AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE SHAWAN –

AMHARA CONQUEST OF THE OROMO and SIDAMA

REGIONS OF SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA 1865-1900

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Khartoum for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in History

By
ElAmin Abdel Karim Ahmed Abdel Karim

Supervisor
Dr. Fadwa Abdel Rahman Ali Taha

Department of History – Faculty of Arts

June 2009
TO the Memory of MY PARENTS
 Acknowledgements

I would like to express my grateful thanks to the University of Khartoum for the

financial support I received throughout the long period of research of the present study. I

extend my sincere thankfulness to all the people who in one way or another offered their

help and assistance. Special mention and particular acknowledgement should, however,

be made to Dr Fadwa Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, Associate Professor of Modern and

Contemporary History in the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of

Khartoum.

Dr. Fadwa has not only been extremely inspiring and tirelessly helpful as my

supervisor, but has also undertaken the onerous task of typing the draft manuscripts

containing so many Amharic terms, titles, personal and place names etc…, besides

references in Italian, French, and occasionally German. Above all I owe her inestimable

debt and immense gratitude for the constant encouragement and unreserved support she

has rendered to me without which the writing of this dissertation would never have been

accomplished.

I
 Contents

Topic Page
Acknowledgments I
Abstract English IV
Abstract Arabic IV
Preface VIII
Abbreviations XIII
Introduction 1
Chapter I: Northern Ethiopia, Shawa and 20
the Outside World 1855 – 1876.
Chapter II The States, Principalities and 46
Peoples of Southern Ethiopia on the Eve
of the Conquest.
- The Western Sidama Kingdoms 49
- The Eastern Sidama 54
- The Oromo 58
- The Eastern Oromo 65
- The Harari & the Gurage 67
- Other Peripheral Groups 69
Chapter III The Genesis of the Conquest: 72
Its Nature Motivations and Methods.
- The Nature of the Conquest 72
- Capacity & Motivation for the Conquest 76
- Methods of the Conquest 85
Chapter IV The Early Phase of Shawan 92
Conquest to 1882
Chapter V The Middle Phase of Shawan 120
Conquests 1883 – 1887
Chapter VI: The Last Phase of Shawan 150
Amhara Conquests 1889 – 1900
Chapter VII: The Shawan Amhara 174

II
Administration of the Conquered
Oromo and Sidama Regions.
Conclusion 196
Bibliography 199
Appendices 220

III
 ABSTRACT

The singular unparalleled process of Shawan Amhara territorial expansion during

the era of the late nineteenth century European colonial conquest of sub-Saharan Africa
and the resultant position of the subject Oromo and Sidama population within the
emergent multi-ethnic, multi-cultural modern Ethiopian state deserve a more detailed and
documented study than have hitherto been possible. The present study, therefore, is
primarily intended to serve that purpose. Its main objective is to incorporate, elaborate
upon and substantially add to the results of what have already been published on the
subject in one single and hopefully coherent work.
The researcher used an analytical approach to the information collected from
published translated Ethiopian chronicles, unpublished and printed primary European
archival source materials, published accounts of the European residents, explorers and
travelers in Shawa and the Oromo and Sidama countries during the times of Menilek or
soon afterwards, and the published secondary sources.
The most important results reached are that the campaigns of Shawan Amhara
military conquests conducted during the late nineteenth century had more than tripled the
territorial extent of the historic Orthodox Christian Ethiopian state and almost doubled
the size of its population. The successful accomplishment of the conquests was mainly
the result of an almost unmatched military superiority of the Shawan armies over the

fighting forces of their adversaries in both man – power and armament.

The military preponderance of the Shawan Amhara was also an instrumental
factor in ensuring the effective administrative control they managed to establish over the
conquered territories and the systematic exploitation of their economic and human
resources. It was also a determinant factor in the decisive defeat of the Italian invading
forces at Adwa in 1896. The result had been the survival of the independence of a
considerably enlarged Ethiopian state during the era of the European scramble and
colonial conquest of sub – Saharan Africa. Internally the outcome had been the sustained
maintenance and consolidation of the newly established Shawan Amharan politico –

IV
military hegemony and domination over the emergent greater Ethiopian polity, thought
the northern Eritrean highlands were ceded to the Italians in 1896.

V
 ‫ﻣﺴﺘﺨﻠﺺ‬

‫ﺗﺘﻄﻠﺐ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺳﻌﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﻤﻴﺰﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻗﺎﺩﻫﺎ ﺃﻣﻬﺮﺓ ﺷﻮﺍ ﺧﻼﻝ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎﺭ‬

‫ﺍﻷﻭﺭﰊ ﰲ ﺃﻓﺮﻳﻘﻴﺎ ﺟﻨﻮﺏ ﺍﻟﺼﺤﺮﺍﺀ ﰲ ﺃﻭﺍﺧﺮ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻭﺍﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﳒﻢ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳎﻤﻮﻋﺎﺕ‬

‫ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﻣﻮ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻴﺪﺍﻣﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻄﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻹﺛﻴﻮﺑﻴﺔ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺜﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﺪﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻷﻋﺮﺍﻕ ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻣﻮﺛﻘﺔ ﻭﺃﻛﺜﺮ‬

‫ﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻛﺘﺐ ﺣﱴ ﺍﻵﻥ ‪ .‬ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﳍﺪﻑ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﲢﻘﻴﻖ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺽ‬
‫ﺗﻔﺼﻴ ﹰ‬

‫ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﲜﻤﻊ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺘﺐ ﻋﻦ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﳌﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﰲ ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺃﻛﺜﺮ ﺗﻮﺛﻴﻘﹰﺎ ﻭﺗﺮﺍﺑﻄﹰﺎ ﻭﺍﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺼﻮﺭﺓ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺪﻡ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻣﻨﺤ ‪‬ﻰ ﲢﻠﻴﻠﻴﹰﺎ ﻟﻸﺣﺪﺍﺙ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﳜﻴﺔ ﻭﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﱵ ﲨﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﺑﻴﺔ‬

‫ﻏﲑ ﺍﳌﻨﺸﻮﺭﺓ ﻭﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﻭﺍﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﳜﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﺧﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺛﻴﻮﺑﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﻨﺸﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﳌﺘﺮﲨﺔ ﻭﺭﻭﺍﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﺑﻴﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﺎﻟﺔ‬

‫ﻭﺍﳌﺴﺘﻜﺸﻔﲔ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺃﻗﺎﻣﻮﺍ ﻭﺟﺎﻟﻮﺍ ﰲ ﺇﻗﻠﻴﻢ ﺷﻮﺍ ﻭﺑﻼﺩ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺪﺍﻣﺎ ﻭﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﻣﻮ ﰲ ﻋﻬﺪ ﻣﻴﻨﻠﻴﻚ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺘﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﱵ‬

‫ﺗﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮﺓ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﺳﺘﺨﺪﻣﺖ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﻮﺟﻮﺩﺓ ﰲ ﺍﳌﺮﺍﺟﻊ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔ ﺍﳌﻨﺸﻮﺭﺓ‪.‬‬

‫ﺗﻮﺻﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﺇﱃ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺃﳘﻬﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳊﻤﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻗﺎﺩﻫﺎ ﺃﻣﻬﺮﺓ ﺷﻮﺍ ﰲ ﺃﻭﺍﺧﺮ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﻥ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻗﺪ ﺿﺎﻋﻔﺖ ﺍﻟﺮﻗﻌﺔ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﺪﻭﻟﺔ ﺇﺛﻴﻮﺑﻴﺎ ﺍﻷﺭﺛﻮﺫﻛﺴﻴﺔ ﺍﳌﺴﻴﺤﻴﺔ ﺛﻼﺙ ﻣﺮﺍﺕ ﻭﺿﺎﻋﻔﺖ‬

‫ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﹰﺎ ﺣﺠﻢ ﺳﻜﺎ‪‬ﺎ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻛﻤﻠﺖ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻐﺰﻭ ﺑﻨﺠﺎﺡ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﺗﻔﻮﻕ ﺟﻴﻮﺵ ﺃﻣﻬﺮﺓ ﺷﻮﺍ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﱵ ﱂ ﲤﺎﺛﻞ ﻣﻦ‬

‫ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺘﺎﺩ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﻮﺓ ﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺪﺍﻣﺎ ﻭﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﻣﻮ‪.‬‬

‫ﻼ ﺁﺧﺮ ﻛﺒﲑ ﺍﻷﺛﺮ ﰲ ﺗﺄﻛﻴﺪ ﺳﻴﻄﺮ‪‬ﻢ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﱵ‬

‫ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﻮﻕ ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻱ ﻷﻣﻬﺮﺓ ﺷﻮﺍ ﻋﺎﻣ ًﹰ‬

‫ﲤﻜﻨﻮﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺄﺳﻴﺴﻬﺎ ﰲ ﺍﳌﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﺍﻟﱵ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﱃ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺘﻐﻼﻝ ﺍﳌﻨﻈﻢ ﳌﻮﺍﺭﺩﻫﺎ ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺸﺮﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻛﺎﻥ‬

‫ﻼ ﺣﺎﲰﹰﺎ ﰲ ﻫﺰﳝﺔ ﺍﻟﻄﻠﻴﺎﻥ ﰲ ﻣﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﻋﺪﻭﺓ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ .1896‬ﻭﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺍﻟﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﺑﻘﺎﺀ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺇﺛﻴﻮﺑﻴﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ‬
‫ﺃﻳﻀﹰﺎ ﻋﺎﻣ ﹰ‬

‫‪VI‬‬
‫ﰲ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺍﻟﺼﺮﺍﻉ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﰊ ﰲ ﺇﻓﺮﻳﻘﻴﺎ ﺟﻨﻮﺏ ﺍﻟﺼﺤﺮﺍﺀ‪ .‬ﻭﺩﺍﺧﻠﻴﹰﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺍﻟﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﺗﺜﺒﻴﺖ ﺩﻋﺎﺋﻢ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻷﻣﻬﺮﺓ ﺷﻮﺍ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻹﺛﻴﻮﺑﻴﺔ ﺑﺄﻛﻤﻠﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻥ ﻣﺮﺗﻔﻌﺎﺕ ﺇﺭﺗﺮﻳﺎ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺸﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﰎ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺎﺯﻝ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻹﻳﻄﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﰲ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪.1896‬‬

‫‪VII‬‬
 PREFACE

Of all the published literature on the modern history of Ethiopia the two studies of
the reign of Menilek II as king of Shawa by Kofi Darkwah and as king of Shawa and
emperor of Ethiopia by Harold Marcus, both published in 1975, still remain the best
informative and authoritative. Nevertheless, the two works devote only very limited
space and attention to the significant theme of the late nineteenth century Shawan
Amhara military conquest of the largely Oromo and Sidama inhabited regions of southern
Ethiopia than it should legitimately deserve. In the same way others, such as Markakis
(1974), Addis Hiwet (1975), Holcomb and Ibssa (1990), Asafa Jalate (1993), and
Tishole Tebebu (1995), provide brief summaries of the expansion and formation of the
enlarged Ethiopian empire-state as a required background for their central socio-political
studies of modern Ethiopian society. And even though more information and insight on
the subject have been provided by a few published periodical articles much still remains
to be done.
The singular unparalleled process of Shawan Amhara territorial expansion during
the era of the late nineteenth century European colonial conquest of sub-Saharan Africa
and the resultant position of the subject Oromo and Sidama population within the
emergent multi-ethnic, multi-cultural modern Ethiopian state deserve a more detailed and
documented study than have hitherto been possible. The present study, therefore, is
primarily intended to serve that purpose. Its main objective is to incorporate, elaborate
upon and substantially add to the results of what have already been published on the
subject in one single and hopefully coherent work.
The main sources which are used for this study may be grouped for convenience
into four categories; (i) published translated Ethiopian chronicles, (ii) unpublished and
printed primary European archival source materials, (iii) published accounts of the
European residents, explorers and travelers in Shawa and the Oromo and Sidama
countries during the times of Menilek or soon afterwards, and finally (iv) the published
secondary sources.
Accesses to Ethiopian archival sources have been practically ruled out. Most of
the country’s state papers are said to have been destroyed or had disappeared during the

VIII
1935-36 Italo-Ethiopian war and the Fascist occupation of the country which followed.
The whereabouts of any remnants that may have survived are still unknown. Some
unpublished Amharic manuscripts, mostly in private possession have not been made
available except to a very few Ethiopians and outsiders. The rich information they
provided, sometimes supplemented by oral data collected during field work, was made
use of in a few of the published periodical articles referred to in the study.
Two traditional Ethiopian sources are used for the present study. The main source
is the two volume French translation of the official Amharic chronicle of the reign of
Menilek II that ends in 1909. It was compiled by his Sahafe Tezaz (“Minister of the Pen”/
Private Secretary) Gobra Sellassie, annotated and published by Maurice de Coppet in
1930-32. Most probably the chronicler wrote his work under the personal guidance and
supervision of his sovereign. As to be expected historical event that were not considered
credible or favourable to Menilek were either glossed over or only hinted to very briefly.
Also the military campaigns, which were led personally by Menilek received relatively
more coverage than others that were commanded by any of his leading generals. The
other Ethiopian source is Carlo Conti Rossini’s Italian translation of an anonymous
Arabic chronicle of Harar, which was published in 1919. As far as one can possibly judge
there is no reason to consider its contents as anything but fairly reliable British archives
at the Public Record Office and the India Office Library in London contain much
information on Ethiopia. Most of it is concerned with the internal affairs of northern
Ethiopia in the 1860s-1880s, the external relations of its rulers and conditions in the
adjacent Afar and Somali coastal regions. The volume of the information beings to build
up after Menilek became emperor in 1889, especially following the battle of Adwa and
the arrival at Addis Ababa of the Rodd mission and the first accredited British resident
envoy Harrington in April 1897 and 1898 respectively. Even so much of the official
correspondence deals with the internal affairs of Ethiopia, the struggles within the
Shawan royal court for power and imperial succession and the competition among the
European powers with interests in the neighbouring regions for paramount political
influence and commercial advantage in the country. The only parts of the southern
Ethiopian regions that were of interest and concern for the British and thereby warranted
being reported about were the borderland territories lying close to their Somaliland and

IX
East African protectorates beside the Anglo Egyptian Sudan. The Oromo and Sidama
populated highland regions in the interior were not included among them. The British
archival sources, therefore, provide very little concerning these territories which is of
value to the purpose of the present study.
The brief French archival material used for this study is contained in a few of the
files that are catalogued under the series Nouvelle Acquisitions Française, Memoirés et
Documents which are deposited at the Ministère des Affaires Etrangers in Paris. It
includes some letters and extracts from the journal that was kept by Pierre Arnoux when
he was in Shawa and copies of notes and letters of Menilek, Massaia, Bremond, Lagarde
and others.
The official Italian archival documents of the former Ministero d’ Africa Italiana
are deposited under the label ASMAI as part of the archives of the Ministero degli Affari
Esteri in Rome. Most of their contents are almost exclusively centered on the Italian
relations with the rulers of northern Ethiopia and Shawa, especially after their occupation
of Massawa in 1885. Some selections of the documents are printed in the official Italian
Government’s Libro Verde, Etiopia XV (Rome, 1890), and in Carlo Giglio, ed., L’Italia
in Africa, Etiopia – Mar Rosso. Vol. III Documenti, 1857-1885 (Rome, 1958).
The paucity of the available primary archival source material renders the
contribution of the published correspondence and accounts of the Europeans who resided
in Shawa or travelled through the country into parts of the Oromo and Sidama inhabited
regions during the times of Menilek or soon afterwards particularly indispensable.
Included in this category are the letters and reports written by members of the Italian
Geographical Society’s mission in Shawa, Marquis Orazio Antinori. Leopoldo Traversi
and Vincenzo Ragazzi, who were based at Let-Marefia close to the Shawan capital
Entotto. Also included in this category is some of the correspondence of Count Pietro
Antonelli the accredited official representative of the Italian Government at the Shawan
royal court between 1883 and 1889. All the four Italians were reportedly intelligent, well-
educated astute and keen observers. They were favourably well placed to have been able
to report accurately and carefully on the events they witnessed or the information they
collected while they were in the country. Traversi and Ragazzi had the added advantage
of having accompanied Menilek on some of the military expeditions, which he led

X
personally in parts of the south. On the other hand, Antonelli’s frequent attendance at the
Shawan royal court and his knowledge of Amharic enabled him to maintain close
relations with several of the prominent Shawan notables and thereby gain access reliable
information. He, too, travelled on a few occasions in Menilek’s company to meet with
Emperor Yohannes. Some of their correspondence and reports are published in such
journals as Bolletino della Società Geografica Italiana, Bolletino della Società Africana
d’ Italia, L’Esploratore Commerciale and Cosmos. Another category consists of the
substantial published literature provided by some of the European explorers and travellers
in Shawa and parts of the Oromo and Sidama countries at the times of Menilek’s rule and
shortly afterwards. Among such sources are the accounts of the Italians Antonio Cecchi,
Gustavo Bianchi, and Cardinal Massaia, the Frenchmen Paul Soleillet, Jules Borelli, J.G.
Vanderhym, Alphonse Aubry and Henri Audon and the Austrian Friederich Bieber.
Cecchi’s published two volume narrative provides very rich and valuable
information about conditions in the Oromo territories beyond the Awash and Abbay
rivers and in the Gibe region in the southwest before the battle of Embabo. Similarly,
Bianchi’s account reports on his journey from Shawa through the Oromo territories lying
immediately to the south and southwest on his way to Gojjam in early 1880. Massaia had
been in Shawa for almost eleven years between early 1868 and June 1879. Even so, his
published volumes provide disappointingly very little, which is of value on the southern
Oromo regions during that period which was not directly linked to his missionary
interests.
Though much of the published account of Soleillet and the latter articles by Aubry
and Audon tend to focus on matters that were of commercial interest they still provide
some material, which is of value to the present study. Borelli’s published journal, which
consists of daily entries, contains valuable information which he collected when he was
in Shawa and during his travels from Entoto to Harar and the Gibe region between early
May 1887 and November 1888. The published account of Vanderhym narrates, among
other information, details of his travels in the company of Menilek on the military
expedition that ended with the conquest of Wallamo. Finally, Bieber’s two volumes
contain substantially valuable material on the Sidama kingdom of Kaffa and its conquest
by the Shawan Amhara, which he had collected while he was in that country in 1919.

XI
 Nevertheless, one have to admit that limitations of the available source material
allowed for the conquest of some regions to be more informatively covered than that of
others. One only hopes that more exhaustive future research would permit for a more
detailed and better balanced reconstruction of the process of Shawan Amhara conquest of
the Oromo and Sidama regions than have hitherto been possible to be carried out.

XII
 ABBREVIATIONS

AA African Affairs
ASMAI Archivio dell’ex – Ministero d’ Africa Italiana
BN Bibliothèque Nationale
BSAI Bolletino della Società Africana d’ Italia
BSGI Bolletino della Società Geografica Italiana
BUCAA Bulletin of the University College of Addis Ababa, Ethnological Society
CEA Cahiers d’ Études Africaines
EC L’Esploratore Commerciale
EO Ethiopia Observer
HA Horn of Africa
IJAHS: International Journal of African Historical Studies
JAEH Journal of African Economic History
JAH Journal of African History
JAHS Journal of African Historical Studies
JES Journal of Ethiopian studies
JHMAS Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences
JHSN Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
JSS Journal of Semitic Studies
LV Libro Verde
MAE Ministère des Affaires Etrangers (France)
MAEI Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Itlay)
M&D Memoires et Documents
NA Nouva Antologia (di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti)
NAF Nouvelle Acquisitions Française
OM Orieute Moderno
RDM Revue des Deux Mondes
RSE Rassegna di Studi Ethiopici
RSO Rivista di Studi Orientali

XIII
SE Le Semeur d’Ethiopie’
QDC Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales
SPI Storia e Politica Internazionale

XIV
 GLOSSARY

Amhara Court Titles And Personnel:-

Negusa Nagast Literally, “king of kings” i.e. the traditional title of the
emperor.
Atse Emperor
Negus King
Bitwadad Chief royal councilor
Blatengetta Chief administrator of the royal palace
Sahafe Tezaz Private royal secretary / i.e. Minister of the Pen
Afa Negus literally, “mouth of the king”/ i.e. royal spokesman
Agafari Chief royal steward
Azaj Royal judge
Bajerond Royal Treasurer
Balamwal Young royal favourite
Masafent Royal princes
Makwanent Chief office holders at the royal court
Lij Title of children of royal blood or of prominent nobles

Amhara Military Ranks And Titles:-

Ras highest military rank

Ras Bitwadad Most favoured Ras
Dajazmach Second highest military rank below Ras; abbr. Dajach when it
is followed by a personal name
Qanazmach Commander of the right wing
Garazmach Commander of the left wing
Fitawrari Commander of the vanguard or advance forces / the imperial
Fitawrari was the Minister of War

XV
Maredazmach Commander of the rear or reserve forces
Abegaz Commander of a frontier post or regional garrison
Balambaras Commander of a fortress
Turk-Bacha Commander of the royal regiment of riflemen
Shalaqa Commander of a thousand soldiers
Shambal Head of five hundred soldiers
Mato Alaqa Head of a hundred soldiers
Hamsa Alaqa Head of fifty soldiers

Amhara Ecclesiastical titles:-

Abun / Abuna Traditional title of the Patriarch or Metropolitan of the

Ethiopian Orthodox Church / Abuna is used when the title is
follower by a personal name.
Ichege Chief administrator of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church
Kahenat The clergy
Alaqa Head of a monastery or an important church
Mamher Head of a group of learned clergy in a monastery or a church
Abba Literally, “Father”/ title of respect for the clergy

General Amhara Glossary:-

Agher tor Foreign battle or war

Amba A flat-topped, steep – sided mountain
Amole Salt bar; used as currency in the nineteenth century
Araki Teff wine
Ashkar Retainer or follower
Asrat The annual ten percent tax on agricultural produce
Ato Title equivalent to “Mr.”
Awaj Royal proclamation

XVI
Balabbat Literally, “one who has a father”/ i.e. a member of the land
owning group
Balg The little rains
Brundo Raw meat
Dega The very elevated highlands above 7, 000ft.
Elafin Private royal quarters
Fanno Adventurous free-lance warriors
Gabbar Tribute and tax-paying subject peasants in the conquered
territories
Gesgassa A military excursion of short duration
Ghebi Royal residence / palace
Gondari Name of the royal regiment of riflemen
Hudad Land farmed by a group of subject tenants, which was used to
provide grain to the royal palace
Katama Garrison town
Keramt The heavy rains
Maderia Untaxed land allotted to civil servants and the military who
were settled in the conquered territories in lieu for salaries
Meslenie The official who represented the royal court or the high
officials in the lands allotted to them in the conquered regions
Naft Gun
Naftenya Literally, “one who has a gun”/ i.e. the term applied to the
administrators and soldier-settlers in the conquered territories.
Nagadras Chief Customs – collector
Nagarit Literally, “drum”
Qolla the unhealthy hot, arid lowlands, and deep river valleys
Qurt Gheber Annual tribute paid by vassal rulers in the conquered territories
Rest / Rist Inheritable land owned by an extended family
Semon Land allotted to the Church in the conquered territories
Siso Land that was allowed to be kept by the former ruling families
after the conquest of their countries

XVII
Shamma A scarf – like cloth that covers head and shoulder
Shanqalla A collective term applied by the Ethiopians to all negroid
peoples
Shifta Bandit or outlaw
Shum Title of a governor of a district
Shum-Shir Literally, “appoint – remove”
Teff Maise – like grain
Tej Honey wine
Tor Battle / war
Warari Soldiers who served as advance patrols or scouts during a
military campaign
Wayna Dega Fertile intermediate highlands
Woizero Lady / equivalent to “Mrs.”
Yekin Agher Conquered / colonised country
Zemacha A military expedition which lasts for from two to four months

Select Oromo Glossary:-

Abba Literally, “Father”/ i.e. possessor – usually a title of respect

Abba Boku Literally, “Father or possessor of the Boku” / i.e. the title of the
executive leader of the gada – group in power
Abb Dula Literally, “Father of War”/ i.e. the title of the war leader of the
gada – group in power
Abba Gada Literally, “Father of the Gada”/ i.e. another title of the war
leader of a governing gada – group
Abba Ganda Literally, “Father / possessor of a district”/ i.e. title of a chief of
a district
Abba Kella An officer who commands a cavalry unit guarding a border
post
Abba Lafa Literally, “Father / possessor of land”/ i.e. a land owner

XVIII
Abba Mizan Literally, “Father of the balance”/ i.e. the title of the official
who was responsible for foreign merchants and foreigners in
general
Abba Muda Literally, “Father of anointing”/ i.e. the spiritual head of
traditional Oromo religion
Abba Qoro Title of an officer responsible for administering a district.
Afkala Local Oromo petty traders in the Oromo kingdoms of the Gibe.
Bideru A suspended hallowed tree-trunk used as a sounding object or
drum
Boku A wooden scepter held by the Abba Boku as a symbol of his
authority
Buta One of the most important Oromo festivals during which each
member of a ruling gada – group celebrated by slaughtering a
bull
Chafe The meadow general assembly attended by the leading
members of a governing gada – group.
Dagno / Daggo A custom official
Donachu Crown prince
Genne Lady of royal blood
Gennefa The king’s / ruler’s first wife
Gossa Clan
Jila A pilgrim to the Abba Muda
Kella A frontier gate
Lemi Royal messenger or ambassador
Luba The fifth gada – group / i.e. the governing gada-group
Massera Royal residence of a king / i.e. palace
Mogga Uninhabited and forested region, which separated neighbouring
political units
Moti Title of the king or ruler
Qalli A ritual expert of traditional Oromo religion
Waq God in Oromo Traditional religion / i.e. the “sky god”

XIX
Other Grossary:-

Adila The royal title of the monarch among the Hadiya Tufte, the
Tambaro and the Kambata
Amno The royal title of the Janjero (Yama) monarch
Angher Heracho Title of the chief of the royal Janjero clan
Damamwit A Gurage deity
Damin Title of a tribal chief among the Qottu Oromo
Doččo The greatest of the Kafficho spirit cults
Eqqo A Kafficho spirit cults
Garad Title of a village chief among the Qottu Oromo
Goqo Name of the warrior clan among the Wallamo (Walayta)
Jihad The Muslim Holy War
Katama Rascho Title of the commander of the Kafficho royal guards
Kawa Royal title of the Wallamo (Walayta) monarch
Mawa Name of the royal Janjero (Yama) dynasty
Mikrecho The Kafficho royal advisory council
Qottu The Muslim Oromo cultivators in the neighbourhood of Harar
Tato Royal title of the Kafficho monarch
‘Ulama Muslim learned men
Yaro The Kafficho traditional supreme being, the “sky god”

XX
 INTRODUCTION

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the majority of the African peoples
inhabiting the greatest parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, were living under independent
African rule largely unaffected by any form of foreign authority. In some small
regions, however, lived modest numbers of European settlers such as in the British
colonies of the Cape and Natal, the Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the
Transval as well as in the off shore islands of Mauritus and Reunion. Some Omani
Arab settler communities were living in the small city-states of the East African coast
and the neighbouring islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Some traders of various
European nationalities were stationed at selected localities on the West African
coastal enclaves, but they were rent-paying tenants to the local indigenous
authorities.1
In political terms those African societies continued to live within a complex
variety of largely dissimilar types of socio – political institutions. These included
states or kingdoms, city-states and principalities of varying administrative structures,
political and military powers, densities of population, histories and territorial size with
borders which often fluctuated with alterations in the politico – military fortunes of
the polity concerned. At the extreme opposite end there were the small groups of
localised wandering bands of hunters and food gatherers who inhabited the remote hot
and arid desert regions of Southern Africa, the inaccessible parts of the East African
Rift Valley and the humid dense tropical rain forests. In between these two categories
were the vast majority of African people who were organised in small chiefdoms and
stateless communities whose members were held together by kinship and lineage ties,
neighourhood relations and age-set arrangements.2 A special category labelled the
“demi-state” has sometimes been suggested to describe a chiefdom which expanded
and became dominated by one particular person but was not yet equipped with viable
administrative and political structures. It usually broke down on the occasion of the
sudden removal of that individual.3

1
- Hallett, R., Africa since 1875 (Ann Anbor, 1974), pp. 37-38.
2
- Ibid., pp. 38-40; Colson, E., “African Society at the Time of the Scramble,” in Gann, L.H. and
Duignan, P., (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 Vol. 1 The History and Politics of Colonialism
1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 27-28.
3
- Hallett, R., op. cit., p. 38

1
 In the geographically favourable conditions of the Sudanic savanna belt, the
light woodlands and margins of the tropical rain forests, the plateau grasslands of
Central Africa and the interlacustrine region of East Africa centralised states were
already in existence for a considerable length of time before the nineteenth century.
The large medieval kingdoms of the Western Sudan had already broken down and
disappeared. They were replaced by several small polities that ranged from the
principalities of Futa Jallon and Futa Toro, the Wolof and Serer states, the Bambara
states of Segu and Kaarta and the state of Macina. In the Central Sudan there were the
Hausa city-states, the sultanates of Kanem-Bornu, Bagirmi and Wadai. Further
eastward were the state of Dar Fur and the tottering Funj sultanate of Sinnar in the
Eastern Sudan. To the east of the Funj kingdom was the ancient Christian kingdom of
Ethiopia located on the northern and central interior highlands of the Horn of Africa.1
In the margins of the tropical forests and closer to the West African coast were
found a number of substantial states and kingdoms by the beginning of the nineteenth
century. They included the Edo kingdom of Benin in southeastern Nigeria, the
powerful Yoruba empire of Old Oyo and its small tributary states to the west of
Benin, the state of Nupe to the north of Yorubaland, the autocratic Fon kingdom of
Dahomey, the Akan Confederacy of Ashante (Asante) and the coastal Fante states in
Ghana.2
In Bantu Central Africa centralised states were found in the regions to the
south of the Congo rain forests, such as the two substantial Lunda kingdoms of
Mwata Yamvo in southwestern Zaire and Mwata Kazembe in southern Katanga as
well as the kingdom of Ovimbundu to the south of the Lunda states and the Luba –
Lomane states. All arround each of the major states were found a number of smaller
polities which were often tribute-paying satelites.3 The once powerful kingdom of Old
Kongo, which attained the peak of its power in the fifteenth century, had already
broken down into small independent provinces. By the beginning of the nineteenth
century the authority of its king was reduced to the immediate surroundings of his
capital.4 In the interlacustrine region of East Africa were to be found the six major
states of Buganda, Bunyoro, Karagwe, Ankole, Rwanda and Burundi. Arround each

1
- Oliver, R. and Atmore, A., Africa Since 1800 (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 8-12
2
- Ibid., pp. 12-13
3
- Ibid., pp. 16-18
4
- Ibid., pp. 20-21

2
of them were several smaller tribute-paying states.1 In the southern Zimbabwean
plateau, the valleys of the Zambezi river and the plains of southern Mozambique
several states arose at least from the fifteenth century onwards. For a time most of
them were tributaries recognising the overlordship of the Mwenemutapa of Great
Zimbabwe. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, most of them including the
Lozi kingdom broke away and became independent.2 In contrast to the States of West
Africa, the Sudanic savanna belt or the Ethiopian region the states of Bantu Africa
had been almost isolated from foreign contacts until the nineteenth century. The only
exceptions had been the Portuguese connections with the kingdom of Old Kongo in
northern Angola, their penetration in the coastal regions of Angola, up the Zambezi
river and the coastal areas of Mozambique.3
Many African polities of almost all types had been profoundly altered during
the course of the nineteenth century. Once powerful states and kingdoms collapsed
and disintegrated into a number of small independent and mutually hostile political
units. Other states were overthrown and replaced by larger and more centralised
polities, while some had managed to recover and prosper after being overrun and
conquered. Some political units had prospered economically and underwent processes
of internal consolidation and outward expansion, while others lost some portions of
their territory but retained their basic structures and power intact. And, above all, new
and more often much larger polities were created where none had existed before, and
new ones were still being built up on the eve of the European partition and conquest
of the continent.4
These major and far-reaching transformations have been described by
Hargreaves as “a sort of African partition of Africa, a radical reshaping of political
structures and boundaries taking place throughout the century.”5 In the view of
Elizabeth Colson these historical changes were mainly the direct reaction of African
societies to the impact of the long-distance trade with the Europeans and their
activities. The changes are said to have been more far-reaching in West Africa than in
East Africa in accordance with the variations in the intensity of the European impact.6

1
- Ibid., pp. 18-20
2
- Ibid., pp. 21-22
3
- Ibid., pp. 22-24
4
- Colson, E., op. cit., p. 27
5
- Hargreaves, J.D., “West African States and the European Conquest,” in Gann and Duignan, op. cit.,
p. 199
6
- Colson, E., op. cit., p. 27

3
 Colson’s interpretation has been criticized by Ajayi as an unjustified
exaggeration of the significance of European influences as a factor for the change. He
argues that European presence during the period when the changes were taking place
was still very limited to the coastal areas and its role as a factor for change, if it
existed at all, was only very marginal. He concludes that for the most of West Africa
the role of the internal politics of the states of the forest region and the Islamic revival
in the Sudanic belt were far more significant.1 The Bakongo people of the Old Kongo
kingdom, the Yoruba of ancient Old Oyo and the Edo people of Benin had created
organised states of their own well before the advent of the Europeans.2 Conversely,
several pre-colonial African commun-ities like the Ibo of southeastern Nigeria, the
Bisa to the north of the Zambezi river and the Yao to the east of Lake Nyasa had been
actively engaged in long-distance foreign trade but did not became organised in
centralised political units. Ajayi contends that even in states that were economically
largely dependent on trade with the Europeans such as the city-states of the Niger
Delta the impact of European influence on their structural development may have
been greatly over emphasised.3
The Islamic reformist movements which were started by the establishment of
the Fulani Muslim theocracies of Futa Jallon and Futa Toro soon spread to the Central
Sudan. Between 1804 and 1810 the Fulani jihad led by ‘Uthman dan Fodio resulted in
the overthrow of the Hausa city-states and their replacement by the single politically
and religiously centralised substantial theocracy of the Sokoto Caliphate with its twin
capitals of Sokoto and Gwandu. The jihad also extended the frontiers of Islam and
Fulani domination southwards through the establishment of new Muslim emirates
such as those of Nupe, Adamawa and Ilorin. The unsuccessful attempt by the jihadists
to extend their control over Bornu led to the fall of the Saifawa and its replacement by
a new Kanembu dynasty, the ascendency of the Shuwan Arab aristocracy and the
beginnings of the reforms of Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanami.4 The example of
‘Uihman dan Fodio jihad in Hausaland was followed by that of Ahmad Ibn
Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr, also known as Ahmadu Lobbo or Sehu Ahmadu, in

1
- Ajayi, J.F.A., “Colonialism : An Episode in African History,” in Gann and Duignan, op. cit., pp.
500-501; idem., “West Africa in the Anti-Slave Trade Era,” in Flint, J.E. (ed.), The Cambridge History
of Africa Vol. 5 From c. 1790 to c. 1870 (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 200-202,221
2
- Ajayi, J.F.A, “Colonialism …,” p. 501
3
- Ibid
4
- Last, Murry, “Reform in West Africa : The Jihād Movements of the Nineteenth Century,” in Ajayi,
J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds.), History of West Africa Vol. 2 (London, 1974), pp. 4-13, 66-68, 96-106

4
Macina in 1818 which resulted in the creation of an independent theocratic state with
its capital at Hamadallahi.1 The Tukolor jihad of al-Hajj ‘Umar Ibn Sa‘id Tal al –
Futi ended in the establishment of an extensive theocratic régime that included the
former states of Segu and Kaarta, the emirate of Macina and parts of the Senegambian
region.2
The adventurous trader turned conquering warrior Samore Toure, using Islam
as an appealing ideology, embarked on a career of military conquest that eventually
led to the emergence of an extensive Mandingo empire in the Upper Niger region.3 In
the Eastern Sudan the decaying Funj Sultanate of Sinnar was toppled by the Turco-
Egyptian armies of Muhammad Ali in 1820. Further Egyptian expansion in the Sudan
was revived by the Khedive Ismail who attempted to extend his control up the Nile to
the Equatorial region and the Great Lakes. Turco-Egyptian presence was terminated
by rise of the Mahdist state following the fall of Khartoum in 1885.4 In the Nilotic
region of Bahr al-Ghazal al-Zubair Rahma Mansur, the most outstanding northern
Sudanese jallaba ivory and slave trader, established for himself an independent
commercial principality. With the aid of his bazinger private army which was
hardened, well-disciplined and well-supplied with firearms he succeeded in defeating
the armies of the sultanate of Dar Fur. Later his possessions were taken over by the
Turco-Egyptian administration following his forced detension in Egypt and the
elimination of his son Sulaiman.5 Rabih Ibn Fad Allah, better known as Rabih al-
Zubair, a former lieutenant in the service of al-Zubair, had broken away from the
latter’s son Sulaiman. Leading his contingents of bazinger warriors into the eastern
parts of present day Central African Republic he overran several local principalities,
including Dar Kuti, and several Zande chiefdoms. In the process he collected tribute
from local rulers and built up the strength of his army. After having been repulsed by
the armies of Wadai Rabih turned westwards to conquer the sultanates of Bagirmi and
Bornu. With his capital located at Dikwa to the south of Lake Chad he became the

1
- Ibid., pp. 14-17
2
- Ibid., pp. 17-23, 341-349, 361-382
3
- Person, Yves, “The Atlantic Coast and the Southern Savannah,” in Ajayignd and Crowder, op. cit.,
pp. 297-301
4
- Hallett, R., op. cit., p. 80
5
- Hallett, R., op. cit., p. 109 ; Holt, P..M., “Egypt and the Nile Valley,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., pp. 36-
38, 43, 44

5
ruler of the whole region that extended from the borders of the emirate of Kano in the
west to those of Dar Fur in the east.1
Further to the east of the Funj kingdom was the ancient Christian empire /
kingdom of Ethiopia on the northern and central highlands of the Horn of Africa. Its
relative isolation, economic stagnation, internal political divisions and the feebleness
of her imperial monarchy were brought to an end by Emperor Tewodros in the mid-
nineteenth century. Revival of imperial paramountcy and internal consolidation begun
by Yohannes were energetically continued by Menilek II. During his reign as king of
Shawa and as emperor of Ethiopia the extensive expansion of Ethiopia’s dominions
was carried out.2
During the 1880s the major internal issues facing the rulers of the newly
established paramountcies of the Western and Central Sudan were centered arround
the problems of effectively controling their substantial states in the face of internal
opposition and rivals. Externally they were, like their counterparts elsewhere in Sub-
Saharan Africa, to confront the challenge posed by increasing European
encroachment.3 In the same period the West African polities of the forest zone
underwent uneven processes of change. Following the collapse of the empire of Old
Oyo at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Yoruba became organised into
several mutually hostile sub-groups or city-states that fought against each other for
territory and control of trade routes. The most important among them were Ibadan and
Abeokuta.4 The kingdom of Benin was little affected by the abolition of the slave
trade since palm oil soon became the main item in its foreign trade. The kingdom’s
problems, however, arose from the loss of control over access to the coast to the
middlemen of the Niger Delta who monopolised canoe transport, and from the effects
of the prolonged civil wars of the period 1854-1880. Otherwise the kingdom’s power

1
Hallett, R., op. cit., pp. 292, 424-425 ; Cohen, R. and Brenner, L., “Bornu in the Nineteenth
Century,” in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., pp. 114-115, see also Adellye, R.A., “Rābih Fadallah 1879-
1893: Exploits and impact on Political Relations in Central Sudan, JHSN, V, 2 (June, 1970), pp. 223-
242; for more details see Hallam, W.K.R., The Life and Times of Rabih Fadl Allah (Ifracombe, 1977).
2
Rubenson, S., “Ethiopia and the Horn,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., pp. 71-77, 80; Sanderson, G.N., “The
Nile Basin and the Eastern Horn,” in Fage, J.D. and Oliver, R., (eds.), The Cambridge History of
Africa. Vol. 6 From 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 645-660
3
Person, Yves, “Western Africa, 1870-1886,” in Fage and Oliver, op. cit., pp. 245-256
4
Oliver and Atmore, op.cit., pp. 37 – 38; Ajayi, J.F.A. “The Aftermath of the Fall of Old Oyo,” in
Ajayi and Crowder, op.cit., pp. 152 – 156, 159 – 166.

6
and basic institutions remained intact.1 The Fon autocratic kingdom of Dahomey,
which was previously much involved in the slave trade adapted itself easily to the
change to the trade in palm oil. Continued imports of guns and gun powder from the
coast turned the kingdom to one of the most powerful states in West Africa and
enabled her rulers to expand their territories northward and westward. Though it lost
part of her territory to Fulani jihadists Dahomey still maintained its internal cohesion
and its political and military powers intact.2
The Ashante (Asante) confederacy continued to prosper and grow militarily
powerful as its rulers concentrated on palm oil and kola nuts production and trade
with the Europeans on the coast in exchange for firearms and gun power beside other
consumer imported goods. While maintaining its hold over the coastal Fante states
Ashante also expanded northwards to secure her traditional trading connections with
Hausaland. The kingdom’s conflict with the Fante states led to British involvement on
the side of the Fante and consequently to the outbreak of the Anglo-Ashante wars of
the nineteenth century.3
The only West Africa region where the European trading activities had the
most obvious impact was that of the swamps and creeks of the Niger Delta and the Oil
Rivers. Formerly a flourishing slave trading centre it turned to be also the major palm
oil producing and trading region. The local African communities, with previous
experience in trading with the interior, readily adapted themselves to the new
promising commercial opportunities. They built up small, but powerful, trading
polities such as Bonny, Brass, Kalaber, Opobo and others. Their local merchant
princes who monopolised canoe transport and mobile naval military power became
the undisputed powerful middlemen between the palm oil producers in the interior
and the European traders on the coast.4
The hinterland and interior regions of East Africa had been isolated from
foreign contact and influence before the beginning of their penetration by the Muslim
Swahili-Arab traders in search for ivory and slaves in the 1830s onwards. Travelling
along the major trade routes that led inland from the Merima coastal ports they passed
through various regions leading to the shores of Lakes Malawi and Tanganiyka and
1
- Ibid., pp. 137-138; Atmore, A.E., “Africa on the Eve of Partition,” in Fage and Oliver, op. cit., p. 49
2
- Ibid., pp. 154-155, 161; Atmore, op. cit., pp. 46-47
3
- Boahen, Abu, “Politics in Ghana, 1800-1874,” in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit, pp. 167-170, 194-198;
Atmore, op. cit., pp. 45-46
4
- Alogoa, E. J., “Long Distance Trade and the States of the Niger Delta,” JAH, 111, 2 (1968), pp.
235-259; Atmore, op. cit., pp. 45, 50-51

7
further beyond to Buganda and Bunyoro in the northern interlacustrine region. The
economic, social and above all political impact of their interaction with the African
societies of the interior, which varied from one region to another, had been far-
reaching. In general those who lived along the major central trade routes, such as the
Nyamwezi in particular, were the most affected.1 Increased African involvement in
commercial activities, the extension of the areas with which they traded and
consequently increased sources of wealth were the obvious results.2 The trade in
slaves, where it predominated, brought about raids, wars and devastation to the
regions from which slaves were taken.3
A major political result of the Swahili-Arab penetration of the interior had
been the extension inland of the political relations of the Sultan of Zanzibar with some
of the rulers of the interior African states and chiefdoms. Another, though more
significant, aspect was the settlement of some of the Zanzibar traders in selected
commercial centres like Tabora, Ujiji and Karagwe where they chose one of their
numbers as governor. Their control of commerce, wealth and possession of imported
guns and gun powder and the resultant social, political power and prestige allowed
them to interfere in the politics of the neighbouring African communities by taking
sides in local disputes, engaging in conflicts on their own or helping a particular ruler
to maintain his authority. The interrelationship between the Swahili-Arab settler
traders and the African rulers were mutually beneficial for both sides as the traders
also needed the protection of the rulers for their continued residence and the conduct
of their commercial functions.4
Nevertheless, the most remarkably significant impact of the presence of the
Swahili-Arabs had been on the nature of African political authority and the pattern of
relationships within each particular polity as well as between one polity and its
neighbours. As political authority became increasingly dependent on military force
rather than on religious basis individuals who possessed wealth and firearms usually
became powerful. They succeeded in attracting more followers and allies and
eventually gaining political power. Equally states whose rulers possessed substantial
wealth from the proceeds of commerce and easier access to larger quantities of

1
- Unomah, A.C. and Webster, J.B., “East Africa: The expansion of Commerce,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit.,
pp. 267-277
2
- Ibid., pp. 284-292
3
- Ibid., pp. 298-300
4
- Unomah and Webster, op. cit., pp. 306-310

8
imported firearms and ammunition gained more power and influence than their less
fortunate neighbours.1
In this way Mtyela Kasanda, better known as Mirambo, a ruler of two small
Nyamwezi chiefdoms, made use of his wealth and military power to become the ruler
of a much enlarged and more powerful independent state which dominated the central
Tanzanian region that extended between Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika. Similarly
Nungu Ya Mawe, a Nyamwezi prince who had failed in assuming political power in
his own chiefdom, led his followers in conquering the less powerful societies in the
surrounding neighbourhood and establishing the autonomous state of Kiwele.
Mirambo, Nungu Ya Mawe and other Nyamwezi state-builders maintained large
armies, composed mainly of Nguni, Massai and detribalised run away mercenaries,
commonly known as ruga ruga, and armed them with guns and spears. Leading their
armies in battles they expanded their states by extending their political authority over
conquered people who, were not related to their own tribal groups.2
In the interlacustrine region the impact of the Arab-Swahili traders was
restricted to the kingdoms of Buganda and Buryoro. The conflict between the two was
fuelled by the possession of firearms obtained by both sides in exchange for ivory.
Buganda, which appeared to have been stronger under Suna and his successor Mutesa,
expanded her territories on almost all directions. In contrast the arrival of the
Khartoum based ivory traders coming into Bunyoro during the reign of Kabarega
from the north was disruptive. The westward extension of the Zanzibari commercial
network beyond Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika was accompanied by the establishment
of Swahili-Arab and Nyamwezi trading settlements on the marginal regions of the
Lunda kingdom of Mwata Kazembe. This eventually led to the fragmentation and the
near break down of the kingdom.
Swahili-Arab and Nyamwezi traders essentially came as peaceful new comers
in search for ivory and slaves. They gradually built up their power by the acquisition
of added quantities of firearms and ammunition.3 They became increasingly powerful
enough to challenge and overthrow many of the chiefs of the small tributary polities
on the periphery of the Lunda state and incorporate their people under their own

1
- Ibid., pp. 310-316
2
- Ibid., pp. 316-318 See also Shorter, A., “Nungu Ya Mawe and the “Empire of the rugaruga, JAH,
111, 2 (1968), pp. 235-259; Bennett, N.R., Mirambo of Tanzania Ca. 1840-1884 (New York, 1971);
Atmore, op. cit., pp. 73-74
3
- Unomah and Webester, op. cit., 291-294; Atmore, op. cit., 73-74

9
control.1 Swahili-Arab traders led by Hamid bin Muhammad el-Murjebi, better known
as Tippu Tip, penetrated into the Congo forest regions beyond the Kasai river. They
deployed their private waungwana irregular forces2 armed with firearms to raid
villages and take away young men and women prisoners to be ransomed for ivory or
sold as slaves.3
At nearly the same time the Nyamwezi trader Msiri led his followers into the
copper producing region of Katanga on the western fringes of the Kazembe kingdom
and the borderlands of the Mwata Yamro Lunda state in the west. Though they came
as traders they soon developed ambitions to assume political power. Msiri steadily
built up his power and influence. Through the use of his private army of followers
equipped with firearms, known as the Yeke, he made himself the autonomous ruler of
a state which included most of the northern and western parts of the Kazembe
kingdom with its capital at Bunkeya. Thus the Kazembe kingdom, already weakened
by internal factional disputes, became substantially fragmented.4
In Western Central Africa the Chokwe, a previously insignificant people, were
turned in 1850s into ferocious warrior elephant hunters. Well armed with guns and
gunpowder Chokwe bands continuously moved on the central plateau hunting
elephants and selling ivory in exchange for more supplies of guns and gunpowder. In
the meantime they incorporated captives within their own ranks thereby substantially
increasing their strength. They also established their own caravan trading network as
rivals to the Swahili-Arab and Nyamwezi traders. The overall impact of the violent
methods they resorted to was the subversion of the large Lunda kingdom of the
Mwata Yamvo which they almost destroyed.5
Two new, though late, developments worthy of note were the responses of the
Bemba state in northeastern Zambia and the Luba Lomami kingdom to the west of
Lake Tanganyika to the impact of the Swahili-Arab long distance trade. The
consolidation and expansion of the Bemba state, founded in the late eighteenth
century, was continued during the nineteenth century by raiding neighbours

1
- Brimingham, D., “The Forest and the Savanna of Central Africa,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., pp. 244-245
2
- Page, M.E., “The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tip: A Case Study in Social Stratification and the Slave
Trade in Eastern Africa,” IJAHS, VI, 2 (1978), pp. 69-83
3
- Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 264-265; Atmore, op. cit., p. 74 See also Cookeys, S.T.S., “Tippu Tip and
the Decline of the Congo Arabs,” Tarikh, No. 1 (November, 1965), pp. 58-69
4
- Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 245-247; Atmore, op. cit., pp. 75-76
5
- Birmingham, op. cit., 236-238 see also Miller, J., “Cokwe Trade and Conquest,” in Gray, R. and
Birmingham, D., (eds.), Pre-Colonial African Trade (London, 1970), pp. 174-201

10
particularly for cattle, slaves and salt and annexing parts of their territories. The
processes were significantly intensified after the Bemba made contacts with the
Swahili-Arab traders from about 1850 onwards. They began exchanging ivory and
slaves with them for firearms, ammunition, cloth and other items. The acquisition of
new weaponry enabled the Bemba to increase the scope of their elephant hunting and
slave raiding and at the same time accelerate the consolidation and expansion of their
state. It also contributed towards strengthening their links with the Swahili-Arabs and
in repulsing attacks of their Nguni neighbours.1
The rulers and chiefs of the Luba Lomami state, the largest and most
centralised of the Luba kingdoms, traditionally monopolised the commercial
exchange of ivory and slaves with the Bisa traders for cloth, beads, salt and other
goods. By the beginnings of the 1870s, when the kingdom was at the peak of its
power, it maintained commercial connections on almost all directions. It was linked
eastward across Lake Tanganyika with the Swahili-Arabs of Ujiji and with the Bisa in
the southeast. In the southwest it was connected with the main routes of the Atlantic
long distance trade which were frequented by the Ovimbundu traders. In the direction
of the west it was linked with the Lunda kingdoms through the intermediary of the
Luba state of Kaniok. Trading was conducted on the basis of mutual goodwill and
benefits. Guns were used for elephant hunting, slave raiding, as items of commercial
exchange or even for the personal protection of the Bisa traders themselves.2
By the early 1870s the kingdom’s economic and political fortunes began to
decline as its ivory and slave resources were increasingly been obstructed. More
powerful ivory and slave raiding Yeke-Nyamwezi and Swahili-Arab traders using
firearms became established to the south and north of the kingdom respectively. The
Lunda were forced, therefore, to obtain slaves from within their own kingdom to buy
the firearms they needed for their own defense. This resulted in ruinous internal
conflicts and instability ending in the people of the kingdom themselves becoming the
victims of the ivory and slave raiding by their new neighbours.3
Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Nguni-speaking Bantu people
occupied the relatively densely populated fertile and well watered southeastern coastal
regions between the Indian Ocean and the Drakensberg mountains in the interior.

