Josue R. Ladiana, vs.

People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 144293. December 4, 2002
Facts:
Joue Ladiana is a public officer, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP)
assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Laguna. While on duty and armed with
firearm, Ladiana allegedly took advantage of his official position and confronted
Francisco San Juan about why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
placed to serve as barricades to prevent the entry of vehicles on P. Jacinto St. When
Francisco told Ladiana that the latter had no business stopping him, Ladiana allegedly
with intent to kill and treachery shot Francisco with his gun hitting the latter in the head
and neck which caused the death of Francisco.
Thus, information for murder was filed with the Sandiganbayan First Division which
issued an order noting that nothing else in the information indicates that Ladiana took
advantage of his official position, but only a mere conclusion of fact. Without this, the
Sandiganbayan cannot acquire jurisdiction. In an amended information, the petitioner
still charged with murder but included additional information to show Ladiana taking
advantage of his official position.
Ladiana pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented five (5) witnesses. Ladana filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to file a Demurrer asseverating that a review of the
documentary and testimonial evidence failed to show that accused is guilty. However,
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion stating that it was no longer proper considering that
Ladiana received the resolution of the Sandiganbayan admitting the prosecution’s
documentary exhibits three (3) months prior.
Ladiana then waived his right to present controverting evidence believing that the
prosecution’s evidence was inadequate to sustain a conviction. Thereafter, the
Sandiganbayan ordered both parties to file their respective memorandums, after which
the case is considered submitted for resolution, but the prosecution did not submit its
memorandum.
Sandiganbayan found Ladiana guilty of homicide based on Ladina’s Counter-affidavit
admission of his responsibility for Francisco’s death but alleged that it was done out of
self-defense and the prosecution failed to prove that there was treachery attending the
crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the counter affidavit executed by Ladiana during the preliminary
investigation is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime.
Ruling:
Yes, the Counter-Affidavit submitted by Ladiana during the preliminary investigation is
admissible. Ladina argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed
citing Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that it is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities
required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-judicial confessions or
admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in
the constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody
interrogation of accused persons.
In the present case, Ladiana admits that the questioned statements were made during
the preliminary investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues
that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies during preliminary
investigations. However, the Court ruled otherwise.
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by
petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear
from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under
custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial
investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at
issue in this case
The Court does not agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of Ladiana’s
Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession, the same is only an admission.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a
statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but
denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the
victim when the latter was attacking him. Petitioner admits shooting the victim which
eventually led to the latter’s death but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In
fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a
confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be
sure, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients
are bound by the actions of their counsels, save when the latter’s negligence is so
gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day in court. Also,
clients, being bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of
the litigation might have been different had their lawyers proceeded differently. A
counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of
evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of
witnesses or pieces of evidence, or the manner of arguing the case. This Court,
however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a new trial,
unless the counsel’s incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly
presenting their case.

Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing
that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.
Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 
Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes v. The Senate of Philippines, House of Representative et
al.
G.R. No. 208162. January 07, 2020
Facts:
Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes is among the 46 accused charged with violating the Anti-
Hazing Law for the death of Chester Paolo Abracia due to injuries he allegedly
sustained during the initiation rites of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. Fuertes is a
member of the fraternity's sister sorority, Tau Gamma Sigma, and was allegedly present
at the premises during the initiation rites.
On August 1, 2013, Fuertes filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court claiming that
Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law are unconstitutional for allowing the conviction
of persons for a crime committed by others, in violation of the res inter alios acta rule. At
the time, she had not yet been arraigned and was at large.

Public respondents argue that petitioner failed to overturn the presumption of

constitutionality of Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law. They claim that the
presumption in Section 4 that the presence of persons during the hazing is prima
facie evidence of participation, unless they prevented the commission of the punishable
act is consistent with Sections 1, 14, and 19 of the Constitution. They argue that several
penal laws allow for prima facie evidence, all of which do not preclude the constitutional
presumption of innocence. They also point out that this Court itself recognizes
disputable presumptions, as in Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3.22. Public
respondents claim that certain laws, such as the Revised Penal Code, Article 275,
penalize presence and inaction. They cited People v. Mingoa and Bautista v. Court of
Appeals in which this Court upheld disputable presumptions in criminal law. 

Public respondents argue that there is no violation of the res inter alios acta rule,
because under the assailed law, there must still be a finding of actual participation
before a person may be held criminally liable.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that conspiracy must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, and a mere presumption cannot be the basis to file information for
murder.

The pertinent paragraph of Section 14 was amended to include the additional defense
of prompt reporting of the hazing to law enforcement authorities. Moreover, under
Section 14, when death occurs during the hazing, the penalty imposed on principals
who participated in it was increased from just reclusion perpetua to reclusion
perpetua and a P3-million fine.  

Issue:
Whether or not Section 14(4) of the Anti-Hazing Law is unconstitutional for dispensing
with the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Ruling:

No. The Court rules that Section 14(4) of the Anti-Hazing Law is not unconstitutional for
dispensing with the constitutional presumption of innocence. Fuertes fails to show that
there is no logical relation between the fact proved (presence during hazing) and the
ultimate fact presumed (participation as a principal in hazing). Section 14 does not do
away with the requirement of proving participation beyond reasonable doubt.

The pertinent portion of Section 14 provides that the presence of any person, even if
such person is not a member of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, during the
hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as a principal unless such person
or persons prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly
reported the same to the law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to
their person or their family.

