did not deny that the weap-
ons were of French origin, but did deny any connection to the coup. It said
that the weapons had been intended for CAR’s gendarmerie. As a former
head of state and minister of defence, Kolingba could have stored weapons in
his residence, as there was little or no oversight of his actions. Moreover, addi-
tional weapons could have been obtained from the area of Mobaye, Kolingba’s
hometown, from which he derives substantial support. ‘Proof’ offered to date
has not supported the claims.
When Bozizé seized power in the March 2003 coup, France initially decried
the removal of President Patassé, who had been democratically elected. How-
ever, France subsequently pursued a constructive relationship with the Bozizé
government. Indeed, in Bozizé’s first year of power alone he received official
visits from more French ministers (three—foreign affairs, defence, and coop-
eration) than his predecessor had in the past decade (Soudan, 2004). In addition
to being the main donor of funds to the CEMAC peacekeeping mission, France
announced a military cooperation programme in July 2003, which began that
October. The programme does not include the provision of any armaments
but rather consists of training several FACA battalions and squads of gen-
darmes and the donation of equipment, primarily vehicles, uniforms, and
radios (Embassy of France in CAR, 2003b).
Libya
President Bokassa turned to Libya for support during the final years of his
rule. He visited Tripoli in 1976, where he converted to Islam. Shortly after
returning home he reverted to Catholicism. Perhaps this explains the decision
of Libyan President Moammar Qadhafi to assist Central African rebels intent
on his overthrow.88 Whatever the case, Libya continued to assist President
Bokassa militarily up to his demise (arguably hastening his departure from
office).89 Libyan aeroplanes transported stocks of war matériel to Bangui in
August 1979, and a small number of advance units were put in position to
support the president (Decalo, 1989, p. 163). Indeed, Bokassa was in Tripoli at
the time of the coup.
During President Kolingba’s tenure, Libya provided military assistance to
both the Central African government and forces opposed to the president. In
1982 Libya delivered four (M-43) 120 mm mortars, ordered earlier that year.90

(Although the Small Arms Survey
normally caps small arms and light
weapons at 100 mm in diameter, the
definition adopted by a UN Group of
Governmental Experts, this weapon
is noted here as it is man-portable and
thus believed worthy of inclusion.)
That same year some 60 Libyan mili-
tary advisers arrived in CAR to take
charge of armoured vehicles, includ-
ing Soviet tanks, which Libya had
provided. Kolingba asked the Libyans
to leave the country in May 1983
(Kalck, 1992, pp. xliv–v).91 Also in
1982 Libya provided Patassé’s sup-
Painting in Bangui, depicting CAR president Ange-Félix
Patassé and Libyan leader Moammar Qadhafi, 2002. porters near Paoua with weapons, as
© Christine Nesbitt/ AP Photo
noted earlier.
Another explanation might be that
Kolingba had learned that Libya was also arming Patassé’s MLPC92 through
airdrops of matériel including small arms and light weapons along the border
with Chad. According to Demafouth, this occurred over a two-month period
in 1983.93 Qadhafi reportedly had established a rapport with Patassé when
the latter served as prime minister during Bokassa’s regime (Decalo, 1989, p.
164). A more significant factor in the Libyan leader’s considerations was likely
a desire to punish Hissène Habré for overthrowing Libya’s ally in Chad,
Goukouni Weddeye, in June 1982. Besides continuing to support Goukouni
in northern Chad, Qadhafi aided the forces of Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué
in the south.
Libya also supplied weapons to CAR during the tenure of President Patassé.
In 1998 it dispatched two or three transport aircraft filled with armaments,
including small arms and light weapons, to CAR, using the airport outside of
Ndélé, not the one in Bangui. These items were destined for the USP headed
by Gen. Bombayeke,94 not for Gen. Bozizé, and more broadly for the FACA,
to which Bombayeke was supposedly subordinate. In May 2001 President

Qadhafi supplied additional weapons to aid President Patassé, this time send-
ing them directly to Bangui.
Libya also employed intermediaries. Some of the weapons Chad provided
to CAR following the 1996 army mutinies came from Libya.95 Libya also de-
livered significant quantities of matériel to the MLC in Gbadolite, DRC, in
October and November 2002 (in support of President Patassé), when the air-
port in Bangui was not safe to use.
Chad
Chadian support for President Patassé, unlike that of France, involved both
troops and small arms. During the 1980s Chad apparently did not transfer
any weapons to CAR, despite having procured huge excess stocks from Libya.96
Following the 1996 army mutinies in CAR, however, President Patassé re-
ceived some 500 Kalashnikovs from Chad.97 Chad contributed troops during
the MISAB operation and the follow-on United Nations Mission in the Central
African Republic (MINURCA). A small number of Chadian military advisers
remained in CAR after MINURCA departed in February 2000.
Unfortunately for President Patassé, Chad also supplied weapons to the
rebel outfit trying to overthrow him. According to Major Namboro Kette,
cabinet chief of the head of the general staff, Gen. Bozizé received all of his
arms from Central African sources.98 This claim reinforces the steadfast asser-
tion of Chad that it did not extend any support to Gen. Bozizé. There are
credible reports, though, that Chad provided logistical assistance as well as
matériel, including small arms and light weapons.99 The apparent introduc-
tion of anti-personnel landmines by Gen. Bozizé’s forces100 suggests that they
Box 2 CAR, Chad, and man-portable surface-to-air missiles

The Government of the United States provided significant levels of matériel in the 1980s to the
Forces armées du nord (FAN) led by Hissène Habré. It did so because it was concerned about
Libyan designs on Chad and President Qadhafi’s increasingly close relationship with Habré’s
political rival, Goukouni Weddeye. Weapons included the Redeye man-portable surface-to-air
missile (Foltz, 1995, p. 23). After the October 2002 coup attempt in CAR, when Libyan counter-
insurgency aircraft were bombarding Gen. Bozizé’s forces, there was a real worry in the United
States that Chad might furnish Gen. Bozizé with such MANPADS. Apparently this did not happen.

did indeed receive outside help, as CAR is not known to have possessed any
such devices.101 It is not possible, however, to prove that Chad supplied these
landmines. What is perhaps more important is not what Chad granted to
Gen. Bozizé, but what it seemingly did not: man-portable surface-to-air air-
defence systems (MANPADS) (see Box 2).
China
Bangui has historically played China and Taiwan off against one another,
seeking—and obtaining—generous financial aid and development assistance.102
CAR’s presidents have switched their country’s diplomatic relations between
China and Taiwan five times since 1962 (Colette and Yabi, 2004) (see Figure 4
below). In 1965, for example, after CAR broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan,
President Dacko secured a CFA franc (FCFA) 1 billion interest-free loan. Assist-
ance from Beijing was limited largely to low levels of technical expertise in
agriculture during the tenure of President Bokassa (as he had re-established
relations with Taiwan). China, however, rewarded CAR with a FCFA 5.5 billion
interest-free loan shortly after President Kolingba visited Beijing in 1983 (O’Toole,
1986, pp. 133–34). In July 1991 Kolingba recognized Taiwan, paving the way for
aid projects. Taiwanese largesse proved underwhelming, however, amounting
to USD 200,000 for Sudanese refugees in 1992 and some technical assistance
(Wang, 2002, p. 86). China provided CAR with various types of assistance (see
below) after President Patassé re-established relations with China, including
plans for a new football stadium and a housing project. Under President Bozizé
China has been especially generous, issuing loans and grants in excess of USD
6 million between June and November 2003 alone (UN OCHA, 2003e).
China has also provided CAR with various small arms and other military
equipment. The possibility of China supplying matériel to CAR came up dur-
ing negotiations in 1997 to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two
countries. For CAR it was impolitic to retain diplomatic relations with Taiwan
at a time when it was seeking UN Security Council support for a UN peace-
keeping operation to succeed MISAB (given that China could exercise its veto).103
(Reports in the Taiwanese media alleged that CAR’s demands—which by
this point extended to payment of civil servants’ salaries—were becoming
too extensive for Taiwan to support (Hung, 1998), but CAR’s need for China’s

Figure 4
CAR’s diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan
since independence in 1960
1960s
1962
CAR establishes diplomatic relations with Taiwan
1964
CAR suspends diplomatic relations with Taiwan in September
1964
CAR establishes diplomatic relations with China on 29 September
1966
CAR suspends diplomatic relations with China on 6 January, within a week of Bokassa
taking office
1968
CAR resumes diplomatic relations with Taiwan in May
1970s
1976
Diplomatic relations between CAR and China are normalized after the countries sign a joint
communiqué on 20 August
1980s
1990s
1991
CAR resumes diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 8 July
1991
CAR suspends diplomatic relations with China
1998
CAR resumes diplomatic relations with China on 29 January
Sources: People’s Republic of China (2000); Kalck (2005)
acquiescence if not outright support at the Security Council probably was the
determining factor.) Relations were re-established in January 1998, two months
before the Security Council authorized that MINURCA takeover from MISAB.
According to Demafouth, the consignment of matériel arrived by road from
the Cameroonian port of Douala in 2000. Equipment included small arms
and light weapons as well as vehicles.104 Under President Bozizé China has
furnished CAR with small arms, particularly automatic weapons; it is be-
lieved such transfers have been extended as gifts.105

Israel
CAR has received many Israeli-made weapons over the years, some procured
directly from Jerusalem, most obtained indirectly from neighbouring coun-
tries’ militaries. Israeli military officials were active in CAR after the country
gained independence, but an early authoritative report on arms holdings in
CAR did not note the inclusion of Israeli weapons.106 Israel, however, is reported
to have provided arms to CAR during Bokassa’s regime (Beit-Hallahmi, 1987,
p. 71), and Israeli rifles and sub-machine guns were reported as part of the
FACA’s arsenal in 1977 (Keegan, 1983, p. 100).107 (Kolingba sought assault rifles
from Israel ostensibly for CAR’s national park guards, but a transfer did not
materialize.)108 It would appear that comparatively more Israeli weapons circu-
lating in CAR have arrived from other countries’ combatants than from direct
government-to-government transfers, however. For example, Israel is known
to have sold weapons to Zaire, and is also reported to have provided weapons
to Chad (Klieman, 1985, pp. 139–41). Soldiers from these two countries are
known to have brought large numbers of weapons to CAR during the 1990s.
Romania/Soviet Union
The Central African Republic also received small arms and light weapons
from eastern Europe. In 1969 Bokassa sent a diplomatic mission to Romania
and the Soviet Union, concluding technical agreements with both countries
the following year (Kalck, 1992, pp. xxxi–xxxii). Details on the agreement
with the Soviet Union remain scarce. During Emperor Bokassa’s coronation
ceremony Soviet weaponry was on display during a military parade (Decalo,
1989, p. 161). The Soviet Union reportedly provided light weapons including
mortars and anti-tank grenade launchers to CAR (Clayton, 1986, p. 240). Soviet
small arms including rifles and sub-machine guns were also recorded in the
FACA’s inventory in 1977 (Keegan, 1983, p. 100), but the equipment’s post-
factory trajectory has not been traced. The technical agreement between CAR
and Romania109 included the provision of Kalashnikov assault rifles, but no
further armaments.110
O’Toole claims that the level of military assistance CAR received from Romania
and the Soviet union fell short of Bokassa’s expectations, with France re-emerging
as the country’s largest provider of matériel (1986, p. 133).

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Chad
Despite the presence of a myriad of political and military actors in Chad, and its
long history of warfare since Chad gained independence in 1960, the armed
forces involved in these conflicts were not a significant source of weaponry
for CAR in the 1960s and 1970s. Largely this is because southerners domi-
nated the Government of Chad, based in N’Djamena, some 500 km north of
the border with CAR. François Tombalbaye (Chad’s first president) and Félix
Malloum (who overthrew Tombalbaye in 1975) were both from the south and
members of the Sara ethnic group.
While political tensions existed in southern Chad, even within ethnic groups,
the situation was calmer than that in the north,111 whose inhabitants considered

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themselves to be substantially disenfranchised. The Chadian civil war began
in 1965, and in 1966 the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (National Lib-
eration Front of Chad, FROLINAT), consisting primarily of northerners, was
established in an effort to coordinate the various rebel groups.
After the southern-dominated Chadian government fell in 1979, CAR remained
largely unaffected by the Chadian conflict for three more years. FROLINAT
essentially broke up after defeating the central government.112 A Gouvernement
d’union nationale de transition (National Union Transitional Government,
GUNT) was created in its stead. The GUNT, which ruled Chad from April
1979 to June 1982, consisted of more than a dozen competing factions.113 The
three most powerful armed forces included Goukouni Weddeye’s Forces armées
populaires (People’s Armed Forces, FAP), Hissène Habré’s Forces armées du
nord (Northern Armed Forces, FAN), and Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué’s
Forces armées tchadiennes (Chadian Armed Forces, FAT).
When Goukouni, then the titular head of GUNT,114 and his FAP succeeded
in ousting Habré from N’Djamena in December 1980, the FAN withdrew to
Sudan, where it rearmed and regrouped. In June 1982 the revitalized FAN
returned to N’Djamena and defeated the GUNT. Goukouni and his FAP fight-
ers withdrew to Cameroon and subsequently made their way to northern Chad.
Chad’s southern border remained largely quiet while the FAP and the FAN
battled one another, with little but cotton crossing into CAR.115 The cold war
backdrop to the Chadian conflict enhanced Western fears of Libyan adven-
turism, however. Regional politics had resulted in a huge inflow of matériel,
including small arms and light weapons, which would come to have a pro-
found effect on CAR.116
This situation changed dramatically during the second half of 1982. After
seizing the capital and besting Goukouni and the FAP, Habré turned his atten-
tion southward to the strongholds of the FAT, which were led by Kamougué
and Djibril Negue Djogo.117 Through a mixture of diplomacy and military
might, Habré substantially decreased the threat that the FAT posed to his rule,
persuading many of its soldiers to lay down their arms or join his army. As a
conciliatory gesture, he renamed the army the Forces armées nationales tcha-
diennes (Chadian National Armed Forces, FANT). Thousands of Chadians
fled to CAR during this period, many with arms; Kamougué and the remnants

of his fighting force were among them.118 Estimates as to their number vary
from 10,000 to 30,000 by the end of 1984, including 5,000 in Bangui, according
to UNHCR (Bigo, 1988, p. 279). One Central African who lived in the region
at the time reported that it was common for these impoverished refugees to
sell weapons they had brought with them in order to obtain money for food
and other basic necessities. Some of the gun buyers then brought their pur-
chases to Bangui, where they would fetch a higher price on the black market.119
Far more worrying for CAR than a sudden influx of Chadian refugees,
however, was the creation of Codos, or commandos, in southern Chad. While
Habré had substantially reduced the threat the south posed to his fledgling
regime, armed opposition in the south had not been wiped out. Many Codos
were veterans of Kamougué’s FAT who refused to join the new national army
or lay down their weapons. Disaffected youth aligned themselves with these
commandos (Foltz, 1995, pp. 21–22). Insecurity reigned, and arms trafficking
to Chad from Sudan continued on a ‘large scale’. In 1984, when President
Kolingba and his convoy arrived in the north-west to survey the situation,
armed men fired on them for several hours.120
Academic literature on Chad has it that by 1985–86 there were some 15,000
Codos. Jean R. Tartter, for example, enumerates five distinct commando groups,
of which the most effective was known as the Red Codos and was under the
command of Col. Alphonse Kotiga.121 According to Tartter, Kotiga was able to
persuade most of these rebels either to join the FANT or to accept some com-
pensation and return to civilian life (Tartter, 1990, p. 220). Others, however,
have questioned Kotiga’s leadership and influence.122 In any event, only around
1,500 were able to take advantage of the opportunity to join the armed forces
loyal to Habré (Tartter, 1990, pp. 194–95). Many of those who did not join the
military turned their attention (and their weapons) to engaging in banditry
along the roads of north-western CAR, and are known as Zaraguinas or coupeurs
de routes. Today, for many Central Africans, the terms Codos, Zaraguinas, and
coupeurs de routes are interchangeable.
The situation deteriorated further in the 1990s, when the Chadian Armed
Forces went through a process of significant downsizing as part of a World
Bank-initiated SSR programme. By the end of 1997 27,000 soldiers had been
demobilized (Bel, Vitali, and Hunwanou, 2004, p. 6). A pilot reintegration

project aimed at reaching 2,800 of the demobilized soldiers was interrupted
in 2000, and planned future programmes have been sidelined. Thousands of
people found themselves essentially unemployed, without skills or the op-
portunity to transition successfully into civilian life; an estimated 3,000–4,000
took up arms again. Many Central Africans believe the problem with Zaragui-
nas (coupeurs de routes) along CAR’s roads escalated sharply as a direct result
of weapons and armed personnel crossing from Chad into CAR in search of
livelihoods.
Even Chadian soldiers with jobs have contributed to the growing problem
of small arms proliferation in CAR. Members of the Chadian Armed Forces
reportedly sold some of their weapons while transiting CAR after having
served in the DRC. Chadian President Idriss Déby, who seized power from
Habré in December 1990, made available some 2,000 troops to assist DRC
President Kabila in 1998. Persuant to the Sirte Agreement of April 1999, the
Chadians withdrew from the DRC in May and June 1999. Gen. (Ret.) Mou-
hammad Hachim Ratanga, the MINURCA Force Commander, acknowledged
that there had been rumours of some Chadian soldiers selling their weapons,
but he said this did not occur from the point at which they crossed into CAR
territory until the town of Damara, some 76 km north of the capital, at which
point the UN peacekeeping force ceased monitoring the situation closely.123
Frustration among the Chadian soldiers ran very high as they had suffered
many casualties in the DRC from combat and disease. Though Libya report-
edly promised support, it did not materialize. They encamped for more than a
week in Kaga Bondoro, the capital of Gribingui prefecture, while the Central
African authorities met with Chadian officials to try to find a way to assuage
the soldiers’ pent-up grievances. Paying the troops defused tensions. It is
understood, though, that some of the 2,000-plus soldiers sold or traded an
unknown number of firearms to Central Africans while in CAR.
Sudan
Sudanese government troops have long been active in CAR, but throughout
Khartoum’s long civil war against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), there were no
reports of their contributing to the proliferation of small arms in the country:

this has apparently changed. Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF) government
launched operations against the SPLA in western Bahr el Gazal state from
inside CAR in the early 1990s (Africa Confidential, 2002). It is not known, how-
ever, whether troops lost or sold any weapons while in the country. Nor were
there any reports that any of the weapons belonging to the 50 or so Sudanese
troops that joined the Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CEN-SAD) peace-
keeping force were lost or sold.124 In 2006, however, it appears that Sudan
took to arming groups active in CAR, as discussed in the Epilogue.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army, however, has been a sustained source
of small arms in CAR. Thousands of soldiers with the SPLA are believed to
have crossed into CAR in the 1980s looking for food and security (during
periods of drought and Sudanese military offensives). Demafouth noted that
in 1985 perhaps 10,000–15,000 Sudanese sought refuge in CAR. He added
that, according to the Central African police commissioner at the time, com-
batants made up approximately 50 per cent of this number, and estimated
that they had brought around 5,000 weapons with them. It was not uncommon
for SPLA members to trade or sell their weapons.125 During the mid-1990s,
when the number of refugees in CAR peaked at about 36, 000 (UNHCR, 2006),
a Kalashnikov could sell for as little as FCFA 3,000 (USD 6); ammunition,
however, was often harder to locate.126 The SPLA controlled the southern two-
thirds of their common border and was known to be occupying villages as far
as 200 km into CAR territory through 2003 (UN OCHA, 2004c).
In December 2002 the Office of the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) decided to close its office at the Mboki refugee camp in Haut-Mbomou
prefecture because of the widespread availability of small arms and the gov-
ernment’s limited presence and inability to provide for the security of its staff.127
Most of the Sudanese refugees remained (farming the 2.5 acres allotted each
family by the CAR government—USCRI, 2004) and UNHCR has received
reports that SPLA has recruited soldiers in the area.128 UNHCR reopened the
camp in 2004, and by 2006 a more extensive and representative governance
structure had brought increased stability.129
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)

In 1997 and 1999 fighting in Zaire resulted in large numbers of armed men
crossing into CAR. The first wave came in the first half of 1997, when mem-

MLC soldier under Congolese rebel Jean-Pierre Bemba patrols with a rocket-launcher north of Bangui, 2002.
© Desirey Minkoh/AFP
bers of President Mobutu’s presidential guard, police, and gendarmerie and

the Forces armées zaïroises (Zairian Armed Forces, FAZ) retreated across the
border to escape Kabila’s advancing Alliance des forces démocratiques pour
la libération du Congo-Zaïre (Democratic Alliance Forces for the Liberation of
Congo-Zaire, AFDL).130 Kabila’s forces swept westward through the provinces
of Haut-Zaire (now Orientale), Equateur, and Bandundu, eventually seizing
the capital in May 1997. A similar exodus occurred in 1999, when forces loyal
to Kabila fled across the frontier with CAR to evade Bemba’s MLC and the
Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).
Upward of 10,000 soldiers and other police and security forces of the central
government in Kinshasa were involved. In the case of Mobutu’s forces, by one
account there were thought to be around 30,000 armed personnel in Haut-
Zaire and Equateur provinces. It has been estimated that one-third would
have entered CAR with the rest crossing into the RoC and the Sudan, or re-
maining in Zaire/DRC—either alive or dead.131 According to a FAZ officer
who had been based in Gbadolite, about 4,500 Zairian troops crossed from
Gbadolite to Mobaye in April 1997. In May, a much smaller group of Zairian

