Planta Potosí Solar-Mexico 300 Mwac: Lightning Risk Assessment

PLANTA POTOSÍ SOLAR-MEXICO
300 MWac
LIGHTNING RISK ASSESSMENT
Project No. 000982-00-E11-CL-0002
Project Title PLANTA POTOSÍ SOLAR
Sub-Project
02 2019//04/23 As Built J. Albornoz JC Fidalgo
01 2018/04/17 Initial J. Albornoz JC Fidalgo
00 2018/01/11 Initial J. Albornoz JC Fidalgo
Client
Rev. Date Remarks Orig Review
Approval
POTOSÍ SOLAR PV PLANT LIGHTNING RISK ASSESSMENT 000982-00-E11-CL-0002
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION 4
1.1 OBJECT ..................................................................................................................................................... 4

1.2 OVERALL DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................................................... 4
2 LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS 6
3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 7
4 RISK COMPONENTS AND DAMAGE SOURCES 8
4.1 TOLERABLE RISK VALUES.................................................................................................................... 11
5 CRITERIA 12
5.1 STRUCTURE’S DIMENSIONS ................................................................................................................ 12

5.2 STRUCTURE’S ATTRIBUTES................................................................................................................. 12
5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES........................................................................................................... 13
5.4 CONDUCTIVE ELECTRIC SERVICE LINES .......................................................................................... 14
5.4.1 Power Line ....................................................................................................................................... 14
5.4.2 Other Overhead Services ................................................................................................................. 15
5.4.3 Other Underground Services ........................................................................................................... 15
5.4.4 Protection Measures ........................................................................................................................ 15
5.5 TYPES OF LOSS ..................................................................................................................................... 16
5.5.1 Type 1 – Loss of Human Life ........................................................................................................... 16
5.5.2 Type 2 – Loss of Essential Public Services ..................................................................................... 17
5.5.3 Type 3 – Loss of Cultural Heritage .................................................................................................. 18
5.5.4 Type 4 – Economic Loss .................................................................................................................. 18
6 INPUT DATA 20
6.1 ISOKERAUNIC LEVEL ............................................................................................................................ 20

6.2 CONTROL BUILDING .............................................................................................................................. 20
6.3 INVERTER STATION ............................................................................................................................... 22
6.4 SOLAR FIELD .......................................................................................................................................... 24
7 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS 27
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7.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR CONTROL BUILDING .................................................................................. 27

7.1.1 Risk R1 (Loss of human life) .............................................................................................................. 27
7.1.2 Risk R2 (Loss of service to the public).............................................................................................. 27
7.1.3 Risk R3 (Economic loss) ................................................................................................................... 27
7.2 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR INVERTER STATIONS ................................................................................ 28
7.3 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SOLAR FIELD .............................................................................................. 28
8 CONCLUSIONS 30
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1 Risk Assessment Results
Page 3 of 31
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECT
This document is intended to present the lightning risk assessment for the Potosí Solar PV Plant.
1.2 OVERALL DESCRIPTION
Potosí Solar PV Plant: FRV (the Customer) is developing Potosí Solar PV Plant (the Project or the PV
Plant) in San Luis Potosí, Mexico.
The survey site is located within the San Luis Potosí State in a plot between El Barril town and
Hernandez town at the north of the state road 15 which connect them.
The project consist in two main installations: the 300MW Solar PV Plant and the evacuation
infrastructure (400kV evacuation line and 34.5/400kV substation)
The site lays on a high central plain at altitudes between 1900 m and 2500 m asl. San Luis Potosí
State is bordered by the following States: Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Nuevo León,
Tamaulipas, Hidalgo and Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave. The closest municipality represents 4.1% of
the State’s total area. In 2009 population was around 34,515 inhabitants (10/2009)
The site is easily accessed through a state road nearby.
The site is characterized by a relatively flat topography regarded quite as a rocky plain with shallow
hollows where scrub type vegetation predominates.
The coordinates of the plant are:
Latitude: 23°2'51.63" North.
Lenght: 102°5'43.12" West.
Elevation: 2050 m over the sea level.
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The next images shown the location of the site:
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2 LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS
The design of the Solar PV Plant, equipment and materials and their installation shall comply with the
latest editions of all applicable local and international Codes and Standards in their latest edition for
this equipment. The following documents form part of this Specification to the extent stated. Where
differences exist between codes and standards, the one affording the greatest protection level shall
apply. Unless otherwise stated, the referenced standard edition is the current and most updated one
at the time the purchase agreement is set in force.
The following standards (latest reviews before the signature date of the contract) will be specifically
applied:
 NMX-J-549-ANCE-2005 – Protection against lightning – Specifications, materials and

