TAPUZ V DEL ROSARIO G.R. No.

182484 | June 17, 2007 | J. Brion

FACTS:

1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other John Does
numbering about 120.

2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they
were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons – entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents’ permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and
bamboo structure.

3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and
prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.

4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor, finding prior possession
through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.

6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision – was
actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion
for demolition.

7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.

8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition in
CA.

10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper

HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content
and substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed
RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been
guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule,
for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition
for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of
past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition
fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the “fishing expedition” that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind in defining what
the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.
Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010)

Facts

In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the
failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibility anent her abduction
and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence on the part of existing police and
military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, this time, to be
spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating agency for
purposes of this petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well as a
recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, retained jurisdiction of this case. Finally,
the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the investigations and submit to the Court its own report and
recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, final disposition.

Issue
Can the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal
appearance of confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath?

Ruling

The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHR investigations have
already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any of the public respondents in the
abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized. CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite
clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR investigations were still not sufficient to identify any of
the respondents, or anyone in particular for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's
abduction. Neither did the ocular inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga,
conducted by the CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.”

The Court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III confidentialreports
or at the least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before the Court of Appeals
will serve as a huge step towards identifying the persons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner.
Certainly, it may aid an on-going investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right
direction. Before disposing of this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every possible
lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.
Lourdes Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871

Facts

On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa

Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron
(AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and
detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation, but only
after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave
misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise
reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police
stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation.

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men
belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such
information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007,
praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of
petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Issue
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an Amparo petition.
Ruling
No. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings
Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if
at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under
the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there are several pending bills on command
responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may
plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra- legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this
jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the
Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or
an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance
to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end.
Salcedo v. Bollozos (Constitutional Law I) THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236. July 5, 2010.] (Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ) RUBEN N.
SALCEDO, complainant, vs. JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, respondent. BRION, J p:

Facts:

This petition is anent to the Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo (complainant), charging Judge Gil
G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and
Ignorance of the Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled "Jose Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn
Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo."

The complainant questioned the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which had been unusually issued with haste. He argued that the
handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and
granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleged that the respondent judge
"accommodated" the issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalack's counsel) are members of the
Masonic fraternity.

In response, respondents argued that when he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to
exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioner's counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason);

Although the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he deemed it more in consonance with the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issues:

I. Whether or not Judge Bolos erred when he issued the Writ of Amparo?

II. Whether or not Judge Bolos should be administratively held liable?

Ruling:

In its decision, the SC affirmed the OCA's recommendation that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be
dismissed for lack of merit.

However, the Supreme Court agreed with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in
Tanmalack's favor.

I
The Court believed that the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since Tanmalack's petition was
fatally defective in substance and content, as it did not allege that he was a victim of "extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
the threats thereof." The petition merely stated that he was "under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he was not
arrested but merely 'in custody.'

II.
On the question of whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he committed in the case, the Court
answered in the negative. Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a
matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal, or administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.

The more significant issue charge by the complainants was the gross ignorance of the law against the respondent judge. A patent
disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than
just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are
likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and
great privilege vested in him.

The believed that the respondent judge's error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence.
The Court noted the fact that at the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been
effective for barely three months. More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. In the present case, the complainant failed to prove by
substantial evidence that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Gil G.
Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.

Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009

Facts

Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month
after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA
through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The
petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the
street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded
the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a
reliable source; that he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG,
PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect
Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed a complaint with the PNP Police
Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of helping her she was told of an intriguing tale
by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having
good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal to help and provide police assistance in
locating her missing husband.

The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed
before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.

Issue
Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victim’s rights for it to be given due course by the court?

Ruling
The Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section
5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of
action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in
light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner
may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to
kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to
require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the
Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing
the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the
details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition
should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if
the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010)

Facts

Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to issue a Writ of
Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before the Court of Appeals.
Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include Marciana Medina ) and to implead other
military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional respondents.

In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez
and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno,
Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the “wives” of Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and
Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers’ uniforms
passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on
Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as
bloodstains. They likewise alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas
and Heherson at the Camp of the Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims’ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the
inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the
rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issue
1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to prove that the
public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty is ground
for the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is
proper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of the
alleged victim.

Ruling

As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required in Amparo petition.
Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance
of their duty the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in
the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every
citizen’s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence
in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ. It
does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or
inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for
the court to grant certain interim reliefs.

On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisional remedies
provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition – Section 14 of theAmparo Rule provides for interim or provisional
reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties,
and preserve all relevant evidence, These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.