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UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, informed by MINURCA peacekeepers on
the ground, wrote that about 5,000 FAC had crossed into CAR in the vicinity
of Mobaye after Gbadolite fell to the MLC in July 1999 (UNSC, 1999a, para.
26). The MINURCA Force Commander, reflecting on the period, believed the
number of FAC to have been closer to 6,000.133
These troops appear to have brought more than 10,000 weapons into CAR.
Conversations with former members of FAC and FAZ who now reside in CAR

revealed that they and their compatriots traversed the Ubangui River with
numerous types of small arms, but few heavy weapons. Weaponry included
a large number of pistols (mostly Belgian 9 mm models), sub-machine guns
(largely Israeli Uzis, plus some Egyptian Port Saids), assault rifles (Belgian
FN-FALs, German G-3s, Israeli Galils, US M-16s, and Kalashnikovs manufac-
tured in the Soviet Union and elsewhere), and anti-tank weapons (Soviet
RPG-7s). As for crew-served weapons, only 60 mm mortars were taken into
CAR, and not in vast quantities. Larger mortars and heavy machine guns
were too heavy or bulky to transport across the river in dugouts.134 Most of
these weapons have not been accounted for. Mutinous FACA soldiers seized
many of them; the government also procured thousands.
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan originally reported that many weapons
taken from FAC had been jointly guarded by Congolese and Central African
troops (UNSC, 1999a, para. 26). Later, however, he acknowledged ‘persistent
reports that some of [these] weapons . . . had not been surrendered but clan-
destinely sold’. He added that ‘only a few of the weapons could be recovered’
(UNSC, 1999b, para. 38).
Libya provided transport aircraft to fly many Congolese troops back to
Kinshasa, but without their weapons (UNSC, 1999b, para. 36). The Central
African government admitted keeping 3,328 light arms belonging to FAC in
safe storage until the war in the DRC was resolved (UNSC, 2000, para. 26). Of
the 3,250 light arms that the Central African government collected from Con-
golese soldiers via MINURCA, the central authorities destroyed some 500 in
2000. Of the remaining 2,750 or so weapons, Demafouth said that approxi-
Box 3 Mutinous FACA soldiers’ seizure of weapons and return of

5.56 mm rifles
Anicet Saulet, a leader of the mutinous FACA soldiers back in 1997, tells how he and his men
patrolled part of the Ubangui River and seized weapons from Zairians fleeing Zongo and other
Zairian towns as they crossed into CAR. Saulet explains that many of these weapons did not enter
CAR, however––at least not at that time. Some weapons, such as M16 and Galil assault rifles,
were of little use to Saulet and his fellow mutineers because 5.56 mm ammunition was in short
supply. They sold or bartered these captured weapons in Zaire where the demand—and price—
were far greater than in CAR.135

mately 300 were M-16s, 200 were Galils, and 100 were Uzis. Most of the others
were Kalashnikovs.136
Though there is some confusion as to what exactly happened to these
weapons, there is apparently consensus that they were never returned to Kin-
shasa. The Central African Minister of Defence, Maurice Regonessa, claimed
that the continuance of war in DRC had prevented his government from re-
turning the weapons collected.137 According to the Central African Minister
Delegate for Security and Disarmament, Col. Jules-Bernard Ouandé, these
weapons were taken from their storage site to arm supporters of Patassé after
the October 2002 coup attempt.138
In an unusual move, in June 2001 Bemba dispatched 700 MLC soldiers to
protect President Patassé from a coup attempt in CAR.139 Within a month the
MLC troops had returned to the DRC.140 When President Patassé’s government
came under attack again on 25 October 2002, Bemba sent some 2,000 sol-
diers.141 This time they remained behind after the immediate threat of rebel-
lion had subsided. Bemba received considerable weaponry, presumably from
Libya, in connection with this undertaking. Several Libyan military transport
aircraft landed in Gbadolite, DRC, the site of the MLC’s headquarters, between
26 October and 3 November 2002. The aircraft, which did not belong to the
MLC, included AN-26s and IL-76s. Bemba denied the UN access to the air-
port, so it is very difficult to know what exactly was delivered.142
It is not known how much, if any, of this equipment went directly to the
CAR government. Patassé had to close the airport in Bangui briefly when the
capital came under attack, and so a retransfer of matériel via the Libyan-
supplied MLC would have been very timely. However, the deliveries to the
MLC occurred just after the UPDF had withdrawn from Equateur province
after the September 2002 Luanda agreement whereby Uganda agreed to leave
DRC. The UPDF did not leave behind appreciable quantities of matériel for
the MLC.143 The MLC, therefore, may well have chosen to squirrel away some
arms, not to mention the equipment its troops would themselves have used
in CAR. In less doubt, though, is that MLC cadres transferred weapons to
Central African citizens. Bemba did not provide his troops in CAR with a per
diem, food, or lodging.144 As a result, MLC rebels looted properties and com-
mitted gross human rights violations. MLC troops allegedly sold excess small
arms to anyone willing to purchase them.145

Republic of the Congo
Geographical, political, and developmental considerations all suggest that
relatively few combatants from the internal conflicts in the Republic of the
Congo have crossed that nation’s border with CAR. The frontier between the
two countries along the Dzanga–Sangha Dense Forest Special Reserve is very
remote. Eastward, along the southern border of CAR’s Lobaye prefecture, the
movement of goods and people is greater.
There is evidence that Rwandan refugees and ex-FAZ, having crossed into
RoC from DRC, have subsequently continued overland into Lobaye.146 Mem-
bers of armed militia groups active in RoC’s various internal struggles could
undertake a similar trek. Since the victor in RoC’s last war, President Denis
Sassou-Nguesso, had broad support in the northern part of the country, it is
unlikely that the fleeing defeated fighters (soldiers supporting former Presi-
dent Pascal Lissouba and Brazzaville Mayor Bernard Kolélas’ militia) would
have retreated towards CAR. Some combatants, however, may have travelled
north by pirogue up the Ubangui River. Conflict in RoC since 1997 has cen-
tred on the Pool region, south of the country’s capital, far away from CAR.147
Overall, the frontier has remained quiet, in contrast to CAR’s borders with
Chad, the DRC, and Sudan.
Although significant numbers of combatants did not cross into CAR from
the Republic of the Congo, small arms and ammunition circulating in CAR
are known to have originated in the state. Richard Carroll of WWF (US) noted
that, between 1997 and 1998, there were indications that Kalashnikovs had
come across the border with the Republic of the Congo after its six-month
civil war ended in October 1997. He cautioned, however, that home-made hunt-
ing rifles and old Soviet 12-gauge shotguns—popular with expatriate hunters
temporarily based in the country—remain by far the most common weapons
found in the Dzanga–Sangha Dense Forest Special Reserve.148 Many of the safari
hunters do not take their weapons with them when they leave the country.149
Allard Blom adds that, while most guns confiscated during anti-poaching
initiatives were old Baikal shotguns (with a few German Mausers also known
to be circulating), some new ones, including Kalashnikovs, have cropped up,
suggesting that this trade continues.150 The weapons are most often used for
poaching.151 A popular 12-gauge shell used in the Baikal and other shotguns

in Sangha-Mbaéré prefecture are reportedly produced in RoC and marketed.152
These shotgun shells, reportedly manufactured in a facility in Pointe Noire,
have appeared as far away as Vakaga prefecture. It is believed they are trans-
ported by boat to Bangui and then conveyed overland throughout the country. 153
Rwanda
Several thousand Rwandans entered CAR between 1994 and 1997. An unknown
number arrived on French military aircraft during Opération Turquoise, the
UN-authorized multinational force that was operational in eastern Zaire and
Rwanda during June–August 1994. Most of these people did not remain in
CAR, but continued on to West Africa and Europe.154 It is not believed that
many Rwandans entered CAR during 1995 and 1996.
The situation changed in 1997, following the emptying of Rwandan refu-
gee and military camps in eastern Zaire after Kabila instigated his rebellion.
UNHCR estimated that some 3,000 Rwandans crossed into CAR during the
first half of 1997. Many (more than 1,000) would have been members of the
Interahamwe militia and former members of the Forces armées rwandaises
(Rwandan Armed Forces, FAR).155
The majority of Rwandans entering CAR had no weapons. A former Rwan-
dan soldier who entered Bangui from Zongo said that many armed Rwandans
(like armed Zairians) sold their weapons while in Zaire or had their firearms
confiscated by the Central African authorities.156 According to UNHCR, 1,280
Rwandans were registered at a UNHCR-run camp in Bouca, and officials
were in the process of interviewing them to determine their status. None was
believed to have small arms or light weapons in the camp.157
Most Rwandans have since left CAR.158 The UNHCR camp in Bouca was
closed in 1998. Demonstrations in Bouca began the day after the 2 August
rebellion, and the Rwandans’ demands to leave CAR became increasingly stri-
dent. The Central African government had long sought another country to host
the Rwandans staying in Bouca, which DRC agreed to do in September 1998.
More than 800 Rwandans from Bouca left CAR for DRC later that month.159
Many of the 1,000-plus Rwandans believed to have crossed into CAR who did
not register at the camp in Bouca are believed to have continued on to other
parts of Africa.

Weapons generated within CAR
Indigenous production
CAR does have a state-run military company, but it does not manufacture arms
(Frères d’Armes, 2000, p. 27). The Manufacture militaire centrafricain (Central
African Military Manufacture, MAMICA) plant, based in the capital, began
operations in 1981. Its nine divisions specialize in the manufacture of men’s
and women’s clothing, woodworking, shoe production, iron-smithing, leather
work, basket making, wood sculpture, quilt making, and knitting. In 2001 it
employed 70 civilian and military personnel (Frères d’Armes, 2000, p. 27).
Artisans fabricate many weapons, however. It is difficult to obtain informa-
tion on the number of people involved in such activities. Occasional references
in published reports indicate that rudimentary hunting rifles are the main, if
not the only, product. These weapons number in the tens of thousands (Mogba
and Freudenberger, 1998, p. 118). Locals in the prefecture of Sangha-Mbaéré
reportedly call these home-made rifles yarenga (Mogba and Freudenberger,
1998, p. 118)—which means ‘doesn’t last’ in the local dialect.160 Elsewhere
people refer to them as ‘fusils poupou’, a reference to the sound their shots
emit.161 In 1962 the French military recorded that 24,000 craft weapons circu-
lated throughout the Central African Republic (SHAT, 1963). Park guards in
Dzanga-Sangha Dense Forest Special Reserve have seized and destroyed large
numbers of these locally made weapons over the years.162
Seizures from government forces

Mutinies have also served as an important domestic source of weaponry. Per-
haps the most significant case of seizure and redistribution of weapons
occurred in 1996, when Central African soldiers emptied the arms depot at
Kassaï barracks. According to the government, more than 2,500 small arms
and light weapons were taken. During 2001 and 2002 Gen. Bozizé’s forces
(while retreating north from the capital toward CAR’s border with Chad)
captured weapons from gendarme depots, at which police armaments also
were kept. After the failed coup attempt of 2002, additional depositories were
ransacked.163 According to Demafouth, Bozizé’s men also seized 1,200 Chinese
small arms during October 2001, while still in Bangui.164 Bozizé’s March 2003

coup similarly initiated the looting of local police depots, down to the last
uniforms, particularly those of the Judicial Police and the Border and Avia-
tion Police (MCE, n.d.). The gendarmerie suffered similar losses during this
period, with many of their depots ransacked.
Corruption and ill-discipline among state security agents have also been a
source of matériel. A native of Haut-Mbomou prefecture relates how it is
sometimes possible for people to buy ammunition from FACA soldiers who
have not been paid.165 Given the persistent and widespread salary arrears,
what is surprising is not that soldiers, gendarmes, or police should on occa-
sion sell some of their weapons and ammunition, or accept a bribe, but that it
is not more commonplace.
Weapons lost by African peacekeeping forces

CAR has hosted more distinct armed peacekeeping missions (four since Jan-
uary 1997) than any other country or conflict zone since the late 1990s.166 (See
Table 10.) When one takes into account troop rotations, it is likely that more
than 5,000 personnel have entered and left CAR since 1997.
The first mission, MISAB, included contingents from six African countries
and had a combined strength of more than 800 troops. The authorized strength
of MINURCA, the UN operation that replaced MISAB, stood at 1,350, which
included contingents from nine countries. MINURCA withdrew in February
Table 10
Peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic,
as of December 2006
Name of Dates Greatest Troop-contributing

mission deployed strength countries
MISAB 02.97–04.98 820 6 Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali,

Senegal, Togo
MINURCA 04.98–02.00 1,350 10 Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Côte

d’Ivoire, Egypt, France, Gabon, Mali,
Senegal, Togo
CEN-SAD 12.01–01.03 300 3 Djibouti, Libya, Sudan
FOMUC 01.03 to date 380 4 Chad, Equatorial Guinea, RoC, Gabon

2000 after having overseen the September 1999 presidential elections. The
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)167 authorized a peacekeeping
operation for CAR in December 2001. Some 300 troops from three countries
served in Bangui for about a year before another African regional organization,
CEMAC, replaced that mission with a slightly larger force.
The four peacekeeping operations have supplied mutinous soldiers or
rampaging citizens with only a few weapons. In June 1997 mutinous troops
attacked a Burkinabe squad stationed in N’Garagba. The mutineers seized
around a dozen personal weapons.168 Other people unfamiliar with the incident,
but knowledgeable about the mission and force protection issues, surmise that
a few crew-served weapons would also have been left behind during the hasty
retreat, including light machine guns and mortars. According to Gen. (Ret.)
Ratanga, the MINURCA Force Commander, no peacekeepers in MINURCA
lost their personal weapons or any crew-served weapons.169
Central African and UN officials and foreign diplomats who worked in
Bangui during the CEN-SAD peacekeeping mission describe the troops as
well disciplined and knew of no instances of weapons being reported lost.
During the March 2003 coup, CEMAC lost a pistol, some rifles, and two
heavy machine guns, as well as other non-lethal equipment. The rifles have
since been returned.170 Some believe that the government reclaimed the two
12.7 mm machine guns, but, as of June 2003, it had not handed them back to
CEMAC. The pistol has not been reclaimed, either.

Child holding spent cartridges at a
rebel camp in north-eastern CAR.
© Pierre Holtz/UNICEF

PART III
Effects and Impacts of Small Arms
Until the mid-1990s, small arms violence occurred rarely in CAR. Coups had
involved little force, and peaceful political protest marked the populace’s
growing frustration with poor governance (Melly, 2002, p. 7). Since the late
1990s, however, the situation has dramatically deteriorated. The country’s
population clusters in the riverine area around Bangui, with large areas ex-
tremely sparsely populated. This is particularly the case in eastern CAR,
along the border with Sudan.171 ‘The state stops at PK-12’ (i.e. the state has no
presence beyond 12 km from Bangui) is a common saying in CAR (Bierschenk
and de Sardan, 1997, p. 441). The expression exaggerates, but evokes the
limited administrative and bureaucratic capacity of the central government.
The paucity of record keeping and the restrictions on travel due to the
general level of heightened insecurity in recent years have made it difficult
to document exhaustively the effects of small arms use on Central African
society. The compromised mobility itself suggests that such effects are
widespread.172
Direct consequences, such as firearm-related deaths and injuries, are not
systematically recorded, and even if they were the figures would not be par-
ticularly revealing, for reasons highlighted below. Considerably more is known
about the impact that small arms (and light weapons) have had on the country’s
wildlife. The indirect ramifications of small arms use and availability are pro-
found but even more difficult to document, although significant progress has
been made towards understanding the very real socio-economic repercus-
sions of small arms proliferation for CAR (Small Arms Survey, 2003, pp. 125–
67). The few examples of indirect results of armed robberies and roadblocks,
although anecdotal, illustrate the range of effects of small arms on Central
Africans—95 per cent of whom live on less than one US dollar a day (UN
OCHA, 2005a).
Part III Effects and Impacts of Small Arms 69

Villagers fleeing their homes and villages to protect themselves from the FACA, Kaga Bandora area, December 2006.
© Frederic Sautereau
Death and injury

Medical records suggest that small arms use is not responsible for a large
number of casualties in the capital, but these statistics are misleading. Inter-
views conducted in 2003 with the directors of two of the four main hospitals
in Bangui indicate that, even during periods of heightened insecurity and
violence, such as coup attempts, very few people were admitted to hospital
because of gunshot wounds. For example, fewer than 50 people were regis-
tered at the community hospital following the failed coup of May 2001, and
a similar number were documented after the unsuccessful coup attempt of
October 2002—six died of their wounds.173 These figures likely understate the
gravity of the matter. The Director of Hôpital de l’Amitié, Cecile Koyang-
banda, points out that such statistics are of limited utility in analysing gun-
related violence and deaths, as many people bury the dead without taking
the body, or reporting the case, to the hospital.174 Documentation by human
rights groups supports her assertion. Amnesty International (2004), for instance,
reported that in November 2002 25 men accused of loyalty to then-insurgent

Gen. Bozizé were shot by forces under Miskine. Fifteen of the men were shot
at PK-12, where the local chief buried the bodies in a mass grave.
During periods of insecurity, civilians often face the choice of caring for
injured relatives or saving their own lives by fleeing. Fierce fighting during the
coup attempt of 28 May 2001, for instance, lasted for a month. Many people
died during that time because their families were forced to abandon them.
Even those brought to a hospital must have relatives to cook and care for them
during their treatment, a burden many find too heavy during such upheavals.175
The cost of medical care is prohibitive for many Central Africans. Following
the termination of an emergency programme subsidizing health care costs run
by Association des œuvres médicales des eglises pour la santé en Centrafrique
(ASSOMESCA), patient visits at Sibut Hospital decreased by 50 per cent,
according to an attendant medical assistant (UN OCHA, 2004b). Not only are
the deceased rarely brought to the hospital, but many people with gunshot
wounds go untreated. In addition, some Central African observers have ac-
cused the military of blocking civilian access to the hospitals during periods
of insecurity (FODEM, 2005). Other victims die en route to Cameroon, whose
hospitals are more accessible for those living in western parts of the country.176
Anecdotal reports suggest that the high incidence of gunshot injury is a
significant problem. A doctor who operates an NGO-subsidized clinic—the
only such facility in the north-west part of the country to remain open during
the insecurity of 2002–03—reports that she regularly sees patients with gun-
shot wounds, often due to cross-border conflict with armed groups and high-
way bandits from Chad.177 In November 2002, at Ngola Market just outside of
Bangui, 120 cattle herders, largely ethnically Chadian, and many more cattle
were killed by government troops and MLC fighters as punishment for their
suspected support for Bozizé, whose fighters’ ranks drew from the northern
border region of their origin (UN OCHA, 2003g).178
Poaching
Central Africa’s wildlife has also suffered greatly because of firearm use.
Poaching has been conducted in CAR for as long as people can remember. It
was not deemed to be a significant problem, however, when hunters used

traditional devices including spears, traps, home-made rifles, and the occa-
sional commercial shotgun. The introduction of modern assault rifles and
machine guns has had devastating consequences. Richard Carroll of WWF,
who worked in northern CAR in the 1970s and early 1980s, says that poach-
ing was always a problem in the area. Indeed, some estimate that 80 per cent
of CAR’s elephant herds were killed in the 1970s (Decalo, 1989, p. 173, n. 29).
Things are known to have changed dramatically, however, around 1982, when
there was an influx of assault rifles and the Kalashnikov replaced the more
traditional spear.179 Sudanese poaching parties do not rely only on Kalashni-
kovs, but also utilize machine guns and RPGs (Lowy, 2002). According to con-
servationists Allard Blom and Jean Yamindou, the size of the Central African
elephant population fell from 50,000 in the 1970s to around 5,000 by the mid-
1990s. The black rhinoceros in CAR fared even worse. Thought to number
some 10,000 around 1970, this species no longer exists in the country (Blom
and Yamindou, 2001, p. 14). Sudanese poachers also kill large numbers of
buffaloes, giraffes, hippopotami, various species of antelopes, and giant elands,
though their primary targets are elephants.180 The Sudanese poachers operate
in bands of approximately 20 men; at the front of the column the hunters ride
on horseback and carry automatic weapons, while their followers lead don-
Game wardens patrol Dzanga-Ndoki National Park, on the lookout for poachers. © Martin Harvey/Corbis

keys used to transport the prey. Some are engaged in diamond mining and
smuggling as well.181 The effects of these incursions have been profound. Safari
hunters, representing an industry generating considerable revenue for CAR,
explain that as recently as 1998 their concessions spread throughout the coun-
try’s territory, but all camps have since become circumscribed to the north-
east, around Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture, because wildlife has become too
scarce elsewhere in the country.182
The trade in bush meat is another major factor in CAR’s dwindling wild-
life.183 To a certain extent, this practice is cultural. For example, the Ba’aka, a
tribe largely composed of hunter-gatherers living primarily in the Sangha-
Mbaéré prefecture, has long killed wild animals for their sustenance. But the
number of people depending on this meat in recent years extends far beyond
the Ba’aka. Migrant workers who have settled in Sangha-Mbaéré to work for
logging concerns have resorted to hunting, especially when they have not
been paid for long periods—a routine occurrence. It is not uncommon for
people to procure shotgun shells to ‘pay’ trackers and hunters to go into the
bush for meat on the understanding that they can use one or more of the shells
to hunt for themselves.184
Duckworth describes the exponential growth of the bush-meat trade in
and around the Dzanga-Sangha reserve as out of control. During 2000–01 he
studied the wildlife products being sold in a central market in Bayanga and
deduced that about 50 animals a day (or 18,000 a year) were being killed. The
actual number would likely be considerably higher as his calculation did not
take into account meat sold along the side of the road or transported for sale
in Bangui.185 In other parts of the country many people who customarily did
not hunt animals have begun to engage in the bush-meat trade. Facing penury,
they are taking advantage of the increased demand and higher prices for bush-
meat in urban centres.186 To a lesser extent, animals in the country are hunted
for sport and are killed because of religious and mystical beliefs.
Mutinies and coup attempts