measurements
 IEC 62305 – Lightning protection
 IEC 61186 – Protection against lighting: Surge arresters using early streamer emission air
terminals
 NFPA 780 – Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems
 NF C 17-102 – Protection contre la foudre. Systèmes de protection contre la foudre à dispositif
d’amorçage
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3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
The environmental/ambient conditions for the Project Design are as follows, unless otherwise stated
in other specific Project information and/or drawings:
Maximum ambient air temperature in the shade 40 °C
Yearly average air temperature 17 ºC
Minimum ambient air temperature 7 °C*
Maximum temperature of metal in the sun 85 ºC
Yearly average / maximun relative humidity RH (pending of confirmation)
Site elevation above the sea 2050m

Desert area, max dust concentration
Atmosphere
sandstorm condition
Maximun wind speed at 10m height **
Anual irradiation (GHI) **

109mm average in August. Driest month is
Maximum rainfall in one day
March with 4mm
Seismic loads **
Number of lightning strikes **
* To be confirmed ** According to Mexican codes
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4 RISK COMPONENTS AND DAMAGE SOURCES
The risk management described in the IEC 62305-2 standard includes a risk assessment procedure
which allows to determine the lightning protection requirements for a given structure. The aim of this
risk assessment is to identify the different risk levels and identify adequate protection measures to
lower them to acceptable values.
To determine the prevailing risk, the relevant object must be considered without any protection
measures (actual condition). Risks that may be caused as a result of direct / indirect lightning strikes to
the structure and supply lines are referred to as risk Rx. Risks that must be assessed for a structure
shall be:
 Risk R1: loss of human life
 Risk R2: loss of services to the public

 Risk R3: loss of cultural heritage
 Risk R4: loss of economic value
Every risk is defined with a maximum tolerable value. To achieve a tolerable risk, technically and
economically sound protection measures are defined, e.g. external lightning protection measures
according to IEC 62305-3 and SPD measures according to IEC 62305-4.
To be able to determine the risk focus more exactly, the risks are considered in detail. Every risk
consists of a sum of different components.
 R1 = RA + RB + RC + RM + RU + RV + RW + RZ
 R2 = RB + RC + RM + RV + RW + RZ
 R3 = RB + RV
 R4 = RA + RB + RC + RM + RU + RV + RW + RZ
Every component describes a certain danger and thus a possible loss. The loss resulting from lightning
effects is defined as follows:
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 L1 = Loss of human life

 L2 = Loss of service to the public
 L3 = Loss of cultural heritage
 L4 = Loss of economic value
The possible loss is assigned to the risk components as shown in Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1
The risk components are differentiated according to the sources of damage.
Source of damage S1: Risk components based on lightning strikes to the structure
RA Component which refers to injury of living beings caused by an electric shock resulting from
touch and step voltage within the structure and up to 3 m around the down conductors outside
the structure. Type of damage L1 may occur for agricultural buildings and type of damage L4 with
possible loss of animals.
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RB Component which refers to physical damage caused by dangerous sparking within the structure
resulting in fire and explosion. Even the environment can be at risk. All types of damage can
occur (L1, L2, L3, L4).
RC Component which refers to the failure of internal systems caused by LEMP. Types of damage
L2 and L4 can occur in all cases and type of damage L1 in case of structures with a risk of
explosion and hospitals or other structures in which the failure of internal systems can be lead
to loss of human life.
Source of damage S2: Risk components for a structure as a result of lightning strikes near the
structure
RM Component which refers to the failure of internal systems caused by LEMP. Types of damage
L2 and L4 can occur in all cases and type of damage L1 in case of structures with a risk of
explosion and hospitals or other structures in which the failure of internal systems can be lead
to loss of human life.
Source of damage S3: Risk components for a structure as a result of lightning strikes to the incoming
supply line
RU Component which refers to injury of living beings caused by an electric shock resulting from
touch voltage within the structure. Type of damage L1 may occur for agriculture facilities and
type of damage L4 with possible loss of animals.
RV Component which refers to physical damage caused by the lightning current injected into the
structure by means of or along the supply line (fire or explosion due to dangerous sparking
between the external installation and the metal parts, typically at the point where the supply
line enters the structure). All types of damage (L1, L2, L3, L4) can occur.
RW Component which refers to the failure of internal systems caused by overvoltage injected into
the structure by means of incoming supply lines. Types of damage L2 and L4 can occur in all
cases and type of damage L1 in case of structures with a risk of explosion and hospitals or
other structures in which the failure of internal systems can be lead to loss of human life.
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Source of damage S4: Risk components for a structure as a result of lightning strikes near the
incoming supply line
RZ Component which refers to the failure of internal systems caused by overvoltage injected into
the structure by means of incoming supply lines. Types of damage L2 and L4 can occur in all
cases and type of damage L1 in case of structures with a risk of explosion and hospitals or other
structures in which the failure of internal systems can be lead to loss of human life.
4.1 TOLERABLE RISK VALUES
The standard specifies maximum values for risks R1, R2 and R3:
 Risk R1: loss of human life RT = 1.0 x 10-05

