869537

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NVSXXX10.1177/0899764019869537Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterlyvan Teunenbroek et al.

Article
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
2020, Vol. 49(1) 53­–73
Look to Others Before You © The Author(s) 2019

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https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764019869537
Review of Social Information sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0899764019869537

Effects on Donation Amounts journals.sagepub.com/home/nvs

Claire van Teunenbroek1 ,

René Bekkers1, and Bianca Beersma1

Abstract
People are often influenced by information about other people’s behavior, that is, social
information. Social information is frequently used by practitioners hoping to increase
charitable giving, while the precise mechanisms through which social information works
are unknown. We conducted a systematic literature review of 35 studies reporting
on the effects of social information on charitable giving. We show that several studies
report no or even negative effects and that a theoretical understanding of social
information effects is lacking. We integrate the empirical findings in the wider fields
of social psychology and behavioral economics and propose an integrative theoretical
model. The model includes four mediators and three moderators that can explain
positive and negative effects of social information. This theoretical framework can
assist researchers to obtain a deeper understanding of social information and support
practitioners in implementing giving tools in donation campaigns.

Keywords
donation amounts, social norms, social influence, social information, systematic
literature review

Can Social Information Increase Donation Amounts?

While the societal and scientific focus on philanthropy has increased (Schuyt, 2012),
the field misses a solid theoretical framework as the literature on philanthropy is

1Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands

Corresponding Author:
Claire van Teunenbroek, Center for Philanthropic Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan
1081, Noord-Holland, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: p.s.c.van.teunenbroek@vu.nl
54 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

mainly empirical (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). This problem has implications for the
usage of a specific tool often used by practitioners to increase donation amounts:
social information. Social information informs individuals about the behavior of oth-
ers which can be used to increase individual donation amounts (Shang & Croson,
2009). Our review of the effects of mentioning previous donation amounts shows that
social information does not always result in a positive effect and sometimes even
decreases donation amounts. The purpose of this article is to develop a theoretical
framework that can guide future research and advise practitioners in the use of social
information as a stimulant for their solicitation methods.
A number of previous studies suggest that social information is a useful tool to
increase the effectiveness of philanthropic solicitation methods (e.g., Alpizar, Carlsson,
& Johansson-Stenman, 2008a, 2008b; Croson & Shang, 2008; Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli,
& Rumiati, 2013; R. Martin & Randal, 2008; Shang & Croson, 2009; van Teunenbroek,
2016; Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers, 2018; Vesterlund, 2003). In contrast to these find-
ings, other studies reported no effects (Catt & Benson, 1977; Kubo, Shoji, Tsuge, &
Kuriyama, 2018; Murphy, Batmunkh, Nilsson, & Ray, 2015; Shang & Croson, 2009)
or even negative effects, meaning that social information decreased rather than
increased charitable giving (Croson & Shang, 2008; Meyer & Yang, 2016). The use of
social information, therefore, instead of increasing donations, could prove to be costly
for practitioners.
From the current literature on social information effects, we cannot conclude to
what extent social information affects donation amounts. Therefore, our central
research question is: “Why and when does social information increase charitable giv-
ing?” The inconsistencies in the literature indicate a need for a theoretical framework
that can assist researchers to obtain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that
drive effects social information on charitable giving. We conducted a systematic litera-
ture review of 35 studies reporting on social information effects on charitable giving
published before January 2019. We observed a large variation in design, methods, and
context between the studies and in the operationalization of social information differs
between studies. Also, we observed that studies contributed limited to no effort to
developing a theoretical explanation behind the (lacking) effect. As a result, we are left
with a series of empirical accounts without a clear theoretical background or an expla-
nation behind the effects (or lack of effects).
We developed a theoretical framework which is a mix of the empirical findings
reported in the 35 studies, integrated with insights from classical psychological theo-
ries and behavioral economic theories. It is important to combine these two fields
because experiments in both fields have shown how situations can be created to stimu-
late giving. For instance, psychologists have shown how humans follow social norms
and often adjust their behavior accordingly (Bernheim, 1994; Festinger, 1954).
Behavioral economists have shown how small pieces of information can influence
decision making (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). In addition, the 35 papers mentioned sev-
eral explanations behind the (lacking) effect of social information, mostly applying
insights from the field of behavioral economics and social psychology. However, the
purported mechanisms were hardly explained or tested.
van Teunenbroek et al. 55

