EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.]

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS

and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila, JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila,
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T . David for
petitioners.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacico P . de Castro,

Assistant Solicitor General Frine C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C . Padua for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHO MAY CONTEST

LEGALITY THEREOF CASE AT BAR. It is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby (Lewis
vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d.
121: Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d. 916; Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F,
60; Moriz vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d. 444). Consequently, petitioner in the case at bar may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the document, papers, and
things seized from the oces and premises of the corporation adverted to, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized eects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate ocers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity U.S., vs.
Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).

2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. Two points

must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tari and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specic oense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the oense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specic omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in the
case at bar do not allege any specic acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tari and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code", as alleged in aforementioned applications without reference to any
determine provision of said laws or coders.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question, would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for
it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the victims, caprice or passion of peace ocers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision Sec. 1,
par. 3 Art. III, Const.) to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not dicult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. Such
is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it t to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court, by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specic oense." Not satised with this qualication,
the Court added thereto paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The grave violation of the Constitution
made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the eects to be searched for and seized, to wit: "Books
of accounts, Financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers, showing
all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related
prot and loss statements." Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transaction were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURES. Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,
but also to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the
party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon
the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to nd that there is probable cause and only possible for the Judge to nd that
there is probable cause and hence, no justication for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justication) for its issuance is the necessity of
shing evidence of the commission of crime. But when this shing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO SECURE ILLEGAL SEARCH
WARRANT OR MAKE UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS NO EXCUSE. The
theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suce to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have.
Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but understandably
nds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact
that the psychological and moral eect of the possibility of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED. The doctrine adopted in

the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the warrants for the search
of 3 residences of petitioners, as specied in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are
null and void; the searches and seizures therein made are illegal.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C .J : p

Upon application of the ocers of the government named on the margin 1

hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Prosecutors several judges 2 hereinafter
referred to as Respondent-Judges issued, on dierent dates, 3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were
o cers, 5 directed to any peace ocer, to search the persons above-named and/or
the premises of their oces, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:

"Books of accounts, nancial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
 documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and prot and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."

as "the subject of the oense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
oense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
oense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tari and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to sh evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
led against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners led with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending nal
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondent-Prosecutors, their agents and or representatives from using the eects
seized as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers,
things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the contested search

warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects
of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any
event, the eects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
oces of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein. 7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found
and seized in the oces of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the rst group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the oces they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the oces and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
eects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate ocers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging

to the corporation did not relate to nor did it aect the personal defendants.
If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights
of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not
the rights of the other defendants . Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not aect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or
the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim
for themselves the benets of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States
(C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
d o es not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the
corporation whose property was taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co.
vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12
thereby, in eect, restraining herein Respondent-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions
need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if
the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures eected upon the authority
thereof are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
eects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or armation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tari and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In
other words, no specific oense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the oense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specic acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tari and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in
the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision
of said laws or codes.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace ocers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not dicult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels
that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the

disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it t to amend Section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause
in connection with one specic oense." Not satised with this qualication, the
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the eects to
be searched for and seized, to wit:
 "Books of accounts, nancial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related prot and loss
statements."

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
w ere legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to
be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective:
the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching ocer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the oending ocial may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing ocials, knows that it cannot prot by their wrong, will
that wrong be repressed". 18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:

"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an oense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
 seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The eorts of the courts
and their ocials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrice of those great principles established
by years of endeavor and suering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land." 19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions of
the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation

of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by ocial lawlessness in agrant abuse
of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specic guarantee against
that very same unlawful conduct. We held that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State court.

"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared

enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be 'a form of words', valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, 'without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would
be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. '
At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was applicable
to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we
have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal ocers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The right to
privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not
susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the
Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessary
that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be
also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by
the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by
Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoinment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
 the exclusionary rule 'is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only eectively available way by removing the incentive to
disregard it.' . . .

"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy
the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in
the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right
to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state ocers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an
empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
eect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police ocer who, in the
name of law enforceable itself, chooses to suspend its enjoinment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police ocer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."
(Emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to
spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To
be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to nd that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justication for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justication) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this shing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suce to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that
violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably nds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral eect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning, power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street,
and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore,
the records, papers and other eects seized in the oces of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other eects under
their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of

and control over the aforementioned records, papers and eects, and the alleged
"personal" nature thereof, has been advanced, not in their petition or amended
petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be a
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
adavits or copies of alleged adavits attached to said motion for reconsideration,
or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satised that the allegations of said petitions and
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned adavits and
other papers submitted in support of said motion, have suciently established the
facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners, to
warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any
rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to
leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specied in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other
eects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other eects seized in the twenty-
nine (29) places, oces and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and
from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following
distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this
case are general warrants and are therefore prescribed by, and in violation of,
Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,

should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are
expressly declared null and void; the searches and seizures therein made are
expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and eects seized in the residences is
made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily

demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the
documents, papers and eects seized in the places other than the three residences
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly
declaring as null and void the search warrants served at such other places and as
illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately
preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the
nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and
the illegality of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In
my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by
the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter
this Court from forthrightly laying down the law - not only for this case but as well
for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception,
in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore
admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumenti, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things
and eects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner aect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic illegality of the search
warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are void
and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No
inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or
the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings
submitted to this Court, the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move
for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and eects that were
seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim
from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years
of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our
courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncements made on the
Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or
return of documents, papers and eects which are the fruits of an unlawful search
and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers
and eects gives "standing"; (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or
constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved
person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search
warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person", gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting
three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the
petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted
named three corporate defendants. But the "oce/house/warehouse/premises"
mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"oce/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of
the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see
pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to
be made, and were actually made, in the "oce/house warehouse/premises" owned
by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion
to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones
vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a
friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir.
1961) (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was
president); United States vs. Jeers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8F. 2d 492,
493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the
defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962)
(papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it
was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental

nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth
Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when he places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
homes, or his oce, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts something in
his ling cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to
know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable
seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the
warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveillance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this
Court over the years have involved a myriad of diering factual contexts in
which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say
here or do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the
Fourth Amendment may be applicable." Hoa vs. U.S. 87 S. Ct. 408
(December 12, 1966) See also U.S. vs. Jeers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searches gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents

seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue
of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These
proprietary and leasehold interests have been suciently set forth in their motion
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the
petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts.; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal oces within the corporate
oces (IBMS, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such oces; or had paid
for the ling cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy
Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling
stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if
not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to
move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and eects seized
therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and
extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standards of
the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
 "We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts.
We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import
into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and
rened by the common law in evolving the body of private property law,
which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which
they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions
in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5
and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd.
9305. Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,' and
'guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards." See
also Chapman vs. United States,354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to
return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records
were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president
successfully moved for the return and suppression as to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:

"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, either his

own or the corporation's, was entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search
and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of
seized articles and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
granted." (emphasis supplied)

Time was when only a person who had property interest in either the place
searched or the articles seized had the necessary standing to invoke the protection
of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. United States, 336 U.S. 461 (1948),
Justice Robert Jackson, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that
"even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion". This view nally became the ocial view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a
step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched, but the
Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to
include "anyone legitimately on premises where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of
a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court concluded that the defendant had
standing on two independent grounds: First he had a sucient interest in the
property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched
(just in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation's
premises and had seized most of the corporation's books and records. Looking to
Jones, the court observed:
"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify one as a
'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.' It tells us that
appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal
Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records,
merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the
books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invaded
premises . . ." Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651.

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th
Cir. 1962). In Villano, police ocers seized two notebooks from a desk in the
defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either;
he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The
Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an
invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296
F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law oce, placed his les in storage and
went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his
standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to
the custodian of his les. The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that.

"Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished

personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of
unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere
procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce
and deliver them." Schwimmer vs. United. States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th
Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against
said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F.
Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y. ). The defendant had stored with an attorney
certain les and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time
of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of
the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's
adavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management". The papers turned out
to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless,
the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on
Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, A'd 155 F.
2d 631; Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that.

"It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were

directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in
the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The rst "search warrant
described the records as having been used in committing a violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . .' The second search warrant was captioned: 'United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing

to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones." (p. 199)

"If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession of the

records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the
premises searched." See also Jeers vs. United States. 88 U.S. Appl. D.C.
58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), armed 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459
(1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was rearmed on motion for reargument; the United
States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly
similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and
corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in
Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY"
against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell
because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners' connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless of whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of
the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to
the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal
capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to
the petitioners all personal and private papers and eects seized, no matter where
these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate oces or any other
place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their
various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the
things seized from the corporate oces and other places were personal and private
papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which
were the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping
should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners wherever they were
unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, oces, warehouses and/or premises
owned and/or controlled and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as
shown in all the search warrants and in the sworn applications led in securing the
void search warrants, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully
seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or
purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void
search warrants in ultimately eecting the suppression and/or return of the said
documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners

likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate
papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as
specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my

disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional
proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Footnotes

1. Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his
capacity as Acting Director of National Bureau of Investigation, Special
Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr., and Assistant
Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, City of Manila.

2. Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman
Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes
Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch Hon.
Eulogio Mencias. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and
Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.

3. Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

4. Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

5. U. S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development

Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc.,
Industrial Business Management Corporation General Agricultural Corporation,
American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday
Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management
 Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing and
Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel
Corporation.

6. Inter alia.

7. Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be
rendered in the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case
against the use of the papers, documents and things from the following premises:
(1) The oce of the US Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg. Arzobispo St., Manila;
(2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th
& 14th Sts. Port Area, Mla; (4) 527 Rosario St. Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or
Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th
St., Port Area, Mla.; 7224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago
and 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco &
Boston, Port Area, Mla; (10) Investment Inc. 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC.
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg.,
San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila;
(14) Room 91, Carmen Apts., Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad St.,
between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm 304, Army and Navy Club, Manila
South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81
Carmen Apts; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Bills, Inc., Trinity Bldg. San Luis,
Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area,
Manila (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila (23) IBMC, 2nd Flr.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Bldg., 610 San Luis
Manila (25) United Housing Corp. Trinity Bldg., San Luis Manila (26) Republic Real
State Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate. Manila;
(28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14
Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and
955 against petitioners before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. the
preliminary injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things found
in the other premises namely: in those of the residences of petitioners, as follows:
(1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park Makati, Rizal (2) 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park,
Makati Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati Rizal."

8. Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9. Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10. In re Dooley (1931) 48 F. 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco vs. U. S.
237 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. 60; Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11. U.S. vs. Gass, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384, 394.

12. On March 22, 1962.

13. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14. Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or
armation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
 describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

15. . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specic oense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or armation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specic oense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 126.)

16. People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

17. Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

18. Pugliese (1945) 153 F. 2d. 497.

19. Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 US 383, 58 L. ed, 652, 34 S. Ct. 341;
underscoring supplied.

20. Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed. 647. 41 S. Ct. 261;
Olmstead vs. United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564; Wolf
vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed, 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States,
364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio L91961), 367
US 643, 6 L. ed 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.

21. Even if remote.

22. Particularly, Jones vs. U.S., 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. Republic, 216 Fed. Supp. 48;
U.S. vs. Jeries, 72 S. Ct. 93; Villano vs. U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henze vs. U.S.
296 Fed. 2d 650.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

* Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.