Army mutinies and coup attempts result in much more than loss of life and
political turmoil. They invariably involve massive displacement of populations,

and a slew of other problems that remain long after the situation is reported to
be ‘calm’ and even after those who fled have returned home.
This was certainly the case with respect to the three mutinies of 1996 and
the ensuing unrest throughout the first half of 1997 in the capital (see Box 4).
Similar problems, though, manifested themselves following the shorter up-
heavals associated with the May 2001 and October 2002 coup attempts. For
example, Amnesty International (2004) found the crime of rape to be wide-
spread, with hundreds of women sexually assaulted at gunpoint by MLC
members as well as by Central African fighters between October 2002 and
March 2003. An NGO operating an emergency clinic in Bangui in October–
November 2003 treated 400 civilians, of whom 40 per cent had gunshot wounds.
Thirteen per cent had been injured by shrapnel. Of the patients treated, 70 per
cent arrived after Bozizé’s fighters had retreated north (FIDH, 2003, p. 13).
Children, too, have been drawn into the violence surrounding the mutinies
and coup attempts. Though not utilized to the notorious extent of some other
conflict areas, children associated with fighting forces (CAFF) have served on
both the government and the insurgent sides in CAR. A mercenary close to
Patassé was reported to have recruited street children to back up the MLC in
support of the president in February 2003. Bozizé also recruited young people
aged 15 years or older for his rebel group, some of whom were subsequently
integrated into the FACA. Lack of training and authority meant that many
young fighters pillaged and abused the civilian population (CSC, 2004).
Small arms use during periods of unrest has also had repercussions for
people’s livelihoods. The livestock sector, which according to the Association
of Livestock Farmers is responsible for generating 35 per cent of rural earn-
ings, was especially hard hit. The association estimated that its members lost
as much as 50 per cent of their cattle during the fighting of October 2002–March
2003 between pro- and anti-government forces (UN OCHA, 2003g). The inse-
curity, whether surrounding coup attempts or the daily challenges posed by
coupeurs de route, is largely to blame for the fact that in 2001 CAR ceased to be
a net meat exporter, relying instead on meat imported from elsewhere in the
region.187
Cotton farming also suffered during that period. Fighters loyal to Bozizé
looted the country’s sole cotton processing plant, taking all the equipment

Box 4 Impacts of the 1996 mutinies on the Central African
economy and civil society
‘The mutinies in the CAR resulted in 70,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 130 destroyed
industries and businesses, and 3,000 lost jobs resulting from the closing of industries and commer-
cial enterprises. According to sources at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation,
in 1996, these conflicts increased inflation by 3 per cent, decreased per capita income by 3 per
cent, decreased exports by 16 per cent, decreased imports by 23 per cent, and decreased state
revenues by 33.6 per cent. These changes caused a dramatic increase in external debt, a decrease
in overall security in the country because of the breakdown of law and order and spread of mili-
tary weapons, a serious decrease in medical services, and shortages of even basic medical supplies.
In a country that already had extremely limited medical services, at least three health centers
were destroyed during the mutinies. Funeral services were limited during this time, and people
were buried in backyards, causing serious health hazards. Finally, very little schooling occurred
during the period (1996 and 1997).
‘Embassies and international organizations closed, leading to the suspension or permanent
closure of projects, such as those concerned with the AIDS campaign [. . .], primary health [. . .],
and blood transfusions [. . .]. The offices of at least 12 donor-financed projects were ransacked or
completely destroyed [. . .]. Of these, some closed down permanently, while others had to start
from scratch and relocate to new offices in Bangui once the situation returned to normal.’
Source: Blom and Yamindou (2001, pp. 13–14)
with them to Chad and burning many homes along the way. Farmers were
thus unable to sell their harvests in 2002 and 2003. In 2004 the government
acknowledged their plight and pledged to rehabilitate the factories in Bossangoa
and Bambari, but farmers said that two years without income had already
taken a toll (UN OCHA, 2004b).
During the mutinies of 1996–97, the formal economy and manufacturing
sector of Bangui was shattered and has yet to recover. According to one analyst,
this was:
partly because many long-term expatriate business residents concluded that the
CAR was too unsafe and opted to rebuild their businesses elsewhere. This has cost
hundreds or possibly thousands of jobs, leaving the formal employment market
even more dependent than before on a public sector with a disastrous record of
failing to pay salaries on time or at all. (Melly, 2002, p. 7)
Even the house of the country director of the World Bank was looted during
the insecurity (Melly, 2002, p. 6).

Armed robbery and armed attacks
Criminals routinely use firearms. Several interlocutors spoke of ‘five or six’
armed robberies committed on an average night in Bangui after the October
2002 coup attempt. The prevalence of armed robbery is believed to be much
greater than reported. A sense of futility, rather than fear of retaliation, ex-
plains why many armed robberies go unreported.188 In Begoua, a small village
just beyond the checkpoint at PK-12, which oversees traffic along the main
road connecting the capital to the rest of the country, the pervasive sense of
insecurity among the villagers has persisted. People return to their dwellings
at dusk and do not venture out again until daybreak. Such previously routine
activities as children going to school or women going to market to purchase
food are now undertaken at great risk, or abandoned altogether.189 The deploy-
ment of FACA troops along the Ngola River, which surrounds the area, has
not brought a sense of security to residents, but rather impeded their com-
mute to the cassava plantations that lie just beyond, causing the price of the
tuber, Central Africans’ staple starch, to double in 2003–04 (Panapress, 2004).
The PK-12 area was also the site of unrest in April 2004 when Chadian fight-
ers who had helped Bozizé take power protested over insufficient pay; state
forces killed eight of these ex-liberators before they were transported north
(US DOS, 2005).
Interestingly, in the city of Bangui fear of armed robbery has a stronger
impact on the community than its incidence. Even if statistics showing a de-
cline in the number of armed robberies could be trusted, there is reason to
believe that stress related to insecurity in Bangui—specifically the fear of
armed robbery—remains widespread throughout the populace. The director
of an NGO working in CAR noted that staff members were clearly operating
well below capacity. He attributed the decline to fear of armed robbery, and
noted that events surrounding the coup of March 2003 had exacerbated the
situation. People were on edge, not listening, and making careless mistakes.190
Outside of the capital highway robbery remains widespread. Residents of
the countryside have reported an increase in recent years, particularly after
the 2003 coup, when many of the fighters who helped Bozizé claim power,
now well armed, scattered northward. The region around the Cameroon–
Chad–CAR border has been especially affected, notably the prefectures of
Ouham, Ouham Pendé, and Nana Gribizi. In the north-east as well, Vakaga

and Haute Kotto prefectures, the robbers are organized into armed groups.
These highway robbers have been known to coordinate operations using sophis-
ticated equipment like satellite phones and automatic weapons (Gbeyoro, 2005,
p. 2). In 2004 armed men attacked the only humanitarian agency operating in
the region (other NGOs stayed away due to the insecurity), forcing the organi-
zation to abandon its relief programmes there (FIDH, 2005, p. 8).
The M’bororo, a nomadic and semi-nomadic ethnic group straddling the
CAR–Cameroon border, are often the target of a particular type of intimida-
tion and robbery by armed men: kidnapping. Largely herders and business-
people, many M’bororo enjoy a more comfortable economic situation than
subsistence farmers, and thus make good targets for this type of extortion.
The German-based advocacy group Society for Threatened Peoples estimates
that 1,000 children were abducted in this manner in 2005, with sums of be-
tween FCFA 500,000 and FCFA three million (USD 911–USD 5,466) demanded
for their release. Payment of a sum this large necessitated the sale of some
families’ entire herd of cattle (US DOS, 2006).
Armed Sudanese poachers and pastoralists in CAR have regularly clashed
with Central Africans. In mid-2002 armed men, allegedly from Sudan, attacked
and burned a number of villages near the town of Gordil, some 1,100 km north-
east of Bangui. The bursts of fighting resulted in the opening of a dialogue
between Patassé and his Sudanese counterpart, Omar al-Bashir, on cross-
border security in September of that year (UN OCHA, 2003h). After assuming
power Bozizé met with al-Bashir and reconfirmed his commitment to a Border
Protection Accord signed in 1982 (AFP, 2004b). Earlier in the year, as one of
the first leaders to reach out to Bozizé following his coup, al-Bashir had given
the CAR government military vehicles and equipment with which to patrol
the Central African side of the border (UN OCHA, 2003h). Central African
soldiers were thus able to reach Bangouti (a town on the south-east border of
CAR, also spelled Bambouti), which had been occupied by SPLA fighters for
the past two years (UN OCHA, 2004c).
Roadblocks
Armed roadblocks impede transport throughout the country, causing the price
of goods to rise, posing a danger to drivers, and reducing hunting safari tour-

ism, which generates considerable revenues for the state and local communi-
ties (see Box 5). Besides lamenting the dismal state of repair of the country’s
roads, the head of a transportation company in CAR detailed the prevalence of
roadblocks throughout the country. He said that, on all of the main arteries,
there are roadblocks every 20–40 km. At each blockade his drivers are habitu-
ally asked to pay bribes of FCFA 500–3,000 (USD 1–6). The people demanding
money—often those employed by the state, such as police officers or sol-
diers—are frequently armed with Kalashnikovs and RPGs. They are more
dangerous and unpredictable when they have been drinking. One of the com-
pany’s drivers was shot while transporting a load for UNHCR in 2003.191
An economic analysis undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
yields empirical evidence that the persistent salary arrears of civil servants
(and the army in particular) and declining terms of trade the Central African
Republic has faced since independence have been a key factor underlying
political instability (Ghura and Mercereau, 2004). The years of fighting and
Box 5 Revenues lost from the downturn in hunting safaris in 2003

By all accounts, safari hunting enthusiasts are not easily dissuaded from pursuing their hobby.
Political tensions in the capital often have little bearing on their decisions, as tour operators
frequently go to great lengths to ensure the safety of their clients. Private planes and first-class
treatment can mitigate or circumvent many of the usual annoyances and inconveniences. But
they come at a price: a typical two-week safari costs in excess of USD 20,000–30,000 per person.
Revenues generated from safari hunting in CAR are not inconsequential, and represent a signifi-
cant income stream for communities in very remote locations far from Bangui and other major
towns and cities. ‘Trophy fees’—rates that governments charge hunters for the animals they kill
or injure—can range from a few hundred to several thousand US dollars per animal. Various
supplemental charges are based on trophy fees, such as a taxidermy and trackers tax, and a com-
munity development tax, each typically a ten per cent surcharge. Additional costs include daily
game park and veterinary fees. This is far from a complete list.
Mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that monies generated from this activity benefit
the local communities surrounding the wildlife reserves. These funds finance development pro-
jects and pay the salaries of government workers who otherwise would go unremunerated. These
government workers also organize local patrol forces to provide anti-poaching services and gen-
eral surveillance of the country’s territory.
In 2003, however, the armed conflict made it very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to re-
supply the lodges in many of the country’s wildlife reserves. The result was a sharp downturn in
safari hunting tourism.

related unrest have also taken a toll on the educational system: ‘Following
the 2003 coup, approximately three-quarters of the country’s schools were
destroyed. . .’ (US DOS, 2006). Real per capita gross domestic product has
declined steadily since independence. Within such a dire status quo, quantify-
ing the effects of small arms’ use becomes difficult as some believe that small
arms exacerbate existing problems rather than instigate negative effects. A
chart prepared by international donors lists 32 factors, from illiteracy to youth
unemployment, as all concurrently acting on each other to produce insecurity
in CAR. Nevertheless, many Central Africans see small arms as a challenge at
the crux of many of the setbacks they face and are working to reduce the
number currently circulating in the country.192

FOMUC soldiers from Chad patrol
the streets in Birao, 2006.
80 The Central African Republic and Small Arms © Francesco Fontemaggi/AFP
PART IV
Arms Recovery and Disarmament Efforts
Since 1997 there have been numerous initiatives to recover weapons in the
Central African Republic. Government forces, such as the police and forest
rangers, have recovered hundreds of weapons. Many more weapons have
been retrieved through internationally supported programmes. The one thing
all these initiatives have in common is that relatively few of the weapons col-
lected have been destroyed.
Unilateral national initiatives

Prior to the 1996 mutinies, arms recovered by the Central African government
were largely limited to weapons the police seized in the course of their nor-
mal duties. The state usually retained these weapons rather than destroy
them. In some instances, however, impounded weapons reportedly have been
returned to their owners. Richard Carroll of the World Wildlife Fund (US),
who was active in the Dzanga-Sangha Dense Forest Special Reserve, has written
about pervasive corruption among the police in Sangha-Mbaéré prefecture.
He notes that park rangers regularly confiscate guns from poachers that the
police had already confiscated (Carroll, 1998, p. 201). The prevalence of gun
use for poaching or banditry throughout the country, the failure of the state to
pay or appropriately arm the police, and an under-financed judicial system
all provide reason to believe that such actions are commonplace.
The OCRB, the police unit in charge of combating banditry, has routinely
seized weapons. Before 1996 it used to recover largely pistols and locally
crafted hunting rifles. In recent years, however, it has seized rifles, machine
guns, and even the occasional mortar. By late December 2003 the OCRB had
recovered 51 small arms and 14 grenades.193 (See Table 11.) These numbers,
which are slightly elevated in comparison with previous years, belie the
changing scope of the problem. The police service believes that bandits are
Part IV Arms Recovery and Disarmament Efforts 81

An armed rebel from UFDR wears good-luck charms, April 2007. © Pierre Holtz/UNICEF
more numerous and better armed than before. At the same time, the strength
of the OCRB has been substantially reduced. Whereas it had 130 police offic-
ers in February 2003,194 the number had fallen to 45 by December—with only
one vehicle to pursue robbers.195 Thanks to French technical assistance, by
Table 11
Weapons recovered by the OCRB, 1 January–19 December 2003
Sub-machine guns Assault rifles Other rifles Miscellaneous
6 MAT-49s 27 Kalashnikovs 9 MAS-36s 10 Defensive

grenades
1 Unknown 3 SKSs 3 Hunting 4 Offensive

(9 mm) rifles grenades
1 Galil
1 FAMAS
Source: Interview with Police Superintendent Yves-Valentine Gbeyoro, Director, DOCRB, 19 December 2003, Bangui.

2006 OCRB had become somewhat less logistically constrained, having taken
possession of additional vehicles, but its means remained limited in relation
to its tasks.
The Government of CAR has recovered thousands of weapons along its
international borders at times of heightened alert (using ad hoc patrols and
deployments). President Patassé’s presidential guard allegedly confiscated
weapons from more than 4,000 FAZ troops who crossed into Mobaye in April
1997.196 In 1999 alone, for instance, President Patassé acknowledged recovering
3,328 weapons from FAC personnel (UNSC, 2000, para. 26). Given the much
larger quantities of weapons that are likely to have been transferred across
the border, and the disincentive for national authorities to provide a full and
accurate account, the true number of armaments seized is likely to be signifi-
cantly higher.
These weapons were never returned to the government in Kinshasa but were
rather stored at Camp Béal in Bangui. In October 2002 President Patassé’s sup-
porters took them to defend the capital following the launch of Gen. Bozizé’s
coup attempt. The weapons were not returned.197
In 2001, the year between the internationally supported arms recovery pro-
grammes of 1997–2000 and 2002 (described below), the government recov-
ered relatively few arms. According to the Central African government, after
MINURCA financial constraints limited its disarmament efforts. During 2001
it collected a single heavy weapon, 100 light weapons, 15,193 rounds of ammu-
nition of various calibres, and 848 examples of ordnance (CAR, 2003a, p. 3).
The government also collected an unspecified number of weapons and ammu-
nition from Kolingba’s residence and forces after the May 2001 coup attempt.
The Commission nationale de désarmement, demobilisation, et réinsertion
(CNDDR) is responsible for managing small arms and light weapons as they
pertain to DDR programmes. President Bozizé created the Commission on 14
September 2004. He tasked CNDDR with carrying out the recommendations
of the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference as they pertain to DDR, and to do so
with the assistance of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) (CAR, 2004).
With this commitment Bangui pledged to undertake as part of any DDR ini-
tiatives ‘effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms
and light weapons’ with certain caveats (UNGA, 2001, section II, para. 21).

Internationally assisted initiatives
Anti-poaching efforts
Foreign-funded anti-poaching projects have established various kinds of work-
ing relationship with the government vis-à-vis the recovery of small arms and
light weapons. For example, the Programme de développement de la région
nord (Programme for the Development of the Northern Region, PDRN) oper-
ated under an arrangement whereby it kept commercially manufactured weap-
ons that it seized from foreign poachers, but returned any arms collected from
Central Africans to the national authorities. Home-made firearms, regardless
of ownership, were destroyed.
WWF, working with the Ministry of the Environment, Water, Forest, Hunting
and Fishing of the CAR and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), operated
a similar programme in the Dzanga-Sanga Dense Forest Special Reserve begin-
ning in 1989. In the project’s first ten years organizers trained 30 rangers, who
collected more than 150 guns. Most of these were shotguns (nearly a third
hand-crafted), but also some large-calibre elephant guns and one Kalashnikov.
During the same period the programme collected 44,000 wire snares, suggest-
CAR soldier displays ammunition used by poachers. © Chris Anderson/Aurora/Getty Images

ing that they remain the most accessible hunting tool for most Central Africans.
The craft weapons and snares were destroyed in a public ceremony (Blom, 1999).
The PDRN’s successor, the Programme de développement des zones cynégé-
tiques villageoises (Programme for the Development of Village Hunting Zones,
PDZCV), operating under the EU-funded Conservation et utilisation ration-
nelle des écosystèmes forestiers d’Afrique centrale (Conservation and Rational
Forest Ecosystem Management, ECOFAC) programme, adheres to the same
rules.198 ECOFAC’s privately funded successor, the Association pour la protec-
tion de la faune Centrafrique (Association for the Protection of Central African
Fauna, APFC), which has operated in CAR since 2005, returns the weapons
it collects to the Central African Ministry of Defence, keeping only those nec-
essary for its guards’ operations.199
Eco-guards in the Ngotto Forest have confiscated more than 200 long guns
and thousands of rounds of ammunition since 1997 (see Table 12). Approxi-
mately 60 per cent of them are hand-crafted. Factory-produced 12-gauge shot-
guns include French, Russian, Belgian, and Italian models. German Mauser
rifles, including .375 and .458 models, have also been recovered.200
Table 12
Weapons and ammunition recovered by EU-funded eco-guards
in the Ngotto Forest, 1997–2003
Year Rifles Cartridges
Hand-crafted Manufactured Totals
1997 10 12 22 N/A
1998 33 23 56 N/A
1999 18 18 36 N/A
2000 37 17 54 179+
2001 9 3 12 702
2002 18 13 31 471
2003 31 11 42 509
Totals 156 97 253 1,861+
Source: Interview with Alain Penelon, Head, Ngotto Forest component, Central African Republic Office, ECOFAC,
19 December 2003, Bangui, and written correspondence, 16 January 2004.

Hand-crafted weapons recovered by ECOFAC in the Ngotto Forest are de-
stroyed. Manufactured weapons are returned to the Ministry of Water, Forests,
Hunting, and Fishing.201
Officials have also recovered weapons from other protected areas. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Water, Forests, Hunting, and Fishing, weapons were also
recovered from one of ECOFAC’s Village-run Hunting Zones, and a national
park. During 2001–02 the ‘Sangba’ ZCV in Bamingui-Bangoran yielded 380
weapons (55 manufactured and 325 hand-crafted) and 2,563 rounds of ammu-
nition (2,048 for ‘armes de guerre’, 434 for manufactured hunting rifles, and
81 for hand-crafted weapons). During the 2002–03 hunting season, 2 manufac-
tured weapons and 15 hand-crafted weapons along with 82 rounds of ammuni-
tion (31 for one of the seized Kalashnikovs and 51 for a manufactured hunting
rifle) were seized in the Bamingui-Bangoran National Park (Bonanneé, 2003).
MISAB and MINURCA programmes

In 1997 the CAR government initiated a concerted arms collection programme
with international assistance. As part of the agreement concluded between the
government and the army mutineers in January 1997, MISAB was to undertake
United Nations peacekeepers from Mali, part of a contingent of MINURCA, 1998. © Evan Schneider/UN Photo

Table 13
Remuneration offered to individuals submitting weapons and
ammunition under official disarmament programmes, 1997–2002
(in FCFA / USD)
Type of weapon/ Good condition Fair condition Poor condition

ammunition
Pistol or revolver 8,000 / 12.56 4,000 / 6.28 1,500 / 2.36
Bolt-action rifle 8,000 / 12.56 3,000 / 4.71 1,500 / 2.36
Sub-machine gun 8,000 / 12.56 4,000 / 6.28 1,500 / 2.36
Assault rifle 8,000 / 12.56 5,000 / 7.85 2,000 / 3.14
Shoulder-fired 15,000 / 23.60 7,500 / 11.78 5,000 / 7.85

anti-tank weapon
Light machine gun 15,000 / 23.60 7,500 / 11.78 5,000 / 7.85

(5.56 mm–7.62 mm)
Heavy machine gun 30,000 / 47.10 20,000 / 31.40 10,000 / 15.70

(12.7 mm–14.5 mm)
60 mm mortar 30,000 / 47.10 20,000 / 31.40 10,000 / 15.70

(complete)
81 mm mortar 45,000 / 70.65 30,000 / 47.10 20,000 / 31.40

(complete)
120 mm mortar 75,000 / 117.75 40,000 / 62.80 30,000 / 47.10

(complete)
Grenades (offensive 500 / 0.79 N/A N/A

and defensive)
12.7 mm or 14.5 mm 50 / 0.08 N/A N/A

ammunition
5.56 mm, 7.5 mm, 25 / 0.04 N/A N/A

7.62 mm, or 9 mm
ammunition
Rocket 700 / 1.10 N/A N/A
60 mm shell 700 / 1.10 N/A N/A
81/82 mm or 1,000 / 1.57 N/A N/A

120 mm shell
Magazine 300 / 0.47 N/A N/A
Note: The exchange rate used in this table is based on an average of 0.00157 FCFA to the USD for the period 1997–2002.
Source: CTD (2002)