We propose a theoretical model with four mediating variables (presented in no

order), three with a positive effect and one mediating variable with a negative effect.
Our model is consistent with the finding that donors have different reasons for giving
(Konrath & Handy, 2018). Social information is only one of many influences that
affect giving. Also, it is likely that individuals have different reasons for (not) follow-
ing social information.
First, some donors donate because they want to behave in a socially acceptable way
(Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). Social information creates social norms (e.g., Croson,
Handy, & Shang, 2009; Sasaki, 2019; Smith, Windmeijer, & Wright, 2015): because
other people are donating, it is apparently common to do so. Second, a related motive
to give is to behave altruistically; to help others (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). Maybe
social information increases an awareness of need: because other people are donating,
there is apparently a real need for help. Third, some donors care about the trustworthi-
ness and efficacy of a charity and search for information about the quality signals to
determine if their donation will be used properly (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). Social
information increases the perceived quality of a charity (Vesterlund, 2003): if other
people are donating, they must perceive this charity of a good quality.
The fourth mechanism refers to a negative mediator. Some donors care about the
perceived impact of their donation on the total amount raised by the charity (Duncan,
2004). Social information can lower the perceived impact of one’s donation: if other
people are donating, my donation will not make a big difference in terms of assem-
bling the target amount.
In addition, we propose three moderators that are expected to influence the medi-
ated effects: (a) who provides the information (e.g., is it a source with whom we iden-
tify or not), (b) what is the content of the information (e.g., is the donation amount high
or low), and (c) where is the donation made (e.g., in public or anonymously). The
mediators specify why there is an effect, and the moderators specify when certain vari-
ables have a stronger effect.

Method
The core of our review is 35 empirical papers reporting social information effects, a
body of literature deriving from two research fields, namely research based on psycho-
logical theories on charitable giving and research based on economic theories on pub-
lic goods. Our methodological approach consists out of two broad steps: we (a)
systematically reviewed the literature and (b) developed a theoretical framework.
To review the literature systematically, we used several inclusion criteria to refine
our search (see Figure 1). We included only papers that contained analyses of chari-
table giving. We excluded papers that examined social information effects on con-
sumer behavior, as the key goal of philanthropy is to make a contribution for the
benefit of the public good (Payton, 1988) whereas consumers buy products for private
consumption.
Multiple types of social information exist, have been examined, and could provide
insight into the effect of using information on another people’s behavior on giving. For
56 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

Study selection approach and data collection

1. Application or exclusion 1. Limited our search to articles published before January 2019.
criteria 2. Limited our search to articles written in English, Dutch or German.

1. Searched databases (PsychInfo, PubMed, Google Scholar) and

2. Selection approach
round I references cited in the articles we found.

1. Independent variable (IV): the word ‘social information’; had to be

3. Eligibility criteria
mentioned in title, keywords and/or abstract: included only
and search terms
information based on social norms (excluded impact information)
(n=13,300).
2. Donation context: included only papers that contained an analysis of
charitable giving (excluded papers focusing on consumer behavior).
Excluded papers with the mention of consumer behavior (n=12,900).
3. Increased focus on philanthropic context. Included papers that used the
following keywords in their title: social information, peer effects,
suggestion amount, conformity, charitable contribution, giving, social
influence, and previous donation amount (n=63).

1. Manually selected or deselected the found articles further by:

4. Selection approach
a. Specified the DV: needed to include the donation amount of
round II
an individual, either earnings, hypothetical or windfall
donations. Other possible (but not necessary) outcome
measures were the number of donors and total donation
amount (n=63).
b. Specified the IV, needed to include social information, focus
on mentioning the donation amount of previous donor(s)
(n=35). Excluding other forms of social information, such as
mentioning the number of donors.
2. Personal and email contact with several authors of the found papers.

Figure 1.  Flowchart of the selection approach.

pragmatic reasons in terms of the independent variable, we focused solely on social

information in the form of “the previous donation amount of an individual or group,”
to keep the project feasible.
The included studies were published by academics in journals, books, or working
papers made publicly available before January 2019. We searched (a) academic data-
bases (PsychInfo, PubMed); (b) Google Scholar; and (c) references cited in the articles
found. We used the following keywords: social information, peer effects, suggestion
amount, conformity, charitable contribution, giving, social influence, and previous
donation amount. We searched for studies with these keywords in their title, keywords,
or abstract, or that used a pair of possible formulations of the independent and depen-
dent variables in their title, keywords, or abstract. This process resulted in 35 empirical
papers. For each paper, we coded the research context, that is, whether it was a lab
experiment, a field experiment, or a survey study, see Figure 2.
van Teunenbroek et al. 57

Review approach included papers (n= 35)

1. Research context and 1. Study design: whether the data was collected using a survey,
sample country lab experiment or (natural) field experiment.
2. Country setting: in what country was the data collected?

