G.R. No. 135808 ESCRA

Supreme Court E-Library
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 651

SEC vs. Interport Resources Corp., et al.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135808. October 6, 2008]
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION,
MANUEL S. RECTO, RENE S. VILLARICA, PELAGIO
RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA, FRANCISCO
ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY and SANTIAGO TANCHAN,
JR., respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. MERCANTILE LAW; REVISED SECURITIES ACT; THE

MERE ABSENCE OF IMPLEMENTING RULES CANNOT
EFFECTIVELY INVALIDATE PROVISIONS OF LAW
WHERE A REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION THAT WILL
SUPPORT THE LAW MAY BE GIVEN; SUSTAINED. —
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which
may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding.
It is well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption
of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is
declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding for all intents and purposes. The mere absence of
implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions
of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the
law may be given. The necessity for vesting administrative
authorities with power to make rules and regulations is based
on the impracticability of lawmakers’ providing general
regulations for various and varying details of management. To
rule that the absence of implementing rules can render
ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities
Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the
legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert
that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on
a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to
act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed
relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know. It is well established that
administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules
652 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate

its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to
the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as
purport to carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless,
it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert
for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from
the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute contains
sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case
of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there
should be no impediment to its implementation. In all, this
Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to render
effective Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act;
nor was the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure invalid, prior
to the enactment of the Securities Regulations Code, for failure
to provide parties with the right to cross-examine the witnesses
presented against them. Thus, the respondents may be
investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper rules
of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations
of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.
2. ID.; ID.; INSIDER’S DUTY TO DISCLOSE WHEN TRADING;
EXPLAINED. — Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads: Sec. 30.
Insider’s duty to disclose when trading. — (a) It shall be
unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer,
if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the
issuer or the security that is not generally available, unless
(1) the insider proves that the fact is generally available or
(2) if the other party to the transaction (or his agent) is
identified, (a) the insider proves that the other party knows it,
or (b) that other party in fact knows it from the insider or
otherwise. (b) “Insider” means (1) the issuer, (2) a director
or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship
or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access
to a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security
that is not generally available, or (4) a person who learns such
a fact from any of the foregoing insiders as defined in this
subsection, with knowledge that the person from whom he learns
the fact is such an insider. (c) A fact is “of special significance”
if (a) in addition to being material it would be likely, on being
made generally available, to affect the market price of a security
to a significant extent, or (b) a reasonable person would consider
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it especially important under the circumstances in determining

his course of action in the light of such factors as the degree
of its specificity, the extent of its difference from information
generally available previously, and its nature and reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in subsection
(b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he knows of a fact of
special significance by virtue of his being an insider. The
provision explains in simple terms that the insider’s misuse
of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of
illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of
investors against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret
information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders
are obligated to disclose material information to the other party
or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This
duty to disclose or abstain is based on two factors: first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone; and second,
the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage
of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing. Under the law, what is required to be
disclosed is a fact of “special significance” which may be
(a) a material fact which would be likely, on being made generally
available, to affect the market price of a security to a significant
extent, or (b) one which a reasonable person would consider
especially important in determining his course of action with
regard to the shares of stock.
3. ID.; ID.; BENEFICIAL OWNER; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED.
— Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward provision that imposes upon (1) a beneficial
owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity
security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such
security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his
or her ownership of the issuer’s securities and such changes
in his or her ownership thereof. x x x Section 36(a) refers to
the “beneficial owner.” Beneficial owner has been defined in
the following manner: [F]irst, to indicate the interest of a
beneficiary in trust property (also called “equitable ownership”);
and second, to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder
to buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered
in the corporation’s books as the owner. Usually, beneficial
ownership is distinguished from naked ownership, which is

the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership,

as against possession of the bare title to property. Even assuming
that the term “beneficial ownership” was vague, it would not
affect respondents’ case, where the respondents are directors
and/or officers of the corporation, who are specifically required
to comply with the reportorial requirements under Section 36(a)
of the Revised Securities Act. The validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.
4. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE FOR THE ENACTMENT OF THE
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS THEREOF, CLARIFIED. —
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted
to promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent
unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain non-
public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed
public. No individual would invest in a market which can be
manipulated by a limited number of corporate insiders. Such
reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities
market. To avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30
of the Revised Securities Act prevented the unfair use of non-
public information in securities transactions, while Section
36 allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into
by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities
of their companies. The Revised Securities Act was approved
on 23 February 1982. The fact that the Full Disclosure Rules
were promulgated by the SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not
render ineffective in the meantime Section 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. It is already unequivocal that the Revised
Securities Act requires full disclosure and the Full Disclosure
Rules were issued to make the enforcement of the law more
consistent, efficient and effective. It is equally reasonable to
state that the disclosure forms later provided by the SEC, do
not, in any way imply that no compliance was required before
the forms were provided. The effectivity of a statute which
imposes reportorial requirements cannot be suspended by the
issuance of specified forms, especially where compliance
therewith may be made even without such forms. The forms
merely made more efficient the processing of requirements
already identified by the statute. For the same reason, the Court
of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no civil,
criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against
the respondents in connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 655

the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing

rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete
by themselves. Their requirements are specifically set out,
and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. In particular,
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward
enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities
and the particular matters which need to be reported in the
registration statement thereof. The Decision, dated 20 August
1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC
from such requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot
suspend the effectivity of these provisions. Thus, this Court
cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC from
exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation
of Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act.
5. ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATIVE DISTINGUISHED FROM
ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS. — In Cariño v. Commission
on Human Rights, this Court sets out the distinction between
investigative and adjudicative functions, thus: “Investigate,”
commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition
of “investigate” is “to observe or study closely; inquire into
systematically: “to search or inquire into” x x x to subject to
an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry.” The
purpose of an investigation, of course is to discover, to find
out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated
is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of
“investigate” is essentially the same: “(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy;
to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;” “to inquire; to make an investigation,”
“investigation” being in turn described as “(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters.” “Adjudicate,” commonly
or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines
the term as “to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties
to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x x to pass

judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.” And “adjudge”

means “to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: x x x to award or grant judicially in a
case of controversy x x x.” In a legal sense, “adjudicate” means:
“To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;” and
“adjudge” means: “To pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.” There
is no merit to the respondent’s averment that the sections under
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, do not
distinguish between investigative and adjudicatory functions.
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, is unequivocally
entitled “Adjudication.”
6. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DUE PROCESS;
REQUIRES ONLY THAT EVERY LITIGANT BE GIVEN
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR AND
DEFEND HIS RIGHT AND TO INTRODUCE RELEVANT
EVIDENCE IN HIS FAVOR; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR. — This is not to say that administrative bodies performing
adjudicative functions are required to strictly comply with the
requirements of Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code,
particularly, the right to cross-examination. It should be noted
that under Section 2.2 of Executive Order No. 26, issued on
7 October 1992, abbreviated proceedings are prescribed in
the disposition of administrative cases: 2. Abbreviation of
Proceedings. All administrative agencies are hereby directed
to adopt and include in their respective Rules of Procedure
the following provisions: x x x 2.2 Rules adopting, unless
otherwise provided by special laws and without prejudice to
Section 12, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987, the mandatory use of affidavits in lieu of direct
testimonies and the preferred use of depositions whenever
practicable and convenient. As a consequence, in proceedings
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission and the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency, created under laws which
authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be reached on
the basis of position papers or other documentary evidence
only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence. In fact, the hearings before such agencies do not
connote full adversarial proceedings. Thus, it is not necessary
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 657

for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be

cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require
otherwise would negate the summary nature of the administrative
or quasi-judicial proceedings. In Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., this Court
stated that: [I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of
fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is
sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported
by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support
an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” In order to comply with
the requirements of due process, what is required, among other
things, is that every litigant be given reasonable opportunity
to appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence
in his favor.
7. ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE REPEAL OF LAW GENERALLY
DEPRIVED THE COURT OF ITS AUTHORITY TO
PENALIZE THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THE
VIOLATION OF THE OLD LAW PRIOR TO ITS REPEAL;
EXCEPTION. — The Securities Regulations Code absolutely
repealed the Revised Securities Act. While the absolute repeal
of a law generally deprives a court of its authority to penalize
the person charged with the violation of the old law prior to
its appeal, an exception to this rule comes about when the
repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the
old law. The Court, in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, sets
down the rules in such instances: As a rule, an absolute repeal
of a penal law has the effect of depriving the court of its authority
to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior
to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal
law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had
been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no
longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never
did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the
inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides
that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. Another
exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute
and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law.
In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment
continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending

cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty

to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.
8. MERCANTILE LAW; SECURITIES REGULATIONS CODE;
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION; RETAINS
LIMITED INVESTIGATORY POWERS; CLARIFIED. —
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides
that criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations
enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation,
while the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers.
Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned
law. In Morato v. Court of Appeals, the cases therein were
still pending before the PED for investigation and the SEC
for resolution when the Securities Regulations Code was
enacted. The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate
dispute, while the subject matter of the other case investigated
by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and violations of
pertinent rules and laws of the company’s board of directors.
The enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not result
in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this Court ordered the
transfer of one case to the proper regional trial court and the
SEC to continue with the investigation of the other case. Under
Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled
Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to
“make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any
provision of this Act x x x.” After a finding that a person has
violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the
case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails
substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be
disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan, this Court enunciated
that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC, which
determines the existence of probable cause, before a
preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In
the aforecited case, the complaint filed directly with the DOJ
was dismissed on the ground that it should have been filed
first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a violation of
the Securities Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for
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criminal prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the

Revised Securities Act. This Court affirmed the dismissal,
which it explained thus: The Court of Appeals held that under
the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any
law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with
the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause,
then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed
to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ
did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint
in I.S. No. 2004-229. A criminal charge for violation of the
Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence,
it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special
competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving
a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise
of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special
law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence,
all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing
rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the
complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the
complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and
prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted. We
thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed
a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal complaint
directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion
can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation
undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a criminal
case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it
is imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated before
the SEC, the administrative agency with the special competence.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION
PERIOD; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — It is an
established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts
the prescription period. A preliminary investigation is
essentially a determination whether an offense has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused
to have committed an offense: A preliminary investigation is

merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of

discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed or whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. To reiterate, the SEC must
first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable
cause in accordance with the doctrine pronounced in Baviera
v. Paglinawan. In this case, the DOJ was precluded from
initiating a preliminary investigation since the SEC was halted
by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its investigation.
Such a situation leaves the prosecution of the case at a standstill,
and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation
against the respondents, who, in the first place, sought the
injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could
do in order to break the impasse was to have the Decision of
the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest
opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during which
the SEC was prevented from continuing with its investigation
should not be counted against it. The law on the prescription
period was never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an
impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be
placed way beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves
of the proper remedy, they would still be barred from
investigating and prosecuting the case. Indubitably, the
prescription period is interrupted by commencing the
proceedings for the prosecution of the accused. In criminal
cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary
investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under
the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code
is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an
investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after
a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ
instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation
that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it discovered
the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted
the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription
period.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 661