1
- Birmingham, D., op. cit., pp. 247-249
2
- Ibid., pp. 250 – 251
3
- Ibid., pp. 251-253

11
They were, similar to the rest of the Bantu peoples of the greater parts of South
Africa, organised in several small independent chiefdoms ruled by clan chiefs
unaffected by any form of foreign influences. Under continued pressure of population
expansion several groups tended to split from their chiefdoms and move away with
their cattle to establish themselves in new unoccupied grazing and farming lands. This
process of continued expansion, however, became increasingly difficult during the
course of the following decades. Most parts of the interior plateau to the west, other
areas to the north and south were already settled. Movement still further southward
was blocked by the northward advance of the White settler frontier from the Cape
Colony up to the Fish river. At the same time trade in ivory with the Portuguese at
Delagoa Bay to the north was being extended to the coastal regions and westward to
the inland plateau. Conflicts and wars between the rulers of the chiefdoms became
more frequent and some ambitious rulers attempted to build up much larger units by
extending their political authority over neighbouring clan leaders.1
It was in such circumstances that the establishment and expansion of the
centralised politico-military autocracy of the Zulu kingdom under the leadership of
Shaka had its origin. Through the systematic use of hardened discipline, skills and
improvised military tactics of warfare and the incorporation of many of the young
men and women of the defeated clans into the ever growing ranks of his followers
Shaka succeeded in transforming the former small clan into the much larger Zulu
‘nation’ which came to dominate what became known as Zululand.2 The wide-spread
violence, migrations and demographic changes which accompanied the rise of the
Zulu kingdom, known as the ‘Mfecane’ i.e. time of troubles, had far-reaching
consequences. Most importantly was that it provided the opportunity for several able
leaders to build up, in their different ways, substantially large centralised states.
Taking advantage of the high and easily defendable steep flat-topped
mountains and narrow valleys of northeastern Lesotho Mosheshoe was able to gather
many small groups of refugees together with his own followers under his protection
and paramountcy into a large centratised and military strong kingdom well defended
by horse - mounted gunmen.3 The Nguni chief Sobhuza, following his defeat at the

1
- Omer-Cooper, J.D., “The Nguni Outburst,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., pp. 321-322, 323 The issue is
discussed at length in Aldredge, E.A., “Sourcres of Conflict in Southern Africa, C. 1800-30: The
Mefcane Reconsidered,” JAH, XXXIII (1992), pp. 1-35
2
- Omer-Cooper, op. cit., pp. 326-335
3
- Ibid., pp. 339-341

12
hands of Zwide, withdrew with his followers into the regions of present day
Swaziland. He gradually united the various chiefdoms of the area under his political
control giving birth to the large centralised Swazi kingdom.1 The military commander
Mzilikazi broke with Shaka and moved away leading his followers through prolonged
campaigns of conquest during which he incorporated many of the young war captives
into the ranks of his army. He eventually ended up in Matabeleland where he settled
down with his following and established the Ndebele kingdom subjecting the local
Shona people as tribute-paying vassals.2 Shoshangane, another Nguni leader who was
separated from Shaka, moved with his followers northward. While on his way he
continued to build up the strength of his army by incorporating young war captives.
Finally he settled down in modern Southern Mozanbique where he established the
powerful Gaza kingdom which was organised on Zulu patterns.3
A few people, such as the Hehe of the highland regions to the northeast of
Lake Malawi, managed to respond positively to the mounting Nguni pressure. Under
the leadership of Munyigumba and his son Mkwawa and through the use of borrowed
Nguni weapons and tactics of fighting the petty Hehe chiefdoms were merged into a
large and powerful politico-military state. The Hehe were, therefore, enabled to
withstand Nguni aggression and later to maintain their control over the Swahili-Arab
traders.4 Other people such as the Lozi, living on the plains of the Zambezi River,
were conquered for a short time after 1840 by warrior Nguni groups from the south
known as the Kololo. They subsequently succeeded in regaining their indep-endence
about 1864.5
The case of the Shawan Amhara conquest of the rich and relatively densly
populated Oromo/Sidama regions of southern Ethiopia is not basically different from
the aforementioned developments occurring nearly every where in Sub-Saharan
Africa throughout the nineteenth century. To a large measure the conquest was made
possible as a result of some external and internal developments. One of them was the
renewal of European commercial interest in the regions of the Horn of Africa in
general, especially after the opening of the Suez canal in 1869. The other was the
resultant significant revival of the Ethiopian foreign oriented long distance caravan

1
- Ibid., pp. 325, 326
2
- Omer-Cooper, op. cit., pp. 343-348
3
- Ibid., pp. 349-350
4
- Hallett, R. op. cit., pp. 573-574; Unomah and Webester, op. cit., p. 279
5
- Birmingham, D., op. cit., pp. 233-234

13
trade.1 The necessities arising from the on-going internal competitive struggles for
power within the Ethiopian polity were significant. They made it an urgent
requirement for rival contestants to obtain as much as possible of added sources of
political and military prowess. This in turn led to the drive to secure, among other
things, exclusive control over the sources of Ethiopia’s valuable exports including
slaves and the main trade routes through which the exports flowed on their way to the
coastal ports. Other objectives included maintaining control over numerous tribute-
paying conquered subjects and reservoirs of abundant manpower available for
recruitment as soldiers. It was in this way that conquered Oromo/Sidama inhabited
regions were expected to provide the means for whoever conquered them to build up
and maintain large armies and to equip them with expensively purchased firearms and
ammunition.
Of all the peoples of the Ethiopian empire-state the Shawan Amhara were the
most favourably positioned to undertake the conquest and occupation of those lands
and gain the substantial gains that may result from the exploitation of their enormous
resources. Their principality was distant from the centre of imperial authority and far
removed from the direct threat of external aggression. It had the advantage of being
geographically located immediately adjoining the Oromo/Sidama inhabited regions on
the north. The gradual southward extension of its southern borders at the expense of
the neighbouring small Oromo tribal groups had become an almost established policy
of the successive Shawan rulers since the time of Ammahayyu in the third quarter of
the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the reign of Menilek Shawa was relatively
more stable, prosperous and comparatively more independent than the other Ethiopian
provinces.2 The Shawan ruler had been motivated by a personal ambition of becoming
emperor since he came to power in 1865. As the turn of events was to confirm he
proved to have been the suitable ruler under whose leadership the conquest and
occupation of the Oromo / Sidama regions were made.
Preoccupation with the conquest of Wallo which was completed by 1876 and
the state of his troubled relations with his more powerful overlord Emperor Yohanne
up to the Liche agreement of 1878 distracted the attention and the military efforts of
Menilek away from southern territorial expansion. The limited southern expansion
was mostly confined to cattle and slave raiding military escursions of short duration.

1
- Atmore, op. cit., p. 18
2
- Atmore, op. cit., pp. 38-39; Abiv, op. cit., pp. 147, 154

14
Their progress was held up by Oromo resistance at the upper valleys of the Awash
river for a considerable length of time. From 1878 onwards, however, the drive of the
process of conquest became more determined and increased in pace and in intensity.1
After the battle of Embabo in 1882 the challenge of Gojjami competition over
the conquest of the southwestern Oromo regions was eliminated. Between 1882 and
1886 the subjection and incorporation of the Oromo kingdoms of Jimma Abba Jifar,
Limmu, Gomma, Gumma and Gera as well as the Oromo of Leqa Naqamte, Leqa
Qellam and Illubabor was completed. In 1885 the Ittu Oromo of the Chercher
highlands were subdued. After six years of often bloody military campaigns between
1881 and 1886 the Arussi (Arsi) Oromo were finally conquered. In January 1887 the
Harari and the small Oromo groups inhabiting their immediate surroundings were
conquered and incorporated. Following the accession of Menilek to the imperial
throne in 1889 the conquest was suspended on occasion of the outbreak of the Great
Famine of 1888-1892, known locally as Kefu qan (Évil Dayŝ).2 It was caused by a
combination of drought, locust invasion, rinderpest and cholera epidemics. The
northern and central provinces were the most immediately affected regions. The loss
of lives, cattle and grain as well as widespread starvation and disease added to the
effects of recent armed conflicts. The consequences of the famine continued for a long
time after the immediate effects gradually withered away. Only small parts of the
recently conquered lands felt the direct impact of the famine. Some contingents of the
imperial army were temporally stationed in the conquered territories mainly to be
supported by the governing authorities there.
Following the resumption of the military campaigns the Sidama kingdom of
Wallamo (Walayta) was conquered 1894. The conquest and occupation of Sidamo
followed between 1894 and 1895. The process of conquest was only briefly
interrupted to concentrate on the war effort before confronting the Italians at Adwa,
but were resumed soon afterwards. The powerful Sidama kingdom of Kaffa was
finally conquered in 1897. Similarly in 1897 the Arussi Oromo of the highlands of
Bale were subdued. In the same year, too, the gold producing sheikhdoms of Bani
Shangul, Aqolda (Asosa) and Khomosha, adjacent to the Wallagga Oromo on the
1
- Marcus, H. G., The Life and Times of Menelik 11, 1845 – 1913 (Oxford, 1975), p. 52; p. 52;
Darkwah, R. H. K., Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire, 1813 – 1889 (London, 1975) pp. 78-79
2
- Marcus, op. cit., pp. 139, 144-145 see also Pankhurst, R., “The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-
1892: A New Assessment,” JHMAS, XXI, I (January, 1966), pp. 95-124 and XXI, 2 (July, 1966), pp.
271-294; Abdulssamad H. Ahmed, “Peasant Conditions in Gojjam During the Great Famine of 1888-
1889,” JES, XX (1987), pp. 1-18

15
borderland between Ethiopia and the Sudan, were subdued and annexed. The pastoral
Borana Oromo in the far southeast were nominally subdued and incorporated in 1899.
Further additions of conquered and annexed territories were made into largely hot and
arid Somali inhabited lowlands in the southeast in competition with the British,
Italians and French who were extending their respective spheres of influence inland
from their coastal protectorates or into humid tropical marginal regions in the far
south and southwest. Their occupation was intended to create protective buffer zones
to secure the safety of the newly conquered and occupied rich, fertile and relatively
densely populated Oromo/Sidama highlands in the interior.
In a few cases where local rulers like Abba Jifar II of Jimma, Kumsa Moroda
of Leqa Naqamte and Jote Tullu of Leqa Qellam submitted peacefully and accepted
their tributary status under Shawan Amhara overlordship they were allowed to retain
a certain measure of autonomy. They continued to govern their people with little
interference as long as they remained loyal and paid their tribute regularly.1 Other
rulers and their subjects who chose to resist the conquerors were dealt with very
harshly. Their lands were devastated, villages were burnt, cattle and other movable
valuable possessions were looted, their young men and women were rounded up and
enslaved.
When the wars of conquest were over the lands of those who resisted the
conquerors were occupied. The imposition of the Pax Shawana signalled for the
subjugated Oromo/Sidama the beginning of their domination by the Shawan Amhara.
Manned fortified military garrisons, katamas, were established at selected elevated
locations in the conquered regions. They were intended to pacify the conquered lands
and to keep control over their subject population. Shawan Amhara and assimilated
Amharised Oromo military and civil administrative officials, eclesiastical
functionaries together with their retainers were stationed in the conquered territories
as settlers. None of them were paid for their services. All of them depended on the
produce of the lands granted to them and the tribute paid to them, in cash, kind, labour
and other multiple services and obligations, by the indigenous inhabitants who
remained on the lands as peasants in lieu of pay. The latter were deprived of the
ownership of land and reduced to the status of serfs as a result. Later new settlers
arrived from the northern and central Ethiopian provinces as well seeking to make a

1
- Markakis, op. cit., pp. 101, 105, 106

16
fortune for themselves in the newly annexed regions. Indigenous local officials were
appointed to act as intermediaries between the conquering authorities and their
conquered subjects.1
The notable feature of several among the many aforementioned developments
occurring throughout the nineteenth century was the emergence of paramountcies
which possessed the characteristics of assimilative “national” states.2 In some cases
deliberate efforts were made to absorb and assimilate conquered people and impress
on them consciousness of distinctive identities such as common languages, social and
cultural affinities and shared loyalities to ruling groups and states. The best examples
of such polities were the Nguni military autocracies of the Zulu, Basuto, Swazi,
Ndebele and Shoshangan’s Gaza kingdom.3 Elsewhere similar developments were a
result of a large period of the evolution of commonly shared socio-political and
cultural traditions as well as historical experiences. These included the Hausa-Fulani
caliphate of Sokoto, the Bornu sultanate, the kingdoms of Benin, Buganda, Bunyoro
and Rwanda.4 Other states such as Ashante (Asante) and Dahomey were more recent
political formations.5 The empires of al-Hajj ‘Umar, Samore Toure and Rabih Ibn
FadL Allah, on the other hand, were basically military conquest states in which
practically no efforts were made to foster the evolution of communal identities and
loyalities.6
At the beginning of the twentieth century Ethiopia emerged as the only
country in Sub-Saharan Africa which survived the European colonial conquest as a
politically independent state, though it lost parts of its northern highlands to the
Italians. The case of Liberia, the other contemporary independent African state, was
totally different. Liberia was originally founded as a suitable place for the settlement
of Afro-Americans and Caribbeans recently freed from slavery and, therefore, was not
a target for European conquest and colonisation.7 Ethiopia owed the maintainance of
her independence largely to her success in decisively defeating the Italians at the
battle of Adwa in March 1896. The military victory was followed by the official

1
- Ibid., pp. 105-106; Marcus, op. cit., pp. 191-193
2
- “Introduction,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., pp. 3-4
3
-Ibid., pp. 4, 5-6
4
- Ibid., pp. 4, 7
5
- Ibid., p. 4
6
- “Introduction,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., p.7
7
Akpan, M.B., "Liberia and Ethiopia, 1880 – 1914: The Survival of Two African States in the Colonial
Era", In Boahen, A.A., (ed.), UNESCO General History of Africa. Vol. VII Africa Under Colonial
Domination, 1880 – 1935 (London, 1985), pp. 249 – 282.

17
diplomatic recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the country by the
European powers. Political independence was further consolidated by the conclusion
of separately negotiated agreements with France, Italy and Britain which delimintated
the newly extended Ethiopian borders in the southeast, south and southwest.1
In many respects the Shawan Amhara experience may be said to have been
comparable with the near contemporary local African expansive “imperialisms” of the
Khedive Ismail and the Zanzibari Sultans Sayyid Sa‘id and Bargash in consort with
the Swahili-Arab traders. Ismail endeavoured to extend his dominions in the Sudan
southward up the Nile in the direction of the Lake Victoria region, along the Red Sea
and the Somali coasts as well as into parts of Ethiopia. His ambitious plans were
frustrated by the outbreak of the Mahdiya in the Sudan and the onset of a crippling
financial crisis that errupted in Egypt.2 At nearly the same period the Zanzibari sultans
Sayyid Sa ‘id and Bargash were gradually extending their informal power and
influence into some parts of the interior regions of East Africa. They concluded
trading agreements and exchanged gifts with several local rulers in the interior to
facilitate and protect the commercial interests of the Zanzibar based Swahili-Arab
traders. The traders themselves succeeded in building up considerable political power
and influence where their settlements were established in the interior regions.
Attempts to transform those informal commercial spheres of influence into political
paramountcies were aborted by the establishment of Europian colonial rule.3 The only
difference between the expansive enterprises of Khedive Ismail and the Zanzibari
sultans and the Swahili-Arab traders on the one hand and the expansionism of the
Shawan Amhara on the other was on their eventual outcome. The Shawan Amhara did
succeed where the other failed.
Ethiopia continued to survive as an independent state throughout the colonial
era, with the exception of the brief period of Italian Fascist occupation between 1935
and 1945. The position on the Oromo and the Sidama people, and others similarly
forcefully subdued and incorporated within the extended boundaries of Ethiopia was
essentially one of conquered, colonised and oppressively governed subject people.

1
- Marcus, op. cit., pp. 172-173, 176-177 For further details see also Rubenson, Sven “Some Aspects of
the Survival of Ethiopian Independence in the Period of the Scramble for Africa,” UCAAR, VI, I
(Spring, 1961), pp. 8-24; idem., “Adawa 1896: The Resounding Protest,” in Rotberg, R.I. and Mazrui,
A. (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York, 1970), pp. 113-142
2
- “Introduction,” in Flint, J.E., op. cit., pp. 1-2; Holt, P.M.,” Egypt and the Nile Valley,” in Ibid., pp.
44, 45, 49-50
3
- Unomah, op. cit., pp. 306-310, 318

18
Practically all possible sorts of strenuous ways and means were undertaken by their
Shawan Amhara conquerors to dominate them and maximise the systematic
exploitation of their labour and the rich resources of their conquered lands. In the
meantime no parallel policies and practices were adopted towards integrating and
assimilating them into the newly enlarged and revived Greater Ethiopia.

19
 Chapter 1
Northern Ethiopia, Shawa and the Outside World 1855 – 1878

In the mid – nineteenth century, the Christian Ethiopian1 Kingdom occupied the vast
temperate northern and central regions of the highland massif of north-eastern Africa,
generally known as the Horn of Africa. The surrounding regions consisted of
lowlands, arid plains, deserts and sea coasts. The kingdom's northern and north-
western borders with the Turco-Egyptian Sudan extended form the hinterland of
Massawa, across the mountainous regions of northern Eritrea, to the course of
Takazze (Atbara) river to the South of Kassala. From there it continued southwards to
the twins towns of Gallabat/Matamma close to the province of Dembya, and then to
the Abbay (Blue Nile) river marking the western border of Gojjam in the south –
west. The southern borders were not in any acceptable sense, clearly defined as they
tended to fluctuate frequently with changes of the political power and military
potentials of the rulers of the southern provinces of Shawa and Gojjam. Nevertheless,
they may be said to have extended south-eastwards from the great southern loop of
the Abbay, along the high plateau region and the valleys of the Awash river to the
edges of the eastern escarpment.2
In Ethiopia's internal politics, political dominance and cultural pre-eminence had been
for many centuries, the preserve of the Tigreans who inhabitewd the northern parts of
the highlands above the Takazze river. Then as a result of the shift of the centre of
imperial power from Tigre to Lasta and then, since the late thirteenth century, to the
central provincesof Bagemder and Amhara the northern Amhara of those provinces
are said to have replaced the Tigreans as the dominant political and cultural

1
Ethiopia is the official name which the country adopted since becoming a member of the League of
Nations in 1923. The term is of Greek origin; literally meaning "the land of peoples with burnt faces",
i.e. dark-skinned. The Christian Ethiopians dislike being referred to as "Habash" and to their country as
"Habasha" or as "Abyssinians" and "Abyssinia". It is not uncommon, however, for the Ethiopians to
use the term Habash and Habasha in informal conversation.
Hess, Robert L., Ethiopia: The Modernization of an Autocracy (Ithaca, 1970), p. XVII; Levine, D.N.
Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (Chicago and London, 1974), pp. 1-3;
Markakis, John, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity (Oxford, 1945), pp. 13n.2, 14n.4; Bahru
Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia (London, 1991), p. 1
2
Rubenson, Sven, "Ethiopia and the Horn", in Flint, John E. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa.
Vol. 5 From 1790 to 1870 (Cambridge, 1976), p. 54, Atmore, A.E. "Ethiopia and the Horn on the Eve
of Partition in Fage, J.D. and Oliver, Roland (eds.), Ibid. vol. 6 from 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge, 1981),
p. 36

20
inheritants of the semitised Christian civilization of ancient Aksum.1 Consequently, it
was from amongst the ranks of their nobility that occupants of the imperial throne
belonged. The southern Amhara of Shawa and Gojjan, by contrast, were regarded as
politically and culturally insignificant. Yohannes IV (r.1872-1889) was the only
Tigrean who assumed imperial dignity ever since the so – called restoration of the
Solomonic dynasty in 1270, with the exception of the short and ineffective reign of
Yostos (r. 1709 – 1714).2
The kingdom was ruled by emperors resident at the imperial capital Gondar, who
styled themselves with the royal title of Negusa Nagast za Ityopya ("King of Kings of
Ethiopia"), and claimed lineage links between their imperial dynasty and King
Solomon of Israel and the Queen of Sheba (Makeda) who was said to have reigned in
Ethiopia; through an alleged liaison between the two during the queen's short sojourn
at the king's court in Jerusalem in the tenth century B.C.3
Imperial political power and authority, theoretically absolute, had diminished
continuously due to the forceful intervention by the powerful among the regional
nobility in royal politics. The decline continued during the period of Ethiopia's
relative isolation from political and cultural developments in the outside world
following expulsion of the Portuguese from the country by Emperor Fasiladis (r.1632-
1667). The only external link Ethiopia continued to maintain was with the Coptic
Orthodox Church and its Patriarch at Alexandria in Egypt, who possessed the sole
authority of appointing and consecrating the Abun ("Archbishop") of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church. Imperial political power and prestige reached their lowest ebb
during 1796-1855, a period known in Ethiopian history as the Zamana Masafent
("The Era of the Princess/Judges"). It was a dismal interlude in Ethiopia's past

1
Ullendorff, E., The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People (2nd ed., reprinted, London,
1967), p. 58. Although this contention has been questioned historically it was widely believed and
therefore, at least, it had a mythical as well as a historical significance. See Pool, D., Eritrea: Africa's
Longest War, (London, 1980), p.8.
2
Tubiana, Joseph, "Turning Points in Ethiopian History", RSE, Vol. 21 (1965), p. 164; Levine, D.N.,
Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture (Chicago and London, 3rd impression,
1967), p. 180; Hoben, Allan, "Social Stratification in Traditional Amhara Society", in Tuden, A. and
Plotincov, L. (eds), Social Stratification in Africa (New York and London, 1970, p. 190.
3
The Kerba Nagast ("Glory of the Kings"), written in the fourteenth century, contains details of the
traditional legend of the visit of Makeda the Queen of Sheba to King Solomon in Jerusalem, her
seduction and the birth of a son, Ibn Hakim ("son of the Wise") acknowledged as the legitimate son of
Solomon who, after his accession to the throne of Ethiopia took the throne-name of Menilek.
Budge, R.A. Walis (trans.), The Queen of Sheba and her Only Son Menylek (Cambridge, 1962);
Ullendorff, E., op.cit, pp. 143-144; Huntingford, G.W.B., "The Constitutional History of Ethiopia",
JAH, 111, 2 (1962), pp. 311-315; Levine, N.D., Greater Ethiopia, pp. 92-112; Greenfield, R, Ethiopia:
A New Political History (London, 1976), pp. 41-42.

21
characterized by almost incessant struggles and wars among the powerful of the
regional nobility for political pre-eminence and the highest post of Ras Bitwaddad
("Guardian of the Monarch"). In the meantime, they steadily usurped most of the
powers and prerogatives of the emperors. As a result, successive emperors were
reduced to puppets; they "merely reigned but did not rule". They were often deposed,
replaced or even murdered on occasions. A Gondari emperor practically had no army
of his own, and his annual royal income was shamefully pitiful. Nevertheless, the
emperors still preserved their shallow aura of legitimacy due to their alleged
Solomonic descent, and the royal imperial title of Negusa Nagasat remained
exclusively for them.
Conventionally, common allegiance to imperial sovereignty, general adherence to the
Christian Orthodox faith and Church and to some extent almost similar traditions and
customs of the country's inhabitants were often regarded as major cohesive and
unifying factors. However, the highly fluid and imprecise legal process of
determining imperial successions, and the availability of several eligible claimants at
one and the same time; the refractory tendencies of the provincial nobility; the
doctrinal divisions and sectarian disputes within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church
which usually assumed regional political significance; and the local disposition of the
population at large were obvious obstacles inhibiting the attainment of political unity
and cohesion. Other contributory factors include the rugged mountainous nature of the
country, and the primitive and hazardous means of transport.
In the circumstances, any attempt made towards the achievement of effective
centralized imperial power and authority was destined to have been personal and
ephemeral. What mattered most were the strong personality and unmatched high
prestige of the reigning emperor and his command of impressive and awe-inspiring
military potentials both in man-power and weaponry, rather than mere presumed
Solomanic dynastic claims and cherished unitary political conceptions. Thus,
throughout most of its history since the sixteenth century the Ethiopian state was in
fact an association of loosely connected semi-autonomous regional units rather than a
united and centralized polity. Until the mid-nineteenth century the country

22
disintegrated into a number of almost independent provincial feudatories whose most
powerful rulers held real power and influence, thereby dominating Ethiopian politics.1
The common interdependence that bound them and their subjects was provided not by
the shadowy imperial monarchy, but by the Ethiopian Orthodox church which
remained the sole repository of Ethiopian national identity.
Oromo political and military dominance was finally eliminated by Kassa Haylu. He
was originally of a humble family background, though distantly related to a local ruler
of the small district of Qwara in the western province of Dembya. He started his early
career as a Shifta (Bandidt) fighting as a leader of a group of rebels and malcontents,
against Turko – Egyptian troops in the lowlands along the Ethiopian – Sudanese
borders, and sometimes serving as a soldier of fortune offering his military services to
various regional rulers. Becoming a successful and powerful military commander,
with a large number of followers, Kassa attracted the attention of Ras Ali II and his
mother Empress Mennen. To avoid the possible threat that he may pose to their own
positions, and to win him to their side, they came to terms with him. He was promoted
to the high rank of Dajazamach, appointed governor of Qwara and grudgingly agreed
to his marriage to Ras Ali's daughter Tawabech.
Political disunity, near continuous power struggles, and devastating inter-regional
wars, with the consequent widespread strife and lawlessness had been intensified by
the intervention of the Yejju Oromo in the country's internal politics. Together with
their kindred Wallo tribesmen they had penetrated into central Ethiopia and were
established in the region by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Their leaders
gradually acquired such power and influence that they rose to high posts at the
imperial court at Gondar. Eventually, members of a powerful Yejju Oromo family,
founded by Ali Gwangul in the 1770's, began to dominate Ethiopian political life as
guardians to the puppet emperors at Gondar and governors of Bagemder with their
seat of political power at Debra Tabor. Though the Yejju Oromo were Muslims, their
leaders became converts to the Ethiopian Christian Orthodox faith for practical
political reasons. They adopted Amharie language and customs and sometimes

1
The people formerly called Galla by outsiders, including the Christian Tigreans and Amhara alike,
strongly object to the appellation considering it has negative pejorative connotation. They called
themselves by no other name but Oromo. See Rossini, C. Conti, Etiopiq e genti di Etiopia (Rome,
1937), p. 327; Becckingham, C.F. and Huntingford, G.W.B., Some Records of Ethiopia 1593 – 1646
(London, 1954), p. iii n.I; Caulk, R.A., "Ethiopia and the Horn" in Roberts, A.D. (ed.), The Cambridge
History of Africa, Vol. 7, From 1905 to 1940 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 704, n.I; Mohammed Hassen, The
Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860 (Cambridge, 1990), p. xi

23
married their daughters to members of the royal imperial family. Of most significance
was that they continued to draw their main power and military support from their
Muslims Yejju and related Wallo Oromo tribesmen. Their last representative was Ras
Ali II who, though still in a minor, nominally ruled as governor of Bagemder and as
guardian to the puppet emperor Yohannes III, while his mother Empress Mennen
Liban the wife of the emperor acted as regent.1
Oromo political and military dominance was finally eliminated by Kassa Haylu. He
was originally of a humble family background, though distantly related to a local ruler
of the small district of Qwara in the western province of Dembya. He started his early
career as a Shifta (Bandit) fighting, as a leader of a group of rebels, and malcontents,
against sometimes serving as a soldier of fortune offering his military services to
various regional rulers. Becoming a successfully and popular military commander,
with a large number of followers, Kassa attracted the attention of Ras Adill and his
mother Empress Mennen. To avoid the possible threat that he may pose to their own
positions, and to win him to their side, they came to terms with him. He was promoted
to the high rank of Dajazmach, appointed governor of Qwara and grudgingly agreed
to his marriage to Ras Ali's daughter Tawabech.
The concord was short-lived. Dajjach Kassa was not satisfied with the governorship
of such a minor district as Qwara. He soon rebelled against Ras Ali and Mennen,
invaded Dembya and even occupied Gondar for a time and collected tribute. The
armies sent against him were defeated. In June 1846 an army led by Mennen herself,
marched to subdue him, but was heavily defeated. Both Mennen and her husband, the
reigning puppet Emperor Yohannes III, were captured. In exchange for their release,
Kassa was given Dembya to govern. Turning his attention once more to the western
frontier, he occupied Matamma, pushed into the Sudan and tried to capture an
advance fortified Turco-Egyptian post at Dabarki. But in March 1848 his army was
defeated; his soldiers being mowned down by the artillery fire of the disciplined
enemy troops. Those who survived were forced to flee to the highlands. This major
set-back to his otherwise successful military career left its mark on his outlook in

1
For a discussion of events during the Zamana Masafent, see Rubenson, S., King of Kings: Tewodros
of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 1966), pp. 17-25; Abir, M, The Era of the Princes. The Challenges of Islam
and the Re-Unification of Christian Empire 1769-1855 (London 1968), pp. 57-71; Bahru Zewde,
op.cit., pp. 11-15. See also Darkwah, R. H. Kofi" A New Approach to Ethiopia in the Eighteenth and
Ninteenth Centuries", Research Review, 1,3 (1967), pp. 44-53 and "Some Development in Ethiopia
During the Era of the Mesafint", Ibid., 6, 2 (1970), pp. 1-14; Crummey, Donald, "Society and Ethnicity
in the Politics of Christian Ethiopia During the Zamana Masefent", IJAHS, 8 (1975), pp. 266-278.

24
planning military reforms and modernization, which included the preoccupation with
firearms, drill and discipline and an obsession with artillery and fortification. He
subsequently succeeded in rebuilding his army, and resumed serving Ras Ali loyally
until 1852 when relations between the two worsned and he rebelled again.
Within two years and in four major military victories Dajjach Kassa Haylu effectively
removed the main war-lords and principal leaders who had dominated Ethiopia's
political life. In the battle of Gur Amba, on 27 November 1852 Dajjach Goshu Birru
of Gojjam was defeated and killed. Birru Alegaz, the governor of Lasta, and other
important vassals of Ras Ali were decisively defeated at the battle of Gorgora on 12
April 1853. Ras Ali's main forces were routed at the battle of Ayshal on 29 June 1853.
Ras Ali himself eluded capture, fled and took refuge among his Yejju Oromo
kinsmen. He made no effort to raise any army and fight back. Finally, Dajjach Wube
of Semien, the last of the major leaders of the period, was defeated and captured at the
battle of Dersege on 8 February 1855. Captured with him was the Coptic Archbishop
whom Wube had brought from Egypt for his own anticipated coronation as emperor.
The victorious Dajach Kassa Haylu was not contented by merely replacing Ras Ali II
as guardian to the reigning Gondari emperor. He deemed it necessary to remove the
puppet occupant of the imperial throne, and crown his own person as the new imperial
monarch. Thus the day after the battle of Dersege, on 9 February 1855, Dajjach Kassa
Haylu was anointed and crowned Negusa Nagasat by Abuna Salama at the church of
Mariam Derese with the throne-name of Tewodros I. Later in his reign, he added to
his royal title "The Elect of God", regarding his rise to imperial power as the outcome
of divine will.1
The policies and aspirations, which the new and ambitious emperor strove to realize,
were lofty indeed. They included the restoration of the power and prestige of the
imperial monarchy, the establishment of the political unity and strength of the
Ethiopian state as well as the modernization of its administrative, military and
religious institutions. From the very start of his reign, Emperor Tewodros took the
first step towards the implementation of the concepts he envisaged for the political
unification of the country. Soon after his coronation he turned his attention
southwards with the intention of subduing the Wallo Oromo and Shawa. The Muslim

1
For the background of Kassa Haylu, his early career and rise to power see Rubenson, S., op.cit., pp.
11,15-17, 25-34,35-45; idem., "Ethiopia and the Horn", pp. 65-67; Abir, M., op.cit., pp. 126-131, 138-
142; Bahru Zewdw, op.cit., pp. 27-30

25
Wallo Oromo inhabiting parts of the plateau immediately to the north of Shawa,
though dependent on the authority of the guardians of the emperors of Gondar, were
virtually independent. The campaign against them, began in June 1855, was a short
one. They were successfully defeated, a number of their chieftains were taken
prisoners, and their naturally fortified mountainous strong-hold of Magalala was
captured. But, as was the case in Ethiopian inter-regional wars of the time, their
country was not pacified. A series of revolts subsequently broke out. Later on,
Tewodros made three more attempts t o subdue and pacify the Wallo country, in
1857, 1862 and 1864, but without success.1
From Wallo Tewodros's imperial army marched into Shawa, the southern province
which had gradually developed into an independent kingdom. It remained, throughout
the, Zamana Masafent an isolated and autonomous political entity unaffected by the
power struggles and inter-regional wars that then engulfed the rest of Ethiopia. Its
ruling dynasty, founded by Nagasi Kristos (d. 1705), and claiming connections with
the Solomonic imperial house was well established. Successive Shawan rulers- Asfa
Wassen (d. 1808), Wassen Sagged( r. 1808-1812) and Sahle Sellassie( r. 1813-1847)
had gradually conquered some of the Oromo tribes who were established in Shawa,
and asserted the independence of their kingdom from direct imperial authority. The
last time that Shawa paid tribute to the Gondari monarchs, was during the reign of
Asfa Wassen. His successor Wassen Saggad styled himself Ras, while Sahle Sellassie
independently assumed the title of Negus ("King"), thereby affirming his claims to
kingship and his de facto sovereign status. Under his rule internal royal authority was
consolidated, several fomer Shawan territories occupied by Oromo tribes up to the
banks of the Chiachia river in the South were re-conquered, and foreign contacts
were initiated resulting in the signing of treaties of "friendship and commerce" with
Britain on 16 November 1841 and with France on 7 June1843. In general, Shawa
grew into a peaceful and prosperous kingdom to the mutual benefit of rulers and
subjects alike. Both developed a common interest in maintaining the independence of
their kingdom. On his death in 1847, Sahle Sellassie was succeeded by his younger
son Haile Malakot. By contrast he was a weak and inexperienced ruler. Nevertheless,
it were the foundations laid by Sahle Sellassie that enabled the dynasty to survive and

1
RubensonS, ., op.cit., p.52; Abir, M, op.cit., pp. 179-180;D arkwah,R .H. Kafi, Shewa,M enilek and
the Ethiopian Empire 1813-1889 (London, 1975), pp. 37-38; Marcus, H.G., The Life and Times of
Menelik 11; Ethiopia 1844-1913 (Oxford, 1975), pp. 17-18.

26
retain the unity and independence of the kingdom and the loyalty and respect of its
subjects.1
It is said that Dajach Kassa Haylu before he was crowned emperor had sent to the
king of Shawa summoning him to come to Gondar and render his homage.
Forewarned of a possible invasion of their kingdom, the Shawans began making
hurried defensive preparations. After crossing the Wallo-Shawan border during the
rainy season of 1855, the imperial army arrived in the northern Shawan province of
Geshe on 17 October. It was there that the first battle of the campaign was fought
against the combined forces of the governors of the three northern Shawan provinces
of Geshe, Geddam and Efrata. The fighting, which lasted the whole day, was fierce,
but at the end Tewodors's army was victorious. While the three governors, realizing
the futility of continuing to resist the overwhelmingly superior imperial forces, readily
submitted Haile Malakot and the rest of this army were determined to resist.They
withdrew to Debra Berhan, hoping that the rains might work to their advantage. Haile
Malakot's army destroyed the grain provisions and burned the city before evacuating
it, as the imperial army continued to push into its direction. Haile Malakot died in
early December1855, before the decisive battle was fought. At Baraket, on 19
December, the imperial army's superior armament and discipline won the day. After a
short period of sporadic skirmishes, the Shawans capitulated.
After crushing an insurrection by the Oromo arround Angolala, Tewodros entered the
capital Ankober in late February 1856. It was there that he received the formal
submission of the kingdom's generals, notables and clergy. Towards the end of the
same month, he settled the issue of the administration of Shawa. He appointed Haile
Mikael, another son of Sahle Sellassie as governor on his behalf with the title of
Maredazmach; traditionally given by the emperors to the rulers of the kingdom before
the reigns of Wassen Saggad and Sahle Sellassie. Tewodros also appointed Ato
Andargatchw as Abegaz ('Frontier Governor"). Finally, the emperor left together with
his army on their way to Gondar passing through Gojjam. He took with him a number
of Shawan notables, including Prince Sahle Mariam, Haile Malakots young son and
heir to the throne, his mother Ejjigiehu, his uncle Ato Darge (the fourth son of Sahle

1
Abir, M., op.cit., Ch. VIII, especially pp. 152-155, 159-132, 176-179; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., Ch. 1,
especially pp. 13-34; idem., "Emperor Theodore II and the Kingdom ofShoa 1855-1865", JAH, X,I
(1969), pp. 105-108.

27
Sellassie), his tutor Ato Nadaw and Walda Tsadek, who were to remain as hostages
in exile at his court.1
Indeed Tewodros had defeated the Shawan armies, and subdued the kingdom, though
not without stiff and courageous resistance. But this did not, in any way, mean the end
of Shawa's independence. During the next nine years a series of rebellions continued
to break out, and the emperor had to campaign in Shawa more than once again in
attempts to crush them and reestablished the authority of his appointed governors.
While Emperor Tewodros was engaged on his first campaign in Wallo and Shawa
Tadla Gwalu, a member of the local ruling family in Gojjam, raised the standard of
rebellion there. In March 1856, the emperor and his army crossed the Abbay on their
way from Shawa into Gojjam. Little resistance was encountered. Tedla Gwalu
managed to escape and withdrew with most of his troops to the safety of an
inaccessible amba in southern G ojjam; a tactic often repeated by the Gojjame ruler.
The emperor withdrew, and was back in Gondar by July.2
In February 1857 Tewodros campaigned again in Wallo where his appointed governor
of Magdala Dajjach Liben and another Wallo chief named Amade Beshir had
rebelled. Magdala was re-captured, and a new governor was appointed there. The
rebels were defeated, but their leaders were not captured. The emperor spent most of
the year in Wallo trying to pacify the country.3 In November 1857, Tewodros
campaigned in Gojjam for the second time, where his appointed governor had failed
to pacify the province. He defeated the rebel forces, caught and executed a number of
the leaders, but Tadla Gwalu once more fled.4
The campaign in Gojjam was followed by another one to Lasta in March 1858. The
hereditary ruler of the province Wagshum Gabre Medhin had rebelled and joined
forces with the Tigren rebel brothers Neguse and Tesemma. He was defeated,
captured and hanged together with eight other rebel leaders in May 1858.5
Insurrections in Wallo flared again and led the emperor and his army there. The rebel
cavalry forces of Amade Beshir were defeated on several occasions, but the leader
himself always managed to escape. Soldiers of the imperial army were allowed, this

1
Rubenson, S., op.cit., pp. 52-53, Abir, M., op.cit., pp. 179-182, Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 38-42,
idem, "Emperor Theodore ", pp. 108-111; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 18-19.
2
Rubenson, S., op.cit, pp 53, 67, 68
3
Ibid., p. 75.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., pp. 75-76

28
time, to pillage the countryside, capture and slaughter the farmer's cattle and plunder
their grain-stores, but orders were given to spare the lives of war captives. In view of
the size of the armies of both sides, and the large scaJe of devastation famine
conditions prevailed in the region. The campaign was interrupted briefly. ln
September 1858 the emperor departed with his army for Gondar to repel a rebel force
from the capital. Then the fighting in Wallo was resumed and continued for almost a
full year, until October 1859. Frustrated by the continuous rebellions of the Wallo and
their stubborn resistance Tewodros turned to brutal reprisals. Hundreds of captives
were mutilated; in one occasion 787 men had both hands cut off. The rebel leaders
Amade Beshir continued to elude capture, but the population suffered too much.1
In Shawa Haile Mikael continued to govern the country loyally for three years, and
paid his annual tribute regularly. Then in October 1859, when the emperor was still
campaigning in Wallo, Prince Sayfu the youngest son of Sable Sellassie led a series of
revolts. The emperor's appointed governors were defeated more than once. Haile
Mikael, who was suspected of being unable or unwilling to deal effectively with his
rebellious young brother, was recalled to Magdala, removed from his post and
detained. Andargatchw, most probably, met the same fate. The two were replaced by
Haile Mikeal's brother-in-law AtoAboye as governor, and a man previously employed
in the court of Sahle Sellassie named Bezzabbeh as Abegaz; both of them having
served in the previous administration. Their efforts to quell the rebellion failed. When
the rebels captured Ankober in October 1859 Emperor Tewodros, who had been sent
to for help, hurriedly marched with his army to Shawa. The rebels were defeated.
Ankober was re-captured, but Sayfu retreated eastwards into Oromo Territories.
Leaving behind his governors in Shawa to finish the task of crushing the revolt,
Tewodros turned to the north on his way to Magdala. The revolt, however, continued
and ended only when Sayfu had been killed in June 1860 while trying to restore order
in his province of Marabiete which had been devastated by the emperor's army on its
withdrawal from Shawa.2
The short campaign in Shawa was followed by another swift one against the rebel
Tigrean brothers Neguse and Tesemma, but they withdrew with their army when the

1
Ibid., pp. 76-77
2
GuebreSllassie Chronique; I, pp: 96-97; 96 ns. 4,5 ;.Rubenson S, ., op,cit:, pp. 77-78, Darkwah, Kofi,
op.cit., pp. 46-48, Idem, "Emperor Theodore… ,pp. III - 113, Marcus, H.G., Op.cit., p. 21.

29
emperor reached Adawa.1 Tewodros postponed continuing the campaign in Tigre and
returned to Debra Tabor on his way on an expedition to Wallo where rebellion sprang
up again during the rainy season of 1860.2 Then he was off again to fight the rebel
Tigrean brothers. They were defeated, and this time the rebel brothers together with
some other rebel leaders were executed near Aksum in January 1861. 3
The next two years brought some respite for Tewodros. But soon afterwards
rebellions started once again in various provinces. In Gojjam TadlaGwalu, who
continued to defy the emperor's authority for more than seven years, had consolidated
his position in the province and even increased the area under his control. The Wallo
Oromo also rose in rebellion. Tewodros decided to deal with Gojjam first, determined
to rid himself of the defiant rebel once and for all. In early 1863 Tewodros led a large
army into Gojjam. The country was devastated and the rebels were severely defeated
at the battle of Injabara, but once again Tadla Gwalu fled. Although the insurgent had
suffered heavy losses he still remained a powerful adversary to reckon with.4
After having served faithfully as one of the two imperial governors of Shawa
Bezzabbeh turned against his sovereign and raised the banner of insurrection in early
1864. He arrested and detained Ato Aboye and declared himself Negus. Although
there were other rebellions in Walqayt and Lasta5 Tewodros found enough time to
march southwards towards the end of the year to deal with the revolts in Wallo and
Shawa. The campaign was a failure as it did not end up in victory at the battlefield.
Wallo remained unsubdued and Bezzabbeh continued in control of Shawa.6 A Last
and equally unsuccessful attempt by the emperor to regain Shawa was made at the
beginning of 1865.7
Tewodros's ambitious policies to assert the political unification and modernization of
Ethiopia ended in failure. The high-handed and forcible methods he employed to
attain his goals degenerated into vicious and often indiscriminate acts of violence and
repression. Mounting frustration and depression drove him to increasing acts of
mutilation of limbs, executions and the looting and burning of homes, crops and grain

1
Rubenson, S., op.cit, pp. 78-79.
2
Ibid., p. 79.
3
Ibid., p.79
4
Ibid., p. 80.
5
Ibid., pp. 80-81.
6
Guebre Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 97; Rubenson, S., op.cit., p. 80; DarKwah, Kafi, op.cit, p. 50;
idem., "Emperor Theodore…," p. 114; Marcus, H,G., op.cit., 23.
7
Rubenson, S., op.cit., p.81.

30
stores.1Most of the powerful regional nobility, the highly influential Ethiopian
Orthodox Church and its clergy were alienated. Many generals, thousands from
amongst the lower ranks and even ordinary soldiers of this once invincible army
began deserting him. Ordinary peasants started attacking and harassing what remained
of his army.2
By 1867 Ethiopia was once more, reduced to the verge of dissolution. Tewodros and
what remained of his army were confined to the fortress of Magdala and its immediate
surroundings. Rebels and rival contenders for power commanding for more powerful
armies than his own controlled the rest of the country. Goboze Gebre Medhin, the
governor of Wag and Lasta, extended his control over parts of Amhara and Tigre as
well. Dajach Kassa, Mercha, a former ally first of the emperor and then of Gobaze
Gebre Medhin was on his way of making himself an autonomous ruler of Tigre and
an aspirant to imperial honours. Tiso Gobaze, the governor of Walqayt, controlled all
the northwestern territories between the Takazze river and Lake Tana, including the
imperial capital Gondar. In Gojjam Tadla Gwalu, a member of the local ruling family
who repeatedly defied the emperor's authority remained an unreconciled adversary.
The young Sahla Mayam had escaped from Magadala and was restored on the throne
of Shawa under the name of Menilek II. In Wallo rebellion centered around two rival
queens, Worqit and Mastawat acting as custodians for opposed young princes.3
Further still Tewodoros was to face the threat of an invading British force sent to
liberate the Europeans, including some British envoys, whom he imprisoned and to
punish him in vindication of British honour.4 Pending the outcome of the imminent
encounter between the emperor and the invading British forces all the rebel magnates
refrained from getting themselves involved in military confrontation with the
emperor. Instead they concentrated their efforts in consolidating their positions in
their respective regional basis.
By the beginning of August 1865 the young Sahle Maryam had himself proclaimed
king of Shawa under the throne – name of Menilek II. From the very start of his

1
For details and sources cited refer to Crummey, Donald, "The Violence of Tewodros," JES, IX,2
(1974), pp. 107-
22
Rubenson, S., op.cit., pp. 69-72, 81.
3
Rubenson, S., op.cit., pp. 80 – 81; idem., "Ethiopia and the Horn", pp. 75 – 76; Marcus, H.G., op.cit.,
pp. 21 – 25; Zewde Gebre – Sellasi, op.cit., pp. 40 - 42
4
Rubenson, S., op.cit., pp. 65, 85 – 89; idem. "Ethiopia and the Horn", pp. 78 – 80; idem., The
Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London, 1976), pp. 239 – 269; Bahru Zewda, op.cit., pp. 38 – 40.

31
region he nourished dynastic ambitions and made claims to the imperial throne.1 He
actually adopted the imperial little of Aste ("Emperor") and had the royal imperial
emblem Negusa Nagast Za Ityopya ("King of Kings of Ethiopia") engraved on his
seal. Equally significant was his choice of the name Menilek, as it was identical to the
name of the first Ethiopian emperor, the legendary alleged son of Solomon and the
Queen of Sheba2. Nevertheless, he was not the only aspirant to imperial power to
make such claims. Both Gobaze Gebre Medhin, Kassa Mercha and even Kassa Haylu
before them actually made explicit claims of their own to imperial legitimacy.3
Immediately after his accession was secured and the loyalty of his subjects
assured Menilek dealt with Bezzabbeh, the former rebel governor of Shawa who had
attempted to thwart his return and restoration on the Shawan throne. After having
been pardoned and reconciled with his suzerain he was arrested on charges of
fomenting rebellion convicted and executed.4 With his elimination Menilek's
restoration may be said to have been complete. Henceforth, he had almost no rival or
potential opponent. His province was relatively prosperous and enjoyed larger periods
of peace than the other Ethiopian regions providing him with a strong local base for
future political action.
From the very beginning of his reign Menilek must have been aware that the
maintenance of a large and powerful army was essential not only for securing and
consolidating his newly gained autonomous position in Shawa, but also for the future
realization of his imperial ambitions. Shawa could provide large numbers of cavalry
but few combatants armed with modern firearms and skilled in handling them largely
due to the restrictions imposed on arms imports at the ports of entry into the country.5
It was with the intention of overcoming this drawback that Menilek initiated foreign
contacts. The dominant objective for his diplomatic correspondence with the
European powers and individual traders was his need to acquire, through purchase or
1
Guebra Sellasie, Chronique, 1, pp. 51-52, 53, 56; Gebra Heywat Baykodon, "Genealogie de la
dynaste Solomonienne du Choa", SE, 3 (June 1907)pp. 205 – 250; Levine, D.N., "On the History and
Culture of Manz," JSS, 9, 1 (Spring, 1964), pp. 208-209; idem., Wax and Gold: Tradition and
Innovation in Etiopian Culture (London/Chicago, 1965), pp. 51 – 52. see also Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp.
7 – 8; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 6-7.
2
- Pankhurst, R., "Letter Writing And the Use of Royal and Imperial Seals in Ethiopia Prior to the
Twentieth Century; JES, II, I (January, 1973), pp. 190, 192- 194.
3
- Crummey, Donald, Imperial Legitimacy And The Creation of Neo – Solomonic Ldealogie in 19th
Century Ethiopia," CEA, 109. XXVIII-1 (1988), p. 13-42.
4
- Guebre Sellasse, Chronique, I, pp. 105-106; Cecchi, A., Da Zeila all frontiedel Caffa, Vol.1 (Roc,
1886) pp. 263 – 264; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 27; Zewde- Gebre – Sellasie, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
5
- Pankhurst, R., "Fire-arms in Ethiopian History, 1800-1935" Eo, 2,2 (1962) pp. 138, 142-146;
Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 44.