 Risk R2: loss of service to the public RT = 1.0 x 10-03
 Risk R3: loss of cultural heritage RT = 1.0 x 10-04
No tolerable value is defined for risk R4. It is open to the person developing the risk assessment to
select a proper value. To this end, it is considered whether the protection measures make economic
sense with regard to the value of the structure.
Risk values will be studied separately for three different areas: the control building, the inverter stations
and the solar field.
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5 CRITERIA
In this section, the different options for each criteria related to the risk assessment are shown.
5.1 STRUCTURE’S DIMENSIONS
Structure’s dimensions are decisive for the risk of a direct strike. Collection areas for direct and/or
indirect lightning strikes are determined based on these dimensions.
Not only the main dimensions shall be taken into account, but also the highest roof protrusions, as their
effect could increase the total collection area.
5.2 STRUCTURE’S ATTRIBUTES
Risk of physical damage
Risk that a discharge will initiate a fire:
 Explosion – structure containing extensive explosive mixtures

 High Risk – structure of highly combustible material (e.g. marquee thatched roof)
 Ordinary Risk – structure of predominantly combustible material (e.g. timber)
 Low Risk – low use of combustible material (timber)
 None – No perceived risk of fire
Structure screening effectiveness
Screening effectiveness of external structure, LPS or other shields at boundary:
 Poor – brick, masonry or non-conducting construction materials

 Average – structure with reinforced concrete or steel columns (spacing 1-2 m)
 Good – structure with metal or metal mesh cladding or reinforced concrete panels
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Internal wiring type
This affects the probability that lightning may cause a dangerous discharge or overvoltage:
 Unscreened – unscreened wiring with no specific routing precautions

 Screened – cables with continuous screens or cable in metal conduit (earthed at both ends)
5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES
The environment surrounding the structure is also an important factor for determining the number of
direct and/or indirect lightning strikes.
Location factor
Factor based on topography and relative height of surrounding structures or objects:
 Lower than – surrounded by smaller structures

 Similar in height – surrounded by higher or similar height structures
 Isolated structure – no other structures within a distance of 3 times the height of the structure
 Exposed hilltop – exposed and isolated structure on hill top
Environmental factor
Spacing of ‘drops’ or nodes in the distribution of power or communication services:
 Urban and tall buildings

 Urban – typically, 100 m to nearest distribution node (e.g. town or city)
 Suburban – residential, 500 m to nearest distribution node (e.g. residential dwelling)
 Rural – typically, 1000 m to nearest distribution node
Number of thunder days
As per isokeraunic map.
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5.4 CONDUCTIVE ELECTRIC SERVICE LINES
5.4.1 POWER LINE
All incoming and outgoing supply lines of the structure under study must be taken into account for the
risk assessment.
Conductive pipes do not have to be considered if they are connected to the main earthing busbar of
the structure. If this is not the case, the effects of incoming pipes should be considered in the risk
assessment (please observe that equipotential bonding is required).
Type of service to the structure
 Overhead – power distribution to the structure via overhead cable