TINGA, J., concurring opinion:
1. MERCANTILE LAW; SECURITIES ACT; SECURITIES

REGULATION; RATIONALE. — The securities market is
imbued with public interest and as such it is regulated.
Specifically, the reasons given for securities regulation are
(1) to protect investors, (2) to supply the informational needs
of investors, (3) to ensure that stock prices conform to the
fundamental value of the companies traded, (4) to allow
shareholders to gain greater control over their corporate
managers, and (5) to foster economic growth, innovation and
access to capital.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCLOSURE REGULATION; JUSTIFIED. —
Disclosure regulation requires issuers of securities to make
public a large amount of financial information to actual and
potential investors. The standard justification for disclosure
rules is that the managers of the issuing firm have more
information about the financial health and future of the firm
than investors who own or are considering the purchase of the
firm’s securities. Financial activity regulation consists of rules
about traders of securities and trading on or off the stock
exchange. A prime example of this form of regulation is the
set of rules against trading by insiders.
3. ID.; ID.; INSIDER TRADING; CONSTRUED. — In its barest
essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based
on knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public
at the time. Such activity is generally prohibited in many
jurisdiction, including our own, though the particular scope
and definition of “insider trading” depends on the legislation
or case law of each jurisdiction. In the United States, the rule
has been stated as “that anyone who, for trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has ‘access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone’
may not take ‘advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing,’ i.e., the investing
public.”
4. ID.; ID.; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION;
FUNCTION TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF ORDINARY
STOCKHOLDERS AND INVESTORS, JUSTIFIED. — The

ability of the SEC to effectively regulate the securities market

depends on the breadth of its discretion to undertake regulatory
activities. The intractable adherents of laissez-faire absolutism
may decry the fact that there exists an SEC in the first place,
yet it is that body which assures the protection of interest of
ordinary stockholders and investors in the capital markets,
interests which may be overlooked by the issuers of securities
and their corporate overseers whose own interest may not
necessarily align with that of the investing public. A “free market”
that is not a “fair market” is not truly free, even if left unshackled
by the Stated as it would in fact be shackled by the uninhibited
greed of only the largest players. Respondents essentially
contend that the SEC is precluded from enforcing its statutory
powers unless it first translates the statute into a more
comprehensive set of rules. Without denigrating the SEC’s
delegated rule-making power, each provision of the law already
constitutes an executable command from the legislature. Any
refusal on the part of the SEC to enforce the statute on the
premise that it had yet to undergo the gauntlet of administrative
interpretation is derelict to that body’s legal mandate. By no
means is the Congress impervious to the concern that certain
statutory provisions are best enforced only after an administrative
regulation implementing the same is promulgated. In such cases,
the legislature is solicitous enough to specifically condition
the enforcement of the statute upon the promulgation of the
relevant administrative rules. Yet in cases where the legislature
does not see fit to impose such a conditionality, the body tasked
with enforcing the law has no choice but to do so. Any quibbling
as to the precise meaning of the statutory language would be
duly resolved through the exercise of judicial review. The
revised Securities Act was later superseded by the Securities
Regulation Code of 2000 (Rep. Act. No. 8799), a law which
is admittedly more precise and ambitious in its regulation of
such activity. The passage of that law is praiseworthy insofar
as it strengthens the State’s commitment to combat insider
trading. And the promulgation of this decision confirms that
the judiciary will not hesitate in performing its part in seeing
to it that our securities laws are properly implemented and
enforced.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATORY POWER THEREOF AKIN
TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; UPHELD. — It should
be emphasized that Sec. 45 of the Revised Securities Act
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 663

invests the SEC with the power to “make such investigations

as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act or any
rule or regulation thereunder, and may require or permit any
person to file with it a statement in writing, under oath or
otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts
and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated”
and to refer criminal complaints for violations of the Act to
the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and
prosecution before the proper court. The SEC’s investigatory
powers are obviously akin to the preliminary examination stage
mentioned in People v. Olarte. The SEC’s investigation and
determination that there was indeed a violation of the provisions
of the Revised Securities Act would set the stage for any further
proceedings, such as preliminary investigation, that may be
conducted by the DOJ after the case is referred to it by the
SEC.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FILING OF
COMPLAINT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION INTERRUPTS THE PERIOD OF
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY;
SUSTAINED. — This Court, in ruling in Baviera v. Paglinawan
that the Department of Justice cannot conduct a preliminary
investigation for the determination of probable cause for
offenses under the Revised Securities Code, without an
investigation first had by the SEC, essentially underscored that
the exercise is a two-stage process. The procedure is similar
to the two-phase preliminary investigation prior to the
prosecution of a criminal case in court under the old rules.
The venerable J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Olarte finally settled
a long standing jurisprudential conflict at the time by holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on its merits. The court gave three
reasons in support of its decision, thus: x x x Several reasons
buttress this conclusions: First the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
“shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information” without distinguishing whether the complaint is

filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation

merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed
to investigate the case its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do not on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
CARPIO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTION

OF ACTIONS; ONLY THE INSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS CAN INTERRUPT THE RUNNING OF
THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. — In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,
the Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Section 2
of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings and not
administrative proceedings. The Court held: x x x This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted
on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that. This interpretation is in consonance with
the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended “when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party.” The proceedings referred to in
Section 2 thereof are “judicial proceedings,” contrary to
the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must
not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does. Indeed, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 expressly
refers to the “institution of judicial proceedings.” Contrary
to the majority opinion’s claim that “a preliminary investigation
interrupts the prescriptive period,” only the institution of
judicial proceedings can interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period. Thus, in the present case, since no criminal
case was filed in any court against respondents since 1994
for violation of the Code, the prescriptive period of twelve
years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 has now expired.
2. MERCANTILE LAW; SECURITIES REGULATION CODE;
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION; EMPOWERS
ONLY TO CONDUCT ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
AND TO IMPOSE FINES AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 665

SANCTIONS; CONSTRUED. — The SEC has no jurisdiction

to institute judicial proceedings against respondents for criminal
violation of the Code. Even if the Court of Appeals did not
issue the injunction, the SEC could still not have instituted
any judicial proceedings against respondents for criminal
violation of the Code. The Code empowers the SEC to conduct
only administrative investigations and to impose fines and
other administrative sanctions against violators of the Code.
Section 54.2 of the Code states that the “imposition of x x x
administrative sanctions shall be without prejudice to the filing
of criminal charges against the individuals responsible for the
violation.” Thus, the criminal charges may proceed
separately and independently of the administrative
proceedings. Under Section 53.1 of the Code, jurisdiction to
institute judicial proceedings against respondents for criminal
violation of the Code lies exclusively with the Department
of Justice (DOJ). Section 53.1 of the Code expressly states
that “all criminal complaints for violations of this Code
x x x shall be referred to the Department of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the
proper court.” No court ever enjoined the DOJ to institute
judicial proceedings against respondents for criminal violation
of the Code. Nothing prevented the DOJ’s National Bureau
of Investigation from investigating the alleged criminal
violations of the Code by respondents. Thereafter, the DOJ
could have conducted a preliminary investigation and instituted
judicial proceedings against respondents. The DOJ did not
and prescription has now set in.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Fortunato F.L. Viray, Jr. for S. Tanchan, Jr.
Rodriguez Delos Santos and Naidas Law Offices for M.S.
Recto, et al.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,1 dated 20 August
1998, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) from taking cognizance of or initiating any action against
the respondent corporation Interport Resources Corporation
(IRC) and members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel
S. Recto, Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, Antonio Reina,
Francisco Anonuevo, Joseph Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr.,
with respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act. In the same Decision of the appellate court, all the proceedings
taken against the respondents, including the assailed SEC Omnibus
Orders of 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995, were declared
void.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved
a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad
(GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired
100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings,
Inc. (GEHI),2 which would own and operate a 102 megawatt
(MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement also
stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase
contract with National Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI’s
power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-
line by mid-September of 1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to
GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to
40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.3
1
Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui with Associate Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo,
pp. 31-38.
2
GEHI is a subsidiary wholly owned by GHB. CA rollo, p. 51.
3
Id. at 46-49.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 667

On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital

stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724
hectares of real estate property in Makati. Under the Agreement,
GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in
Malaysia, shall extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the
proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI.4
IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing
the approval of the agreement was sent through facsimile
transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC,
but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it.
Upon the advice of the SEC, the IRC sent the press release on
the morning of 9 August 1994.5
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to
make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB
and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded
IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 16
August 1994, the SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring
IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid Memorandum
of Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed
all principal officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the
Brokers and Exchanges Department (BED) of the SEC to explain
IRC’s failure to immediately disclose the information as required
by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.6
In compliance with the SEC Chairman’s directive, the IRC
sent a letter dated 16 August 1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto
copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its directors, Manuel
Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before
the SEC on 22 August 1994 to explain IRC’s alleged failure to
immediately disclose material information as required under the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.7
4
Id.
5
Id. at 5-6.
6
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
7
CA rollo, p. 6; Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by
Corporations Whose Securities Are Listed in Any Stock Exchange or Registered/
Licensed Under the Securities Act, issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 8 February 1973; see rollo, p. 65.

On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order

finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material
Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when
it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB.
In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the officers and
directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares
in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
Securities Act.8
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September
1994, which was superseded by an Amended Omnibus Motion,
filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority
to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, 9 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution
and Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC. Respondents
also claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process
when it ordered that the respondents appear before the SEC
and “show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions
should be imposed on them,” and, thus, shifted the burden of
proof to the respondents. Lastly, they sought to have their cases
tried jointly given the identical factual situations surrounding
the alleged violation committed by the respondents.10
Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of
Proceedings on 24 October 1994, wherein they moved for
8
Rollo, p. 10.
9
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject
to the Commission’s control and supervision, the exclusive authority to investigate,
on complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the Board of Directors/
Trustees of corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their
stockholders, officers or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or
representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations administered and
enforced by the Commission; to file and prosecute in accordance with law and
rules and regulations issued by the Commission and in appropriate cases, the
corresponding criminal or civil case before the Commission or the proper court
or body upon prima facie finding of violation of any laws or rules and regulations
administered and enforced by the Commission; and to perform such other powers
and functions as may be provided by law or duly delegated to it by the Commission.
10
CA rollo, pp. 68-94.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 669

discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings before

the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and the investigating
officials had become reasonably free from prejudice and public
pressure. 11
No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the
aforementioned motions, but on 25 January 1995, the SEC issued
an Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same in this
wise:12
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the
Commission resolves and hereby rules:
1. To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide the
instant case in accordance with the Rules of Practice and Procedure
Before the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED),
Securities and Exchange Commission, to be composed of Attys.
James K. Abugan, Medardo Devera (Prosecution and Enforcement
Department), and Jose Aquino (Brokers and Exchanges Department),
which is hereby directed to expeditiously resolve the case by
conducting continuous hearings, if possible.
2. To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994
requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why no
administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on
them.
3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration,13
questioning the creation of the special investigating panel to
hear the case and the denial of the Motion for Continuance.
The SEC denied reconsideration in its Omnibus Order dated 30
March 1995. 14
The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals
docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, questioning the Omnibus
11
Id. at 95-107.
12
Id. at 39-43.
13
Id. at 152-162.
14
Id. at 44.

Orders dated 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995.15 During

the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed
a Supplemental Motion16 dated 16 May 1995, wherein they
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating and proceeding
with the hearing of the case against respondents herein. On 5
May 1995, the Court of Appeals granted their motion and issued
a writ of preliminary injunction, which effectively enjoined the
SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against
the respondents herein. 17
On 23 October 1995, the SEC filed a Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so that the case may be investigated
by the PED in accordance with the SEC Rules and Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose creation
the SEC had earlier ordered. 18
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision19 on 20 August
1998. It determined that there were no implementing rules and
regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the
provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents
allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it
found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any
suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative
proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without
violating their rights to due process and equal protection. It
further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC
cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for
the sole purpose of re-filing the same case against the respondents.20
15
Id. at 1-37.
16
CA rollo, pp. 214-230.
17
Id. at 237-238.
18
Id. at 269-270.
19
Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui with Associate Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo,
pp. 31-38.
20
Id. at 35-36.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 671

The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice

and Procedure Before the PED, which took effect on 14 April
1990, did not comply with the statutory requirements contained
in the Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the
Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the PED affords a
party the right to be present but without the right to cross-
examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of Section
12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code. 21
In the dispositive portion of its Decision, dated 20 August
1998, the Court of Appeals ruled that 22:
WHEREFORE, [herein petitioner SEC’s] Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders is hereby DENIED. The petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is GRANTED. Consequently,
all proceedings taken against [herein respondents] in this case,
including the Omnibus Orders of January 25, 1995 and March 30,
1995 are declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction
is hereby made permanent and, accordingly, [SEC] is hereby
prohibited from taking cognizance or initiating any action, be
they civil, criminal, or administrative against [respondents] with
respect to Sections 8 (Procedure for Registration), 30 (Insider’s
duty to disclose when trading) and 36 (Directors, Officers and Principal
Stockholders) in relation to Sections 46 (Administrative sanctions)
56 (Penalties) 44 (Liabilities of Controlling persons) and 45
(Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses) of the Revised
Securities Act and Section 144 (Violations of the Code) of the
Corporation Code. (Emphasis provided.)
The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court

of Appeals denied in a Resolution23 issued on 30 September 1998.
Hence, the present petition, which relies on the following
grounds24:
21
Id. at 36.
22
Id. at 37.
23
Id. at 40-41.
24
Id. at 14.