2. Research design 1. Benefit: what was the charitable project mentioned as donation
goal?
2. Sample: what was the role of the donors while they made a
donation (e.g. student, tourists, customer)?
3. Independent variable: was the suggestion amount based on the
average, median or percentile?
4. Covariates: possible other variables connected to social
information.
5. Dependent variable: was the donation behavior based on the
individual donation amount, total donation amount per project
or number of donors?

3. General overview 1. We reviewed the papers to summarize the effect of social

information on the individual donation amount

4. Mediators and 1. We reviewed the papers in terms of the theory they used to
moderators support their design.
2. We reviewed the papers in terms of the theory they used to
explain their (lacking) findings.
3. We categorized the theories and explanations in mediators and
moderators.
4. If needed we used findings from social psychology and
behavior to introduce a variable and explain definitions.

Figure 2.  Flowchart of the review approach.

Next, we developed a theoretical framework. We reviewed each study and coded

the used explanation (if mentioned) behind the effects (or, if applicable, the explana-
tion that was provided for not finding effects).
To categorize the diverse range of explanations offered by the researchers, we used
theories of social psychology and behavioral economics. For the selection of these
theories, we focused on well-known theories of behavioral economics (for instance,
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) and social psychology (for instance, Cialdini, Schroeder &
Kallgren, 1990) often used in research on philanthropy.
The selection method could have resulted in a bias, as papers presenting significant
results are more likely to be published than papers reporting non-significant results
(i.e., publication bias, Scherer, Langenberg, & von Elm, 2007). Although we did not
specifically focus on published papers, we expect that more researchers have found a
non-significant effect than we found and have reported in this literature review. As a
result, our selection method may have resulted in an overestimation of the size and
significance levels of effects (Scherer et al., 2007). While we cannot observe results
58 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

from all studies that have remained unpublished, we did include seven unpublished
research papers and found that these papers report similar effects in terms of the direc-
tion and significance compared to the published papers. Therefore, we conjecture that
the risk of selection bias is limited.

General Overview
Several laboratory experiments (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009; Blake, Rosenbaum, &
Duryea, 1955; Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976; Goeschl, Kettner, Lohse, & Schwieren,
2018; Hysenbelli et al., 2013; Jones & McKee, 2004; Klinowski, 2015; Reingen,
1982; Sell & Wilson, 1991; Vesterlund, 2003) and field experiments (Agerström,
Carlsson, Nicklasson & Guntell, 2016; Alpizar et al., 2008a, 2008b; Bøg, Harmgart,
Huck, & Jeffers, 2012; Croson et al., 2009; Croson, Handy, & Shang, 2010;
R. Kawamura, Ida, & Ogawa, 2018; R. Martin & Randal, 2008; Sasaki, 2019; Shang
& Croson, 2006; Shang, Reed, & Croson, 2008; Silverman, Robertson, Middlebrook,
& Drabman, 1984; Smith et al., 2015; van Teunenbroek, 2016; Van Teunenbroek &
Bekkers, 2018) reported positive effects of social information on the amount donated.
The strength of the effect on the individual donation amount varied: for example, 12%
(Bekkers, 2012; Croson & Shang, 2013; Shang & Croson, 2009), 14% (Shang &
Croson, 2006), 16% (Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers, 2018), and 18% (Alpizar et al.,
2008a, 2008b); other studies reported no effects (Catt & Benson, 1977; Kubo et al.,
2018; Murphy et al., 2015; Shang & Croson, 2009) or even negative effects on the
donation amount (Croson & Shang, 2008; Meyer & Yang, 2016). While Shang and
Croson (2009) found that donors to a US radio campaign donated more after they had
heard previous donors’ donation amounts, Murphy and colleagues (2015) could not
replicate their findings using a similar experiment with donors to a radio campaign in
Alaska.
While most studies focused on examining social information effects on charitable
giving report the effect on the individual donation amount, some studies also report the
effect on the participation rate. Social information does not always enhance people’s
decision to donate (Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers, 2018; Goeschl et al., 2018; Klinowski,
2015; Murphy et al., 2015; Reingen, 1982). However, other studies have found a posi-
tive effect on both the individual donation amount and the participation rate (R. Martin
& Randal, 2008; van Teunenbroek, 2016).
In conclusion, some studies report positive effects of social information on indi-
vidual donation amounts, but others report no effects or even negative effects. In addi-
tion, even if social information increases individual donation amounts, it does not
always enhance people’s decision to donate. These different outcomes of using social
information call for further explanations for why and when social information has an
effect.