32
otherwise, substantial quantities of firearms and ammunition. He is said to have made
his first foreign approach towards the end of 1865 when he wrote to the French
Consul at Aden asking to be supplied with cannon and muskets. In 1867, when British
military action against Emperor Tewodros became certain, he sent a messenger with
gifts and letters to Queen Victoria and to the British Resident at Aden. He announced
his accession to the throne, requested the renewal of the amicable relations Britain
previously had with his grandfather Sahle Sellassie and asked for skilled craftsmen to
be sent to him. Except for a courteous reply acknowledging his accession and the
dispatch of a few presents nothing positive came out of the initiative.1
In 1867 Menilek responded favourably to a request made by the Roman
Catholic Cardinal Massaia for permission to travel through Shawa on his way to
rejoin the mission previously established among the Oromo of the south – west. The
king's real intention was to use Massaia's services as an adviser and an intermediary
for contacts with Europe. After his arrival in Shawa in early 1868 he was kept close to
the court until he was expelled together with the other Roman Catholic missionaries
on orders of Emperor Yohannes in June 18792.
Menilek did not, despite Massaia's advice, become involved with the British
force on its way from the coast to Magdala. At the head of some 3,000 men he made a
short display of force at some distance from the fortress between 30 November and 2
December 1867 before withdrawing, Shortly afterwards Wagshum Gobaze Gebre
Medhin made a brief appearance with a small army in the surroundings of the
fortress, but he too moved away. News that Tewodros had left Debra Tabor on his
way to Magdala forced both of them to turn back. 3 They even turned down Napier's
offer to come and take possession of Magdala after the fortress had been stormed and
burned and Tewodros had taken his own life. A Shawan envoy sent to Napier at the
last moment learned, while on his way, that the British had already left for the coast
after having handed over the ruined fortress to Mastawat, the Wallo rival of Menilek's
ally Worqit.4 Later Menilek wrote to Napier declaring that he would have liked to
assist the British in their campaign against Tewodros, but unfortunately he was too far

1
- Marcus, H. G., op. cit., p. 28; Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit.,p. cit., p. 58; Caulk, R.A.; Minilik And The
Diplomacy of Commerce: Prelude to An Imperial Foreign Policy," JES, XVII, 2 (November, 1984), P.
64.
2
- Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., 59-60; Caulk, R.A., op.cit., p. 64.
3
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 28-29.
4
- Ibid., p. 32; Caulk, R.A., po.cit., 65.

33
away to offer his help.1 In1869 he wrote to Queen Victoria asking to be supplied with
guns, and to the British Resident at Aden for permission to establish a Shawan trading
agency there. The request for arms was ignored, but approval was granted for Menilek
to have the Frenchman Césair Tian, then a resident at Aden, as his agent.2
Almost simultaneously with initiating foreign contacts Menilek embarked on
the conquest and pacification of Wallo, the strategically vulnerable Oromo region
commanding the principal entry into Shawa from the north. It was evident that once
the power struggle in northern and central Ethiopia was resolved the victor would
almost certainly move to invade Shawa and subdue its ruler. It was to guard against
such a possibility that the conquest of Wallo was started in October 1867. It took
almost nine years to complete. The towns of Warra Ilu and Enawari were built to
serve as military garrisons and administrative centres. Menilek's accomplishment of
the conquest at a time when Shawa's military resources were only slightly better off
than those of the Wallo Oromo was largely due to the internal disunity among the
Wallo and the lack of interference by outsiders in the process. Nevertheless, his hold
over the region, exercised through the local representatives Abba Wattu and
Muhammad Ali, was tenuous at best.3 Menilek also managed to enlist the support of
Dajach Wale whom he appointed as governor of his native Yejju region.4
In the meantime the British campaign against Tewodros was successfully
completed. After a brief skirmish at Aroge on 10 April 1868 the British shelled and
stormed Magdala. Tewodros committed suicide on Easter Monday 13 April 1868
rather than allow himself be taken prisoner. Soon after the release of the European
prisoners the fortress was looted, its guns and mortars were destroyed before it was
set on fire. True to their initial declarations the British forces commenced their
withdrawal to the coast on 17-18 April 1868 without attempting to set up or promote a
successor to the late emperor.5
Of the principal contestants for imperial succession Wagshum Gobaze Gebre
Medhin was in the most favourable position. After having consolidated his authority
over Amhara he defeated and killed Tiso Gobaze of Walqayt who had control over
Bagemder as well. He subsequently had himself crowned as Emperor Takla Giyorgis
1
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., P. 32.
2
- Darkwah., Kofi, op. ict., p. 63.
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie; Chronique, 1, pp. 119-120, 121-123; Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, p. 267-269;
Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., pp. 87-90; Marcus, It G. op. cit., pp. 28-29, 35.
4
- Ibid., p. 35.
5
- Ibid., p. 31.

34
II in mid – August 1868.1 Both Dajach Kassa Mercha and Menilek II withheld their
recognition of his accession and continued to challenge him. Towards the end of the
year the new emperor crossed with his army into Talanta, bordering on Wallo,
intending to subdue the Yejju rebel Faris Ali. Menilek was then in Wallo campaigning
against Mastawat and her son Abba Wattu. Only the course of the river Bashilo
separated their respective camps. When Menilek was asked by Takla Giyorgis to
submit he readily complied. He sent his leading general Dajach Gobana at the head of
a delegation with tribute to the imperial camp. An agreement seems to have been
reached between the two. The Bashillo river was to be the boundary between their
respective domains, and Menilek was to acknowledge Takla Giyorgis as emperor and
pay him annual tribute.2 In Gojjam the emperor campaigned first against Birru Goshu
whom he defeated and hanged.3 Afterwards he fought his successor Tadla Gwalu
who, on the approach of the emperor's army, fled and took refuge with his Oromo
relatives beyond the Abbay. The emperor appointed Adal Tesemma, another member
of the local Gojjami ruling family, as his governor of the province. After the departure
of the imperial army the rebel Tadla Gwalu reappeared on the scene once again. He
was defeated and captured by Adal Tesemma who delivered him to the emperor at
Debra Tabor. Adal Tesemma was rewarded by being promoted to the highest rank of
Ras and was given the emperor's paternal sister, Leqetch, in marriage.4
The challenge of Dajjach Kassa Mercha of Tigre remained unresolved. While
Takla Giyorgis was busily engaged elsewhere Kassa Mercha continued building up
his power and influence in his province. He was generously rewarded by the British
force for the positive support and cooperation he afforded while it was on its way
from the coast to Magdala and back. Among the gifts made to him were 6 mortars
with 200 rounds of munition per piece, 6 howitzers with 50 rounds of munition for
each, about 600 rifles and muskets with assorted amounts of gun powder, percussion
caps and packing materials.5 He also managed to enlist the services of J.C. Kirkham, a
Scottish adventurer who had joined the British force with unofficial status, to train his

1
- Ibid., p. 33.
2
- Ibid, 34; Zewde Gèbrè-Sellassie, op.cit., 31-32; Rubenson, S., "Ethiopia and the Hom", p. 84.
3
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., P. 33.
4
- Zewde Gebre – Sellassie, op. cit., p. 32.
5
- Marcus, H.g., op.cit., p. 32.

35
troops.1 Kassa also succeeded in obtaining a new abun, Atnathewos, from Egypt to
replace the late Abuna Salama who died in imprisonment at Magdala.2
The challenge of Dajjach Kassa Mercha was finally resolved in July 1871 at
the battle of Assam where Kassa's small force of 12,000 troops some of whom
equipped with arms newly acquired from the British force won a decisive victory over
Takla Giyorgis's larger army of some 60.000 combatants most of whom were cavalry.
The emperor himself was wounded, unhorsed and captured. Most of his generals,
24,000 of his soldiers, his mother, wife and brother Birru were taken prisoners. The
former emperor was eventually blinded and killed or died, while most of his captured
generals and soldiers were incorporated into the ranks of the victors' army.3 Six
months later, on 21 January 1872, Kassa Mercha was solemnly anointed and crowned
at Aksum by the newly consecrated Abuna Atnathewas as "king of kings Yohannes
IV, King of Sion of Ethiopia."4
It was at the beginning of his reign while he was engaged in fighting the
Azebu (Raya) Oromo, who had recently raided southeaster Tigrean territories, that
Emperor Yohannes received news of Turco-Egyptian occupation of the northern
Ethiopian region of Bogos. He immediately retuned to Adwa, but did not launch a
counter offensive. Instead he dispatched some 15,000 of his troops to the northern
border districts to guard against further enemy encroachments while he proceeded to
attempt resolving the ensuing conflict diplomatically. He sent John Kirkham in a
mission with letters addressed to the Khedive of Egypt, Queen Victoria, The President
of France and the emperors of Austria, Germany and Russia complaining about the
occupation of Bogos and soliciting help in resolving the issue.5 Even though the fate
of Bogos was still undecided the emperor marched with his army into the central
provinces to subdue their governors. Ras Wolde Sellassie (Worennya) of Amhara and
Semien was forced to capitulate and submit without a shot being fired. Next, in
January 1873, the Yejju ruler Ali Birru was defeated and killed, and in February the
emperor obtained the submission and promises of allegiance from Takla Giyorgis's
former vassal governors at Gondar.6

1
- Ibid., P. 33.
2
- Ibid., P. 34.
3
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 34-35; Zewde Gebre – Sellassie, op.cit., pp. 32-33.
4
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 35; Zewde Gebre- Sellassie, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
5
- Marcus, H.G. op. cit., p. 37; Zewde Gebre –Sellassie, op. cit., pp. 48-49; Rubenson, S., The Survival
pp. 297-298.
6
- Zewde Gebre – Sellassie, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

36
 Yohannes then turned southwards to deal with Ras Adal Tesemma of Gojjam.
In early December 1873 the imperial army crossed the Abbay into Gojjam. Little
resistance was encountered as the Gojjami ruler continued to retreat southwards with
his followers. Hardships caused by the long march from Debra Tabor, lack of
provisions, casualties resulting from an outbreak of an epidemic and the approaching
onset of the rainy season finally compelled the emperor to withdraw after having
appointed Desta Tadla Gwalu as his own governor over the province. But soon
afterwards Ras Adal defeated and killed the emperor's nominee in October 1874.
Then he made his submission to Yohannes who confirmed him in his position as the
vassal governor of Gojjam and Damot.1
After spending Christmas at Debra Tabor, Yohannes left for Yejju in early
January 1875. While he was campaigning there Abba Wattu of Wallo, who had
rebelled against the king of Shawa, came and submitted to him. Menilek who was
then in Wallo with his army, hurriedly sent a deputation with tribute and assurances of
allegiance to the emperor.2 News received that the Turco-Egyptians were advancing
inland from Massawa forced the emperor to withdraw. Afterwards Menilek managed
to regain control of Magelala, captured and imprisoned Abba Wattu and replaced him
by Muhammed Ali as governor over Wallo.3
In the meantime the accession of Yohannes IV was an occasion for Menilek to
renew his earlier initiatives for openning up foreign contacts with the aim of securing
access to ports on the coast and the acquisition of arms and munition,. The mission of
Abba Mikael, sent to Europe in June 1872, was intended to arouse European interests
in the commercial potentialities of Shawa. The envoy proceeded to Italy with letters
from his sovereign addressed to the Pope, King Victor Emmanuel II and the Italian
Geographical society, while the other correspondence intended for Queen Victoria,
the President of France and the German Kaiser were delivered to their respective
consuls at Aden. In Italy Menilek's envoy was received in audience by the king and
addressed leading members of the Italian Geographical Society. Considering
subsequent Italian involvement with Shawa this particular initiative does not seem to
have been such a failure as it seemed at the time.4

1
- Ibid., p. 45.
2
- Ibid.
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 121, 123; Marcus, H.g., po. cit., p. 40.
4
- Antinori, O., “Il messaggio all’ Italia del Re dello Scioa,” Cosmos, 1 (1873), P. 52; Marcus, H.G.,
op. cit., pp. 42-43; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 60, 65-66; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 66.

37
 Having obtained no positive response from the European powers Menilek
turned to Egypt. His first serious contact with the Khedive was made in February
1874. The reply for this was mistakenly handed to the emperor, and the contents were
so vague that Yohannes failed to realise that it was not intended for him. Again in
March and May 1875 Menilek sent two missions to Egypt headed respectively by
Aleqa Birru Wolde Giyorgis and the Armenian Boghos effendi. All that Menilek
offered was his friendship in return for the free transit of goods, including arms,
through Zeila, and sending him artisans and a Coptic prelate.1 Contrary to what has
sometimes been suggested,2 no conspiracy hostile to Yohannes was entered into
between Menilek and the Egyptians as a result of those in initiatives.3
The only planned, though eventually aborted; offer made to Menilek at that
stage to join with the Egyptians in a hostile military action against the emperor was
made in late 1875. Werner Munzinger was ordered to advance inland from Tajura and
occupy the small Afar sultanate of Aussa, and to deliver a gift of 500 rifles and
munitions to Menilek and promise further supplies if the latter consents to move with
his army northwards simultaneously with an Egyptian attack on the emperor from the
north. In fact neither the proposal for coordinated action against Yohannes, nor the
gift of amsever reached Shawa. Munzinger's small force of 400 men was ambushed
and almost wiped out by the Afar on the morning of 14 November 1876. Munzinger
and Aleqa Birrce were among those who were killed.4 Another gift of 500 rifles
intended for Menilek was never dispatched from Zeila.
In the meantime an Egyptian force of 1,200 men commanded by Muhammad
Rauf Pasha departed from Zeila and occupied Harar on II October 1875.5 Another
much larger and well - equipped Egyptian force of 2,500 men advancing from
Massawa under the command of colonel. Soren Aldolph Arendrup Pasha and Arakil
Bey Nubar was attacked and defeated by Yohannes at Gundet during the night of
16/17 November 1875. Several hundred modern Remington rifles, six artillery pieces,
large quantities of ammunition, considerable amounts of provisions and cash were

1
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 38; Zewde Gebre – Sellassie, op.cit., p. 55-56, 57.
2
- Marcus, H.g., "Menilek", in Bennet, N.R., ed., Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political
Biographies (Boston, 1968), 13-14; idem., op. cit., pp. 38-39; Zewde Gebre – Sellassie, op. cit., p.57;
Rubenson, S., The Survival, pp. 368-369.
3
- Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., p. 76; Rubenson, S., The Survival, pp. 369-371.
4
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 40; Zewde Gebre-Sellassie, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Rubenson, S., The survival,
p. 318.
5
- Ibid., p. 317

38
captured.1 It was only after this military setback and before orders were given for
another expedition to move against the emperor that the Khedive Ismail sent a letter to
Menilek informing him that a large army was being ordered to inflict due punishment
on Yohannes, declaring that Egypt had no intention on occupying Ethiopia, and
proposed that in case Menilek found himself with his army at Adwa the Egyptians
would be happy to conclude peace with him.2 Menilek received this letter in January
1876. Uncertain of Egyptian success and aware of the grave consequences of allying
himself with a foreign Muslim power against the emperor and his own countrymen he
chose a cautious action. He sent envoys and a token supportive force of some hundred
cavalry to the emperor while he himself, together with the greater part of his army,
awaited the outcome of events in Wallo.3 The larger and better equipped Egyptian
army under the command of Muhammad Ratib Pasha and General Loring, sent to
avenge the defeat at Gundet, was overwhelmed on 7-9 March 1876 by Yohannes at
Gura. This time the war booty is said to have consisted of some 12,000 - 13,000
Remington rifles, 16 cannon, large amounts of ammunition and supplies.4
The military victories of 1875-1876 substantially reinforced Yohannes's
military strength, but did very little to solve his despute with the Egyptians or to
silence internal dissidence. Hopes of soliciting diplomatic support from the Christian
European powers against Muslim Egypt were in vain. It was only in 1884 that British
pressure obliged Egypt to hand back Bogos to Yohannes, but not Massawa, in
exchange for the emperor's assistance in evacuating the besieged Turco -Egyptian
garrisons in the Eastern Sudan. The embargo imposed on the import of arms at
Massawa was continued.5 Internally Ras Wolde Mikael, the governor of Hamasien,
had rebelled and joined with the Turco-Egyptians, while Ras Wolde sellassie
(Worennya), the governor of Amhara and Bagemder who had wavered on his support
for the emperor was imprisoned and replaced. His son Nagash led a rebellion which

1
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 40-41; Zewde Gebre-Sellassie, op. cit., 61-62; Rubenson, s., The
Survival, pp. 321-322.
2
- Ibid., p. 325.
3
- Ibid.; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 67.
4
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 42; Rubernson, The Surviral, pp. 327-328. For an assessment of the Ethio-
Egyptian conflict and wars of 1875 – 1876 refer to Caulk, R. A., "The orogin of the Ethio-Egyptian
Border Problem", JAH, VIII, (1967), pp. 443 – 461; idem., "Menelik and the Ethio-Egyptian War of
1875 – 1876: A Reconsideration of Source Material," Rural Africana, No.11, (Spring, 1970), pp. 63 –
69.
5
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 81; Sanderson, G.N., "Ethiopia. The Reign of Yohannes IV, From 1871,”
in Fage, J.D. and Oliver, R. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa. Vol. 6 from 1870 to 1905
(Cambridge, 1985), pp. 645-647.

39
was suppressed with the help of Ras Adal Tesemma.1 Menilek, who had never openly
recognized Yohannes as his sovereign, took the apportunity of the emperor's
engagements with the rebels and jointly with Muhammad Ali of Wallo invaded
Bagemder in early 1877.2 It is difficult to ascertain exactly what he intended to
achieve as he did not go far beyond Debra Tabor on the route to Gondar.
While on the march northwards Menilek found little local support. Moreover,
his troops who had suffered many casualties during a recent military expedition
against the qurage to the south of Shawa had very little inclination for a prolonged
campaign away from home. Eventually he decided to return with his army to Shawa
passing through Gojjam rather than following the route through Wallo that led him
northwards in the first place. On the way Muhammad Ali broke ranks and retired with
his army on the pretext of intending to put down an anti-Shawan insurrection that
broke out in Wallo. On arrival there he made himself the lender of the revolt and later
defected to join with the emperor. In the meantime a conspiracy was hatched in
Shawa under the leadership of Menilek's consort Bafana with the aim of replacing
Menilek by one of her sons from a previous marriage.3
When Menilek began campaigning in Gojjam Ras Adal Tesemma withdrew
with his army to the south, and later took refuge with the emperor at Debra Tabor.
The Shawan soldiers, already exhausted from the long march, were also weakened by
disease and desertions. They were unwilling to continue fighting with the prospect of
having to face two armies in unfriendly country. Moreover, the approach of the rainy
season and the hazards of escape across a flooded Abbay river finally convinced the
king to terminate the campaign. On the morning of 25 May 1877 the return march to
Shawa commenced. By mid-November Menilek managed to regain control in Shawa,
but his hold over Wallo had callapsed.4
It was at such a critical and unfortunate moment for Menilek that Emperor
Yohannes finally decided to invade Shawa. It's ruler's autonomous status and his
dissident tendencies have been worrying the emperor for so long. The scale of the
1875-1876 military victories freed Yohannes from the possibility of renewed Turco-
Egyptian aggression and substantially augmented his army's armament. In late 1877

1
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 42; Sandreson, G.N., op. Cit., p. 647.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique op. 137..
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 135-136; Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 269-273; Marcus, H.G.,
op. cit., pp. 42, 52; Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., 90-95. Zewde Gebre – Sellassie, op. cit., pp. 89, 90-91.
4
- Marcus, H.G. op. cit., pp. 42,52-53.

40
he left Debra Tabor at the head of a large army heading for Shawa determined to
subjugate its ruler more firmly and assert his own imperial hegemony. In early
January 1878 the imperial army, then reinforced by the forces of Ras Adal Tesemma
and Muhammad Ali, entered the northern Shawan province of Manz where it got
engaged in minor clashes with the Shawan defenders. An early tentative move by
Menilek to sue for a peaceful settlement was rebuffed by the discouragingly harsh
terms set by the emperor. Full – scale war seemed imminent.1
In Liche Menilek issued an awaj ("Proclamation") for general mobilisation.
Fortifications were hastely constructed, and the royal treasury was transported to
Fekre Gemb. At the beginning of February the king left with his army to encounter
the invader, but soon turned back. A council of war decided against engaging the
emperor's army in battle. It was left for the clergy on both sides to mediate for a
peaceful settlement.2 The emperor was not unwilling to compromise. His large and
well-equipped army was already beginning to feel the effects of shortages of
provisions. It consisted of about 70,000 infantry 14,000-15,000 of whom possessed
modern repeating Remington rifles, besides 3,000-4,000 cavalry and large numbers of
irregulars many of whom were armed with old guns of assorted models, lances,
swords and spears. Joined with the emperor own army were 20,000 troops of Ras
Adal Tesemma and the 4,000-5,000 cavalry force of Muhammad Ali.3 By comparison
Menilek's small army of about 40.000 cavalry and infantry was poorly supplied with
old firearms mostly matchlocks and percussion guns but no modern weapons.4
Although it had the advantage of operating on its own territory it was obviously no
match for the over whelmingly superior forces of the emperor and his allics.
Soon a truce was arrived at allowing for the exchange of captives and the re-
provisioning of the imperial army. Further negotiations finally resulted in an
agreement on details of a formal peace settlement. According to the terms of the
Liche Agreement of 20 March 1878, also known as the treaty of Wadala, Menilek was
to declare his public renunciation of the imperial title and retain only the title of
Negus; recognise Yohannes as the legitimate Negusa Nagast and perform a personal
formal act of submission. He was to render homage and fealty to the emperor; pay
him a heavy periodic tribute; offer him military assistance whenever being asked to;

1
- Ibid., p. 53.
2
- Marcus, H.g., op.cit., pp. 53-54.
3
- Ibid., pp. 55-56.
4
- Ibid., pp. 44, 54.

41
supply the imperial army with provisions while it stayed in Shawa; ensure safe
passage for the emperor and his army to the monastery of Debra Libanos; and transfer
Shawa's capital from Liche to Debra Berhan. In addition Menilek's domain was
defined as extending to the Bashillo river in the north, the Abbay river in the west and
the Awash in the south and east. The Shawan king was to renounce claims to
sovereignty over Wallo, but was allowed to retain its governorship provided that he
cooperated with the emperor in the building of Churches there and Christianising the
predominantly Muslim local population. Other terms included the adoption of the
Two Birth' doctrine by the Shawan Church and its clergy, though a year's grace was
allowed before implementation to smooth the way for the change; the expulsion of the
Catholic missionaries and other Europeans and to discourage their entry into Shawa.
In return Menilek was to be formally recognised and crowned by Emperor Yohannes
as Negus of Shawa, and to be granted the governorship of Wallo.1
The ceremony of submission, reconciliation and coronation took place at
Liche on 26 March 1878. Menilek was made to approach Yohanne's presence in the
traditional humble and submissive manner. He walked towards the emperor's tent on
foot, head bowed and bare to the waist, carrying a stone on his neck and prostrated
himself in front of Yohannes. Shortly afterwards the sovereign and his vassal met in
private discussion for a short time. Then Yohannes ceremoniously crowned Menilek,
with the Ichege in attendance, as Negus of Shawa conferring imperial sanction on his
kingly status.2
Two months later (May – June 1878) a religious council was convened at
Boru Meda in Wallo on orders of Emperor Yohannes. Its aim was to put an end to
doctrinal controversies and affirm unity of faith within the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church through out the country. The major resolutions of the council enforced
uniform adherence to the official Qara Haymanat ("Two-Birth") doctrine, and the
Christianisation of Muslims and pagans. Those who did not conform were to suffer
repression and persecution. Christians were given two years to conform, while
Muslims and pagans were allowed three and five years respectively to convert to
Christianity and be baptised or face the prospects of losing their posts and land
properties. Few Muslims, particularly in Wallo, complied to forced conversion. Some

1
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 414-421; Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 54-55 Darkwah, Kofi; op. cit., pp.
77-78; Zewde Gebre-Sellassie, op. cit., p. 93-94; Sanderson, G.N. op. cit., p. 648.
2
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 442-443; Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 55-56.

42
conformed in name only, while many others chose to flee to neighbouring or far-away
Muslim regions in the southwest or southeast. The leading Wallo chieftains
Muhammad Ali and Abba Wattu were converted to Christianity and baptised. The
former was renamed Mikael and was prompted to the rank of Ras, while the latter was
given the name of Haile Maryam and awarded the rank of Dajazmach. In Shawa
many Muslims were made to forsake their faith and convert to Christianity, while
most of the pagan Oromo were forcibly converted and circumcised.1
The 1878 crisis left Menilek personally humiliated and politically isolated.
Fortunately enough both his local power base and his army together with its
armaments remained undamaged. Similarly his ambitious aspirations for succession to
the imperial throne and subsequent hegemony throughout the entire Ethiopian realm
survived undiminished. Nevertheless, the course of events leading to the imperial
invasion of Shawa and the peace settlement which followed convinced the king of the
disastrous consequences of prematurely challenging Emperor Yohannes by being
involved in the internal politics of northern Ethiopia. He realised that his failure to
alter the balance of power to his favour was primarily due to the inferiority of his
military strength compared to that of the emperor. He could not hope to make a
successful bid to supreme imperial dignity unless he could muster enough military
resources in manpower and weaponry at least equal to if not more superior to those
available to the emperor.2 So far he had been unable to obtain sufficient supplies of
arms despite the several attempts he had made in that direction. At the Shawa
traditional outlet of Zeila the local governor Abu Baker Ibrahim, in collaboration with
the Egyptian authorities at Harer, Berbera and Tajura obstructed Shawa's foreign trade
and her import of arms. As yet no alternative routes giving Menilek's trading caravans
unimpeded access to the ports of Obok and Assab had been opened up.3
The French arms trader Pierre Arnoux had been in the country since 1874.
Members of the Italian Geographical Society's Expedition, led by Marchese Orazio
Antinori, had arrived at Liche towards the end of September 1876. However, the arms
that Menilek actually received from them were disappointingly very few. Arnonx
presented him with a gift of about 100 rifled carbines, some revolvers and cartridges.
At the beginning of July 1876 the Frenchman left Shawa for Europe with letters

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 156-158; Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 57-58; Caulk, R.A.,
"Religion And the State In Nineteenth Century Ethiopia", JES, X, I (January, 1972), pp. 23-26.
2
- Marcus, H.g., op. cit., p. 56.
3
- Ibid., pp. 44-45, 46.

43
addressed to the heads of the governments of Egypt, France, Britain, Italy and the
Papacy. He was also entrusted with a caravan carrying goods belonging to Menilek to
be sold abroad and the proceeds of the merchandise was to pay for the purchase of
arms. The caravan, however, was forced to follow the route leading to Zeila rather
than the one to Obok. At Zeila the goods was seized by its governor Abu Baker
Ibrahim. The mission to Europe intended to facilitate obtaining arms produced no
results.1 Orazio Antirori, on the other hand, was persuaded to sacrifice the weapons
originally intended for the protection of members of the expedition and provide the
king with a gift of 50 Remington rifles and to sell him a further 100 rifles.2 Sebastiano
Martini-Bernardi, a new member who joined the expedition in Shawa, was sent by
Menilek back to Italy in 1877 to obtain more arms. He returned in November 1879
bringing with him only a few hundred rifles and relevant munitions.3 Still the very
presence in Shawa of the arms merchants Pierr Arnoux, soon to be fallowed by others
including Paul Soleillet, léon Chefneux, Jules Brémond, Léon Pequignot and Phillipe
Jubert together with members of the Italian geographical expedition provided Menilek
with favourable channels to pursue more energetically the continuing efforts of
obtaining arms.
After the 1878 peace settlement Menilek continued to distance himself as far
as possible from the internal politics of northern Ethiopia. He also proceeded to deal
cautiously and peacefully with Emperor Yohannes; accepting his policies and
cooperating in their implementation. He assisted the emperor in the forcible
Christianisation of the Muslim chiefs and peoples of Wallo and in the building of
churches in their provinces. He also contributed to the forced convertion to
Christianity of the Muslims of Ifat and Argoba and the pagan Oromo of Shawa
compelling the male population of the latter to be circumcised. Menilek compelled the
Shawan Chruch and her clergy to adopt the national "Two- Births" doctrine. And in
1879 he expelled the European Roman Catholic missionaries Cardinal Massaia,
Gonzague and Taurin from Shawa on orders of the emperor, but succeeded in
avoiding the expulsion of all the Europeans then in Shawa whose services he needed.4

1
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 44-45; Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
2
- Massaia, G., Trentacinque anni, X, pp. 99-100; Giglio, Carlo, L'Italia in Africa, Etiopia – Mar
Rosso, 1, 1857- 1885 (Rome, 1958), pp. 138, 139; Marcus, H.G., op. cit., p. 47.
3
- Cecchi; A., Da Zeila, 1, p. 160; Giglio, C., L'Italia in Africa, 1, p. 139, Marcus, H.G., op.cit., 47-48;
Darkwah, Kofi; op. cit., n. 28, pp. 66-67.
4
- Marcus, H.G., op. cit., pp. 58-59; Sanderson, G.N., op. cit., p. 648.

44
 Also after 1878 Menilek began to direct his main attention and efforts towards
the conquest and exploitation of the rich Oromo and Sidama regions lying beyond
Shawa's southern frontiers. During the early years of the king reign Wallo, on the
northern Shawan frontier, was the main field for Shawan military campaigns. After
1878 with the formal recognition of his status as king of Shawa the security of the
northern frontier relatively assured, and due to the favourable ease of the tension and
suspicion which had previously characterised the king's relations with the emperor
Menilek began to concentrate on southern conquest and exploitation of incorporated
territories. It was only in this way that he could manage to amass the necessary
revenues, man-power and other resources needed for the continued payment of the
prescribed heavy tribute, the maintenance of a large and powerful army and for the
purchase of imported expensive modern weapons for it. All of these were essentially
required in preparation for making a future successful bid for the imperial throne and
political hegemony when a favourable opportunity presented itself.1

1
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., 56-57; Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., pp. 78-79; Sanderson, G.N., op. cit., pp. 648-
649.

45
 Chapter II
THE STATES, PRINCIPALITIES AND PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN
ETHIOPIA ON THE EVE OF THE CONQUEST

The greatest part of Southern Ethiopia may be described roughly as the

country that extended from the southernmost curve of the Abbay river in the
northwest and the valleys of the Awash and its main tributaries in the north and the
northeast to the international boundary of Ethiopia with Kenya in the south. Its
western limit corresponds to a line where the southern highlands dip gradually into
the lowlands of the Ethiopian –Sudanese frontier. In the east it stretches beyond the
Rift valley chain of lakes to the Ethiopian Somali border as the highlands
progressively give way to arid steppe regions. Most of the region is an extension of
the northern and central Ethiopian highlands which decline progressively from the
centre towards the outside. It consists of mountains with isolated peaks, plains and
numerous watercourses. The highlands are divided into two unequal parts by the
northern extension of the depression formed by the East African Rift valley and its
chain of lakes that runs from Lake Zwai in the northeast to Lake Rudolf in the
southwest. Furthermore; the highlands are criss – crossed by six major watercourses
and their tributaries. In the northwest the Didessa is the longest one. The Gibe (Omo)
and its major tributary the Gojeb are the largest in the southwest. In the northeast the
Webi Shebelle rises in the Sidamo highlands, traverses Arussi (Arsi) country before
entering Somalia. In the southeast numerous streams feed the Ganale Doria and the
Dawa Parma; the two eventually converge to form the Juba river.
Despite the highlands geographical location closer to the Equator, their
general elevation endows them with a temperate climate which varies with changes in
altitude. The greater parts of the highlands are most suitable for agriculture; being
fertile, cool and moist with variations in the amount and evenness of precipitation and
the duration of the rainy season. On the other hand the lowlands and deep valleys are
often hot, less fertile or virtually arid. Traditionally the Ethiopians divide their country
topographically into three distinct zones, the dega (the very cold highlands above
7,000ft with an annual average temperature of about 16˚C), the wayna dega (the
intermediate zone with a temperate climate, adequate rainfall and rich soils, hence the

46
most suitable for human occupation and the pursuit of agricultural and animal
husbandry), and the qolla (the unhėalthy, hot and arid lowlands and deep valleys).
Similar to the north, Southern Ethiopia enjoys two annual rainy seasons, the
keramt (“heavy rains”) that falls between June and September, and balg (“little rains”)
generally occurring between March and May. Abundant heavy rains, fertile soils and
a temperate climate led to the growth of dense forests, the very rich agricultural
production and considerable cattle – herding. The southwestern regions in particular
had traditionally been the richest and the major source of most, if not all, of the
natural products for the external commerce of the whole Ethiopian region; ivory,
civet, gold, coffee and above all slaves. By comparison the southeastern regions were
densly populated, rich in cattle and agricultural production though offered very little
items of exportable value except slaves.1

The Cushitic - speaking Muslin and pagan Oromo and Sdiama2, together with the
small enclaves of Semitic – speaking Gurage and Harari are the main peoples who
occupy the greater parts of Southern Ethiopia, and hence they are the ones with whom
this study is concerned. Others who occupy the peripheral regions had been
execluded, expect where reference to them is relevant to the main study. The peoples
concerned are ethnically and culturally quite different from the Semitic – speaking
Christian Ethiopians of the northern and central highlands with whom they shared no
common historical experiences whatsoever. They had led an independent existence
for centuries as the neighbours of the Christian Ethiopian kingdom, but largely
beyond its direct military control and political influence. They had developed, in their
different ways, their own cultural, religious and political institutions. Their political
organisations ranged from communal societies and chiefdoms to states with powerful
monarchs and elaborate hierarchies for the exercise of authority. It was only during
the later part of the second half of the nineteenth century that their independent

1
- Migliorini, Elio, “L’Itiopia”, in L’Italia in Africa. Vol. 1 Il territorio e le popolazioni (Rome, 1955),
pp. 49-50, 52-58; Dugdale, J.S., “Ethiopian Climates and Vegetation: The state of our Present
Knowledge”, JSS, Vol.IX, No. 1 (spring, 1964), pp. 250-256; Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern
Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (London / Addis Ababa, 1991), pp. 1-2, 4-5. For further details refer to Mesfin
Wolde – Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia (Adiss Ababa, 1972).
2
- For the etymological origin and use of the term Sidama see Cerulli, Enrico, “Note su alcune
popolazioni Sidama del’Abissinia Meridionale: 1 Sidama Orientatle,” RSO, Vol. X (1925), pp. 597-
598; idem., Studi Ethiopicċ 11 : La lingua e la storia del Sidamo (Rome, 1937), pp. 31-32; Rossini, C.
Conti, Ethiopia e genti di Ethiopia (Rome 1937), p. 150: Trimingham, J.S., Islam in Ethiopia (London,
1952), p. 179n1; Cerulli, Ernesta, Peoples of Southwestern Ethiopia and its Borderland (London,
1956), p. 69 n.2.

47
existence was brought to an abrupt end by the Shawan Amhara conquest and the
incorporation of their homelands within the extended borders of the modern Ethiopian
state. In view of their being conquered and their territories were annexed it was not
uncommon among the Shawans until recently to refer to the southern regions as
Yekin Agher (literally, “conquered / colonised country”)1.
For a long time it was accepted that the Sidama were the original inhabitants
of most parts of Southern Ethiopia before the arrival of the Oromo following their
large-scale migrations and eventual occupation of considerable areas of the south in
the aftermath of the disastrous Muslim jihad wars of the sixteenth century.2 The
advent of the Oromo is said to have irreversibly altered the demographic pattern of the
south by displacing or exterminating most of the former Sidama peoples of the
regions they occupied, while others were subjugated and progressively assimilated. In
the process several Oromo groups gradually abandoned pastoralism, took to sedentary
agriculture and animal husbandry and adopted many Sidama socio-political and
cultural institutions.
These assertions have been questioned. It is argued that the Oromo, too, were
indigenous peoples of parts of the Southern Ethiopian highlands for the greater part of
their history prior to the sixteenth century. Initially they were mixed farmers, not a
pastoral people, but some of them became pastoralists only after they had moved from
the highlands to lowlands regions.3
Whatever the case might have been, the result was that most of the surviving
Sidama were displaced and managed to survive only in the most inaccessible
mountainous and thickly forested regions of the south. By the mid-nineteenth century

1
- Bereket Habte – Selassia, “Political Leadership in Crisis,” HA, Vol. III, no. 1 (January – March,
1980), p. 4.

2-Trianingham, J.S., op. cit., pp. 76-81, 89-91; Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia 1270-
1527 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 297-302. For further details see Furry, Robert, “Quelques hypothèses sur les
origines des conquêtes Musulmanes en Abyssinie an xvie siecle,” CEA, Vol. II, No. 1 (1961), pp. 24-
36; Davis, A.J., “The Sixteenth Century Jihad in Ethiopia and the Impact on its culture,” JHSN, Vol. II
(1960-1963), pp. 113-128, Vol. III (1964) pp. 567-592.
3- On Oromo origin and expansion refer to Lewis, I.M.., “The Galla in Northern Somaliland,” RSE,
Vol. XII (1959), pp. 21-28; Lewis, H.S. “The Origin of the Galla and Somali,” JAH, Vol. VII, No. 1
(1966), pp. 27-46; Hultin, John, “The Oromo Expansion Reconsidered,” NEAS, Vol. I, No. 3 (1983),
pp. 188-193; Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860 (Cambridge, 1990),
pp. 1-6, 18-47. The peoples called Galla by the Christian Ethiopians and outsiders strongly object to the
use of the Term to refer to them as having pejorative connotations. They call themselves and prefer to
be called by no other name but Oromo. See Mohammed Hassen, op.cit., p. xi

48
they were represented by the powerful states of Kaffa, Janjaro and Wallamo
(Walayta), while others were much reduced in population size and occupational areas.
The latter included the Omotic (Wammate) Sidama, so – called because of their
location near the Omo river, who included among others the Konta, Kullo, Badditu,
Gamo and Gofa. Also the Eastern Sidama, represented by the Sidamo, Hadiya,
Kambata, Daraso, etc.., met the same fate. The Semitic – speaking Gurage and Harari
were similarly assaulted by the Oromo, dispossessed of much of their former
territories and managed to survive as isolated enclaves surrounded on almost all sides
by the Oromo.1

By the middle of the nineteenth century Southern Ethiopia consisted of a

multitude of peoples with considerably varied socio – political organisation, cultures
and political experiences. One category of polities included the hereditary, powerful
and highly organised Sidama states of Kaffa, Janjaro and Wallamo (Walayta), and the
not so highly structured small Oromo “monarchies” or states of the Gibē region. A
nascent process of unification and state formation was already taking place among the
Oromo of Gudru, just to the south of the Abbay, and of Leqa Naqame and Leqa
Qellam in Wallage just before the respective regions were conquered by the Shawan
Amhara. Elsewhere among the Omotic and the Eastern Sidama some forms of a lower
level of socio – political organisation existed. Of a special category of its own was the
Muslim emirate of Harar; an important centre of Islamic influence though of no real
political power. Elsewhere some forms of a lower level of socio – political
organisation existed, such as among the Omotic and the Eastern Sidama. Otherwise
tribal divisions, communal societies and political fragmentation prevailed.

THE WESTERN SIDAMA KINGDOMS:

The largest, most powerful and the most highly organised of all the Sidama
states was the kingdom of Kaffa, situated just to the south of the Gojeb river which
seperated it from the Oromo states of Jimma Abba Jifar and Gera. The course of the
Umma river formed its eastern and south eastern boundary with Konta and Kullo,
while in the south and southwest its territories extended to as far as the country of the

1
- Beckingham, C.F. and Huntingford, G.W.B. Some Records of Ethiopia 1593 – 1646 (London, 1959),
pp. Ixxi – Ixxii, 150-155; Huntingford, G.W.B., The Galla of Ethiopia: The Kingdoms of Kafa and
Janjero (London, 1955), pp. 12-13; Lewis, H.S., A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Gifar (Madison,
1965), pp. 23-25.

49
Ghimirra.1 The state, whose origin is said to go back to the fourteenth century,
reached the climax of its power at the turn of the eighteenth century. By that time its
overlordship, if not direct political power and control, was extended over tribute –
paying vassals such as the Beneso, Nao, Maji, Konta, Kullo and even the far away
Wallamo (Walayta), Tambaro, and Kambata. Perhaps the lack of a more mature
political ideology and the absence of overwhelming military power precluded the
transfer of wider political vantage and influence into more direct and assertive
hegemony.2
At the top of kingdom’s political hierarchy was a hereditary monarch, the
kaffino tato (the “Kaffa king”) the highest and supreme political and spiritual
authority, who resided at one or the other of the twin capitals of Bonga and
Anderacha. The person of the monarch was regarded as sacred; he was not touched or
allowed to touch even his own food or drink, his glance was strictly avoided, he held
audience seated in seclusion behind a curtain, and others had to prostate themselves in
his presence. He was regarded as an immortal king-god whose body might die but his
spirit was believed to pass into the body of his successor. Special privileges reserved
for the monarch included the wearing of a particular dress and various royal insignia
such as a golden arm – bracelet, a golden ring and a special helmet – shaped crown
with a triple phallus of gold in front.
Despite all this, however, royal authority was far from being absolute.
Arbitrary royal action was limited by the deliberations and decisions of an advisory
council, the mikrecho, consisting of the older representatives of the seven privileged
office – holding clans. Among the court officials the katama raschio (the “commander
of the royal guards”) rose to prominence and assumed greater authority and power as
the chief councillor. Below the royal and privileged clans were the free commoners
who enjoyed no privileges and were debared from holding office. At the bottom of the

1
- Cecchi, Antonio, Da Zeila alla frontiere del Caffa, Vol. 1 (Rome, 1886),pp. 483-485; Gaslini, A. de,
“Per la carta etnografica dell ovest Etiopico,” RCI, auno XV, No. 8, fasc.8 (1941), p. 990; Huntingford,
G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 103, 105.
2
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, pp. 506-519; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale, Vol. I (Rome, 1932), pp.
187-188; Huntingford, G.W.B. op. cit., pp. 108-109; Orent, Amnon, “Refocusing on the History of
Kafa Prior to 1897; A Discussion of Political Processes, “ AHS, Vol. III, No. 2 (1970), pp. 267-273,
274-278.

50
social stratification were the low – caste groups, the hunters, tanners, potters and
blacksmiths and then the slaves.1
For defensive purposes Kaffa, like other Sidama and Oromo states, was
surrounded by wide stretches of deserted and uncultivated land, the mogga. Then at
some distance there were a number of naturally and artificially constructed barricades
broken by guarded gates, kellas. The kingdom had no standing army apart from the
frontier garrisons and the royal guards. All the free male population were expected to
turn up for military service when called upon to do so, each person providing his own
weapons – spears, shields and daggers, as well as provisions. There were only a few
old rifles, numbering no more than about 300 by 1897, which were said to have been
brought into the kingdom during the reign of Galli Shorocho (r. 1870 – 1890)..2
The peoples of Kaffa were strong adherents of traditional spirit cults. Belief in
the supreme deity, yaro (the “sky- god”) had gradually diminished in significance in
the course of time giving way to the spirit of eqqo whose priests were believed to
possess the power of persuading the spirit to leave its usual abode in trees, bushes and
streams and take up temporary residence in their own bodies. The spirit then spoke
through its human host uttering prophesis. The Kaffa King himself was said to
embody the spirit of doččo, the greatest of all the spirit cults and as such was
considered immortal. There also existed a belief in a goddess of fertility whose rituals
were performed by women.3 Some vague remnants and distorted observances of
Monophysite Christianity had survived among some sections of the population.
Although many Muslim traders had frequented Kaffa markets very few but foreign
traders were Muslims. The activities of the Capuchin missionaries in Kaffa for a short
period (1855-1861) resulted in gaining some converts to Roman Catholicism.4
Kaffa was the wealthiest and the most prosperous of the Sidama states. Its
economy was based on agricultural produce and animal husbandry. Besides the large-

1
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, Vol. II, pp. 487-488 491-492; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale, Vol. I pp,
183-184, 193-195; idem, Studi Ethiopici : La lingua Caffina (Rome, 1951), pp. 2-3, 8-10; Huntingford,
G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 104-105, 113-114, 116-117; Orent, Amnon, op. cit., pp. 282-292.
2
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, Vol. II, p. 484; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occiden-tale, Vol. I, pp. 190-191;
Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 126-127.

3
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, Vol. II, pp. 355-356, 485-486; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale, Vol. I, pp.
216-217, 219-22; Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 120, 132, 133.
4
- Ibid., p. 134; Orent, Amnon, op. cit., p. 279.

51
scale cultivation of ensat (“false banana”) common to all Sidama regions, a variety of
cereal crops, cotton and coffee were grown. Peasants held their lands as royal tenants
paying annual taxes and forced to render prescribed labour on royal estates. The
monarch, members of the royal family and elders of the noble office-holding clans
possessed large landed estates worked for them by slaves. Kaffa also carried on a
flourishing trade with the neighbouring Oromo states of the Giba to the north and
further beyond. Slaves procured as war captives, victims of slave raiding or received
as tribute from vassals predominated among the exports. They were followed in
importance by ivory, musk, coffee and honey. Taxation on land and custom dues on
the export and import trade provided the main sources of the royal revenue.1
The kingdom of Wallamo (Walayta) to the east of Kaffa equally had a remote origin
traditionally associated with Motalomi of medieval times. He is said to have been the
founder of the kingdoms first ruling dynasty, the Walayta Malla, which ruled until the
fifteenth century. It was then replaced by the “Tigrean” dynasty which was believed
to have been established by a group of one hundred and fifty Tigreans led by a certain
Mikalo (Michael) who had come to the region as settlers. At the top of the kingdoms
hierarchy was a hereditary monarch, the kawa, whose person was regarded as sacred.
His daily life and actions were strictly regulated through less rigourously than his
counterpart in Kaffa, most probably because the human origin of the ruling dynasty
was known. Theoretically, at least, the king’s powers were absolute; he monopolised
all power over the land which he distributed among the warrior class, the goqa, in
return for military service; the prerogative over the lives of his subjects and the right
of enslavement of persons found guilty of grave felonies. In fact, however, the kings
had always been careful to moderate their actions in order to avoid conflict with the
elders of the privileged office - holding clans and rich commoners. Representatives of
those clans were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the collection and
remittance of taxes and tribute and the dispensation of justice. Several Wallamo kings
actually died in exile having been forced to flee or abdicate. A popular uprising in the
mid-nineteenth century triggered by the excesses of a reigning monarch led to the
diminution of absolute royal power and its subjection to control by an advisory
council composed of regional clan representatives. Prior to that time the kingdom of

1
Cecchi, A, Da Zeila, Vol. II, pp. 506, 510, 513, 516; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale, Vol. I, pp.
187-188; Huntingford, G.W.B. op. cit., pp. 106, 109, 111, 112, 129; Bahru Zewde, op. cit, p. 16.

52
Wallamo had extended its suzerainty over the neighbouring Konta, Kullo, Gamo and
Tambaro before itself finally becoming tributary, together with its former vassals, to
the kingdom of Kaffa. It remained so until its conquest by the Shawan Amhara.1
The Janjaro (Yamma) kingdom, the third western Sidama polity, was located
along the western banks of the Gibe river to the northeast of Kaffa and the Oromo
kingdom of Jimma Abba-Jifar. In former times the kingdom occupied a much larger
territorial area the greater part of which had subsequently been incorporated by
Jimma. The bitter conflict between the two states continued until both of them were
finally conquered and their territories annexed by the Shawans.2 In its highdays the
kingdom was a centralised hereditary monarchy organised on hierarchial basis
analogous to that which existed in Kaffa. The ruling dynasty, the mawa, claiming
north Ethiopian origin was said to have replaced a former indigenous one, the halman
gamma. Succession to royal office was hereditary within the royal clan, mawa, but it
was not necessarily in the primogeniture line. The death of a monarch and the
accession of his successor were occasions of much ritual ceremonials accompanied by
human sacrifices.3
The monarch, the amno, who was believed to possess the attributes of divinity,
stood at the top of the political and administrative structure of the state. In contrast to
the case of Kaffa, the king among the Yamma represented both the highest political
and spiritual authority; being regarded also as the chief priest of the traditional spirit
cults. Below the king and directly responsible to him were the court officials who
were always drawn from amongst members of the royal clan. Chief among them was

1
- Cerulli, Enrico, “It Sidama dell’Omo,” pp. 5, 36, 45-46; Gavrilov, W., op. cit., p. 1071. Beckingham
and Huntingford, op. cit., p.Ixvi; Cerulli, Ernesta, op. cit., pp. 86, 104-105, 107; Haberland, E., op. cit.,
264-266-269-270; Bahru Zewde, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
2- Cecchi, A. Da Zeila, Vol, II, pp. 252-253; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale, Vol. II, pp. 13-14; de
Gaslini, A., op. cit., p 988; Beckingham and Huntingford, op. cit., p. Ixviii, Huntingfod, G.W.B., op.
cit., pp. 137, 138.
3- Cecchi, A. Da Zeila, Vol. II, pp. 356-357; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale Vol. II, pp. 15-16;
Beckingham and Huntingford, op. cit., p. Ixviii; Huntingford, op. cit., pp. 137, 140-141.

53
the angher heraschio who held an eminent position similar to that of the katama
raschio in Kaffa. Besides them, the elders of the principal Yamma clans provided the
occupants of the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy and participated in
deciding the succession to the throne.1
Agriculture, the herding of a few numbers of livestock trade and crafts provided
the basis of the kingdom’s economy. Royal revenues were derived from taxes levied
from all landowners and heads of families, dues on livestock as well as on the
agricultural produce of royal estates worked by slave labour.2
The Yamma lived in relative isolation from their neighbours, and were almost
constantly in continued fear of being attacked. For this reason nearly the whole
kingdom, and even individual homesteads, were surrounded by carefully defended
ditches and palisades.3
THE EASTERN SIDAMA:-
The Eastern Sidama, with the exception of the Sidamo, Darasa and Konso,
were also organised into hereditary autonomous states which varied in territorial and
population size. The small state of Qabiena was located in the northern most region
inhabited by the eastern Sidama which abuts on the territories of the half-Oromo
tribes of Waliso and Soddo and on those of the Christian Ulbarage Gurage. Its
inhabitants who were ethnically mixed with the neighbouring Gurage were staunch

1- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, Vol.II, pp. 51-52, 62, 118; Cerulli, Enrico, “I Sidama Orientale”, RSO,
Vol.X (1925), pp. 600-602; Beckingham and Huntingford, op. cit., p. IXX; Shack, W., The
Gurage: A People of the Ensete Culture (London, 1966), pp. 19-20; Braukämper, Ulrich, op.
cit., p. 34.
2- Cecchi,A. Da Zeila, Vol.II, p. 357; Cerulli, Enrico, Etiopia Occidentale, Vol.II, pp. 16-17;
Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 141-142.
3- Ibid., pp. 138, 143.