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO QUASH THE ASSAILED SEC OMNIBUS
ORDERS DATED JANUARY 25 AND MARCH 30, 1995.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE
IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR
PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY
CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT
CORPORATION AND ITS DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO
SECTION 30 (INSIDER’S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN
TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL
STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND THE
SICD RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/
PROCEEDINGS25 ARE INVALID AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted
that while this case was pending in this Court, Republic Act
No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code,
took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was already
repealed as provided for in Section 76 of the Securities Regulation
Code:
SEC. 76. Repealing Clause. — The Revised Securities Act (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 178), as amended, in its entirety, and Sections 2, 4
and 8 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, are hereby repealed.
All other laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
25
The Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) Rules of
Procedure on Administrative Actions/Proceedings took effect on 29 December
1996, after the violations allegedly took place.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 673

inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby repealed or

modified accordingly.
Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and
the Securities Regulation Code has taken the place of the Revised
Securities Act.
The Court now proceeds with a discussion of the present
case.
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act do not require the
enactment of implementing rules to
make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing
rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act,
no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had
against the respondents without violating their right to due process
and equal protection, citing as its basis the case Yick Wo v.
Hopkins. 26 This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity,
which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding.
It is well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption
of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is
declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding
for all intents and purposes.27 The mere absence of implementing
rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a
reasonable construction that will support the law may be given.
In People v. Rosenthal, 28 this Court ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that
“legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty
26
118 U.S. 356.
27
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
v. Mabalot, 428 Phil. 154, 164 (2002); Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345
Phil. 962, 979 (1997).
28
68 Phil. 328, 348 (1939).

if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and

give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual
on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose
for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise
and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for
its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.” (25
R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 29 the Court underlined
the importance of the presumption of validity of laws and the
careful consideration with which the judiciary strikes down as
invalid acts of the legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid
in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.
To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine
of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory
is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power

to make rules and regulations is based on the impracticability
of lawmakers’ providing general regulations for various and
varying details of management.30 To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress,
such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying
the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law,
because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob
the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. 31
It is well established that administrative authorities have the
29
G.R. No. 100883, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 516, 523.
30
Geukeko v. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712-713 (1957).
31
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 675

power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given

statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and
regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by
the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general
policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and
regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive
prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. 32
Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards and
an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of
the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to
its implementation.
The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins 33 shows a glaring error. In the cited case, this Court
found unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the board of
supervisors authority to refuse permission to carry on laundries
located in buildings that were not made of brick and stone,
because it violated the equal protection clause and was highly
discriminatory and hostile to Chinese residents and not because
the standards provided therein were vague or ambiguous.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, such that
the acts proscribed and/or required would not be understood
by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads:
Sec. 30. Insider’s duty to disclose when trading. — (a) It
shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer,
if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer
or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider
proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party
to the transaction (or his agent) is identified, (a) the insider proves
that the other party knows it, or (b) that other party in fact knows
it from the insider or otherwise.
32
Del Mar v. The Philippine Veterans Administration, 151-A Phil.
792, 802 (1973).
33
Supra note 23.

(b) “Insider” means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of,
or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former relationship
to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special significance
about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or
(4) a person who learns such a fact from any of the foregoing insiders
as defined in this subsection, with knowledge that the person from
whom he learns the fact is such an insider.
(c) A fact is “of special significance” if (a) in addition to being
material it would be likely, on being made generally available, to
affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b)
a reasonable person would consider it especially important under
the circumstances in determining his course of action in the light
of such factors as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its
difference from information generally available previously, and its
nature and reliability.
(b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he knows of a fact of special
significance by virtue of his being an insider.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider’s misuse
of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of
illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of investors
against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret information,
takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated
to disclose material information to the other party or abstain
from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose
or abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone; and second, the inherent
unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.34
In the United States (U.S.), the obligation to disclose or abstain
has been traditionally imposed on corporate “insiders,” particularly
officers, directors, or controlling stockholders, but that definition
34
In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 677

has since been expanded. 35 The term “insiders” now includes

persons whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer
gives or gave them access to a fact of special significance about
the issuer or the security that is not generally available, and
one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the
person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders
have the duty to disclose material facts which are known to
them by virtue of their position but which are not known to
persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect
their investment judgment. In some cases, however, there may
be valid corporate reasons for the nondisclosure of material
information. Where such reasons exist, an issuer’s decision not
to make any public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as
a violation of insider trading. At the same time, the undisclosed
information should not be improperly used for non-corporate
purposes, particularly to disadvantage other persons with whom
an insider might transact, and therefore the insider must abstain
from entering into transactions involving such securities.36
Respondents further aver that under Section 30 of the Revised
Securities Act, the SEC still needed to define the following
terms: “material fact,” “reasonable person,” “nature and
reliability” and “generally available.” 37 In determining whether
or not these terms are vague, these terms must be evaluated in
the context of Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act. To
fully understand how the terms were used in the aforementioned
provision, a discussion of what the law recognizes as a fact of
special significance is required, since the duty to disclose such
fact or to abstain from any transaction is imposed on the insider
only in connection with a fact of special significance.
35
Id. citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. Rep.
No.792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). A significant purpose of the Exchange
Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal
advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.
36
In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 SEC 633, 29
July 1971; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,
401 F. 2d 833, 13 August 1968.
37
Rollo, p. 459.

Under the law, what is required to be disclosed is a fact of

“special significance” which may be (a) a material fact which
would be likely, on being made generally available, to affect
the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) one
which a reasonable person would consider especially important
in determining his course of action with regard to the shares of
stock.
(a) Material Fact — The concept of a “material fact” is not
a new one. As early as 1973, the Rules Requiring Disclosure
of Material Facts by Corporations Whose Securities Are Listed
In Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under the
Securities Act, issued by the SEC on 29 January 1973, explained
that “[a] fact is material if it induces or tends to induce or
otherwise affect the sale or purchase of its securities.” Thus,
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act provides that if a fact
affects the sale or purchase of securities, as well as its price,
then the insider would be required to disclose such information
to the other party to the transaction involving the securities.
This is the first definition given to a “fact of special significance.”
(b.1) Reasonable Person — The second definition given to
a fact of special significance involves the judgment of a “reasonable
person.” Contrary to the allegations of the respondents, a
“reasonable person” is not a problematic legal concept that needs
to be clarified for the purpose of giving effect to a statute; rather,
it is the standard on which most of our legal doctrines stand.
The doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the “reasonable
man” as the standard.38 A purchaser in good faith must also take
into account facts which put a “reasonable man” on his guard.39
38
Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. (Emphasis provided.) McKee v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 68102-03, 16 July 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 539,
citing Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No 73998, 14 November
1988, 167 SCRA 363, 373.
39
Dela Cruz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72981, 29 January
1988, 157 SCRA 660, 671 and Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858,
874 (1996).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 679

In addition, it is the belief of the reasonable and prudent man

that an offense was committed that sets the criteria for probable
cause for a warrant of arrest. 40 This Court, in such cases,
differentiated the reasonable and prudent man from “a person
with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge,” and
identified him as “the average man on the street,” who weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.
Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have in abundance. 41 In the same vein, the
U.S. Supreme Court similarly determined its standards by the
actual significance in the deliberations of a “reasonable investor,”
when it ruled in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 42 that
the determination of materiality “requires delicate assessments
of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from
a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to
him.”
(b.2) Nature and Reliability — The factors affecting the
second definition of a “fact of special significance,” which is of
such importance that it is expected to affect the judgment of a
reasonable man, were substantially lifted from a test of materiality
pronounced in the case In the Matter of Investors Management
Co., Inc. 43:
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether information
is material under this test are the degree of its specificity, the extent
to which it differs from information previously publicly disseminated,
and its reliability in light of its nature and source and the circumstances
under which it was received.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the “nature and

reliability” of a significant fact in determining the course of
action a reasonable person takes regarding securities must be
40
Webb v. Hon. de Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 779 (1995).
41
Id. at 780.
42
48 L ed 2d 757, 766 (1976).
43
Supra note 33.

clearly viewed in connection with the particular circumstances

of a case. To enumerate all circumstances that would render
the “nature and reliability” of a fact to be of special significance
is close to impossible. Nevertheless, the proper adjudicative
body would undoubtedly be able to determine if facts of a certain
“nature and reliability” can influence a reasonable person’s
decision to retain, sell or buy securities, and thereafter explain
and justify its factual findings in its decision.
(c) Materiality Concept — A discussion of the “materiality
concept” would be relevant to both a material fact which would
affect the market price of a security to a significant extent and/
or a fact which a reasonable person would consider in determining
his or her cause of action with regard to the shares of stock.
Significantly, what is referred to in our laws as a fact of special
significance is referred to in the U.S. as the “materiality concept”
and the latter is similarly not provided with a precise definition.
In Basic v. Levinson,44 the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against
confining materiality to a rigid formula, stating thus:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that
requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances.
But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the
purposes of the Securities Act and Congress’ policy decisions. Any
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality,
must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.
Moreover, materiality “will depend at any given time upon a

balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the
totality of the company activity.”45 In drafting the Securities
Act of 1934, the U.S. Congress put emphasis on the limitations
to the definition of materiality:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable
to have absolute certainty in the application of the materiality concept,
44
99 L ed 2d 194, 211 (1988).
45
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 849 (1968).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 681

it is its view that such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality
concept is judgmental in nature and it is not possible to translate
this into a numerical formula. The Committee’s advice to the
[SEC] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to continue
consideration of materiality on a case-by-case basis as
disclosure problems are identified.” House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee
on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (Comm.Print 1977). (Emphasis provided.)46
(d) Generally Available — Section 30 of the Revised Securities

Act allows the insider the defense that in a transaction of securities,
where the insider is in possession of facts of special significance,
such information is “generally available” to the public. Whether
information found in a newspaper, a specialized magazine, or
any cyberspace media be sufficient for the term “generally
available” is a matter which may be adjudged given the particular
circumstances of the case. The standards cannot remain at a
standstill. A medium, which is widely used today was, at some
previous point in time, inaccessible to most. Furthermore, it
would be difficult to approximate how the rules may be applied
to the instant case, where investigation has not even been started.
Respondents failed to allege that the negotiations of their agreement
with GHB were made known to the public through any form of
media for there to be a proper appreciation of the issue presented.
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act
As regards Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act,
respondents claim that the term “beneficial ownership” is vague
and that it requires implementing rules to give effect to the law.
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward
provision that imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more
than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a
director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation
to submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the
issuer’s securities and such changes in his or her ownership
thereof. The said provision reads:
46
Basic v. Levinson, supra note 41 at 211.

Sec. 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders. —

(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than ten per centum of any [class] of any equity security which
is registered pursuant to this Act, or who is [a] director or an officer
of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration
of such security on a securities exchange or by the effective date
of a registration statement or within ten days after he becomes such
a beneficial owner, director or officer, a statement with the Commission
and, if such security is registered on a securities exchange, also
with the exchange, of the amount of all equity securities of such
issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after
the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change
in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission,
and if such security is registered on a securities exchange, shall
also file with the exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at
the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership
as have occurred during such calendar month. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 36(a) refers to the “beneficial owner.” Beneficial owner

has been defined in the following manner:
[F]irst, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property
(also called “equitable ownership”); and second, to refer to the power
of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the
shareholder is not registered in the corporation’s books as the owner.
Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked ownership,
which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership,
as against possession of the bare title to property. 47
Even assuming that the term “beneficial ownership” was vague,
it would not affect respondents’ case, where the respondents
are directors and/or officers of the corporation, who are specifically
required to comply with the reportorial requirements under Section
36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. The validity of a statute
may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. 48
47
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882,
1 December 2004, 445 SCRA 1, 155-156, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition.
48
Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, 392 Phil. 518, 528 (2000), citing Sanidad
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA
333, 358.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 683

Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted

to promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent
unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain non-
public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed
public. No individual would invest in a market which can be
manipulated by a limited number of corporate insiders. Such
reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities
market. To avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30
of the Revised Securities Act prevented the unfair use of non-
public information in securities transactions, while Section 36
allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into by
corporate officers and directors as regards the securities of their
companies.
In the case In the Matter of Investor’s Management Co., 49
it was cautioned that “the broad language of the anti-fraud
provisions,” which include the provisions on insider trading,
should not be “circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications.” The ambit of anti-fraud provisions is necessarily
broad so as to embrace the infinite variety of deceptive conduct.50
In Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, 51 this Court
brushed aside a contention, similar to that made by the respondents
in this case, that certain words or phrases used in a statute do
not set determinate standards, declaring that:
Petitioners contend that the words “as far as practicable,” “declining”
and “stable” should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do
not set determinate and determinable standards. This stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings
of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. x x x. The fear of petitioners that these words will
result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is
thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of
similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
49
Supra note 33.
50
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 11 L ed 2d 237, 247 (1963).
51
346 Phil. 321, 362 (1997).

