Stonehill v. Diokno

STONEHILL v.
DIOKNO
DOCTRINE: “Exclusionary Rule”
FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government (respondent prosecutors), several judges (respondent
judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners & or the corporations of which they were officers,
directed to any peace officer, to search the persons named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or
residences, and to seize several personal properties as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits
of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners Stonehill, et.al. filed w/ the SC this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.
ISSUES:
Whether the right against unlawful search and seizures may be invoked by artificial beings?
Whether or not the search warrants in question were validly issued?
Whether or not the articles seized by virtue of the warrants are admissible in evidence?
RULING:
YES. Artificial beings are also entitled to the guarantee although they may be required to open their books of accounts
for examination by the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER.
YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Art. III, Section 2 of the Constitution: (a) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein; and (b) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to ALL business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights-- THAT THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case
must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be
allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured
the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by
other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired,
is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed".
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962
are null and void.

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