Mediators
We present four mediators; in no order (see Figure 3). The mediators do not exclude
each other: they may operate at the same time.
van Teunenbroek et al. 59

Figure 3.  A visual representation of the proposed framework including the independent
variables (IV), dependent variables (DV) and mediators (Med).
Note. All variables above the dotted line are positive effects of social information on charitable giving,
and the one below the line has a negative effect. The numbers refer to the supporting articles in the
reference list. All displayed relationships are positive unless noted otherwise.

Perceived Social Norms

Human decision-making is largely influenced by social norms as they provide cues
about how to behave in a given situation (i.e., descriptive social norm), including
charitable donations (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). “Conforming,” a term often
connected with social norms, refers to social comparison stimulated by a desire to
blend in, resulting in behavior adjustment: it is a social phenomenon whereby people
perceive other people’s behavior as cues for acceptable behavior and adjust accord-
ingly (Meyer & Yang, 2016). Human behavior is strongly influenced by a desire to
conform to social norms (Bernheim, 1994; Festinger, 1954).
Social norms have been related to donation behavior (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011).
By making social information available, researchers try to influence the decisions of
potential donors by hinting at an answer to the fundamental question: what does a
person like me do in this situation? Donors who desire to conform are likely to target
the modal donation amount as a reference for the acceptable donation amount
(Bernheim, 1994). Most of the studies that mention an explanation behind the social
information effect suggest social norms are at work (see Figure 3).
60 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

Smith et al. (2015) analyzed online fundraising data (focused on giving by peers)
and found a positive effect of previous donations: a £10 increase of past donations
increases donation amounts by £2.50. The researchers explain their findings by stating
that social information provides donors with “the appropriate amount to give.”
However, the researchers also state that the observed large and small donations imply
that donors are not simply following the group by matching the amount donated most
often. We would expect that if social information functions as a social norm, individu-
als mirror the amount, because social norms increase the individual tendency to con-
form (Bernheim, 1994; Festinger, 1954). Van Teunenbroek & Bekker (2018) found a
similar effect studying donors to crowdfunding projects in a large field experiment:
donors increased their donation amounts in response to social information, but they
did not mirror the suggestion amount of €82. The researchers argue that the suggestion
amount was too atypical to mirror a suggestion amount, because €82 does not resem-
ble a commonly chosen donation amount.
Sasaki (2019) used a similar design as Smith et al. (2015): an online fundraising
page mainly supported by peers. The study found that the more the last five donations
resembled each other, the more likely they were to influence a new donor. It is impor-
tant to note that the studies of Smith et al. (2015) and Sasaki (2019) did not contain an
explicit test to measure if social information functions as a social norm.
Croson et al. (2009) conducted a laboratory experiment with students. The partici-
pants read a scenario mentioning that they donated $25 to a radio campaign; during a
conversation with a solicitor, they were told that another member donated $10 or $50.
Next the participants indicated how much they thought the average radio listener
would donate (i.e., hypothetical donation context). The researchers found a direct
effect of social information on hypothetical charitable giving, which decreased—but
did not disappear—after controlling for social norms as a mediating variable. While
the strength of the relation between social information and hypothetical giving is
reduced by including social norms as a mediator, the mediating variable only explains
a part of the relation. Social norms may thus partially explain the relationship between
social information and charitable giving.
Goeschl et al. (2018) conducted a modified dictator game to research causal mecha-
nisms that link social information with donation behavior through influencing social
norms. Contrary to the study of Croson et al. (2009), the study existed out of two
interconnected experiments conducted among a non-student sample with actual dona-
tions to an existing public good. The researchers followed a similar research design as
Croson et al. (2009), but this time including actual donation amounts instead of hypo-
thetical giving. The researchers included three conditions, control, low (€1), and high
(€7). Only the high condition resulted in higher donation amounts, but not more
donors. In addition, the researchers asked the participants what they thought other
donors would donate (that is the stated belief). The researchers found similar results:
social information affects donation behavior through changing the perception of the
social norm. The outcome shows that social information does not only increase the
donation amount (in the case of a high suggestion amount) but also increases the belief
about the donation amounts of other donors. However, the stated beliefs are not fully
van Teunenbroek et al. 61

aligned with the suggestion amount through social information: in the case of the high
and base condition, the stated beliefs are higher than the actual donation amount.
There is one paper (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2009) that specifies the social information
effects even further by distinguishing between descriptive (i.e., what most people do)
and normative (i.e., what should be done) norms. The social information described in
the previous studies conveys a descriptive social norm, because it describes the most
common behavior (on average donors donate X euros) instead of how individuals
should behave (you should donate around the average of X euros). The researchers
found that participants in the role of a dictator (the one in control of distributing the
earnings) is more likely to offer an equal split, if they read that this is often done by
others (i.e., a descriptive social norm), or that an equal split is most appropriate accord-
ing to dictators of previous sessions (i.e., an injunctive social norm). Interestingly,
social information in the form of a descriptive social norm trumps an injunctive social
norm when both are presented at the same time. Social information as described in this
article refers to descriptive norms: it provides individuals with information on typical
behavior in a given situation (Cialdini et al., 1990), instead of an injunctive norm
which refers to what is typically approved in society (i.e., what people ought to do).
Social information can change the perceived descriptive social norm, which may then
change the donation behavior. While such a mediation is suggested by researchers
focusing on social information effects, the effect remains unclear as previous studies
have not assessed it properly.