54
adherents to Islam. They were often called the Hadiya Wambe by their neighbours;
Wambe being the name of an early celebrated ruler of the region. The small state of
Qabiena was recently founded by Omar Baxa, a Muslim adventurer from Caha who
took for himself the Islamic politico-religious title of imam. His designated successor
arround 1878 was his leading warrior Hassan Injamo, the son of one of Omar’s
principal followers. Two other very small northern Hadiya Sidama groups were the
Libido of the Māräqo region, between Lake Zuai and upper Bilate river, and the
Masmas living a little further towards the Omo or the Gibē river. They represented
remnants of a Semitic-speaking population, probably of Gurage origin, who had been
largely assimilated into the Cushitic-speaking Hadiya cluster.1
Further to the south were the independent hereditary states of the Hadiya Tufte
(Gudiella), the Kambata and the Tambaro. The course of the Bilate river separated
them from the Arussi (Arsi) Oromo. The small state of the Hadiya Tufte occupied the
region between the Gibe in the west, Qabiena in the north and the territories of the
Tambaro in the South. In the state succession to king ship was hereditary in the
primogeniture line within the royal clan. The ruler had the royal title of adila; most
probably derived from the Arabic adil meaning “just”. Their last two rulers before the
incorporation of their state by Menilek were Ango and his son and successor Ada.
The royal clan was said to have attained royal status because its members were the
most valourous. Directly below the king in the socio-political order were the nobility;
consisting of the elders of the major Hadiya clans each of which was governed by a
chief who was an elder member of a major clan, and was assisted by a special royal
representative.2
The Kambata, the most southern of the eastern Sidama group and bordering on
the territories of the Ometo, formed a small hereditary state whose ruler also had the
title of adila. They claimed for their royal dynasty, the oyeto, a Gondari origin and
close affinities with their counterparts among the Hadiya Tufte. The genealogies of
their rulers were traced back to Hämälmal, the alleged founder of the ruling dynasty
who was said to have had eleven successors up to the time of the Shawan Amhara

1
Ibid., p. 142.
2
- Cerulli, Enrico, “I Sidama Orientale,” pp. 599-600, 602, 603; Gaslini, A. dei, op. cit, pp. 982-983;
Beckingham and huntingford, op. cit., pp. Ixiii-Ixv; Braukämper, Ulrich, op. cit., pp. Io n..34, 35-36,
46.

55
conquest in 1891. His remembered descendants, in order of succession, were Agato,
Wako, Oyato, Dagohia and Dilbato who was still reigning in1891.1
The Tambaro, bordering on the Wallamo, also organised themselves in a small
state whose ruler was more of an elected chief than a hereditary sovereign. They
traced their origin back to Mola and his seven sons from whom the seven Tambaro
clans were said to be descended. Hence they prefer being called the Lamalemola,
“literally, the descendants of Mola.2
The Sidamo (singular Sidancho) occupied the region extending from the
northeastern shores of Lake Margerita in the south up to the upper valleys of the two
principal tributaries of the Webi Shebelli, the Webi Sidamo and Mana, in the north.
The Bilate river to the west and the Bali highlands to the east formed the boundaries
of their territories. The Sidamo were not organised into a centralised state on the eve
of the Shawan Amhara conquest. Their traditions indicate that once in the distant past
all the Sidamo were ruled by kings who were subsequently deposed because of the
tyrannical nature of their rule. The Sidamo were made up of a cluster of thirteen
localised clans. Each clan claimed descent from a common ancestor and occupied a
defined territorial region to which it gave its own name. Equally each clan was
governed by its own chief, the moti, who combined in his own person the twin
functions of peace-keeper and senior religious functionary who performed sacrifices
and was believed to possess the powers of confering blessing and casting evil spells.
He was assisted by a number of subordinates among whom the woma, (“the leader”),
and the clan elders, the chimesa, constituted an advisory council, the songo.
Existing side by side with the above mentioned political arrangement was on
age-set institution, the luwa, which was most probably borrowed from the
neighbouring Oromo. This was a system in which all the male members of a clan
were jointly initiated into an age-group every seven years. Members of the age-group
elected their own leader – priest, the gadan (plural gadana) who functioned as both
peace-keeper and high priest. Members of each age-group shared common obligations
and duties of participating in the conduct of clan and inter-clan affairs. Frequent inter-
clan rivalries and conflicts and the constant fear of the domination of one particular

1
- Cerulli, Enrico, “I Sidama Orientale,” pp. 599-600, 644-645-646; Gaslini, A. die, op. cit., p. 983;
Beckingham and Huntingford, op. cit., p. Ixv; Braukämper, Ulric, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

2- Cerulli, Enrico, “I Sidama Orientale,” pp. 646, 676; Braukämper, Ulrich, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

56
clan over the others may help to explain the failure of the Sidamo in developing a
centralised political organisation.1
Equally without a centralised state structure were the small tribes of Darasa
and Alaba living to the south west of the Sidamo. They were agriculturalists and cattle
herders. Though basically Sidama the Darasa in particular had been considerably
influenced by their neighbours the Jamjam (Guji) Oromo from whom they borrowed,
among other aspects of their culture, the age-grading system similar to the Sidamo.2
The Konso inhabited the narrow highland range contained between the
Gomida plain and Lake Shamo in the north and the Sagan river which seperated them
from the Borana Oromo in the south. To the east of them were the Burji who lived on
the Amaro mountains, while to the west was the Waito valley through which the river
of the same name flows into Lake Stephanie. The Konso are generally considered as
an amalgam, both ethnically and culturally, drawn from amongst the neighbouring
Jamjam (Guji) and the Borana Oromo. This is attested to not only by Konso traditions
but also by linguistic affinities and other close cultural similarities such as the
possession of an age-grading system and analogous religious beliefs and rituals. What
distinguished the Konso from their Oromo neighbours and from the other Sidama in
general was their remarkable and distinct way of living in densly populated and
heavily defended walled settlements located on the tops of hills. Outside the
settlements were the fields where they tilled the soil and herded their cattle. Similarly
remarkable was their culture of terrace farming, highly skilled wood carving and the
widespread use of stone in the building of dwellings, town walls, field enclosures,
defensive constructions and dams.3
In a separate category were the Omotic (Wamate) Sidama who inhabited the
regions in the vicinity of the Omo river all along its middle course from near its
junction with the Gojeb in the west to the south eastern basins of Lake Margherita and
Ciamo-Ruspoli. Their northern representatives were the Konta (Warata), while the
southern ones were the Badditu. In between were to be found the other equally small

1
- Cerulli, Enrico, “I Sidama Orientale,” pp. 663-664; idem., Studi Etiopici III: La lingua e la storia del
Sidamo (Rome, 1937), pp. 1-2, 32; Hamer, J.H., “Sidamo Generational Class Cycles: A Political
Gerontocracy,” Africa, Vol.XL, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 50-70; Stanely, S., “The Political System of
the Sidamo,” Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. III (Addis
Ababa, 1970), pp. 215-228.
2
- Moreno, M.M., “Nuove notizie sull’ Alaba e sugli Alaba,” RSE, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1941), pp. 43-53;
Giaccardi, A., “Le popalaziooni del Borana e del Sidamo,”RDC, Vol.II (1937), pp. 1558-1559.
3
-Hallpike, C.R., The Konso of Ethiopia: A Study of the Values of a Cushitic People (Oxford, 1972),
pp. 21-39.

57
groups such as the Kullo, Boroda, Basketo, Zala, Gama, Gofa, etc… The two small
states of Gamo and Gofa were typical examples of the political organisation then
current among the Omotic Sidama.
THE OROMO:-
The Oromo were once culturally homogeneous mixed farmers sharing
common political, social and religious beliefs and institutions. By the time they settled
in the regions they had occupied they became divided into a number of independent
tribes or groups of tribes, each of which was governed by its own gada system and
owed no allegiance to any outside authority. Their widespread geographical
dispersion, the variety of the ecological environments of their new habitats and
contacts with alien peoples and cultures inevitably led to significant socio-political
transformations among many of their tribal groups. With the notable exception of the
islamised monarchical Oromo of the Gibe region and those living in the vicinity of the
walled town of Harar the greater part of the Oromo retained a considerable degree of
political and cultural uniformity. Most of them continued to lead a pastoral life
accompanied sometimes by farming, and adhered to their traditional socio-political
organisation and religious beliefs and rituals. What singularly distinguished them
apart was their preservation of the traditional gada-system for the organisation and
conduct of tribal affairs.1
The gade-system, often labelled “egalitarian and republican,” involved the
division of all the male members of a tribe into age-groups arranged in five grades;
each grade lasting for a period of eight years. All the males initiated together
constituted a distinct group, the gada. This group then passed collectively from one
grade to the next every eight years. Each gada when it reached the fifth grade, luba,
excersised communal governing authority over the whole tribe for a period of eight
years. From amongst members of the luba were elected the representative officials
who acted in its name. The most important of them were the abba boku (“Father of
the Sceptar”), sometimes also called the abba gada (“Father of the Gada”), and the
abba dula (“Father of War”). The abba boku held the highest rank as the paramount
chief who presided over tribal assemblies and proclaimed the decisions arrived at. The
abba dula was the leader of the warriors of the tribes in times of war and was
responsible for executing decisions reached at tribal meetings.

1
- Beckingham and Huntingford, op. cit., pp. Ixxi,Ixxvi – Ixxviii.

58
 Matters concerning war and peace with neighbours, settlements of inter-tribal
disputes, judicial punishments for criminal offences, etc… were decided during the
public assemblies chaired by the abba boku. General opinion usually rallied behind
such decisions since no solitary group within the tribe could be formed outside the
gada. Thus, by drawing membership from all sections of the tribe, ranking them in
groups according to seniority and assigning to each group specific communial
functions and obligations the gade-system served as a unifying force.
At the end of the eight year period the acting governing group, the luba, and its
elected officials resigned all authority and were then replaced by the succeeding new
luba. Officials and members of the retired group serve as respected elders and
advisers to the newly installed luba. A person’s initiation in the first gada occurred
when one’s father had retired after having passed through all the five grades of the
gada system. In this way the system did not only provide the basic structure of tribal
life and government but it also regulated every phase of a member’s life as he
progressed from childhood, through youth, being a warrior, a ruler and finally a
respected elder.1
The elected officials of the gade system were assisted by hereditary religious
leaders, the kallu, who possessed powerful religious and moral influence but held no
position in the gada system and hence had no political or executive authority. The
kallu anointed and blessed the elected gada officials on taking office and performed
the major sacrificial ceremonies. The abba muda (“Father of anointing”) who resided
at Wallabo in Arussi country was considered as the greatest Oromo traditional
religious dignitary; believed to be the diret descendant of the mythical ancestor of all
the Oromo. Periodic pilgrimage from all the Oromo tribes was made to the abba muda
to honour him and receive his blessing and anointing. Afterwards the pilgrims, jila,
became qualified to undertake ritual functions in their own home regions.2

1
- Cerulli, Enrico, “The Falk-Literature of the Galla of Southern Ethiopia”, in Harvard African Studies,
Vol. III Varia Africana (Cambridge Mass., 1922), pp. 167-181; Beckingham and Hungingford, op. cit.,
pp. 205-212; Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 41-55, Asmaron Legesse, “Class Systems Based on
Time,” JES, Vol. I, No. 2 (1963), pp. 1-29; idem., Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African
Society (New York, 1973); Triulzi, A., “The Gudru Oromo and Their Neighbours in the Two
Generation before the Battle of Embabo,” JES, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January, 1975), pp. 50-53; Gadas
Melbaa, Oromia: A Brief Introduction (Fin Fine and Zerliningo, n.d.), pp. 9-16, Mohammed Hassen,
op. cit., pp. 9-17
2- Knutsson, K.E., Authority And Change: A Study of The Kallu Institution Among The Macha Galla of
Ethiopia (Götenborg, 1967); Mohammad Hassen, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

59
 In the territories the Oromo occupied they became divided into several tribes
or confederation of tribes. The Tulama, often called the Shawan Oromo, settled on
large parts of the Shawan plateau, except for its northeastern and southwestern
regions. In the direction of the south they extended beyond the Awash river, while in
the north they reached into territories extending across the Wančit river. They were
politically fragmented into a number of small tribes, including among others the
Abitchu, Gombitchu, Abu, Ada, Darra, Galan, Gulale, Salale, Oborra, Tumuga, Jidda,
etc… Most of them had been much influenced by the Shawan Amhara close to whom
they settled. Apart from some converts to Orthodox Christianity or to Islam most of
them retained their traditional social and cultural traits; especially their socio-political
institution of the gada system and strong attachment to their indigenous religious
beliefs and practices.1
The northern Macha branch of the western Oromo occupied the region to the
east of the Didessa and south of the Abbay rivers, the latter seperated them from
Gojjam. They extended eastwards from the mouth of the Muger river to Qabiena, and
included the tribes of Gudru, Harro, Liban – Kutai, Ammuru, Jimma – Rare, Jimma –
Tibe, Calya, etc …2 Further to the west of them were the Wallagga group who
inhabited the region along the banks of the Didessa and extended all along the vallies
of the Baro and Dabus rivers towards the Ethio-Sudanese border. They included,
among others, the tribes of Illu, Nole Sibu, Leqa Sayo, Leqa Qellam, Leqa Saya and
Leqa Neqamte.3
The most clearly defined Macha group, however, were those of the Gibe
region in the southwest, to the south of the Wallagga group and north of the Gojeb
river, which seperated them from the Sidama kingdom of Kaffa in the south. They
were the ones who formed the five small Oromo kingdoms of Jimma Abba-Jifar
(Jimma Kaka), Gomma, Gumma, Gera and Limmu Enarea at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. The formation of these states had been the result of a long process
of slow internal changes with the Oromo societies of the region that included the
transformation from nomadism to settled agricultural life, occupational and social
differentiation and stratification and the progressive disintegration of the tradition
gada-system leading to the strengthening of the actual power and influence of the war

1
- Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., p. 13; Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., pp. 23-24.
2
- Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., p. 12; Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., pp. 23-24.
3- Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., p. 34; Triulzi, A., “The Gudru Oromo…,” p. 47.

60
leader, the abba dula. Such individuals eventually possessed major sources of wealth
in land and cattle and commanded large followings and clients. They became
powerful enough to undermine the elected authorities of the gada system whom they
either came to terms with or forcibly removed. Hence, they provided the sole political
and military leadership needed for state formation. The borrowing of state
organizational models from former or neighbouring Sidama states, and the conversion
of rulers and their households to Islam besides the wide diffusion of the religion
among their subjects may have helped in speeding the consolidation of the process of
state building.1
The organisation of the Gibe kingdoms was very much alike. Kingship was of
the hereditary despotic type with succession in the primogeniture line; the eldest male
issue from a free and legally – wed wife, usually the elder one, succeeded his father.
The king, moti, held the supreme administrative, military and judicial authority within
his domain. Theoratically, at least, he had unlimited jurisdiction over the lives,
property and labour of his subjects. It was his prerogative to fix or alter the boundaries
of the administrative districts, koro, into which his kingdom was divided; to appoint,
transfer or dismiss the officials charged with their administration, abba koro, and their
subordinates, abba ganda. As the highest judicial authority the king personally dealt
with the important legal cases and appeals; minor issues were dispensed of in his
name by provincial governors. To the monarch were reserved such matters as the
conduct of foreign affairs involving the declaration of war, the conclusion of peace,
alliances with neighbouring rulers, jurisdiction over foreign traders, prisoners of war
as well as patronage over “low-caste” or “paria” groups. Some members of the royal
family, notably the designated successor, the donaččio, and the king’s first wife, the
ghennefa, did help in the conduct of state affairs, but they constituted no formal check
whatsoever on the exercise of absolute royal power.2

1
- Lewis, H.S., “A Reconsideration of the Socio-Political System of the Western Galla,” JES, Vol. IX
(1964), pp. 139-143; idem., A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jifar: Ethiopia 1830-1932 (Wisconsin,
1965), pp. 35-44; Abir, M., Ethiopia. The Era of the princes. The Challenge of Islam and the
Reunification of the Christian Empire 1769-1855 (London and Harlow), pp. 73-94; idem., “The
Emergence and Consolidation of the Monarchies of Enarea and Jimma in the First Half of the
Nineteenth Century,” JAH, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1965), pp. 205-229; Mohammed Hassen, op. cit., pp. 86-93.

2
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, Vol. II, pp. 165-166, 127, 270; Beckingham and Huntingford, op. cit., p. Ixxxi,
Lewis, H.S., Jimma Abba Jifar, pp. 74, 88; Abir, M., The Era of the Princes, pp. 82-83.

61
 The most important of the officials attached to the royal court was the abba
mizan who combined the functions of chief treasurer, supervisor of foreign merchants
and markets as well as super intendant of the royal estates, stores and workshops.
Others included the royal messengers, lemi, who acted as envoys and ambassadors to
the neighbouring rulers. Custom officials, daggo or dagno, inspected those entering or
leaving the kingdom.1
For military purposes each kingdom was surrounded by multiple lines of
natural and artificially constructed defences. First, there was the mogga, a belt of
uncultivated, uninhabited no-man’s land surrounding the kingdom which was usually
infested with bandits and run-away slaves, ketto. Then, there fallowed the proper
defences constituted by natural impediments of thick forests, mountains rivers,
etc…reinforced when necessary by ditches and palisades. At specially selected
locations the defences were broken by a number of gates, kella, each of which was
guarded by a cavalry unit commanded by an abba kella whose main duties included
the control of authorised entry and exit of individuals and maintaining general
surveillance. In case of an approaching danger an alarm was transmited by sounding a
number of suspended hollowed tree-trunks, bideru, placed at some intervals from each
other. Small standing armies and a few bodyguards of Amhara and Tigre mercenary
matchlocks men were maintained. In times of war all the free able-bodied men were
called for military service. The combatants provided their own horses, if they had any,
their own weapons consisting of shields, swords, spears and daggers as well as
provisions.2
Economically the exceptional fertility of the Gibe region allowed for the
cultivation of cereals, coffee and cotton as well as for the herding of livestock. Land
and cattle ownership together with participation in and control of local and long-
distance commerce provided the basis for the prosperity of the states, their rulers,
court official and traders. The regions principal markets, usually located at the capitals
of the states, were the junctions where a network of local trade routes that crisscrossed
the surrounding countries converged. Local Oromo traders, afkala, travelled all the
year round along those routes collecting the highly priced exportable commodities of
slaves, ivory, gold, civet – musk, hides and honey before funelling them into the Gibe
markets. There they were exchanged with the Muslim northern Ethiopian, Shawan,

1
- Abir, M., The Era of the Princes, p. 84.
2
- Ibid., pp. 81-82

62
Wallo and Harari long-distance caravan merchants, jabarti, for imported cotton cloth,
beads, glass, metal wares, iron and copper sheets and above all salt. The latter item
was extracted from the Taltal salt mines in northern Afar country, and was used for
consumption, and in the form of salt bars, amole, as a medium of exchange. After
wards the jabarti merchants departed with their goods on their way back to the north.
They followed the principal route that started from Jiren in Jimma, passed through
Sakka in Limmu to Assandabu in Gudru. From there the route continued, across the
Abby, to Basso in southern Gojjam, Derita in Bagemder and to Gondar. There it
branched into two directions; westwards to Metemma / Gallabat on the frontier with
the Sudan and eastwards via Adwa to Massawa on the Red Sea coast. A minor route,
which was to gain considerable importance in the years to come, led from Sakka
northwards through Soddo and Qabiena to the Shawan markets of Aliu Amba, Rogge
and Abdul Rasul. From there the route continued passing through Harar to end at the
northern Somila parts of Zeila and Berbera, or it passed through the territories of the
Afar sultanate of Aussa to terminate at the port of Tajura.
In religious terms Islam appears to have made its way into the Gibe region and
was already gaining converts well before the states were founded at the beginning of
the nineteenth century. Afterwards Muslim north Ethiopian and Harari jabarti traders,
and the ‘ulama who accompanied or followed them continued coming into the region
more frequently. They became the main propagators of the new faith. In comparison
Muslim northern Sudanese jalaba traders seem to have contributed very little to the
spread of Islam in the region prior to the second half of the nineteenth century.1
It is remarkable that the ethnic, linguistic and religious homogeneity of the
Oromo of the Gibe, their similar social and political institutions, agricultural practices
and commercial contacts had not been effective enough to promote political unity
among their states. Inter-state rivalries for political prominence and disputes over land
and the control of commerce were the usual sources of conflict and disunity, though
their disruptive effects were often tempered by political marriages, alliances and the
exchange of envoys and gifts.2
The establishment of centralised polities was not solely confined to the Oromo
of the Gibe region. Later tendencies and efforts towards political centralisation and
state formation were taking place among the Leqa Neqamte and the Leqa Qellam in

1
- Abir, M., The Era of the Princes, pp. 50-71, 76-80; Mohammed Hassen, op. cit., pp. 135-156.
2
- Ibid., p. 197.

63
Wallagga and among the Gudru Oromo. The emergence of the centralised polity of
the Leqa Neqamte was equally closely associated with the rise to political and
military prominence of an individual autocrat who successfully undermined, gradually
eclipsed and replaced the traditional gada leaders. Bakare Godana (d. 1868), after
having been elected as the abba dula of one of the lineage groups of the Leqa Oromo
began to challenge the power and authority of the elected contemporary abba baku
Fido Bakkissa. With the aid of his large forces of warriors Bakare repeatedly defeated
his adversary in battles finally forcing him to concede his loss and flee the country.
Afterwards Bakare proceeded to assert his personal authority and extend his control
through success in warfare over the chiefs of the territories between the Wama and the
Didessa rivers. He established his residence and administrative centre at Wacha,
already an important gada political and spiritual locality. After his death his son and
successor Moroda continued the policy of conquest and consolidation still further by
the extending the conquered territories beyond the Didessa river. He moved his
residence to Neqamte, at a short distance from Wacha, which became his political and
military centre. Enlargement of conquered lands brought with it the benefits of
securing increased human and material resources as well as more wealth derived from
the ownership of land, the levying of tribute, and the collection of custom duties on
cross-border trade.1
Likewise, to the southwest of the Leqa Neqamte beyond the Birbir river, a
similar process led to the break down of the gada system institution and the rise to
power of a number of strong and autocratic warlords. One of them was to Joté Tulu,
an alleged adopted son of a chief of one the Leqa clans of Ghidame a locality in the
region arround Dembidollo. Having already distinguished himself as a renowned
warrior with a large following he set about defeating his rivals and conquering their
regions. In this way he eventually created the emergent state of Leqa Qellam.2
Similar processes of centralisation of political power and state building was
taking place among the northern Macha Oromo of Gudru and neighbouring Lagamara
just to the south of the Abbay river. The father of Gama Moras was originally a
Christian immigrant who came to Gudru from Gojjam and was adopted by one of the
1
- Abebe Ambatchew and others, “Field Trip to Näkamate,”UCAAR, No. 6 (1957), pp. 9-11; Terrefe
Woldetsadik, “The Unification of Ethiopia (1880-1935), Wallaga,” JES, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1968), p. 74;
Bartels, Lambert, “Studies of the Galla in Wallaga: Their View of the Past, Ibid, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1970),
pp. 150-153.
2- Terrefe Woldetsadik , op. cit., p. 74; Bartels, Lambert, op. cit., p. 146.

64
local leading Borana nobility. With the help of the inherited large fortune which his
father had made from trade Gama Moras made himself the actual ruler of Assandabo,
the region’s principal market place on the caravan trade route leading from the rich
southwest across the Abbay to Gojjam and beyond. He made good use of his
accumulated wealth in converting it in the ownership of land, cattle and slaves. He
also used his wealth for winning over friends and supporters and for acquiring
firearms and enlisting the services of a number of northern Ethiopian mercenary gun-
men. With the aid of his wealth and military power he fought and subjugated the
chiefs of the seven Gudru clans making himself the warlord and antonymous ruler of
Gudru. However, after his death in 1872 the leaders of the Gudru clans challenged the
political authority of his successive sons, Goshu and Galata. The ensuing conflict
provided the Gojjami with the opportunity to intervene and eventually gained control
over Gudru. Abba Gallet, also of immigrant Gojjami origin, attempted initiating a
similar move towards political centralisation in adjacent Lagamara, but his political
authority had not been substantially established by the time of his death.1
Elsewhere in Oromo land to the south of the Abbay competition over land and
cattle ownership, the economic benefits resulting from the control of long-distance
trade and warfare for political predominance gradually undermined the traditional
gada institution before it had been reduced to a mere shadowy semblance. New
wealthy and ambitious individuals came to the forefront, replaced the elected gada
officials and began to exercise their newly acquired personal political and military
powers. These included Abise Gabra in Horro, Tesso Qanno in Amurru, Qadida
Wannabe in Jimma – Rare, Sori Gala among the Jimma Gannati and Wayyesa Galaye
in Genda-Barat. And Oba Manni in Ammaya and Sullo.2

THE EASTERN OROMO:-

A number of the Eastern Oromo tribes, commonly referred to as the Harari
Oromo, occupied the highland regions of Chercher and Gara Mulata extending up to
and including the uplands all arround the walled-town of Harar. They comprised six
small tribal groups which were the Ittu, Ania, Ala, Nole, Jarso and Babile. Their
territories bordered on those of the Afar (Danakil) in the north, the Somali in the east

1
- Lewis, H.S. , op. cit., pp. 139-143; idem, Jimma Abba Jifar, pp. 31-33; Triulzi, A., “The Gudru
Oromo…,” 58-59; Mohammed Hassen, op. cit., pp. 89-90, 94-95.
2
- Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., p. 183; Triulzi, A., “The Gudru Oromo”, p. 58.

65
and Arussi (Arsi) Oromo in the west and south. Over a long period of time those of
them who lived in close proximity to the town of Harar abandoned pastoralism,
became sedentary agriculturalists, participated in local trade and embraced Islam.
They were collectively known as qottu (“cultivater”). The peoples concerned
however, prefer calling themselves islama (“muslim”) and sometimes Oromo but
never Galla. Others who lived further away and remained cattle-herders were called
prontuma. They continued to recognise the authority of their elected gada office
holders. The Qottu’s pursuit of sedentary life and conversion to Islam led to the
breakdown of their traditional gada institutions. Political authority gradually became
concentrated in the hands of lineage group leaders and their subordinates whose
authority was confirmed by being appointed as damin (“chief of a tribe”) and garad
(“village chief”) respectively.1
Further to the south, southwest and west settled the large confederation of
Oromo tribes collectively known as the Arussi (Arsi). Their region extended all along
the valleys of the Webi Shebelli and the highlands to the east of the Rift valley and its
chain of lakes to the territories of the Borana Oromo in the south; roughly the region
which formerly constituted the medieval Muslim state of Bali. While each tribe
maintained its independence, the territorial grouping was based on district rather than
on clan affiliations. Most of the Arussi Oromo retained their pastoral way of life and
much of their traditional culture. The possession of cattle was much valued. For an
individual to possess 5,000 head of cattle was not uncommon. Horses, too, were much
valued; everyone owned a horse, and some had two or more. Proximity to the Muslim
Somali and Harari as well as the effects of the religious teachings of the followers of
the reputed preacher Shaykh Hussein led to some conversion to Islam among the
Arussi. Wakabo in Arussi country was the residence of the abba muda (“father of
anointing”) to whom adherents of traditional Oromo religion from all over Oromo
land go on pilgrimage. Also in Arussi country, located at a few miles to the north of
Moyale, was the tomb of Shaykh Hussien the holy place to which Muslim Oromo
performed the pilgrimage.2
The nomadic Borana, the southern most of the Oromo tribal groups, were
spread all along the dry savanna lowlands of south eastern Ethiopia and extended

1
- Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., pp., 10, 14-15; Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., p. 32, Abir, M., The Era of
the Princes, p. 10.
2
- Huntingford, G.W.B., op. cit., pp. 12, 81-85; Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., p. 32; Villenenve, A.dei,
“Etnografica e regime del Bale,” RDC, Anno 1, (January, March, 1938), pp. 66-68.

66
some way into neighbouring Somalia and northern Kenya. They remained the most
conservative of all the Oromo, retaining both their gada institution and their
indigenous religious beliefs and practices. Their predominantly pastoral economy was
based on the herding of cattle, though they also kept some goats, sheep and a few
camels. The Borana distinguished between the true of senior tribes the Gona and Sabu
on the one hand, and the junior tribes of Gaba, Sakuye and Gari. Though culturally
similar to the true Borana in many ways, the junior or client tribes grazed their
livestock separately and were not allowed to intermarry with the true Borana. Also
they were often execluded from participation in the socio-political and ritual functions
of the gada system.1
To the northwest of the Borana, on the lowlands of the eastern shores of Lake
Margherita and on parts of the highlands further to the east, lived the Jamjam (Guji).
They consisted of a confederation of four tribes; the Alabdu, Uraga, Mati and Hoku.
The northern tribe of Alabdu was considered inferior far having been ethnically mixed
with and culturally influenced by the neighbouring non-Oromo Darasa. Differences in
altitude had led to variation in their cattle based economy. In the highland regions,
where some cultivation of barley and ensete edulis (“false banana”) was practised, a
more settled way of life prevailed. Similar to the Borana, the Guji preserved their gads
institution and their traditional religious beliefs and rituals.2

THE HARARI AND THE GURAGE:-

The Muslim Semitic-speaking Harari once occupied more extensive territories
as part of the medieval Muslim state of Adal with the town of Harar ass its
metropolitan centre. Politically weakened by the internal disputes and militarily
exhausted by the jihad wars of the sixteenth century the Harari became an easy prey
for the invading Oromo who battered and harassed them relentlessly. As a result they
were constantly pushed back and managed to survive only as an isolated people
confined within the stone-walled town of Harar and its immediate environs, while the
Oromo occupied the regions all arround them. Nevertheless Harar survived and
continued its precarious existence as the capital of an emirate of the same name. The
emirs and the town’s people succeeded in maintaining nominal authority over the

1- Knutsson, K.E., op. cit., pp. 30, 161-169.

2
- Ibid., pp. 30-32, 141-146-147

67
surrounding Oromo through a blend of religious influence, diplomacy, political
marriages and land grants.
Commerce and agriculture were of equal significance as the main sources of
Harar’s economy. The town was an important entrepot of commerce linking the
interior markets of Shawa, Aussa, parts of Arussi, Gurageland and the Ogaden with
the ports of Zeila, Berbera and Tajura. The principal exports included slaves, ivory,
civet, gum, ostrich feathers, hides, coffee, safflower, wax and honey. The main
imports were textiles, beads, rice, sugar, dates, paper, lead and copper. Various fruits
and vegetables, coffee, safflower and qat were grown on irrigated orchards and
gardens in the vicinity of the town. With its many mosques, several tombs of
venerated Muslim awliya and its reputed learned ‘ulama Harar remained the most
important and respected centre of Islamic learning and peaceful proselytisation.
Weakened and considerably troubled by internal strife and intrigues the emirate of
Harar was occupied by the Turco-Egyptian forces in 1875. Its emir Muhammad b. Ali
b. Abdal al-Shakur was deposed and subsequently killed. The occupation lasted for a
decade during which the town’s population increased, its commerce flourished and its
religious influence greatly renewed. The Egyptians finally withdrew after handing
over the government of the emirate to Abdullahi, the son of the last emir on 20 May
1885.1
The Gurage peoples inhabited the semi-mountainous region arround Lake
Zwai. Their neighbours were the Soddo and the Libido in the north and the northwest
respectively, the small state of Qabiena in the west, the Arussi in the east and the
Kambata and Sidamo in the south. Though basically of Sidama origin, they had been
substantially influenced by successive waves of Semitic-speaking immigrants in the
distant past. The Gurage were said to have once been ruled by a dynasty of north
Ethiopian ancestory which was overthrown by the Shawan monarch Sahle Sellassie (r.
1813-1847). On the eve of the Shawan Amhara conquest, however, Gurage society
was politically fragmented and lacked cultural homogeneity. The Northern Gurage,
the Aymallel (Kestane) were Monophysite Christians who considered themselves a
separate people proud of their north Ethiopian ancestory and Christian heritage. The
Eastern Gurage who included the tribes of Selti, Walani and Urbarage were Muslims,

1
-Shack, W.A., The Central Ethiopians: Amhara, Tigrina and Related Peoples (London, 1974), pp.
109-110, 119-121; Abir, M., The Era of the princes, pp. XX-XXI, 9-14, 18-19; Caulk, R.A., “Harar
Town and its Neighbours in the Nineteenth Century,” JAH, Vol. XIIII, No. 3 (1977), pp. 369-386.

68
being affected by Islamic religious influences emanating from the Harar region. The
Western Gurage, the most numerous group, consisted of the largest tribe of Caha and
the smaller ones of Aklil, Mcher, Gyeto, Gumar, Ennamor and Eza; collectively
known as the säbät bet gurage (‘seven houses of Gurage’).1
Each Gurage tribe was made up of a number of patrilineal clans, each of
which with its own chief. The authority of a particularly powerful clan chief seldom
extended beyond members of his own clan. Although several tribes or clans
sometimes cooperated with each other against a common enemy they were almost
constantly plagued by mutual dissensions and hostilities. The great numbers of
Gurage sold into slavery were the results of recurrent inter-tribal wars as well as the
consequences of attacks, raids and kidnapping made upon them by hostile neighbours.
There is some evidence, however, to suggest that the Western Gurage, under Caha
leadership were in the process of establishing some sort of a loosely-knit politico –
religious centralisation in the period just preceding the Shawan Amhara conquest of
their region. Caha predominance was most probably due to the strategic location of its
territories astride the important trade routes, its seniority at the Ya-Goka (‘tribal
court’) and its custody of the shrines and the ritual representatives of the main Gurage
deities of waq, boza and damamwit.
The Gurage were sedentary agriculturalists living in small densly populated
village communities distinguished by the extensive cultivation of ensete edulis,
(“false banana”), which constituted their staple food crop. They also grew a variety of
other crops including barely, peas, horsebeans as well as coffee and tobacco; cattle,
sheep, fowls, horses, and mules were kept.2

OTHER PERIPHERAL GROUPS:-

All along the peripheries of the southern Ethiopian plateau lived several tribal
groups of diverse ethnic origin and culture some of whose territories were
incorporated within the enlarged Ethiopian empire – state during the last stages of the
Shawan Amhara conquest. The included the Afar, Somali, and the negroid Berta and
Nioltic tribes of the south western borderlands.

1- Shack, W.A., The Gurage: A People of the Ensete Culture (London, 1966), pp. 5-7, 16, 34-35; idem;
The Central Ethiopians, pp. 97-100, 119-120.
2- idem., The Gurage, pp. 50-83, 97-98, 109-111; idem., The central Ethiopians, pp. 5-7, 16, 34-35.

69
 The Muslim southern Afar (Danakil) nomads of the Aussa sultanate occupied
the inhospitable lowlying desert regions extending from the foot-hills of the Shawan
plateau to the port of Tajira on the Red Sea coast. Their pastoral economy which was
centered on the herding of camels, goats, and few sheep was the primary source of
livelihood. It was supplemented by some cultivation along the narrow valleys of the
Awash river which traverses the sultanate and by revenues derived from their control
the transmit trade route that linked the principal Shawan markets with Tajura and the
salt mines located just to the south of that port. Inspite of the barren nature of their
country and the ferocity of its peoples the sultanate was deemed important for the
Shawans whose rulers maintained friendly relations with the Afar sultans.1
The Muslim Somali tribes whose territories came under Shawan rule included
the Batire and the Abaskul living to the east and southeast of Harar respectively, the
Yabarre of the Jigjiga region and the tribal groups of the Ogaden district. Pastoralism
supplemented by hunting was the main occupation of the tribesmen, though some
cultivation was practised where favourable conditions allowed. They shared with the
rest of their kinsmen a very strong sense of national identity firmly based on common
ethnic ancestory, common language and culture as well as shared staunch adherence
to Islam. It was due to the passage of the trade routes from Shawa to Zeila and
Berbera through their territories that they became a target for Shawan annexation.
Along the Ethio-Sudanese border in the southwest lived the negroid tribes
collectively known to the Ethiopians as shanqalla (“slaves”). Notable among them
was the Berta who occupied the undulating plateau region lying between the Sudanese
border in the west, the Abbay river in the east and the lega Qellan Oromo country in
the south. They were organised into three small Muslim sheikhdoms of Aqolda
(Asoso), Bela-Shanqul (Beni Shangul) and Khomosha. Their indigenous Berta
inhabitants were ruled over and subjected to serfdom by a small aristocracy of mixed
Beta and Muslim Arabic-speaking northern Sudanese jalaba ancestory, the Watawit,
who had replaced a former dynasty of Funj origin. It was due to their reputation as
being rich sources of gold and slaves that the Berta Sheikhdoms were subjected to
successive Funj, Turco-Egyptian, Mahdist overrule before being conquered by the
Shawan Amhara.

1-Lewis, I.M. Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho (London, 1955), pp. 155-169;
Abir, M., The Era of the Princes, pp. 19-23, 49-50, 63-64.

70
 The Nilotic Anuak (Yambo), led by their village headmen, had an economy
based on a combination of agriculture, hunting and gathering. Their neighbours, the
pastoral Nuer developed a special socio-political and spiritual culture based on cattle
possession. Further to the south were to be found the equally stateless Koma and Mao.
And along the southern border with Kenya, to the south of Kaffa, were the various
small negroid tribes of the Gimira group.1
Scattered amongst nearly all the societies of southern Ethiopia were found a
number of small submerged low caste or paria minorities. They were believed to have
been representatives of remnants of pre-Sidama inhabitants. They were generally
despised by the peoples among they lived because of their supposed low descent and
of their being the practitioners of certain manuel occupations that were considered
ignoble. They were often the blacksmiths tanners and potters.

1
- Triulzi, Alesandro, “Trade, Islam and the Mahdia in Northwestern Wallaggā, Ethiopia,” JAH, Vol.
XVI, No. 1 (1975), pp. 55-61; idem., Salt, Gold and Legitimacy: Prelude to the History of No-Man’s
Land: Bela Shangul , Wallaggā, Ethiopia (Ca. 1800-1898)( Napoli, 1981), pp. 1-8,87-124, 125-144.

71
 CHAPTER III
THE GENESIS OF THE CONQUEST: ITS NATURE MOTIVATIONS AND
METHODS

The conquest of the Oromo and Sidama regions of Southern Ethiopia during
the last decades of the nineteenth century was successfully undertaken during the
reign of Menilek II while he was still king of Shawa (r. 1865-1889), nominally a
vassal of Emperor Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889), and later while he reigned as emperor
(r. 1889-1913) of a considerably enlarged Ethiopian empire-state. The incorporation
of the newly conquered southern territories, including the Oromo and Sidama regions,
nearly tripled the extent of the historical Christian Ethiopian state and more than
doubled the number of its inhabitants. As a relentlessly sustained and noteworthy
accomplishment the conquest ranks as an episode with no parallel in the nineteenth –
century history of Sub – Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, its nature, the driving
motivations behind it and the methods through which it was carried out are issues that
have still to be adequately explained.

(I) The Nature of the Conquest:-

The military conquest and annexation of the Oromo and Sidama inhabited
regions has often been portrayed as an Ethiopian or often more precisely as an
Amhara conquest. Consequently, its results are said to have been the extension of
Ethiopian / Amhara rule and the imposition of Ethiopian / Amhara political
dominance and cultural influence over the newly subjugated alien Muslim and pagan
peoples of the south.1
Acceptance of such generalised assertions fails to distinguish between the
Shawans, who actually initiated and undertook the conquest and the creation of the
enlarged Ethiopian polity as it emerged at the dawn of the twentieth century, and the
hitherto politically and culturally dominant northern Ethiopians / Amhara of the
central highlands whose vassals the Shawans has nominally been throughout the
period of the conquest prior to 1889.2 The problem is further compounded when the

1
- Levine, D.N., Wax And Gold, pp. 1-3, 4; idem., Greater Ethiopia, pp. 84-86, 90- 91, 156-159;
Markakis, John, op.cit., pp. 21, 22, 23, 24, 105; Muhammed Hassen, The Oromo Of Ethiopia, pp. 197.
198. 199.
2
- Salole, Gerry, “Who Are The Shoans?,” HA, 2, 3 (July /September, 1973), p. 20.

72
descriptive labels “Amhara” and “Shawan” are variably used in one and the same
source to describe Menilek’s expansionism.1
A reappraisal of the cultural inter – relations and ethnic mixture that occurred
between the Amhara and Oromo groups who had settled within the borders of Shawa
suggests that the process of interaction and acculturation between the two ethic groups
has progressed so far that by the beginning of the nineteenth century a distinct
communal Shawan identity actually developed.2 While outside observers usually
distinguish and differentiate between whom they refer to as “Shawan Amhara” and
“Shawan Oromo” the northern Ethiopians of the core regions do not. Both the
northern Amhara and the Tigre designate the two categories collectively as Shawans.
They often regard the Shawans as political upstarts and even exclude them from the
ranks of the true Amhara, designating them as “half-Oromo”.3
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Nagassie Kristos, the alleged founder
of Shawa’s royal dynasty was neither of Amhara ancestory nor was he an Amhara
political appointee, but was in fact a successful and renowned Oromo war – leader
who rose to power through his skills and achievements in warfare. Afterwards he
styled his rule on Amhara patterns.4 His successors together with their royal, civil and
military nobility have been anxious to stress their connections with the northern
Amhara largely for reasons of political expediency. The connection served to confer
on them a justified identification with the political and cultural “Axumite” heritage of
the historical Christian Ethiopian state. This in its turn bestowed on their royal
dynasty legitimised claims to the Solomonic imperial throne,5 no matter that such
claims has been challenged by the northern Amhara and the Tigre.6 Another
consideration to be taken note of is that the Shawan campaigns of conquest were, in
fact, conducted in alliance and cooperation with the various Oromo leadership and
tribesmen of the Tuloma, Wallo. Wallagga and Jimma Abba Jifar. All of them fought
for the cause and in the interests of Menilek as a Shawan monarch, his royal dynasty
and his ruling nobility. As a result they subsequently gained considerably more from

1
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 94, 98, 99, 108, 110, 140.
2
- Salole, Gerry, op.cit., pp. 20-21.
3
- Levine, Wax And Gold, p. 47
4
- Darkwas, Kafi, op.cit., p. 6, n.12; Salale, Gerry, op.cit., p. 20
5
-Ibid., p. 21.
6
- Levine, D.N., Wax And Gold, p. 389, n.24

73
the results of the conquests than did the northern Ethiopian Amhara and Tigre
peoples. 1
The northern Ethiopians, northern Amhara and Tigre alike, neither
participated in the conquest nor did they benefit from its results. The few northerners
who fought for the Shawans during the early campaigns were the experienced
riflemen and gunners drawn from all over northern Ethiopia. They had individually
and voluntarily enlisted in Menilek’s service and formed the special gondari royal
regiment.2 Moreover, both the emperors and the northern provincial magnates were
kept almost continuously preoccupied with internal squabbles for power or fighting in
defence of Ethiopia’s borders against foreign Turco- Egyptian, Italian and Mahdist
encroachments. Indeed, they seen to have been more or less inattentive to the
impending threat that Shawan southern expansionism might pose to themselves until
it was too late.3
In the meantime, the Shawans asserted their control over the Oromo of the
Gibe and Wallagga between 1882 and 1886. Their conquest of the Ittu and Arussi
(Arsi) Oromo was completed in 1885 and 1886 respectively. In January 1887 the
conquest of the town of Harar and the small Oromo groups living in its immediate
surrounding fallowed. By then Shawan control was extended over vast territories that
exceeded in extent the domains of the northern Christian Ethiopian state. And
Menilek had become the most powerful regional heavy weight politically and
militarily. His personal prestige, too, was unmatched.
When Emperor Yohannes IV died unexpectedly fighting the Mahdists at the
battle of Metamma / Gallabal in March 1889 Menilek immediately proclaimed
himself emperor. The Tigre, led by Ras Mangasha and Ras Alulua, made an
unsuccessful attempt to stop him. In the end, being gravely weakened by the effects of
the war against the Mahdists, they submitted and reluctantly accepted his imperial
suzerainty. Negus Takla Haymanot of Gojjam, already defeated by Menilek in 1882
and effectively removed for good from the contest for southern expansionism, was
virtually powerless to challenge the Shawan king’s accession. The success with which
Menilek’s pretensions to imperial sovereignty were asserted was in fact an actual

1
- Greenfield, R., op.cit., pp. 97-98; Salole, Gerry, op.cit., p. 21; Muhammed Hassen, The Oromo of
Ethiopia, pp. 198-200.
2
-Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 97-98; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 71.
3
- Salole, Gerry, op.cit., p. 21.

74
Shawan “conquest” of the rest of the Christian Ethiopian state.1 Menilek’s kingdom of
Shawa, in effect, became Menilek’s Ethiopian empire.2 It was this new and greater
empire which was passed in inheritance to his successive Shawan successors; his
grandson Lij Iyasu (r. 1913-1916), his daughter Zawditu (r. 1916-1930), and the
greater grandson of Sahle Sellassie Tafari Makonnen who assumed power first as
regent to Zawditue and later as emperor under the royal name of Haile Sellassie I (r.
1930-1974). 3
“The Shawanness” of the newly extended polity created by Menilek was
visibly illustrated by the fact that the Shawans and their Oromo assimilated
collaborators almost exclusively monopolised the high and influential posts at the
centre and in the provincial military and civil administration of the newly
incorporated conquered territories. Both were also the main recipients of the wealth
generated by the exploitation of the conquered Oromo and Sidama regions. Other
Ethiopians from the core northern regions were generally excluded from sharing in
such rewards.4Northern Ethiopian communities who resided at Addis Ababa at the
turn of the century were considered by the Shawans as outsiders rather than fellow
citizens. Cases involving their members were tried by their own representatives like
other foreign residents, and were not tried at the local courts.5 Moreover, Shawan
appointees stationed in the northern regions encountered much resentment and
animosity from the northern Amhara, Tigre and Gojjami nobility and ordinary peoples
who considered them as representatives of the Shawan ruling dynasty which usurped
their imperial inheritance.6 The Tigre in particular felt deeply hurt and betrayed by
Menilek for allowing the Italians to retain possession of the Eritrean highlands even
after they had been decisively defeated at Adwa in 1896.7

1
- Salole, Gerry, op.cit., p. 21.
2
- Baxter, P.T.W., “The Creation and Constitution of Oromo Nationality,” in Fukui, Katsyoshi and
Markakis, John (eds.), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London, 1994), p. 169.
3
- Salole, Gerry, op.cit., p. 21.
4
- Salole, Gerry, op. cit., p. 21.
5
- Ibid., pp. 21-22, citing Gebre Heywat Baykadan’s Mengistenna Ya Hesb Astadar (“Government and
Adminstration of the People”).
6
- Levine, D.N., Wax And Gold, pp. 45, 47; Salole, Gerry, op.cit., 21.
7
-Greenfield, R., op.cit., p. 117; Markakis, John, op.cit., p. 48 and Salole, Gerry, op.cit., p. 22, both
citing Gebre Heywat Baykadan’s Minilek na Etiopya (“Menilek and Ethiopia”).

75
(ii) Capacity and Motivation for the Conquest:-
That the Shawans could have possessed sufficient capacity to initiate and
pursue with success the substantial military conquest and annexation of the Oromo
and Sidama inhabited southern regions is not difficult to explain. It is to be noted that
Ethiopian political and military power has always been extended along the highland
plateau in the direction of the south. Shawa, geographically located at the
southernmost extremity of the Christian Ethiopian state, naturally served as the
forward base for the southern extensions of Ethiopian political and military power
and the gateway for the spread of its cultural influences in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries.1 Equally it was the Ethiopian province which suffered the most from the
devastating effects of the Muslim jihad wars of the sixteenth century and rapid
migrations of the Oromo which followed in the seventeenth century. Then after
Ethiopian power and influence has been rolled back and contained within regions
lying to the north of the Abbay and Awash rivers Shawa, once more, resumed its
strategic and political significance as the defensive base on which a centralised
Ethiopian polity eventually developed.2
Political centralisation apparently made it possible for the early Shawan rulers
to maintain the command of effective political power and the ability to enlist and use
relatively impressive military power. Consequently, they became increasingly
powerful enough not only to defend their territories and subjects from further Oromo
incursions but also to take the offensive against them. Furthermore, the relative
geographical isolation of Shawa from the northern and central Ethiopian provinces,
and probably the deliberate policy of her rulers to distance themselves as far as
possible from the destructive inter-regional wars of the Zamana Masafent provided
them with a relatively strong and economically prosperous local base of power.3 In
contrast to other Ethiopian provinces Shawa had, by the end of Sahle Sellassie's reign,
gradually developed into a relatively peaceful, prosperous and politically autonomous
principality. Its wealth was mainly derived from the export of slaves through caravan

1
- Taddesse Tamrat, Church And State in Ethiopia 1270-1527 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 97-98, 100;
Markakis, John, op.cit., pp. 14-15, 16.
2
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 7-8; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 6-8.
3
- Markakis, John, op.cit., pp. 18-19; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 7.

76
trade – routes leading across the Afar lowlands to Tajura and Coffe via Harar and
Somali territories to the ports of Zeila and Berbra on the Gulf of Aden.1 Eventually,
the course of internal consolidation and the gradual southern extension of territories
begun by the early Shawan rulers were to reach their fruitful climax during the reign
of Menilek II.
The political divisions, cultural differences, mutual hostilities and military
weakness of the southern societies made them vulnerable to Shawan aggression. The
rich natural, commercial and human resources of their regions drew covetous Shawan
attraction and expansionist ambitions. At the same time the constant feuds and inter-
tribal wars as well as the almost ceaseless rivalries that prevailed among them
prohibited them possibility of their uniting in any effective defensive action against
their Shawan adversaries.2 The greater unity of the Shawans and the large armies they
could put in the field of battle gave them the military advantage. Access to and the use
of firearms by the Shawans, however, assumed decisive roles only after the mid-
1880’s. It was only from then onwards that their armies become increasingly
equipped with imported more efficient modern European weapons. The maintainance
of relations with European powers and private arms traders and the openning of
independent routes to ports on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden secured for the
Shawans unimpeded flow of traffic in the much sought-after firearms and munitions.
The possession and deployment of such arms made Shawan military victories more
easier and their control over the conquered subjects more firmly established.
To some extent, moreover, the traditional Ethiopian epic the Kebra Nagast
(“Glory of the Kings”)3 provided the necessary encouragement and ideological
legitimisation for the Christian Ethiopian conquest and subjection of alien, non-
Semitic, non-Christian peoples. For the Shawans the Oromo, who happened to live
just across their southern borders were the logical target. They formed the greater part
of the inhabitants of the south, large numbers of them were converts to Islam while
the rest were heathens. In addition they were held historically responsible for the

1
Merid W. Aregay, "The Early History of Ethiopia Coffee Trade and the Rise of Shawa", JAH, XXX,
(1988), pp. 19 -25.
2
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 9, 25, 97-98.
3
A fourteenth century Ge'ez translation of an early Coptic Tesxt containing a mixed composition of
Old Testament, Jewish, Christian and Arabic legend and literature.