Among the words or phrases that this Court upheld as valid

standards were “simplicity and dignity,”52 “public interest,” 53
and “interests of law and order.” 54
The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February
1982. The fact that the Full Disclosure Rules were promulgated
by the SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not render ineffective in
the meantime Section 36 of the Revised Securities Act. It is
already unequivocal that the Revised Securities Act requires
full disclosure and the Full Disclosure Rules were issued to
make the enforcement of the law more consistent, efficient and
effective. It is equally reasonable to state that the disclosure
forms later provided by the SEC, do not, in any way imply that
no compliance was required before the forms were provided.
The effectivity of a statute which imposes reportorial requirements
cannot be suspended by the issuance of specified forms, especially
where compliance therewith may be made even without such
forms. The forms merely made more efficient the processing
of requirements already identified by the statute.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident
mistake when it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative
actions can possibly be had against the respondents in connection
with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to
the absence of implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently
clear and complete by themselves. Their requirements are
specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable. In particular, Section 855 of the Revised Securities
Act is a straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the
52
Balbuna v. Hon. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150, 154 (1960).
53
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328, 342 (1939).
54
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 702 (1919).
55
Sec. 8. Procedure for registration. — (a) All securities required to
be registered under subsection (a) of Section four of this Act shall be registered
through the filing by the issuer or by any dealer or underwriter interested in the
sale thereof, in the office of the Commission, of a sworn registration statement
with respect to such securities, containing or having attached thereto, the following:
(1) Name of issuer and, if incorporated, place of incorporation.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 685

registration of securities and the particular matters which need

to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The Decision,
(2) The location of the issuer’s principal business office, and if such
issuer is a non-resident or its place of office is outside of the Philippines, the
name and address of its agent in the Philippines authorized to receive notice.
(3) The names and addresses of the directors or persons performing similar
functions, and the chief executive, financial and accounting officers, chosen or
to be chosen, if the issuer be a corporation, association, trust, or other entity; of all
the partners, if the issuer be a partnership; and of the issuer, if the issuer be an
individual; and of the promoters in the case of a business to be formed.
(4) The names and addresses of the underwriters.
(5) The general character of the business actually transacted or to be
transacted by, and the organization and financial structure of, the issuer including
identities of all companies controlling, controlled by or commonly controlled
with the issuer.
(6) The names and addresses of all persons, if any, owning of record
or beneficially, if known, more than ten (10%) per centum in the aggregate
of the outstanding stock of the issuer as of a date within twenty days prior
to the filing of the registration statement.
(7) The amount of securities of the issuer held by any person specified
in subparagraphs (3), (4), and (6) of this subsection, as of a date within twenty
days prior to the filing of the registration statement, and, if possible, as of one
year prior thereto, and the amount of the securities, for which the registration
statement is filed, to which such persons have indicated their intention to subscribe.
(8) A statement of the capitalization of the issuer and of all companies
controlling, controlled by or commonly controlled with the issuer, including the
authorized and outstanding amounts of its capital stock and the proportion thereof
paid up; the number and classes of shares in which such capital stock is divided;
par value thereof, or if it has no par value, the stated or assigned value thereof;
a description of the respective voting rights, preferences, conversion and exchange
rights, rights to dividends, profits, or capital of each class, with respect to each
other class, including the retirement and liquidation rights or values thereof.
(9) A copy of the security for the registration of which application is made.
(10) A copy of any circular, prospectus, advertisement, letter, or
communication to be used for the public offering of the security.
(11) A statement of the securities, if any, covered by options outstanding
or to be created in connection with the security to be offered, together with
the names and addresses of all persons, if any, to be allotted more than ten
(10%) per centum in the aggregate of such options.
(12) The amount of capital stock of each class issued or included in the
shares of stock to be offered.
(13) The amount of the funded indebtedness outstanding and to be created
by the security to be offered, with a brief statement of the date, maturity, and

dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the

respondent IRC from such requirements. The lack of implementing
character of such debt, rate of interest, character or amortization provisions,

other terms and conditions thereof and the security, if any, therefor. If substitution
of any security is permissible, a summarized statement of the conditions under
which such substitution is permitted. If substitution is permissible without
notice, a specific statement to that effect.
(14) The specific purposes in detail and the approximate amounts to be
devoted to such purposes, so far as determinable, for which the security to
be offered is to supply funds, and if the funds are to be raised in part from
other sources, the amounts and the sources thereof.
(15) The remuneration, paid or estimated to be paid, by the issuer or its
predecessor, directly or indirectly, during the past year and the ensuing year
to (a) the directors or persons performing similar functions, and (b) its officers
and other persons, naming them whenever such remuneration exceeded sixty
thousand (P60,000.00) pesos during any such year.
(16) The amount of issue of the security to be offered.
(17) The estimated net proceeds to be derived from the security to be offered.
(18) The price at which the security is proposed to be offered to the
public or the method by which such price is computed and any variation therefrom
at which any portion of such security is proposed to be offered to persons
or classes of persons, other than the underwriters, naming them or specifying
the class. A variation in price may be proposed prior to the date of the public
offering of the security by filing an amended registration statement.
(19) All commissions or discounts paid or to be paid, directly or indirectly,
by the issuer to the underwriters in respect of the sale of the security to be
offered. Commissions shall include all cash, securities, contracts, or anything of
value, paid, to be set aside, or disposed of, or understanding with or for the benefit
of any other person in which any underwriter is interested, made in connection
with the sale of such security. A commission paid or to be paid in connection with
the sale of such security by a person in which the issuer has an interest or which
is controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer shall be deemed to
have been paid by the issuer. Where any such commission is paid, the amount
of such commission paid to each underwriter shall be stated.
(20) The amount or estimated amounts, itemized in reasonable detail, of
expenses, other than commission specified in the next preceding paragraph,
incurred or to be incurred by or for the account of the issuer in connection
with the sale of the security to be offered or properly chargeable thereto,
including legal, engineering, certification, authentication, and other charges.
(21) The net proceeds derived from any security sold by the issuer during
the two years preceding the filing of the registration statement, the price at
which such security was offered to the public, and the names of the principal
underwriters of such security.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 687

rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these provisions. Thus,

this Court cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC
(22) Any amount paid within two years preceding the filing of the
registration statement or intended to be paid to any promoter and the consideration
for any such payment.
(23) The names and addresses of the vendors and the purchase price of any
property or goodwill, acquired or to be acquired, not in the ordinary course of
business, which is to be defrayed in whole or in part from the proceeds of the
security to be offered, the amount of any commission payable to any person in
connection with such acquisition, and the name or names of such person or persons,
together with any expense incurred or to be incurred in connection with such
acquisition, including the cost of borrowing money to finance such acquisition.
(24) Full particulars of the nature and extent of the interest, if any, of
every director, principal executive officer, and of every stockholder holding
more than ten (10%) per centum in the aggregate of the stock of the issuer,
in any property acquired, not in the ordinary course of business of the issuer,
within two years preceding the filing of the registration statement or proposed
to be acquired at such date.
(25) The names and addresses of independent counsel who have passed
on the legality of the issue.
(26) Dates of and parties to, and the general effect concisely stated of
every material contract made, not in the ordinary course of business, which
contract is to be executed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the
registration statement or which has been executed not more than two years
before such filing. Any management contract or contract providing for special
bonuses or profit-sharing arrangements, and every material patent or contract
for a material patent right, and every contract by or with a public utility company
or an affiliate thereof, providing for the giving or receiving of technical or
financial advice or service shall be deemed a material contract.
Any contract, whether or not made in the ordinary course of business with
any stockholder, whether a natural or juridical person, owning more than ten
(10%) per centum of the shares of the issuer shall be deemed a material
contract for the purpose of this Act.
(27) A balance sheet as of a date not more than ninety days prior to the date
of the filing of the registration statement showing all of the assets of the issuer,
the nature and cost thereof, whenever determinable with intangible items segregated,
including any loan to or from any officer, director, stockholder or person directly
or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer. In the event any such assets consist of
shares of stock in other companies, the balance sheet and profit and loss statements
of such companies for the past three years shall likewise be enclosed. All the
liabilities of the issuer, including surplus of the issuer, showing how and from
what sources such surplus was created, all as of a date not more than ninety days
prior to the filing of the registration statement. If such statement is not certified

from exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation

of Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act.
by an independent certified public accountant, in addition to the balance sheet

required to be submitted under this schedule, a similar detailed balance sheet of
the assets and liabilities of the issuer, certified by an independent certified public
accountant, of a date not more than one year prior to the filing of the registration
statement, shall be submitted.
(28) A profit and loss statement of the issuer showing earnings and income,
the nature and source thereof, and the expenses and fixed charges in such detail
and such form as the Commission shall prescribe for the latest fiscal year for
which such statement is available and for the two preceding fiscal years, year
by year, or, if such issuer has been in actual business for less than three years,
then for such time as the issuer has been in actual business, year by year. If the
date of the filing of the registration statement is more than six months after the
close of the last fiscal year, a statement from such closing date to the latest
practicable date. Such statement shall show what the practice of the issuer has
been during the three years or lesser period as to the character of the charges,
dividends or other distributions made against its various surplus accounts, and as
to depreciation, depletion, and maintenance charges, and if stock dividends or
avails from the sale of rights have been credited to income, they shall be shown
separately with statement of the basis upon which credit is computed. Such statement
shall also differentiate between recurring and nonrecurring income and between
any investment and operating income. Such statement shall be certified by an
independent certified public accountant.
(29) Any liabilities of the issuer to companies controlling or controlled by the
issuer shall be disclosed in full detail as to use of the proceeds thereof, the maturity
and repayment schedule, nature of security thereof, the rate of interest and other
terms and conditions thereof. If the proceeds, or any part of the proceeds, of the
security to be issued is to be applied directly or indirectly to the purchase of any
business, a profit and loss statement of such business, certified by an independent
certified public accountant, meeting the requirements of subparagraph (28) of
this subsection, for the three preceding fiscal years, together with a balance sheet,
similarly certified, of such business, meeting the requirements of subparagraph
(27) hereof of a date not more than ninety days prior to the filing of the registration
statement or at the date such business was acquired by the issuer more than
ninety days prior to the filing of the registration statement.
(30) A copy of any agreement or agreements or, if identical agreements
are used, the forms thereof made with any underwriter, including all contracts
and agreements referred to in subparagraph (19) hereof.
(31) A copy of the opinion or opinions of independent counsel in respect
to the legality of the issue.
(32) A copy of all material contracts referred to in subparagraph (26)
hereof, but no disclosure shall be required by the Commission of any portion
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 689

II. The right to cross-examination is

not absolute and cannot be
demanded during investigative
proceedings before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the Court of
Appeals pronounced that the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure
of any such contract if the disclosure of such portion would impair the value
of the contract and would not be necessary for the protection of the investors.
(33) A detailed statement showing the items of cash, property, services,
patents, goodwill, and any other consideration for which securities have been
or are to be issued in payment.
(34) The amount of cash to be paid as promotion fees, or of capital stock
which is to be set aside and disposed of as promotion stock, and a statement
of all stock issued from time to time as promotion stock.
(35) In connection with securities issued by a person engaged in the
business of developing, exploiting or operating mineral claims, a sworn statement
of a mining engineer stating the ore possibilities of the mine and such other
information in connection therewith as will show the quality of the ore in such
claims, and the unit cost of extracting it.
(36) Unless previously filed and registered with the Commission and brought
up to date:
(a) A copy of its articles of incorporation with all amendments thereof
and its existing by-laws or instruments corresponding thereto, whatever
the name, if the issuer be a corporation;
(b) A copy of all instruments by which the trust is created or declared
and in which it is accepted and acknowledged, if the issuer is a trust;
(c) A copy of its articles of partnership or association and all the
papers pertaining to its organization, if the issuer is a partnership,
unincorporated association, joint-stock company, syndicate, or any other
form of organization.
(37) A copy of the underlying agreements or indentures affecting any
stock, bonds, or debentures offered or to be offered by the issuer and outstanding
on the part of companies controlling or controlled by the issuer.
(38) Where the issuer or registrant is not formed, organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines or is not domiciled in the Philippines, a
written power of attorney, certified and authenticated in accordance with
law, designating some individual person, who must be a resident of the Philippines,
on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions
or other legal proceedings against him, and consenting that service upon such
resident agent shall be admitted as valid and proper service upon the issuer
or registrant, and if at any time that service cannot be made upon such resident
agent, service shall be made upon the Commission.

Additional information or documents, including written information from

an expert, may be required, or anyone of the above requirements may be
dispensed with, depending on the necessity thereof for the protection of the
public investors, or their applicability to the class of securities sought to be
registered, as the case may be.
The registration statement shall be signed by the issuer, its principal executive
officer, its principal operating officer, its principal financial officer, its comptroller
or principal accounting officer or persons performing similar functions. The
written consent of the expert named as having certified any part of the registration
statement or any document used in connection therewith shall also be filed.
Upon filing of the registration statement, the registrant shall pay to the
Commission a fee of not more than one-tenth of one per centum of the maximum
aggregate price at which such securities are proposed to be offered and the
fact of such filing shall be immediately published by the Commission, at the
expense of the registrant, in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, once a week for two consecutive weeks, reciting that a registration
statement for the sale of such security has been filed with it, and that the
aforesaid registration statement, as well as the papers attached thereto, are
open to inspection during business hours, by interested parties, and copies
thereof, photostatic or otherwise, shall be furnished to every applicant at such
reasonable charge as the Commission may prescribe.
Any interested party may file an opposition to the registration within ten
days from the publication.
If after the completion of the aforesaid publication, the Commission finds
that the registration statement together with all the other papers and documents
attached thereto, is on its face complete and that the requirements and conditions
for the protection of the investors have been complied with, and unless there are
grounds to reject a registration statement as herein provided, it shall as soon as
feasible enter an order making the registration effective, and issue to the registrant
a permit reciting that such person, its brokers or agents, are entitled to offer the
securities named in said certificate, with such terms and conditions as it may
impose in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
The Commission shall, however, advise the public that the issuance of
such permit shall not be deemed a finding by the Commission that the registration
statement is true and accurate on its face or that it does not contain an untrue
statement of fact or omit to state a material fact, or be held to mean that the
Commission has in any way given approval to the security included in the
registration statement. Every permit and any other statement, printed or otherwise,
for public consumption, that makes reference to such permit shall clearly and
distinctively state that the issuance thereof is only permissive and does not
constitute a recommendation or endorsement of the securities permitted to
be offered for sale. It shall be unlawful to make, or cause to be made, to any
prospective purchaser any representation contrary to the foregoing.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 691

was invalid since Section 8, Rule V56 thereof failed to provide

for the parties’ right to cross-examination, in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987 particularly Section 12(3), Chapter
3, Book VII thereof. This ruling is incorrect.
Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure, categorically stated that the proceedings before the
PED are summary in nature:
Section 4. Nature of Proceedings — Subject to the requirements of
due process, proceedings before the “PED” shall be summary in
nature not necessarily adhering to or following the technical rules
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission, for the guidance of investors,