Awareness of Need
Numerous studies examining donation patterns have shown that people must be aware
of there being a need for help before they feel motived to give (more) (Bekkers &
Wiepking, 2011), also referred to as awareness of need. Several field studies demon-
strated that the degree of need for help increases the likelihood of helping (Levitt &
Kornhaber, 1977; Schwartz, 1974; Staub & Baer, 1974).
Awareness of need can be increased if beneficiaries communicate this need to
potential donors (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). We would expect that the implementa-
tion of social information could increase awareness of need by communicating this
need to donors: “If people are willing to donate large amounts of money, there must
really be a need for help and I should donate a higher amount.” However, this mecha-
nism has not received any attention from scholars examining effects of social
information.

Expected Quality
It is a classic assumption in economics that people are rational and aim to increase
their utility from social interaction. We expect that people prefer to donate to projects
and practitioners of higher quality, as low-quality projects are less likely to provide
utility to people. People find it hard to judge the quality of philanthropic projects and
practitioners (Handy, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1980, 1981) possibly because there are
62 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

so many charities, and proper quality signals are costly (Vesterlund, 2003). If other
donors contribute, donors may perceive the donation as a signal that the charity is of a
good quality, which enhances the perceived trustworthiness and efficacy of that char-
ity (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). Also, social information could signal that a non-
profit is associated with a positive organizational legitimacy. A quality signal is
important for establishing enough trust to donate (Bekkers, 2003).
One study specifically suggested that social information works as a quality signal
(Vesterlund, 2003). Vesterlund (2003) suggests that donors’ social information changes
the way donors think about the value of the project. However, Vesterlund did not include
an explicit test of expected quality. The explanation of Vesterlund builds on the assump-
tion that individuals have imperfect information about the quality of the charity.
Smith et al. (2015) provided an indirect empirical test to determine if social infor-
mation functions as a quality signal. The researchers used by-proxy reasoning to deter-
mine if social information influenced the perceived quality of a project. The researchers
based their approach on the assumption that the content of social information would
be more important for “unknown” charities that were characterized by being start-ups,
small-sized, involving young people, and based on overseas (Heutel, 2014). These
types of charities were more likely to require a quality signal, as charities about which
donors know little are probably more in need of additional information (Heutel, 2014).
Social information, therefore, should have a stronger effect (Smith et al., 2015).
However, Smith et al. (2015) found that the effects of social information were stronger
for larger and older charities and that there were no effects of geography.
The reasoning of Smith et al. (2015) was based on the untested assumption that
small, young, and overseas charities are perceived as a “risky investment.” With recent
scandals relating to some of the bigger and better-known charities, however, donors
might be more skeptical about the quality of these bigger and well-known charities.
Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers (2018) found no evidence to support the idea that
social information functions as a quality signal in their field experiment with donors to
crowdfunding campaigns. They expected that social information would be most effec-
tive in the middle of the campaign, as donors in the middle were expected to base their
donation decision on the perceived quality of the project. Contrary to their expecta-
tions social information was especially effective in the beginning and end of a
campaign.
Social information could function as a quality signal, by providing donors with the
idea that others think that this is a good project/non-profit. While findings by Smith
et al. (2015) and Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers (2018) suggest social information does
not work in this way, they did not explicitly measure perceived quality. Therefore, it is
still uncertain if social information functions as a quality signal.