88
Table 14
Weapons recovered during MISAB
Type of weapon Surrendered by: Arms taken from

Kassaï depot
18.08 01.09 15.09 29.09 13.10 27.10 04.12 02.01 02.02 10.03
1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998
Handguns 2 7 7 11 15 16 16 16 N/A N/A 111

Sub-machine guns 209 209 221 281 297 299 299 304 N/A N/A 459
Assault rifles 150 178 198 241 256 261 261 265 N/A N/A 541
Bolt-action rifles 349 420 489 608 650 651 651 662 N/A N/A 1,181
Small Arms
Lt. machine guns 38 45 47 51 52 52 52 52 N/A N/A 80
The Central African Republic and Small Arms

.30 ca. machine guns 13 13 13 13 15 15 15 15 N/A N/A 17
Sub-totals 761 872 975 1,205 1,285 1,294 1,294 1,314 1,356 1,373 2,389
RPG-7s 4 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 N/A N/A 11
73 mm A-T weapons 62 63 64 66 66 66 66 66 N/A N/A 67
75 mm recoilless guns 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A 2
12.7 mm machine guns 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A 3
14.5 mm machine guns 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 N/A N/A 6
60 mm mortars 7 9 9 12 13 13 14 14 N/A N/A 19
Light Weapons
81/82 mm mortars 4 7 7 9 13 13 13 15 N/A N/A 15
120 mm mortars 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 N/A N/A 4
Sub-totals 87 94 97 106 111 111 112 116 117 118 127
Sources: Security Council Documents (para.) – S/1997/652(20); S/1997/684(14); S/1997/716(22); S/1997/759(25); S/1997/795(12); S/1997/828(12); S/1997/954(15); S/1998/3(16);
S/1998/86(11); S/1998/221(14)
Table 15
Ordnance recovered during MISAB, as of 31 December 1997
Ammunition Explosives (and detonators)
Designation Quantity Designation Quantity
5.56 mm rounds 69,092 37 mm fragmentation hand 1,858

grenades
7.5 mm SLC rounds 14,000 Fragmentation hand grenades 3,174

(China)
7.5 mm S/B rounds 123,954 GR FLG AP34 rifle grenades 16

(France)
7.5 mm X rounds 34,719 RPG-7 rockets 1,172
7.5 mm X S/B rounds 135 73 mm anti-tank rocket launchers 9
7.62 x 25 mm (Tokarev) rounds 2,811 37 mm stun hand grenades 1,047
7.62 x 39 mm (Kalashnikov) 42,060 FL LAC F4 hand grenades 1,305

rounds
7.62 x 51 mm (NATO) rounds 15,962 F4 hand grenades 316
7.62 x 54 mm (rimmed) rounds 121,261 Russian grenades 3
9 mm Parabellum rounds 5,546 60 mm mortar shells 1,821
12 gauge riot control rounds 731 81 mm mortar shells 852
12.7 mm (.50 calibre) rounds 3,191 120 mm mortar shells 211
14.5 mm rounds 15,855 75 mm recoilless rifle rounds 168

(US)
75 mm recoilless rifle rounds 223

(China)
M79/M203 40 mm rounds 6,060

(US)
Time fuses (inactive) 2,325
7.5 mm grenade (blank) cartridges 755
Pyro detonators 6,100
Total: 449,317 Total: 26,659
Note: The author would like to thank James Gebhardt for clarifying inconsistencies and correcting inaccuracies in the original
text on which this chart is based. However, no changes were made to the figures given. The total number of explosives does
not correspond to the sum of the individual explosives listed.
Sources: Data based on figures provided in UN Document S/1998/3, para. 17, and James Gebhardt

a major arms recovery effort. A small financial incentive was offered to indi-
viduals to entice them into relinquishing their weapons with no questions
asked (UNSC, 1997b, paras. 7–10). Inducements ranged between USD 13 for
a pistol, sub-machine gun, or rifle and USD 123 for a 120 mm mortar system,
assuming that the weapons were in good condition.202 Smaller sums were
offered for matériel handed over in a mediocre or poor state (see Table 13).
As further encouragement to participate in disarmament, those who failed
to turn in their weapons within a stipulated (short) amount of time were to be
pursued through the courts. MISAB’s last report to the UN Security Council
stated that 1,373 small arms and nearly 118 light weapons were recovered
(UNSC, 1998b, para. 14).203 (See Table 14.) MISAB also stated that it had col-
lected 464,604 munitions rounds and 26,714 explosives and detonators (UNSC,
1998b, para. 14) (see Table 15). It is likely that the final numbers were some-
what higher, given that MISAB continued to patrol Bangui for an additional
five weeks before MINURCA replaced it.
Undoubtedly, the recovery of so many arms, along with the equally impor-
tant political dialogue that accompanied the initiative, helped to stabilize an
explosive situation that had resulted in significant loss of life. Tensions re-
mained high in the capital after the signing of the Bangui Accords in January
1997, and many people died in major flare-ups in late June 1997 (US DOS,
1998).204 The significance of the recovery programme, however, has been con-
sistently misrepresented. Claims that more than 90 per cent of heavy weapons
and more than 50 per cent of light weapons were retrieved during the MISAB
operation are routinely made. But these percentages are based on a comparison
of the total number of weapons recovered and the number seized from Kassaï
barracks. Yet this was just one component, albeit an important one, of the dis-
armament programme. President Patassé’s government had every interest in
promoting this viewpoint, as it removed the pressure on the government to
account for weapons that it had provided to the militias. MISAB, meanwhile,
may have been motivated to highlight an ‘uncontested’ success when other
aspects of the peace accords were not going so well. Whatever the underlying
factors, one thing is certain: such a characterization is at best inappropriate
and at worst disingenuous. Worryingly, the UN has perpetuated this myth.205

The disarmament effort was implemented selectively and not in the spirit
of the Accords, focusing primarily on the arrondissements home to the mutineers.
Faltas (2001, p. 90) reports that ‘while weapon collection took illegal arms off
the streets, it increased the bitterness, frustration and insecurity of the popu-
lation in the rebels’ quarters by disarming the mutineers, but not their adver-
saries’. Moreover, a leading (pro-mutineer) disarmament official alleged that
some of the weapons collected had been diverted on their way to being stored
and bought illegally by supporters of the government.
To explain the relatively low rate of recovery of light weapons, MISAB em-
phasized the ease with which small arms could be transported out of Bangui
or successfully hidden. Furthermore, it acknowledged that a demand for
these weapons still existed, complicating recovery efforts. It hypothesized that
rebels may have hastily discarded an unknown quantity of armaments in the
forest or the Ubangui River following encounters with MISAB during the
June 1997 armed confrontations. Finally, it reported that some 130 rebels never
returned to their barracks and were believed to have absconded with their
small arms, many to another country (UNSC, 1997b, para. 13).
No weapons collected during MISAB’s tour of duty were destroyed. The
arms collected were transferred to the UN mission in April 1998.206
Weapons collection continued under MINURCA, but on a limited scale.
Although its mandate did not contain an explicit reference to weapons collec-
tion (UNSC, 1998c), UN peacekeepers did pursue leads on weapon caches.
According to MINURCA Force Commander Gen. (Ret.) Ratanga, they retrieved
weapons from throughout the capital—the force did not concern itself with
whether a particular quartier was perceived as pro- or anti-government.207
According to the UN, MINURCA recovered 128 small arms, 21,724 rounds of
ammunition, and 243 explosives between December 1998 and early October
1999 (UNSC, 1999b, para. 38). Regardless of the question of the mandate, this
appears to have been a missed opportunity. The mutineers’ enthusiasm for dis-
armament had diminished once the programme through which they received
monetary compensation for relinquishing their arms ended. MINURCA, how-
ever, had the capability to seize weapons from the mutineers, and doing so
would have helped defuse the unrest of the ensuing years.

Of those weapons MINURCA did collect, very few were taken out of service
and made inoperable. MINURCA destroyed some obsolete ammunition, and
in a public ceremony on 16 July 1999 burnt 158 obsolete small arms (Faltas,
2001, p. 90). A second public ceremony took place on 11 January 2000, during
which the remaining ‘unserviceable’ arms collected by MISAB and MINURCA
were laid waste (UNSC, 2000, para. 26). It was not possible to determine the
exact number of weapons involved, but Demafouth said that most were
MAS-36 bolt-action rifles, plus a few Kalashnikovs.208 The remainder of the
recovered armaments had been transferred to the CAR government the pre-
vious week (UNSC, 2000, para. 25). The small number of weapons destroyed
suggests that most of those collected were in good condition.
National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration

In February 2002 the CAR government launched a new programme to recover
arms and to provide marketable skills (UNDP, 2002). The principal objectives
of the Programme national de désarmement et de reinsertion (National Pro-
gramme for Disarmament and Reintegration, PNDR) were to recover around
10,000 small arms and light weapons and to offer livelihoods training to 2,000
individuals who opted to participate (UNDP, 2003a, p. 1). Political and mili-
tary developments in CAR, however, made it difficult to implement the pro-
gramme as planned. The failed coup attempt of October 2002, the heightened
instability that followed in its wake, and the successful coup of March 2003
greatly complicated matters. Despite—or perhaps because of—these chal-
lenges, by January 2003 PNDR had secured funding from several countries,
although contributions still fell short of projected needs.209
Three components—disarmament, training, and reinsertion—were created
to implement the PNDR. A central Comité technique de désarmement (Technical
Disarmament Committee, CTD) together with Comités locaux de désarmement
(Local Disarmament Committees, CLDs) were to assume primary responsi-
bility for disarmament. A Comité technique de réinsertion (Technical Reinte-
gration Committee, CTR) would assume primary responsibility for training
and reinsertion. To that end, the CTR would employ a micro-credit scheme to
be known as Mutuelles d’épargne et de crédit en appui à la réinsertion (Mutual
Savings and Credit to Support Reintegration, MECAR).

The seven-member CTD consisted of representatives of the FACA, gendar-
merie, police, UNDP, and Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la con-
solidation de la paix en Republique Centrafricaine (BONUCA), as the UN
Peace-Building Office in CAR is known. The Ministry of Plans and Interna-
tional Cooperation headed the CTR, which comprised officials from six other
ministries within the government, UNDP, BONUCA, PNDR, and international
funders associated with the programme (UNDP, 2003a).
In the end 29 CLDs were created, of which 22 became operational. Offices
were established in the capital and in 10 of CAR’s 16 prefectures. Eighteen
were established in Bangui’s eight arrondissements. Two offices were opened
just outside Bangui, in Begoua and Bimbo, the capital of Ombella-Mpoko
prefecture. An office was established in the capitals of nine other prefectures:
Basse-Kotto, Mobaye; Haut-Mbomou, Obo; Lobaye, Mbaïki; Mbaéré-Kadéï,
Berbérati; Mbomou, Bangassou; Nana-Mbaéré, Bouar; Ouham, Bossangoa;
Ouham-Pendé, Bozoum; and Sangha-Mbaéré, Nola.
The attempted coup in October 2002 and its aftermath effectively derailed
the CTD’s plans. Though the offices had recruited staff and initiated efforts to
sensitize people to the threat that small arms and light weapons pose to their
security, nine of them never recovered any weapons. While all 18 CLDs in
Bangui became operational, only four offices outside the capital functioned
as envisioned: those in Begoua and Bimbo, a few kilometres from Bangui,
and those in Bangassou and Mobaye. Plans to establish offices in Bamingui-
Bangoran (Ndélé), Nana-Grébizi (Kaga Bondoro), Haute-Kotto (Bria), Kémo-
Gribingui (Sibut), Ouaka (Bambari), and Vakaga (Birao) never came to fruition.210
The PNDR recovered a little more than 1,000 weapons (see Table 16). The
data includes so many inconsistencies that it is impossible to determine with
any certainty what actually occurred. Reports of the PNDR, UNDP, and the
UN Secretary General contain different figures. Of these three sources, the
PNDR, which bears primary responsibility for implementing the project, is
considered authoritative as it has the most details. Within the reports of the
PNDR, the figures believed to be most accurate come from its detailed ac-
counts of individual weapons recovered. Based on PNDR data, in an early
report the CAR government enumerated 891 small arms and 14 light weap-
ons collected between 23 January and 31 May 2002, supplying serial numbers

Table 16
Weapons recovered by PNDR, 23 January–31 May 2002,
and 15 June 2002–14 May 2003
Weapon type Weapons recovered
Category Model Calibre 23 January– 15 June 2002– Total

31 May 2002 14 May 2003
Pistols & Total 19 2 21

revolvers
Sub-machine MAT-49 9 mm 58 10 68
guns
Uzi 9 mm 17 8 25
Total 75 18 93
Rifles Misc. hunting n.a. 0 2 2
Mousqueton 8 mm 4 0 4
FAMAS 5.56 mm 0 2 2
Galil 5.56 mm 38 4 42
Vektor R5 5.56 mm 23 0 23
SAR 80 5.56 mm 0 2 2
M16 5.56 mm 24 1 25
Small arms
MAS-36 7.5 mm 105 27 132
M1949/56 (FSA) 7.5 mm 7 3 10
FAL 7.62 mm 21 6 27
G3 7.62 mm 0 4 4
Kalashnikov/ 7.62 mm 558 60 618

Type 56
SKS 7.62 mm 0 0 0
Total 780 111 891
Light machine AA-52 7.5 mm 5 1 6

guns
DKN 7.62 mm 3 0 3
RPK 7.62 mm 9 1 10
Total 17 2 19
Totals for small arms 891 133 1,024

Heavy 12.7 mm machine gun 0 0 0
machine guns
14.5 mm machine gun 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0
Shoulder- RPG-7s 7 1 8
launched
Light Weapons
LRACs 7 1 8
and anti-tank
weapons Total 14 2 16
Mortars 60 mm 0 0 0
81/82 mm 0 0 0
120 mm 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0
Totals for light weapons 14 2 16
Totals for all weapons 905 135 1,040
Note: The total figures do not include 84 weapons collected from Bangassou and Mobaye for which no specific information
is available. It was not possible to obtain information on weapons collected during the period 1–14 June 2002.
Sources: CTD and PNDR.
when possible (CTD, 2002, pp. 2–21). In a May 2003 document the PNDR
similarly listed additional firearms collected since the first destruction cere-
mony on 15 June 2002 (see below): 133 small arms and 2 light weapons (PNDR,
2003a, sec. VI). Eighty-four weapons collected in Bangassou and Mobaye
were not included, as they were to be destroyed on site for security reasons
(secs. IV and VI). The total number, therefore, is 219. Only 59 of these 84 addi-
tional weapons are mentioned in the May 2003 document and not in the same
level of detail as the other 135 (sec. IV). Apparently, 25 of these 84 weapons
were transferred to Bangui separately.211
Information on ammunition collected under the PNDR is even more diffi-
cult to acquire with any confidence. The PNDR reported that it recovered
134,829 rounds of ammunition and 1,443 explosives. In addition, more than
1,700 magazines were turned in. Other matériel received included binoculars,
uniforms, and communications equipment (PNDR, 2003a, sec. VI).
Part of the confusion arises from the fact that some of the weapons the
government seized during the failed coup attempts of May 2001 and October

Table 17
Ordnance recovered by PNDR, 23 January 2002–14 May 2003
Ordnance type and accessories Matériel recovered
Category Calibre/Type 23 January–31 15 June 2002– Total

May 2002 14 May 2003
Ammunition 5.56 mm 1,500 128 1,628
7.5 mm 31,458 3,342 34,800
7.62 mm 56,651 25,685 82,336
8 mm 0 0 0
9 mm 2,530 872 3,402
12.7 mm 325 220 545
14.5 mm 0 2 2
Total 92,464 30,249 134,829*
*The total figure for ammunition includes 12,116 rounds for which no specific information
is available (6,380 recovered in Bangassou and Mobaye, and 5,736 apparently recovered
during the first two weeks of June 2002).
Explosives Grenades 1,041 69 1,110
60 mm mortar 6 36 42
shells
81/82 mm mortar 0 0 0
shells
120 mm mortar 2 2 4
shells
RPG rockets 37 7 44
LRAC rockets 0 0 0
Anti-personnel 0 1 1
mines
Total 1,086 115 1,443**
** The total figure for explosives includes 239 grenades, 2 RPG rockets, and 1 LRAC rocket
that apparently were recovered in the first two weeks of June 2002. In one place in the report,
mention is made of three 82 mm mortar shells having been recovered after 14 June 2002, but
this inconsistency (and many others) is not included in the interest of consistency.

Magazines MAT-49 150 358 508
Uzi 0 18 18
FAMAS 0 4 4
Galil 100 18 118
SAR 80 0 15 15
M16 0 2 2
FSA 0 2 2
FAL 50 0 50
G3 0 5 5
Kalashnikov 560 352 912
Total 860 774 1,714***
*** The total figure for magazines includes 80 for which no specific information is available,
and which were recovered in Bangassou and Mobaye. Nor is any information available for
the period 1–14 June 2002.
Sources: CTD and PNDR
2002 appear to have been added to PNDR statistics. There is considerable

disagreement between the CTD and PNDR officials as to the origin of the
weapons stored in the three containers at Camp Béal, in Bangui. Three officials
extremely familiar with the programme provided very different accounts of
what took place.212 It does not seem plausible that the PNDR collected 135,000
rounds of ammunition from fewer than 1,000 people. Rather, it seems that
most of the ammunition recovered from the two mutinies has been grouped
with the weapons recovered by the PNDR, calling into question the programme’s
record-keeping.
Two hundred and twenty individuals who participated in the project (UN
OCHA, 2003i) were selected to receive training.213 The amount of money that
a recipient received for relinquished weapons and ammunition determined
eligibility. The minimum was FCFA 8,000 (USD 14). The rationale behind this
figure was that it would reward those who gave up weapons in good condi-
tion. No one who turned in a weapon in an average or poor state would reach

this threshold.214 There is no indication that former combatants—the pro-
gramme’s target—received the lion’s share of the training.
Instruction was offered in a number of skills over a four-month period.
Training began in August 2003 and lasted until December 2003. Skills were
provided to those seeking employment as carpenters, electricians, mechanics,
and tailors, as well as in other trades and professions. Each trainee received a
reintegration package, including tools appropriate for their chosen occupa-
tion, valued at up to USD 500 (UN OCHA, 2003i). The project concluded on
31 January 2004 (UN OCHA, 2004a).
Two arms-destruction ceremonies took place under the PNDR. The first
was held on 15 June 2002, during which 705 small arms and 9 light weapons
were set ablaze (PNDR, 2003a, sec. I). No ammunition or explosives were
destroyed because of the inability of the PNDR to dispose of them safely. A
second ceremony was convened on 25 July 2003 (PNDR, 2003b). The PNDR
reported that it destroyed 209 small arms and 3 light weapons, as well as
134,352 rounds of ammunition, 1,361 grenades, 27 mortar shells, 54 rockets,
and 1 anti-personnel landmine (PNDR, 2003b, p. 3). The PNDR also stated
that, during this time, it destroyed 11 additional small arms (eight Kalash-
Table 18
Ordnance destroyed by PNDR, 22 July–2 August 2003
Date Cartridges Shells Rockets Grenades
22 July 14,928 7 5 104
25 July 14,900 8 10 161
28 July 14,028 9 10 154
29 July 29,984 15 20 315
30 July 15,178 8 9 154
31 July 15,078 7 9 156
1 August 14,953 7 9 156
2 August 15,303 8 11 166
Totals 134,352 69 83 1,366
Source: PNDR

nikovs, two MAT-49s, and one MAS-36), 41 canon and mortar shells (eight
107 mm canon shells and 22 60 mm, two 81 mm, and nine 82 mm mortar
shells), and 1,582 rounds of 7.5 mm, 7.62 mm, 9 mm, and 12.7 mm ammuni-
tion, among other military equipment (PNDR, 2003b, p. 3). For the reasons
discussed above, there is cause to question this breakdown. Of the many pos-
sible explanations for the discrepancies between the number of weapons re-
portedly recovered and those subsequently destroyed, the most plausible is
that the government would have sought to keep collected matériel that was in
good working order.
Forces multinationales de la CEMAC (FOMUC) operations

CEMAC agreed to establish a peacekeeping mission in CAR to replace the
troops from CEN-SAD at its regional summit in Libreville in October 2002.
The first elements of the force were deployed in December that same year. In
the wake of the successful March 2003 coup d’etat, the mandate for FOMUC,
as the mission came to be known, was expanded to include helping to im-
prove the security situation in the country, assisting with the electoral process,
and helping to restructure the FACA. The 380-strong force, under the com-
mand of Gabon,215 benefits from French financial, matériel, and logistical assist-
ance, which includes French troops stationed at the airport in Bangui as part
of Opération Boali (Frères d’Armes, 2006, p. 22).
While FOMUC’s mandate does not include an explicit tasking to under-
take disarmament,216 its peacekeepers nevertheless have recovered arms in
carrying out their activities. Since the coup d’état in March 2003, FOMUC has
undertaken a number of operations with the goal of securing Bangui and the
surrounding area. For example, between 23 May and 15 June 2003 FOMUC
peacekeepers arrested and disarmed a couple of hundred fighters who had taken
part in the March coup d’etat and transported them to Chad (FOMUC, 2004).
It is unclear, however, what happened to the weapons FOMUC recovered
in its early post-coup operations. According to CEMAC, the force had recov-
ered more than 100 weapons, many in good condition. They consisted of
rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, sub-machine guns, bolt-
action rifles, and assault rifles (FOMUC, 2003a). However, according to the
peacekeeping force, by mid-December 2003, recovered weapons and muni-

Table 19
Matériel recovered by FOMUC, to 17 December 2003
Type Quantity (totals)
Firearms
Simonov (SKS Carbine) 21
Kalashnikov (rifle, unspecified) 7
M-79 (grenade launcher) 1
RPK (machine gun) 1
Pistol (unspecified) 1
Carbine 9 mm, English (unspecified) 1
Carbine 22 (mm) American (unspecified) 2
Totals 34
Ammunition
7.62 mm short (7.62 x 39) 355
7.62 mm long (7.62 x 54) 570
5.56 mm 136
9 mm 15
Totals 1,076
Grenades
Rifle grenade, Model M203 13
Hand grenade, Soviet model 7
Hand grenade, French model 3
Smoke grenade 1
Totals 24
Magazines
Kalashnikov 31
FAMAS 6
English 9 mm carbine 3
Totals 40
Source: FOMUC (2003b)

tions in FOMUC’s possession included 34 (different) firearms, a little more
than 1,000 rounds of ammunition, and a few dozen grenades and mazagines
(FOMUC, 2003b) (see Table 19).
Other
Chadian soldiers supported Bozizé’s takeover of power in March 2003. Four
hundred Chadian soldiers, led by Deputy Chief Staff of the Chadian Armed
Forces Col. Daoud Soumain Khalil, entered Bangui on 19 March to help re-
store calm to the city and environs, which had descended into looting and
chaos following Patassé’s ouster. Within the first week of their operations,
they had reportedly recovered some 1,300 firearms and 270 stolen vehicles. In
an interview with IRIN News, Col. Khalil estimated that 90 per cent of the
people they disarmed were Bozizé’s supporters. When possible, they dis-
armed Patassé’s supporters as well, but ‘most avoided this because they keep
their arms at home’ (UN OCHA, 2003b).
The Chadian ambassador, Maitile Djoumbe, handed over the weapons to
Bozizé’s Chief of Staff, Antoine Gambi (UN OCHA, 2003a), in a ceremony on
25 March. The Chadians subsequently recovered some 200 more weapons,
which they also handed over to Bozizé. The ultimate fate of the weapons,
which do not appear to be registered in government stockpiles, is unconfirmed,
though they may have been destroyed or sent to N’Djamena. Alternatively, it
is also widely believed in the country that coup victors reward their inner
circles who helped them take power with weapons, which they keep at their
homes. This may explain the confusion as to the weapons’ whereabouts.217
Indeed, when Col. Danzoumi Yalo, until then Bozizé’s right-hand man and
head of the USP, was arrested in December 2003, he was found to possess
large quantities of armaments at his home (Afrique Express, 2004).