77
occupation of territories that were formerly integral parts pf the medieval Ethiopian
state.1
In an assessment of the motivating factors behind the Shawan conquest and
incorporation of the Oromo and Sidama regions in the late nineteenth century one can
identify three main, though inter-connected, political, economic and military factors.
Although the three were intimately related to each other they have been singled out
below and treated at some length sperately for the sake of convenience.
Any attempt to explain the driving forces behind the conquest should assign a
primary role to Menilek’s personal ambitious aspirations, backed by his ruling
nobility, for accession to the Solomonic imperial throne and subsequent hegemony
over the whole of the Ethiopian state. His early attempts to realise his objectives
through altering the politico-military balance of power in the contest with the more
powerful northern regional magnates to his own advantage were a dismal failure. The
crisis of 1876-1878 culminated with his forced submission to Emperor Yohannes and
his acceptance of the imposed terms of the Liche Agreement. After 1878 Menilek was
obliged to pursue a twin future policy. On the one hand he was to maintain cordial
relations with the emperor concur with his policies and cooperate in implementing
them. Of singular importance was the stipulated condition of his continued annual
delivery of a heavy tribute to the emperor. On the other hand he was to refrain, as far
as possible, from meddling in the internal politics of northern Ethiopia. Thus with his
path to supreme imperial power through the north being blocked Menilek was obliged
to turn his attention and energies towards the “open” south. The alternative strategy
was aimed at securing the possible ways and means through which his cherished
objectives could be attained.
The conquest and exploitation of the lucrative commercial potentialities
besides the substantially rich natural economic and human resources of the Oromo
and Sidama inhabited regions must have seemed as the sought after solution. It was
only by doing so that Menilek could manage to build up his military power through
increased recruitment in the ranks of his armies and the purchase for them of
sufficient quantities of expensive imported European firearms and ammunitions. The
resultant military might was an essential preparation for a winning future bid for
imperial sovereignty and dominance. At the same time Menilek could avoid being

1
- Markakis, John, op.cit., pp. 30-31, 32-33.

78
bankrupted and his financial resources ruined by securing access to source of material
supplies and revenues to meet the requirements for the heavy annual tribute he had to
deliver to the emperor. The Oromo and Sidama regions, more particularly those of the
southwest, has historically been the rich sources of supply for Ethiopia’s highly
valued exportable commodities of foreign commerce; gold, ivory, civet musk, coffee,
honey and above all slaves of both sexes. The rulers of northern Ethiopia; whose own
regions produced no comparable trade goods, derived a great part of their revenues
from the taxes and tolls imposed on the passage of the transit trade from the south
across their territories on its way to the sea ports. During the early years of Menilek’s
reign Shawa’s share of the trade was modest. The bulk of it flowed northwards
through Lagamara and Gudru to Basso in southern Gojjam and then via Gondar and
Adwa to Massawa. The seizure and control of as much as possible of the rich sources
of supply for the trade goods and the redirection of the routes through which it was
funnelled through Shawan territories must have been among the cardinal motivating
factors for the conquest.1
As the southern borders of Shawa were progressively extended through
campaigns of conquest and her share of the transit commerce increased so did the
wealth of Menilek. Substantial booty in the form of captured cattle, ivory, horses, war
prisoners, young men and women was gradually replaced in significance by the
revenues derived from commerce and the regularly delivered tribute. While the sale of
civet musk, coffee, hides, ostrich feathers, honey and other products was open for all,
a royal monopoly was exercised on transactions in gold and ivory. Also the indirect
proceeds and taxes received from trading in slaves were preserved for the king.
Tribute, on the other hand, was handed over by the governors of the conquered
territories and the tributary autonomous local rulers. Much of it was initially paid in
gold, ivory, civet musk, slaves and other local products. By 1881, however, an
estimated 70,000 thalers worth of tribute was paid in cash. Other sources of royal
revenues were the occasional gifts made to the monarch by various military
commanders and provincial governors.
Finally and most importantly was the quest for drawing the maximum possible
benefits from the direct exploitation of the appropriated conquered lands and the
labour of its population once they were occupied. Traditionally this was accomplished

1
-Marcus, H.G. op. cit., p. 140; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 96, 100, 104.

79
through the systematic application of the gabber-neftenya system. Large parts of the
best fertile lands were reserved for the crown as royal estates. They were intended to
provide provisions for the royal court and its various palaces and to maintain cows,
horses and other animals belonging to the monarch. Members of the royal family and
court nobility were also awarded sizeable landholdings for providing provisions for
their households. Other lands were allotted in lieu of salary or services rendered to the
multitude of unpaid administrative and military personnel who were stationed in the
conquered territories; military commanders / governors, subordinate officers, officials
and their numerous soldier-settler followers. Other recipients of land grants were the
church and its clergy who were established in the newly annexed regions and the
indigenous intermediary functionaries, balabbats. All such landholders, neftenya,
were granted land not on the basis of size, but rather according to the number of the
client peasant farmers, gabbars, who settled and worked on it. The neftenyas were
charged with the supervision of the gabbars settled on their lands, collecting and
forwarding part of the tribute and taxes paid by them. In addition they were entitled to
receive a variety of onerous services owed by the gabbars. The gabbar was obliged to
pay a part of his produce, usually a quarter or a third, as tribute, taxes on his livestock,
customary dues of meat, honey and butter, and offer the neftenya gifts on occasions of
religious festivals, his marriage or birth of a son. In addition he was to offer his
unpaid labour in helping the neftenya cultivate his own farm, grind and transport his
grain, help in building his house, granary and fences, look after his animals, provide
fire-wood and fodder etc … and act as his porter and messenger. In this way the
Shawan conquerors managed to provide for the upkeep of the hierarchy of
administrative appointees and the armies of occupation stationed at strategically
located military bases, katamas, in the conquered regions.
The steady flow of revenues in kind and hard cash made Menilek wealthy
enough to be able to purchase increasing quantities of better quality imported modern
weapons and relevant ammunition. At the same time he could well afford to continue
the delivery of substantially rich tribute to the emperor. Firearms and their accessories
were to be become the largest and most valued items of import that flowed into
Shawa from the coast. Their flow had been slow during the 1870’s and early 1880’s.
It was started by Menilek entrusting some European arms dealers with royal caravans
loaded with ivory, civet musk, coffee and other merchandise to be sold abroad and the
proceeds used to buy arms for him. For example, in 1876 the Frenchman Pievve

80
Arnoux was put in charge of a royal caravan consisting of 165 camels carrying 2,100
kilograms of ivory, 6,900 kilograms of coffee, 1,500 kilograms of civet, 1,950 hides,
12 kilograms of musk and other local products. The total value of the trade goods was
estimated at about 200,000 francs.1 A similar assignment was entrusted to L.A.
Bremond in 1882 when he was sent to the coast with a caravan carrying ivory and
musk. The proceeds of the sale of the cargo, expected to fetch some 40,000 – 50,000
francs, in addition to 60,000 thalers in cash given by Menilek, were to pay for the
purchase of arms.2 He returned to Shawa in mid-1883 with a consignment of 6,000
rifles.3 The same procedure was repeated with Labatut in September 1885 and Léon
Chefneux in February 1886.4
In December 1877 Sebastino Martini Bernardi, a newly arrived member of the Italian
expedition, was given 7,708 thalers and sent back to Italy to buy arms for the king.5
Later towards the end of April 1883 Pietro Antonelli, anther member of the Italian
expedition delivered to Menilek the 2,000 Remington rifles for which he had
previously contracted in 1881 to supply.6 Then in November 1884 he signed a new
private contract with Menilek for the supply of 50,000 new Remington rifles with 200
rounds of ammunition a piece over a ten years period.7
The flow of the imported arms increased steadily after the establishment of the
Italians and the French at Assab and Obock in 1883-1884 respectively and the
opening of trade routes linking them to Shawa. From then onwards the Italian
government, through Pietro Antonelli as the official emissary, and individual French
arms traffickers became the major supplies of arms to Menilek. The king paid for his
purchase partly in local merchandise, but mostly in thalers. It was estimated that by
1889, when he became emperor, Menilek had at his disposal at least 60,000 rifles of
all sorts, one million rounds of ammunition, one million percussion caps, and many
barrels of gunpowder.8
Besides the required despatch of tribute to the emperor, royal revenues were
needed to meet the demands for the upkeep of the rank and file of the royal regiment

1
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 44; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 174.
2
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 60.
3
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 204.
4
- Ibid., p. 176.
5
- Ibid.
6
- Giglio, C. Etiopia – Mar Rosso, 1, p. 154; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 68,70.
7
- Giglio, C. Ethiopia – Mar Rosso, 1, pp. 273-274; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 73-74; Darkwah, Koki,
op.cit., , pp. 200-201.
8
Ibid., pp. 201 – 205.

81
stationed at and arround the court, the large number of peoples employed at the many
royal household establishments, and the enormous royal feasts given a special
religious occasions when about 10,000-13,000 peoples were usually fed far four days
at a time. Menilek is said to have confided to a member of his trusted entourage that:
“Kassa (Emperor Yohannes IV) beat Takla Giyorgis
with cannon; I have fought him with Thalers (Maria
Theresa dollars), with Tej (honey-wine), and with
brundo (raw meat) and Iam confident of defeating
him.”1
In conformity with one of the main terms of the 1878 Liche Agreement Menilek
unfailingly continued the regular remittance of impressive tribute to Emperor
Yohannes. For instance, as early as May 1878, when negotiations for the peace
settlement were still going on, Menilek is said to have dispatched to the imperial
camp an advance rich tribute consisting of 10,000 cows, 1,000 horses, 1,000 mules,
large numbers of slaves of both sexes and various provisions.2 Later in the same
month he provided the emperor with numerous cows, enormous quantities of honey,
tej, araki (native wine) and valuable gifts which included several mules harnessed in
gold, a number of double-barrelled rifles and two coats of arm said to have been
gifted to him by members of the Italian expedition and Khedive Ismail.3 Several
months later when the king presented the emperor with a further impressive tribute
Yohannes is reported to have said: “Only today am I … Emperor.”4
In December 1880 Menilek is said to have paid Emperor Yohannes 50,000
thalers in cash, 600 mules and horses with tacks trimmed in silver and gold, and first
quality shammas (tobes) worth about 80,000 thalers. And in May 1881 the tribute he
sent to the emperor consisted of 10,000 thalers in cash, 30,000 duallas of grain,
10,000 cows, 2,000 measures of flour, and 400 urns of butter; the last four items
estimated at about 50,000 thalers.5 On another occasion, in January 1886, the lavish
tribute he presented to the emperor was valued at 2,000,000 lire.

1
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 37 citing Massaia, G. Trentacinque anni, IX, p. 106.
2- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 440-442.
3
- Antonelli, Pietro, “Scioa e Scioani," lettera del Conte Pietro Antonelli, Let-Marefia, July, 1881”,
BSGI, XIX, fasc. 1 (January, 1882), p. 21.
4
- Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 56 citing Massaia, G., Trentacinque anni, XI, p. 46.
5- Antonelli, P., “Scioa e Scioani,” p. 88; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 64.

82
 Another contributing factor that impelled the conquest, especially during its
last stages, was Menilek’s positive response to the advancing thrust of British, Italian
and French imperialism. Signs of such reaction many have been apparent as early as
1887 when fears about a possible Italian advance on Harar after the Porro massacre
moved Menilek to proceed with the conquest and incorporation of the town and its
immediate surroundings. The response was continued after he became emperor. In
April 1891 he sent a letter to the major European powers in which he defined the
historical extent of the boundaries of Ethiopia. These happened to include large areas
already claimed, though not occupied, by the British, the Italians and the French
already established in their coastal protectorates. Menilek’s claims were largely
ignored, most probably because the prevalent official opinion in Europe was that
Ethiopia was already on its way of becoming an Italian protectorate. No protests were
made or actions were taken when some of Menilek’s army units began infiltrating the
Ogaden region already claimed, but not occupied, by Britain.
After the 1896 victory at Adwa the policy of encroaching into the surrounding
lowland regions was intensified. Between 1896 and 1900 an increasing number of
military units were sent into the peripheral lowland regions surrounding the southern
highlands in all directions. In the south-east the greatest parts of the Ogaden region
were claimed by 1898. In the south Menilek’s forces had reached the shores of Lake
Rudolf in 1898 and conquered Borana Oromo territories in 1899. In the south-west his
forces reached the Akobo river in the plains of the Southern Sudan. The economically
unattractive, sparsely-occupied, arid, hot or humid lowlands were not targeted for
their value. Menilek’s main preoccupation and real objective in securing control over
them was to maintain them as “protective buffer Zones” to ward off aggressive
European intrusion into the already occupied rich Oromo and Sidama inhabited
highlands in the interior.1
In this connection Menilek has sometimes been described as a participant with
the Europeans in the partition and colonisation of Sub-Saharn Africa during the last
two decades of the nineteenth century.
“{He} participated in the scramble for Africa, his
rivals were the Europian Colonial powers, he

1
- Marcuss, H.G., “Imperialism and Expansionism in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900”, in Gann, L.H., and
Duignan, Peter (eds.), Colonialism in Africa1870-1960. Vol. 1 The History and Politics of Colonialism
1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 447-448;

83
 reached boundary agreements with the Europeans
similarly as they had reached with each other,
and conquered peoples that were of a different
ethnic and religious composition, and who were
considered culturally and racially inferior.”1
For the politically conscious Oromo and Somali activists and sympathisers for
their cause the common colonial experience has resulted in the homelands of their
kinsmen being forcefully conquered and their defenceless peoples being oppressively
governed.2 This, too, was the view of the former governments of the Somali
Republic.3
Admitedly parallels and similarities between the two particular episodes do exist, but
this does not make them identical. Neither the initial considerations that motivated
them nor were the circumstances surrounding the different phases of their
development the same.
It has sometimes been suggested that among the motives for the conquest of
the Oromo and Sidama southern regions were Menilek’s aspirations to regain
provinces that once were “rightfully belonging to the domain of the Solomonic
throne”, but were “lost” after the Muslim jihad wars of the sixteenth century and the
Oromo migrations that fallowed. 4 Indeed this is the usual explanation which is rather
than justification provided by chroniclers and traditional Ethiopian historians for what
they refer to as the “reconquest” and “reoccupation” of the south.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that hunger for land in the core northern
provinces, aggravated by the disastrous effects of the 1889-1892 Great Famine
“stimulated the tendency towards expansionism.”5 It is true that the effects of these
occurrences stimulated the late migration of the Tigre and northern Amhara into the
newly conquered southern regions rather than having had an initial motivating role in
the actual process of conquest.

1
-Natsoulas, Theodore, “The Anatomy of An Indigenous African Colonial State”, HA, 4/3 (1981), p. 3.
2
- Greenfield, Richard and Mohammed Hassan, “Interpretation of Oromo Nationality”,HA, 3/3 (1980),
pp. 8-11.
3
- The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives (Mogadishu, 1962),pp. V-VI, XI-XII, 11,
13, 25, 77; The Somali Nation And Abyssinian Colonialism (Mogadishu, 1978), pp. 5-11, 15-16; The
Portion of Somali Territory Under Ethiopian Colonization (Mogodishu, 1974), for maps and plates.
4
- Markakis, John, op.cit., p. 23; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 96, 100.
5
Markakis, John, op.cit., pp. 23 -24.

84
(iii) Methods of the Conquest:-
In Shawa of the beginnings of the mid-nineteenth century, as elsewhere in
Christian Ethiopia, there were no professional standing armies. Such a development
occurred only gradually over the following years. Every able-bodied male subject of
the monarch was originally a peasant working on the land, but was expected to enlist
as a soldier whenever being asked to do so. In times when the country was threatened
by outside aggression or when a military campaign into enemy territories was planed
the monarch, as the commander – in – chief, issued orders for all the able male adults
among his subjects to present themselves already prepared for military service.1
It has been estimated by Antonelli that Menilek could mobilise a maximum of
196,000 troops by the late 1887. Total mobilisation, however, was practically
impossible, for it meant the evacuation of most of the soldiers from the newly
incorporated conquered territories. He could actually assemble a force of about
34,000 combatants immediately, including soldiers of the royal regiment who would
be armed with good quality rifles. A total of up to 100,000 men at arms could
properly be assembled in cases of emergency, nearly half of whom would be in
possession of firearms. The remaining 96,000 troops would be left for garrison duties
in the conquered regions.2
Two major annual military campaigns of conquest, Zemechas, were usually
conducted by the Shawans, after the “big rains”, keremt, which occur between June
and September, and the “little rains”, balg, that fall in March or April; after the heavy
farming duties were already completed. Each Zemecha sent into enemy territories
usually lasted for from two to three or four months, returning in some cases with no
less than 60,000 – 100,000 heads of cattle and thousands of slaves as war booty. In
this way the military campaigns of conquest were “indispensable for the economic life
of the country”. From the king downwards to his generals, their officers, the soldiers
and even the ordinary poor subjects drew substantial direct or indirect rewards from
the results of a campaign. On the other hand, hurried punitive expeditions of shorter
duration, gesgassas, were often undertaken during emergencies and for specific

1
- Sambon, Luigi, L’Esercito Abissino (Rome, 1896), p. 7 The same is printed as “Etiopia Militare”,
BSAI, IX (1890); Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 180.
2
- ASMAI 36/ 5-43 Conte Pietro Antonelli, “Memoria sulla “zemeccia”o spedizione dell’ esercito
scioana”, Addis Ababa, 23 Nov. 1887, fols. 25-29. Hereafter referred to as Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”,
and fol number. It is printed in Libro Verde, No. XV, Etiopia, Doc. No. 131, pp. 280 – 307 and in
L’Esplorazione Commerciale, Anno V, fasc. X (Oct. 1890), XI (Nov. 1890), and XII (Dec. 1890);
Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 180-181; Marcus, H.G. op.cit., p. 66.

85
objectives; to punish a rebellious tribe that with held the usual payment of tribute or to
pillage the territories of an independent tribe that attacked another who happened to
be tributary or friendly to the Shawans. It usually lasted for about a fortnight, or at
most for a month or a month and a half. It brought back rich booty in captured slaves
and livestock.1
Sometimes a gesgassa could have been part of a Zemecha, when some of the
soldiers left their encampment in enemy territory for two, three or five days to pillage
the surrounding countryside before returning to their camp with captured cattle, slaves
and provisions. On occasions when Menilek travelled with a large part of his army to
meet with the emperor at Debra Tabor in Bagemder or at Boru Meda in Wallo the
soldiers travelling with him described their journey as Zemacha.2
Once a zemacha or a gesgassa was decided upon mobilisation commenced
about a month or a month and a half before its departure. A royal proclamation, awaj,
was issued at least a fortnight and a half ahead of the departure indicating the specific
date and place for the assembly of the troops. This was announced in public by an
officer, meslene, of the royal spokesman, afa-negus (“month of the king”), through
the slow and solemn strokes of the huge royal war-drums, nagarits, for fourty five
times at regular internals of an hour or an hour and a half.3 The royal proclamation
issued for the 1886 campaign against the Arussi (Arsi) Oromo was as follows:-
“Eat well and feed your horses and your mules
to become fat, prepare flour, red pepper, salt
and other provisions, and let all be found here
at Entotto on the day of Abbo, after the eighth of
Easter. Whoever does not heed my words will be
punished with the confiscation of all his goods.”4
The king himself often marched, surrounded by his royal bodyguards, at the
head of several military campaigns of conquest. In such cases he led the royal troops
in person. Most of the other expeditions, however, were undertaken under the
command of his leading generals and their officers. In such instances a part of the
royal troops was allotted for the commanding general for the duration of the
1
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia; fols. 2-5; Dakrwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 181; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., 65.
2
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fol. 2.
3
- Ibid., fols. 11-12, 35; Sambon, L., op.cit., pp. 7-8; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 65, Darkwah, Kofi,
op.cit., p. 187.
4
- Antonello, P., “zemeccia”, fol. 12; Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 8; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 66. The text
cited above is Marcus’s translation from the Italian original.

86
campaign. They provided the core for his less experienced soldiers to bolster their
morals and increase their fire-power. In the absence of the monarch they were led by
their own commander, the turk pasha. In 1887 he was Dajach Makuria.1
Provisions for the monarch, his royal troops, the generals and their subordinate
officers were provided in advance. They were carried on donkeys led by some of their
soldier aides. Additional provisions were expected to be provided by local governors,
shums, and tributary rulers as the army passed through their territories. The soldiers
brought with them their own traditional weapons (lances, spears and shields), and
their own provisions (dried meat, roasted grain, flour, red pepper and salt). In addition
they carried the firearms that were distributed to them by their commanding officers.2
On the fixed day for departure the disordered rush of officers, soldiers,
retainers, wives and slaves carrying the soldiers provisions accompanied by priests
carrying wooden alters, crosses and other sacred objects moved along the road like “a
torrential stream”. All followed the king or the commanding governor without
knowing the exact destination of the expedition which was kept a secret. While the
priests chanted hymns and blessed the soldiers, elderly onlookers and young girls
sang and applauded them ass they passed by. While the army was still within Shawan
or friendly territories the local shum or tributary ruler provided additional provisions
and carriers. They were also expected to ensure that the road was easily passable for
the army. From time to time new combatants joined the ranks of the army, bringing
with them their own weapons and provisions for the duration of the campaign. Of
special note were the large groups of adventurous warriors, fanno, who joined the
army en - route, armed with lances, spears and shields, but carried no provisions.
They were expected to live solely on what they could pillage on the field.3
Some order prevailed when the army was encamped. Only the king, the high
ranking officers of his royal bodyguard or the commanding general and his senior
officers slept in tents. The royal tents were located at the centre, surrounded by those
belonging to the other commanders each of whom was assigned a place according to
his rank and status. Some of the rank and file of subordinates had huts of straw

1
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fols. 15-16, 27-28; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 66; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp.
181-183, 185-186.
2
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fol. 29; Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 9; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 65; Darkwah,
Kofi, op.cit., p. 188.
3
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fols. 31-32, 35; Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 10; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., pp. 65-
66; Darkwah, Kofi, p.cit., pp. 188-189.

87
temporally constructed for them. The rest of the soldiers and their followers either
sought shelter as best as they could or slept in the open air.1
The Fetha Nagast ("Law of the Kings")2 provided the traditional guiding regulations
for the methods to be followed in the process of the conquest of alien peoples. These
read as follows:-
"When you reach a city or a land to fight against its inhabitants, offer them terms of
peace. If they accept you and open their gates, the men who are there shall become
subjects and shall give you tribute, but if they refuse the terms of peace and offer
battle, go forward to assault and oppress them, since the Lord your God will make
you master of them."3
Therefore, in case the local ruler of an invaded region chose to submit before
the beginning of hostilities he was usually offered the chance to do so. He often came
forward carrying a stone on his neck and knelt in front of the king or the commander
of the campaign signalling his humility and peaceful submission. He was normally
allowed to retain his position as an autonomous tributary ruler of his people provided
that he continued to acknowledge Shawan overlordship and delivered the prescribed
annual tribute. His territory and his people were spared the mass killings,
emasculations, general devastation, the capture of livestock and the enslavement of
women, young girls and boys that were the fate of others who opted for resistance and
were ruthlessly subjugated.4
On the entry of the invading army into hostile enemy territories the fanno
broke away and moved one or two days in advance of the main army. They
functioned as scouts and advance patrols; destabilising the enemy, killing any of them
they encountered, plundered the countryside and burned villages. Those who were
captured during the preliminary skirmishes were interrogated about the whereabouts
of the enemy fighters, where were the cattle concealed and where grain and other
valuable belongings were hidden. Those who did not cooperate were killed on the
spot as a warning to the other captives. Those who cooperated satisfactorally and

1
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fol. 32; Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 10; Marcus, H.G. op.cit., p. 66.
2
A compilation of traditional Ethiopian law, apparently a translation in Ge'ez of an Egyptian Coptic
text, which appeared in the fifteenth century.
3
Quted by Joh Markakis, op.cit., p. 104 and note 1 on the same page citing the English translation of
the original Ge'ez manuscript prepared by Paulos Tzadua for the Law Faculty Haile Sellassie
University, p. 50.
4
- Markakis, John, op.cit., pp. 104-105.

88
provided valuable intelligence were given a horse and new clothes similar to those
worn by the Shawan soldiers and employed as spies and guides.1
The main force continued its march with increased speed while the nagarits
were sounded continuously. The country on all sides of the army’s path became
deserted and desolate as the local inhabitants fled with their movable belongings
seeking safe refuge. Along the way the monarch or the commander of the campaign
kept watching the surroundings through his field glasses to ascertain, if possible,
where enemy soldiers had fled or their cattle was concealed.2
Before sunset an elevated part of the countryside was selected as a place to
stop for the night. The royal tents were hurriedly fetched and put up. Then thousands
of other smaller tents belonging to the accompanying commanders sprang up
immediately. Others among the lower ranks had small huts of straw constructed for
them or spent the night on the open air. The royal tent, usually made of red silk, was
pitched at the centre of encampment facing the direction along which the army would
be heading next morning. Nearby were the tents of the royal favourites and
bodyguards. Tents belonging to the other commanders were put up arround them in an
ordered manner according to rank and status.3
Early the next day, just before dawn, extraordinary movements and general
commotion commenced as the camp was pulled down. At the sounds of the nagarits
all noisy movements were halted. The army then prepared to regroup and advance to
take up an assault position. At the centre was the monarch, as commander-in-chief,
surrounded by his young favourites, balamwals, and his royal bodyguards. Overall
field command was entrusted to a ras; or if a ras was actually in command of a
campaign directions on the field were made the responsibility of a dajazmach. The
advance units were placed under the command of a fitawrari (“major-general”).
Command of the right wing was given to a qagnazmach (“brigadier-general”); while
the left wing was commanded by a grazmach (“brigadier-general”). The rear guard
and the reserves were placed under the command of a meridazmach (“colonel”). The
gondari royal regiment was usually commanded by the king personally, but in his
absence it was led by its own commander, the turk pasha. Other field – officers were
the balambaras (“lieutenant-general”); the shalaqa (“commander of 1,000 men”); the

1
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fols. 21-22, 32-34; Sambon, L., op.cit., pp. 42-43; Marcus, H.G., op.cit.,
pp. 66-67.
2
- Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 45.
3
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia,” fals. 34-36; Sambon, L. op.cit., pp.45-48.

89
shambal (“leader of 500 men”); the mato (“leader of 100 men”); and the hamsa (“head
of 50 men”)1.
The signal for the army to attack was given by the solemn strokes of the
nagarits. All the components of the army, headed by the fitawrari and his advance
units, rushed to attack en mass amid the continued sounds of the nagarits and the
shouts of war cries; irrespective of military hierarchical order or status. This was
specially so as their enemy adversaries were not armed with firearms and the
prospects of rich booty and trophies was irresistible. In Antonelli’s words, “one sees
thirty or forty thousand men all running in one direction … soldiers no longer
thinking about their generals, nor … of the king {who} in these moments is a simple
soldier … It is a flood of men following a giddy course”.2
During the actual battle, thor, which continued for about some eight or ten
hours, the Shawans mounted two or three frontal attacks on their enemies. On each
attack several groups of cavalry and infantry engaged the enemy, retreated and
returned to fight again in confusion. Riflemen kept on firing their rifles at some
distance from each other as they moved forward. Others fought in direct face to face
combat. Taking advantage of their superior-fire power and their larger numbers the
Shawans often overwhelmed their adversaries. Each attack resulted in substantial
numbers of the enemy being killed or emasculated and left to die on the battlefield.
Large numbers of cattle, young women and children were rounded up and driven to
the camp. Captured able-bodied males and the elderly were summarily executed.
Whole villages were looted before being burned and reduced to ashes. At the end of
the day fighting was stopped as the camp was beginning to fill up with captured war-
booty.3
Ruthless killings, emasculations and unwarranted severe devastations were
usually inflicted on the enemy when the invaders’ initial offer of peaceful submission
was turned down, or when the enemy’s stubborn resistance took a heavy toll of
Shawan soldiers. Fighting was terminated only when the surviving local rulers finally
decided to submit. The most ferocious and the bloodiest of all the zemachas was the
one sent against the Arussi (Arsi) Oromo in May 1886 after which the unfortunate

1
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fol. 37; Sambon, L., op.cit., pp. 49-50; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 67, n.1 on
the same page.
2
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia,” fol. 37 The quoted observation is Marcus’s translation from the Italian
original, Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 50; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 67.
3
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fols. 37-39; Sambon, L., op.cit., pp. 50-56; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 67.

90
tribesmen were cowed into submission.1 The defeated local rulers presented
themselves at the camp, and performed the traditional act of formal submission. Each
of them approached the king or whoever commanded the campaign carrying a rock on
his neck before kneeling at his feet as a sign of humility and vassalage. Once this was
over an awaj was issued prohibiting further hostile acts and devastation for the
vanquished authorities and their people had become Menilek’s subject. The
commander of the campaign appointed one of the accompanying military
functionaries, with some soldiers and settlers, to remain behind and administer the
land on behalf of the negus of Shawa.2
After victory celebrations and feastings were completed, the camp was pulled
down and the army started to return home. In addition to the usually disordered
procession of commanders, officers, soldiers, their retinue and followers numerous
slaves of both sexes were added. They walked on the sides carrying loads of war-
booty and spoils on their bare backs and heads. Thousand heads of livestock were
shepherded alongside them. On reaching safe Shawan territory the booty was sorted
and divided, with the monarch’s share amounting to a half or two – thirds of the total.
The rest was divided among the soldiers who were disbanded and returned to their
villages. The king, his royal bodyguards and the accompanying commanders and
officers proceeded on the road leading to the capital. Their triumphant re-entry was
made amid festive celebrations and joyful parades. After being feasted by the king,
usually in turns, the royal bodyguards were disbanded to resume their duties around
the royal households, while accompanying commanders and officers returned to their
respective provinces. 3

1
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia,” fols. 42-43; Sambon, L., op.cit., pp. 57-60; Marcus, H.G. op.cit., pp. 67-
68.
2
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia,”fol. 43; Sambon, L., op.cit., pp. 63-64; Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 68.
3
- Antonelli, P., “zemeccia”, fols. 43-44; Sambon, L., op.cit., p. 64; Marcus, H.G. op.cit., p. 68.

91
 CHAPTER IV
The EARLY PHASE OF SHAWAN CONQUEST TO 1882

For most of the early years of his reign, between his coronation as negus of
Shawa in August 1865 and the conclusion of the Liche peace agreement of 20 March
1878 with Emperor Yohannes IV, Menilek seems to have been too much preoccupied
with his kingdom’s most pressing immediate domestic problems. Among the urgent
tasks demanding his attentive consideration had been the maintenance of his own
position as the sovereign monarch of Shawa. In addition he had to protect the
independence of his kingdom from any foreseeable threat from either the imperial
centre or any one of the major contestants for imperial succession and hegemony in
northern Ethiopia. Therefore, guaranteeing the security of Shawa’s strategically
important though highly vulnerable northern frontier, which was inhabited by the
Wallo Oromo, assumed the highest priority. 1
The situation on the open southern borders of the kingdom, however, was
different, Shawan military offensive against the small and fractious Tuloma /
“Shawan” Oromo groups on the southern border regions dates back to the times of
Amha Iyasus in the third decade of the eighteenth century. Afterwards successive
Shawan rulers, especially Sahle Sellassie (r. 1813-1847), adopted a subtle
combination of diplomatic peaceful persuasion, inducements of political marriages,
alliances and the use of physical force in dealing with their Oromo neighbours in the
south. By so doing they succeeded in obtaining the submission of some of the Oromo
groups, their acknowledgment of Shawan overlordship and their own tributary vassal
status. The accomplishments of the various Shawan rulers varied considerably, for
some of them were more successful than others in attaining their objectives.2
Menilek’s grandfather Sahle Sellassie has been credited with subduing the
Abitchu, Gombitchu and Karayu Oromo up to the course of the Awash river in the
south. His armies are said to have raided and collected tribute from as far as the

1
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 54-55, 56.
2
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

92
regions of the Borena Oromo, across the Abbbay in the southwest, and the Soddo
Oromo beyond the Awash to Aimelell in northern Gurageland. Those gains are said to
have led Sahle Sellassie to style himself with the royal title of “negus of Shawa, Yifat,
the Galla {Oromo} people and Gurage.”1 His successor Haile Malakot (r. 1847-1856)
is reported to have been able to suppress the rebellion of several tributary Oromo
groups beyond the Awash river who raided into Shawan territories. Apparently no
new gains were made at the expense of the Oromo during his short reign.2 In 1858
Bezzabbeh, the governor of Shawa on behalf of Emperor Tewodros, is said to have
extended Shawa’s influence southwards as far as Gurageland, and had demanded
tribute from Oromo tribes on the borders of Limmu – Ennarya who most probably
were allies or tributaries of Abba Bagibo.3
On their arrival in Shawa in September 1876 Cecchi and Chiarini were told
that the kingdom under the new rule of Menilek was reasonably calm, but the Oromo
on its southern borders has always been prone to be rebellious and keen on preserving
their independence. They often rebelled, infiltrated and raided Shawan regions. The
king’s generals have been forced, on several occasions, to hasten to punish the
insurgents, safeguard the integrity of the borders and re-establish respect for Shawan
authority.4 They were also told that Gobana has recently been promoted to the rank of
dajazmach as a reward for his valuable contribution in the suppression of a series of
Oromo rebellions. 5
By the beginning of our period, therefore, some sort of a general pattern
concerning Shawan-Oromo relationships on the swaying open southern borders seem
to have already been well established. Some Oromo tribal groups appear to have been
peacefully or forcibly subdued, while others alternated between continued
submissions or opted for rebellion and the maintainance of their autonomy. Shawan
frontier-governors sing. abegaz, with some Shawan soldier-settlers were stationed at
selected strategically located garrison villages, katamas. They were entrusted with the
duties of overseeing the continued Shawan hold over the subject peoples in the region,
collecting and forwarding tribute, and protecting the passage of commercial caravans

1
- Abir, M., op.cit., pp. 153-154-157, 163-164, 176; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 8-9, 26.
2
- Abir, M., op.cit., p. 178; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 36.
3
- Muhammed Hassen, op.cit., p. 194.
4
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 267-268.
5
- Ibid., p. 268.

93
etc … They were also charged with undertaking military campaigns for future
conquest on their own initiative or when being ordered to do so.1
For Menilek’s purposes as well as far his future plans the conquest and
incorporation of the petty politically divided and mutually hostile Tuloma / “Shawan”
Oromo tribal groups was a preliminary objective. Only after their subjection have
been completed would his armies be able to reach up to the rich Macha Oromo
regions lying further southwards in the direction of the Gibe states. Although such
considerations were of basic importance for the future realisation of his imperial
pretensions Menilek did not appear to have pressed on with their becoming realised
soon after his coming to power. Preoccupation with the conquest of the strategically
important Wallo region, between 1868 and 1876, was a major distraction.2 The ill-
fated attempt to influence the internal struggle for imperial succession which broke
out in the north on the death of Emperor Tewodros was another.3 Moreover, the
puzzling prolonged campaign of 1876-1877 through Wallo to Bagemder, the invasion
and pillaging of Gojjam before returning to Shawa has been a fruitless waste of
precious time and resources.4
Though the necessary attention and military resources for sustained southern-
oriented conquest and territorial acquisition were not forthcoming prior to 1878 the
Shawans had neither been idle on their southern borders, nor did they turn a blind eye
on developments alongside them. They continued to conduct not only defensive
actions but mostly offensive military campaigns, often in alliance with some Oromo
groups, against other neighbouring kinsmen in the south. In so doing the Shawans
appear to have had the advantages of strong leadership, the ability to deploy greater
numbers of combatants on the battlefield and better tactics. In contrast the structural
political weakness and disunity as well as the almost constant hostilities and struggles
for power precluded the possibilities of the Oromo and Sidama societies to unite
together in a common front in the face of a common enemy. An even more serious
handicap for the two societies had been the failure of their leaders and their subjects
to adapt themselves to the use of firearms. No doubt much of that failure could be
ascribed to two factors. Firstly, the whole of southern Ethiopia was largely landlocked

1
- Abir, M., op.cit., pp. 163-164, 174-175; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 189-190, 192-193.
2
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 83-84, 87-90.
3
- Ibid., p. 73; Marcus, H.G. op.cit., pp. 33-35.
4
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 76; Marcus, H.G. op.cit., p. 42.

94
from access to foreign sources of firearms supplies. Secondly, the rulers of northern
Ethiopia had successfully adopted a strategic and monopolistic policy which
prohibited the traffic of firearms to the south. Still, a large part of the failure rests on
the traditional disdain and reluctance of the Oromo, in particular, to use firearms.1
From time to time military excursions were sent to neighbouring Oromo
countries to subject independent tribal groups, suppress rebellions, punish non-
payment of tribute and stop raiding into Shawan territories. Beside the restoration of
Shawan control and prestige those short campaigns, gesgassa, assured the Shawans
substantial booty and tribute. From an early period since he came to power Menilek
seems to have been convinced of the need to maintain connections and alliances with
many of the leaders of the Tulama Oromo of Shawa if he hoped to govern Shawa
effectively and ensure the expansion of her southern borders. This seems to have been
the probable reason why the young king came to depend increasingly on Gobana
Dacci, then a young soldier at the Shawan royal court. It was mostly under the
influence and leadership of Gobana that several of the Tulama Oromo leaders joined
in an alliance with the Shawan king to assist in his plans for southern territorial
conquest. Indeed the Oromo alliance formed the basis for the combined armies,
composed mostly of Oromo cavalry, which Gobana led personally; the ones that had
been credited for the greater part of the southern conquests made before 1889. To
borrow Richard Greenfield’s remark Gobana “was the architect of the Shawan Galla
{Oromo} Confederation which sought to unite all these {Tulama} groups and which
Menilek used to further extend the areas under his control.”2
Gobana is said to have been born in Shawa about 1817 or 1821 of Tulama
Abitchu parentage. His wife is reported to have been the sister or the daughter of
Birru Nagawi, a leader of the Salale Oromo who had been killed while fighting
against the Chabo Oromo.3 According to Muhammed Hassen, however, he was born
to “a princely Christian Oromo family.4
Gobana appears to have started his career as a young soldier at the courts of
Sahle Sellassie, Haile Malakot and Bezzabbeh before he attracted Menilek’s attention
and joined his service soon after 1865. Exactly how and when did that happen or
what were the circumstances in which he so favourably impressed the young king

1
- Darkwash, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 97-98; Muhammed Hassen, op.cit., p. 197.
2
- Greenfield, R., op.cit., p. 97.
3
- Ibid.
4
- Muhammed Hassen, op.cit., p. 198.

95
with his military talent and promising future is difficult to ascertain. What has been
agreed upon, however, is that his rapid rise to power and prominence has been quite
unprecedented for an Oromo; being successively promoted to the ranks of abegaz,
dajac-agafari and dajazmach before 1878, and then ras in that year.1 A contemporary
description of his two residences in Abitchu country located at Gimbisi, a little to the
south of Liche and Angolala, and at Aman a short distance south of the Beresa stream
had been given by Cecchi. Both were built on high hill tops surrounded by very deep
slopes an almost all sides, more or less naturally fortified fortresses strong enough to
withstand Oromo attacks.2 He has been portrayed differently as Menilek’s “ablest
general and the greatest empire-builder”, though for most of the Oromo he has been a
traitor who “betrayed his own people”.3
The only available source material concerning the early Shawan military
excursions and campaigns against the Tuloma Oromo groups is probably still the brief
oral information collected by Enrico Cerulli and Richard Greenfield. What follows in
the three paragraphs below, therefore, is no more than a modest reconstruction of
those verbal testimonies, admitted that outstanding problems of detail, dating and
chronological sequence have not been solved.
Biratu Golé, the leader of the Metta Oromo in the regions to the south of
Mount Wachacha, is reported to have been the first to join the newly formed Oromo
alliance under the auspices of Gobana Dacci. After having agreed with the latter he
still sought and got Menilek’s royal assurances that the Oromo allies would not be
badly treated.4 Gobana himself is said to have led four expeditions against the Abitchu
Oromo. In the first campaign he fought and defeated Tufa Botora, a leader of some
Abitchu clans. He followed his victory by building a fortified residence, katama, at
Fallé.5 Afterwards he led two unsuccessful excursions against Tufa Oba, the leader of
other Abitchu clans. Each time his armies raided enemy territories returning with rich
booty. At last while Gobana was preparing for a third expedition to fight him the

1
- For a biography of Gobana see Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, n. 12 by de Coppet on page 120;
Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 262-263, 268; Cerulli, Enrico, “The Falk Literature of the Galla of
Southern Abyssinia”,Harvard African Studies. Vol. 3 Africana Varia (Cambridge, Mas; 1922), pp. 71-
72; Bairu Tafla, “There Portraits … Ras Gobana Dacci,” JES, V,2 (July, 1967), pp. 145-150; idem.,
“Gobana Dachi”, in L.H. Ofosu Appiah and others (eds.), The Encyclopaedia Africana. Dictionary of
African Biographies. Vol. 1 Ethiopia-Ghana (New York, 1977), pp. 74-75; Muhammed Hassen, op.cit.,
pp. 198-199.
2
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 282-283-284, 286.
3
- Muhammed Hassen, op.cit., p. 198.
4
- Cerulli, E., op.cit., p. 96.
5
- Ibid.

96
Oromo leader and his fellow tribesmen were saved by the intervention of Menilek’s
tutor Nadaw who managed to secure their peaceful submission to the king. Not with
standing Tufa Oba’s submission Gobana proceeded with the construction of two
katamas in his lands at Gimbisi and Aman. Similar to the one at Fallé they were
located on flat hill tops with steep slopes on almost all sides and the approaches to
them were reinforced by artificially made baricades.1
The conquest of the Salale Oromo is reported by Cerulli to have been the
result of a six months long campaign led jointly by Darge and Gobana. Soleillet, who
travelled through Salale country in mid – 1882, makes no mention of a role for
Gobana in the conquest. He was told that the old Salale leader Djara – Gada,
considering Darge’s victory over his countrymen as a revenge for their murder of his
eldest son Djillo, willingly gave the country to him.2 The small territory of the Golle
Oromo, a little to the north of Salale, is said to have been subjected by Fitawrari Laye,
a subordinate officer of Darge.3 Enrico Cerulli mentions a rebellion by the Oborra
Oromo which is said to had continued for almost a whole year before it was put down
by Darge and Makonnen.4
The Gulale Oromo are said to have resolutely stood by the decision taken at
the meeting of their gada elders to resist a Shawan army which was on its way to
attack them under the command of Walde Bayseum. They fought and defeated the
Shawans. Enrico Cerulli gives the text of one of their songs, which they usually sang
during the butta festivals, in which they recall their victory over Walde’s force. Later
their leader Tufamuna, who refused to join Gobana's Oromo alliance, was defeated
and killed in battle by the confederate partners, the Abitchu and the Metta.5
Afterwards the Oromo confederation became increasingly powerful to take up and
defeat the Abu of Mount Zikwala and the Jillé Oromo near Lake Zway.6 Advancing
further towards the southwest they defeated and killed the leader of the Ambo Oromo
in battle.7

1
- Cerulli, E., op. cit., p. 73.
2
Ibid., p. 72; Soleillet, Paul, Voyages en Ethiopic (Rouen, 1886), p. 144
3
Ibid., p. 291.
4
Cerulli, E., op. cit., pp. 96, 97.
5
- Cerulli, E., op.cit., pp. 70, 141 ; Greenfield, R., op.cit., p. 98.
6
- Ibid.
7
- Ibid.

97
 Thus while Menilek was still preoccupied with safeguarding the security of
Shawa's northen frontiers his generals gradually brought several of the Tolama
neighbouring Oromo groups under Shawan control. Correspondingly the kingdom's
southern borders had increasingly been pushed further southwards in the direction of
the Awash river. With the opening of Shawa to the outside world and as the advent of
more Europeans in the country increased historical documentary source materials
became more readily available. In turn this allows for a more accurate and trustworthy
account of the Shawan conquest of the Oromo and Sidama region.
Pierre Arnoux, the adventurous French arms trader and traveller, was told on
arrival at Liche in November 1874 that Menilek's cousin Dajach Mashasha Sayfu
Sellassie was absent on a military expedition fighting some unidentified Oromo tribes
in the neighbourhood of the Awash river.1 Nothing more has been mentioned about
the excursion of the royal prince by the time of the departure of Arnoux for the coast
in mid-May 1875.
During Arnoux's absence Menilek personally led two seperated campaigns in
1875 and 1876 to the south. They were conducted against the Gurage people of Lakes
Zway and Shala region. The main motives behind them are said to have been the
king's desire to recover some valuable Christian treasures, dating back to medieval
times, that were reportedly been kept for safety in the islands of Lake Zway, and to
secure access to the sources of supply for the much sought after Gurage slaves.2
The first campaign, conducted during May-June 1875, appears to have
resulted in the establishment of some kind of Shawan authority over some northern
Gurage tribal groups, though not including the Chaha. Most probably they were the
inhabitants of the provinces of Aimellel, Muhur, Abso, Ghedelei and Esgiā.3 In a
letter addressed to Arnoux on 23 June 1875 Menilek boastfully claimed that his army
had actually conquered the country and he had established five nagarits (literally
"drums"), i.e. administrative districts. The king then enumerated them as Qabiena,
Maru, Walliso, Ammaya and Ambo in Meta {Mecha}, and Agamja in Soddo.4
Furthermore, it is said that Menilek had initially appointed Dajach Germamé to
govern the country on his behalf, but when the latter turned down the royal offer the
1
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Pierre Arnoux's Journal, entry for 13.5.1875; Darkwah, Kofi,
op.cit., p. 99.
2
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 99.
3
- Ibid., n. 138 on p. 102.
4
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Menilek's letter to Pierre Arnoux dated 23.7.1875; Darkwah,
Kofi, op.cit., 99

98
king divided the country into five administrative districts. Soon after Menilek's
departure with his army Omar Baxa, a Muslim adventurer of Caha Gurage origin
ousted Menilek's representative at the district of Qabiena and continued to govern the
region as an independent ruler.1 In early 1976, realising that his small province was
threatened by increased Shawan military advance, Omar Baxa went to Shawa with a
tribute of civet musk to Menilek and offered to become his tributary.2 The Soddo
Oromo, Qabiena's northern neighbours, appear to have submitted to the Shawans most
probably at near the same time.
When the first members of the Italian Geographical Society’s Expedition led
by Orazio Antinori met Menilek at Liche they found that the king has already been
preparing for a planned military campaign to be launched in the direction of the south.
A large army was assembled, after having been summoned by a royal proclamation.
Early on the morning of 15 October 1876 the king left marching at the head of his
army towards the south. Two weeks later the Shawans camped in the country of the
Gumar Gurage. Far away and all around the camp were scattered groups of local
peoples shepherding their cattle. Menilek's chronicler Gabre Sellassie state that the
day on which the camp was set up happened to have been an occasion for a religious
holiday during which soldiers were traditionally forbidden to leave their camp to fight
the enemy. Disregarding such restrictions large numbers of the irregular soldiers,
warari, left the camp and commenced raiding the surrounding countryside. Menilek is
said to have become engulfed with grave misgivings as he watched the fires lit on the
encircling hills while the marauding warari attackers continued to plunder at the
distance.
This time the Shawans appear to have encountered considerable resistance and
suffered substantial losses. Gabre Sellassie writes that many of Menilek's soldiers and
officers never returned to the camp, presumably being killed. He continues to
comment that Menilek was so saddened by the death of his Christian soldiers that he
permitted everybody to enslave the prisoners they had captured.3 The disastrous
outcome of the campaign has been confirmed by Cecchi who describes it as being
"unfortunate" and estimates that the Shawan army's losses at about a third of the

1
- Greenfield, R., op.cit., p. 99.
2
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 11, p. 52; Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 99, n. 127 citing Lande, Louis – L.,
"UnVoyageur Francais dans l'Ethiopie Meridionale", RDDM, XXXI (1879), p. 390.
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 124-125.

99
number of its soldiers.1 On its way back home the army continued its forced marching
all day until sunset to avoid further losses. Though no new gains were made the
campaign brought back substantial booty in captured cattle and slaves.2
Dajach Gobana Daci is said to have campaigned with success during 1868 and
1878 among the Gulale, Yaha, Metta and the Chabo Oromo bordering on the Gurage.
Hapte Giyorgis and Balcha Safe are said to have been captured during one of those
campaigns in the region of Agamja.3 By 1875 most of the "Shawan" / Tuloma Oromo
tribes appear to have been forced into submission and the payment of tribute, most
probably with the exception of the Karayu in the southeast.4 Nevertheless, occasional
rebellions and insurrections were frequent and much more fighting was still to be
undertaken before Shawan hold over conquered regions could be substantiated.
Shawan armies seem to have also penetrated into regions immediately southwards
beyond the Awash, and further south westwards into the northern and north eastern
approaches of the Gibe kingdoms. Jimma Abba Jifar (Jimma Kaka), the richest and
most powerful of the Gibe states, became particularly menanced by Menilek's armies
which had campaigned up to Soddo, Gurage and Qabiena close to its borders.5 It has
been claimed that all the Liban Oromo in the region between the Muger river and the
headwaters of the Awash were conquered by that time. As a result Shawan western
borders were brought closer to the eastern frontiers of Gudru.6 In fact in the same
letter referred to as a source for the above mentioned statement Massaia makes the
generalized assertion that all the Liban Oromo including the Kutay up to Čallia paid
tribute to Menilek.7 In another text of the letter bearing the same date, however, the
Cardinal states that Menilek's armies had raided and plundered up to near the Gibe,
and had subjected part of Gurage to the southeast of Jimma Abba Jifar (Jimma Kaka),
but in all those campaigns the Shawans had "pillé mais n'organise rein".8
From what has been outlined above a general pattern of the Shawan military
conquests accomplished so far may be observed. The Shawans appear to have been

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 124-125, n. 2 on p, 125; Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, p. 271;
Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 102.
2
- Darkwah,Kofi, op.cit., p. 102.
3
- Bairu Tafla, "Two Ethiopian Biographies," JES, VI, 1 (January, 1968), p. 125; Tsehai
Berhanesellassie, "The Life and Career of Däjazmač Balča Aba Näfso," Ibid., 1x,2 (July, 1971), pp.
173, 174.
4
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Letter of Massaia, dated 13.6.1873.
5
- Ibid. Letter of Massaia, dated 9.6.1873.
6
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., p. 98, n. 121. citing letter of Massaia, 15.2.1876.
7
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Letter of Massaia, 15.2.1876.
8
- Ibid.