may require issuers to submit their securities to rating by securities rating agencies
accredited by the Commission, to provide all information necessary therefor,
and to report such rating in the registration statement and prospectus, if any,
offering the securities.
If any change occurs in the facts set forth in the registration statement,
it shall be the obligation of the issuer, dealer or underwriter who filed the
original registration statement to submit to the Commission for approval an
amended registration statement.
The Commission, in its order, may fix the maximum amount of commission
or other form of remuneration to be paid in cash or otherwise, directly or indirectly,
for or in connection with the sale or offering for sale of such securities in the
Philippines and the maximum amount of compensation which the issuer shall pay
for mining claims and mineral rights for which provision is made by the issuer for
payment in cash or securities. The amount of compensation which shall be paid
the owner or holder of such mining claims or mineral rights shall be a fair valuation
thereof, as may be fixed by the Commission, after consultation with the Bureau
of Mines, and after receiving such technical information as the issuer or dealer
or the owner or owners of such claims may care to submit in the premises.
A copy of the order of the Commission making the registration effective,
together with the registration statement, shall be transmitted to the exchange
wherein the security may be listed and shall be available for inspection by
any interested party during reasonable hours on any business day.
The order shall likewise be published, at the expense of the registrant,
once in a newspaper of general circulation within ten days from its promulgation.
The same rules shall apply to any amendment to the registration statement.
56
Section 8. Order of Investigation — The parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the Hearing Officer
which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

of evidence obtaining in the courts of law. The Rules of Court may

apply in said proceedings in suppletory character whenever
practicable.
Rule V of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure further
specified that:
Section 5. Submission of Documents — During the preliminary
conference/hearing, or immediately thereafter, the Hearing Officer
may require the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
verified position papers accompanied by all supporting documents
and the affidavits of their witnesses, if any which shall take the place
of their direct testimony. The parties shall furnish each other with
copies of the position papers together with the supporting affidavits
and documents submitted by them.
Section 6. Determination of necessity of hearing. — Immediately
after the submission by the parties of their position papers and
supporting documents, the Hearing Officer shall determine whether
there is a need for a formal hearing. At this stage, he may, in his
discretion, and for the purpose of making such determination, elicit
pertinent facts or information, including documentary evidence, if
any, from any party or witness to complete, as far as possible, the
facts of the case. Facts or information so elicited may serve as
basis for his clarification or simplifications of the issues in the
case. Admissions and stipulation of facts to abbreviate the
proceedings shall be encouraged.
Section 7. Disposition of Case. If the Hearing Officer finds no
necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their
position papers and supporting documents, he shall so inform the
parties stating the reasons therefor and shall ask them to acknowledge
the fact that they were so informed by signing the minutes of the
hearing and the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may
require the parties to submit their respective verified position
papers, together with all supporting documents and affidavits
of witnesses. A formal hearing was not mandatory; it was within
the discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine whether there
was a need for a formal hearing. Since, according to the foregoing
rules, the holding of a hearing before the PED is discretionary,
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 693

then the right to cross-examination could not have been demanded

by either party.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII
of the Administrative Code, entitled “Adjudication,” does not
affect the investigatory functions of the agencies. The law
creating the PED, Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,
as amended, defines the authority granted to the PED, thus:
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have,
subject to the Commission’s control and supervision, the exclusive
authority to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any act
or omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees of corporations, or
of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders,
officers or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or
representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations
administered and enforced by the Commission; to file and prosecute
in accordance with law and rules and regulations issued by the
Commission and in appropriate cases, the corresponding criminal
or civil case before the Commission or the proper court or body
upon prima facie finding of violation of any laws or rules and
regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; and to
perform such other powers and functions as may be provided by law
or duly delegated to it by the Commission. (Emphasis provided.)
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of
the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC and to file
and prosecute such cases. It fails to mention any adjudicatory
functions insofar as the PED is concerned. Thus, the PED Rules
of Practice and Procedure need not comply with the provisions
of the Administrative Code on adjudication, particularly Section
12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 57 this Court
sets out the distinction between investigative and adjudicative
functions, thus:
“Investigate,” commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of “investigate” is “to observe or study closely; inquire
57
G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483, 495-496.

into systematically: “to search or inquire into” x x x to subject to

an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry.” The purpose
of an investigation, of course is to discover, to find out, to learn,
obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by
the inquiry.
The legal meaning of “investigate” is essentially the same: “(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace
or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
of evidence; a legal inquiry;” “to inquire; to make an investigation,”
“investigation” being in turn described as “(a)n administrative function,
the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am
J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters.”
“Adjudicate,” commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle.
The dictionary defines the term as “to settle finally (the rights and
duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised:
x x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.” And
“adjudge” means “to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: x x x to award or grant judicially in a case
of controversy x x x.”
In a legal sense, “adjudicate” means: “To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge
in its strictest sense;” and “adjudge” means: “To pass on judicially,
to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x Implies
a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.”
There is no merit to the respondent’s averment that the sections

under Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, do not
distinguish between investigative and adjudicatory functions.
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, is unequivocally
entitled “Adjudication.”
Respondents insist that the PED performs adjudicative functions,
as enumerated under Section 1(h) and (j), Rule II; and Section
2(4), Rule VII of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure:
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 695

Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement

Department — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department is primarily charged with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Suspends or revokes, after proper notice and hearing in accordance
with these Rules, the franchise or certificate of registration of
corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the following
grounds:
1. Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation can do
or is doing to the great prejudice of or damage to the general public;
3. Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of the
Commission restraining commission of acts which would amount
to a grave violation of its franchise;
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Imposes charges, fines and fees, which by law, it is authorized
to collect;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. Powers of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer
shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
4. To cite and/or declare any person in direct or indirect contempt
in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
Even assuming that these are adjudicative functions, the PED,

in the instant case, exercised its investigative powers; thus,
respondents do not have the requisite standing to assail the
validity of the rules on adjudication. A valid source of a statute
or a rule can only be contested by one who will sustain a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. 58 In the instant case,
58
Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, supra note 45 at 528, citing Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, supra note 45 at 358; and Valmonte v. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, 22 September 1987, Resolution.

respondents are only being investigated by the PED for their

alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the
transactions entered into by its directors involving IRC shares.
The respondents have not shown themselves to be under any
imminent danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the exercise of adjudicative functions by the SEC. They are
not being or about to be subjected by the PED to charges, fees
or fines; to citations for contempt; or to the cancellation of
their certificate of registration under Section 1(h), Rule II of
the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure.
To repeat, the only powers which the PED was likely to exercise
over the respondents were investigative in nature, to wit:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department is primarily charged with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Initiates proper investigation of corporations and partnerships
or persons, their books, records and other properties and
assets, involving their business transactions, in coordination
with the operating department involved;
xxx xxx xxx
e. Files and prosecutes civil or criminal cases before the
Commission and other courts of justice involving violations
of laws and decrees enforced by the Commission and the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder;
f. Prosecutes erring directors, officers and stockholders of
corporations and partnerships, commercial paper issuers
or persons in accordance with the pertinent rules on
procedures;
The authority granted to the PED under Section 1(b), (e),
and (f), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure,
need not comply with Section 12, Chapter 3, Rule VII of the
Administrative Code, which affects only the adjudicatory functions
of administrative bodies. Thus, the PED would still be able to
investigate the respondents under its rules for their alleged failure
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 697

to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions

entered into by its directors involving IRC shares.
This is not to say that administrative bodies performing
adjudicative functions are required to strictly comply with the
requirements of Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code,
particularly, the right to cross-examination. It should be noted
that under Section 2.2 of Executive Order No. 26, issued on 7
October 1992, abbreviated proceedings are prescribed in the
disposition of administrative cases:
2. Abbreviation of Proceedings. All administrative agencies are
hereby directed to adopt and include in their respective Rules of
Procedure the following provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
2.2 Rules adopting, unless otherwise provided by special laws and
without prejudice to Section 12, Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the mandatory use of affidavits in
lieu of direct testimonies and the preferred use of depositions
whenever practicable and convenient.
As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, such as the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency,
created under laws which authorize summary proceedings,
decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or
other documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence. 59 In fact, the hearings before
such agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings.60
Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to
appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel of
the adverse party. To require otherwise would negate the summary
nature of the administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.61 In
59
Rabago v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82868,
5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 158, 164-165; Rase v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 110637, 7 October 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 532.
60
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Tongson, 459 Phil. 742, 753 (2003).
61
Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 56 at 534.

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v.

Factoran, Jr., 62 this Court stated that:
[I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported
by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of
fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence
is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and
substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
In order to comply with the requirements of due process,
what is required, among other things, is that every litigant be
given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right
and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor.63
III. The Securities Regulations Code
did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act
since said provisions were reenacted
in the new law.
The Securities Regulations Code absolutely repealed the Revised
Securities Act. While the absolute repeal of a law generally
deprives a court of its authority to penalize the person charged
with the violation of the old law prior to its appeal, an exception
to this rule comes about when the repealing law punishes the
act previously penalized under the old law. The Court, in
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, sets down the rules in such
instances:64
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving
the court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation
of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified
repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal
what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense
no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never
did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion
62
G.R. No. 75501, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 54.
63
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Tongson, supra note 57 at 753.
64
416 Phil. 722, 746-747 (2001).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 699

of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal
shall have no effect on pending actions. Another exception is where
the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act
previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act
committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in
the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of
whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the
accused. (Emphasis provided.)
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against
the respondents despite the repeal, since Sections 8,65 12, 66
65
SEC. 8. Requirement of Registration of Securities.
8.1. Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or distribution within
the Philippines, without a registration statement duly filed with and
approved by the Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the
securities, in such form and with such substance as the Commission
may prescribe, shall be made available to each prospective purchaser.
8.2. The Commission may conditionally approve the registration statement
under such terms as it may deem necessary.
8.3. The Commission may specify the terms and conditions under which
any written communication, including any summary prospectus, shall
be deemed not to constitute an offer for sale under this Section.
8.4. A record of the registration of securities shall be kept in a Register
of Securities in which shall be recorded orders entered by the Commission
with respect to such securities. Such register and all documents or
information with respect to the securities registered therein shall be
open to public inspection at reasonable hours on business days.
8.5. The Commission may audit the financial statements, assets and other
information of a firm applying for registration of its securities whenever
it deems the same necessary to insure full disclosure or to protect
the interest of the investors and the public in general.
66
SEC. 12. Procedure for Registration of Securities. —
12.1. All securities required to be registered under Subsection 8.1 shall
be registered through the filing by the issuer in the main office of
the Commission, of a sworn registration statement with respect to
such securities, in such form and containing such information and
documents as the Commission shall prescribe. The registration
statement shall include any prospectus required or permitted to be
delivered under Subsections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.
12.2. In promulgating rules governing the content of any registration statement
(including any prospectus made a part thereof or annexed thereto), the
Commission may require the registration statement to contain such

information or documents as it may, by rule, prescribe. It may

dispense with any such requirement, or may require additional
information or documents, including written information from an expert,
depending on the necessity thereof or their applicability to the class
of securities sought to be registered.
12.3. The information required for the registration of any kind, and all securities,
shall include, among others, the effect of the securities issue on ownership,
on the mix of ownership, especially foreign and local ownership.
12.4. The registration statement shall be signed by the issuer’s executive
officer, its principal operating officer, its principal financial officer, its
comptroller, principal accounting officer, its corporate secretary or persons
performing similar functions accompanied by a duly verified resolution
of the board of directors of the issuer corporation. The written consent
of the expert named as having certified any part of the registration
statement or any document used in connection therewith shall also be
filed. Where the registration statement includes shares to be sold by
selling shareholders, a written certification by such selling shareholders
as to the accuracy of any part of the registration statement contributed
to by such selling shareholders shall also be filed.
12.5. a) Upon filing of the registration statement, the issuer shall pay
to the Commission a fee of not more than one-tenth (1/10)
of one per centum (1%) of the maximum aggregate price at
which such securities are proposed to be offered. The
Commission shall prescribe by rule diminishing fees in inverse
proportion to the value of the aggregate price of the offering.
b) Notice of the filing of the registration statement shall be
immediately published by the issuer, at its own expense, in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines,
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks, or in such other
manner as the Commission by rule shall prescribe, reciting
that a registration statement for the sale of such security has
been filed, and that the aforesaid registration statement, as
well as the papers attached thereto are open to inspection at
the Commission during business hours, and copies thereof,
photostatic or otherwise, shall be furnished to interested parties
at such reasonable charge as the Commission may prescribe.
12.6. Within forty-five (45) days after the date of filing of the registration
statement, or by such later date to which the issuer has consented,
the Commission shall declare the registration statement effective
or rejected, unless the applicant is allowed to amend the registration
statement as provided in Section 14 hereof. The Commission shall
enter an order declaring the registration statement to be effective
if it finds that the registration statement together with all the other
papers and documents attached thereto, is on its face complete and
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 701

26,67 27 68 and 2369 of the Securities Regulations Code impose

duties that are substantially similar to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of
the repealed Revised Securities Act.
that the requirements have been complied with. The Commission

may impose such terms and conditions as may be necessary or
appropriate for the protection of the investors.
12.7. Upon effectivity of the registration statement, the issuer shall state
under oath in every prospectus that all registration requirements have
been met and that all information are true and correct as represented
by the issuer or the one making the statement. Any untrue statement
of fact or omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statement therein not misleading
shall constitute fraud.
67
SEC. 26. Fraudulent Transactions. — It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
securities to:
26.1. Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
26.2. Obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact of any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading; or
26.3. Engage in any act, transaction, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
68
SEC. 27. Insider’s Duty to Disclose When Trading. —
27.1. It shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the
issuer, while in possession of material information with respect to
the issuer or the security that is not generally available to the public,
unless: (a) The insider proves that the information was not gained
from such relationship; or (b) If the other party selling to or buying
from the insider (or his agent) is identified, the insider proves: (i)
that he disclosed the information to the other party, or (ii) that he
had reason to believe that the other party otherwise is also in
possession of the information. A purchase or sale of a security of
the issuer made by an insider defined in Subsection 3.8, or such
insider’s spouse or relatives by affinity or consanguinity within the
second degree, legitimate or common-law, shall be presumed to have
been effected while in possession of material non-public information
if transacted after such information came into existence but prior
to dissemination of such information to the public and the lapse of
a reasonable time for the market to absorb such information: Provided,
however, That this presumption shall be rebutted upon a showing
by the purchaser or seller that he was not aware of the material
non-public information at the time of the purchase or sale.