Families fleeing the Vakaga region, April 2007.
© Pierre Holtz/UNICEF

Conclusion
Between 1996 and 2003 a series of events significantly transformed Central

African society. The government itself was responsible for some, but over
others it had no control. The state’s ability to regulate weapons among civilians
is essentially non-existent. The massive influx of arms into many parts of the
country represents a threat to national security and to law and order. Succes-
sive coup attempts have led to greater insecurity, and the belief that a weapon
is necessary for self-defence has become widespread among civilians.
The successful coup in March 2003 both clarified and obscured information
about small-arms holdings in CAR. Bozizé, eager to initiate foreign-funded
disarmament, has produced some data on the strengths of armed groups and
their holdings. On the other hand, stockpile management remains opaque, to
the extent that the ultimate fate of some of the weapons collected during dis-
armament operations (such as the 1,300 firearms allegedly collected by Chadian
soldiers in the week following the coup) is unknown.
CAR today is a tinderbox, but there is still hope that tensions can be defused.
The country has enjoyed a mostly peaceful history—independence from
France came without an armed struggle—and small arms were not prevalent
among civilians until 1982. Recent years have not been so kind to the country,
with a succession of mutinies and coup attempts unsettling the nation, and
conflicts in various neighbouring states spilling across their common bor-
ders. These developments have contributed to a lack of security in CAR. The
continuing conflict in Darfur, which borders CAR’s north-east corner, and
armed conflict in Chad indicate that conflict will continue to dominate news
from the region. Zaraguinas roam the roads with seeming impunity outside
of the capital, and armed robberies occur frequently in Bangui and elsewhere.
Kidnapping for ransom, too, has become widespread outside of Bangui, with
cattle herders largely the victims. Insecurity in the north, around the town of
Paoua, has caused tens of thousands to flee to Chad. Even greater numbers
have fled their homes and live in the bush.
Conclusion 103
Seized weapons at Camp de Roux, 2003. © Desirey Minkoh/AFP
The various peacekeeping missions in CAR have not been a significant source
of weaponry for the population. Disarmament efforts to date have been largely
a waste of money, as evidenced by the recirculation rather than the removal
of arms. The few arms that were recovered were largely in poor condition. In
some ways, disarmament initiatives exacerbated tensions within the popula-
tion, because the apparent selectivity with which schemes were implemented
hardened differences between groups. These experiences suggest that the focus
of any future programme should lie in broad-based arms recuperation rather
than strictly in DDR. Weapons and ammunition collected will likely recirculate
unless they are destroyed.

It is hoped that the study’s findings will aid policy-makers in devising new
security-sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration pro-
grammes, both in CAR and in other places. The problems that ail the Central
African Republic—a weak central government, regional conflicts, the prolifera-
tion of small arms and light weapons, to name but a few—are, unfortunately,
not unique to CAR.
Conclusion 105
Abdoulaye Miskine, rebel leader of the Union
Democratic Forces for the Rally (UFDR), attends the
signing of a peace treaty between the UFDR and
the CAR goverment in Sirte, Libya, February 2007.
106 The Central African Republic and Small Arms © Mahmud Turkia/AFP
Epilogue
By Louisa N. Lombard
Introduction
The years since Gen. François Bozizé’s assumption of power in March 2003
have not restored calm across the country’s territory. The list of security
threats Central Africans face have, if anything, mounted. Among the elements
compromising citizens’ security are former combatants, whether ‘reintegrated’
through disarmament assistance or not; highway bandits in the areas outside
the capital, particularly along the borders with Chad and Cameroon; and
gangs of poachers armed with automatic weapons. Actors in the conflicts in
Chad and south-western Sudan have drawn on CAR territory to further their
struggles. Several armed groups aiming to unseat Bozizé have emerged since
2006. The steps taken towards improving security and quelling the prolifera-
tion of small arms, described below, have only scratched the surface of these
problems. Addressing the root issues will require greater resources, better
planning, and a regional approach.
Central African citizens approved a new constitution in a referendum in
December 2004. Five months later presidential elections confirmed Bozizé’s
position as commander in chief. The return to constitutional democracy prompted
the African Union to welcome CAR back into membership. The elections also
paved the way for negotiations with the IMF and other international lenders,
a course intended to break the cycle of economic and political instability into
which the country has fallen. Nevertheless, persistent salary arrears (even after
aid from France and China earmarked for that purpose) frequently trigger
paralyzing civil service strikes. A government-wide civil service census in
April 2006 aimed at culling their numbers led to additional unrest as people
feared losing their positions.
Despite his popularity at the polls, Bozizé faces multiple armed rebellions
in the north, and early battles between these armed insurgents and govern-
Epilogue 107
ment forces reveal the latter to be outgunned, undertrained, and unmotivated.
Much of the countryside remains prey to road-blockers, highway bandits, and
kidnappers, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons.
The Central African Republic faces a long list of challenges, and small arms
and light weapons play into many of them, from rising food prices due to
armed highway bandits to militia intimidation during elections. The country
has indeed become a tinderbox, awash with weapons, a situation that appears
to be worsening together with the conflicts in Chad and Sudan.
The security situation in CAR

Bangui
Armed robbery has become relatively rare in Bangui. Inhabitants attribute
much of the remaining crime to actions by inebriated members of the state
security forces. Though assessing the incidence of burglaries across the city is
difficult given that most are not reported, or take place beyond the areas the
police regularly patrol, several recent developments have contributed to the
reduction in general lawlessness.
Members of the FACA have reportedly intimidated city residents with their
weapons in order to extort money or other goods from them, but such inci-
dents appear to be declining. Some see the downturn in crime as a result of a
crackdown by military commanders on such offences, with offending soldiers
receiving harsh sanctions or expulsion.218
France’s donation of vehicles to the gendarmerie and police has improved
these entities’ capacity for surveillance and response to calls. On the neigh-
bourhood level, many communities have organized local defence groups to
patrol the streets at night. Those suspected robbers the Office central de répres-
sion du banditisme (Central Office for Crime Suppression, OCRB) captures have
at times received severe, extra-judicial punishment, perhaps deterring other
potential criminals. The OCRB regularly transports apprehended suspects to
Cattin, 5 km south-west of Bangui, for punishment. These apprehended sus-
pects have been found shot and killed, their bodies placed in open-air jeeps
for the drive back to the city centre as a warning to those who might be tempted
by thievery (US DOS, 2006).

Even with less crime in the capital, however, life has become increasingly
difficult for Central Africans in a number of ways. With transportation both
risky and expensive on CAR’s unpoliced and washed-out roads, prices for
basic goods have risen. For instance, the price of a bag of cassava (Central
Africans’ staple starch) doubled, from 12,000 FCFA (USD 23) to 24,000 FCFA
(USD 46), between 2004 and June 2005, according to a labour union leader in
Bangui (UN OCHA, 2005b).219 Civil servants, who are among the minority of
the population with formal employment, have persistently gone unpaid, de-
spite recurring budget assistance for salary bills from France, China, and the
European Union.
The Republican Guard has been accused of harassment and intimidation,
including during the 2005 presidential campaign and election. Some observ-
ers alleged they arrested opposition candidates, assaulted election officials,
and harassed voters.220 Peaceful demonstrations by supporters of legislative
opposition candidate Nicolas Tiangaye in the fourth arrondissement brought
the Republican Guard to the scene; they fired their guns in the air to disperse
those assembled, and at least two civilians were killed (FODEM, 2005; US
DOS, 2006). The French ambassador in Bangui chastised the Republican Guard
for their transgressions and expressed hope that it would be reorganized.221
However, others with knowledge of the events claimed that only two mem-
bers of the Republican Guard had caused and disruption. They also claimed
that Bozizés opponents had exploited the propaganda effects of these inci-
dents to the full.222
The Republican Guard’s comportment in other instances, however, sug-
gests that they are indeed heavy-handed. When in June 2006 Prime Minister
Elie Doté travelled to Paoua, 500 km north of Bangui in Ouham-Pendé, to
survey the security situation, residents marched in the streets. Their leader
proffered a list of grievances. The extortion and harassment perpetrated by
the Republican Guard soldiers who had been dispatched to the region (based
at Bossangoa) in January to quell armed violence occupied the top of the list.
These soldiers, together with other members of the FACA, accused the popu-
lation of supporting forces aiming to unseat President Bozizé and perpetrated
exactions that observers have called excessive and indiscriminate (RFI, 2006).
Epilogue 109
Coupeurs de routes/Kidnappers
The few aid groups in the country find themselves facing deteriorating con-
ditions. Their efforts to reach the areas outside the capital have long been
frustrated by roadblocks, both north of the capital and in the south-east. Now
the unrest surrounding the armed rebellions that have arisen since 2006 also
impede their endeavours. Some NGO staff refer to the area around Bossangoa,
Kaga Bandoro, and Batangafo as the ‘triangle of death’, a moniker attributable
to both the perceived risks of travel there and the plight of the isolated area’s
residents.223 The escalating conflict has drawn some attention from the inter-
national community, but aid levels remain well below that which the UN
assesses the emergency to require.
Whereas armed actors previously allowed humanitarian vehicles such as
those of Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders, MSF) to pass un-
touched, that discipline has become unreliable. (Some of the coupeurs do not
speak Sangho, the common language spoken in CAR, indicating that they come
from outside the country’s borders.) In early 2004 one MSF vehicle came under
fire, taking four shots to the cab and next to the gas tank. The coupeurs allowed
it to pass when they learned it carried only doctors and medical supplies.224
More recent attacks have been deadly. In April 2006 in the north-western
town of Yaloké, a vehicle donated by UNICEF to the Ministry of Health came
under fire. The two doctors in the vehicle died of the gunshots they sustained,
and two of the FOMUC soldiers who responded to the attack were wounded
as well (UN OCHA, 2006b). Armed men shot and killed a French MSF volun-
teer in Ngaoundai in June 2007. The previous month, two Cooperazione Inter-
nazionale (COOPI) staff members had been abducted in Bozoum (UN OCHA,
2007b). COOPI subsequently suspended its operations in the north-west.
Instability created by bands of robbers and the remnants of former armed
groups has taken hold in northern CAR, along the Cameroonian and Chadian
borders. Describing the situation, area residents distinguish between highway
bandits, who hold up unsuspecting travellers for quick monetary gain, and
‘heavily armed groups, often in military uniforms who, in addition to com-
mitting atrocities and robbery, supposedly have political demands and enlist
people by force’. The former are particularly prevalent along the border with
Cameroon, where the relatively well-off M’Bororo herdsmen make good targets.

The latter largely conduct their operations along the border with Chad (AUPSC,
2005, paras. 9, 10).
Ex-combatants
The armed rebels who helped Bozizé seize power are now generally referred
to as either ‘liberators’ or ‘patriots’. In his November 2003 letter to the World
Bank appealing for funding for disarmament and demobilization, Bozizé esti-
mated their ranks to number 1,640, of whom 540 had already been integrated
into the FACA. He expected an additional 150 to be integrated shortly (CAR,
2003b). The liberators initially consisted of Bozizé’s fellow-dispossessed Gbaya
soldiers. When Bozizé was chased northward in the autumn of 2002, he found
additional recruits among the northern pastoralist communities, who were
being persecuted by Miskine’s pro-Patassé men. In addition, at least several
hundred Chadians joined Bozizé’s cause (Boisbouvier, 2004). Chadian soldiers
also accompanied Bozizé and his men as they took the capital.225
After the successful coup, many of the fighters roamed the countryside,
harassing and abusing the population. Some blame the increases in highway
banditry and kidnappings for ransom since 2006 on these armed men (Refu-
gees International, 2004).
The Chadian ex-liberators claimed their leader had promised them FCFA
10 million (approximately USD 10,800) each for their efforts.226 In April 2004
they refused to wait any longer for their payment. About 280 (AFP, 2004a) of
them looted approximately 75 homes in Bangui and engaged in combat with
presidential security forces some 500 metres from Bozizé’s residence. Eight
liberators and one presidential guard died during the fighting. At the end of
April, with trucks and logistical support from FOMUC, the fighters were
transported home to Chad (US DOS, 2005; FOMUC, 2004). In a ceremony in
the Chadian town of Goré that included both Central African and Chadian
military officials, each ex-fighter was paid FCFA 1 million (approximately
USD 1,800).227
On 22 May 2007 the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced the Court’s decision to open an investiga-
tion into crimes committed in CAR since 1 July 2002. The ICC is particularly
concerned with abuses by Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC forces in 2002–03, but its
Epilogue 111
jurisdiction also covers those by Patassé’s men, including Abdulaye Miskine’s
armed group, and those by forces loyal to Bozizé. Human rights organiza-
tions such as Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme
(FIDH) and Amnesty International (2004) have documented MLC fighters’
abuses of civilians, with MLC cadres allegedly commonly committing rape at
gunpoint. This investigation marks the first undertaken by the ICC in which
sexual crimes far outnumber fatalities (UN OCHA, 2007a). The ICC was to
establish an office in Bangui to facilitate the investigation.
Rebellion in the north

The armed conflicts currently manifesting in the CAR occur along two primary
axes, the north-west and the north-east.
The conflict in the north-west, primarily centring on the town of Paoua and
its environs, dates to the second half of 2005. Armed men bearing light weap-
ons launched five attacks on border communities in CAR during the period
June–December 2005. Initially, villagers explained the attacks as the start of a
campaign by Patassé to reclaim power (AUPSC, 2005, paras. 11, 12). When on
12 March 2003 the office of President Bozizé acknowledged the attacks as the
work of armed groups rather than simply banditry, as the government had
previously averred, they, too, placed the blame on Patassé. The president
claimed that former president Patassé was the rebellion’s leader and that he
had established a training camp on the Chad border for his MLPC fighters228
(UN OCHA, 2006a).
The conflict that has subsequently unfolded should not be viewed as solely
a political dispute, however. Civilian–military tensions run high as well; in
one confrontation in 2005 an armed gang attacked a truck loaded with ciga-
rettes, under guard by the FACA, and stole its cargo. The soldiers responded
with reprisals against the locals, including burning homes, further alienating
the population from the central state’s embrace.229 In November 2006 Presi-
dent Déby sent 150 soldiers to the border town of Goré to support the FACA’s
operations.
The UNSC identified four main rebel groups in the region in its report of 27
June 2006 (2006a, para. 25). In late 2006 two of them, both led by defectors
from the FACA, appeared to represent the strongest presence on the ground:

An APRD rebel walks through the bush in Boya, July 2007. © Lionel Healing/AFP
the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie

(APRD), whose spokesperson, Jean-Jacques Larmassoum (‘Lieutenant Larma’,
a long-time associate of Patassé), was arrested in Bangui and sentenced to life
in prison on 18 August 2006; and the Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR),
led by Lieut. Florian Ndjadder, the son of a general (now deceased) who was
close to Patassé.
These groups consist of a small core of fighters (one informed source placed
their permanent strength at only 15 men each in late 2006) who draw recruits
from local populations as and when required to carry out operations. The
number of locals expressing loyalty to the groups has swollen as government
soldiers’ reprisals have spread. The groups’ leaders retain control of weaponry,
which includes grenades and automatic weapons.230 Among civilians locally-
made hunting rifles are widespread.
The main effects on the population have been fear and massive displacement.
Entire villages flee into the bush when they hear the sound of approaching
vehicles, whether belonging to rebels or to state forces. By January 2007 UNHCR
estimated that 70,000 had fled the country’s borders, with 48,000 living in the
Epilogue 113
Gondjé, Amboko, and Yaroungou camps near the Chadian town of Goré, and
another 2,000 dispersed along the Chadian side of the border. Another 20,000
live in Cameroon (UNHCR, 2007). A nine-year-old Central African boy reported
to a journalist, ‘We were in the field when we heard gunshots. We joined other
people who were running toward Chad. We had only some utensils we use
for our meals in the field. We abandoned our fields, and our houses contain-
ing the little we own’ (UN OCHA, 2005d). The number of internally displaced
persons is even greater, at 150,000, with 60,000 in the Paoua-area prefectures
of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé alone (UNHCR, 2007).
Humanitarian relief from Médecins sans Frontières (Spain, Holland, and
France branches), Cooperazione Internationale, and the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross have palliated the health effects of the crisis, but the
international response falls short of civilians’ needs. The Inter-Agency Stand-
ing Committee estimated in 2006 that more than 30,000 Central Africans ‘from
the subprefectures of Paoua, Markounda, Batangafo and Kabo are in need of
emergency assistance in the form of basic health care, food, water and sanita-
tion, as well as protection’ (UNSC, 2006a, para. 12). Many villages have been
burned to the ground by either government forces or armed group fighters,
with wells and other critical infrastructure destroyed (MSF, 2006).231
Abdulaye Miskine, the Patassé era militia leader and highway bandit, has
figured in the recent insecurity in the north-west. He met with Bozizé in Sirte,
Libya, in January 2007 and signed a peace agreement on behalf of the Front
démocratique du peuple centrafricain (Democratic Front of the Central Afri-
can People, FDPC). The FDPC was based in the area around Kabo, in north-
central CAR.
In the north-east the unrest bears a more overt relationship to the power
struggles in Chad and Sudan. Rebels opposing the government of Chadian
president Déby have used CAR’s territory as a staging ground since at least
April 2006. The group that led a coup attempt on the Déby government in
April 2006, the Front uni pour le changement démocratique (United Front for
Democratic Change, FUC), has operated in CAR, receiving support from
Khartoum (though its base remains in Darfur) (ICG, 2006). Twenty pick-up
trucks loaded with FUC fighters crossed through CAR territory, a short-cut
from Sudan to Chad, in early April 2006. On 25 and 26 April an Antonov

cargo plane that had in the past been under contract to the UN in Sierra Leone
flew in from the east (Sudan) and commandeered the airstrip in the town of
Tiringoulou.232 On the first day it unloaded some 50 armed, well-equipped
men in combat gear who then disappeared into the countryside.233 On the
second day more military equipment was offloaded (FIDH, 2006, p. 58).234
The CAR government responded by closing its border with Sudan, but ‘there
is every indication that armed individuals have established a foothold in the
north-eastern part of the Central African Republic’ (UNSC, 2006a, para. 27).
Given the greater resources of the Chadian and Sudanese governments, the
security situation in CAR depends to a great extent on the relationship between
its northern neighbours.
At the end of June 2006 clashes between FACA soldiers, FOMUC peace-
keepers, and rebels in the north-eastern town of Gordil left more than 33 com-
batants dead, among them FACA and FOMUC soldiers, and rebels. Civilians,
too, were caught in the crossfire (UN OCHA, 2006c).
Before dawn on 30 October 2006, 50–60 armed men seized the town of Birao,
facing little opposition from the 60 FACA posted there, who fled alongside
the civilian population. The insurgents had timed their advance to follow
two weeks after a troop rotation brought fresh soldiers to the town. The com-
batants took nine vehicles that the FACA had left behind, including two pick-
ups mounted with 12.7 mm heavy machine guns. They also recuperated two
kinds of mortars, a light machine gun, and a PKM machine gun.235 They seized
all of the stockpile’s ammunition as well.236
In the following weeks the armed men, whose on-the-ground spokesperson
‘Captain Yao’ identified them as the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le
Rassemblement (UFDR), took control of the towns of Ouanda Djallé and Sam
Ouadda, and briefly occupied others, such as Ndélé. Their fighters reached as
far south as the town of Mouka. In addition to the FACA stockpiles at Birao,
they claimed all the armament at Ouanda Djallé and Ndélé except the small
arms held by the fleeing soldiers.237
President Bozizé called on France for help. Benefiting from Mirage aerial
support, French soldiers and FACA retook Birao on 27 November and the
other towns in the following days. French soldiers had been dispatched to
larger towns in advance of the rebels’ potential arrival for purposes of secu-
Epilogue 115
ritization and reconnaissance, including to Bria and Ndélé.238 Several months
of relative calm ensued, only to break into open conflict again on 3–4 March
2007, with clashes between the UFDR and soldiers posted at Birao. Seven
hundred and thirty-six civilian homes were destroyed, with both sides bear-
ing some culpability.239
According to rebel spokespeople, UFDR is an umbrella term for several
armed groups based in the region, including Chadian rebels. Among the
leadership with CAR-directed ambitions is, at the political level, Abakar Sabone,
a Chadian ‘ex-liberator’ jailed in Cotonou, Benin.240 Another Chadian ex-lib-
erator headed the level of military strategy: Faki Ahmat (‘Col. Marabout’).
Col. Marabout’s current whereabouts are not certain, but some reports place
him in Khartoum. For military operations on the ground, ‘Capt. Yao’ and
Damane Zakaria, an associate of Patassé who was the mayor of Tiringoulou,
were among the leaders. Yao was the main communicator with the press during
the rebels’ advance. Damane was believed killed during the French/FACA
operations but has subsequently re-emerged to enter into negotiations, includ-
ing with UNICEF over the handover of child soldiers.241
These recent developments reveal the ease with which armed groups can
take CAR towns, for use as a rear base for Chadian and Sudanese fighters as
well as to destabilize the government in Bangui. The FACA’s stockpiles have
proven similarly vulnerable. The active intervention of the French has tempo-
rarily returned stability to the north-east, but the armed rebels remain, better
equipped than before.
Efforts to improve the security situation

Faced with a daunting range of security challenges, the Central African gov-
ernment is endeavouring to calm the situation. International donors have
supported security sector reform and disarmament. Additional programmes
are planned. The conflicts in the country’s northern regions have underscored
the importance of an accountable and effective state force to protect the pop-
ulation. Some of the steps taken towards this still far-off goal are elaborated
below.

