EN BANC

[G.R. No. 64261. December 26, 1984.]

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.

BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC. , petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL. , respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vino, Augusto Sanchez,

Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ESTOPPEL BY LACHES; DEFINED. —

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARGE OF LACHES NEGATED BY EXTRAJUDICIAL EFFORTS
EXERTED BY PETITIONERS IN CASE AT BAR. — Although the reason given by
petitioners may not be attering to our judicial system, the Supreme Court nds no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that
they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby
refuting the charge of laches against them
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; PETITIONER NOT ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANTS ALTHOUGH HE HAD USED AND MARKED AS
EVIDENCE THE SEIZED DOCUMENTS; CASE AT BAR. — Respondents submit the theory
that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the
seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q-022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. The Supreme Court does not follow the
logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has
used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of
the assailed search warrants.
4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY; THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM THE WARRANT IS DIRECTED MUST HAVE
CONTROL OR POSSESSION OF PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED; CASE AT BAR. —
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may
be seized under a search warrant. The rule does not require that the property to be
seized is stolen property. Necessarily stolen property must be owned by one other than
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 the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is su cient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
5. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; MACHINERIES INTENDED FOR AN INDUSTRY
WHICH MAY BE CARRIED ON IN A BUILDING WHEN PLACED BY A TENANT REMAIN
MOVABLE PROPERTY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SEIZURE; CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 415
[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles. instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may
be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property . In Davao
Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo (61 Phil. 709) where this legal provision was invoked, this Court
ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by
the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being
the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
PROBABLE CAUSE AS REQUISITE FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT; DEFINED
AND EXPLAINED RELATIVE TO PUBLICATION OF SUBVERSIVE MATERIALS; CASE AT
BAR. — Probable cause for a search is de ned as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar. the application and/or its supporting a davits must
contain a speci cation, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended. . . " (Annex 'C', Petition, p. 51, Rollo) is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
nding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have
done so.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; ISSUANCE OF WARRANT UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE; TEST OF SUFFICIENCY NOT MET IN CASE AT BAR. — Insu cient as
basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
a davit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-mentioned were used and
are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote
the objective of, illegal organization such as the Light-a-Fire Movement." In mandating
that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,.
. . after examination under oath or a rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
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 may produce; (Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution) the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justi ed. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance (64
Phil. 33), the Supreme Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
a davit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."
The averment in the joint a davit led before respondent judge hardly meets the test
of sufficiency established by the Court in Alvarez case.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS DECLARED VOID. — In Stanford vs. State
of Texas (379 U.S. 476, 13 L ed 2nd 431) the search warrants which authorized the
search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas,
and the operations of the Communist party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general,
and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the
statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. (68 am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-737). The description of the articles sought
to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press,
when "O cers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and
Puritan." Reference to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the
policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with
"the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
9. ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS; VIOLATED BY CLOSURE OF BUSINESS
AND PRINTING OFFICES IN CASE AT BAR. — The premises searched were the business
and printing o ces of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent
to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, (Sec. 9, Art. IV of
the Constitution) and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTINUED SEALING OF PRINTING MACHINES IN CASE AT
BAR PURSUANT TO PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 885 NOT JUSTIFIED; REASONS. —
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person,
natural or arti cial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities. . . in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as
may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful, however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of implementing rules
and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of National Defense. Besided, in the
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 December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reporter that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester
the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. That the property seized on
December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further con rmed by the reply of then
Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS;
SUPPRESSION OF PRESS FREEDOM RESULTING FROM SERVICE OF GENERAL,
WARRANTS IN CASE AT BAR EXPLAINED. — The action against WE FORUM was a
naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross
violation of the Constitution. The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in
Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision, and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized."
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].) Any search warrant
which is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace o cers." ( Ibid.,
p. 748.) The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a speci c offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not su ce. In the case at bar nothing speci cally subversive
has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D.
885, as amended. There is no mention of any speci c provision of the decree. In the
words of Chief Justice Concepcion "It would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision
thereof. The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search
warrants authorizes Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possessions, among other
things, of the following: subversive documents, pamphlets, lea ets, books and other
publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations
known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement." The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, lea ets,
books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is
nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. The
warrants, therefore are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution. In
point of fact, there was nothing subversive which had been published in MALAYA which
has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has
been taken. Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the
warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the
exclusionary rule of evidence.

DECISION

ESCOLIN , J : p

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 Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and o ce and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal O cer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants,
subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in
Criminal Case No. Q-022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled "People
v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al." 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General
in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners'
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will
not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until nal
resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles . . . " 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and
academic. LexLib

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the
search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the
validity of the warrants before this Court, should have led a motion to quash said
warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural aw notwithstanding, we
take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search
of the "We Forum" o ces, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all
metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justi es this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice
Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case
from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it . . . "
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.
Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on
December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was led only on June 16,
1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
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 earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the
filing of the petition thus:
"Respondents should not nd fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was led on June 16, 1983, more
than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.