27.2. For purposes of this Section, information is “material non-public” if:

(a) It has not been generally disclosed to the public and would likely
affect the market price of the security after being disseminated to
the public and the lapse of a reasonable time for the market to absorb
the information; or (b) would be considered by a reasonable person
important under the circumstances in determining his course of action
whether to buy, sell or hold a security.
27.3. It shall be unlawful for any insider to communicate material non-
public information about the issuer or the security to any person
who, by virtue of the communication, becomes an insider as defined
in Subsection 3.8, where the insider communicating the information
knows or has reason to believe that such person will likely buy or
sell a security of the issuer while in possession of such information.
27.4. a) It shall be unlawful where a tender offer has commenced or is
about to commence for:
(i) Any person (other than the tender offeror) who is in possession
of material non-public information relating to such tender
offer, to buy or sell the securities of the issuer that are sought
or to be sought by such tender offer if such person knows
or has reason to believe that the information is non-public
and has been acquired directly or indirectly from the tender
offeror, those acting on its behalf, the issuer of the securities
sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or any insider
of such issuer; and
(ii) Any tender offeror, those acting on its behalf, the issuer of
the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer,
and any insider of such issuer to communicate material non-
public information relating to the tender offer to any other
person where such communication is likely to result in a
violation of Subsection 27.4 (a)(i).
(b) For purposes of this subsection the term “securities of the issuer
sought or to be sought by such tender offer” shall include any
securities convertible or exchangeable into such securities or
any options or rights in any of the foregoing securities.
69
SEC. 23. Transactions of Directors, Officers and Principal
Stockholders.
23.1. Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than ten per centum (10%) of any class of any equity security
which satisfies the requirements of Subsection 17.2, or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the
time either such requirement is first satisfied or within ten days after
he becomes such a beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 703

Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which previously

provided for the registration of securities and the information
that needs to be included in the registration statements, was
expanded under Section 12, in connection with Section 8 of the
Securities Regulations Code. Further details of the information
required to be disclosed by the registrant are explained in the
Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities
Regulations Code, issued on 30 December 2003, particularly
Sections 8 and 12 thereof.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been reenacted
as Section 27 of the Securities Regulations Code, still penalizing
an insider’s misuse of material and non-public information about
the issuer, for the purpose of protecting public investors. Section
26 of the Securities Regulations Code even widens the coverage
of punishable acts, which intend to defraud public investors
through various devices, misinformation and omissions.
Section 23 of the Securities Regulations Code was practically
lifted from Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. Both
provisions impose upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than
ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a director
or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to
submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer’s
securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof.
Clearly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the courts
of their authority to punish a person charged with violation of
the old law that was repealed; in this case, the Revised Securities
Act.
with the Commission and, if such security is listed for trading on an

Exchange, also with the Exchange, of the amount of all equity securities
of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten
(10) days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there
has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file
with the Commission, and if such security is listed for trading on an
Exchange, shall also file with the Exchange, a statement indicating
his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes
in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.

IV. The SEC retained the jurisdiction

to investigate violations of the
Revised Securities Act, reenacted in
the Securities Regulations Code,
despite the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides
that criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations
enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while
the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers. 70
Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law.71
70
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses.
— 53.1 The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as
it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about
to violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder,
or any rule of an Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency,
other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to
file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission
shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the matter to
be investigated. The Commission may publish information concerning any
such violations, and to investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which
it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions
of this Code, in prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing
information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning
the matters to which this Code relates: Provided, however, That any person
requested or subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any investigation
shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation:
Provided, further, That all criminal complaints for violations of this Code,
and the implementing rules and regulations enforced or administered by the
Commission shall be referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary
investigation and prosecution before the proper court: Provided, furthermore,
That in instances where the law allows independent civil or criminal proceedings
of violations arising from the same act, the Commission shall take appropriate
action to implement the same: Provided, finally,That the investigation,
prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be given priority.
71
SEC. 54. Administrative Sanctions. — 54.1 If after due notice and
hearing, the Commission finds that: (a) There is a violation of this Code, its
rules, or its orders; (b) Any registered broker or dealer, associated person
thereof has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations,
another person subject to supervision who commits any such violation; (c) Any
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 705

In Morato v. Court of Appeals,72 the cases therein were still

pending before the PED for investigation and the SEC for
resolution when the Securities Regulations Code was enacted.
The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate dispute,
while the subject matter of the other case investigated by the
PED involved the schemes, devices, and violations of pertinent
rules and laws of the company’s board of directors. The enactment
of the Securities Regulations Code did not result in the dismissal
of the cases; rather, this Court ordered the transfer of one case
to the proper regional trial court and the SEC to continue with
the investigation of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this
case, the SEC already commenced the investigative proceedings
against respondents as early as 1994. Respondents were called
to appear before the SEC and explain their failure to disclose
pertinent information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC
Chairman, having already made initial findings that respondents
failed to make timely disclosures of their negotiations with GHB,
ordered a special investigating panel to hear the case. The
investigative proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals, which
became permanent by virtue of the Decision, dated 20 August
1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of
this case, the Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised
Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the repeal
cannot deprive SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating
registrant or other person has, in a registration statement or in other reports,

applications, accounts, records or documents required by law or rules to be
filed with the Commission, made any untrue statement of a material fact, or
omitted to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading; or, in the case of an underwriter,
has failed to conduct an inquiry with reasonable diligence to insure that a
registration statement is accurate and complete in all material respects; or
(d) Any person has refused to permit any lawful examinations into its affairs,
it shall in its discretion, and subject only to the limitations hereinafter prescribed,
impose any or all of the following sanctions as may be appropriate in light of
the facts and circumstances.
72
G.R. No. 141510, 13 August 2004, 436 SCRA 438, 458.

the case; or the regional trial court, to hear any case which may
later be filed against the respondents.
V. The instant case has not
yet prescribed.
Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot
and academic, since any criminal complaint that may be filed
against them resulting from the SEC’s investigation of this case
has already prescribed. 73 They point out that the prescription
period applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such
as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years under
Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and
Act No. 3763, entitled “An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Act.”74 Since
the offense was committed in 1994, they reasoned that prescription
set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot. Such position,
however, is incongruent with the factual circumstances of this
case, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation
interrupts the prescription period.75 A preliminary investigation
is essentially a determination whether an offense has been
committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused
to have committed an offense:
73
Rollo, pp. 649-652.
74
Section 1. Violation penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than
two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any
other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except
the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years: provided, however,
That all offenses against any law or par of law administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. (Emphasis provided.)
75
Llenes v. Dicdican, G.R. No. 122274, 31 July 1986, 260 SCRA 207,
217-220; and Baytan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 153945, 4 February
2003, 396 SCRA 703, 713.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 707

A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often

the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
or whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. 76
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is
entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses,
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority
to “make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision
of this Act XXX.” After a finding that a person has violated
the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and
entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded.
In Baviera v. Paglinawan,77 this Court enunciated that a criminal
complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the
existence of probable cause, before a preliminary investigation
can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case, the
complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the
ground that it should have been filed first with the SEC. Similarly,
the offense was a violation of the Securities Regulations Code,
wherein the procedure for criminal prosecution was reproduced
from Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act. 78 This Court
affirmed the dismissal, which it explained thus:
76
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 360
SCRA 618, 623.
77
G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007.
78
The Revised Securities Act provides that:
Sec. 45. Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses. — (a) The
Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about
to violate any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation thereunder,
and may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in writing, under

The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal
complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC
must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there
is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since
petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement,
the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint
in I.S. No. 2004-229.
oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and

circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission is
authorized, in its discretion, to publish information concerning any such violations,
and to investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which it may deem
necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act,
in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information
to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning the matters
to which this Act relates: Provided, however, That no such investigation shall
be conducted unless the person investigated is furnished with a copy of any
complaint which may have been the cause of the initiation of the investigation
or is notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation: Provided, further,
That all criminal complaints for violations of this Act, and the implementing
rules and regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be
referred to the National Prosecution Service of the Ministry of Justice for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court: and, Provided,
finally, That the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be
given priority. (Emphasis provided.)
The Securities Regulations Code provides that:
SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses . —
53.1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about
to violate any provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder,
or any rule of an Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency,
other self-regulatory organization, and may require or permit any person to
file with it a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission
shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the matter to
be investigated. The Commission may publish information concerning any
such violations, and to investigate any fact, condition, practice or matter which
it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions
of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in
securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation
concerning the matters to which this Code relates: Provided, however, That
any person requested or subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any
investigation shall simultaneously be notified in writing of the purpose of such
investigation: Provided, further, That all criminal complaints for violations
of this Code, and the implementing rules and regulations enforced or administered
by the Commission shall be referred to the Department of Justice for preliminary
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 709

A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code

is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge
and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a
special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence,
all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing
rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the
complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint
to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided
in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed
a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal complaint directly
with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed
to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation
undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a criminal
case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it is
imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated before the
SEC, the administrative agency with the special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings
against the respondents as early as 1994. This investigation
effectively interrupted the prescription period. However, said
proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued
by the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively
enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil, or administrative
case against the respondents herein.79 Thereafter, on 20 August
1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision in C.A.
investigation and prosecution before the proper court: Provided, furthermore,

That in instances where the law allows independent civil or criminal proceedings
of violations arising from the same act, the Commission shall take appropriate
action to implement the same: Provided, finally, That the investigation,
prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be given priority.
79
Rollo, p. 32.

G.R. SP. No. 37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be

made permanent and prohibiting the SEC from taking cognizance
of and initiating any action against herein respondents. The
SEC was bound to comply with the aforementioned writ of
preliminary injunction and writ of injunction issued by the Court
of Appeals enjoining it from continuing with the investigation
of respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from
the injunctive writs would be sufficient ground for contempt.
Moreover, any step the SEC takes in defiance of such orders
will be considered void for having been taken against an order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or
judicial body would likewise be impossible pending the injunctive
writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the ruling of this
Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan, 80 the DOJ itself could not
have taken cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary
investigation without a prior determination of probable cause
by the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was not enjoined
by the Court of Appeals from conducting a preliminary
investigation, any preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ would have been a futile effort since the SEC had only
started with its investigation when respondents themselves applied
for and were granted an injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary
investigation or filed a criminal case against the respondents
during the time that issues on the effectivity of Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and the PED Rules of Practice
and Procedure were still pending before the Court of Appeals.
After the Court of Appeals declared the aforementioned statutory
and regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no civil, criminal or
administrative case may be filed against the respondents for
violations thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there
was no statutory provision which respondents could be accused
of violating.
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous
ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August
80
G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 170.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 711

1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any
kind of investigation against the respondents for violations of
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then,
the prescription period is deemed interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations
and make a finding of probable cause in accordance with the
doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan. 81 In this case,
the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation
since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing
with its investigation. Such a situation leaves the prosecution
of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can
conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the
first place, sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution.
All that the SEC could do in order to break the impasse was to
have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had
done at the earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the
period during which the SEC was prevented from continuing
with its investigation should not be counted against it. The law
on the prescription period was never intended to put the
prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in which the prosecution
of a case would be placed way beyond their control; for even
if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still
be barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by
commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused.
In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary
investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the
Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is
initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an
investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after
a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ
instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that
was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it discovered
the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted
the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the
81
Id.

preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases,

such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.
VI. The Court of Appeals was justified
in denying SEC’s Motion for
Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus
Orders dated 23 October 1995.
The SEC avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied
its Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, dated 23
October 1995, in the light of its admission that the PED had
the sole authority to investigate the present case. On this matter,
this Court cannot agree with the SEC.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals denied the
SEC’s Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, since
it found other issues that were more important than whether or
not the PED was the proper body to investigate the matter. Its
refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal,
civil, or administrative case may be filed against the respondents
under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due
to the absence of any implementing rules and regulations.
Moreover, the validity of the PED Rules on Practice and Procedure
was also raised as an issue. The Court of Appeals, thus, reasoned
that if the quashal of the orders was granted, then it would be
deprived of the opportunity to determine the validity of the
aforementioned rules and statutory provisions. In addition, the
SEC would merely pursue the same case without the Court of
Appeals having determined whether or not it may do so in
accordance with due process requirements. Absent a determination
of whether the SEC may file a case against the respondents
based on the assailed provisions of the Revised Securities Act,
it would have been improper for the Court of Appeals to grant
the SEC’s Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders.
IN ALL, this Court rules that no implementing rules were
needed to render effective Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act; nor was the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure
invalid, prior to the enactment of the Securities Regulations
Code, for failure to provide parties with the right to cross-examine
the witnesses presented against them. Thus, the respondents
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 713

may be investigated by the appropriate authority under the

proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code
for violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act. 82
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 20 August 1998 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the permanent injunction
issued pursuant thereto. This Court further DECLARES that
the investigation of the respondents for violations of Sections
8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be undertaken
by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities
Regulations Code. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Velasco, Jr., Reyes, and
Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, and Azcuna,
JJ., join in the separate concurring opinion of J. Tinga.
Tinga, J., please see concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Nachura and Brion, JJ., no part.
Corona, J., on official leave.
82
Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, known as the Securities Regulations
Code, enacted on 19 July 2000, reads:
5.2 The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section
5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The
Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate
disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one
(1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction
over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June
2000 until finally disposed.