 Buried – power distribution to the structure via underground cable
 None – no power lines are connected to the structure
Type of external cable
Probability that a direct or indirect strike to a power line will cause failure of electrical/electronic
equipment. This is a function of the type of line in use:
 Screened – cable with overall screen or cable in metal conduit (earthed at both ends)
 Unscreened – no earthed screen around the cable or line
Presence of MV / LV transformer
Existence of a supply transformer at the structure. This include an MV/LV transformer with galvanically
separated windings, isolation transformer or substation:
 Transformer – (i.e. MV line) correction for overvoltages applied

 No transformer – (i.e. LV line) no correction for overvoltages
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5.4.2 OTHER OVERHEAD SERVICES
Number of conductive services
Data or communication lines connected to the structure. Lines that follow the same physical routes are
not considered as separate services.
Probability that a direct or indirect strike to an overhead line will cause failure of electrical/electronic
equipment. This is a function of the type of line in use:
 Unscreened – no earthed screen around the cable (typical)
5.4.3 OTHER UNDERGROUND SERVICES
Number of conductive services
Data or communication lines connected to the structure. Lines that follow the same physical routes are
not considered as separate services.
Probability that a direct or indirect strike to an underground cable will cause failure of
electrical/electronic equipment. This is a function of the type of line in use:
 Unscreened – no earthed screen around the cable (typical)
5.4.4 PROTECTION MEASURES
Class of LPS
IEC Lightning protection system:
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 Class I
 Class II
 Class III
 Class IV
 No LPS
Fire protection provisions
Protection measures taken to reduce the consequences of fire:
 Automated – e.g. automatically operated sprinkler systems, fire proof materials or surge
protected fire alarms
 Manual – e.g. extinguishers or fire hydrants, manual alarms, fire proof compartments
 None – No fire protection measures
Surge Protection
 No surge protection installed

 Only equipotential bonding SPDs at service entrances lines according to IEC 62305 Part 3-1
 Coordinated SPD protection according to IEC 62305 Part 4-2
5.5 TYPES OF LOSS
5.5.1 TYPE 1 – LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE
Special hazards to life
Increasing factor for the relative amount of damage caused by special hazards:
 No special hazards
 Low level of panic (e.g. structures limited to 2 floors and less than 100 people)
 Average level of panic (e.g. theatres, concert hall, sporting events with between 100 to 1000
people)
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 Difficult structures to evacuate (or with immobilized people)

 High level of panic (e.g. theatres, concert hall, cultural and sporting events with more than 1000
people)
 Hazardous risk to the surrounding environment
 Contamination risk to the surrounding environment
Life loss due to fire
This is related to the occupancy and the relative time that people are in the facility:
 Other structures
 Churches, museums, entertainment buildings
 Commercial / industrial properties, schools, offices
 Hospital, hotels, civil buildings
Life loss due to overvoltages
This is related to the occupancy and the relative time that people are in the facility:
 Structures with no safety critical electrical systems (e.g. houses)

 Structures with safety critical electrical systems (e.g. high rise with elevators)
 Facilities with life critical equipment (e.g. hospitals)
 Facilities with risk of explosion
5.5.2 TYPE 2 – LOSS OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES
Services lost due to fire
Loss of essential services due to fire. This is relevant to those structures which provide a utility service
to the public:
 No essential service function associated with the structure

 Radio, TV, telecommunication, power supply, railway
 Water and gas supplies
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Services lost due to overvoltages
Loss of essential services due to overvoltages. This is relevant to those structures which provide a
utility service to the public:
 No essential service function associated with the structure

 Radio, TV, telecommunication, power supply, railway
 Water and gas supplies
5.5.3 TYPE 3 – LOSS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
Cultural heritage lost due to fire
This is relevant to structures of significant cultural or heritage value:
 Not relevant
 Museums, heritage structures, etc.
5.5.4 TYPE 4 – ECONOMIC LOSS
Special hazards to economics
Increasing factor for situations where environmental hazards exist:
 No special hazards
 Hazardous risk to the surrounding environment
 Contamination risk to the surrounding environment
Economic loss due to fire
This relates to the monetary value of the possible loss compared to the total monetary value of the
structure, its contents and activities:
 Not relevant
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 Schools, commercial activities, public entertainment, prisons, churches