"The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had
waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at rst to
exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven [11] years had taught them
that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse.
"Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons
close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos,
through counsel Antonio Coronel, asking the return at least of the printing
equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col.
Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal O cer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the
desired results.
"After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come
to Court." [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be attering to our judicial
system, We nd no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the
contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the
presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized
property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had
used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q-
022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We
do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The
fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the
validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the
search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an
examination under oath or a rmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated
by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court. 6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as
petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an
examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b] were used to search two
distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the
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 execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the
two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b]
which states:
"Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he
is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City."

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search
two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to
have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses
of the places sought to be searched were speci cally set forth in the application, and
since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is
more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20-
82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously, this
is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82
[b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with su cient particularity, it has been held "that the executing o cer's prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing o cer is the a ant on whose a davit the warrant
had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the
building described in the a davit. And it has also been said that the executing o cer
may look to the a davit in the o cial court le to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that
although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging
to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services,
Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties
that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
"Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the

offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing

an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be
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 owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the
search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is su cient that
the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were
seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works"
are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal
provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant. prcd

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon

application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 1 0 The
application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro
U. Tango, 1 1 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col.
Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the ling of the
application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents
could not have provided su cient basis for the nding of a probable cause upon which
a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides: LLphil

"SEC. 3. . . . and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible o cer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
a rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized."

We nd petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is

de ned as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when
the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting a davits must contain a speci cation, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not su ce. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are
all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended . . . " 1 2 is a mere conclusion of
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 law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars
as would justify a nding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insu cient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the
statement contained in the joint a davit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango,
"that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises
above-mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are
continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the
objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 1 3
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, . . . after examination under oath or a rmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 1 4 the Constitution requires no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which
the issuance of a search warrant may be justi ed. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance,
1 5 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is
to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the a davit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched,
the quoted averment in said joint a davit led before respondent judge hardly meets
the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The
search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
"1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the
'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the 'WE FORUM' newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, lea ets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement
and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE
FORUM' and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking
'Bagong Silang.'"

In Standford v. State of Texas, 1 6 the search warrant which authorized the search
for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
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 and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general,
and that portion of a search warrant - which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the
statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 1 7 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in a question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Standford case, the U.S. Supreme Court calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English
Press, when "O cers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
o ces of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 1 8 and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. Thus state of being
is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. LLjur

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person,
natural or arti cial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly
constituted authorities . . . in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as
may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful, however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing
rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported
that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military
authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982.
Thus:
"The President denied a request led by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to
Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendaña."
"On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum
o ces in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all
materials in the premises.
"Cendaña said that because of the denial, the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the
court." 1 9
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 That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is
further con rmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter
dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM" case. 2 0 In this reply dated February 11,
1983, Minister Romulo stated:
"2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and
confiscate the equipment and materials it uses." 2 1

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b]

issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and
are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of
the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby
ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C .J ., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr ., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ ., concur.
Aquino, J ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J ., concurring :

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin. At the

same time I wish to state my own reasons for holding that the search warrants which
are the subject of the petition are utterly void.
The action against WE FORUM was a naked suppression of press freedom for
the search warrants were issued in gross violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV,
stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126
Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will
result in wiping "out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers." (Ibid., p. 748.) LibLex

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause a speci c offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not su ce. In the case at bar nothing speci cally subversive
has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as
instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D.
No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any speci c provision of the decree. In the
words of Chief Justice Concepcion, "It would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision
thereof. cdrep

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 The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants
authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other things, of
the following:
"Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement."

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, lea ets, books,
etc. subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the
applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the
Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as
there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA which has replaced
the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken. LLphil

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the

warrants should be returned to the owners and all of the items are subject to the
exclusionary rule of evidence.

Footnotes

1. Petition, p. 44, Rollo.

2. Manifestation and Opposition, p. 75, Rollo.

3. Templo v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295.

4. 63 Phil. 275.

5. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29.

6. Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Examination of the Applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to them.
7. The opening paragraph of Search Warrant No. 20-82 [b] reads:

"It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of Maj.
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Lt. Pedro U. Tango, that there are good and sufficient reason
to believe that Jose Burgos, Jr. Publisher-Editor of 'WE FORUM' with office address at
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, has in his possession and
control at said address the following: . . . :
8. 68 Am. Jur. 2d., 729.

9. 61 Phil. 709.
10. Annex "C", Petition, pp. 51-52, Rollo.

11. Annex "B", Petition, pp. 53-54, Rollo.

12. Annex "C", Petition, p. 51, Rollo.

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 13. Annex "D", Petition, p. 54, Rollo.
14. Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution.

15. 64 Phil. 33.

16. 379 U.S. 476, 13 L ed 2nd 431.

17. 68 Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-737.

18. Sec. 9. Art. IV of the Constitution.

19. Annex "K", Consolidated Reply, p. 175, Rollo.

20. Annex "L", Consolidated Reply, p. 178, Rollo.

21. Annex "M", Consolidated Reply, p. 179, Rollo.

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