CONCURRING OPINION
TINGA, J.:
While I fully concur with the ponencia ably penned by Justice

Chico-Nazario, I write separately to highlight the factual and
legal background behind the legal proscription against the blight
that is “insider trading.” This case is the farthest yet this Court
has explored the matter, and it is heartening that our decision
today affirms the viability for prosecutions against insider trading,
an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities market.
This case bears special significance, even if it does not dwell
on the guilt or innocence of petitioners who are charged with
insider trading, simply because the arguments raised by them
essentially assail the validity of our laws against insider trading.
Since we deny certiorari and debunk the challenge, our ruling
will embolden our securities regulators to investigate and prosecute
insider trading cases, thereby ensuring a more stable, mature
and investor-friendly stock market.
The securities market, when active and vibrant, is an effective
engine of economic growth. It is more able to channel capital
as it tends to favor start-up and venture capital companies. To
remain attractive to investors, however, the stock market should
be fair and orderly. All the regulations, all the requirements,
all the procedures and all the people in the industry should
strive to achieve this avowed objective. Manipulative devices
and deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey
wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When
someone trades in the market with unfair advantage in the form
of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants
are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given
enough of stock market scandals coupled with the related loss
of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain
of capital. And investors would eventually feel more secure
with their money invested elsewhere.1
1
See COLIN CHAPMAN, How the Stock Market Works (1988 ed.),
pp. 151-152.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 715

The securities market is imbued with public interest and as

such it is regulated. Specifically, the reasons given for securities
regulation are (1) to protect investors, (2) to supply the
informational needs of investors, (3) to ensure that stock prices
conform to the fundamental value of the companies traded, (4)
to allow shareholders to gain greater control over their corporate
managers, and (5) to foster economic growth, innovation and
access to capital.2
In checking securities fraud, regulation of the stock market
assumes quite a few forms, the most common being disclosure
regulation and financial activity regulation.
Disclosure regulation requires issuers of securities to make
public a large amount of financial information to actual and
potential investors. The standard justification for disclosure
rules is that the managers of the issuing firm have more information
about the financial health and future of the firm than investors
who own or are considering the purchase of the firm’s securities.
Financial activity regulation consists of rules about traders of
securities and trading on or off the stock exchange. A prime
example of this form of regulation is the set of rules against
trading by insiders.3
I.
In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of
securities based on knowledge of material information not disclosed
to the public at the time.4 Such activity is generally prohibited
in many jurisdictions, including our own, though the particular
scope and definition of “insider trading” depends on the legislation
or case law of each jurisdiction. In the United States, the rule
2
See R. JENNINGS, H. MARSH, JR., J. COFFEE, JR. AND J.
SALGIMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (8 th
ed., 1998), pp. 1-6.
3
F. Babozzi and F. Modigliani, Capital Markets (3 rd ed., 2006).
4
“Generally speaking, insider trading is trading in securities while in possession
of material nonpublic information.” S. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
AND ECONOMICS (2002 ed.), p. 519.

has been stated as “that anyone who, for trading for his own
account in the securities of a corporation has ‘access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone’
may not take ‘advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing’, i.e., the investing
public.”5
It would be useful to examine the historical evolution of the
rule.
In the United States, legal abhorrence of insider trading preceded
the modern securities market. Prior to 1900, it was treatise law
that the doctrine that officers and directors of corporations are
trustees of the stockholders does not extend to their private
dealings with stockholders or others, though in such dealings
they take advantage of knowledge gained through their official
position.6 Under that doctrine, the misrepresentation or fraudulent
concealment of a material fact by such corporate officers or
directors gave rise to liability based on general fraud as understood
in common law, yet such liability would arise only if the defendant
actively prevented the plaintiff from looking into or inquiring
upon the affairs or condition of the corporation and its prospects
for dividends.7 The rule, as understood then, did not encompass
a positive duty for public disclosure of any material information
pertinent to a corporation and/or its securities.
The first paradigm shift came with a decision in 1903 of the
Georgia Supreme Court in Oliver v. Oliver,8 which pronounced
that the shareholder had a right to disclosure, and the corporation
a corresponding duty to disclose such material information, based
on the principle that “[w]here the director obtains the information
5
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961); cited in
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
6
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4 at 520 citing H.L. Wilgus, Purchase of
Shares of a Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 Mich. L.
Rev. 267, 267 (1910).
7
Id., citing Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 589 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.1868).
8
45 S.E. 232 (Ga.1903).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 717

giving added value to the stock by virtue of his official position,

he holds the information in trust for the benefit of [the
shareholders].”9 Subsequent state jurisprudence affirmed this
fiduciary obligation to disclose material nonpublic information
to shareholders before trading with them, otherwise known as
the “minority” or the “duty to disclose” rule. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1909 expressed preference for a different
rule in Strong v. Repide, 10 acknowledging that the corporate
directors generally owed no duty to disclose material facts when
trading with shareholders, unless there were “special
circumstances” that gave rise to such duty. The “special
circumstances,” as identified in Strong, were the concealment
of identity by the defendant, and the failure to disclose significant
facts having a dramatic impact on the stock price.
Both the “special circumstances” and “duty to disclose” rules
gained adherents in the next several years. In the meantime,
the 1920s saw the unprecedented popularity of the stock market
with the general public, which was widely taken advantage of
by corporations and brokers through unscrupulous practices.
The American stock market collapse of October 1929, which
helped trigger the worldwide Great Depression, left fully half
of the $25 million worth of securities floated during the post-
First World War period as worthless, to the injury of thousands
of individuals who had invested their life savings in those
securities.11 The consequent wellspring of concern over the welfare
of the investors animated the passage of the first U.S. federal
securities laws, such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which declared that “transactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets
are affected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such
transactions.”12
9
Id.
10
213 U.S. 419 (1909).
11
See R. JENNINGS, H. MARSH, JR., J. COFFEE, JR. AND J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 2 at 2; citing H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
12
Id.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided

that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of the national securities exchange —
xxx
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. 13
It is this provision which stands as the core statutory authority

prohibiting insider trading under U.S. federal law. 14 Yet the
provision itself does not utilize the term “insider trading,” and
indeed doubts have been expressed whether it was intended at
all by the U.S. Congress to impose a ban on insider trading
through the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.15 At the same time,
the provision did grant to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (U.S. SEC) the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.” This power was exercised
by the U.S. SEC in 1942, when it enacted Rule 10b-5, which
has been described as “the foundation on which the modern
insider trading prohibition rests.”16 The Rule reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
13
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
14
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4 at 525.
15
Id. at 526.
16
Id. at 527.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 719

statements made, in the light of the circumstances under

which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceipt upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17
Again, the rule by itself did not provide for an explicit prohibition
on insider trading practices, and commentators have expressed
doubts whether the U.S. SEC in 1942 had indeed contemplated
that the rule work to such effect.18 Yet undoubtedly the Rule
created a powerful antifraud weapon,19 and it would finally be
applied by the U.S. SEC as a prohibition against insider trading
in the 1961 case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co.20
The facts of that case hew closely to our traditional
understanding of insider trading. A corporate director of Curtiss-
Wright Corporation had told one of his business partners, Gimpel,
that the board of directors had decided to reduce the company’s
quarterly dividend. Armed with such information even before
the news was announced, Gimpel sold several thousand shares
in the corporation’s stock held in customer accounts over which
he had discretionary trading authority. When the news of the
reduced dividend was publicly disclosed, the corporation’s share
prices predictably dropped, and the owners of the sold shares
were able to avoid injury. The U.S. SEC ruled that Gimpel had
violated Rule 10b-5, even though he was not an insider privy
17
17 CFR §240.10b-5.
18
“According to one account, the decision to adopt the rule and model
it on Section 17(a) [of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act] was arrived at
without any deliberation, with the only official discussion consisting of one
SEC Commissioner reportedly observing, “we are against fraud, aren’t we?”
T.L. HAZEN, The Law of Securities Regulation (4th ed., 2002), at 571;
citing J. Blackmun, dissenting, Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975).
19
Id. at 570-571.
20
Supra note 5.

to the confidential material information, but merely a “tippee”

of that insider. In doing so, the U.S. SEC formulated the “disclose
or abstain” rule, requiring that an insider in possession of material
nonpublic information must disclose such information before
trading or, if disclosure is impossible or improper, abstain from
trading.21
Not long after, the American federal courts adopted the
principles pronounced by the U.S. SEC in Cady, Roberts, and
the rule evolved that insider trading was deemed a form of
securities fraud within the U.S. SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction.22
Subsequently, jurisprudential limitations were imposed by the
U.S. Supreme Court, ruling for example that an insider bears a
duty to disclose on the basis of a fiduciary relationship of trust
and confidence as between him and the shareholders;23 or that
a tippee is liable for insider trading only if the tipper breached
a fiduciary relationship by disclosing information to the tippee,
who knew or had reason to know of the breach of duty.24 In
response to these decisions, the U.S. SEC promulgated Rule
14e-3, which specifically prohibited insiders of the bidder and
the target company from divulging confidential information about
a tender offer to persons that are likely to violate the rule by
trading on the basis of that information. 25
In the United Kingdom, insider trading is considered as a
type of “market abuse” assuming the form of behavior “based
on information which is not generally available to those using
the market but which, if available to a regular user of the market,
would or would be likely to be regarded by him as relevant
21
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4 at 528.
22
Particularly, through the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1968), which has been described as “the first of the truly
seminal insider trading cases,” even though much of its core insider trading
holding had since been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. See BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 4, at 529.
23
U.S. v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
24
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1984).
25
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 537.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 721

when deciding the terms on which transactions in investments

of the kind in question should be effected.”26
The Philippines has adopted statutory regulations in the trading
of securities, tracing in fact as far back as 1936, or just two
years after the enactment of the US Securities Exchange Act of
1934. The then National Assembly of the Philippines enacted
in 1936 Commonwealth Act No. 83, also known as the Securities
Act,27 designed to regulate the sale of securities and to create
a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for that purpose.
Notably, Com. Act No. 83 did not contain any explicit provision
prohibiting insider trading in precise terms, even as it contained
specific provisions prohibiting the manipulation of stock prices28
or the employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.29
This silence is unsurprising, considering that American federal
law had similarly failed to enact so specific a prohibition and
that Rule 10b-5 of the U.S. SEC had not yet come into existence
then.
However, in January of 1973, the SEC would issue a set of
rules, 30 which required specific insiders to “make a resonably
full, fair and accurate disclosure of every material fact relating
or affecting it which is of interest to investors.” 31 It was explained
therein that a fact is material if it “induces or tends to induce
or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of the securities of the
issuing corporation, such as an acquisition of mining claims,
patent or formula, real estate, or similar capital assets; discovery
of mineral ores; declaration of dividends; executing a contract
26
Financial Securities and Markets Act of 2000, Part VIII (118)(2)(a).
27
See Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 83 (1936).
28
See Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 83 (1936).
29
See Sec. 21, Com. Act No. 83 (1936).
30
Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by Corporations whose
Securities are Listed in any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under
the Revised Securities Act, dated 29 January 1973.
31
See R. MORALES, The Philippine Securities Regulation Code
(Annotated) (2002 ed.) at 199.