 Hospitals, industrial buildings, museums, agricultural properties
Economic loss due to overvoltages
This relates to the monetary value of the possible loss compared to the total monetary value of the
structure, its contents and activities:
 Not relevant
 Museums, agricultural properties, schools, churches, public buildings
 Hospital, industrial or commercial complex, offices, hotels
 Risk of explosion
Step/touch potential loss factor
Economic loss due to step and touch potentials. This relates to loss due to step and touch potentials
inside, and up to 3 m outside, the structure:
 Agricultural properties with animals inside / outside the structure

 Agricultural properties without risk of shock to animals
Tolerable risk of economic loss
Acceptable economic loss per year. Depends on building owner`s requirements:
 1 loss in 10
 1 loss in 100
 1 loss in 1,000
 1 loss in 10,000
 1 loss in 100,000
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6 INPUT DATA
6.1 ISOKERAUNIC LEVEL
One of the main parameters needed for developing lightning risk assessments is the amount of
lightnings per squared kilometer hitting the ground in a full year period, also known as annual ground
flash density. This information is presented in what are called isokeraunic maps, as the ones shown in
Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-1 Zoom on San Luis Potosí region
As it can be observed from the isokeraunic map, the corresponding value for the San Luis Potosí region
where the PV Plant is located varies between 1 to 2.9 flashes/km2·year. Therefore, in terms of safety,
the highest value has been chosen for the study.
6.2 CONTROL BUILDING
The following criteria regarding PV Plant characteristics has been applied for the assessment:
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Structure’s Dimensions
o Length of structure (m) ........................................ 40
o Width of structure (m) .......................................... 15
o Height of roof plane (m) ....................................... 6
o Height of highest roof protrusion (m) ................... 6
o Collection area (m 2) ............................................. 3,598
Structure’s Attributes
o Risk of physical damage ...................................... Low
o Structure screening effectiveness ....................... Average
o Internal wiring type............................................... Unscreened
Environmental Influences
o Location factor ..................................................... Lower than
o Environmental factor ............................................ Suburban
Conductive Electric Service Lines
 Power Line
o Type of service to the structure ........................... Buried cable
o Type of external cable ......................................... Screened
o Presence of MV / LV transformer ........................ Transformer
 Other Overhead Services

o Number of conductive services ........................... 0
o Type of external cable ......................................... Unscreened
 Other Underground Services

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Protection Measures
o Class of LPS ........................................................ Class IV
o Fire protection provisions .................................... Manual Systems
o Surge Protection .................................................. Service entrances only
Types of Loss
 Type 1 – Loss of Human Life

o Special hazards to life ......................................... Low Panic Level
o Life loss due to fire .............................................. Industrial properties
o Life loss due to overvoltages ............................... Not relevant
 Type 2 – Loss of Essential Public Services

o Services lost due to fire ....................................... Power Supply
o Services lost due to overvoltages ........................ Power Supply
 Type 3 – Loss of Cultural Heritage

o Cultural heritage lost due to fire........................... No heritage value
 Type 4 – Economic Loss

o Special hazards to economics ............................. No special hazards
o Economic loss due to fire .................................... Other structures
o Economic loss due to overvoltage ....................... Other structures
o Step/touch potential loss factor ........................... No shock risk
o Tolerable risk of economic loss ........................... 1 in 10,000
6.3 INVERTER STATION
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o Collection area (m 2) ............................................. 551
o Risk of physical damage ...................................... None
o Structure screening effectiveness ....................... Good
o Location factor ..................................................... Lower than
 Power Line
o Presence of MV / LV transformer ........................ Transformer


 Protection Measures:
o Class of LPS ........................................................ No LPS
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o Surge Protection .................................................. Service entrances only
Types of Loss

o Special hazards to life ......................................... No special hazards
o Life loss due to fire .............................................. Other structures

o Services lost due to fire ....................................... No service exist
o Services lost due to overvoltages ........................ No service exist

o Cultural heritage lost due to fire ........................... No heritage value

6.4 SOLAR FIELD
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o Collection area (m 2) ............................................. 97,889
o Risk of physical damage ...................................... None
o Structure screening effectiveness ....................... Good
o Location factor ..................................................... Isolated structure
 Power Line
o Presence of MV / LV transformer ........................ None


 Protection Measures:
o Class of LPS ........................................................ No LPS
o Surge Protection .................................................. No protection
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Types of Loss:

o Special hazards to life ......................................... No special hazards
o Life loss due to fire .............................................. Other structures

o Services lost due to fire ....................................... No service exist
o Services lost due to overvoltages ........................ No service exist

o Cultural heritage lost due to fire........................... No heritage value