Individual Donation Impact

None of the reviewed studies mentioned that social information could relate to a lower
donation impact. However, social information does not always increase donation
behavior and has even been found to decrease donation behavior in some studies (e.g.,
van Teunenbroek et al. 63

Croson & Shang, 2008, 2013; Meyer & Yang, 2016). Economists describe that donors
are influenced by the estimated impact of their donation (Duncan, 2004), such that
potential donors think “If other people are already donating large amounts of money,
my money is less needed to reach the donation goal, and I could donate a lower amount
(or not at all) to save money without appearing less important.” The impact philan-
thropy model claims that donors are stimulated and enjoy personally increasing the
output of a public good (Duncan, 2004), possibly to appear important. Our interpreta-
tion of our impact mechanism is that impact refers to a donor’s feeling of how much
their donation contributed to successfully assembling enough money to produce the
public good. As a result, the attractiveness of giving decreases with each donation as
it decreases the donation impact (Duncan, 2004). Providing social information, there-
fore, could be harmful. The feeling of making a difference also matters in prosocial
behavior (Aknin, Dunn, Whillans, Grant, & Norton, 2013; Bekkers & Wiepking,
2011).
While impact has not been examined directly, there is one study that showed that
group size has a negative influence on the donation amount (Scharf & Smith, 2016).
This means that if the donation amount of previous donors gives individuals the feel-
ing that the project is supported by a large group, it could have a negative effect on the
individual donation amount.

Moderators
In addition to the mediators, we argue that the three W’s moderate the mediating vari-
ables: who, what, and where (see Figure 4).

Who
When people receive information, it matters who provides it: they prefer to follow
information from similar others (e.g., family and friends, that is, strong ties) or people
with similar attributes (Festinger, 1954). If there is a shared sense of social identifica-
tion (i.e., shared identity), this is particularly influential for someone’s own decision-
making (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004).
Researchers identified several ways in which a shared identity can be manipulated
to increase the effectiveness of social information on donation behavior. Hysenbelli
et al. (2013) conducted a laboratory experiment with Italian students in a hypothetical
context: students indicated how much they would donate after reading a scenario men-
tioning the donation amount of previous Italian (i.e., similar identity) or German
donors. The researchers found that a high suggestion amount (€90) resulted in higher
donation amounts, whereas a low suggestion (€10) had no effect. A suggestion made
by a similar other increased the effectiveness of the high suggestion amount, but not of
the low suggestion amount.
One study suggested that although donors who make multiple donations (“prior
members”) are unaffected by social information, the effect can be re-established when
the solicitor connects the term “prior members” to social information in their
64
Figure 4.  A simplified visual representation of the proposed framework including the independent variables (IV), dependent variables (DV),
mediators (Med) and moderators (Mod, depicted in light gray).
Note. The mediators and moderators are presented in no particular order: there is not an order of events in relation to the moderators. The numbers refer
to supporting articles in the reference list.
van Teunenbroek et al. 65

solicitation (Shang & Croson, 2009). We suggest that, by adding the word “prior,” the
researchers have increased the focus on similarity in having made a prior donation and
have thus increased the sense of shared identity between the source and the target of
the social information.
Croson et al. (2010) found that if social information was connected to the same
gender as that of the participant, the information had a stronger effect on donations
than in the mismatched condition (e.g., showing a female the donation amount of a
male). Unfortunately, the study did not use a randomized control design. Therefore,
we cannot be sure whether the increasing participation rate of females solicited by a
female was due to gender matching. It is also important to discuss the role of attrac-
tiveness and gender in relation to donation amounts, because the gender of the donor
and solicitor is a partial determinant of the donation amount (Raihani & Smith, 2015).
A study analyzing online donations showed that male donors donate more when solic-
ited by attractive females. The study also shows that males do not conform to donation
amounts made by previous male donors. It is important to note that in this study the
researchers focused on relatively large donations (i.e., at least twice the average and
more than £50).

What
Classic economic theories argue that people respond to relative prices at all times
(Sargeant & Jay, 2004). This effect can also be found in philanthropy: when the costs
of giving are lowered, donations increase (Eckel & Grossman, 2003; Eckel, Tech, &
Grossman, 2004). If a suggested donation amount is too high, people may perceive the
amount as unfair or excessive, which decreases charitable giving (Hysenbelli et al.,
2013). A suggested donation amount that is perceived as too high is probably less
effective in influencing giving.
Several studies support this line of reasoning: social information based on the 99th
percentile is no longer effective in increasing the individual donation amount (Croson
& Shang, 2013; Shang & Croson, 2006). While a high donation amount might not
increase the individual donation amount, Smith et al. (2015) found that a large dona-
tion (at least 10 or more times the average donation) does increase the number of
donors. Apart from using amounts that are too high, mentioning an amount that is too
low can decrease the individual donation amount (Croson & Shang, 2008; Meyer &
Yang, 2016). In a laboratory experiment with students, other studies found that sug-
gesting a high donation amount (€90) is actually more effective than suggesting a low
donation amount (€10) to increase hypothetical giving (Hysenbelli et al., 2013).
Unfortunately, it is unclear why exactly donors do not respond to information about
very high donation amounts. Also, it is unclear when exactly the information is per-
ceived as too high.
The amount mentioned might influence the nature of the impact mediator, changing
the effect from negative to positive. We would expect that a lower suggestion amount
increases the perceived impact of a donation, as there is a higher percentage of the
target amount left. This means that a donor can have a higher impact. Duncan (2004)
66 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

states that donors enjoy personally increasing the output of the good. We expect that a
low suggestion amount makes donors feel like their gift really would be important and
could have a big impact.