of merger or consolidation; rights offering; and any other

important event or happening.” 32
The enactment of the Revised Securities Act in 1980 (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 178, as amended) provided for the first time a
specific statutory prohibition in Philippine law against insider
trading. This was embodied in Section 30 of the law, which
provides:
Sec. 30. Insider’s duty to disclose when trading — (a) It shall
be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if
he knows a fact of special signifinace with respect to the issuer or
the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider
proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party
to the transaction (or his agent ) is identified, (a) the insider proves
that the other party knows it, or (b) that other party in fact knows
it from the insider or otherwise.
(b) “Insider” means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of,
or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former relationship
to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special significance
about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or
(4) a person who learns such a fact from any of the foregoing insiders
as defined in this subsection, with knowledge that the person from
whom he learns the fact is such an insider.
(c) A fact is “of special significance” if (a) in addition to being
material it would be likely, on being made generally available, to
affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) a
reasonable person would consider it especially important under the
circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of
such factors as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference
from information generally available previously, and its nature and
reliability.
(b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he knows of a fact of special
significance by virtue of his being an insider.
Contrary to the claims of respondents, such terms as “material
fact,” “reasonable person,” “nature and reliability” and “generally
32
Id.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 723

available” as utilized in Section 30 do not suffer from the vice

of vagueness and do not necessitate an administrative rule to
supply definitions of the terms either. For example, as the ponente
points out, the 1973 Rules already provided for a definition of
a “material fact,” a definition that was actually incorporated in
Section 30.
Yet there is an underlying dangerous implication to respondents’
arguments which makes the Court’s rejection thereof even more
laudable. The ability of the SEC to effectively regulate the
securities market depends on the breadth of its discretion to
undertake regulatory activities. The intractable adherents of
laissez-faire absolutism may decry the fact that there exists an
SEC in the first place, yet it is that body which assures the
protection of interests of ordinary stockholders and investors
in the capital markets, interests which may be overlooked by
the issuers of securities and their corporate overseers whose
own interests may not necessarily align with that of the investing
public. A “free market” that is not a “fair market” is not truly
free, even if left unshackled by the State as it would in fact be
shackled by the uninhibited greed of only the largest players.
Respondents essentially contend that the SEC is precluded
from enforcing its statutory powers unless it first translates the
statute into a more comprehensive set of rules. Without denigrating
the SEC’s delegated rule-making power, each provision of the
law already constitutes an executable command from the
legislature. Any refusal on the part of the SEC to enforce the
statute on the premise that it had yet to undergo the gauntlet of
administrative interpretation is derelict to that body’s legal
mandate. By no means is the Congress impervious to the concern
that certain statutory provisions are best enforced only after an
administrative regulation implementing the same is promulgated.
In such cases, the legislature is solicitous enough to specifically
condition the enforcement of the statute upon the promulgation
of the relevant administrative rules. Yet in cases where the
legislature does not see fit to impose such a conditionality, the
body tasked with enforcing the law has no choice but to do so.
Any quibbling as to the precise meaning of the statutory language
would be duly resolved through the exercise of judicial review.

It bears notice that unlike the American experience where

the U.S. Congress has not seen fit to specifically legislate
prohibitions on insider trading, relying instead on the discretion
of the U.S. SEC to penalize such acts, our own legislature has
proven to be more pro-active in that regard, legislating such
prohibition, not once, but twice. The Revised Securities Act
was later superseded by the Securities Regulation Code of 2000
(Rep. Act No. 8799), a law which is admittedly more precise
and ambitious in its regulation of such activity. The passage of
that law is praiseworthy insofar as it strengthens the State’s
commitment to combat insider trading. And the promulgation
of this decision confirms that the judiciary will not hesitate in
performing its part in seeing to it that our securities laws are
properly implemented and enforced.
III
Now on the issue of prescription.
The issue boils down to the determination of whether the
investigation conducted by the SEC pursuant to Section 45 33
of the Revised Securities Act in 1994 tolled the running of the
period of prescription. I submit it did.
Firstly, this Court, in ruling in Baviera v. Paglinawan 34 that
the Department of Justice cannot conduct a preliminary
investigation for the determination of probable cause for offenses
under the Revised Securities Code, without an investigation
first had by the SEC, essentially underscored that the exercise
is a two-stage process. The procedure is similar to the two-
phase preliminary investigation prior to the prosecution of a
criminal case in court under the old rules.35 The venerable J.B.L.
33
A similar provision is found in Section 53 of the Securities Regulation
Code of 2008.
34
G.R. No. 168380, 8 February 2007, 515 SCRA 515.
35
The first phase was the preliminary examination for the determination
of the fact of commission of the offense and the existence of probable cause,
as well as the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The second phase was the
preliminary investigation proper (after arrest, for the determination of whether
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 725

Reyes in People v. Olarte 36 finally settled a long standing

jurisprudential conflict at the time by holding that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely
for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
The court gave three reasons in support of its decision, thus:
. . . Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first the text of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period
of prescription “shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information” without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed
in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely,
or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate
the case its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do not on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint. 37
The same reasons which moved the Court in 1967 to declare

that the mere filing of the complaint, whether for purposes of
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation should
interrupt the prescription of the criminal action inspire the Court’s
ruling in this case.
It should be emphasized that Sec. 45 of the Revised Securities
Act invests the SEC with the power to “make such investigations
as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act or any
rule or regulation thereunder, and may require or permit any
person to file with it a statement in writing, under oath or
otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts
there was a prima facie case against the accused and whether the issuance
of the arrest warrant was justified).
36
125 Phil. 895 (1967).
37
Id.

and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated”

and to refer criminal complaints for violations of the Act to the
Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and prosecution
before the proper court.
The SEC’s investigatory powers are obviously akin to the
preliminary examination stage mentioned in People v. Olarte.
The SEC’s investigation and determination that there was indeed
a violation of the provisions of the Revised Securities Act would
set the stage for any further proceedings, such as preliminary
investigation, that may be conducted by the DOJ after the case
is referred to it by the SEC.
Secondly, Sec. 2 of Act No. 332638 provides in part:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 3326 was approved on 4 December 1926, at a time

that the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. The
prevailing rule at the time, embodied in the early case of U.S.
v. Lazada 39 and later affirmed in People v. Joson, 40 is that the
prescription of the offense is halted once the complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch
as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of criminal
proceedings against the accused.41 People v. Parao42 — a case
38
Entitled “AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION
FOR VIOLATION PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPALS
ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN
TO ACT.”
39
9 Phil. 509 (1908).
40
46 Phil. 380.
41
9 Phil. 509, 511.
42
52 Phil. 712 (1929).
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 727

which affirmed the power of the then municipal president to

conduct preliminary investigation in the absence of the justice
of the peace and of the auxiliary justice of the peace when the
same could not be deferred without prejudice to the interest of
justice — established the correlative rule that the first step taken
in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature
of a judicial proceedings which suspends the prescription of
the offense. 43 But although the second Olarte 44 case made an
affirmative ruling that the preliminary investigation is not part
of the action proper, the Court therein nevertheless declared
that such investigation is quasi-judicial in nature and that as
such, the mere filing of the complaint with the justice of the
peace should stall the exhaustion of the prescriptive period of
the offense charged.
While it may be observed that the term “judicial proceedings”
in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before “investigation and
punishment” in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-
up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the modifier “judicial” should be taken to refer to the
trial and judgment stage only and not to the earlier investigation
phase. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead
to his prosecution as provided by law shall suffice to toll
prescription.
Thus, in the case at bar, the initiation of investigative
proceedings against respondents, halted only by the injunctive
orders issued by the Court of Appeals upon their application no
less, should and did interrupt the period of prescription.
43
52 Phil. 712, 715.
44
G.R. No. L-22465, 28 February 1967.

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent because the majority opinion is patently contrary

to the express provision of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
The majority opinion holds that the administrative
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for violation
of the Securities Regulation Code (Code). The majority opinion
holds:
x x x It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings
against the respondents as early as 1994. This investigation
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC
in 1995 (sic), soon after they discovered the questionable acts
made by the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period. (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling of the majority violates Section 2 of Act No.

3326 entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and To Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run. Section
2 provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,1 the Court ruled that the proceedings

referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings
and not administrative proceedings. The Court held:
1
G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1991, 211 SCRA 277.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 729

x x x This means that the running of the prescriptive period

shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act
No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
“when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.” The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are “judicial
proceedings,” contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General
that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that
we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter
of fact, it does. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 expressly refers to the

“institution of judicial proceedings.” Contrary to the majority
opinion’s claim that “a preliminary investigation interrupts the
prescriptive period,” only the institution of judicial proceedings
can interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
in the present case, since no criminal case was filed in any
court against respondents since 1994 for violation of the Code,
the prescriptive period of twelve years under Section 12 of Act
No. 3326 has now expired.
The fact that the Court of Appeals enjoined the SEC from
filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against respondents
for violation of the Code is immaterial. The SEC has no jurisdiction
to institute judicial proceedings against respondents for criminal
violation of the Code. Even if the Court of Appeals did not
issue the injunction, the SEC could still not have instituted any
2
Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides: “Violations penalized by special
acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) after a year for offences punished only by a fine
or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than
two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any
other offence punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except
the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.” (Emphasis
supplied)

of the Code. The Code empowers the SEC to conduct only

administrative investigations and to impose fines and other
administrative sanctions3 against violators of the Code. Section
54.2 of the Code states that the “imposition of x x x administrative
sanctions shall be without prejudice to the filing of criminal
charges against the individuals responsible for the violation.”
3
Section 54 of the Securities Regulation Code provides: “Administrative
Sanctions. — 54.1. If, after due notice and hearing, the Commission finds
that: (a) There is a violation of this Code, its rules, or its orders; (b) Any
registered broker or dealer, associated person thereof has failed reasonably
to supervise, with a view to preventing violations, another person subject to
supervision who commits any such violation; (c) Any registrant or other person
has, in a registration statement or in other reports, applications, accounts,
records or documents required by law or rules to be filed with the Commission,
made any untrue statement of a material fact, or omitted to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading; or, in the case of an underwriter, has failed to conduct an
inquiry with reasonable diligence to insure that a registration statement is
accurate and complete in all material respects; or (d) Any person has refused
to permit any lawful examinations into its affairs, it shall, in its discretion, and
subject only to the limitations hereinafter prescribed, impose any or all of the
following sanctions as may be appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances:
(i) Suspension, or revocation of any registration for the offering of securities;
(ii) A fine of no less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) nor more
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus not more than Two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for each day of continuing violation;
(iii) In the case of a violation of Sections 19.2, 20, 24, 26 and 27,
disqualification from being an officer, member of the Board of
Directors, or person performing similar functions, of an issuer required
to file reports under Section 17 of this Code or any other act, rule
or regulation administered by the Commission;
(iv) In the case of a violation of Section 34, a fine of no more than three
(3) times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the purchase,
sale or communication proscribed by such Section; and
(v) Other penalties within the power of the Commission to impose.
54.2. The imposition of the foregoing administrative sanctions shall be
without prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the individuals
responsible for the violation.
54.3. The Commission shall have the power to issue writs of execution to
enforce the provisions of this Section and to enforce payment of
the fees and other dues collectible under this Code.
VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 731

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Padilla, et al.
Thus, the criminal charges may proceed separately and

independently of the administrative proceedings.
Under Section 53.1 of the Code, 4 jurisdiction to institute
of the Code lies exclusively with the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Section 53.1 of the Code expressly states that “all criminal
complaints for violations of this Code x x x shall be referred
to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation
and prosecution before the proper court.” No court ever
enjoined the DOJ to institute judicial proceedings against
respondents for criminal violation of the Code. Nothing prevented
the DOJ’s National Bureau of Investigation from investigating
the alleged criminal violations of the Code by respondents.
Thereafter, the DOJ could have conducted a preliminary
investigation and instituted judicial proceedings against respondents.
The DOJ did not and prescription has now set in.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156962. October 6, 2008]
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. LUIS J.

PADILLA, EMMANUEL S. DUTERTE, CARLOS
TUPAS, JR., and ROLANDO C. RODRIGUEZ,
respondents.
4
Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides that “all criminal
complaints for violations of this Code, and the implementing rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred
to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and
prosecution before the proper court.” Section 45 of the old Revised Securities
Act contained substantially the same provision.

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VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 651

[G.R. No. 135808. October 6, 2008]

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner,

1. MERCANTILE LAW; REVISED SECURITIES ACT; THE

652 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 653

it especially important under the circumstances in determining

654 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership,

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 655

the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing

656 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.” And “adjudge”

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 657

for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be

658 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 659

criminal prosecution was reproduced from Section 45 of the

660 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 661

TINGA, J., concurring opinion:

1. MERCANTILE LAW; SECURITIES ACT; SECURITIES

662 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

ability of the SEC to effectively regulate the securities market

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 663

invests the SEC with the power to “make such investigations

664 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation

CARPIO, J., dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTION

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 665

SANCTIONS; CONSTRUED. — The SEC has no jurisdiction

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

666 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 667

On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital

668 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 669

discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings before

670 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Orders dated 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995.15 During

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 671

The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice

The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court

672 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 673

inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby repealed or

674 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and

The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power

VOL. 588, OCTOBER 6, 2008 675

power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given