Security sector reform
At the end of 2003 the CAR government began restructuring the FACA, with
technical assistance provided by France. French military cooperation in 2004
and 2005 included the training of three FACA battalions. Whereas previously
the FACA had been divided into various divisions that each reported to a
particular leader, by October 2005 all the units reported directly to the military
chief of staff and his deputy (see Figure 5). There were eight such divisions:
bataillon mixte d’intervention et d’appui; bataillon d’infanterie territoriale
no. 1; bataillon d’infanterie territoriale no. 2; bataillion amphibie; bataillion
des services et du soutien ; bataillon du génie; armée de l’air; centre d’instruc-
tion de Kassaï.242 In addition, the Republican Guard became part of the FACA.
FACA soldiers patrol Markunda in Ouham prefecture, July 2008. © Reuters/Emmanuel Braun
Epilogue 117
Figure 5
Organizational chart of the Forces Armées Centrafricaines,
as of October 2005
CEMA
CEMA Deputy
BMIA BIT 1 BIT 2 BA BSS BG AA CIK GR
Notes:
CEMA: Chef d’état major des Armées (Joint Chiefs of Staff)
BMIA: Bataillon mixte d’intervention et d’appui (Mixed Intervention Support Battalion)
BIT 1: Bataillon d’infantrie territoriale no. 1 (Territorial Infantry Battalion 1)
BIT 2: Bataillon d’infantrie territoriale no. 2 (Territorial Infantry Battalion 2)
BA: Bataillon amphibie (Amphibious Battalion)
BSS: Bataillon des services et du soutien (Services and Support Battalion)
BG: Bataillon du génie (Field Regiment)
AA: Armée de l’air (Air Force)
CIK: Centre d’instruction de Kassaï (Kassaï Training Centre)
GR: Garde Républicaine (Republican Guard)
Sources: Written correspondence between Nicolas Florquin and well-informed source, Bangui, 22 October 2005.
With the exception of the Republican Guard, which contains some 1,200
members, the largest FACA division is the bataillion mixte d’intervention et
d’appui, with 650 soldiers. Together with the bataillon d’infantrie territoriale
no. 1 and no. 2, which each have 450 soldiers, it forms the bulk of the FACA’s
operational effectiveness. The other divisions are smaller and are hardly opera-
tional. The FACA’s total strength stands at approximately 5,000 (Frères d’Armes,
2006, p. 19).
By the end of June 2006, three FACA battalions had been restructured, and
a fourth was undergoing training. Despite such progress, the FACA remains
incapable of securing the country’s territory (UNSC, 2006a, para. 29).

France has also provided material assistance to the CAR military, but the
assistance has not included small arms. In July 2006 the CAR ministry of de-
fence announced it would receive a C130 Transall cargo plane for the transport
of heavy equipment to the northern part of the country. French troops and
fighter jets would also arrive to aid the FACA in its efforts (Radio Centrafrique,
2006). French air support was also given earlier in the year, for a FACA and
FOMUC campaign in the north in January 2006.
BONUCA has also assisted in the FACA’s reform. The Military Section has
arranged ‘training courses for battalion command post observers and officers,
auto mechanics and small-calibre weapons technicians’. The Civilian Police
Section has also organized targeted skills courses, which 158 police officers
and 98 gendarmes have completed (UNSC, 2005, paras. 22, 23).
President Bozizé officially designated the Republican Guard a part of the
FACA. The Republican Guard consists of three battalions: the battalion d’honneur;
the battalion provincial; and the battalion de protection et de sécurité des insti-
tutions (BPSI). The bataillon d’honneur and the bataillon provincial report to
the chief of staff of the armed forces, while the BPSI reports directly to the
president.243 The bataillon d’honneur counts 150 members among its ranks,
and the bataillon provincial has 300. The BPSI is by far the largest battalion in
the Republican Guard, with 750 members.244
In contrast to President Patassé’s tenure, when members of the Republican
Guard could be identified by the weapons they carried, under President Bozizé
their armament has dropped to significantly less than one firearm per member
of the Republican Guard.245 However, they remain the government entity with
the greatest power.
The gendarmerie has also benefited from reform. France, through a mili-
tary assistance programme, trained one mobile squadron as well as 200 new
recruits in 2004. Active recruitment and training have increased the force’s
size, with the goal of an expected effective strength of 1, 800 to be achieved by
the first trimester of 2007 (Frères d’Armes, 2006, p. 26). France also donated
2,500 uniforms, 140 vehicles (light vehicles, tactically-equipped pick-ups, and
motorcycles), and radios (Embassy of France in CAR, 2003b; Frères d’Armes,
2006, p. 32). The programme had been carried out by October 2005, and no
changes to the structure of the gendarmerie have been envisioned.246
Epilogue 119
Though France’s support for the state security sector has been the most
extensive, other countries have contributed as well. Morocco also donated
uniforms and vehicles to the gendarmerie shortly after Bozizé took power
(MCE, n.d.). In November 2005 Antoine Gambi, then chief of the general staff
of the CAR, travelled to China. While there, he met with the Chinese minister
of defence, Cao Gangchuan, and the pair pledged enhanced military coopera-
tion on behalf of their respective countries (Xinhua, 2005). Some members of
the state security forces bear Chinese-made Kalashnikovs, believed to be a gift
from China.247
The South African defence minister visited Bangui in December 2006 in the
aftermath of the UFDR’s arrested advance. At the conclusion of his trip he
announced his country would support the CAR government by launching
training for the FACA in the coming weeks. He also noted the material needs
of the state security sector and promised to discuss further military aid with
the cabinet (Pienaar, 2006).
Perhaps to a greater extent than his predecessors, Bozizé endeavoured to
establish full control over the security sector. He himself holds the position of
Minister of Defence, and his son, Francis Bozizé, serves as his second in com-
mand as the Director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence. Rifts within
the military became evident in 2006, however. A government-wide census of
employees undertaken to cull their numbers left those soldiers downsized
aggrieved. In May, the Batallion mixte d’intérvention et appui (Mixed Battalion
for Intervention and Support, BMIA, deployed to the north-east, left their
posts, and began marching towards Bangui upon hearing of plans for their dis-
missal. Bozizé himself, in military uniform, travelled to intercept them and
negotiate their return to his side.
Following an armed group’s surprise attack on Gordil in late June 2006,
Bozizé named his close associate Col. Jules-Bernard Ouandé the head of the
FACA (Frères d’Armes, 2006, p. 18). The ease with which rebels took several
north-eastern towns in November 2006 points to the continuing lack of moti-
vation and poor training of the FACA, however.
Donors have picked up on the continuing lack. Increased efforts, benefiting
from greater involvement and coordination, have been planned for late 2007.

Forces Multinationales de la CEMAC (FOMUC)
Throughout 2003 and 2004 FOMUC conducted patrols to help secure the
capital and the main roads leading from it. When ‘liberators’ who were upset
over lack of payment for their participation in the March 2003 coup stormed
the president’s residence on 17 April 2004, FOMUC responded by disarming
the 410 men and transporting them to Chad. The peacekeepers collected a
total of 58 weapons in this operation (FOMUC, 2004).
Following the extension of its mandate to the full CAR territory in June 2005,
the force has also undertaken missions to help restore calm to rural areas of
the country and facilitate commerce. FOMUC subsequently opened bases at
Bria and Bozoum, both sites from which its soldiers can patrol on multiple
axes. Some 70 peacekeepers arrived in Bria (600 km north-east of Bangui) in
October 2005 to provide security for the region’s artisanal diamond miners, who
are often victimized by coupeurs de route with automatic rifles (AFP, 2005b).
The 80-strong Bozoum unit was deployed in mid-August 2005 (AFP, 2006a).
Members of the FACA and gendarmerie accompanied the FOMUC soldiers,
and French air support was provided in January 2006. After six months of
patrols, the unit’s commander, Congolese Col. Guy-Blaise Kakinda Hellebaut,
declared the efforts to make the region secure a success, with no major high-
way bandit activity. However, local residents remained fearful that FOMUC’s
eventual handover of control to the FACA would result in a return to criminal-
ity, as they accuse members of the FACA of harassment and failure to pursue
robbers (AFP, 2006a).
In December 2006 FOMUC was in the process of constructing an additional
base at Kaga Bandoro. All three bases were to be handed over to the FACA by
April 2007.248
Towards a national strategy for small arms control

During President Bozizé’s tenure, the Central African government has placed
an emphasis on controlling the proliferation of small arms. Through a presi-
dential decree, Bozizé created the Commission nationale de désarmement,
démobilisation et réinsertion (National Commission for Disarmament, Demo-
bilization, and Reintegration, CNDDR) on 14 September 2004. The CNDDR
Epilogue 121
was charged with carrying out the recommendations established through the
United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weap-
ons in all its Aspects, held in New York in July 2001 (CAR, 2004).
Programme for Reintegration and Assistance to Communities (PRAC)

The CNDDR managed its first programme to control small arms proliferation
jointly with UNDP. Together, they launched the USD 13 million Programme
de réinsertion et d’appui aux communautés (Programme for Reintegration
and Assistance to Communities, PRAC), with funding from the World Bank.
The PRAC began on a trial basis in December 2004 and expanded to other
areas of the country the following June (UN OCHA, 2005c). Initially, based on
lists of fighters provided by the government, the PRAC aimed to demobilize
7,565 ex-combatants. After programme staff scrutinized the lists, cross-checking
tallies given by the CNDDR, the leaders of the armed groups, and the prefec-
ture and arrondissement-level disarmament committees, they reduced this
number to 5,447 in February 2006.249 In the end, though, 7,556 disarmed. The
programme covered Bangui and its environs, as well as the prefectures of
Ouham, Ouham-Pendé, Nana-Grébizi, and Kemo through its field offices in
Sibut, Bozoum, and Bossangoa (PRAC, 2006b). Rather than offering cash for
weapons relinquished, the PRAC’s staff distributed a kit of household goods
to ex-combatants and followed up with training, primarily in agriculture and
building, and micro-credit initiatives. Some community-wide development
projects were to be undertaken as well (PRAC, 2005).
By the end of July 2005 a total of 868 ex-combatants had been demobilized.
Of these 282 were women. The former fighters handed in 235 weapons and
21,823 pieces of ordnance. The small number of arms collected reflects the
fact that many of the ex-combatants had already been disarmed by the FACA,
one of the several peacekeeping missions in CAR, or Chadian soldiers who
assisted Bozizé following the March 2003 coup. People not on the lists of ex-
combatants also arrived with weapons at the disarmament sites, hoping to
benefit from the training and micro-credit offered in exchange for weapons.
Their eagerness to give up their arms—even in prefectures home to insecurity
(Ouham and Ouham-Pendé, for instance)—in exchange for material assist-
ance suggests that broader-based arms recuperation efforts, such an arms for
development project, could be successful in CAR (PRAC, 2005).

Table 20
Ex-combatants demobilized, by location, as of December 2006
Location Number
Bangui
First arrondissement 383
Second arrondissement 748
Third arrondissement 648
Fourth arrondissement 568
Fifth arrondissement 818
Sixth arrondissement 718
Seventh arrondissement 819
Eighth arrondissement 685
Bégoua (just outside Bangui) 1,147
Bimbo (capital of Ombella-M’poko prefecture) 332
Ouham Prefecture 212
Ouham-Pendé Prefecture 191
Kémo-Gribingui Prefecture 140
Nana-Grébizi Prefecture 147
Total 7,556
Source: PRAC (2006b)
By the completion of the disarmament and demobilization phases at the

end of 2006, 7,556 ex-combatants had been demobilized (see Table 20). These
former fighters turned in a total of 419 small arms (see Table 21). Most of
these arms and munitions were voluntarily turned in by the civilian popula-
tion, not the ex-combatants (PRAC, 2007). In all, very few weapons were col-
lected for the cost of the project. The recuperated arms represent but a small
fraction of the arms currently circulating in CAR.
There remains a discrepancy between the list of ex-combatants the PRAC
verified as eligible for the programme and those ex-combatants actually de-
mobilized. Even with the extensive efforts made in the verification process,
Epilogue 123
Table 21
Weapons collected by the PRAC, 30 June–31 December 2005
Site Arms Cartridges Grenades Mortar Mines Rockets Other

shells effects*
Bangui &
environs 371 65,579 1,376 565 5 5 537
Bossangoa &
Bozoum 28 4,526 39 0 0 6 89
Sibut &
Kaga-Bandoro 20 2,574 14 2 1 2 1
Total 419 72,679 1,429 567 6 13 627
Notes:
Some variation exists in the final tallies for arms collected by the PRAC. The figures given here are as of February 2007.
* Chargers, uniforms, or pieces of weapons.
Source: PRAC (2007)
these eventual differences illustrate how difficult it is to disarm and demobi-

lize armed groups that have long been inactive. Much of the collected arma-
ment came from those who had not taken part in any armed group. Some of
the armed groups targeted by the PRAC, such as the pro-Patassé militias,
were more loose networks than formal entities, and a decade has passed since
their creation, during which time they effectively disbanded.250 The PRAC’s
emphasis on these ex-combatants as beneficiaries, and the apparently few
weapons they had to relinquish, prevented some of the people holding arms
who lack an affiliation with a defunct armed group from turning in their
weapons. The rise of armed groups outside of Bangui at the same time as the
PRAC carried out its operations underscores the scope of the weapons prolif-
eration that the programme left unaddressed.
By June 2006 some ex-combatants had launched protests against the PRAC,
arguing that the programme was poorly run and that the reintegration assist-
ance they had been promised had fallen far short of expectations. They also
accused the programme of an ethnic bias in favour of the Gbaya, Bozizé’s affilia-
tion (Le Confident, 2006b). Protests occurred throughout the rest of 2006, with
ex-combatants massing outside the PRAC’s offices. Programme officials ex-
plained the unrest as a consequence of the slow disbursal of funds from World

Bank headquarters, leading to delays in provision of reintegration assistance.
Whatever the case, it is clear that communication between the various part-
ners in the programme was poor.
Commission Against the Proliferation of Small Arms,

for Disarmament and Reintegration (CNPDR)
The CNDDR also aimed to articulate a national strategy for small arms con-
trol that would place particular emphasis on civilian armament. With that
goal in mind, the CNDDR and UNDP co-organized a National Workshop on
the Proliferation of Small Arms in CAR. The workshop took place between 18
and 22 October 2005. The workshop enabled representatives of various min-
istries and other public sector representatives to create institutional mecha-
nisms for coordinating measures against small arms trafficking. Participants
also worked to name the various factors influencing the proliferation of small
arms in CAR, the principal actors involved in the trade, and the major axes of
a national strategy for small arms control (CNDDR, 2005).
The workshop identified the five main areas that should define the national
strategy on small arms:
s the restoration of confidence and security, as well as the reinforcement of

the reconciliation process, especially through the professionalization of the
defence and security forces;
s the reinforcement of the legislative, regulatory, and institutional aspects of
small arms;
s the reinforcement of mechanisms for internal control of small arms, with
particular emphasis on the governance of state stockpiles;
s the reduction of the number of small arms in circulation by encouraging
civilians to relinquish their weapons, which would then be destroyed; and
s the reinforcement of cooperation mechanisms at the subregional, regional,
and international levels.
To coordinate these activities, the workshop recommended the creation of

a Commission nationale contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit
calibre, pour le désarmement et la reinsertion (National Commission Against
the Proliferation of Small Arms, for Disarmament and Reintegration, CNPDR),
Epilogue 125
which would replace the former CNDDR with a broader mandate. The new
CNPDR will formulate a plan of action taking into account the recommenda-
tions of the workshop, as well as the underlying causes of small arms prolif-
eration. It will also design various initiatives under the rubric of ‘arms for
development’ whereby civilians will trade arms for development assistance.
The presidential decree creating the CNPDR was finalized in September 2006.251
Tripartite Commission (CAR, Cameroon, Chad)

on Cross-Border Security
On 25–26 August 2005, representatives of the governments of CAR, Cameroon,
and Chad met in Yaoundé to discuss the causes of cross-border insecurity
and develop a plan for improving the situation. The meeting resulted in a
number of recommendations, including:
s ‘Careful deployment of units along high-risk highways and areas;

s Strengthening the capacity of the defence and security forces on the ground
(number of men, transport facilities, signals and information);
s Involving the local administrative and traditional authorities in informing
and creating awareness among the people;
s Intensifying information exchange on security;
s Notifying one another before carrying out planned operations in the border
areas, with the possibility of exchanging liaison officers, using air facilities
for observation, and conducting joint operations’ (AUPSC, 2005, para. 17).
To ensure that these measures will be fully carried out, the delegates at the
meeting recommended that a Tripartite Commission on Cross-Border Security
be established. The commission’s members would be drawn from defence and
security forces in the three countries, as well as local administrative officials
(AUPSC, 2005, para. 19).
The Commission’s resolutions were quickly implemented. The measure
enabling the three countries’ security forces to cross their common borders in
pursuit of armed groups and other criminals initially helped prevent any of
the armed groups currently operating in CAR from establishing long-term
bases (UNSC, 2006a, para. 26). Chadian soldiers currently patrol the cross-
border area around Goré, for instance. However, beginning in 2006, north-

eastern-based rebels operated from bases in the Gordil–Tiringoulou area.
This deterioration shows how patrolling such a vast, sparsely populated ter-
rain remains far beyond the state security sector’s capabilities, even given the
regional coordination.
Conclusion
Between 1996 and 2003 a series of events profoundly transformed Central
African society, and the years since have shown the depth of the challenges
that transformation brought about. The government at the time bears respon-
sibility for some of those events, but others were outside of its control. The
capacity of the state to regulate the possession and circulation of small arms
among civilians disolved, to become virtually non-existent. The CNPDR began
its effort in that regard essentially from scratch. The influx of small arms in
large parts of the country represents a huge challenge for national security
and the maintenance of public order. The eagerness of the population to relin-
quish their weapons in exchange for some form of economic assistance is a sign
that a concerted effort could improve the situation, however.
People gather at a hospital in Kabo, December 2007. © Spencer Platt/ Getty Images
Epilogue 127
The UNSC has recognized that the ‘conflicts in Chad, Darfur and CAR are
increasingly interlinked’ (2006b, para. 53), and is considering the deployment
of UN blue helmets to Birao, in north-east CAR. Such a presence could help
control the porous border and contribute to securing the full measure of the
country’s terrain. Steps taken thus far to control the proliferation of small arms
have achieved modest progress in some areas. But, somewhat paradoxically,
such programmes have perhaps mainly served to draw attention to how the
path to security across CAR’s territory appears ever-lengthening.

ANNEX
Chronology of Key Events in CAR’s History
1894
France declares the region now known as CAR the ‘Ubangi-Shari dependency’.
1910
Ubangi-Shari becomes part of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa.
1946
France grants the territory a national assembly and representation in the French
parliament; Barthélemy Boganda becomes the first Central African to serve in
the French parliament.
1 December 1958
France grants the territory self-government within French Equatorial Africa;
Boganda assumes the position of prime minister.
29 March 1959
Boganda dies in a plane crash.
13 August 1960
France grants CAR independence; David Dacko assumes the presidency.
1962
Creation of the FACA.
5 January 1964
Dacko wins presidential election in which he is the only candidate.
31 December 1965
Bokassa leads the ambush and assassination of the commander of the gen-
darmerie, Jean Izamo.
1 January 1966
The FACA take control of Bangui and Bokassa assumes power.
Annex Chronology of Key Events in CAR’s History 129

10 November 1967
A French paratrooper detachment (the 11th Intervention Division) is sent to
Bangui at Bokassa’s request; France describes the move as a ‘tropical country
acclimatization exercise’.
11–12 April 1969

Arrest and execution of Lt. Col. Alexandre Banza, accused of a plot against the
president’s life.
4 March 1972
The CAR government names Bokassa president for life.
20 May 1974
Bokassa pronounces himself a marshal.
3 February 1976
The commander of the air force (Bokassa’s son-in-law), his brother, and another
officer attempt to assassinate Bokassa at the airport in Bangui. All three are
killed in the ensuing violent crackdown.
November 1976
Military officers again attempt to assassinate Bokassa.
4 December 1977
Bokassa declares himself emperor of the ‘Central African Empire’ in a lavish
ceremony.
19–22 January 1979

Students and unemployed youth demonstrate in Bangui. The government
responds with violent repression, backed up by 300 Zairian paratroopers sent
by Mugabe to support his CAR ally.
18–19 April 1979

Some 100 children aged 8–16 rounded up and killed, some by Bokassa him-
self. Amnesty International makes the massacre known to the world in a report
issued a few weeks later.
17 August 1979
France, bowing to international pressure, stops all but humanitarian aid to CAR.

