Banate vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc., G.R. No. 163825, July 13, 2010

I.SHORT TITLE: BANATE V.
PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
II. FULL TITLE: VIOLETA TUDTUD BANATE, MARY MELGRID M. CORTEL,

BONIFACIO CORTEL, ROSENDO MAGLASANG, and PATROCINIA
MONILAR, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL
BANK (LILOAN, CEBU), INC. and TEOFILO SOON, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 163825, July 13, 2010
III. TOPIC: Real Estate Mortgage
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Sometime in November 1997 the spouses Maglasang and the spouses Cortel asked PCRB’s
permission to sell the properties which they mortgaged with the bank. They likewise
requested that the said properties be released from the mortgage since the two other loans
were adequately secured by the other mortgages. The spouses Maglasang and the spouses
Cortel claimed that the PCRB, acting through its Branch Manager, Pancrasio Mondigo,
verbally agreed to their request but required first the full payment of the subject loan. They
thereafter sold to petitioner Violeta Banate the subject properties for P1,750,000.00 and used
the amount to pay the subject loan with PCRB. After settling the subject loan, PCRB gave
the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of Lot 12868-H-3-C to Banate, who was able to
secure a new title in her name. It, however, carried the mortgage lien in favor of PCRB,
prompting the petitioners to request from PCRB a Deed of Release of Mortgage. As PCRB
refused to comply with the petitioners’ request, the petitioners instituted an action for specific
performance before the RTC to compel PCRB to execute the release deed. Accordingly,
PCRB claimed that full payment of the three loans, obtained by the spouses Maglasang, was
necessary before any of the mortgages could be released; the settlement of the subject loan
merely constituted partial payment of the total obligation. Thus, the payment does not
authorize the release of the subject properties from the mortgage lien.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The petitioners instituted an action for specific performance before the RTC to compel PCRB
to execute the release deed when it refused to comply with the petitioners’ request.
Accordingly, PCRB claimed that full payment of the three loans, obtained by the spouses
Maglasang, was necessary before any of the mortgages could be released; the settlement of
the subject loan merely constituted partial payment of the total obligation. Thus, the payment
does not authorize the release of the subject properties from the mortgage lien. The RTC
ordered PCRB to execute a deed of release of mortgage over the subject properties, and to
pay the petitioners moral damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s
decision. The petitioner then filed an appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not the purported agreement between the petitioners and Mondigo novated the
mortgage contract over the subject properties and is thus binding upon PCRB.
VII. RULING:
No. The purported agreement did not novate the mortgage contract, particularly the cross-
collateral stipulation thereon.
As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in the
contract. However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not
limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if, from the four corners of the
instrument, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This
stipulation is valid and binding between the parties and is known as the “blanket mortgage
clause” (also known as the “dragnet clause).”
In the present case, the mortgage contract indisputably provides that the subject properties
serve as security, not only for the payment of the subject loan, but also for “such other loans
or advances already obtained, or still to be obtained.” The cross-collateral stipulation in the
mortgage contract between the parties is thus simply a variety of a dragnet clause. After
agreeing to such stipulation, the petitioners cannot insist that the subject properties be
released from mortgage since the security covers not only the subject loan but the two other
loans as well.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit,
and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2003 and its
resolution dated May 5, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74332. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Banate vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc., G.R. No. 163825, July 13, 2010

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Banate vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc., G.R. No. 163825, July 13, 2010

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Banate vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (Liloan, Cebu), Inc., G.R. No. 163825, July 13, 2010

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

I.SHORT TITLE: BANATE V.

PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK

II. FULL TITLE: VIOLETA TUDTUD BANATE, MARY MELGRID M. CORTEL,

III. TOPIC: Real Estate Mortgage

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

You might also like