Where
The philanthropic literature describes that the donation context influences donation
amounts. For instance, individuals are more generous in a public setting where they
are observed (Van Vugt & Hardy, 2010). Charitable givers are held in high regard, and
refraining from giving could damage one’s reputation (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). If
we apply this to the “perceived social norm” mediator, we would expect that a public
donation context increases the effect as people will only benefit from behaving in line
with social norms if their behavior is observable. While some people might refrain
from giving after seeing social information because it decreases the impact of their
donation, therefore, they might still donate if the context is public. Social information
is expected to be less effective in a private context, as the behavior is less observable.
An exception on this is online giving where a donor can choose to publish their dona-
tion amount.
Alpizar et al. (2008a, 2008b) collected field data at a national park and found that
tourists who were informed about other people’s typical donation ahead of the solicita-
tion donated 25% higher amounts, but the effect was not significantly different from
an anonymous donation context. Unfortunately, social information and anonymity
were not manipulated in separate conditions, and the influence of anonymity on the
social information effect, therefore, remains unclear.
A second contextual factor that could increase the effectiveness of social informa-
tion is an ambiguous context. Social psychologists perceive a situation as ambiguous
if there is no obvious way to behave and objective standards are unavailable. From an
economic perspective, a context is ambiguous if the realized event is unknown or
unique (Izhakian & Benninga, 2011). In an ambiguous context, information is an
important input for decision making (Frank, 2015).
If social information affects the perception of a social norm, it is likely to be more
effective in an ambiguous context (Crutchfield, 1955; Festinger, 1954), as people are
more likely to compare themselves with other people in ambiguous situations (Buunk
& Mussweiler, 2001; J. R. Martin & Wheeler, 2002). In an ambiguous context, there-
fore, social information could function as a social guideline.
For example, new donors to a radio campaign were affected by social information,
but renewing donors were not (Murphy et al., 2015; Shang & Croson, 2009). As
renewing donors are familiar with the context, it is not an ambiguous context to them,
and, as a result, social information has a limited or no influence on this situation
(Bekkers, 2012). New donors, on the other hand, are unaware of such a reference
amount, and so they are looking for a social signal about the “correct” donation
amount.
van Teunenbroek et al. 67

Discussion and Conclusion

The literature on social information has yielded several insights, such as empirical
evidence for a positive effect and several methods for increasing the effectiveness of
social information. However, the diversity in findings apparent in our review shows
that more work needs to be done to learn to understand why effects do or do not occur.
Building on the broader literature of social psychology and behavioral economics, we
have sought to contribute to such understanding. We proposed a model with mediators
and moderators that impact the relation between social information and donation
behavior.
Our model can explain both positive and negative effects of social information. In
addition, our review reveals that, as moderating variables, it matters who provides the
information, what the content of the information is, and where the donor is while
receiving the information. We believe this framework increases our understanding of
existing research on social information effects and helps chart future research direc-
tions. By increasing our understanding of social information effects, we contribute to
the further development of effective solicitation tools to increase charitable giving.
We make three suggestions for future research. Our first suggestion refers to an
important empirical question that remains unanswered: the relative influence of each
of the mediators—whether social information primarily affects donation behavior
because it influences the perceived social norms, awareness of need, expected project/
non-profit quality, or the individual donation impact—is still unclear at this point.
Multiple mediators are likely to operate simultaneously, and their combinations are
likely to differ across time, contexts, and donors. There are also likely to be interaction
effects: awareness of need will be higher if donors find perceived social norms impor-
tant. It is likely, moreover, that there are several three-way interactions between medi-
ators and moderators. The same social information could also result in two effects that
cancel each other out. For instance, social information could increase awareness of
need and, therefore, have a positive effect, but at the same time decrease perceived
donation impact, resulting in a negative effect. We believe that, next to testing the
proposed theoretical model, identifying systematic patterns in the effects of modera-
tors, mediators, and their interactions is an important task for future research.
Second, in addition to characteristics such as gender, personal characteristics of
potential donors, such as personality traits, and socioeconomic characteristics are
likely to influence social information effects. Individual characteristics, however, can
only be measured but not manipulated, unlike contextual factors. Practitioners could
adjust contextual factors, but not the individual characteristics of their donors. It would
be fruitful, nonetheless, to study the influence of individual characteristics. A chal-
lenge for future research is to investigate how the model works with different groups
of donors, by segmenting donors, for instance, based on common characteristics such
as shared needs, personality traits, and socioeconomic status to identify “high yield
segments”: What group of donors would profit most from using social information?
Third, we suggest that it would be fruitful to redirect efforts from trying to increase
donation behavior as much as possible and develop “the most effective stimulant.”
68 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 49(1)