20–21 September 1979
French soldiers, facing little resistance, take over the airport and city of Bangui
while Bokassa visits Tripoli.
27 September 1979
David Dacko forms a government of which he is the head.
19–24 December 1980

Bokassa condemned to death in absentia by a Bangui court.
9 January 1981
320 French troops dispatched to Bangui to support the struggling president.
21 July 1981
Marshal law declared.
1 September 1981
Under pressure from Col. Mantion, Dacko cedes power, naming Chief of Staff
André Kolingba president.
2 September 1981
Kolingba forms the CMRN.
3 March 1982
Minister of Information François Bozizé announces on the state radio that
there has been a coup and that Ange-Félix Patassé is the new president.
4 March 1982
The Presidential Guard, led by Col. Mantion, represses the attempted coup.
January 1985
24 poachers arrested and elephant hunting is formally forbidden by law.
19 September 1993
Kolingba loses presidential election to Ange-Félix Patassé, a prime minister
under Bokassa.
18 April 1996
200–300 FACA soldiers mutiny in protest at salary arrears; payment from
France brings an uncertain calm to the situation.

18 May 1996
For a second time, FACA mutiny in protest at salary arrears, this time drawing
in some 700 disgruntled soldiers to their cause.
26 May 1996
The rebellion ends with peace accords granting amnesty to the mutineers and
allowing them to retain their weapons, signed in Bangui.
15 November 1996
Third FACA mutiny; some 800 soldiers join the cause.
26 November 1996
Mutineers demand that Patassé cede the presidency.
4 January 1997
Two French soldiers killed by mutineers; French troops launch violent reprisal.
25 January 1997
Signing of the Bangui Accords, providing for an inter-African peacekeeping
force in CAR.
12 February 1997
MISAB peacekeeping force dispatched to CAR; disarmament initiative starts.
20–22 June 1997

Confrontations between mutineers and MISAB peacekeepers leave 100–200
dead, but bring political calm for a time.
15 April 1998
MISAB replaced by MINURCA; weapons collection programmes continue
and MINURCA remains until February 2000. As part of a major reduction in
the French military presence in Africa, the final contingent of French troops
leaves CAR.
November 2000
180,000 civil servants strike in protest at the 29 months’ salary arrears they
are owed. The strike lasts nearly five months.
December 2001
CEN-SAD peacekeepers arrive.

27–28 May 2001
Coup attempt by Kolingba and supporters; Libyan soldiers, with MLC fighters,
help keep Patassé in power.
7 June 2001
Combat ends in Bangui.
26 October 2001
François Bozizé fired from his position as Chief of Staff of the armed forces,
accused of involvement in the May coup attempt.
3–8 November 2001

Fighting breaks out in Bangui between soldiers loyal to Bozizé and those loyal
to Patassé; with the help of 180 Libyan soldiers, Patassé chases Bozizé and his
supporters northward out of the city and calm returns to the capital.
23 January 2002
PNDR commences.
October 2002
Unsuccessful coup attempt by armed forces Chief of Staff François Bozizé; he
retreats north to regroup and assemble more fighters and weapons.
October 2002
Bemba and MLC fighters return, committing rape, looting, and murder with
impunity.
January 2003
CEN-SAD replaced by CEMAC.
15 February 2003
Chadian President Idriss Deby visits Bangui, which the public perceives as a
visit of reconciliation; the same day MLC troops start pulling out of CAR.
15 March 2003
Patassé ousted in successful coup by Bozizé.
September–October 2003
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission holds hearings; former leaders
apologize for their past mistakes, but Patassé is not invited.

4 December 2004
New constitution approved with 90 per cent of the vote in a referendum.
December 2004
PNDR ends.
24 May 2005
Bozizé declared the winner of 8 May presidential elections.
June 2005
PRAC begins.
25–26 April 2006

An Antonov cargo plane, originating from Sudan, commandeers an airstrip
at the northern CAR town of Tiringoulou, offloading armed men and military
equipment.
26–27 June 2006

Members of the FACA and FOMUC clash with rebels in the town of Gordil,
leaving at least 33 dead.
September 2006
CNDDR becomes CNPDR.
30 October–November 2006
Rebels seize Birao and other towns in north-east.
27 November 2006
French soldiers and FACA retake Birao; other rebel-held towns return to the
state in following days.
Chronology sources: Kalck (1992; 2005); Balencie and de la Grange (2001); various IRIN news articles

Endnotes
1 The term ‘small arms’ encompasses the following weapons: revolvers and self-loading pistols,
rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light machine guns. Light weapons
are defined as heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers,
portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and
anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre (UNGA, 1997). The UN
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All its Aspects highlights a wide range of negative consequences associated with
the proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons. These include: increasing the
intensity of contemporary conflicts; diminishing the security of vulnerable groups such as
women and children or refugees and internally displaced persons; increasing the violence
associated with large-scale criminal activity (and the concomitant burden on the criminal jus-
tice system); eroding development gains and the prospects for socio-economic development;
threatening humanitarian relief operations and workers; and increasing the public health
burden associated with firearms violence (UNGA, 2001).
2 Bozizé was one of the authors of an unsuccessful coup against the Kolingba regime in March
1982, which aimed to install Patassé as president (Kalck, 1992, p. 33). After failing in his bid
for the presidency in 1993, he became Patassé’s chief of staff of the armed forces. Throughout
the army mutinies of the 1990s, he was known as a loyal supporter of Patassé (Jones, 2003;
Kalck, 2005, p. 33).
3 The name Ubangi-Shari (also written as Oubangui-Chari) comes from the name of the river
that represents much of the territory’s southern border, the Ubangui, and headwaters of the
Shari river, which empties into Lake Chad and originates in the town of the same name in the
northern prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran.
4 Cameroon’s first president, Ahmadou Ahidjou, was only the second head of state on the
continent to voluntarily relinquish power (the first having been Senegal’s Leopold Senghor,
who stepped down in 1981). Ahidjou had a change of heart and led a coup attempt the follow-
ing year, but it was quickly put down.
5 Elements of the army mutinied on three separate occasions in 1996: in April, May, and November
(McFarlane and Malan, 1998, pp. 49–51).
6 Author interviews with knowledgeable sources, Bangui, June and December 2003.
7 Barthélemy Boganda, universally recognized as the ‘father’ of the country even though he
was killed in a mysterious plane crash a year prior to independence, was also an Ngbaka
(from Bobangui). Both Dacko and Bokassa claimed to be related to Boganda, although some
have questioned Dacko’s ties.
8 The brutal methods employed by government forces during the Bokassa era may have deterred
opponents from taking up arms.
9 One group, the Mouvement centrafricain de libération nationale (MCLN), was created in
1979, but initially received training and equipment outside of CAR. It was quickly uprooted
Endnotes 135
and neutralized after an attack in Bangui in 1981. The Mouvement de libération du peuple
centrafricain (MLPC), a CAR-based political party, began to receive arms after the 1981 gen-
eral election (in which it failed in its bid to capture the presidency). See Part II.
10 The acronym ‘AK-47’ refers explicitly to the Kalashnikov AK-47. Because the term is often
used to refer to a variety of weapons that are derived from the basic AK-47 design, the term
‘Kalashnikov’ is used here to refer to these derivatives and not to a specific model or country
of origin.
11 The number of French troops stationed in CAR was believed to be some 8,000 by the end of
the 1980s (Decalo, 1989, p. 171), up from a little more than 1,000 earlier in the decade (Keegan,
1983, p. 100).
12 Security Council resolution 1159 authorized MINURCA on 27 March 1998 to be established
on 15 April 1998 (UNSC, 1998c). The French troops stationed at the bases were withdrawn
and preparations for the closing of the bases made during the month-long Operation Cigogne
(stork), in preparation for the official handover of the bases to the CAR authorities by 6 April
1998 (Kalck, 2005, p. liv). French troops participated in MINURCA, which benefited from
supplemental French military support not part of the mission (see, for example, UNSC
1998d; 1998e).
13 The figures for the air force come from Frères d’Armes (2000), p. 28. The strength of the navy
comes from an author interview with Jean-Jacques Demafouth, former Minister of Defence,
Government of CAR, Geneva, 8 April 2003.
14 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported in 2001 that 1,250
former FACA troops crossed into the DRC after the failed coup (UNHCR, 2001b). Around 80
per cent went to a town some 100 kilometres from Zongo, across the Ubangui River from
Bangui. The other 20 per cent or so remained in Congolese villages along the river (UNHCR,
2001a).
15 Author interview with Jean-Jacques Demafouth, former Minister of Defence, Government
of CAR, Paris, 3 September 2003.
16 The resident French diplomatic adviser, in place since Operation Barracuda in 1979, was Col.
Jean-Claude Mantion. He instigated Kolingba’s ascent to power in 1981 without consulting
his government in Paris, and, as head of the Presidential Guard, suppressed the attempted
coup in 1982. He and the French ambassador were pulled from the country in 1993 follow-
ing civilian unrest due to disgruntlement with the Kolingba government, a move that paved
the way for a return to democracy (Milburn, 2004; Kalck, 2005, p. 128). While he served in
Bangui, some observers dubbed Col. Mantion the ‘President of Kolingba’ for his broad reach
over the government’s operations, including at times negotiating on its behalf (Decalo, 1989,
p. 169). Other sobriquets included ‘the Viceroy’ and ‘Clint Eastwood’ (Kalck, 2005, p. 128).
17 Interview by Nicolas Florquin with well-informed source, Geneva, September 2004.
18 Interview by Louisa Lombard with well-informed source, Bangui, December 2006.
19 Author interview with Jean-Jacques Demafouth, former Minister of Defence, Government of
CAR, Geneva, 9 April 2003.

21 Author interview with Ernest Latakpi, General Director, Police Administration, Ministry of
Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 19 December 2003. There are plans to create two addi-
tional ‘directions’: Direction des études (DE) and Direction de la surveillance territoire (DST).
Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 19 December 2003.
Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 19 December 2003.
24 Author interview with Louis Mazangue, Director, OCRB, Ministry of Interior, Government
of CAR, Bangui, 18 February 2003.
Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 27 June 2003.
Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 27 June 2003.
27 The Gardes forestiers, Gardes chasse, and Personnels des circonscriptions minières de diamant,
respectively.
28 Author interview with Michel Bonannée, water and forest engineer, head of mission, Ministry
of Water, Forests, Hunting, and Fishing, Government of CAR, Bangui, 17 December 2003.
29 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Jean-Yves Socart, Director, Powers Security Company,
Bangui, 13 December 2006.
31 Author interview with knowledgeable source by telephone, 5 April 2005.
32 In January 1979 the government used deadly force in response to protests against Bokassa’s
orders for students to wear school uniforms, which had also led to some looting. Some 200
civilians were killed. In a separate altercation in April 1979, security forces rounded up elemen-
tary and high-school students, which resulted in the massacre of more than 100 young people.
Bokassa was widely believed to have participated in the killings (O’Toole, 1986, pp. 53–54).
33 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Bangui, June 2003.
34 Author interview with Richard Carroll, Director, Africa and Madagascar Program, World
Wildlife Fund (US), 6 August 2003, by telephone.
35 Interview by Louisa Lombard with knowledgeable source, Bangui, June 2003.
36 On 15 March 1981 Dacko won the presidency with a majority of less than 0.25% in an election
marked by widespread fraud. Violence erupted in Bangui over the result, and the country
remained instable in the following months (Kalck, 1992, pp. xl–xli).
37 Interview with Jean-Pierre Waboe, Chief of Staff, Ministry of Health, Government of CAR,
Bangui, 26 June 2003, courtesy of Louisa Lombard.
38 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Tom Zoellner, 7 August 2006, by telephone.
39 Written correspondence with knowledgeable source, 2003.
40 Capt. Serge Kolingba and former FACA lieutenant Antoine Bodo were the suspected leaders
of a plot to create a Yakoma militia. Bodo was murdered at his home on the night of 18–19
November 1999, along with four suspected witnesses, and their bodies were dumped beside
the road. Press reports and human rights groups alleged that the killers were members of
FORSDIR (US DOS, 2000).
Endnotes 137
41 ‘Oscar Leaba’ posits Kolingba did not instigate the coup, but rather was a front man doing
others’ bidding. See Leaba (pseudonym), 2001, p. 170.
42 Author interview with Joseph Ngozo, translator, Embassy of the United States in CAR, June
2003.
43 Most of these smaller neighbourhoods have a historic link to a particular region or ethnic
group in the country. There are no laws or physical boundaries (other than streets) separating
quartiers, but people have tended to settle among family members, and over time the ethnic
character of these areas has made them distinct. This is so even though intermarriage is not
uncommon. Patrilineal descent is prevalent throughout the society.
44 Interview by Nicolas Florquin and Louisa Lombard with informed source, Bangui, August
2004.
of CAR, Geneva, 8 April 2003.
46 The SCPS provided security for logging companies, diamond mining interests, and those
responsible for sensitive deliveries, such as those of money. Author interview with Jean-
Jacques Demafouth, former Minister of Defence, Government of CAR, Paris, 3 September
2003.
47 Written correspondence with Olivier Nyirubugara, former IRIN correspondent in Bangui,
31 March 2005.
of CAR, Paris, 16 June 2003.
49 In fact, Miskine’s father was Chadian and his mother was Central African, and he grew up
in Chad. Interview by Louisa Lombard with Marielle Debos, Ph.D. candidate in political
science, Sciences-Po, New York, 9 January 2007.
50 Author interviews with knowledgeable sources, Bangui, February and June 2003.
52 Under an October 2002 agreement, Bangui and N’Djamena committed themselves to ensuring
that Bozizé would leave Chad for France and that Miskine would leave CAR for Togo. See
UN OCHA (2002a).
53 Allegations were made in 2005 that Miskine was the head of a rebel group in northern CAR,
the Forces pour la démocratie du peuple centrafricain (FDPC). This group took responsibil-
ity for clashes with the FACA near the town of Débora in June 2005 (Alwidha, 2005). Miskine
has subsequently adopted the name ‘Brahim Moustapha’ and heads an armed group perpe-
trating continued attacks in the north (see Epilogue) (UNSC, 2006a, para. 25; Le Confident,
2006a).
54 Author interview with well-informed source, Bangui, June 2003.
55 Interview with Maj. Anicet Saulet, Officer in Charge of Special Duties, Ministry of Territorial
Administration, Government of CAR, Bangui, 20 December 2003.
56 Written correspondence between Nicolas Florquin and Jean-Pierre Perez, Military Advisor
to the President, Central African Republic, 22 October 2005; Interview by Louisa Lombard
with Alain Pietrantoni, Security Officer, World Food Programme (WFP), Bangui, 17 Decem-
ber 2006.

57 Quartier residents, who had formed their self-defence group at the initiative of Col. Nambou
André Marie of the Ministry of Water and Forests (ID+, 2003).
58 Author interview with Thierry Arthur Mokonou, security guard, King Security Service,
59 It did not prove possible to locate or meet with Golf and Secuveille representatives during a
December 2003 visit to Bangui.
60 Author interviews with Ghislain Bandakouma, General Director, Boxer (Security Company),
and Joachim Coles Daouda, Director for Administration and Finances, Bureau centrafricain
de gardiennage et de surveillance (BCAGS), Bangui, 17 and 18 December 2003, respectively.
61 Author interview with Dina Aziali, secretary, AGIP (Agence de gardiennage d’intervention
de protection et de sécurité privée)-Cobra, Bangui,16 December 2003.
62 As of December 2006 only Fox still equipped its guards with blank-firing pistols; BCAGS
and Cobra no longer used the weapons, and the latter had at most a few employees. Inter-
view by Louisa Lombard with Jean-Yves Socart, Director, Powers Security, Bangui, 13 Decem-
ber 2006.
63 Author interview with Roger Dibert-Kongba, inspector, Fox sécurité privée, Bangui, 18 Decem-
ber 2003.
64 Author interview with Dina Aziali, secretary, AGIP-Cobra, Bangui, 16 December 2003.
65 See Blom, Prins, and Yamindou (2004).
66 Bangui was discussing conservation projects in the Bangassou forest and the Chinko Basin.
69 Author interviews with: Raymond Mbitikon, head, Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises com-
ponent, CAR Office, ECOFAC, Bangui, 18 December 2003; Gérard Motkin, administrative
and financial director, CAR Office, ECOFAC, Bangui, 18 December 2003; and Alain Penelon,
head, Ngotto Forest component, CAR Office, ECOFAC, Bangui, 19 December 2003.
70 Written correspondence with Olivier Feneteau, technical adviser, Zones Cynégétiques Villa-
geoises component, CAR Office, ECOFAC, 7 August 2003.
Wildlife Fund (US), 6 August 2003, by telephone.
72 These figures are based on the ratios 886:555 and 61:315, respectively. It is assumed that the
weapons of French personnel attached to these services were included in the totals (68 French
nationals were attached to the gendarmerie and 7 to the police). If these French personnel
kept their weapons separately, the ratios for the Central African gendarmerie and police
would rise to 1.82 and 0.20, respectively. The ratios for the Republican Guard and the army
were nearly identical: 1.35 (907:672), and 1.34 (1,017:761), respectively. The ratio for the Repub-
lican Guard would not change if the two French personnel attached to the service had kept
their weapons outside of the state armouries; but if this were true for the 110 French personnel
attached to the army, that service’s multiplier would rise to 1.56 (SHAT, 1963, pp. 34, 38, 49,
57, 62).
Endnotes 139
of CAR, Paris, 11 December 2003.
74 Interview by Nicolas Florquin with Jean-Jacques Demafouth, former Minster of Defence,
Government of CAR, 23 March 2005, by telephone (courtesy of Nicolas Florquin).
75 Author interview with Jean-Jacques Demafouth, former Minster of Defence, Government of
CAR, 23 March 2005, by telephone.
76 Author interview with Lucy Jones, former Reuters correspondent, 5 August 2003, by telephone.
22 March 2005.
78 Author interviews with knowledgeable sources, Bangui, February and June 2003.
79 For more information on the Dominion of Melchizedek and a copy of the a letter dated 3 June
1993 apparently on CAR government stationery and signed by Kolingba that recognizes the
Dominion’s sovereignty and calls for a ‘mutually beneficial relationship between our two
countries’, see <http://www.melchizedek.com/images/centralafrican.jpg>. Written corre-
spondence between the author and Sir Richard James McDonald, President of the Dominion
of Melchizedek, 1 August 2007.
80 According to UN Comtrade, Bangui has reported to have received small arms, parts, and
ammunition from 14 countries: Belgium, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, France,
Germany (both the former Federal Republic of Germany and the current unified Germany),
Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
An equal number of countries have reported transferring such matériel to Bangui, according
to UN Comtrade: Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany
(both the former Federal Republic and the present unified Germany), Lebanon, Portugal,
Romania, Senegal, Spain, and Switzerland. CAR’s reported imports often differ significantly
from supplier countries’ reported exports to CAR. Courtesy of research undertaken by NISAT/
PRIO. Written correspondence with Nic Marsh, 11 August 2006.
81 In 1995 Romania supplied USD 1.125 million worth of light weapons and larger ammuni-
tion (930690). This category has 86 sub-categories and includes light weapons as well as
larger conventional weapons. For more on this category see Glatz (2006, p. 72).
82 France was concerned that President Bokassa was prepared to grant Libya a military base in
CAR, as well as access to uranium deposits, in exchange for financial and military aid, and
that Libyan President Moammar Qadhafi appeared amenable to such a deal. France viewed
such a strategic relationship as a threat to its access to uranium deposits in CAR (Moose,
1985, p. 81).
83 Also important to the maintenance of stability was Col. Jean-Claude Mantion, a French
military adviser in Bangui, whose reach across the government was broad; he ‘“takes key
decisions, is responsible for security and issues passports. No change in the country can take
place without his approval . . . Emperors and generals may come and go, but the French
presence remains”’ (Decalo, 1989, p. 171, quoting an Africa Confidential report).
84 This is not to suggest that France was responsible for its ineffectiveness. Indeed, only France
provided military and financial assistance to the force. Reports of Chinese and German assist-
ance are inaccurate. Both countries pledged aid, but this assistance had yet to be disbursed
by the time of the March 2003 coup.