100
quite successful in most of the campaigns which they conducted among several of the
Oromo and Gurage tribal groups. Substantial war booty, mostly captured cattle and
slaves of both sexes, had been plundered. Submissions and promised payment of
tribute were obtained. Nevertheless, such developments had not been accompanied by
a parallel occupation of conquered territories. The construction and manning of well-
defended garrison compounds, katamas, and the establishment of minimum
administrative structures were lacking in nearly all the conquered regions. The
existence of only a few ones has been reported not far away from the southern
surroundings of the royal residences of Liche, Entoto, Qundi and Debra Berhan.1
In such circumstances the control of the Shawans over most of their newly
subdued tributaries appears to have been tenuous if not existent sometimes. Rebellion
and the withholding of the payment of tribute were frequent occurrences.
Correspondingly the Shawans responded with destructive military reprisals in order to
punish the rebels and to restore Shawan authority and prestige.
Though the agreement of 1878 had settled the relationship between Yohannes
and Menilek to the favour of the emperor it offered significant gains for the king of
Shawa. In the first place it secured his internal position as the recognized legitimate
negus of his kingdom. Secondly, his control over the recently conquered strategically
significant Wallo region and the subordination of its local rulers to his political
authority were affirmed. Hence, he had very little to fear from the emperor. His
relations with Yohannes were destined to continue unharmed as long as he did not
interfere in the internal politics of northern Ethiopia and proceeded with the regular
delivery of pleasing tribute to his imperial sovereign.2 He began, therefore, to devote
most of his energies and military capabilities towards southern expansionism.
Simultaneously, he took more sustained measures to increase his revenues in
exportable merchandise and in cash. It was only in that way could he hope to keep the
emperor reasonably satisfied with the substantially rich tribute regularly paid to him,
and at the same time manage to continue supplying his armies with expensively
purchased modern weaponry. By so doing he would be better prepared for an eventual
challenge for imperial succession.3

1
- For a description of Gobana's residences at Gimbisi and Aman in Abitchu Oromo country see
Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, pp. 282-283, 284, 288.
2
- Darkwah, Kofi, op.cit., pp. 78-79, 95; Sanderson, G.N., op.cit, pp. 648-649.
3
- Sanderson, G.N., op.cit., pp. 648-649; Marcus. H.G., op.cit., p. 57; Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., pp. 78-
79; Bahru Zewde, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

101
Before negotiations for the peace agreement of 20 March 1878 had been finalized
people in Liche were talking about a forth- coming military excursion, gesgassa, to be
led by the king or one of his generals into neighbouring Oromo regions. It was
generally believed that the purpose behind it had been to procure what was needed for
the payment of tribute to the emperor.1 On 10 March, while on his way from Qundi to
let Marefia, Cecchi was informed that Azaj Walda Tsadik had left to join Menilek
who was then campaigning with his army in Abitchu country. The Abitchu Oromo
were said to have rebelled and killed some 600 Shawan soldiers at Finfini. A week
later, when he was travelling from Let Marefia to Liche, he met groups of Shawan
soldiers returning from the kings camp.2 The war booty plundered during the
campaign appears to have formed the greater part of the tribute delivered to the
imperial camp for contributing towards the upkeep of the emperor's army and the
accompanying troops of Ras Adal Tesemma of Gojjam and Muhammad Ali of Wallo
while they camped on Shawan soil.
On 26 March 1878, six days after Menilek's formal submission to Emperor
Yohannes Cecchi, together with Chiarini and Orazio Antinori, encountered Dajach
Gobana and Menilek's cousin Dajach Mashasha Sayfu. They were commanding some
4 to 5 thousand cavalry and between 6 to 7 thousand infantry some of whom were
armed with rifles while others carried lances. All of them were busily engaged in the
construction of a round-shaped compound, katama, with a wide opening facing the
direction along which the generals intend to lead their armies.3
Cecchi and Chiarini were told that the authority of Dajach Mashasha over the
Oromo on the plain of the Awash had not been firmly established.4 The young prince
admitted that the situation among the Oromo of the region was far from being calm
and stable, so that in times of an emergency he or some of his officers would have to
march at the head of thousands of their troops up to the Awash to restore peace and
order. He intended to stay with his soldiers for a while to maintain order among the
turbulent Oromo tribesmen.5 Further southwards they came across groups of some

1
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, p. 436
2
- Ibid., pp. 437-438.
3
- Ibid., p. 496.
4
-Ibid., p. 506.
5
- Ibid., p. 507.

102
5,000 Shawan soldiers under the command of Qaqnazmach Worku and Semmu Negus
engaged in fighting some 2,000 Abu cavalry. They were informed that Dajach
Mashasha had once returned from one of his excursion among the Abu Oromo with a
booty consisting of 7,000 head of cattle and about 3,000 to 4,000 war captives.1
Cecchi comments "Ecco in qual modo ai confini del regno si obbediva agli ordini che
Menelik areva dato di proteggersi."2
After his coronation as negus of Shawa on 26 March 1878 Menilek promoted
his uncle Dajach Darge and his leading General Dajach Gobana to the highest military
rank of ras. Ras Gobana was left acting as regent in Liche while the king left to meet
the emperor in Bagemder and attend the council of Boru Meda. Ras Darge, on the
other hand, was entrusted with the conquest of the Muslim Darra Oromo occupying
parts of the precipitous plateau on the northwestern borders of Shawa with Gojjam
and Wallo. The Darra led by their warrior leader Hassan Wadaj, had rigorously
resisted two separate moves to subjugate them. The first attempt is said to have been
made by Dajach Mashasha Sayfu, while the other was undertaken by Muhammad Ali,
on order from Emperor Yohannes, while he was on his way back to Wallo after
having participated in the 1878 imperial invasion of Shawa. Soon afterwards Hassan
Wadaj died a natural death in 1874, after having slaughtered his war horse, kurara,
vowing "after me no one will ride kurara". The Darra continued to be ruled by a
council of their elders which included Hassan's widow.3 It was Ras Darge who
successfully accomplished the conquest of the Darra in 1878 while Menilek was with
the emperor in Bagemder.4
Though the relatively modest southern penetration and wide spread raiding by
Menilek's armies had not been accompanied by a corresponding extension of Shawan
rule and authority a gradual shift towards concentration on southern oriented conquest
began to take place after 1878. Already by 1876, when the conquest of Wallo was
almost completed, Menilek could start committing more of his troops for campaigning
on the southern front. By that time, too, his armies had begun advancing towards the
rich Oromo kingdoms of the Gibe in the southwest. One direction was by moving
from Entoto in a south western route through northern Macha regions commanding
the principal northern gateway to the region. The other was for Shawan armies to

1
- Ibid.
2
- Ibid.
3
- Cerulli, E., op. cit., pp. 22-23.
4
- Soleillet, P., Voyages en Éthiopie (Rouen, 1886), pp. 291-292.

103
continue campaigning and extending the range of their authority through Soddo,
Qabiena, Botor and Badifolla to the north eastern frontiers of Jimma Abba Jifar, then
the richest and most powerful of the five Oromo states of the Gibe region.
Once Menilek took the decision to extend the range of Shawan expansive wars
of conquest to Oromo lands to the south of the Abbay river he knew quite well that he
was taking the risk of bringing about an eventual conflict with the rulers of Gojjam.
The geographical location of Gojjam on the northern banks of the Abbay gave its
rulers the advantageous control over the principal gateway for the highly valued
commerce of the rich Gibe region and Kaffa in the southwest. Ras Adal Tesamma's
predecessors, descendants of Oromo settlers in Gojjam, had been campaigning and
raiding into the adjacent Oromo highlands beyond the Abbay for almost two
generations or more. 1 His great grandfather Dajach Zawde, who had been married to
a daughter of one of the leaders of the Ammuru Oromo from beyond the river, is said
to have been a reputed governor of Damot who made a reputation for himself by
raiding Oromo regions to the south of his territory.2 His son and successor Goshu
Zawde (d. 1852) has been credited with extending his authority over the eastern parts
of Gojjam within the bend of the river, and conducting military excursions against
neighbouring Oromo groups in the south.3
The Gudru and some sections of the Jimma Raré are said to have maintained
peaceful relations with the Gojjame across the river, where as the Kutay (Genda
Barat), Liban and the Horro to the east of the Gudar river continued to raid both their
Oromo neighbours in the south and the Gojjame in the north. Dajach Goshu Zawde is
reported to have retaliated by campaigning vigorously against them; his soldiers often
returned with captured cattle and war prisoners.4 Nevertheless, none of those military
activities appear to have resulted in the extension of Gojjame authority or presence in
the highland region to the south of the Abbay.5
In 1872 Ras Adal Tesamma took the opportunity of the struggle for power
which occurred in Gudru following the death of Gama Moras to intervene. After

1
- Caulk, R.A., "Territorial Competition and the Battle of Embabo, 1882." JES, XIII, 1, (January,
1975), p. 66.

2
- Ibid.
3
- Ibid., pp. 66-67.
4
- Ibid., p. 67; Triulzi, A., "The Gudru and their Neighbours in the Two Generation Before the Battle
of the Embabo," JES, XIII, 1 (January, 1975), note 89 on page 60.
5
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., 68.

104
settling the succession dispute to his own advantage by securing the overthrow of
Gama Moras's family and the appointment of a client ruler over the Gudru Ras Adal
established a garrisoned post, katama, in Gudru. It was the first of its kind ever
maintained by the Gojjame in the southern highlands.1 From there Ras Adal sought to
extend his authority and influence further among the surrounding Oromo. With the
help of a few matchlockmen Fitawrari Yemar Goshu, the commander of the katama in
Gudru, succeeded in holding Horro cavalry attacks at bay for a time. After the Horro
leader Abiše Garba was deposed and his brother Fandalala was appointed in his place
as a leader the Horro became tributary to Gojjam.2 FitawrariYemar got married to a
daughter of the deposed leader as a token for strengthening Gojjame alliance with the
Horro.3
By 1878 Gojjame authority does not seem to have extended beyond Gudru and
parts of Horro, Lagamara and Jimma Raré. The situation had not changed much by
the time of Ras Adal's coronation as negus of Gojjam and Kaffa under the new royal
name of Takla Haymanot in January 1881.4
The penetration of Shawan raiding campaigns westward of Entoto into the
direction of the Oromo regions below the Abbay seem to have started round about
1876 at least.5 The targeted area appears to have been Lagamara, situated to the south
of Gudru, between the Abbay and the headwaters of the Gibe.6 Menilek's generals
advancing on this front made slow progress. Preoccupation with conducting punitive
military excursions against several recalcitrant Oromo groups on the banks of the
Awash seem to have been responsible for much of the delay.7 Menilek's armies are
said to have been held at bay for some time by the Kutay (Genda Barat). At least they
succeeded in getting through to the eastern part of the country where a local client
governor was appointed. The rest of Kutay fell in Gojjame hands.8 It was only after
the rainy season of 1878 that a Shawan expedition under the command of Ras Gobana

1
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Massaia's letter to Antoine D'Abbadie, 9.6.1873; Massaia, G.,
Trentacinque anni, IX, p. 111 ; X , pp. 174-176; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 66 ; Triulzi, A., op. cit., pp.
59, 60.
2
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., 67; Triulzi, A., op. cit., pp. 61-62.
3
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 67.
4
- Ibid., p. 68.
5
- Ibid., p. 66.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., p. 71, n 26.
8
Ibid, p. 67 n 9.

105
Daci and Dajach Mashasha Sayfu manage to reach Lagamara in October – November
1878.1
The expedition is said to have left Entoto and Finfini towards the middle of
October. On reaching the approaches of Lagamara, however, a detachment which
broke away from the main army under the command of Dajach Mashasha Sayfu made
a direct thrust into the region. The people fled in all directions with their cattle and
few movable belongings as the Shawans appeared in the distance. Several hundreds of
them took refuge at the compound of the Roman Catholic mission and its
surroundings. The Shawan soldiers advancing in battle formation attacked the
assembled crowds. The encounter had been ferocious and bloody as victims were
slaughtered in the hundreds. Few managed to flee, while the young survivors were
rounded up and taken prisoners. Cattle and valued movable belongings were
plundered. Even the mission's building were raided and destroyed. The indigenous
clergy, teachers and several of their new converts were captured, and their private
properties were confiscated. Later in Shawa, in deference
to the pleas of Cardinal Massaia, they were released and their belongings were
restored to them.2
There is no evidence of either Shawan campaigns beyond Lagamara or of
Gojjame advances southwards from Gudru with the accompanying payment of tribute
being made by the time Cecchi was set free in 1880. Mounting panic, however, began
to spread among the Oromo of the Gibe states as alarming news reached them about
alternating movements of Shawan and Gojjame armies in the outskirts of their region.
In early June 1879 a Gojjame army was said to have been camping in Lagamara.
Later in the same month it was reported that the Gojjame had reached Leqa.3
There were rumoured reports that the Shawan general Ras Gobana and the Gojjame
general Ras Daraso would soon be marching southwards.4 It was generally believed
that Ras Adal and Menilek were intending to invade the small Oromo states of the
Gibe to secure the release of the imprisoned Cecchi and to punish his captors. In June

1
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Massaia's letter to Antoine D'Abbadie, Fekare – Ghemb,
3.12.1878. The letter has been printed in Farina, Gioacchino, Le lettere del Cardinal Massaia del 1846
al 1886 (Taurin, 1936), p. 324, and in Martine, Egilberto, Massaia di vicino (n.p., 1937), doc. no. XCII,
p. 410; Letter of Orazio Antinori to the Italian Geographical Society, Let. Marefia, 27.1.1879 in BSGI
(1879), p. 363; Letter of Cecchi and Chiarini to Cap. Camperio,” in, Ibid. (1880), p. 324; Cecchi, A, Da
Zeila, 11, p. 337.
2
- Massaia, G., Trentacinque anni, X, pp. 176-179; XI, pp. 93-94.
3
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 68.
4
- Ibid., p. 71.

106
1879 news began circulating that the Gojjame were planning to advance from their
base in Gudru to join with a Shawan army near Ambo, to the south of Mount Dandi,
for an expedition to Jimma Abba Jifar and Limmu – Enarya.1 Later in the same
month it was heard that the young king of Jimma had sent tribute to Menilek.2 This
has been confirmed by Orazio Antinori who reported the arrival in September 1879 of
five men from Jimma Abba Jifar (Jimma Kaka) carrying tribute from the young king
of that country to Menilek.3
At the beginning of 1880 it was said that Ras Gobana, who had left Shawa
with a large army, had come through Qabiena on his way towards Limmu – Ennarya.
By February he was reported to be among the Oromo of Tadalle, just to the east of the
Gibe river from Jimma Abba Jifar, preparing to attack Jimma's tributary clients the
Botor.4 In July 1880 a messenger sent by Ras Adal Tesamma arrived in Gera. He was
carrying letters addressed to the queen mother of that country and to the rulers of
other neighbouring states informing them that he was not going to send an army to
exact tribute from them if they released Cecchi from imprisonment. The Gojjame
ruler threatened to close all trade routes and markets for merchants of their countries
in case they refused to comply.5 After envoys of the rulers of the adjacent Oromo
states met with the queen mother of Gera, for the third time, she complied and Cecchi
was set free.6
After having been liberated Cecchi left Gera in the middle of August 1880
heading northwards in the direction of the Abby. Passing through Sopso he learned
that Garbe Jello, the leader of the Leqa Bello who had detained Chiarini the previous
year, had become a tribute – paying vassal of the Gojjame.7 As he continued on his
way Cecchi was unaware of any Gojjame presence or detectable signs of their
influence until he reached Embabo and met with Fitawrari Yemar Goshu. The
Gojjame subjection of the small Oromo groups in the neighbourhood of Gudru close
to the Abbay did not seem to have been accomplished by then or they had regained

1
- Ibid., n. 27 on page 71 referring to a letter of Cecchi printed in BSGI (1881), p. 702.
2
- Ibid., n. 28 on page 71 citing Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 11, p. 704 quoting Chiarini.
3
- M. & D. NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Letter of Massaia, 13.2.1879; Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., p. 99 and n.
128 on the same page citing Archivio Storico della Società Geografic Italiana, Cartoni VIIC Antinori to
Bienenfeld, Let – Marefia 13.9.1878.
4
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 11, pp. 547, 549; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., pp. 71-72.
5
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 11, pp. 545-546, 548-549; Caulk, op. cit., p. 68.
6
- Cecchi, A., Da Zeila, 1, p. 549.
7
- Ibid., pp. 554-555; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 68.

107
their autonomy.1 As late as October 1880 Fitawrari Yemar was obliged to conduct a
punitive excursion against Qadida of the Jimma – Raré.2 While Cecchi was a guest of
Yemar at Embabo it was reported that Danagla Rufo, a Gudru leader whom the
Gojjame had supported in 1872, had joined a party of rebellious Gudru notables.3 The
expedition which Yemar Goshu led, and which Cecchi joined, was most probably a
raid conducted against the rebal Horro leader Abiše Garba.4
The southern extension of Shawan control and influence away from Entoto
had similarly been limited by the end of 1880. Gustavo Bianchi, travelling in
February – March 1880, found that wide stretches of uncultivated land on both banks
of the Chia Chia river, at a distance of a day's journey to the south of Debra Berhan,
were considered to have been the southern borders of Shawa a few years before. The
Oromo inhabiting the regions south of Debra Berhan and Entoto up to the river were
peacefully governed by Ras Gobana. The Abitchu, Gombitchu, Bacio, Abu and Metta
Oromo, living between the Chia Chia and the Awash river in the south, often rebelled
whenever Gobana was away from Entoto or Gimbisi with his army, so that his return
usually signalled the renewal of punitive retaliation and the plundering of cattle.5
South of the Awash the local Soddo chiefs, shums, Dagaga, Tore and Oba as well as
Omar Baxa the ruler of Qabiena and Ato Dori the leader of Aimallel Gurage were
loyal tributaries of the king of Shawa.6
At the time of Bianchi's journey all the Oromo on the western banks of the
Awash were generally alarmed by the customary collection of tribute due before the
celebrations of Ethiopian Easter in the early days of May.7 All along his route in
Bacio and Abu territories Bianchi saw gloomy remains of abandoned villages reduced
to heaps of burnt ashes. Only well defended larger groups of dwellings managed to
survive being devastated by Gobana's soldiers.8 Gobana had crossed the Awash and
camped among the Abatu Oromo while he was campaigning against the Bacio and the
Soddo. Everywhere along his route Bianchi saw people hurriedly fleeing in all

1
- Ibid.
2
- Triulzi, A., op. cit., p. 62.
3
- Ibid., p. 62; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 69.
4
- Triulzi, A., op. cit., p. 60; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 68.
5
Bianchi, Gustavo, Alla terra dei Galla. Narrazione della spedizione Bianchi in Africa nel 1879-82.
(Milan, 1880), pp. 227-228.
6
Ibid., pp. 240, 241, 255, 261, 287.
7
Ibid., p. 245.
8
- Ibid., p. 246.

108
directions away from the reach of Gobana's soldiers.1 At the end the Italian traveller
realised that Ras Gobana had given up his intended campaign towards Jimma Abba
Jifar and Gera. On 25 March 1880 Gobana's 20,000 strong army pulled down its camp
and started its return march to Entoto.2
Continuing on his way towards Gojjam Bianchi arrived at Fiche, the katama of
Menilek's paterual uncle Ras Darge in Salale country. He was advised against
travelling across Kutay territories, but was given an escort which led him through
Jaraso lands towards Gojjam. Ras Darge frankly admitted that he had nothing in his
hands to extend Shawan dominions from Entoto up to Kaffa as Menilek would have
liked.3 On 26 April 1880 Bianchi crossed the Abbay into Gojjam.4
On 30 June 1880 Antinori reported from Shawa that Ras Gobana had returned
from a military expedition which he claimed had led him across the Awash to the
banks of the Gibe river. Finding the river unfordable and infested with crocodiles his
army turned back and withdrew towards Shawa. Mashasha Worke, who had
accompanied the general on the campaign, informed Antinori that Gobana had
intended to invade the Oromo kingdoms of Jimma Abba Jifar, Limmu – Ennareya and
Gera. He added that representative of the rulers of Jimma Abba Jifar had appeared on
the opposite bank of the river to negotiate with Gobana.5
Though the Shawans and the Gojjame had been campaigning into Oromo
lands for long there had been no determined limits to the extent of their respective
spheres of influence beyond the boundaries of their dominions by the end of 1880.
Claims and counterclaims had been hotly contested by both sides.6 On his part
Emperor Yohannes did not appear to have been necessarily worried about the
consequences of the on going competition between his two vassals for territorial
expansion in the south. On the contrary he appears to have been more favourably
inclined to support the growing ambitions of the Gojjame ruler. His main intention
appears to have been to distance his mutually hostile vassals still further from each
other so as to prevent their allying themselves against him.7 The emperor's decision to

1
- Ibid., pp. 340, 393, 404, 406.
2
- Ibid., 409-410, 420-421.
3
- Ibid., pp. 433, 434, 435.
4
- Ibid., pp. 443-444.
5
- Letter of Orazio Antinori to the President of the Italian Geographical Society, Let Marefia,
28.10.1880, BSGI (1881), p. 159; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 72.
6
- Ibid., pp. 74-75, 79.
7
- Ibid., p. 75.

109
support Takla Haymanot could not have been made to counterbalance the increasing
power of Menilek as has sometimes been asserted.1 Obviously the king of Shawa had
not become so powerful by the beginning of 1881 to make it difficult for Yohannes to
overwhelm him.2
At a ceremonious occasion held at Samera, near Debra Tabar in Bagemder,
Emperor Yohannes crowned Ras Adal Tesamma as Takla Haymanot negus of Gojjam
and Kaffa on 20 January 1881.3 Most of the emperor's main tributary vassals,
including Menilek, were present. They were accompanied by some of their generals
and court dignitaries. The addition of Kaffa, the name of the still unconquered rich
and powerful Sidama kingdom, had been a symbolic guesture to encouring the newly
crowned Negus Takla Haymanot to push forward with his campaigns southward. This
seems to be in line with a reported gift made to him by the emperor of some 8,000
rifles.4
Once the coronation ceremonies were over Menilek travelled to Warra Ilu in
southern Wallo where he intended to spend the rainy season. Meanwhile it was
learned in Shawa that royal orders from him were received by his regent to prepare
for an year – long expedition to be conducted in the direction of the south.5 This may
have been Menilek's immediate response to the new title and status awarded to his
rival by the emperor. Rumours were also heard that Yohannes would personally
campaign southward from Gojjam. Caulk has argued at length that the expedition for
which preparations were asked to be made was the one that Ras Gobana commanded
towards the end of May 1881, and not 1880 as has been mistakenly dated by Ato
Asme Giyorgis. Accordingly, it had been the first Shawan campaign to penetrate
across the Gibe river resulting in rending the rulers of the five small Oromo kingdoms
tributaries to Shawa. Gobana's appearance in the Gibe states is said to have caused
much alarm among the neighbouring Leqa. It was feared that the Liban and Nonno
Oromo to the north of Jimma Abba Jifar may have submitted to the Shawans as well.6

1
- Marcus, H.G., "Menilik II," p. 26; Bahru Zewde, op. cit., pp. 44, 45.
2
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 75-76.
3
- Marcus, H. G., op. cit., p. 68; Caulk, R. A., op. cit., p. 76.
4
- Marcus, H. G., op. cit., n. 4 on page 68 citing Cicognami , Luigi, "Sulle condizioni odierne dell'
Abissinia," BSAI, VI (1887), p. 33.
5
- Caulk, R. A., p. 73, n. 35 on the same page citing Ferdinand's diary, entries for 3 and 18 March
1881.
6
- Ibid., p. 73.

110
 The contemporary Gojjame chronicle compiled by Alaqa Takla Iyasus is said
to mention that the Gojjame expedition sent to the south had resulted in the defeat of
thirty – two local Oromo rulers, all of whom were said to have paid tribute to Gojjam.
The chronicler's account claims that the Gojjame general Ras Daraso had marched
through Gudru, Ammuru and Horro on his way to invade the Nonno, besides the
kingdoms of Jimma Abba Jifar, Gera and Guma. He then turned and began marching
1
towards Kaffa when he was met by the Shawan army led by Ras Gobana. The
chronicler's basic drawback as Caulk observes is that his account makes no specific
indication of place names and dates for the episodes it mentions. This, no doubt,
makes attempts to determine the details and chronological sequence of Gojjame
penetration into the Gibe region almost impossible.2

According to Caulk the Gojjame chronicler's claims about the achievements of

Ras Daraso may have been the result of two or more campaigns occurring at separate
intervals between the coronation of Takla Haymanot in January 1881 and January
1882 when the Shawan general Ras Gobana interrupted Daraso's almost unopposed
campaigning up to the Oromo kingdoms of the Gibe.3 His reconstruction of the
Gojjame advance suggests earlier campaigning which resulted in the extension of
Gojjame control over the neighbouring Oromo groups surrounding Gudru by the end
of the rainy season of 1881. Ras Daraso's latest expedition, in which Gojjame allies
from Gudru, Horro and Kutay (Genda Barat) participated, had penetrated into the
small Oromo kingdoms of the Gibe.4 While he was on his way Daraso was met by
envoys of Moroda Bakare of the Leqa Naqamte with tribute declaring his
submission.5 On his arrival in the Gibe region all the rulers of the Oromo states
submitted and paid tribute. Only the king of Guma, who chose to oppose the invading
Gojjame army, was killed. Afterwards Ras Daraso continued on his way towards
Kaffa when he was overtaken by Ras Gobana.6

1
- Ibid., p. 76, n. 48 on the same page citing Takla Iyasus, "Gojjam Chronilcle'" folio 88.
2
- Ibid., p. 76.
3
- Caulk, R. A., op. cit., p. 76.
4
- Ibid.
5
- Abebe Ambachew and others, "Field Trip to Neqemte," BUCAAR, VI (June, 1957), pp. 12-13;
Terrefe Woldetsadik,"The Unification of Ethiopia, 1880-1935, Wallaga," JES, VI, 1 (January, 1968),
pp. 75-76; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 77.
6
- Ibid.

111
 News about the presence of Ras Daraso in the Gibe region reached Shawa in
early December 1881. After further information, supposedly about Gojjame victory in
Guma and the death of her king, was revealed to Menilek a war council was held at
Entoto. Afterwards Ras Gobana was ordered to depart immediately on an expedition
to fight those who were considered intruders into Shawan sphere of influence. Ras
Gobana's army abandoned its camp at Finfini at dawn on 14 December, and began its
march towards the Gibe.1 On 7 January 1882, a day after Ethiopian Christmas, king
Menilek himself left on a fifteen day gesgassa into the country of the Arussi (Arsi)
Oromo in the southeast.2 Before his return, however, a letter had arrived in Shawa
from Gobana indicating that the Gojjame army had fled after his troops had
intercepted its baggage train, gwaz. It added that the Gojjame were obliged to
surrender the ivory, cattle, civet and war captives they had collected as booty and
tribute which Gobana claimed had been taken from regions that were already
tributaries to Menilek.3 The Gojjame chronicler Alaqa Takla Iyasus asserts that the
booty was left by Ras Daraso in Limmu when he had marched towards Kaffa. When
he returned back he was informed that Ras Gobana had confiscated his booty. The
chronicler adds that Daraso was willing to fight, but after Gobana had invoked the
emperor's name the ivory and other goods were left in the custody of a group of
northern merchants on behalf of Emperor Yohannes.4
Menilek was crossing the Awash with his army on the return from the short
excursion against the Arussi Oromo when he heard the news about what had
happened when the Gojjame army of Ras Daraso had been intercepted by Ras Gobana
in the Gibe region and was forced to withdraw. On 26 January 1882 Menilek was
back at Entoto.5 Whether Ras Daraso had promised not to interfere any more in what
Gobana had claimed to be Shawan sphere of influence or even agreed not to recross
the Abbay river in future is uncertain – What appears more probable was that the two
generals might have agreed to refer the dispute for their respective masters and the
emperor and wait for further instructions.6

1
Caulk, R. A., op. cit., pp. 77-78.
2
- Ibid., p. 78.
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 171, 173; Caulk, R. A., op. cit., p. 78.
4
- Ibid., note 52 on page 78 citing Alaqa Takla Iyasus, unpublished Amharic history of the kings of
Gojjam, MS 254, IES, folio 88.
5
Caulk, R. A., op. cit., p. 78.
6
Ibid.

112
 In the meantime Ras Gobana continued to strengthen Shawan presence in the
Gibe valley by obtaining the submission of all the kings of the small Oromo kingdoms
and their payment of tribute.1 Afterwards he led his army across the Gojeb river into
the Sidama kingdom of Kaffa. The Kaffa king and his councillors hesitated for a
while. Finally they sent their tribute.2 When Negus Takla Haymanot learned about the
circumstances of his general's collision with Gobana's Shawan army and how the
former had been forced to withdraw he became enraged. He wrote to the emperor
complaining that king Menilek had taken away the land given to him and the tribute
that was rightfully collected. Yohannes answered councilling restrain and ordered his
two tributaries not to fight each other, but to submit their dispute for his arbitration.
He warned that whoever became the aggressor would be punished.
While reporting his successful accomplishments Ras Gobana informed king
Menilek that Ras Daraso's army had been reinforced from Gojjam and was again on
the move towards the Gibe. On 3 February 1882 further news reached Shawa that
Negus Takla Haymanot himself had crossed the Abbay on his way to support his
general, which was not true.3 Nevertheless, the fate of the rich kingdoms of the Gibe
and the surrounding regions was at stake. The possibility that Ras Gobana's army
might clash once again with a Gojjame army compelled Menilek to set off
immediately marching for the Gibe. It had become necessarily urgent for Menilek to
strengthen Gobana and to consolidate his successful achievements.4
Since the beginnings of 1882, when the arrival of the Gojjame in the Oromo
states of the Gibe became known, Menilek had become more determined than ever
before to incorporate within his dominions the greater part of the Oromo countries to
the east, south and west of Shawa as well as the Sidama kingdom of Kaffa, not
withstanding that Takla Haymanot had been crowned as negus of Kaffa by the
emperor. At the same time he appears to have been prepared to accept Gojjame
control over some small Oromo districts more closer to the Abbay.5
Becoming apprehensive of the probable consequences of the reported
involvement of Negus Takla Haymanot, and possibly intending to prevent the out
break of war with the Gojjame Menilek left Entoto with his army crossing the Awash

1
- Ibid., p. 80.
2
- Ibid., pp. 80-81.
3
- Ibid., p. 81.
4
- Ibid.
5
- Ibid., p. 79.

113
on 22 March 1882.1 Marching westward he joined with Ras Gobana's army, which
had recrossed the Gibe on 29 March, round the southern slopes of Mount Tulu Dimtu.
The two armies continued marching towards the Gibe which they crossed on 2 April
to set up their camp at Sayo. During the march the Shawan soldiers raided the Oromo
inhabitants of the region through which they passed. The king had some of the
plundered goods restored and the captured prisoners released. Further plundering was
strictly forbidden.2 On 5 April Garbe Jello of the Leqa Billo Oromo, a former
Gojjame tributary vassal, submitted and paid his tribute. On 12 April queen Mastawat
of Wallo arrived at the head of contingents of Wallo cavalry. Emissaries from Moroda
Bakare, the leader of the Leqa Naqamte, and from Danno Béra of the Jimma –Raré
came to the camp to declare the submission of their masters and paid the tribute.
Continuing to march south westwards the Shawan army came to the highland region
beyond the Aleltu river on 14 April where a nearby katama of Ras Daraso was
burned. Then the army descended into the lowlands and crossed the Didesa river.3
Marching almost continuously in the direction of the south – west the Shawan
army arrived at Bunno Sači on the bank of the Sésé river where it camped. On 21
April smoke was seen arising from the fires set by Daraso's troops camping on the
other side of the river.4 On 23 April Fitawrari Yemar Goshu came to the camp to meet
Menilek. After an animated discussion with Menilek, Fitawrari Yemar Goshu left
carrying a letter from the king to Ras Daraso. In the letter Menilek reprimanded the
Gojjame general for coming back with fresh support after having pledged under oath
not to do so. He demanded that the Gojjame army withdraw beyond the Abbay while
he and Takla Haymanot should proceed to present their respective case to the
emperor.5 Three days later the envoys of Daraso came back with his consent to
withdraw his army unless his sovereign should personally come and assume
command.6
Afterwards the two armies continued to march northwards seperated from
each other by the course of the Sésé river. They recrossed the Didesa and passed
through Leqa before crossing the Gibe river to arrive at the southern edges of the

1
- Caulk, R. A., p. 81 The itinerary of Menilek's army mentioned above had been based on an unsigned
Amharic MS, Bibliothequ Nationale, Paris, Collection Antoine d' Abbadie, No. 254.
2
- Ibid.
3
- Ibid.
4
- Ibid., pp. 81-82.
5
- Ibid., p. 82.
6
- Ibid.

114
Čomman swanp. Qadida Wanable leader of the Jimma-Raré, another former Gojjame
tributary, came to submit and pay tribute to Menilek. On the king's orders the Shawan
soldiers raided the local Oromo people in retaliation for their leader Faudalala having
deliberately guided units of Menilek's army through parts of the Čomman swamp
causing unnecessary delay, hardships and the loss of many pack animals.1
On 28 May emissaries of Negus Takla Haymanot arrived at Menilek's camp.
They announced his arrival and his challenge for the Shawan king to fight. A brief
exchange of messages between the two kings was ended without resolving their
dispute. Two days later, after Fandalala had submitted to Meniloek and paid his
tribute, the Shawan army passed through the Čomman swamp into Gudru. Soon
afterwards the Gojjame army commanded by Negus Takla Haymanot arrived to the
north of the Shawans.2
On the morning of June 1882 the armies of Menilek and Takla Haymanot
were deployed in battle formation facing each other at the plain of Embabo Meda in
Gudru. The battle commenced at about 10 a.m. with cannon fire by the Gojjame
artillery. It did little damage, though it ran down and slackened Ras Gobana's
attacking Oromo caralry. Then when firing for the third time the gun carriages broke
down and became inoperable. Riflemen of both armies advanced to fire their
weapons. Many soldiers fled. The Wallo horsemen swept on the Gojjame lines, while
Ras Gobana's cavalry regrouped and attacked the enemy army at the rear capturing its
camp and surrounding its combatants. Greatly outnumbered the Gojjame fought
vigorously. Even after Negus Takla Haymanot was wounded and captured, two hours
after the battle began, the Gojjame generals and part of their troops continued to fight
throughout the afternoon. When their centre collapsed and many were killed or
wounded the Gojjame generals finally submitted with all their weapons.3
Shawan losses were estimated at about 963 being killed, 1, 648 were wounded
and 539 horses. About one fifth of the Gojjame troops, 929 men, were reported to
have been killed, 1,738 were wounded and the rest were either taken prisoners or had
escaped. Six cannon, about 3,700 rifles of assorted types and the whole baggage train

1
- Ibid., pp. 82-82.
2
- Ibid., p. 83.
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 179-180; Antonelli, P., "Zemeccia," folios 44-45; Caulk, R.A.,
"Firearms and Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth century," JAH, XIII, 4, (1972), p. 620, n.
41 citing Takla Iyasus, "Gojjam Chronicle", folios 88-90 and Asme Giyorgis,"Ya – Galla Tarikh" ;
Marcus, H. G., op. cit., pp. 69-70.

115
of the enemy army fell into Shawan hands.1 The ordinary prisoners were conducted
by Ras Gobana's soldiers towards the Abbay after having been disarmed and released.
Those who had been wounded were left to recover in the custody of Qadida Wannabe
just to the south of Embabo.2 Menilek himself marched triumphantly towards Shawa
taking with him his royal captives Negus Takla Haymanot and his two sons, a number
of Gojjame generals and high ranking notables. Three weeks later Menilek's army and
the captives reached Entoto.3
It had been a long and difficult campaign that ended in a costly victory.
Nevertheless it substantially improved Menilek's position and prestige. Obviously he
seems to have been too much pleased with himself when he wrote to the European
powers on 20 July 1882:-
"A long and hard campaign of seven months … had just
permitted me to subject and render tributary the kings
of Limmu, Gomma, Guma and the … king of Kaffa."
In the same letter he announced his victory over Negus Takla Haymanot and made
much of the contribution of the Oromo cavalry to his success asserting:-
"Victory was assured us at last by the impetuosity
and bravery of our Galla cavalry which braved firearm
and cannon with spears alone to divide the enemy
army in half and put it completely to route."4
In a short note addressed to the French Roman Catholic missionary in Harar Mgr.
Taurin de Cahagne Menilek wrote:
"The king of Gojjam challenged me to battle
I marched against him. I took his crown, and took all his lands."5
On hearing new of the battle of Embabo Emperor Yohannes hurriedly left
Debra Tabor for Wallo in spite of the difficulties and discomfort of campaigning
during the rainy season. He seems to have been determined to intervene decisively in
the conflict between his two mutually hostile vassals. On his way southwards he

1
- Marcus, H. G., op. cit., p. 70, n. 1 on the same page citing Asme Giyorgis, "Ya – Galla Tarikh", II,
folio 102; Caulk, R. A., op. cit., p. 83.
2
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 83.
3
- Ibid.
4
- ASMAI 1 / 4-27 Menilek to Umberto 1, 20.7.1882; M. & D., NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Menilek to
the President of France, 20.7.1882; Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 84.
5
- Ibid., n. 73 on page 84, citing M. & D., NAF Afrique 62 / 10222 Menilek to Turin de Chagne, n. p.,
n.d.

116
release Menilek's cousin and rival Dajach Mashasha Sayfu from imprisonment. When
he arrived in southern Wallo he set up his camp at Warra Ilu near to the northern
borders of Shawa on 18 July.1
Having been summoned by Emperor Yohannes Menilek left Entoto in the
Middle of August on his way to the emperor's camp at Warra Ilu in the company of
his distinguished royal captives, his two sons and several of his generals besides a
small escort. They were welcomed with honours on arrival and remained with the
emperor until February 1883.2 Yohannes was seriously intending to maintain his
imperial sovereignty, and restore the relative balance of power that had been
established in 1878. At the same time he sought to limit the king of Shawa's ambitious
pretentious and activities.3 Accordingly a new peace settlement, which included a
dynastic marriage arrangement, was concluded between Yohannes and Menilek.
Among the basic features of the 1882 settlement was the emperor's recognition
of Menilek's recent military victory and his conquests in the rich south western
Oromo regions and Kaffa, while retaining his sovereign control over him. Negus
Takla Haymanot, his captured sons and generals were released. The royal title of
negus of Kaffa was awarded to Menilek, reducing the Gojjame ruler's title to negus of
Gojjam. The two vassals were penealised for fighting each other without the consent
of the emperor. The governorship of Agawmeder, which had been withdrawn from
Takla Haymanot, was given to the emperor's most reliable general Rass Alula.
Menilek was stripped of the strategically significant Wallo region. Most of the
southern and eastern parts of Wallo were awarded to Ras Mikael. Northern Wallo was
handed over to Yohannes's twelve years old son Ras Areya Sellassie as dowry for his
marriage to Menilek's six year old natural daughter Zawditu. The emperor maintained
his control over the region through the appointment of the trusted Dajach Mangasha
Ateqem and Dajach Walde as regents for the young couple. They were eventually
married later in October 1882. Ras Areya Sellassie was recognized by Menilek as the
legitimate successor of Emperor Yohannes to the imperial throne on condition that if
he died without issue he himself would become the lawful imperial successor.4 Most
of the cannon and firearms, which had been confiscated from the Gojjame army at the
1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 183; Caulk, R. A., op. cit., p. 85.
2
- Ibid.
3
- Ibid. Darkwah, Kofi, op. cit., p. 86.
4
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., pp. 85, 86-87; Marcus, H.G. op. cit., p. 71 Menilek's chronicler Gabra Sellasse
passes over the details of the settlement concentrating on the marriage of Ras Areya Sellassie and
Zawditu.

117
battle of Embabo, were returned to Negus Takla Haymanot. Some Ethiopian sources,
however, claim that older models and defective rifles had been substituted for most of
the captured weapons.1
Thus Menilek came out of the 1882 crisis with his political and military
position strengthened and his prestige and influence greatly reinforced, despite the
serious loss of Wallo. In a further move intended to prescribe the ambitious activities
of king Menilek the emperor persuaded him to marry Taitu Betul of the ruling Yejju
Oromo family in 1883. Yohannes hoped that her presence at the royal court of Shawa
might help in consolidating the position of sympathisers with the emperor and
northern influence in general.2
The Macha Oromo to the south of the Abbay regarded the Shawan and
Gojjame conflict as a duel between two rival intruders in which they had no reason to
participate, and out of which they would inevitably suffer. Whoever emerged the
winner would almost certainly become their new alien dominant rulers. Therefore,
most of their local rulers remained neutral, while only a few defected to side with the
Shawans at Embabo.3
The most outstanding and long lasting outcome of the events of 1882,
however, had been the formal recognition which Menilek obtained for the Shawan
control over the richest regions of the Oromo kingdoms of the Gibe and Kaffa, and
the exclusion of Negus Takla Haymanot from further competition for expansion in the
south. Henceforth the whole of the southern Oromo and Sidama countries became
open to almost unhindered and imminent Shawan conquest and annexation.4 Though
for some time after 1882 most of the highly lucrative transit commerce of the
southwest continued to flow northward through Gojjam an increased volume of the
trade was later steadily diverted through Shawa en route to the coastal ports.5
By 1884-1885 the opening of the caravan trade routes linking the ports of
Assab, Obock and the whole bay of Tajura to Shawa was completed. The consequent
redirection of most of the rich trade of the southwest through Shawa to the coast
brought about highly significant advantages for Menilek's expansionist drive. His
economic resources became substantially enhanced and diversified. Increased

1
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p.85; Terrefe Woldtsadik, op.cit., p.79 and note 48 on the same page.
2
Marcus, H.G., op.cit., p. 71
3
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 88; Triulzi, A., op. cit., pp. 62-63.
4
- Caulk, R.A.., op. cit., p. 88.
5
- Ibid.

118
revenues were derived from the spoils of the southern campaigns of conquest, tribute
paid by vassal local rulers or collected by Shawan governors form conquered peoples,
royal monopolies excersised on the commercial exchange in gold and ivory and
taxation levied on the trade in slaves, civet musk, coffee, gum and other products.
Consequently the ability of Menilek to equipp his ever enlarged armies with the
purchase of the best types of imported rifles and cartridges became appreciably
expanded.1 It followed that the pace of southern conquest was made progressively
rapid and more successful as a result during the forthcoming years.

1
- Caulk, R.A., op. cit., p. 88.

119
 CHAPTER V
THE MIDDLE PHASE OF SHAWAN
CONQUESTS 1883 – 1888

By the end of 1882 the political power and personal prestige of Menilek were
considerably strengthened, despite his forced acceptance of the intervention of the
emperor in the internal affairs of Shawa and the equally compelled surrender of direct
control over Wallo. He was obliged to submit to the wishes of Yohannes by divorcing
his former consort Baffana and marrying the Yejjn Oromo princess Taitu Betul. The
marriage, conceived by the emperor as a step further towards increasing the influence
of the elements that sympathised with imperial policies at the Shawan royal court, was
held in April 1883.1 On Menilek’s part the political gains made as a result of the new
settlement of 1882 were worth the sacrifices rendered. His recent military victory at
the battle of Embabo and the conquest of the rich Oromo Kingdoms of the Gibe and
the submission of Kaffa were recognised by Emperor Yohannes. In addition, his
leading general Ras Gobana was appointed as his governor over the recently subdued
kingdoms of Limmu-Ennarea, Gomma, Gumma and Gera.2 Jimma Abba Jifar,
however, was allowed to retain its autonomy under its local ruler in view of his
voluntary peaceful submission and recognition of his tributary status under Shawan
overlordship.3
The submission of the powerful Sidama kingdom of Kaffa in 1882 was only
nominal and very brief. The Shawan army led by Ras Gobana and Dajjach Mashasha
Workie, which penetrated into Kaffa passing through Jimma Abba Jifar, stayed for
only a week in the country. It withdrew after Gobana received some “rich” gifts sent
to him by the Kaffa king Galli Sherocho. There is no evidence that any more tribute
was sent to Shawa or acknowledgment of any form of Shawan authority was made by
the king of Kaffa until the kingdom was finally conquered in 1897. Nevertheless,
Menilek continued to regard Kaffa as tributary to Shawa, styling himself in his
official correspondence as “Negus of Shawa, by God’s Blessing, of Kaffa and all the
Galla lands."4 The Frenchman Paul Soleillet, who was traveling with authorisation of

1
- Marcus, op.cit., pp. 71-72; Darkwah,op.cit.,pp. 79-80; Sanderson, op.cit, pp. 649-650
2
Soleillet, P., Voyages en Éthiopie, pp. 115, 143
3
Darwah, op.cit.,p.100; Sanderson, op.cit., p.650
4
- Bieber, F.J. Kaffa Ein Altkuschitches königtum in Inner-Afrika, 1, (Munster and Wein, 1920), pp.
92-93

120
Menilek, was allowed to go up to Bonga in Kaffa but not beyond it during his short
stay in the country between 12-24 December 1882.1 Afterwards both Leopoldo
Traversi and Jules Borelli were refused entry into the kingdom in 1887 and their
presents were returned to them although they were travelling as friends of the king of
Shawa.2 Actually Menilek himself is reported by Borelli as having told him when he
was still in Shawa; “you can go to any territory under my control except Kaffa which
has refused to pay me tribute.”3
After 1882 Menilek continued his conquest of the southern Oromo regions in
order to ensure the supply of plundered war booty in cattle and slaves and in tribute
exacted from subjected rulers and their people. Revenues from these sources were
needed for the continued dispatch of periodic tribute to the emperor and for the
upkeep of the royal court and soldiery, and above all for the purchase of firearms and
munitions. Simultaneously, he continued to maintain the goodwill of the emperor
through abiding with his policies and persistingly providing him with pleasingly rich
tribute. Nevertheless, the progress of the conquest was slow and sometimes difficult at
the beginning. The Arussi (Arsi) Oromo, in particular, maintained a vigorous and
determined resistance to repeated Shawan military campaigns conducted between
1882 and 1886. In addition Menilek was faced with serious financial problems arising
from the shortage of hard cash in Maria. Theresa Dollars in his possession. And
largely due to the Egyptian blockade imposed on the import of arms to Shawa and the
extortions of Abu Bakr at Zeila comparatively small quantities of arms and
ammunition were received by Menilek up to 1885.4
Payments for the arms were often made at high prices and in cash making it
sometimes difficult for Menilek to pay for the arms already delivered to him. Also the
regular dispatch of the costy imperial tribute constituted an added heavy burden on his
limited resources. Moreover, very little effective efforts were made so far to exploit
the substantial potentials of the recently conquered rich Oromo regions in the south
and southwest. There is nor record of any revenues reaching Menilek from the
conquered regions apart from the substantial gifts made to him by Ras Gobana at the
marriage of his daughter Zawditu to the emperor’s son Ras Areya Sellassie in
1
Sollellet, P., Voyages en Éthiopie, pp. 184, 185, 187, 188, 191, 209
2
Borelli, J., Éthiopie méridionale (Paris, 1890), pp. 298-299, Darkwah, op. cit, p. 100
3
Borelli, J., Ethiopie meridionale, p. 260
4
Caulk, R.A., “Minilik 11 and the Diplomacy of Commerce: Prelude to an Imperial Foreign Policy,”
JES, XVII (November, 1984), pp. 68-70; Sanderson, op. cit., pp. 650-651.

121
October 1882 and by Sultan Abba Jifar II of Jimma on the occasion of his wedding to
Taitu in April 1883. 1
In the meantime favourable circumstances in the mid-1880s enabled
Menilek to put an end to the relative isolation of Shawa. The enforced withdrawal of
the Egyptians from Harar and the ports of the Red Sea and the Somali coast, the
acquisition of Assab by the Italians in June 188 and the Obock – Tajura region by
France in 1884-1885 led to the opening of alternative secure caravan trade routes
linking the coastal ports with Shawa. The practicability of the Shawa – Obock route
was demonstrated by Brémond and Soleillet in 1882. After having concluded a
satisfactory agreement with the Afar sultan Muhammad Anfari of Aussa Pietro
Antonelli travelled the Assab – Shawa route in April 1883 when he delivered to the
king of Shawa the 2,000 Remington rifles and munitions already contracted for in
March 1881. Both the Italians and the French were willingly inclined to provide
Menilek with the modern weapons he needed and was prepared to pay for.
Henceforth, Italo-French commercial competition at the Shawan court ensured
Menilek an almost constant flow of weapon supplies at relatively lower costs.
The Italians mainly through Pietro Antonelli, both in his personal capacity and
later after 1882 in his role as the official representative of the Italian government at
Menile;’s court, were his major arms suppliers. A second significant source was
provided by the private French arms traders, the most important of whom were
Soleillet, Chefneux, Brémond, Labatut and Savoure. Though Soleillet and Labatut
died in 1886 the others continued their commercial activities well into the 1890s. A
third source from which Menilek obtained appreciable supplies of firearms were the
customary “gifts” given to him by the many European travelers who visited Shawa
during his long reign. Between 1875 and March 1888 Menilek had obtained,
according to Darkwah’s well-documented brief survey, a total of 21,726 rifles, 11,692
guns of various types, 1,569,000 cartridges, 972,000 percussion caps, 6 cannon and 10
pistols.2
On 23 January 1889 Antonelli arrived at Addis Ababa with 4,700 Remington rifles
and 220,000 cartridges for Menilek, beside 268 rifles and 3,000 cartridges as personal

1
- Sollellet, P., Voyages en Éthiopie, p. 97; Marcus, op. cit., p. 72; Darkwah, op. cit., p. 134
2
- Darkwah, op. cit., pp. 199-205 and the references given there.