In fact, the constitutionality of Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law has
already been discussed and upheld by the Court. In Dungo v. People, the Court
acknowledged that the secrecy and concealment in initiation rites, and the culture of
silence within many organizations, would make the prosecution of perpetrators under
the Anti-Hazing Law difficult.

The crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially Greek
organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any
information regarding initiation rites. The silence is only broken after someone has been
injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the
secret is revealed and the activities become public. Bearing in mind the concealment of
hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of
circumstantial evidence to prove it. Because of this, this Court held that the provision
that presence during a hazing is prima facie evidence of participation in it relates to the
conspiracy in the crime.

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable
presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy.
Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the
hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the
commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable
presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which
can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of
the hazing.  
 People of the Philippines, V. Aldrin Licayan y Sucano (At Large)
G.R. No. 144422. February 28, 2002

Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide and convicted on the basis of
the following circumstances.
First, the accused drank rhum with Bernard Agcopra, an automotive mechanic with
whom he applied for work. Having consumed the rhum, they decided to go to Bernard
Agcopra’s shop. At Agcopra’ shop, they drank some more rhum where they were joined
by Romeo Bangcong, who was also Agcopra’s friend and finished drinking in Agcropa’s
shop at 5:00 P.M.
Second, the three continued drinking in the house of the owner of the overhauled
engine. After consuming two bottles of Beer Grande, they bought one case of the
same beer grande, and brought the same to the house of Romeo Bangcong. When they
arrived, Romeo’s wife Rosalinda and his children, Rey Oriente, Raymundo and five-year
old Rowena were there. Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer anymore. He
went with Romeo to the barangay captain leaving appellant in Romeo’s house. When
Romeo returned to his house, appellant was embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it
by saying that he missed his daughter. Appellant kept on embracing Rowena in the
presence of the Bangcong family. At about 6:00 P.M., Rowena asked that she be
allowed to watch television at neighbor Dorbit’s house fifteen meters away. An hour
after, Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch Rowena.
Third, Rey reached Dorbit’s house, he saw the appellant there with Rowena. And telling
the latter "Day, come here because your father asked you to go home so you can eat
your supper." Appellant then held the hand of Rowena and dragged her into a dark
area.
Fourth, when Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to the Dorbit house to
inquire about her. Rey Oriente told him what happened, which caused him to cry.
Neighbors were alerted and immediately organized a search party. One group spotted
appellant when they trained a flashlight to him. He ran towards the ricefield. They
chased him, but failed to catch him when he jumped into the deep Inobulan River.
Fifth, the following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found at the
swamps.
Sixth, with muddy pants, wet and without slippers accused emerged at the place where
Wilson Salvaña and companions were drinking at about 9:30 P.M. of June 25th. He
wore a striped blue shirt. He accepted the offer to drink and then proceeded away from
them.
Seventh, accused was the last person with whom Rowena was last seen.
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the foregoing circumstances are insufficient to
prove his guilt. He argues that: a) the first three (3) circumstances do not point to
accused-appellant’s guilt; b) prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano who was among
those who organized the search party, is not credible because he did not shout upon
finding accused-appellant; c) the witnesses could not have seen accused-appellant in
the darkness; d) the witnesses could have seen somebody else; e) assuming that
accused-appellant was the one seen by the posse, he was not committing any wrong by
running away; f) the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them
where Rowena’s body could be found based on accused-appellant’s admission is
hearsay; g) granting that accused-appellant revealed where Rowena’s lifeless body
could be found, he never admitted having raped and killed her; h) the admission made
by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is inadmissible; i) the circumstance that accused-
appellant was seen with wet pants, muddy body and without slippers lacks probative
value; and j) there were no tell-tale signs that accused-appellant was dragging Rowena
to the swamp.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant should be convicted based on circumstantial evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, appellant should be convicted based on circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a court
may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The rules on evidence and case law
sustain the conviction of the accused through circumstantial evidence when the
following requisites concur: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused.
The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly
but together. Like strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like weaving a
tapestry of events that will culminate in a clear picture that will reveal a convincing
scenario pointing towards the accused as the author of the crime.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle
which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing towards the conclusion
the accused is the author of the crime.
The contention that accused-appellant could not have been identified from a distance of
about twenty (20) meters in the dark is untenable, considering that illumination
produced by a flashlight or kerosene lamp is sufficient to allow the identification of
persons.
Accused-appellant’s argument that he did not commit any wrong in running away upon
being espied by the search party likewise deserves scant consideration. Courts go by
the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as
bold as a lion. Accused-appellant has not satisfactorily explained why he fled upon
being spotted by the posse.
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by Rogelio "Jun-jun"
Dahilan, Jr. as to the location of the victim’s body is hearsay. Rogelio Dahilan, Jr.
testified that accused-appellant indeed told him where the victim’s body can be found.
What is more, the victim’s body was actually recovered at the location pointed by
accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant’s objection to the admissibility of his statement as to where he
dumped the body of the victim, which allegedly partakes of an extra-judicial confession,
is just as tenuous. His statements are merely an extra-judicial admissions.
While accused-appellant indeed did not admit to anyone that he raped and killed
Rowena, the prevailing circumstances overwhelmingly point to his guilt. As stated
earlier, direct evidence is not always necessary to identify the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime. A witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, hut he may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant
as when the latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime, as in this case.
In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety are as convincing as
direct evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of the accused-appellant. In other
words, the circumstantial evidence against accused-appellant fully justifies the finding of
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felony committed.