Instead we advise a focus on “clean” manipulations with proper explanations for their
hypothesized effects. In other words, few studies have tried to examine potential medi-
ators to understand “why” the effect occurs. Instead, researchers have mostly focused
their attention to the moderators, to increase the effectiveness of social information.
For instance, Croson and Shang (2013), Shang and Croson (2006), Croson and Shang
(2008), and Meyer and Yang (2016) all focused on the question whether a large of
small amount was more effective. We advise authors to also think about explanations
behind these effects.
In our model we focused on mediators related to the finding people have different
incentives for giving (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). We did consider two additional medi-
ators not discussed in the model: the providing of a reference point and diffusion of
responsibility. People tend to value prior information and use this information as a refer-
ence point for behavioral adjustments, which is also known as anchoring (Hammond,
Keeney, & Raiffa, 1998). Goeschl et al. (2018) examined whether social information
functions as a mere reference. If it would function as a reference point, then any number
would influence donation behavior by simply working as an unconscious suggestion (i.e.,
a nudge; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Goeschl et al. (2018) found that providing donors with
a random number, instead of a number based on a donation amount of a previous donor,
did not influence the donation behavior. Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers (2018) argue against
the possibility that social information functions as a reference point, because donors in
their field experiment did not exactly donate the suggestion amount of 82.
A diffusion of responsibility could be an additional negative mediator. Social psy-
chologists describe that the larger the group, the lower the responsibility people feel to
help (Latané & Darley, 1970), as a larger group makes it easier to feel anonymous
(Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982), which has also been described as an increased diffu-
sion of responsibility. If the suggested donation amount gives people the feeling that a
group of people relates to the project, their donation may be perceived as less needed.
In other words, social information could result in a bystander effect by decreasing
people’s feeling of responsibility. Such diffusion of responsibility has not yet received
any attention from scholars researching social information.
We consider one additional moderator not discussed in the model: liking. Liking
refers to the finding that individuals prefer things that are connected to the self (Byrne,
1971). Based on the similarity breeds liking principle, it could be argued that if the
provided information is associated with something that is connected to the self (for
instance, the letter in one’s name; Bryne, 1971), it is likely to be more effective.
Edwards and List (2013) found that a suggestion amount (not social information) con-
nected to the donors’ graduation year (a suggestion of €20.03 for those who graduated
in 2003) resulted in stronger tendencies to conform to the suggested amount but not to
higher donations than the non-personalized suggestion of €20.00.
As we only partially based our results on empirical papers and updated this with theo-
ries from other fields, future investigation is necessary to test our proposed model and
further map the effects of social information. This is in the interest of scholars who aim to
help this scientific field to become more mature and of practitioners who wish to imple-
ment social information as an effective and efficient stimulant for individual donations.
van Teunenbroek et al. 69

Social information could have a positive effect on charitable giving, but researchers
have mainly focused on demonstrating and reporting positive social information
effects rather than the development of a proper theory to support the effects. In this
article, therefore, we have taken the first step toward a theoretical framework by devel-
oping a model that highlights the restrictions and possibilities of social information in
affecting donation behavior. The field of social information represents a vibrant area
for theoretical development.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: This study was funded by the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (NWO), grant #314-99-105. René Bekkers was supported by the Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences / Van der Gaag Foundation.

ORCID iD
Claire van Teunenbroek https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7295-3095

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Author Biographies
Claire van Teunenbroek is a PhD candidate at the Center for Philanthropic Studies at the Vrije
Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her research on charitable giving takes a mul-
tidisciplinary perspective; she combines philanthropic insights with theories from social psy-
chology and behavioral economics. Her current research focusses on determinants and conse-
quences of social information on (online) charitable giving.
van Teunenbroek et al. 73

René Bekkers leads the Center for Philanthropic Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His
research combines surveys, experiments and administrative data to study causes and conse-
quences of philanthropy
Bianca Beersma is a professor in the department of Organization Science at the Vrije
Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam, The Netherlands. She received her Ph.D. in organizational psy-
chology from the University of Amsterdam. Her current research interests include prosocial
behavior in organizations, team processes and performance, negotiation, conflict management,
and organizational gossip.