122
gifts to the king, Ras Darge, Ras Gobana, Dajach Makonnen, Azaj Walda Tsadek and
two other dignatioes.1
Consequently, it was from 1885 onwards that the Shawan armies were be
coming progressively more formidable in manpower and better armament, so that the
pace and range of the conquests were gradually increased. At the end of October 1888
Antonelli estimated that the king of Shawa had “at least 50,000 men equipped with
European firearms of all kinds and a good stock of ammunition and accessories”.2 By
the time he become emperor in 1889 Menilek was favourably positioned that he could
bargain and choose the most modern weapons at considerably reasonable prices.3
Among the notable Shawan conquests, apart from the subjection of the Oromo
kingdoms of the Gibe, was that of the Arussi (Arsi) who were the largest single
Oromo group. The military campaigns undertaken for their conquest which were
begun at the beginning of 1882 were continued up to 1887. The regions they
inhabited, comprising parts of the lowlands of the Right Valley and the highlands
further to the east, were not very rich in themselves compared to the Oromo lands of
the Gibe in the southwest. Nevertheless, the conquest of Arussi country was expected
to provide the Shawans with substantial immediate war-booty in cattle and slaves.
More than that it would secure for Menilek control over the important southeastern
trade route that led from Gurage country through Arussi territories to the commercial
centre of Harar. It would also facilitate the realisation of Menilek’s plans for the
conquest of the trading and strategically significant walled – town of Harar and its
surroundings to forestall its occupation by one of the European powers already
established at parts of the coast. Above all the successful subjection of the Ariussi
would be a step forward towards the more rewarding conquest further a field. 4
The first Shawan military campaign conducted against the Arussi Oromo,
which was refered to in the previous chapter, was begun at the beginning of 1882 and
lasted for three weeks. It appears to had been primarily intended to obtain the
maximum possible booty which would help in increasing the king’s revenues.

1
- Ibid., p. 202 and note 74 citing ASMI 36/5-48 Telegramma (Antonelli) to Governor of Assab,
Rome, 29.9.1888; Antonelli, “Nota dei doni per S.M. Menelik 11, Re di Scioa,” same date. Also
Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 256 and note 13.
2
- Darkwah, Op. cit., p. 207 and note 90 citing ASMI 36/5-50 Antonelli to MAE, Assab, 31.10.1888.
3
- Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 74, 75-77; Caulk, R.A. “Minilik and the Diplomacy of Commerce…” pp. 72-
79; Sanderson, Op. cit., p. 651.
4
Hajj Gnamo Abbas, “La Conquête impériale Éthiopienne des Oromo-Arsi (1882-1892)”, Africa, LIV,
1, (1999), p.89

123
Leaving his uncle Ras Darge Sahle Sellassie in charge of Shawa during his absence
Menilek left Entotto on 12 January 1882 with a large army heading for Arussi
country.1 .After crossing the Awash river the army marched first through the
territories of the already subdued Soddo Oromo before entering the country of the
Maraqo Gurage along the northern shores of Lake Zwai. On the basis of oral
testimonies Ulrich Braukämper claims that the Maraqo Gurage who attempted to
resist the advancing army were defeated. Many of them were killed, including their
leader Lačebo Ağačo, and others were captured and taken to Shawa as slaves.2 Then
after leaving the baggage-train at Tebbo, a little distance to the south of Dabo-Godja,
the army continued marching all night. The next day the Shawan soldiers
unexpectedly attacked the isolated and unsuspecting Arussi groups. The helpless
Oromo were unable to offer any resistance to the invaders. Villages and grainaries
were sacked and burnt. Large numbers of the Arussi were killed or enslaved and
substantial numbers of cattle were captured.3 Afterwards the army withdrew and
camped near the Awash. Those who were in charge of the captured cattle were
ordered to join the buggage-train and return to Shawa. The next day the rest of the
army left its camp and continued marching in the direction of Mount Chilalo while the
soldiers began setting fires, sacking and plundering all along their way. Gabre
Sellassie writes ; “it is impossible to count the number of the cattle that was captured
and those of the Galla who were killed that day."4
Soon news of the Shawan aggression became widespread and the Arussi
Oromo began preparing to resist the invaders. Thus while the Shawan army was
resting at Qedida the Arussi warriors, “who were as numerous as the sands of the
sea”, stage a surprising night attack on its camp killing large numbers of the Shawan
soldiers before swiftly withdrawing and dispersing in all directions. After regrouping
the Shawans pursued the Arussi Oromo all the way to the summit of Mount Chilalo.
Most of those they encountered on the way were killed and substantial numbers of
cattle were rounded up and taken away. The total number of the captured cattle that

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, I,p.171; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op.cit.,p.89
2
Braukamper, Ulrich, “La Conquete et l’ adminstration Éthiopiennes du Kambata an temps de Menilek
11” in Tubiana, J. (ed.), Modern Ethiopia. Form the Accession of Menilek 11 to the Present
(Rotterdam, 1980),p. 160
3
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1,p. 171; Hajj Gnamo Abbas,op.cit,p.98
4
Guèbrè Sellasoe, Chronique, 1, p. 172

124
was brought back to Shawa is given by the chronicler as 65,712.1 On the other hand
the enumeration by Gabre Sellassie of the names of some of the Shawan officers who
were killed in action during the fighting indicates that the army had suffered heavy
casualties. In the words of Lincoln de Castro the campaign was a “disgraziata
spedizione."2
Afterwards the king decided to terminate the campaign and return back to
Shawa. The justification given by the chronicler is that Menilek was worried for not
having heard from Ras Gobana who had left with a large army towards the Oromo
kingdoms of the Gibe and Kaffa.3 The prospect of the defeat of Gobana at the hands
of the rival Gojjame would have been a serious blow to his politico-military ambitions
or even his ultimate destiny. On the other hand the success of his leading general in
defeating the rival Gojjame in his absence would have raised even more serious
consequences. The resistance put up by the Arussi Oromo, however, can not be ruled
out as an important factor in determining the decision to end the campaign.
Nevertheless, while the Shawan army was on its way back to Shawa the Arussi
fighters continued to attack and harass its rearguard until it left their country.4
The campaign of 1882 was only the first of a series of other almost annual
military expeditions that were conducted against the Arussi Oromo until the conquest
of their country was completed in 1886. After returning to Shawa Menilek began to
reconsider the tactics to be adopted against the Arussi in large measure because of
their resistance to his army. According to what seems to have been a new strategy two
notable northern Arussi clan chiefs, Suffa Kusso and Damu Ussu, were invited by the
king to Entotto. They were made to watch a military parade and a display of firearms
in an attempt to impress and intimidate them. Later an offer was made to them and to
all the other Arussi clan chiefs to be allowed local autonomy in ruling their own
people and to be awarded Shawan titles in exchange for agreeing to submit to
Menilek, pay him tribute and acknowledge hiss suzerainty. On their return home their
advice to accept the terms offered for making their submission was rejected by the
other clan chiefs and elders at their gada general assembly. Instead, an alternative

1
Ibid.,
2- Ibid p. 172 and note on the same page citing de Castro, L., Nella terra die Negus. Pagine raccolte in
Abissinia, 11, (Milan, 1915), p. 328; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., pp. 98-99
3
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 173
4
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1 p. 173; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., p. 100

125
decision calling for unity and solidarity in resisting the Shawan invaders was agreed
upon1.
The second military campaign undertaken against the Arussi Oromo, which
was also led personally by Menilek, began in December 1883. The details concerning
this escursion, about which the chronicler is silent, are based on oral information.
From the very beginning of their entry into Arussiland the Shawan troops were met
with a stubborn resistance from Arussi fighters led by the warrior named Gosa
Dilamo. But in spite of heavy losses and several setbacks the Shawans continued their
destructive devastation of Arussi highlands before they arrived at Qadida where they
camped for a few days. In the meantime levies from several Arussi clans were
mobilised under the leadership of several warriors, including Lenieso Diga, with the
intention of encircling and eventually eliminating their Shawan adversaries. The
Arussi fighters encountered the Shawan army at a short distance to the south of the
Awash. During the battle which followed, and which lasted for several hours, the
Arussi Oromo gained their first military victory. The Shawans were practically
defeated. Menilek himself is said to have managed to escape only because of the
speed of his war-horse. According to informants the pursuing Arussi fighters were
obliged to turn back because one of their leaders, Jatené Bultum, was wounded by
shots fired at him by the Shawan soldiers. Nevertheless the victory assumed a special
important symbolic significance because the Arussi warriors succeeded in capturing
the Shawan army’s royal war-drums, nagarits. Later on the Arussi celebrated this
victory at Burqunte where the continuation of the resistance was solemnly affirmed.2
A third expedition was conducted against the Arussi Oromo again under the
personal command of Menilek, during March-April 1884. This time the Shawan army
returned after only a few weeks in Arussi country. At one time during the escursion
the Arussi fighters made an unexpected night attack on the encampment of the
Shawan army at Haro Hamomota. Many of the Shawan soldiers and camp followers
were killed or injured. The herd of cattle which the Shawans had previously plundered
was scattered.3 The outcome of the campaign, which is based on oral testemonies, is
confirmed by the account of Henry Audon who was in Shawa at the time. He writes:

1 - Ibid., pp. 92-93

2
Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., p. 100
3
- Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., pp. 100-101

126
“Two or three of his {Menilek’s} generals lost their camp materials and half their
soldiers. They had to fight their way in retreat abandoning to the Arussi the booty
that was captured at the beginning of the expedition."1
Up to November 1885, even though all the previous efforts to force the Arussi
Oromo into submission had failed, Menilek did not give up continuing his military
offensive against them. And in spite of some sporadic and occasional success,
particularly as far as booty was concerned, practically no positive results were
achieved. The prolongation of the war for the conquest of the Arussi Oromo was
basically due to the fact that the Shawan Amhara did not possess an obvious
overpowering military advantage at the time. The Arussi, on the other hand, suffered
from several disadvantages though they had the edge in their numerical superiority
over the Shawans. They were fighting with simple traditional weapons of lances and
swards against a Shawan army most of whose troops were well armed with repeating
rifles and were comparably better organised and commanded. Also the Arussi
warriors could not maintain themselves in the battlefield for more than a week at most
during any single military engagement before breaking away to go their different
ways. Above all they lacked the existence of a centralised authority that could ensure
the effective mobilization and coordination of their war efforts. But still their
determination to continue their vigorous resistance in defense of their independence
was a major factor which contributed to the continuation of the fighting. Another
important factor was the fact that up to the mid-1880s the Shawans could hardly
depend on considerable military resources apart from those of Shawa itself. Even so
those limited resources were outstretched as several Shawan military commanders and
their forces were already committed in various engagements elsewhere in the south. A
last fact of major significance in delaying the Shawan conquest of the Arussi Oromo
was the nature of the invading Shawan army itself. In the prevailing circumstances of
the time it was very difficult to keep the army engaged in the field in a hostile country
for long. It was, therefore, necessary for hostilities to be stopped for a time before
fighting was resumed once more in order to have enough time for the army to
remobilise and become prepared for redeployment in another engagement. It was
more specifically for this reason that the Shawans depended heavily on the use of the
unmatched superior fire-power of their soldiers. Consequently, it was only from the

1
- Audon, H., "Voyage an Choa (Abissinie méridionale) 1884-1888, TDM (August/September, 1889),
p. 150 ; Hajj Gnamo Abbas. op. cit., p. 102

127
second half of the 1880s onward that the situation began to be substantially altered as
a result of the almost unhindered flow of stocks of firearms and munitions into
Shawa. The effectiveness of the increased use of firearms was considerably increased
and the Shawan wars of conquest were becoming progressively successful and at the
same time more cruel and bloody. 1
In order to put an end to previous defeats and to successful Arussi resistance
Menilek carefully prepared for the organisation of a big military expedition to be sent
against the Arussi Oromo. He entrusted its direct command to his uncle Ras Darge
Sahle Sellassie, thought he participated personally in the campaign. A royal
proclamation, awaj, was issued giving firm orders for general mobilisation. Those
who would be participants in the forthcoming campaign were to present themselves
readily prepared at the specified date and place. Those who did not abide by the royal
orders were threatened by the confiscation of all their belongings.2 At last the king
and his uncle left Entotto with a large army on 5 Guenbot / 12 May 1886.3 This is
confirmed by the account of Dr. Leopoldo Traversi who accompanied them on the
expedition.4 After crossing the Awash their army passed through Soddo and Marako
Guroge countries into the Arussi highlands. The soldiers began ravaging and looting
all over the country around Mount Chilalo before returning with their booty to the
plain of Albasso. Leaving their baggage train at their camp there in charge of Dajjach
Wolde Gabriel and part of the Shawan soldiers Menilek and the rest of the army left
and camped for the night a long distance away. Those who remained at Albasso camp
were unexpectantly attacked at night by a large Arussi cavalry force killing many of
the soldiers and camp followers. The number of the victims is estimated by de Salviac
at two thousand or more while the chronicler gives the figure of 700 only.5 A similar
second attack on the same camp was aborted due to the vigilance of the Shawan
officers and their soldiers. A large number of the Arussi assailants were killed by the
defending riflemen6.The next day Menilek’s troops began plundering the plain of
Albasso for the three days before setting up their camp the foot of a nearby mountain.

1
- Darkwah, op.cit., p. 103-104; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op.cit., p. 101
2
Antonelli, P., "Zemeccia", fol. 12; Marcus, op. cit., p. 66; Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., p. 102
3
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chroniqu, 1,p.234; Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., p. 102
4
Traversi, L., “Estratto di lettere sul vioggio negli Arussi, Guradghe, etc…” BSGI 11, X11 (April,
1887),p.276.
5
- Guèbrè Sellasie, Chronique, p. 234; Traversi; op., cit., p. 274.
6
Guèbrè Sellasie, Chronique, I,p. 234 ; Traversi, op. cit., p. cit., p. 257; Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., p. 102.

128
Defensive precautions were made and orders were given for the officers and sentries
to be alert. Again the Arussi Oromo attacked the king's encampment at night, but
many of the attackers were mowned down by the rifle fire of the Shawan soldiers.
Later on when the Shawans camped at Sirka the warari bands began setting fires and
looting the surrounding territories. Many of the isolated and defenseless Arussi groups
were killed and large numbers of cattle, horses and mules were gathered and taken
away.1
At this stage the Shawan war of Arussi conquest was radically transformed
into a vicious and cruel policy of mutilation and extermination. The Arussi were the
only tribal group among the southern Oromo societies who put up a vigorous and
determined resistance to the conquering Shawan armies inflicting considerable
casualties among their ranks. As a result the Shawans reached the point where they
began to respond with rampant vengeance. The policy of mutilating and killing the
Arussi Oromo, even the prisoners, women and children without distinction, was
resorted to as a last and desperate measure to force their submission. On one occasion
Dajjach Walde Gabriel had the right wrists of about 400 Arussi captives cut off. On
another instance, which became known as the Anole massacre, a number of Arussi
notables and their followers who were assembled to make their peaceful ssubmission
were suddenly set upon by the Shawan soldiers who cut off the right arms of the men
and the breasts of the women?2 It was in this respect that Kofi Darwah writes:
“Of all the campaigns that Menilek conducted before
he became Emperor in 1889 perhaps the most sustained
and the most bloody were those against the Arussi Galla "3

In the face of the indiscriminate mutilations and killings, the loss of the lives
of great numbers of combatants and the destructive plundering of livestock which
accompanied each confrontation with the Shawan conquerors since the beginning of
1882 certain notable Arussi clan chiefs decided to renounce the fighting and render
their submission. Though this did not bring an end to the war of conquest it was a sign
for Menilek that the victory would not be delayed for long.4

1
Guebra Sellasie, Chronique, I, p. 235; Antonelli “Zemeccia” fol 96,; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op.cit., pp.
102 - 103
2
-Ibid., p. 103 and n. 14 on page 107
5- Darkwah, op. cit., p. 103.
4
Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., pp. 103-104

129
 After almost two months of campaigning (May-June) Menilek decided to
return to Entotto. The main rainy season, kerant which falls between July and
December, was approaching. During this period the conduct of military campaigns
was impractical. The King’s uncle Ras Darge was left behind with the larger part of
the army and considerable provisions at the well defended katama of Azule to
complete the task of subjugating the Arussi Oromo.1 In the meantime while Menilek
and his forces were on their way to Shawa they were attacked during the night at Dida
by large numbers of Arussi warriors led by Lenjeso Diga. During the resultant
confusion most of the cattle, horses and mules which were previously collected as war
booty were lost and the Shawan camp was set on fire.2 After this set back the king and
his troops continued on their way to Shawa and arrived at Entotto on 24 June 1886.3
Meanwhile Ras Darge and his army remained at their katama of Azule well
protected by about 10,000 riflemen. The still undefeated Arussi Oromo began
mobilising to attack them. At the same time they appealed to Ras Gobana, the Tuloma
Oromo of Shawa and those of Qabiena and their Gurage neighbours for solidarity and
help against the Shawans. Their appeal got no response from either Ras Gobana or the
Shawan Tuloma Oromo who remained loyal to Menilek and his régime. Only the
Muslim jihadists of Qabiena and the western Gurage became their indirect allies.4 On
his part Ras Darge succeeded, through the use of secret local spies and collaborators,
in tempting the unsuspecting Arussi warriors to attack his army at its well defended
katama on the night of 6 September 1886. Ras Darge had given orders for his officers
and troops, who were already prepared for battle, to remain calm and immobile at
their posts without firing their rifles until he gave the order to do so5. As it was
expected the unsuspecting Arussi warriors continued to advance in large numbers
intending to attack their enemy by surprise. Substantial numbers of them had already
made their way inside the enclosure of the katama when the Shawan riflemen began
firing at the attackers before any of them could use their weapons. Even though the
order to start firing was prematurely given by Dajjach Asfaw, one of the two sons of
Ras Darge, the result was predictable. Nearly all the Arussi assailants who got inside
the confines of the katana were killed while most of the others who were on the
1
- Guèbrè Sellasie, Chronique, I,p. 236 see also Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., pp. 104-105..
2
Traversi, op. cit., p. 97; Audon, H. op. cit., p. 150
3
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chrronique, 1. p. 236 and note 7 on the same page..
4
Hajj Gnamo Abbass, op. cit., p. 105
5
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1,p. 236; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op. cit., p. 105

130
outside fled. The victorious Shawan soldiers and cavalry continued chasing the
fleeing survivors for several days killing all those they encountered.1 The battle of
Azule, therefore, was an unanticipated bloody massacre as far as the Arussi Oromo
were concerned. The numbers of the Arussi who were killed that day is given by
Gabre Sellassie as 6,500, while de Salviac estimates their numbers as probably more
than 12,000.2 Whatever the exact figures might have been one thing was made very
clear. The final outcome of the Shawan war for their conquest was finally decided and
their subsequent fate as a conquered and subjected people under Shawan Amhara
dominance was predetermined.
There is no doubt that, beside treacherous betrayal, the inability of the Arussi
Oromo to adapt their traditional methods of warfare to the military strategies and
techniques of their Shawan adversaries did contribute to the failure of their resistance.
In the end, however, the principal factor in explaining their defeat was the fact that
they were fighting an unequal battle. The large numbers of the undisciplined Arussi
warriors were armed with only simple lances while their adversary was a relatively
organised army whose soldiers were comparatively better commanded and well
equipped with modern firearms.3 In the immediate aftermath of the battle of Azule
most of the Arussi, with the exception of a few rebels, lost the driving force for
further resistance. The great losses in human lives, plunderd livestock, destruction of
farms, granaries and villages as well as the effects of drought hastened their
submission. It was further accelerated by the need to avoid the consequences of the
repressive policy of massive mutilations and killings adopted by Ras Darge to speed
up the conquest and pacification of Arussi country. According to informants delegates
representing the various northern Arussi clans met at their gada general assembly and
unanimously decided on their submission and an end to hostilities.4
At the same time of the 1886 Arussi campaign a Shawan army led by Ras
Gobana and reinforced by Gurage and Marako auxiliaries invaded the territories of
the Sosogo and Lemo Hadiya to the south of the Gurage. The Sosogo, who were then
engaged in fighting with the neighbouring Kanbata, were surprised by the Shawan
attack. Their combatants were forced to retreat in haste as their villages on the plain
1
Ibid., p. 106.
2
Guebre Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p.237 and note one on the same page citing de Salviac, M., Une
people antique au pays de \Menelik. Les Gallas (Paris, 1901), pp. 233 – 235.
3
Hajj Gnamo Abbas, op.cit., p. 106 - 107
4
Ibid., p.107.

131
were set on fire. The Shawans then established a katama from which the soldiers set
out to pillage the surrounding neighbourhood and returned to wait for repulsing the
attacks of the local warriors. The situation for the Sosogo became desperate as most
of their livestock had fallen into the hands of the Shawan soldiers. At the end a
delegation, headed by their war-leader Gedo Baširro, went to the camp of Ras Gobana
and declared their official submission.1 During the course of the same campaign the
Shawan army also passed through the northern peripheries of the territories of the
Lemo and fought against some of their forces led by adil Ada.2
After that campaign Ras Gobana was transfered with his army by Menilek to
Western Wallagga as part of a general administrative reorganisation of the recently
conquered territories. Dajach Walda Ašagra, who resided with his army near Waliso
since 1879 , had conducted several expeditions up to Kambata, but they were for the
most part restricted to plundering and returning with booty rather than to establish an
effective occupation. From 1886 onwards the military activities of the garrison of
Waliso were intensified towards the south.3 Nevertheless, the effective occupation of
the regions to the south of Gurage country was accomplished a few years afterwards.
Shawan forces became preoccupied with combating the Muslim followers of Hasan
Enjamo of Qabiena who declared a jihad against the Christian Shawan invaders in
June 1886. From then onwards until 1889 the jihadists and their neighbouring Muslim
Oromo and Gurage allies continued fighting against the Shawans so that the soldiers
of the garrison stationed at Waliso in Soddo / Guarge province could leave their
katana only with difficulty.45
Details concerning Shawan expansionist activities in the Macha Oromo
regions of the southwest after the battle of Embabo remain obscure in Gabre
Sellassie’s official chronicle and the available accounts of European travellers.
Through the use of information contained in unpublished manuscripts and local oral
source to supplement the content of the official sources Alesandro Triulzi provides a
reasonable appraisal of events occurring during the mid – 1880s. When Menilek
travelled to meet with the emperor in Wallo during the rainy season of 1882 Ras
Gobana and Dajach Mashasha Worke were ordered to leave with their army to the

1
Braukämper, U., op. cit., p. 162
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., pp. 162-163.
4
Ibid, p 163

132
Gibe region to organise the newly acquired territories. Gobana’s army camped in
Limmu where he collected tribute. Later on he established a number of military posts
in western Leqa and Sibu countries of western Wallagga. Also during the same period
of 1882-1883 Gobana is said to have led his army to Sayyo, Leqa Qellam, Anfillo and
up to IIubbabour and Gimira where he fought and defeated the local leaders of those
regions and collected tribute from them.1 The whereabouts and movements of Ras
Gobana afterwards in the southwest are not known for certain except that he was in
Wallagga in 1886 conducting military expeditions to the west of the Dabus river up to
Fadasi on the Ethio-Sudanese border regions. The French traveller Jules Borelli, who
met with Gobana in October 1886 soon after his return from Wallagga, states that
Gobana had advanced with his army to Fadasi and that he met “some Mahdist bands”
whom he peacefully persuaded to withdraw to the north. He adds that the general
brought back with him substantial quantities of ivory and gold2. The Italian traveller
Emilio Dulio, who was in the southwest in 1886, reports that Ras Gobana had
subjugated the Arfillo and had gone as far as the Sobat river capturing some
Remington rifles from some “Arab” groups. He claims that the general had also
conquered the “regions to the left of the Didesa from which comes the gold of the
Galla.” The presence of Ras Gobana, the “Makk of the Abyssinians”, in northwestern
Wallagga in 1886 was reported by the local Mahdist commander in Bani Shangul to
the Khalifa in Omdurman.3 Nevertheless the lack of sufficient information in the
official Ethiopian sources and in the travel literature led to the confusion of the first
encounter between Gobana and the Mahdists in Wallagga in 1886 with the later
armed engagement between the armies of Ras Gobana and the Mahdist commander
Khalil al-Khuzāni in October 1888.4
Despite his fall from royal favour and being deprived of the prestigious title of
Negus of Kafa and the governorship of the rich Macha Oromo regions he had
conquered Gobana still enjoyed some usefulness in the king’s consideration.5 He was
left behind in charge of Shawa between December 1887 and June 1888 when

1
- Triulzi,. A., Salt, Gold and Legitimacy: Prelude to the History of a No-Man’s Land. Bela Shangul,
Wallaggā, Ethiopia (ca. 1800 – 1898) (Napali, 1981), p. 156.
2
Borelli, J., op. cit., pp. 150. 164 ;
3
Triulzi, A., "Trade, Islam and the Mahdia in Nortwestern Wallagga, Ethiopia JAH, XVI, I (1976), p.
67., idem., Salt, Gold and Legitimacy, p. 158.
4
Ibid., p. 159
5
Muhammad Hasen, op.cit., p. 199.

133
Menilek, on orders from the emperor, left with his army to the north. The governors
of the recently subdued southwestern regions were also recalled to join with their
armies in the general mobilisation against the Italians. Following Menilek’s return to
Entotto on 29 June 1888 Ras Gobana was sent to fight the Muslim rebels in the Soddo
/ Gurage region returning afterwards to Entotto on 4 September 1888.1 It was after
this campaign that Ras Gobana was despatched with his army to combat against a new
intrusion of Mahdist forces in northwestern Wallagga. He left Shawa on 17
September, crossed the Gibe and arrived at Billo in eastern Wallaga on 26 September.
From there he went southwards to Leqa Naqamte where he called up the Oromo
tributary Moroda Bakare to join his forces with the Shawan army. They then crossed
the Birbir and Diddessa rivers. On 14 October 1888 Gobanas army encountered the
Mahdist forces and their Bani Shangul allies at Gute Dili near Nejjo where a battle
was fought during which the Mahdists were defeated. Their losses are claimed to have
been 5,000 ansārs killed at the battlefield and 1,325 rifles were captured. Gobana’s
army then pursued the retreating Mahdist commander and his few remaining forces up
to the Dabus river before returning to its camp at Nole Kabba. On arriving there
Gobana received orders from Menilek to hand over the command of the army to
someone else and return immediately to Shawa. A week later Ras Gobana was back at
Entotto.2
Local traditions in Wallagga recall that Ras Gobana’s expedition and the
victory he achieved against the Mahdists were the outcome of a call for help made by
Moroda Bakare the ruler of the Leqa Naqante Oromo and Joté Tullu of the Leqa
Qellam.3 Moroda Bakare at first submitted peacefully to the Gojjame general Ras
Darasu in 1881 and later to his Shawan counterpart Ras Gobana in early 1882. As a
result he was allowed to continue governing his domain and the small territories of the
neighbouring clan chiefs whom he had brought under his authority as a tribute paying
vassal of the king of Shawa. In addition he was awarded the title of Dajjazmach and
given 150 guns by Gobana. In contrast Joté Tullu made his submission to the
Shawans only later. The few firearms which he had before 1886 were most probably

1
Triulzi, A., Salt, Gold and Legitimacy, p. 159.
2
- Ibid. , pp. 159-160
3
- Ibid., 160-161

134
received from the rulers of Bani Shangul and the Mahdists who became stationed
there in 1882. He also obtained the services of a few gunmen from the same sources.1
The possession of firearms enabled Moroda to send military expeditions
northward to extend his authority over Gimbi and the Sibu trading centre of Nejju
across the Diddessa river. Relative superiority in cavalry and firearms allowed
Moroda to subject Gimbi and most of the Sibu clan heads except those of Jarso and
Gambela regions. Watcho Dabalo, the chief of Jarso region, is said to have enlisted
Mahdist military support in checking the advance of Morada’s forces towards his
territories and forcing it to retreat.2 On the other hand local traditions and the
unpublished biography of Jote Tullu are unanimous that the Oromo ruler made
effective use of Mahdist military support to continue the expansion of Qellam at the
expense of the neighbouring petty clan chiefs. He maintained friendly relations with
the Muslim rulers of Bani Shangul and the Mahdist commander of the garrison
stationed there and allowed many Muslim traders and ansārs to settle in his country. It
is said that he converted nominally to Islam in order to win Mahdist good will.3
The Oromo of Wallaga in general, and Joté Tullu and his Qellam country men,
in particular, soon began to feel the impact of the new wave of Mahdist militancy
which followed the death of the Mahdi in June 1885 and the accession to power of the
Khalifa Άbdullāhi in Omdurman. The payment of a heavy tribute was demanded from
Joté by Khalil al Kuzāi the Mahdist commander of the Bani Shangul garrison. Heavy
taxes were imposed on his subjects and strict Islamic laws were enforced. Joté Tullu
rebelled and began to resist the Mahdists before withdrawing to Leqa Nqamte to seek
Moroda’s help.4
The situation was virtually the same in the other Oromo regions of western Wallagga.
The new Mahdist policies and forceful practices provoked general resentment and
alarm among most of the local Oromo rulers and their subjects alike. Things got even
worse as the prevailing famine conditions of 1888 in the border regions were
compounded by poor harvests. The local Mahdist authorities began making
increasingly excessive demands requiring the rulers and their people to provide
provisions to feed the ansārs. Failure in complying with meeting those demands was
met with very severe punishments. Peoples cattle was taken away, homes were set on

1
- Triulzi, A., Salt, Gold and Legitimacy, pp. 163
2
- Ibid., pp. 163-164
3
- Ibid., pp. 162-163
4
- Ibid., p. 164

135
fire and even families were enslaved. In the circumstances Moroda Bakere made an
appeal to Ras Gobana for help. In the meantime the Mahdist regional commander
Khalil al-Khuzāni and the rulers of Bani Shangul are said to have written to Gobana
demanding the payment of tribute and threatening him with war in case he refused.1
After having arrived in Wallagga Ras Gobana and his army were joined by
Moroda Bakare, Joté Tullu and some of the Sibu leaders together with some of their
forces. Eventually a battle was fought on 14 October 1888 around a small hill called
Gute Dile immediately to the east of Nejjo. The fighting is said to have been bloody.
At the end the Mahdists and their allies were severely defeated. Only Khalil and
Muhammed Hasan the ruler of Fadasi and a few ansārs and Bela shangul soldiers
managed to escape while the rest were killed at the battlefield. Local traditions claim
that only 300 ansār riflemen participated in the fighting, while Terrefe Woldetsadik
gives their number as 600. The numbers of the soldiers of Ras Gobana’s own army
were between 500 and 600.2
Following his victory over the Mahdists and the capture of the weapons of
those who were killed in action Ras Gobana marched, with Moroda and Joté, across
Jarso territories to the Dabus river. As he marched along he established Shawan
overlordship over all the regions he passed through. On returning to Leqa Qellam he
easily defeated the Busase rulers of the Anfillo to the southeast of Jote's territories and
ended any remaining ansār resistance. Both Moroda and Joté were confirmed as the
recognised autonomous rulers of their respective large domains under Shawan
supreme suzerainty.3 By the end of 1888, therefore, the incorporation of the Oromo
inhabited regions of western Wallagga, the rich ivory and coffee producing regions of
Qellam and Anfillo as well as the gold-bearing basin of the Diddessa river into
Menilek’s expanding empire was completed.
The last Shawan expansionist achievement of significance before Menilek
became emperor was the conquest and annexation of the town of Harar and its Oromo
and Somali inhabited neighbourhood at the beginning of 1887. The walled town was
of vital commercial and strategic significance as far as Shawa was concerned. In the
first place it was an important trading entrepot through which exportable ivory, civet
1
- Terrefe Woldetsadik, op. cit., p. 80 ; Triulzi, A., "Trade, Isalm and the Mahdia" , pp67-68; idem.,
Salt, Gold and Legitimacy, pp. 163-164
2
- Terrefe Woldetsadik, op. cit., p. 80; Triulzi, A., "Trade, Islam and the Mahdia", p. 68; idem., Salt,
Gold and Legitimacy, p. 165 and note 63 on the same page.
3
Triulzi, A., Salt, Gold and Legitimacy, p. 166

136
musk, gold, coffee and slaves from the rich Oromo / Sidama southern regions and
local ivory, coffee, tobacco, ostrich feathers, hides etc.. flowed on their way to the
coastal ports. At the same time Harar was favourably located to command control of
the major caravan trade routes which connected the producing regions of the
exportable items of commerce with the Afar and northern Somali coastal ports and
with the sources of salt supplies in the Afar desert as well. Most significantly Harar
controlled the routes through which most of Shawa’s imports of firearms and
ammunition passed. Moreover, the town was the political centre of the regions close
to the coasts and, therefore, the most vulnerable to alien aggression and indirectly of
major strategic significance to the security of Shawa itself.1 It was for these reasons
that Menilek became concerned about Harar and seriously entertained the possibility
of its conquest and annexation for quite a long time.2 He regarded with considerable
concern the extension of Turco-Egyptian political authority from Massawa in the
north to Berbera and Zeila in the south and subsequently to Harar in October 1875. In
a letter addressed to the European powers on 6 December 1878, three years after the
occupation of Harar, Menilek complained:
“This can only be seen as a desire to change
our cross topped crown with his (the Khedive)
crescent decorated turban)."3
In fact the real reason for Menilek’s alarm was the fact that the extension of
Turco-Egyptian authority threatened Shawa’s essential import of firearms and
ammunitions. Another reason may have been his fear that the new authorities in Harar
may attempt to reopen the old direct trade route that once led from Gurageland and
the adjacent Oromo / Sidama regions to Harar. In so doing they would divert a
valuable part of the profitable trade of those regions away from Shawan controlled
markets. The proceeds of the taxes imposed on the transit trade goods in Shawa were
essentially needed to pay for the purchase of imported firearms and muntions.4

1
- Darkwah, op. cit., pp. 104-105 For information concerning Harar during the period prior to
Menilek's conquest refer to Abir, M., op. cit., pp. 9-14 and Caulk, R.A., " Harär Town and its
Neighbours in the Nineteenth Century", JAH, XVIII, 3 (1977), especially pp. 379-385.
2
- M.&D. NAF Afrique/105 Report of L.A. Bremond, Entotto, 14.11.1883; Audon, H. op. cit, p. 144
see also Cauld, R.A.," The Occupation of Harar: January 1887" JES, IX, 2 (July, 1971), pp. 1,4
3
- Menikle to Umberto 1, Entotto 6.12.1878, in LV, Etiopia, XV (1890), Doc. No. 37, pp. 58-59 see
also Caulk, "The Occupation …," pp. 1-2.
4
- Ibid., p. 2

137
 When the Turco-Egyptain evacuation of Harar became imminent Menilek
began to assert his claims to Harar and express his intention for its eventual
occupation. He wrote to King Umberto 1 of Italy on 25 May 1885:“… my nearness to
the Turks is very harmful to my country and every day they cause more difficulties to
me. Even before the Turks took Harar from me I sent my complaints to several
European governments. "Now I address them to you … Having taken Harar, they
contrive to seize my territory of the Ittu Galla and the desert. If, as a result of this, I
go to war with them, your Majesty will be my witness before the governments of
Europe in order that they will not consider me their enemy. They know that I
absolutely cannot allow my territory to be taken without defending myself.”1
Actually the Turco-Egyptians were on the eve of abandoning Harar rather than
threatening to attack any territories claimed by Menilek at the beginning of 1884.2
Meanwhile preparations for the eventual Shawan occupation of the town were begun.
Spies were sent to Harar to report back on the internal situation. Information was also
sought from the Roman Cathotic missionary Taurinde Cahagne who was stationed
there after his expulsion from Shawa in 1879.3 The military expeditions conducted
against the Ittu Oromo, who occupied the Chercher highlands between the Awash
river and Harar, were continued. Two campaigns led by Dajach Walde Gabriel in
1883 and 1884 were unsuccessful in subduing them. He fought them for the third time
in February-March 1885 with no success.4 And though the evacuation of Harar, which
was started in October 1884, was completed in May 1885 no further Shawan
campaigns were conducted against the Ittu until October 1886.
In the meantime internal developments restricted the king’s freedom of action
and temporally delayed any offensive action on his part concerning Harar. The
unexpected Italian occupation of Massawa on 5 January 1885 strained their relations
with Emperor Yohannes. In the circumstances it became difficult for Menilek to
continue with his plans for the conquest of Harar with open Italian backing without
offending his mighty imperial suzerain whom he feared or risk damaging his friendly
relations with the only European power on which he depended for the essential

1
- Menilek to Umberto 1, Entotto 25.5.1885, in Giglio, C., Etiopia-Mar Rosso, 111, Documenti (Rome,
1960), Doc. no. 337. p. 65
2
Caulk, “, The Occupation…….”, pp. 1,3,4.
3
- Ibid., p. 5
4
- Ibid.,

138
supplies of firearms and ammunitions.1 However, soon after Yohannes became
reconciled with the Italians the king of Shawa resumed his efforts to gain Italian
diplomatic support for his intended occupation of Harar. On 11 April 1885 he
proposed to Pietro Antonelli, the official Italian representative in Shawa, that Italy
occupies Berbera and Zeila while he takes Harar.2 Later, when there was no response
from Antonelli Menilek wrote again to the king of Italy on 4 June 1885:
“I wish you to know that by the time you receive this
letter Harar as well as its neighbourhood will definitely
be under my authority. The region was part of Shoa
since the time of my great grand father. I have no
idea what European kings will say about this.
So, I beg your majesty to defend me against anyone
rising as a result of this issue since I have only retaken
my own region.”3
Once again Menilek was obliged to postpone taking an offensive action
concerning Harar. His uneasy relations with Emperor Yohannes were further
complicated by accusations of having encouraged the Italian advance from Massawa
to Sahati in June 1885 and of stirring up the Muslim Wallo Oromo rebellion led by
Sheikh Talha bin G’afar.4 Therefore, he had no alternative but to comply with the
orders of Emperor Yohannes and moved, together with his army, to Wallo where he
participated with the emperor’s army in suppressing the rebellion and in the
pacification of the region afterwards. The military assistance he offered and the
substantially rich tribute, estimated at about 2 million lire/ 200,000 thalers, he
delivered in January 1886 convinced the emperor of his loyalty. The governorship of
parts of Wallo which were previously withdrawn were restored to him. He was also
reconciled with his cousin Dajjach Mashasha Sayfu.5
After having spent two months in Wallo Menilek and his army were back at
Entotto on 15 March 1886 in time for the Ethiopian Easter celebrations. Then the king
campaigned with his uncle Ras Darge in Arussi country from the middle of May until

1
- Marcus, op. cit., pp. 82-83; Caulk, "The Occupation …," p..5
2
- Ibid.
3
- Ibid., p. 6 and note 32 on the same page.
4
- Ibid., ; Marcus, op. cit., , p. 84
5
- Caulk, "The Occupation …," p.p. 6-7 ; Marcus, op. cit., 84

139
the middle of June before returning to Entotto towards the end of July 18861. More
preparations were made for the intended take over of Harar. The construction of a
bridge over the Awash river to facilitate the passage of troops and pack animals all the
year round was started. Dajach Walde Gabriel was appointed governor of Chercher.
He left with his army in October charged with continuing the campaign against the
still unsubdued Ittu Oromo and establish a forward military post on the way to Harar
and if possible to advance all the way to the town itself.2
Though the Turco-Egyptian evacuation of Harar was completed on 31 May
1885 and the government of the town and its surrounding territories was handed over
to Emir Άbduallāhi Ibn Muhammad Abd al-Shakur Menilek did not launch a direct
attack on Harar until November 1886. The time needed to gain Italian diplomatic
support and freedom from internal engagements may have been responsible for the
delay.3 By mid – 1886 he was at last free from engagements in Wallo. And with the
conquest of the northern Arussi Oromo completed the take over of Harar could not be
delayed any longer. It was at this time that he decided to press forward with his plan
for the conquest of Harar before any one of the European powers already established
at parts of the Afar and northern Somali coasts could forestall him.
Both the Italians and the French were interested in replacing the Turco-
Egyptians at Harar and at the coast. Menilek might have been unaware of the aborted
Italian diplomatic approaches made during January-November 1884 and March-April
1885 to obtain British approval for Italian occupation of Zeila and Harar.4 Also he
might have been ignorant of the missions of some French officials to Harar and the
Somali coast in 1885.5 He was concerned, however, about the activities of the French
traders at the Bay of Tajura and their disputes with the local Afar chiefs over the Lake
Assal region which threatened Shawan sources of salt supplies.6 Equally worrying to
Menilek were the news which he received in June 1886 of a recently concluded
agreement between Britain and France for the prohibition of the import of arms
through their coastal possessions.7And in Harar the emir had refused to allow the

1
Caulk, “The Occupation …,” p. 7
2
Ibid.
3
- Ibid.
4
- Zaghi, C., "Zeila e la mancata occupazione dell' Harar," SPI, 1, (March 1941), pp. 11-18 with an
appendix of documents; Giglio, C., op. cit., pp. 352-359,439-442 see also Darkwah, op. cit., p. 106.
5
Ibid.
6
- Caulk, "The Occupation …," p.8
7
- Ibid..

140
transportation of previously purchased firearms and munitions to Shawa.1 Also in
June 1886 Menilek learned about the massacre at the hands of the soldiers of the emir
of Count Pietro Porro and eight members of an Italian commercial and scientific
expedition at Artu near Jildessa on 9 April 1886.2 This finally aroused the king’s fears
that the Italians may respond by occupying Harar.
Although several Shawan military commanders and their forces were already
engaged in campaigning in the south Menilek resolved on proceeding with his planed
conquest of Harar. He was aware that the emir had at his disposal only a small force
which was left to him after the Turco-Egyptain evacuation was completed. It
consisted of a few hundred soldiers with about 300-400 rifles and some cannon and
ammunitions. It was clearly incapable of defending Harar in the face of a Shawan
attack let alone protect the outpost of Jildessa and the caravan trade routes beside
serving as the personal guard of the emir as well.3 Menilek also knew that the internal
situation in Harar was getting worse for the townsmen and the few Europeans who
stayed behind after most of the others were ordered to leave. Emir Άbdullāhi was
becoming increasingly unpopular. Commerce declined and several markets were
closed. Egyptian currencies and Maria Theresa thalers were replaced by almost
worthless newly issued dinars.4
At the end of the 1886 rainy season immediate preparations were started for
the organisation of a military expedition. Without counting the army of Ras Gobana
which was stationed in Shawa and of the other military generals engaged in the south
at the time the king could still have at his disposal no less than 10,000 soldiers.5 On
12 November 1886 Menilek and his assembled army left Entotto without disclosing
the intended destination of the expedition.6 Only a few very close to the king,

1
- Marcus, op. cit., pp. 90-91

3- "Rapporto del R. Consolata d'Italia in Aden al MAE," BSGI, XXIII, V, (May, 1886), pp. 406-407;
Sacconi,G. "Lettere dall' Harar," EC, 11 (1887), pp. 4-9; Caulk, "The Occupation …," p.7 See also
Marcus, op.cit., p. 91; Darkwah, op. cit., p. 106

4- Marcus, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

4
Ibid., p.90 and note 4 on the same page citing Paulitschke, P., "Relazione subling sulle condizione
dell' Harar nel Gennaio 1886,"BSGI, XXIII (1886), pp. 397-399.
5
ASMAI 36/2 – 12 Antonelli to MAE, ? 5. 1886.
6
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 238 and note 5; ASMAI 36/4 Antonelli to Comimisario civile in
Aden, Entotto 12. 12. 1886; Letters of P. Autonelli dated Entotto 11. 12. 1886 and V. Ragazzi dated
Harar 13. 1. 1887 to the Italian Geographical Society in BSGI, XXII (March, 1887), pp. 194 and 195

141
including Drs. Vincenzo Ragazzi and Raffaele Alfieri who accompanied him, knew
that he was actually heading for Harar. Most of the soldiers who had gathered at
Entotto and others who joined the army on its way towards the Awash believed that
they were going to reinforce the army of the King’s uncle Ras Darge who was
campaigning against the Arussi Oromo.1
On 28 November Menilek’s army crossed the Awash into Arussi country and
continued marching along the highland regions for ten days. Then it descended into
the plain and valleys of the Magna river below.2 Most of the local Oromo inhabitants
fled on the advance of the Shawans and took refuge into the almost impenetrable
forests nearby. Although the chiefs of the region had already submitted and paid
tribute to Ras Darge the indisciplined soldiers began pillaging the surroundings and
setting fire to the villages. Those who tried to protect their property were killed. At
the end of the day the looting and killings were stopped on orders of the king.3
Meanwhile Ras Darge and his army had been stationed during the rainy season at a
newly established and well defended katama at Dida. They had successfully repulsed
repeated Arussi attacks and often undertook counter attacks against the Oromo in the
neighbourhood. Darge’s forces appear to have gained the upper hand over the Arussi
who abandoned the surrounding neighbourhood and withdrew to the south. The
consequent shortage of food supplies as well as the fighting against the Arussi Oromo
resulted in heavy loss of lives among the troops of Ras Darge.4
Soon Menilek’s army of 30,000 - 35,000 soldiers and more than 10,000 pack
animals was joined with Ras Darge’s equally large army. The combined armies then
marched through eastern Arussi country towards the Awash river. As the inhabitants
of the region were not yet subdued the Shawa soldiers continued raiding and looting
the countryside as they passed on their way.5 Early in December when the army was
approaching the valley of the Awash the king changed the direction of the march.

respectively; Ragazzi, V., "Relazione sul suo viaggio dallo Scioa ad Harar," Ibid. XXV (January,
1888), p. 66.
1
Ragazzi, V., "Relazione sul suo viaggio dallo Scioa ad Harar," BSGI, XXV (January, 1888), p. 66;
Caulk," "The Occupation …" pp. . 8-9.
2
Ragazzi, "Viaggio dallo Scioa ad Harar …," p. 69.

4- Ibid., p. 70..
4
Letter of P. Antonelli to Societa, Entotto 11.12.1886, in BSGI (March, 1887), p.194.
5
Ragazzi, op. cit., pp. 71-72

142
Instead of continuing to march northward towards Shawa the army turned and started
to march hurriedly northeastwards in the direction of the Ittu territories of the
Chercher highlands.1 The troops were already exhausted and the transport animals
were worn out from the long and difficult march. Many of the soldiers had died of
disease and in fighting the Arussi Oromo. Therefore, most of the army’s baggage was
abandoned on reaching the border of the Ittu country.2 On 15 December the army
crossed the Egersa river and the deserted border region, the mogga, that separated the
territories of the Arussi and Ittu Oromo.3
On 18 December Menilek’s army reached the camp of Dajach Walde Gabriel
at Galamso only to find out that the general’s advance guard had dispersed and his
soldiers as well as the regiment given to him had deserted and withdrew towards the
Awash and Shawa.4 Walde Gabriel had made some progress in fighting the Ittu
Oromo and advanced up to the Burca river and set up his camp at Galamso. His
troops, already exhausted and reduced in numbers by disease and desertions, were
reluctant to fight against an enemy army most of its soldiers were armed with modern
firearms as themselves. They also found out that the walled town of Harar was well
defended by cannon and riflemen. Large numbers of his soldiers, therefore, refused to
continue participating in the campaign, rebelled and withdrew in the direction of the
Awash and Shawa.5 Still determined to proceed to Harar Walde Gabriel pushed on
with the remaining soldiers of his army. In late November he arrived at Hirna on the
borders of the Ittu and Oborra territories where he camped. Meanwhile Emir
Άbdullāhi had advanced with his army to encounter the invading Shawan army and
camped nearby in Oborra country. The two armies kept a watchful eye on each other
for some time. Then during one night the Harari forces shot several fireworks to
frighten the Shawans. Shocked and unnerved by the unfamiliar sight and fearful of
being surrounded the general’s army broke up. The general and his soldiers withdrew
during the night towards the Awash.6

1
ibid., 75; Caulk," The Occupation …," p. 9.
2
Ragazzi, op. cit., 76
3
Ibid.
5- GuèbrèSellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 239-241; Caulk, "The occupation …pp, 9-10
5
Guèebrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 239; Caulk, "The Occupation …, " p. 10
6
Ragazzi, Op. cit., pp. 76, Caulk, "The Occupation …", pp. 10-11, and note 65 on page 11 citing Asme
Giy9rgis, "Ya- Galla Tarikh", fol. 106.

143
 By 26 December Menilek's army had advanced from Galamso and camped at
Hirna along the Burca river. Further progress was delayed by thick bushes and woods
before the army crossed the Burca into Oborra country.1 The king and his army
resumed marching at dawn on the first day of January 1887 after information was
received that Emir Άbdullāhi had come with a large army and camped at Warabile to
the northeast of Hirna.2 In fact the emir had left Harar on 26 December and stopped
on his way at Chillanco where he constructed a small fort consisting of three wooden
huts protected by a surrounding ditch and fences. On 2 January the Shawan army
resumed its march very early in the morning in full war gear well prepared for being
attacked by the emir's forces at any moment. When it arrived at Chillanco it was
discovered that the Harari army had left the place and moved its camp to the higher
location of Warabile.3 Menilek's army then halted and camped at Chillanco as the
Ethiopian Christmas celebrations were approaching. Raiding bands were then sent
out of the camp on a zerafa to pillage the Oromo neighbourhood for food supplies for
the forthcoming feast. Many of the soldiers who went out of the camp are said to have
been killed or wounded by the local Oromo and their captured rifles were taken to the
emir.4
On 3 January Menilek sent a message to Emir 'Abdullāhi demanding his
submission and payment of tribute.5 According to the Chronicler Gabre Sellassie,
however, Menilek offered to allow the emir to continue governing Harar as a tribute
paying vassal if he chose to submit peacefully, He claims that the king wrote to
'Abdullāhi:
“I have come to bring your country under subjection,
but not to ruin it. If you submit, if you become my
vassal, I shall not refuse you the government of the
country. Reflect upon this so that you will not be
sorry about it later.6

1
Ragazzi, op.cit., pp. 76 – 77.
2
- Ibid., p. 77.
3
- Ibid..
4
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, 243 ; Ragazzi, Op. cit., pp. 77, 78 see also Caulk, "The Occupation
…," p. 11.
5
Ragazzi, Op. cit., p. 77.
6
Guèebrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 242-243.