85 Author interview with Col. Patrice Sartre, military adviser, Secretary General of National
Defence, Office of the Prime Minister, Paris, 18 June 2003.
86 Interview with Jean-Jacques Demafouth, former Minister, Ministry of Defence, Central African
government, 9 April 2003, Geneva.
87 Interview with Lt.-Col. Daniel Taes, Defense Attaché, French Embassy to the Central African
Republic, 18 February 2003, Bangui.
88 Qadhafi offered training in Libya to several hundred members of the MCLN, headed by
Rudolphe Iddi Lala. In 1979 Qadhafi sent MCLN cadres to Chad to fight on behalf of his ally,
Goukkoni Weddeye. Iddi Lala eventually made his way back to CAR, where he orchestrated
the July 1981 bombing of a Bangui cinema. The MCLN was rooted out and shortly after the
blast ceased to be a coherent force or threat. Author interview with Jean-Jacques Demafouth,
former Minister of Defence, Government of CAR, Geneva, 8 April 2003.
89 One of the reasons given for France’s decision to support Bokassa’s overthrow, besides his
regime’s gross human rights abuses, was Bokassa’s close ties to Tripoli.
90 Written correspondence with Siemon Wezeman, researcher, Arms Transfers Project, Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute, 2 June 2003.
91 O’Toole notes that Kolingba’s interest in re-engaging Tripoli might best be explained as a cal-
culated move to win greater assistance from France. Dacko had previously severed diplomatic
relations with Libya in January 1980 (O’Toole, 1986, pp.137–38).
92 Patassé had returned from exile in Togo to his birthplace, Paoua. He was still smarting over
the March 1981 national elections, which he—and many others including impartial observers—
believed Dacko had rigged, thereby denying Patassé victory. Ironically, a year later Bozizé,
then Minister of Information, announced a coup d’état in support of Patassé. However, the
announcement turned out to be premature as the Presidential Guard, under French com-
mand, successfully intervened in support of Kolingba (Kalck, 1992, p. xlii).
CAR, Geneva, 8 April 2003. The area of this activity lay south of Sahr and Doba, the capitals
of the southern Chadian prefectures of Moyen-Chari and Logone Orientale, respectively,
and north of the Central African towns of Paoua and Bazoua in Ouham-Pendé and Ouham
prefectures, respectively.
94 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Washington, DC, 2003.
95 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Washington, DC, 2003.
96 Some analysts value the matériel at more than USD 1 billion (see Foltz, 1995, p. 29). Iraq pur-
portedly benefited most from this windfall. Author interview with William J. Foltz, H.J. Heinz
Professor of African Studies and Political Science, Yale University, 25 August 2003, by telephone.
97 Author interview with knowledgable source, Bangui, February 2003.
98 Author interview with Maj. Namboro Kette, cabinet chief of the head of the general staff,
Bangui, 27 June 2003.
99 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Bangui, February 2003.
100 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Bangui, February 2003.
101 Indeed, Bangui denies having used or possessed mines (UN OCHA, 2002b). CAR signed
and ratified the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use Stockpiling Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction on 8 November 2002.
Endnotes 141
102 In this regard CAR is not alone: many poor African countries frequently switch diplomatic
relations between China and Taiwan. Examples include Chad and Liberia.
103 CAR would have taken notice of China’s lack of enthusiasm for the proposed UN peacekeep-
ing mission in Guatemala. China originally vetoed the resolution—Guatemala maintained
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China subsequently relented and approved the mission,
but ensured that it would be small in scale and in existence for a short period.
105 Interview by Louisa Lombard with knowledgable source, Bangui, 13 December 2006.
106 In addition to disbursing development assistance and establishing business interests (see
Decter, 1977, pp. 36–37), Israel created and trained the Jeunesse pionnière nationale (National
Youth Service), a youth corps designed to inculcate civic pride and national identity. The
trainers tended to be military officers. A 1963 document in the French military archives detail-
ing arms holdings with the armed forces, gendarmerie, and police did not mention any Israeli
weapons or provision of weapons from Israel (SHAT, 1963).
107 In his extensive review of Israeli arms transfers, Aaron Klieman states only that Israel is
‘regarded’ as having provided military assistance to CAR, but offers no further information
(1985, p. 139).
108 Written correspondence between Louisa Lombard and Allard Blom, Senior Programme Officer,
WWF, 2 August 2006.
109 Bokassa’s relationship with Romania was notorious for another reason. He became besotted
with a Romanian dancer renowned for her beauty, and brought her back to Bangui in 1975,
against her will, to join a harem that would eventually number eight wives and more than
30 mistresses of many nationalities. She was killed before the decade was out, allegedly by
Bokassa himself (Decalo, 1989, p. 177 n. 91; author interviews).
111 According to Buijtenhuijs (1998, pp. 22–23), in Chad, the ‘north’ commonly refers to some
three-quarters of the country’s territory, while the ‘south’ comprises just the five southern-
most prefectures. Citizens’ relative adherence to Islam largely influences this definition. The
populations of these two regions are roughly equal.
112 Fissures were apparent well beforehand, perhaps the most significant being when Habré broke
ranks to join the Malloum government in 1978.
113 In 1981, for example, there were no fewer than 17 politico-military factions contending for
power in Chad (Foltz, 1995, p. 17).
114 Goukouni succeeded the first head of the GUNT, Lol Mahamat Choua, who ruled briefly
from April to November 1979.
115 The Comité permanent, a southern-led administration that paralleled the GUNT, sold its
main export, cotton, through Cameroon and CAR (Buijtenhuijs, 1998, p. 25).
116 For background on the conflict, US and French military support for Habré, and Libyan assist-
ance to Goukouni, see René Lemarchand (1985).
117 Kamougué had led the gendarmerie, whereas Djogo had been head of the army.

118 Samuel Decalo put the number of Kamougué’s supporters that crossed into CAR with him
at 300–500 (1997, p. x, p. 66).
119 Written correspondence with knowledgeable source in Bangui, July 2006.
120 Kolingba responded by sending the FACA to Paoua, the most important town in the area. The
soldiers retaliated savagely against the population (Bigo, 1988, p. 280). Paoua, Patassé’s birth-
place and his base of political support, was an area hostile to the Kolingba government.
121 Other Codos groups included Thunder Red Codos, Coconut Palms, Hope, and Green Eagles
(Tartter, 1990, p. 220).
122 Rita M. Byrnes, for example, describes the Codos as being ‘nominally’ united by Kotiga.
123 Author interview with Gen (Ret.) Mouhammad Hachim Ratanga, Bangui.
124 The planned deployment of an additional 1,500 Sudanese soldiers did not take place.
126 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Alexis Mbolinani, 19 December 2006.
127 Author interview with UNHCR official, Bangui, December 2003. In anticipation of the peace
accord to be signed by the NIF and the SPLM, UNHCR officials reopened the Mboki office in
February 2004, hoping to organize the voluntary repatriation of some of the estimated 37,000
Sudanese citizens living in CAR (UN OCHA, 2004c).
128 Author interview with UNHCR official, Bangui, February 2003.
129 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Augustino Attilio, Chairman, Sudanese Refugee Com-
mittee of Mboki, 15 December 2006.
130 This was not the first time Mobutu’s troops had come to CAR. In 1979, when Bokassa faced
rioting by unpaid civil servants, students, and unemployed youth that reportedly left 100 mem-
bers of the Imperial Guard dead, Mobutu dispatched 300 soldiers, carrying machine guns
and mortars that they used against the population, to assist his ally (Decalo, 1989, p. 162).
131 Author interview with former FAZ soldier, Bangui, December 2003.
133 Author interview with Gen. (Ret.) Mouhammad Hachim Ratanga, Bangui, 14 February 2003.
He added that an additional 6,000–7,000 family members and non-combatants accompanied
them.
134 Author interview with former FAZ and former FAC soldiers, Bangui, February and June 2003.
135 Author interview with Anicet Saulet, Officer in Charge of Special Duties, Ministry of Territo-
rial Administration, Government of CAR, Bangui, 20 December 2003.
137 Author interview with Maurice Regonnessa, Minister of Defence, Government of CAR, Bangui,
11 February 2003.
138 Author interview with Col. Jules-Bernard Ouandé, Minister Delegate, Head of Security and
Disarmament, Ministry of the Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 20 December 2003.
139 Allegations that Bemba was using CAR territory for arms and diamond smuggling purposes
(Dietrich, 2003, p. 5) might help explain his interest in helping Patassé retain power.
140 The MLC troops were in CAR fewer than two weeks (UN OCHA, 2001).
Endnotes 143
141 The number of MLC troops sent to CAR has been reported to be as high as 3,000 (see UN
OCHA, 2002b).
142 Author interview with peacekeepers, United Nations Mission de l’Organisation de Nations
Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, MONUC), Mbandaka, February 2003.
143 Author interviews with MONUC officials, Kinshasa and Mbandaka, February 2003.
CAR, Paris, 16 June 2003.
145 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Bangui, June 2003.
146 Author interview with Rwandan refugee and former Zairian soldiers, Bangui, February and
June 2003. The number of ex-FAZ who entered CAR via the RoC is considerably less than
those who crossed into CAR directly from Zaire/DRC.
147 For an analysis on the military strength and support for Lissouba’s Cocoyes, Sassou-Nguesso’s
Cobras, and Kolélas’s Ninjas, see Demetriou, Muggah, and Biddle (2002, p. 55).
Wildlife Fund (US), 10 June 2003, by telephone.
149 Author interview with Olivier Feneteau, Technical Advisor, Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises
component, CAR Office, ECOFAC, Paris, 2 September 2003.
150 Written correspondence with Allard Blom, Head, Gabon Office, ECOFAC, 7 August 2003. Blom
wishes it to be understood that he is writing in his personal capacity and not as a representa-
tive of ECOFAC.
151 Written correspondence with Allard Blom, Senior Programme Officer, WWF, 2 August 2006.
152 Author interview with Richard Carroll, Director, Africa and Madagascar Program, World Wild-
life Fund (US), 10 June 2003, by telephone.
component, CAR Office, ECOFAC, Paris, 2 September 2003. Feneteau has come across two
25-shell boxes in Vakaga.
154 Author interview with Rwandan refugee, Bangui, 18 December 2003.
156 Author interview with ex-FAR officer, Bangui, 16 December 2003.
157 Author interview with UNHCR official, Bangui, December 2003.
160 Roundtable discussion with members of the CTD and PNDR, Bangui, 28 June 2003.
161 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Alain Pietrantoni, Field Security Adviser, WFP, Bangui,
18 December 2006.
163 Author interview with Maj. Namboro Kette, cabinet chief of the head of the general staff,
165 Interview by Louisa Lombard with native of Haut-Mbomou prefecture, Bangui, June 2003,
Bangui.

166 Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui (MISAB), 1997–98; La Mission
des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine (MINURCA), 1998–2000; Peacekeeping force
of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), 2001–03; Peacekeeping force of the
Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale (CEMAC), 2003 to date.
167 The organization’s French acronym is COMESSA, for Communauté des états sahélo-sahariens.
While this term is sometimes used in the literature, ‘CEN-SAD’ is much more common. It
represents the first two Arabic letters of the organization’s name in Arabic. CEN-SAD is
used in this study.
168 Author interview with Lieut.-Col. Dominique Kouerey, former Head of Plans, Headquarters,
MISAB, Libreville, 22 June 2003.
169 Author interview with Gen. (Ret.) Mouhammad Hachim Ratanga, Libreville, 19 June 2003.
170 Author interview with Rear-Admiral Martin Mavoungou Bayonne, Force Commander, CEMAC,
171 Only slightly more than 5% of the country’s inhabitants live in Haut-Mbomou, Haute-Kotto,
and Vakaga prefectures (UN OCHA, 2003c, p. 9). Jones (2002) reported, for example, that the
citizens of Mboki, a town in Haut-Mbomou prefecture, had not received any mail since 1974.
172 Central Africans recall that through the 1970s travellers could traverse the country in saloon
cars, unimaginable today when highway bandits and impassable roads predominate.
173 Interview by Louisa Lombard with official, community hospital, Bangui, June 2003. Statistics
for the March 2003 coup were not available at the time of the interview.
174 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Cecile Koyangbanda, Director, Friendship Hospital,
June 2006.
177 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Ione Bertocchi, Director, Ngaoundaye Hospital, Bangui,
27 August 2004 (used with the permission of UNDP, Bangui).
178 The massacre of the Chadian nationals became a pretext for Déby to dispatch Chadian sol-
diers to CAR to retaliate against Patassé. Written correspondence with Olivier Nyirubugara,
former IRIN correspondent in Bangui, June 2006.
179 Author interview with Richard Carroll, Director, Africa and Madagascar Program, WWF
(US), 10 June 2003, by telephone.
180 Written correspondence with Fred Duckworth, professional hunter, Safaria, 12 September 2003.
181 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Mikhail Morchine, Director, APFC, 11 December 2006,
Bangui.
182 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Andre Roux, professional hunter, Swanepol and Scandrol
Safaris, 19 December 2006, Bangui.
183 To all intents and purposes, the distinction between ‘poaching’ and the ‘bush-meat trade’ is
a question of political correctness. The term ‘poaching’ has a negative connotation, suggesting
heartless people who prey on defenceless animals for crass commercial gain. Those trading
in bush meat, meanwhile, are often viewed as impoverished, kind-hearted village folk trying
to eke out a living. The difference, of course, is lost on the animals.
Endnotes 145
184 Author interview with Richard Carroll, Director, Africa and Madagascar Program, WWF
(US), 10 June 2003, by telephone.
185 Written correspondence with Fred Duckworth, professional hunter, Safaria, 12 September 2003.
186 Interview by Louisa Lombard with knowledgeable source, Bangui, June 2003.
June 2006.
188 Many victims of criminal activity, including armed robbery, choose not to file a report, as
they believe that the police and the state are powerless to do anything about the problem.
Interview by Louisa Lombard with knowledgeable source, Bangui, June 2003.
189 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Oryemba Gilles, scribe, Begoua village, Begoua, 26 June
2003.
190 Interview by Louisa Lombard with a knowledgeable source, Bangui, June 2003.
191 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Marc-André Cahlik, owner, transportation company,
192 Interview by Louisa Lombard with civil society leader, Bangui, June 2003.
193 Author interview with police superintendent Yves-Valentine Gbeyoro, Director, OCRB, Bangui,
19 December 2003.
194 Author interview with Controller General Louis Mazangue, Director, OCRB, Ministry of the
Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 18 February 2003.
195 Author interview with police superintendent Yves-Valentin Gbeyoro, Director, OCRB, Min-
istry of the Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 27 June 2003.
196 Author interview with Guy Guernas, Associate Protection Officer, UNHCR, Bangui, 14 Feb-
ruary 2003.
197 Author interview with Col. Jules Bernard Ouandé, Minister Delegate, Head of Security and
Disarmament, Ministry of the Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui, 20 December 2003.
component, CAR Office, ECOFAC, Paris, 2 September 2003.
199 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Mikhail Morchine, Director, APFC, 11 December 2006,
Bangui.
200 Author interview with Alain Penelon, head, Ngotto Forest component, CAR Office, ECOFAC,
201 Author interview with Alain Penelon, head, Ngotto Forest component, CAR Office, ECOFAC,
202 ‘Taux de Recompense’ courtesy of PNDR, Bangui, February 2003. The figures are based on
an average value of the CFA Franc of 609.33 for July, August, and September 1997, the period
when the vast majority of weapons were turned in.
203 The figures in the document are supplied as percentages of the weapons seized from Kassaï
barracks, provided in previous Security Council documents (UNSC, 1998a, p. 7).
204 A resumption of hostilities in late June resulted in some 500 deaths and 70,000 internally
displaced persons (US DOS, 1998).
205 For example, Secretary General Annan wrote in 2001 that, ‘[t]o date, 95 per cent of the heavy
weapons that have been in circulation since the mutinies of 1996 and 1997 have been recov-
ered, compared with 65 per cent of light weapons’ (UNSC, 2001, para. 23).

209 In January 2003, USD 1.96 million had been secured from donor countries and the UN.
Canada, Germany, Italy, and Norway together contributed more than half of this amount,
with UNDP covering the rest. UNDP on behalf of PNDR was seeking an additional USD 3.2
million for the programme (UNDP, 2003b, p. 10).
210 Author interview with Col. Alphonse Mombeka, Coordinator of Disarmament, Sub-Ministry
for Public Security and Disarmament, Ministry of the Interior, Government of CAR, Bangui,
15 December 2003.
211 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Bangui, December 2003.
212 Author interviews with knowledgeable sources, Bangui. February, June, and December 2003.
213 Author interview with Harouna Dan Malam, Chief Technical Assistant, PNDR, United Nations
Office for Project Services (UNOPS), Bangui, 15 December 2003. The PNDR had previously
reported that, as of October 2002, 826 individuals had taken part in the programme (UNDP,
2003a, p. 4). The reason for the discrepancy is not clear, but it may be that records were lost
during the October 2002 coup attempt.
214 Author interview with Harouna Dan Malam, Chief Technical Assistant, PNDR, UNOPS,
215 Gabonese troops were the first to deploy. They were followed by contingents from Congo
(Brazzaville) and Equatorial Guinea. Malabo withdrew its troops after the March 2003 coup
d’état. Chad subsequently contributed troops to the mission.
216 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Commandant Aurélien Mboubi-Kouloubi, Officier Con-
duite, FOMUC, Bangui, 13 December 2006.
June 2006.
218 Written correspondence between Nicolas Florquin and a well-informed source, Bangui, 22
October 2005.
219 The 2004 price for cassava was itself more than double the 2003 price (Panapress, 2004).
220 Written correspondence between Louisa Lombard and Désiré Bango Sambia, Head Transla-
tor and Interpreter, Embassy of Nigeria in the Central African Republic, 1 June 2005.
October 2005.
October 2005.
223 Interview by Nicolas Florquin and Louisa Lombard with UN official, Bangui, 25 August 2004
(used with the permission of UNDP, Bangui).
224 Interview by Nicolas Florquin and Louisa Lombard with NGO official, Bangui, 26 August
2004 (used with the permission of UNDP, Bangui).
225 Written correspondence between Louisa Lombard and informed source, 23 June 2007.
226 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Marielle Debos, Ph.D. candidate in political science,
Sciences-Po-Paris, New York, 10 January 2007.
Endnotes 147
227 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Marielle Debos, Ph.D. candidate in political science,
Sciences-Po-Paris, New York, 9 January 2007.
228 Meeting in Bangui in July 2006, the members of the MLPC party named as their head Martin
Ziguélé, a reform-minded prime minister under Patassé, to distance themselves from the
former president. Ziguélé is a distant relative of Patassé (Melly, 2002, p. 7).
229 Interview with Alain Pietrantoni, Security Officer, WFP, Bangui, 17 December 2006.
230 Interview by Louisa Lombard with a well-informed source, Bangui, 13 December 2006; inter-
view with Nicholas Reader, Information Officer, IRIN, Mboki, CAR, 16 December 2006.
231 Though the recent insecurity has caused a surge in the number of Central Africans moving
into Chad, this migration has been going on for years, during both war and peace, as Central
Africans have sent their children to Chad to benefit from its education and health services,
which their own government has neglected to provide (UN OCHA, 2005d). Armed Chadian
herdsmen steering their cattle onto Central Africans’ fields also force the farmers there north-
ward across the border, local residents report (AUPSC, 2005, para. 13).
232 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Laurianne Comard, Political/Information Officer, Euro-
pean Union, Bangui, 17 December 2006.
233 Interview by Louisa Lombard with a well-informed source, Bangui, December 2006.
234 Allegations have subsequently emerged that Sudan has used CAR territory to supply the
Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army as well (ICG, 2007, p. 8).
235 Interview by Louisa Lombard with a well-informed source,, Bangui, 13 December 2006.
236 Interview by Louisa Lombard with a well-informed source, Bangui, 11 December 2006.
238 Interview by Louisa Lombard with informed source, Bangui, 20 December 2006.
239 Internal UN report (not for distribution), March 2007.
240 President Bozizé has requested his extradition to Bangui.
242 Written correspondence between Nicolas Florquin and a well-informed source, Bangui,
22 October 2005.
22 October 2005.
244 Telephone conversation between Nicolas Florquin and a well-informed source, Bangui,
27 October 2005.
22 October 2005.
22 October 2005.
247 Interview by Louisa Lombard with knowledgeable source, Bangui, 13 December 2006.
248 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Aurélien Mboubi-Kouloubi, Officier Conduite, FOMUC,
249 Written correspondence between Nicolas Florquin and Fabrice Boussalem, Programme Spe-
cialist for Recovery, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP, 6 March
2006.

250 Interview by Nicolas Florquin and Louisa Lombard with ex-Karako militia members, Bangui,
26 August 2004 (used with the permission of UNDP, Bangui).
251 Interview by Louisa Lombard with Adama Dian-Barry, Chargée de l’Information et de la ges-
tion des Connaissances – Prévention des Crises et Relèvement, UNDP, Bangui, 12 December
2006.
Endnotes 149
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Small Arms Survey By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N.

SMALL ARMS: A REGIONAL TINDERBOX

p +41 22 908 5777

By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N. Lombard

SMALL ARMS: A REGIONAL TINDERBOX

p +41 22 908 5777

By Eric G. Berman with Louisa N. Lombard

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN

A Small Arms Survey publication

Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

First published in December 2008

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

Small Arms Survey

Copyedited by Michael James

Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland

ii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the

Small Arms Survey

p +41 22 908 5777

The Small Arms Survey iii

Eric G. Berman is Managing Director of the Small Arms Survey. He began

Louisa N. Lombard is a University Scholar at Duke University, where she is

iv The Central African Republic and Small Arms

vi The Central African Republic and Small Arms

viii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables .................................................................................................................................... xiii

List of Maps ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... xv

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................................................ xvi

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................... xxi

PART I Availability and Distribution of Small Arms ........................................................................ 11

x The Central African Republic and Small Arms

PART II Small Arms Flows and Trafﬁcking ....................................................................................................... 41

PART III Effects and Impacts of Small Arms ................................................................................................... 69

PART IV Arms Recovery and Disarmament Efforts ............................................................................ 81

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 103

Epilogue by Louisa N. Lombard ...................................................................................................................................... 107

ANNEX Chronology of Key Events in CAR’s History ............................................................... 129

Endnotes .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 135

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 150

xii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables xiii

xiv The Central African Republic and Small Arms

AEF Afrique Equatoriale Française

xvi The Central African Republic and Small Arms

List of Abbreviations xvii

xviii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

List of Abbreviations xix

The Central African Republic and Small Arms

1ET 'IRXVEP%JVMGER6ITYFPMG -RXIVREXMSREP

Executive Summary xxi

xxii The Central African Republic and Small Arms

Executive Summary xxiii

xxiv The Central African Republic and Small Arms

A brief history of CAR

President Tenure Ethnic group Birthplace/ Position prior Reason for

David 1960–65 Ngbaka Bouchia Minister of Coup d’état

Jean-Bédel 1966–79 Ngbaka Bobangui Chief of staff Ousted in

David 1979–81 Ngbaka Bouchia Bokassa’s per- Coup d’état

André 1981–93 Yakoma Kembé Chief of staff Election defeat

1ET 'IRXVEP%JVMGER6ITYFPMG -RXIVREXMSREP