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7 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS
Given the characteristics of the PV plant, only risk R1, R2 and R4 apply to the study. There is no risk of
loss of cultural heritage. As it had been said, three different zones have been studied separately: the
control building, the inverter stations and the solar field.
7.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR CONTROL BUILDING
7.1.1 RISK R1 (LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE)
The following risk was determined for persons outside and inside the structure:
 Tolerable risk RT: 1.00 · 10-5
 Calculated risk R1: 5.79 · 10-8
7.1.2 RISK R2 (LOSS OF SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC)
The risk R2, failure of services to the public, was determined for the structure as follows:

7.1.3 RISK R3 (ECONOMIC LOSS)
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7.2 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR INVERTER STATIONS

7.3 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SOLAR FIELD
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8 CONCLUSIONS
Once the risk assessment has been carried out, the following conclusions can be stated:
 The solar field needs no Lightning Protection System (LPS).

 Inverter stations need no LPS due to the low risk value obtained. Nevertheless, the installation
of a LPS (class IV) in each station is recommended, given the high value of the equipment.
 The control building shall be protected by means of a class IV LPS.
The PV plant shall be considered safe in terms of lightning protection once this indications are followed.
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Lightning Risk Assessment
Annex I:
Risk Assessment Results
Page 31 of 31
NORME CEI
INTERNATIONALE IEC
INTERNATIONAL 62305-2
STANDARD Edition-1
2005-01
Project: CONTROL BUILDING
Results for collection areas and frequencies: 3.598 m2

Ad - collection area of direct strikes to the structure
0,003 flashes/year
Nd - expected annual number of direct strikes to the structure
224.450 m2
Am - collection area of structure influenced by induced overvoltages from indirect strikes
0,648 flashes/year
Nm - expected annual number of strikes direct to ground or to grounded objects near the structure inducing overvoltages
35.352 m2
Ac1 - collection area of overhead lines from direct strikes
0,026 flashes/year
NL1 - expected annual number of direct strikes to the overhead line which are potentially dangerous
1.000.000 m2
Al1 - collection area of overhead lines to indirect strikes
1,450 flashes/year
NI1 - expected annual number of indirect strikes to ground near the overhead line which induce damaging overvoltages
21.958 m2
Ac2 - collection area of underground lines from direct strikes
0,016 flashes/year
Nl2 - expected annual number of strikes direct to the underground lines which are potentially dangerous
559.017 m2
Al2 - collection area of underground lines to indirect strikes
0,811 flashes/year
NI2 - expected annual number of indirect strikes to ground near the underground line which induce damaging overvoltages
Type 1 - Loss of Human Life:

RA1 - risk of dangerous touch and step potentials inside and outside the structure from a direct strike to the structure 2,61E-09
RB1 - risk of destruction due to fire, explosion, mechanical, chemical damage from a direct strike to the structure 2,61E-08
RC1 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from a direct strike to the structure 0,00E+00
RM1 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from an indirect strike to the structure 0,00E+00
RU1 - risk of dangerous touch and step potentials inside and outside the structure from a direct strike to the service lines 5,73E-10
RV1 - risk of destruction due to fire, explosion, mechanical, chemical damage from a direct strike to the service lines 2,87E-08
RW1 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from a direct strike to the service lines 0,00E+00
RZ1 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from an indirect strike to the service lines 0,00E+00
Type 2 - Loss of Essential Public Services:

RC2 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from a direct strike to the structure 2,61E-06
RM2 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from an indirect strike to the structure 6,48E-04
RW2 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from a direct strike to the service lines 9,55E-06
RZ2 - risk of electrical / electronic equipment failure due to overvoltage from an indirect strike to the service lines 1,91E-05
Type 3 - Loss of Cultural Heritage:

RB3 - risk of destruction due to fire, explosion, mechanical, chemical damage from a direct strike to the structure 0,00E+00
RV3 - risk of destruction due to fire, explosion, mechanical, chemical damage from a direct strike to the service lines 0,00E+00
Type 4 - Economic Loss:

RA4 - risk of dangerous touch and step potentials inside and outside the structure from a direct strike to the structure 0,00E+00
RU4 - risk of dangerous touch and step potentials inside and outside the structure from a direct strike to the service lines 0,00E+00
IEC Risk Assessment Calculator: Version 1.0.3 Database: Version 1.0.3
IEC Central Office Support (Tel: +41-22-919 0211)

Copyright © 2005, IEC. All rights reserved.
The IEC lightning risk assessment calculator is intended to assist in the analysis of various criteria to determine the risk of loss
due to lightning. It is not possible to cover each special design element that may render a structure more or less susceptible to lightning
damage. In special cases, personal and economic factors may be very important and should be considered in addition to the assessment
obtained by use of this tool. It is intended that this tool be used in conjunction with the written standard IEC62305-2.
NORME CEI
INTERNATIONALE IEC
STANDARD Edition-1
2005-01
Project: INVERTER_STATION
Results for collection areas and frequencies: 551 m2

0,000 flashes/year
203.395 m2
0,589 flashes/year
35.676 m2
0,026 flashes/year
1.000.000 m2
1,450 flashes/year
22.159 m2
0,016 flashes/year
559.017 m2
0,811 flashes/year





NORME CEI
INTERNATIONALE IEC
STANDARD Edition-1
2005-01
Project: PV_PLANT
Results for collection areas and frequencies: 97.889 m2

0,284 flashes/year
594.246 m2
1,439 flashes/year
35.784 m2
0,104 flashes/year
1.000.000 m2
1,450 flashes/year
22.227 m2
0,064 flashes/year
559.017 m2
0,811 flashes/year






Planta Potosí Solar-Mexico 300 Mwac: Lightning Risk Assessment

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Planta Potosí Solar-Mexico 300 Mwac: Lightning Risk Assessment

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PLANTA POTOSÍ SOLAR-MEXICO

LIGHTNING RISK ASSESSMENT

Project No. 000982-00-E11-CL-0002

Project Title PLANTA POTOSÍ SOLAR

02 2019//04/23 As Built J. Albornoz JC Fidalgo

01 2018/04/17 Initial J. Albornoz JC Fidalgo

00 2018/01/11 Initial J. Albornoz JC Fidalgo

1.1 OBJECT ..................................................................................................................................................... 4

2 LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS 6

4 RISK COMPONENTS AND DAMAGE SOURCES 8

4.1 TOLERABLE RISK VALUES.................................................................................................................... 11

5.1 STRUCTURE’S DIMENSIONS ................................................................................................................ 12

6.1 ISOKERAUNIC LEVEL ............................................................................................................................ 20

7 RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS 27

7.1 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR CONTROL BUILDING .................................................................................. 27

ANNEX 1 Risk Assessment Results

1.2 OVERALL DESCRIPTION

The site is easily accessed through a state road nearby.

The coordinates of the plant are:

Latitude: 23°2'51.63" North.

Lenght: 102°5'43.12" West.

Elevation: 2050 m over the sea level.

The next images shown the location of the site:

2 LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS

 NMX-J-549-ANCE-2005 – Protection against lightning – Specifications, materials and

Maximum ambient air temperature in the shade 40 °C

Yearly average air temperature 17 ºC

Minimum ambient air temperature 7 °C*

Maximum temperature of metal in the sun 85 ºC

Yearly average / maximun relative humidity RH (pending of confirmation)

Site elevation above the sea 2050m

Anual irradiation (GHI) **

Number of lightning strikes **

* To be confirmed ** According to Mexican codes

4 RISK COMPONENTS AND DAMAGE SOURCES

 Risk R1: loss of human life

 Risk R2: loss of services to the public

 Risk R4: loss of economic value

 L1 = Loss of human life

The risk components are differentiated according to the sources of damage.

4.1 TOLERABLE RISK VALUES

 Risk R1: loss of human life RT = 1.0 x 10-05

5.1 STRUCTURE’S DIMENSIONS

5.2 STRUCTURE’S ATTRIBUTES

Risk of physical damage

Risk that a discharge will initiate a fire:

 Explosion – structure containing extensive explosive mixtures

Structure screening effectiveness

Screening effectiveness of external structure, LPS or other shields at boundary:

 Poor – brick, masonry or non-conducting construction materials

Internal wiring type

 Unscreened – unscreened wiring with no specific routing precautions

5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES

Factor based on topography and relative height of surrounding structures or objects:

 Lower than – surrounded by smaller structures

Spacing of ‘drops’ or nodes in the distribution of power or communication services:

 Urban and tall buildings

Number of thunder days