144
No reply was received from the emir. Ragazzi mentions that it was not expected that
he would accept, adding that in any way Menilek was determined to march on to
Harar.1 According to a Harari chronicle, however, it was immediately after the defeat
of Dajach Walde Gabriel's army that Menilek wrote to Emir 'Abdullāhi demanding his
submission and the payment of tribute. It is claimed that it was after 'Abdullāhi had
refused Menilek’s demands and Menilek threatened that the emir applied to the Harari
'ulama and notables for their advise. They are said to have agreed with him saying:
"We will not pay tribute to the infidel. We
will fight and if they win let them take Harar
and we will pay tribute to them.”2
"It was only logical that the devout Muslim emir and his fellow Harari 'ulama and
notables should have responded in the way they actually did. However, it seems very
difficult to imagine as has been argued at length that Menilek, being the far-sighted
statesman he was, would have been willing to allow local autonomy to a Muslim ruler
over such a commercially and strategically significant region as that of the town of
Harar and its dependent territories.3 The centuries long Harari traditions of
independence, the legacy by the religious conflicts with the Christian Ethiopians and
the general animosity of the Harari towards foreigners especially the Christians ruled
out such a possibility. In the circumstance the armed encounter between the two sides
was unavoidable. The Harari Chronicle maintains that Menilek and 'Abdullāhi
became involved in an exchange of arrogant challenges just before the battle
commenced. Menilek boasted about the numerical superiority of his forces while
'Abdullāhi reminded him of the forcefulness of is own men.4
At last Emir 'Abdullāhi decided to attack the Shawan army when he thought
the conditions were favourable. He chose the afternoon of the Ethiopian Christmas
day, 6 January, to launch a surprise assault on the Shawan army at its Chillanco camp.
He believed that the Shawan officers and soldiers would be caught off their guard
after having had much to eat and drink during the festivities. The Harari attack began
during the first hours of the afternoon when their forces suddenly started descending
down the surrounding hill sides towards the Shawan camp in the valley below.

1
- Ragazzi, Op. cit., pp. 77-78 see also Caulk, "The Occupation …," p. 12
2
- Conti Rossiri, C., "Testi in lingua Harari: Cronaca di Harar," RSO, VIII, (November, 1919), p. 422 ;
Caulk,"The Occupation …," p. 12
3
- Ibid., pp. 12-14.
4
- Conti Rossini, C., Op. cit., pp. 423-424; Caulk, "The Occupation ..," p. 12.

145
Unknown to them Menilek appears to have alerted his army in advance to an expected
attack on that day.1 In fact he had been watching the hilltops through a field telescope.
Therefore, he was able to regroup his army in time for battle against the advancing
Harari army.2 The Hararis were lured into the open valley where the greater numbers
of the Shawan army gave them an obivious advantage. The emir's three cannon,
which were placed on an nearby hill side facing the Shawan camp, fired at least once
before the gunners and others in charge of them were overrun by the Shawan cavalry
without causing much damage to the Shawan army. In Ragazzi's opinion the cannon
were either poorly handled or that the Shawan cavalry counter attack was too swift
that the gunners were overwhelmed and slain before they could fire once more and the
cannon fell into Shawan hands.3
Menilek's army which fought at the battlefield was composed of about 20,000
– 25,000 soldiers, at least 8,000 of them were armed with good rifles. On the other
hand 'Emir 'Abdullāhi commanded a force of about 3,000 – 4,000 soldiers of whom
only 1,000 had firearms, but no more than half of the guns were in good working
order.4 At the beginning of the battle the two armies advanced rapidly as the soldiers
on each side kept on firing at each other. After the first round of rifle fire the Harari
forces suddenly slowed down, turned around and then fled abandoning their artillery
and rifles at the battlefield. The Shawan cavalry pursued the fleeing soldiers for a long
way.5 The defeated Harari army had simply been "out gunned, outnumbered and
outmaneuvered.”6
According to Harari sources the battle of Chillanco was long and hard fought.7
Ragazzi claims that it was very brief lasting for only a quarter of an hour.8 He
estimates that the Harari lost a thousand dead, most of whom were Oromo and Issa
Somali besides very few "Arabs and a couple of Egyptians. In contrast only a little
more than a hundred Shawans were killed and about 600-700 were wounded.9 Emir
Άbdullāhi escaped first to Harar. Leaving Ras Darge behind in charge of the camp

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 243.
2
- Ibid.; Ragazzi. Op. cit., p. 78
3
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 243-244 ; Antonelli, P., "Zemeccoa," fol. 44; Ragassi, Op. cit.,
pp. 78-79 See also Caulk, "The Occupation…," pp. 14-15.
4
- Ragazzi, Op. cit., p. 79.
5
- Antonelli, P., "Zemecca," fol. 44; Ragazzi, Op. cit., pp. 78-79.
6
- Bahru Zewde, Op. cit., pp. 63-64.
7
- Conti Rossini, C.., Op. cit., p. 424.
8
- Ragazzi, Op. cit., p. 79
9
- Ibid. See also Caulk, "The Occupation …," pp. 15, 16.

146
Menilek hurried by forced marches towards Harar arriving near the undefended town
on 8 January.1 He sent messengers to Άbdullāhi demanding his submission and
threatening to plunder the town if he did not. Άbdullāhi agreed to submit, but he fled
during the night with his wives and children to seek refuge with his Somali relatives
and supporters at Jijjiga to the east of Harar.2 Before he left Άbdullāhi sent a message
to Menilek appealing to him not to ransack the town. The next day, 9 January, a
deputation of leading Harari notables, including the emir's uncle Ali Άbubakr, the
qadi Άbdullāhi, the Harari merchant Hajj Yusuf Barhadli and the Italian trader
Sacconi came out to meet with Menilek. After making their official submission they
pleaded with him for his benevolence and requested him to respect the shar'ia laws of
the local Muslim community. They were well received and their pleas and requests
were accepted.3 In this way Harar capitulated without any further fighting and
bloodshed and the town was saved form being sacked. The same day Menilek sent his
treasurer Bajerond Atnafe with an armed escort to take possession of the town and the
emir's palace, the diwan, and to prepare the population for his arrival. Other officials
and guards were stationed at the gates of the town where the Shawan flags were
hoisted on their tops as well as at the entrance to the diwan and at the main square,
faras maqala.4
On 11 January the victorious Menilek made his entry into the nearly deserter
town accompanied by several of his military commanders. They made their way into
the diwan formally asserting the town's occupation.5 Although the greater part of the
army was left at its camp outside the town's walls guards were posted inside the town
to prevent looting.6 On Thursday 27 January Menilek appointed his cousin and trusted
balamwal Balamaras Makonnen Walda Mika'el military governor of Harar. He was
promoted to the rank of dajazmach and given a small garrison.7 The uncle of Emir
Άbdullāhi Ali Abubakr was appointed civil administrator apparently responsible for
the local Muslim population. Other Harari were assigned to lesser administrative
posts.8 An indemnity of 10,000 thalers was imposed on each of the five gates of the

1
- Antonelli, P., "Zemecca," fol. 44; Ragazzi, Op. cit., p. 79.
2
- GuebrèSellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 245.
3
- Ibid.
4
- Ibid.
5
- Ibid.
6
- Ibid., p. 246.
7
- Ibid., p. 247 ; Marcus, Op. cit., p. 93.
8
- Caulk, "The Occupation …," p. 17 and note 110.

147
town and Ali Abubakr was charged with assisting in its collection.1 The king then
spent two days raiding the Oromo in the surrounding neighbourhood and looting their
cattle to feed this army. The accumulated booty captured during the whole campaign
was distributed among the officers and soldiers. Most of the weapons, munitions and
the two mountain guns found at the emir's arsenal together with the arms and
ammunitions confiscated from the European owned shop were taken by Menilek. The
rest of the weapons were left to Dajach Makonnen.2 The already existing system of
taxation was preserved. Ali Abubakr, the qadi Abdullahi and Hajj Yusuf Barhadli
were entrusted with ensuring that the taxes previously paid to the Turco-Egyptians
should also be paid to Menilek's appointed governors. They were also sworn on the
Qor'an to report any threat to his government they might know of. They were also
empowered to mediate between him and his appointed governor on behalf of any
member of the Harari population who might have suffered any injustice.3 Furthermore
it is said that before he left Harar Menilek issued the following decree:
"Let the Muslim live as his father before him;
And the Galla too as his father did."4
Finally after having finished with the organisation of the affairs of Harar
Menilek left with his army for Shawa on 7 February. He made his triumphant entry
into Entotto on 6 March 1887. He was ceremoniously preceded by musicians playing
the musical instruments captured at Harar. Following him was his army carrying the
booty taken during the campaign including two Krupp cannon, each carried by twenty
men. Ras Gobana, who had remained with his army at Entotto during Menilek's
absence, gave his victorious sovereign a happy reception.5
For most of the period between 1885 and 1888 Emperor Yohannes had been
preoccupied with foreign Mahdist and Italian threats in the north. In contrast further to
the south Menilek enjoyed a comparatively larger measure of freedom of action.
Therefore, he was able to extend the Shawan territorial conquests in the directions of
the southeast and southwest. In the southeast the northern Arussi Oromo were
subdued in 1885-1886. The subjection of the Ittu Oromo followed in 1886. The town
of Harar and its surrounding regions were conquered at the beginning of 1887. In the

1
- Borelli, J., Op. cit., p. 214 ; Caulk, "The Occupation," p. 18
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 248-249 ; Cauld, "The Occupation …," pp. 17-18.
3
- Ibid., pp. 18 -19.
4
- Conti Rossini, C., Op. cit,., p. 426.
5
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 93.

148
southwest Ras Gobana was successful in eliminating Mahdist threat in northwestern
Wallaga and completed the conquest of the Oromo of the region by the end of 1888.
The Shawan conquests and incorporation of Harar and its Oromo and Somali
neighbourhood were particularly significant. The hold over Harar provided Menilek
with secure control of the junction of the principal caravan trade routed that connected
Shawa with the coastal ports of Zeila, Berbera, Obock and Jibuti. Harar once again
became a significant trading centre, especially of the arms trade. Menilek had notified
the European powers of his occupation of Harar on 20 January 1887.1 But he still had
no control over a coastal port. In this context he wrote to the king of Italy in May
1887:
"My occupation of Harar is good new for the commercial relations between
Italy and Shawa, but more important than this… is (the question) of Zeile. If
your Majesty sees to its cession to me the route will be opened to trade not
only from Shawa but also from the countries of Arussi, Kambata,
Jimma and Kaffa …"2
The conquest of Harar and the surrounding regions adjacent to the European
controlled coastal areas also provided Menilek with a forward base for further
expansion eastwards into the Ogaden and other Somali inhabited territories.

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 93 and note 6 citing F.O. 78/4078 Menilek, circular to the Powers, Harar 20 .1.
1887 .
2
- Darkwah, Op. cit., pp. 105-106, note 150 on page 106 citing, ASMA/ 36/4.40 Menilek to
Umberto 1, Entotto 7.5. 1887.

149
 CHAPTER VI
THE LAST PHASE OF SHAWAN AMHARA CONQUESTS 1889-
1900

There were no substantial conquests being made in the immediate years that
followed the occupation of Harar at the beginning of 1887 and the final submission of
the Oromo of Wallaga by the end of 1888. This was largely attributed to Menilek’s
preoccupation with a number of significant episodes and developments that took place
in 1888 and soon afterwards. One of these was the deterioration of the relations
between Emperor Yohannes and the Italians leading to the Dogali incident in January
and later the imperial army’s attack on Sahati at the end of March 1887. The events
placed Menilek, whom the emperor and most Tigrean notables regarded as an ally of
the Italians, in a difficult position. The choice of remaining neutral, taking sides with
the emperor whose military strength the Shawans “feared and respected” or with the
Italians who were his principal weapon suppliers was a real dilemma. At nearly the
same time a Mahdist army under the command of Hamdān Abu ‘Anja inflicted a
severe defeat on the Gojjame army of Negus Tekla Haymanot at Sarwaha in Dembiya
in January 1888, then plundered Bagemder and sacked Gonder before returning to
Metemma (Gallabat with thousands of war-captives. Then there were the strained and
relations between the emperor and his Gojjame and Shawan vassals and the projected
imperial military campaign to punish them for allying themselves against him.
Even after his defacto accession as emperor in 1889, Menilek soon got
engrossed with the crucial internal issues of obtaining unanimous recognition of his
status as the imperial monarch and the acceptance of Shawan hegemony over the
whole country. He was also concerned with the tragic effects of the 1889-1892 famine
and epidemics. In addition, he had to exert his efforts and skills to safeguard the
maintenance of Ethiopia’s independence by thwarting the threat posed by Italian
colonial ambitions. Nevertheless as emperor he simultaneously continued the twin,
closely interconnected, policies of “building up the military capabilities of his armies
by providing them with expensive imported armaments” and proceeding with the
conquests in the direction of the south. In fact, it was only after 1893 that the thrust of

150
the expansionist conquests was resumed with vigour; only to be interrupted briefly
during the military preparations, mobilization and the fighting against the Italians at
Adwa in 1896.
In the meantime, Italian supplies of firearms and ammunitions to Menilek
were continued, except temporarily during March-October 1888. Vincenzo Ragazzi
arrived in Shawa in late November 1888 with 1,000 Remington rifles for king
Menilek.1 No doubt they were a part of the arms that were promised to be delivered to
him when he signed the secret treaty of amity and alliance with Antonelli in August
1887.2 Antonelli himself reached Addis Ababa on January 1888 with “4,785
Remingtons, 300 Wetterlelys, 210,000 Remington cartridges, 426,000 Wetterley
cartridges, 490 muzzle – loaders, 1,000,000 percussion caps, 1 machine-gun, 12 cases
of power, and 100,000 talers.”3Another 5,000 muzzle-loaders were still at Assab
awaiting transportation to Shawa.4
The flow of arms was substantially increased between 1889 and 1896.
Following the signing of the supplementary convention to the Treaty of Wichale on 1
October 1889 the Italian government granted Menilek a loan of 4 million lire;5 of
which 2 millions were used by Makonnen to pay for the purchase of arms and
munitions when he was in Italy. A consignment of such arms consisting of 1,300
guns, 20,000 Remington cartridges and 10,000 Wetterley cartridges were landed at
Assab in early January 18906, another which included 846 guns and 46,592 cartridges
followed in early March 1890.7
A modest enumeration of some of the armaments that were actually delivered
to the emperor between 1889 and 1896 may provide an indication of the scope and
rate of the arms flow. Jules Brémond’s 2,500 Remington rifles prepared for shipment
at Marseille far Obock in February 1889 most certainly reached Menilek before his
accession to the imperial throne.8 In late January 1890 a large caravan of 328 camels
carrying 6,000 rifles and 740,000 cartridges left Assab for Shawa; another 4,000 rifles

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 108 and note 5 citing Ragazzi to Crispi, Entoto, 30.11.1888, Libre verde, xv,
Ethiopia, No.203; Darkwah, Op.Cit., p. 201 claims that Ragassi brought “only 62 Remington rifles and
6,000 cartridges.”
2
- Marcus, Op.Cit., pp. 102, 108.
3
- Ibid., p. 109 and note 2 citing Antonelli to Crispi, Lakoali, 26.12.1888, Libre verde, xv, Etiopia, No.
207.
4
- Ibid., p. 109 note 3 citing Antonelli to Crispi, Hadelo Gubo, 10.12.1888, Italian Archives, 36/5.
5
- Ibid., p. 118 and note 3.
6
- ASMAI 36/9-72 R. Commissario Civile in Assab to Salimbeni in Let-Marafya, 6.1.1890.
7
- ASMAI 36/9-72 R. Commissario Civile in Assab to Italitan Consul in Aden, 6.3.1890.
8
- Darkwah, Op.Cit., p. 204 and note 81.

151
and 864,000 cartridges were left behind at Assab for future shipment to Shawa.1
Towards the end of March 1890 about 10,000 guns, and one million Remington and
Gras cartridges were for warded to Menilek from Assab.2 On 29 August, an agent of
the emperor left Assab for Shawa with 317 cases of cartridges.3 Léon Chefneux
arrived at Addis Ababa on 8 October 1890 with 15 “good rapid-firing” cannon.4 And
in April 1892 a consignment of 28,420 Remington rifles, 575 cases of cartridges and
6, 345 guns were handed over to an agent of Menilek at Assab for transportation to
Shawa.5
In the meantime Shawan caravans began to use Obock more frequently from
the mid-1892 onwards.6 The French arms merchant Savoure left Harar on 21 July on
the way to Obock with a caravan carrying 1,000 tusks of the “best quality” ivory,
musk and 3,000 ounces of gold belonging to Menilek; the proceeds of their sale were
to be used for the purchase of weapons.7 In an attempt to salvage, Italian relations
with the emperor Traversi brought him in early May 1892 the million Remington
cartridges that had been already purchased and paid for.8 Even so the French
continued to supply Menilek with the weapons he needed. In order to bolster up the
fortunes of Obock and to encourage the pro-French inclinations of Ras Makonnen, the
emperor’s governor of Harar, the governor of the French Somali coast Léonce
Lagarde secretly supplied him with “200,000 rifles with spare parts and ammunition”
and 14,300 thalers towards the end of 1893.9 The prospects of Obock and later Jibuti
becoming the principal ports for Ethiopia’s foreign commerce were confirmed by the
progressive Italo-Ethiopians conflict and changes in French official policy impelled
by considerations about the Upper Nile and interests in the Addis Ababa-Jibuti
railway project. Consequently, the flow of French supplies of modern armaments was
continued up to the battle of Adwa in 1896.10

1
- ASMAI 36/9-72 R. Commissario Vivile in Assab to Salimbeni in Let-Marafya, 29.1.1890.
2
- ASMAI 36/9-72 R. Commissario Civile in Assab to Salimbeni in Let-Marafya, 29.3.1890.
3
- ASMAI 36/9-72 R. Commissario Civile in Assab to Salimbeni in Let-Marafya , 1.11.1890.
4
- ASMAI 36/9-72 Salimbeni to MAE, Let-Marafya, 2.11.1890.
5
- ASMAI 36/14-128 Luigi Capucci to Salimbeni in Ankober, Assab, 18.5.1892.
6
- Marcus, Op.Cit., pp. 140-141.
7
- ASMAI 36/14-128 Luigi Capucci to Salimbeni in Ankober, Assab, 18.5.1892; ASMAI 36/10-81
Salimbeni to MAE, Harar, 20.6.1892; Marcus, Op.Cit., p. 141.
8
-ASMAI 36/10-80 Salimbeni to MAE, Harar, 12.5.1892; ASMAI 36/10-82 MAE to Salimbeni,
Rome. 10.7.1892; Marcus, Op.cit., pp. 145-146.
9
- Ibid., p. 148.
10
- Ibid., p. 158 and note 5.

152
 In December 1895 Léonce Lagarde, the governor of the French Somali
protectorate, reported that the Ethiopian emperor could effectively deploy 95,000
riflemen in the field.1 An Italian source estimated that there were about 80,000
riflemen and 8,000 cavalry in the ranks of the Ethiopian army at Adwa.2 Moreover,
most of the armaments of the defeated Italian forces, including cannon and artillery,
were captured by the victorious Ethiopians at the battlefield.3 In addition, substantial
consignments of modern weapons were transported through Jibuti for delivery to
Emperor Menilek between 1896 and 1902. For instance, the greater part of the nearly
100,000 rifles with ammunitions that were reportedly being exported from France in
1899 most certainly found their way to Ethiopia. And “at least 280,000 carbines and
fusils Gras” were said to have been sold to Ethiopia in 1901.4
Ethiopia’s military power, in terms of modern weaponry, was impressively
displayed on 1 March 1903 when 307, 000 riflemen of the estimated 600,000 riflemen
in the combined Ethiopian armies participated in a military parade held on the
occasion of celebrating the seventh anniversary of the victory of Adwa. After the end
of the parade, the standing imperial army’s 90,000 men-at-arms staged a
demonstration of the skilled firing of machine guns, cannon and rifles.5
The steady increase in the military capacities of the emperor’s armies in terms
of weaponry, hitherto briefly outlined, was most certainly accompanied by an
expansion in the size of their manpower. Some additional conquests were made
during the difficult conditions prevailing in the early years of Menilek’s reign as
emperor before they were resumed with active interest and vigour after 1892, when
the country began to sufficiently recover from the effects of the famine. The northern
and central Ethiopian provinces, and even Shawa, were the most disastrously affected
by the famine. In contrast most of the recently conquered territories and others lying
beyond were either comparably less severely affected or had escaped the effects
altogether. In such circumstances it become necessary for the emperor, the military
commanders of his armies and his provincial governors to look for sources of

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 404 and note 3 by Mauricede Coppet citing Livre vert, XXIII
bis, p, 167.
2
- Ibid., citing G.E.H. Berkeley, the Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menilek (London, 1902), p.
268.
3
- Marcus, Op.Cit., p. 173.
4
- Ibid., p. 218 and note 2 citing French Archives, Ethiopie, défense nationale, armée – armaments,
N.S.4, 1896-1907.
5
- Guèbreè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, pp. 502-504, 505; Marcus, Op.Cit., p. 217-218.

153
provisions and sustenance for the soldiers of their armies in the southern Oromo and
Sidama inhabited regions. The movement of large numbers of displaced peoples away
from their home regions in search for food and water in the south added another
motivating factor for conquering expansionism. An additional driving force was
provided by the imposition of heavy taxes on all the provinces in order to raise the
necessary funds to repay the Italian debt and to obtain provisions from unaffected
neighbouring territories from abroad.1
It was in early 1889, just before Menilek become emperor, that Ras Gobana
succeeded in defeating the jihadist forces of Hasen Enjamo of Qabiena and their
Muslim Oromo and Gurage allies at Gabdu near Waliso securing Shawan control over
the upper Gibe regions.2 Dajach Walda Ašagra, the governor of the Soddo / Gurage
region who had been recalled to Shawa by Menilek in 1888 was soon back at his post
and resumed his functions. In 1891,he organised and led a military expedition against
the Sosogo who had refused to pay the tribute. He also conducted another expedition
against the Lemo and the Soro Hadiya up to the territories of the Tambaro and the
Kambata. Their isolated and ineffective resistance was easily overcome.3 At the end,
however, it was Dajach Wadaju, the son of Ras Gobana, who successfully
accomplished the conquest of the Sidama peoples of Hadiya and Kambata. During
1891-1892, while the famine was at its peak and the local people were physically
weakened to offer any effective resistance, Wadaju conducted another expedition
which reached up to the plains to the east of the Bilate river and subdued the Alaba.
After resisting for a while under the leadership of their abagaz Barre Kağaw, the
Alaba gave up and capitulated.4
By 1893, therefore, the Badawaččo Hadiya remained the only Sidama people
to the north of the Wallamo (Walayta) who were still unconquered by the Shawan
Amhara. The campaigns of Walda Ašagra and Wadaju Gobana had passed along the
northern peripheries of their territories indicating that the days of their independent
existence were inevitably coming to an end very soon. The killings of their religious
leader the angančo Kabisso and of Dilbatto the king of the neighbouring Kambata at
the hands of the Shawans were forbearing for them. They retreated to the south and

1
Marcus, op.cit., p. 136.
2
- Braukämper, U., Op. cit., p. 163.
3
- Ibid.
4
- Ibid.

154
concluded a military alliance with their former traditional enemies the Wallamo to
oppose the Shawan invaders.1
Meanwhile in November 1890 Emperor Menilek distributed substantial
numbers of his royal troops to be joined with the armies led by several of his generals
and sent them into the recently conquered regions and beyond in the south. The aim
was to allow the soldiers to live off the lands and forage for booty in the regions that
were less severely affected by the famine and disease more than to accomplish new
territorial conquests. Some of them were attached to the army of Takla Haymanot
whose country was ravaged by Yohannes’s army two years before.2 The army which
was led by Dajach Bacha Abboyé then left for Kaffa whose king had refused to pay
tribute to Ras Gobana and to Bacha Abboyé himself in 1885 and 1886 respectively.3
The territories up to the borders of Kaffa were raided but Kaffa was not subdued.4
Other troops of the royal army were attached to the army of Menilek’s cousin and
brother-in-law Dajach Walde Giorgis, which left to the southwest and succeeded in
conquering the small Sidama states of Konta and Kullo (Dauro) to the east of Kaffa.5
Another contingent of the royal army was joined with the army commanded by
Dajjach Tessemma Nado, which was sent towards the regions beyond the Gaba river
which seperated Wallagga from Illubabour. Tessemma raided the territories up to near
the borders of Kaffa before withdrawing to the north.6 Still other royal troops were
joined with the army of Dajach Makonnen in Harar. Makonnen had been recalled by
the emperor to Addis Ababa to assist in negotiations with the Italians and his army
was commanded during his absence by his lieutenant at Harar Fitawrari Bangousse
and the commander of the royal contingent Qaqnazmach Bacha Bacha took command
of the army sent against the Somali of the Ogaden to the south and southeast of Harar.
In the autumn of 1891 the forces had pushed up to Ime on the bank of the Webi
Shebelli river, Considerable stretches of Somali regions were overrun. Tribute was
collected, hundreds of people were killed and wounded and large numbers of cattle,

1
Ibid, pp. 163 – 164.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 306 and note 11.
3
- Borelli, J., Op. cit., p. 155.
4
- Bieber, F. J., Kaffa: Ein Altkuschitisches Königtum in Inner-Africa, 1, (Munster and Wien, 1920),
pp. 93-94.
5
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 306 and note 12 ; Bieber, Kaffa, pp. 97, 100, See also Marcus, Op.
cit., p. 139.
6
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 306 and note 14.

155
sheep and goats were looted and taken away. 1 This occurred nearly at the same time
when Dajach Lul Saggad conquered the Sidamo who inhabited the regions between
the Arussi highlands of Bale and the territories of the Borena Oromo in the far
southeast. A sizeable number of royal troops were similarly joined with the army of
Menilek’s uncle Ras Darge.2
Darge, who had recently completed the conquest of the northern Arussi
Oromo, was planning a joint military campaign with Dajach Walde Gabriel the
governor of the Chercher region to subdue the southern Arussi Oromo living on the
Bale highlands to the south of the Webi Shebelle. Some of the southern Arussi had
participated with their northern kinsmen in resisting the Shawan invaders and
substantial numbers of the survivors from the 1886 Azulé massacre had sought refuge
with their fellow tribesmen in the south. Furthermore, the rich, fertile and well-
watered Bale highlands drew the covetous attention of the Shawan generals to
conquer and occupy.3 The Oromo populations of the region, similar to their northern
counterparts, were at a considerable disadvantage in fighting against the Shawan
armies most of whose soldiers were armed with modern firearms. In addition, large
numbers of them were terrified by the cruel policies and actions which were adopted
by Ras Darge in suppressing the resistance in the north. As a result, their isolated and
largely ineffective resistance was easily overcomed. The conditions of famine and
disease at the time also contributed towards considerably enfeebling the local
population and crippling their capacity to resist.4 Their effects also obliged Ras Darge
and Dajach Walde Gabriel to interrupt their campaigning. Their soldiers could not
find enough to eat or even to forage for. They, therefore, withdrew with most of their
troops to the north leaving the rest behind.5
In 1893, with the end of the difficult years of the famine, the campaigning for
the conquest of the southern Arussi Oromo was resumed. This time the Shawan
armies were led by Dajjach Walde Gabriel and the two sons of Ras Darge, Dajach
Asfaw and Dajach Makonnen. Both of them had previously participated with their
father in the conquest of the northern Arussi Oromo. By the beginning of 1897 the
southern Arussi Oromo were finally subdued and all aspects of sporadic resistance
1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 307 and note 2 See also Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 138-139 for more
details and sources.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, pp. 306-307.
3
- Hajj Gnamo Abbas, Op. cit., p. 109.
4
- Ibid., pp. 109-110.
5
- Ibid., p. 110.

156
had been suppressed. Shawan troops were stationed at several katamas established at
selected strategic locations to serve as military garrisons and administrative centres to
control the subjected conquered Arussi Oromo population.1
Among the Shawan expeditions which were conducted in the southern Oromo
/ Sidama regions after the end of the famine was the one that was led personally by
the emperor to Lake Zwai towards the end of 1893. Previous expeditions sent to the
Lake Zwai region had resulted in the subjection of the Gurage population of the
surrounding territories, but without succeeding in subduing the inhabitants of the
islands within the lake. Equally no attempt was made to obtain the Christian treasures,
religious books, tabots and other sacred objects believed to had been hidden in the
churches in the lake during the Christian / Muslim wars of the sixteenth century.
Boats were needed to get to the islands and the soldiers of those expeditions did not
have them. The chronicler Gabre Sellassie claims that during the 1893 expedition the
emperor intended to obtain those Christian treasures and sacred objects beside helping
the Christian inhabitants of the islands who had remained in isolation without baptism
and communion.2
Menilek left with his army on the way to Lake Zwai and camped for the first
time at Endawdi some 20 kilometers to the south of Addis Ababa on 14 December
1893. Then the army crossed the Awash river by the bridge which was constructed by
the Swiss Alfred Ilg and the Luigi Italian Capucci during the 1886 Arussi campaign.
After resuming its march, the army stopped to camp three times until it reached
Bahrgona near the shore of Lake Zwai. The emperor and his soldiers camped there
staying for five days during which flotillas of sixty small boats were built capable of
transporting about sixty people. Then they moved with the boats to the shore opposite
the two islands of Debra Sina and Guèlila. Many soldiers drowned while crossing the
lake carrying with them some cannon and a machine gun. The weapons were fired to
frighten the inhabitants of the islands and induce them to come forwards and confer
with the emperor. The leader of the islands Alibo came forward and made his
voluntary submission to Menilek. The emperor and his army spent a whole week in
the neighbourhood of the lake raiding the territories of the adjacent Oromo who had
obstructed the movements of the Zwai people on entering or leaving their islands.
Alibo was reinstalled as governor of the inhabitants of the islands with status of

1
- Ibid.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 335.

157
balabbat. Then Menelik returned with his army to Addis Ababa taking with him some
of the religious books and sacred objects that were found in the churches of the
islands.1
Before the onset of the rainy season of June – September 1894 Ras Walde
Giorgis, who had been promoted to the higher rank a year before, subdued the petty
Sidama tribal groups of the Gofa, Kuscha, Bocha and Malo to the west of the of the
Omo river up to Lake Stephanie who were formerly tributaries to the kingdom of
Kaffa.2 By then, with the Kambata and the Arussi Oromo to the north of them already
subdued, the Sidama people of the kingdom of Wallamo (Walayta), who inhabited the
regions between the Omo River in the west and the Bilate River in the east, become
vulnerably exposed to the advancing tide of Shawan military expansionism. A
tentative attempt was made in 1890 by Ras Mangasha Atikem and Dajach Tessemma
Darge to subdue the Wallamo was successfully repulsed by their young king Tona.3
Menilek’s chronicler Gabre Sellassie states the official view that the Shawan military
campaign conducted in 1894 to conquer the Wallamo kingdom was a defensive
counter attack to put an end to repeated aggression by the Wallamo against Shawan
controlled territories.4 This contention has been accepted and repeated by Harold
Marcus when he writes that the “ Wallamo Galla (sic. Oromo) raiding into the empire
was threatening to become more serious because several punitive expeditions had
failed {to stop them}.”5 In fact, it was to make up for the 1890 failure to subdue the
Wallamo that Menilek personally led the 1894 campaign against them.
Although the proclamation for the Wallamo expedition was made in August
the departure of Menilek and his army from Addis Ababa was put off until 15
6
November 1894. The delay, according to Vanderheym who accompanied the
emperor on the expedition, was attributed partly to waiting for the arrival of the
armies of Ras Darge and Ras Mikael and partly to the opposition of Empress Taitu
and a number of the old counsellors at the imperial court for conducting military

1
- Ibid., pp. 336-337.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 360 and note 4; Bieber, Kaffa, 1, p. 100.
1- Vanderheym, J.G., Une expédition avec le négous Ménélik (Paris, 1896), p. 139; Braukämper, U.,
Op. cit., p. 165.
4
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 360.
5
- Marcus, H.G., “Imperialism and Expansion in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900,” in Gann, L.H. and
Duignan, P. (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Vol.1 The History and Politics of Colonialism
1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 449.
6
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 361; Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 149.

158
expeditions in distant regions.1 Participants with Menilek on the expedition were Ras
Mikael of Wallo, Dajach Haile Mariam the governor of Gurage, Fitawrari Gabayehu,
Leq Maqwas Abata Bawalo and Bajerond Balcha.2 After marching for fifteen days the
emperor and his army arrived at Korga in the deserted border region, the mogga,
between the Arussi Oromo and the Wallamo.3 It was there that the elder son of Ras
Darge Dajach Tessemma, then the governor of Arussi, came to meet with the
emperor. He brought with him a large quantity of cattle to feed the Shawan troops.4
Afterwards Menilek is said to have sent messengers to king Tona of the Wallamo
demanding his submission and the payment of tribute if he did not wish that his
people would be killed or his country destroyed. But the young king Tona defiantly
refused to accept the emperor’s demands and decided to fight the invaders.5 On
arriving at the main entrance to Wallamo territories, the Shawan soldiers spent much
time and effort to clear the road from the large number of ditches covered by tree
trunks intended to hinder the passage not only of cavalry, horses and mules but also of
people walking on foot.6
After crossing the kella with difficulty the Shawan army camped at Kontola
for two days (1-3 December), during which the soldiers became involved in a number
of skirmishes with the Wallamo. In the account of Gabre Sellassie the Wallamo
started the offensive by attacking the Shawans with an army of about 20,000 cavalry
and 10,000 infantry. Despite their bravery the Wallamo suffered many casualties. Still
they continued to fight until the emperor gave orders to Abata and Balcha to fire their
mountain machine guns to disperse the Wallamo warriors.7 Then Menilek and his
army marched for two days camping twice on the way until on the third day they
came in sight of Dalbo the principal village of king Tona.8 Again, according to Gabre
Sellassie, the emperor sent messengers to the king demanding his submission and the
payment of tribute but once more Tona refused.9 On 10 December, Menilek gave the
order for his army to launch a full-scale attack in order to put an end to the skirmishes
and guerrilla war that were going on for the past ten days. The advance guard led the

1
- Ibid., pp. 139-140.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 362.
3
- Ibid., p. 361.
4
- Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 158.
5
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 362.
6
- Ibid.; Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 159.
7
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 362 and note 3.
8
- Ibid., p. 363.
9
- Ibid.

159
main forward assault while the right and left wings moved on to encircle the Wallamo
warriors. That day the unfortunate Wallamo were hopelessly defeated at Gasena.
Their warriors who were poorly armed with lances and spears had no chance
whatsoever in resisting the military might of the Shawan forces most of whom were
equipped with superior modern rifles and some machine guns. The victorious Shawan
troops then continued the massacre of the unfortunate survivors, while the wounded
and mutilated were trampled on by the cavalry. The killings and ravaging throughout
the country up to the neighbouring Boroda continued from 11 to 15 December.
Everyday the soldiers returned to their camp with captured, slaves and booty.1
Braukämper, on the basis of local oral sources, claims that the Badawaččo Hadiya
allies of the Wallamo under the command of their war leader Gatisso Balango had
taken part with the Wallamo in fighting against the Shawans.2 After the defeat of the
Wallamo fighters king Tona fled to neighbouring Boroda where the Shawan warari
troops and the soldiers of Ras Mikael caught up with him. He was wounded by a
gunshot and taken prisoner on 11 December 1894 bringing the fighting for the
conquest of Wallamo to an end.3 The numbers of the Wallamo who were killed or
captured, excluding the women, are given by Gabre Sellassie as 118, 987. Menilek
estimated their number at about 90,000 while the estimate of Vanderheym is given as
20,000.4 On the other hand, the exact numbers of the looted cattle are difficult to
determine because large numbers were slaughtered by the soldiers for their
sustenance. The number of those that had remained after the end of the hostilities is
given by both the chronicler and Vanderheym as 36,000.5 However, substantial
numbers of the captured cattle died after becoming infected by rinderpest or were
abandoned on the way back to Shawa to avoid the spread of the disease.6 Afterwards
the emperor returned home making his triumphant entry into Addis Ababa with
18,000 war captives including King Tona on 18 January 1895.7 Later on and after
having made his formal submission to Menilek Tona was allowed to return home as
the appointed governor of his country under imperial suzerainty.8

1
- Ibid. ; Vanderheym, Op. cit., pp. 180-183.
2
- Braukämper, U., Op. cit., p. 165.
3
-Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 363; Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 182.
4
-Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 363; Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 172.
5
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 363; Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 184.
6
- Ibid.
7
-Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 364; Vanderheym, Op. cit., p. 191.
8
Gubere Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 364 and note 2 on the same page.

160
 By 1895, the Shawan Amhara conquests in the south had been greatly
extended as far south as Wallamo and the small Sidama states adjacent to the
kingdom of Kaffa in the north. In the southeast Shawan forces based at Harar had
raided Somali territories beyond Ime in the direction of Lugh for livestock and
demanded tribute. On the whole the incorporated conquered southern regions rather
than the northern and central provinces, which were impoverished by the famine,
provided the necessary human and material resources that were needed during the war
with the Italians. The uncompromising insistence of the Italians on their claims of a
protectorate over Ethiopia and Menilek’s stubborn refusal to surrender Ethiopian
sovereignty led to the hostilities that eventually resulted in the defeat of the Italians at
the battle of Adwa on 1 March 1896.1
After the war Menilek’s efforts were directed towards consolidating his
military victory by obtaining formal recognition of Ethiopia's independent and
sovereign status from the European powers with colonial possessions in regions
adjacent to his country, mainly Britain and France. Italian recognition of Ethiopia’s
independence and sovereignty had been affirmed by the Addis Ababa peace
agreement concluded on 26 October 1896.2 The British who were already established
in neighbouring territories to the east and south of Ethiopia would possibly soon
extend their authority over the Sudan in the west as well. The French had provided
Menilek with diplomatic support during his recent conflict with the Italians and
through their port of Jibuti they controlled the flow of Ethiopia’s foreign commerce
and particularly the flow of the bulk of her import of armaments. Both Britain and
France became involved in a race to win Menilek’s support to attain their aspirations
in the Sudan and the upper Nile valleys. With regard to the Mahdist state in the
Sudan, which seemed to have been still strong, Menilek sought to maintain cordial
relations with Khalifa Άbdullāhi in order to secure his cooperation in warding off the
common threat of European colonial aggression. In these circumstances, Menilek
adopted carefully planned and implemented twin policies. On the one hand he pursed
a cautious diplomatic manoeuvring which safeguarded Ethiopia’s independence and
the integrity of her territories without openly antagonising any of the European

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 145-173; Sanderson, Op. cit., pp. 656-657, 660-661.
2
- Ibid., pp. 176-177.

161
powers concerned.1 On the other hand he ordered his generals to resume the process
of southern conquest which had been temporarily interrupted by the war. The aim was
to occupy and incorporate additional territories as well as to infiltrate and lay claims
to peripheral regions all along the recently conquered lands.
In late 1896, Menilek ordered the newly promoted Ras Walde Giorgis Abboye
to undertake the conquest of the last independent and powerful Sidama state of Kaffa
and the adjacent regions to the south as far as Lake Rudolf. Also ordered to join under
his command were Dajach Tessemma Nado the governor of Illubabour and Dajach
Demessie Nassibu the recently appointed governor of Wallagga to replace Fitawrari
Taklie who died at Adwa.2 Other participants who are not mentioned by the chronicler
were the troops of Negus Takla Haymanot of Gojjam.3 Of the 31,000 strong armies
sent on the Ya-Kaffa Zemeccia (“The Kaffa Campaign”) Ras Walde Giorgis
commanded 15,000 troops of whom 7,000 were equipped with rifles, Negus Takla
Haymanot’ 8,000 soldiers were all armed with firearms while 4,000 of the 8,000
troops of Dajach Tessemma had rifles.4
The king of Kaffa Galli Sherocho, after sending some “rich gifts” to Ras
Gobana and Mashasha Workie in 1881. had refused to submit and pay tribute to Ras
Gobana in 1885 and to Dajach Bacha Abboye in 1886 and again in 1890.5 At the time
of the 1896-1897 expedition, the regions to the north and east of the kingdom were
already conquered by the Shawan Amhara. The Sidama kingdom of Janjero (Yama)
to the north of Kaffa was conquered by Walde Giorgis in 1885 with the assistance of
Abba Jifar II of Jimma. The small Sidama states of Kullo (Dauro) and Konta to the
east of the kingdom were subdued by him in 1889 though King Gansa of Kullo and
the ruler of neighbouring Konta rebelled and withheld the payment of tribute during
his absence in 1895-1896. The Gofa, Malo and other neighbouring petty Sidama
groups were also subdued by Walde Giorgis in 1890. With the conquest of the
Wallamo (Walayta) Sidama in 1895, the kingdom of Kaffa became the only
remaining independent Sidama kingdom confined by Shawan controlled territories.6

1
- Marcus, Op. cit, pp. 177-183 See also Sanderson, G.N. “The Foreign Policy of the Negus Menelik
1896-1898,” JAH, V, I, (1964), pp. 87-97; Marcus, H.G., “The Foreign Policy of the Emperor Menelik,
1896-1898: A Rejoinder,” Ibid., VII, 1, (1966), pp. 117-122.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 461 and notes 3, 4, 5; Bieber, Kaffa, 11, pp. 95-96.
3
- Bieber, Kaffa, 1, p. 96.
4
- Ibid., Marcus, op.cit., p. 185
5
- Bieber, Kaffa, 1, pp. 92-93.
6
- Ibid., p. 95.

162
With the considerable quantities of weapons captured at Adwa and others purchased
from the European arm traffickers at their disposal Menilek and his generals became
determined and confident to conquer Kaffa.1
The armies sent to accomplish the conquest began their attack on the kingdom
simultaneously on three fronts. In November 1896 Ras Walde Giorgis advanced with
his army from the direction of the east plundering and subduing the Kullo, Konta and
the territories of the adjacent Demota, Tola, Chida and Nola Sidama groups on his
way until he reached Bonga the principal market of Kaffa which he destroyed and
burnt. He continued on his march to Andaracha the royal residence of the Kaffa
monarchs which he also destroyed and established his camp on its site. From there
groups of soldiers went out every day to raid and loot the surroundings returning to
the camp with captures cattle and slaves.2 In the meantime, Dajach Demessie Nassibu
led his army accompanied by a small force provided by Abba Jifar of Jimma across
the Gojeb river in the north into Kaffa.3 At the same time Dajach Tessemma Nado
who had departed with his army from Gore in Illubabour subjected en route the Bitto,
Chamo, Gimira and other small negroid groups to the southwest of Kaffa entering into
the kingdom. The aim behind taking such a round about route was to block the way
for the retreat of the Kaffitcho in that direction when they were being attacked from
the east and the north.4 The forces of Demessie and Tessemma finally joined with the
army of Ras Walde Giorgis at Andaracha in March 1897.5
The young king Gake Sherocho, also remembered by his people as Chinito the
diminutive of Taten Chini (“King Chini”), had succeeded his father Galli Sherocho in
1890.6 He had already taken the precautions to defend his kingdom and prepare for
resisting the invading Shawan armies. He destroyed grain fields and prohibited the
cultivation of ensete and the sowing of grains in the border regions to deprive the
invaders of provisions. Trenches and ditches four to five foot wide were dug out and
palisades were constructed at the borders. Gates were chained and padlocked and
guards were posted at the main points of entry into the country, the kellas.7 All the

1
Ibid., p. 98.
2
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, pp. 461-462; Bieber, Kaffa, 1, p. 101
3
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 462
4
Ibid.
5
Bieber, Kaffa, 1, pp. 101-102
3- Ibid., p. 101; Bieber, Kaffa, 11, p. 118.
7
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 462; Bieber, Kaffa, 1, pp. 101, 223-226.

163
male population were mobilised for war. Bieber was told that the Kaffa king could
summon a large army of an estimated 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry all armed
with lances, spears, knifes and shields but only 300 riflemen armed with obsolete
weapons captured from the Shawan armies since the reign of Galli Sherocho.1 The
sacred royal crown of the Kaffa monarchs was secretly buried at Mount Butto because
it was generally believed by the Kafficho that the strength of their country would
continue as long as the sacred royal symbol remained in the land. Other royal objects
and properties were also hidden elsewhere. The king’s wives were taken to safety
while his favourite wife accompanied him.2
Meanwhile the main rainy season had begun rendering the movement of
armies difficult between March and October as the rivers became flooded and the
ground turned muddy.3 Food shortages and the spread of disease caused many deaths
among the ranks of the Shawan troops.4 Though overwhelmed and disadvantaged in
terms of armaments the Kafficho continued to fight a harsh and bloody guerrilla war
which lasted for nearly nine months. The country was devastated, the main centres of
Andaracha, Bonga and Chida were destroyed and large numbers of its population
were killed, captured or forced to flee to neighbouring countries.5 A local informant
told Bieber that, the victims were so numerous that every family in the land had lost a
son, brother or a relative.6 The monarch became a fugitive accompanied only by a few
of his royal servants.7
According to Gabre Sellassie the Kafficho finally submitted on 3 September
1897 the same day when King Gake Sherocho as well as his royal crown, chair and
two war-drums were captured.8 However, Bieber claims that the Kaffa king was
captured on 11 September 1897.9 He goes on to say that though his capture officially
brought the campaign of conquest to an end the Kafficho still continued the fighting
for some time afterwards. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to force captives
or to bribe informants to reveal the whereabouts of the royal crown. One day by mere
chance Ras Walde Giorgis noticed that a part of a forest was guarded with special

1
- Bieber, Kaffa, 11, pp. 292-293, 295.
2
- idem., Kaffa, 1, p. 101.
3
- Ibid., p. 102.
4
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 463; Kaffa, 1, pp. 100-101.
5
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 1, p. 463; Bieber, Kaffa, 1, pp. 167, 170-172.
6
- Ibid., p. 101.
7
- Ibid., p. 102.
8
Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 463.
9
- Bieber, Kaffa, 1, p. 98.

164
care by the Kafficho. He hid himself in the vicinity and discovered where the buried
crown was. It was only after the crown was found by Walde Giorgis that the Kafficho
finally stopped the fighting and submitted.1
After the war was ended all the Kafficho war captives were set free. Only the
slaves who were found in Kaffa at the time of the conquest were taken by the victors
as war booty. After separating the ten percent of the slaves as the royal share the rest
were listed in the treasury records.2 Half of the captured cattle was reserved for the
royal household and the other half was left for Ras Walde Giorgis and his army.3
After the conquest the Kafficho were prohibited from possessing or carrying firearms
except for the local high officials who converted to Christianity and were retained in
the administration of the country. The rest of the subject population were allowed to
carry only spears and knifes for their own protection. The foreign merchants who
were allowed to enter the country were prevented to sell firearms to the Kafficho or to
any of the subjected neighbouring people.4 They were not allowed to enlist in the
ranks of the Shawan armies for campaigning except as volunteers, fanno, in major
military campaigns against a foreign enemy, yaagher tor.5
After the end of the fighting Ras Walde Giorgis left for Addis Ababa on 3
October 1897 with the greater part of his victorious army. He took with him his royal
prisoner Gake Sherocho fettered in his silver chains together with his captured royal
crown, chair, war-drums and other objects belonging to him. He left behind his wife,
Woyzero Shumbayyach, the sister of Empress Taitue Betul, in charge of the recently
conquered country.6 He arrived at the capital at the beginning of November. On the
morning of Saturday 6 November 1897 the captive former monarch shackled with his
silver chains, bare at the head, feet and shoulder, with a rock on his neck and dressed
in trousers, a green-bordered robe and black mantle rode on mule back to make his
ceremonial official submission in front of Emperor Menilek.7
On arriving at the first gate of the imperial palace, ghebi, the captive Gake
Sherocho dismounted from his mule, bowed and remained prostrated until the royal
attendant, agafari, who was sent to announce his arrival to the emperor and request

1
- Ibid., p. 102.
2
- Bieber, Kaffa, 11, p. 309.
3
- Ibid., pp. 309-310.
4
- Ibid., p. 310.
5
- Ibid., p. 310.
6
- Ibid., p. 534.
7
- Ibid., p. 536.

165
permission for his entrance retuned. The procedure was repeated two more times
before the former king reached the entrance to the private imperial quarter, elfin,
where Emperor Menilek was seated on his throne. Seated outside near the doors of the
elfin were Ras Walde Giorgis and Dajach Tessemma Nado. Several officers, troops
and court officials were assembled according to their ranks at the courtyard of the
ghebi. On entering in the presence of the emperor, the captive monarch bowed and
prostrated himself. He remained in that position until the emperor stood up and
acknowledged his acceptance of Gake Sherocho’s submission. The former monarch
then stood up, removed the stone from his neck, put on a head cloth and covered his
shoulder with a part of his robe. With his chained hands stretched forward, he
appeared before the crowd of officers and soldiers gathered at the courtyard.1
After the ceremony was over the emperor, Ras Walde Giorgis and the captive
Gake Sherocho conferred in private about the future of the conquered country. Bieber
claims that the emperor intended to appoint the defeated former monarch as a vassal
ruler of his country under Shawan suzerainty in exchange for the regular payment of a
prescribed annual tribute.2 But Ras Walde Giorgis objected and insisted that the
former king should be bound into captivity in Shawa and that the governorship of
Kaffa should be given to him as he was its conqueror. Because of the stubborn
resistance of the Kafficho, the long duration of the fighting and the large numbers of
the Shawan soldiers killed during the campaign as well as fears about possible future
rebellion Menilek agreed.3 Gake Sherocho was bound over under the custody of
Azzaj Walda Tsadek at Ankober. Ras Walde Giorgis was appointed governor of
Kaffa and the territories he had conquered in the southwest. He left Addis Ababa for
the south soon afterwards to establish his administration in the newly conquered Kaffa
and to undertake further extensions of Shawan domains in the direction of Lake
Rudolf.4
Later on the emperor became worried about the possible troublesome
consequences of the continued presence of the royal crown and other royal objects
belonging to the former Kafficho monarch. It was for this reason that he gave the
crown to his Swiss councillor Alfred Ilg to take it with him to Europe5, while he

1
- Bieber, Kaffa, 11, pp. 536-538.
2
- Ibid., pp. 538-539.
3
- Ibid., p. 539.
4
- Ibid.
5
- Bieber, Kaffa, 1, pp. 99, 102.

166
gifted the royal chair to Monsier Léonce Lagarde the Minster plenipotentiary at the
French Legation at Addis Ababa.1
Also in 1897, a military expedition was sent to subdue the pastoral Borana
Oromo in the far southeast. On Sunday 31 May 1897, the imperial Fitawrari Hapte
Giorgis was appointed governor of the Borana Oromo and commissioned to conquer
their territories which extended from Lake Stephanie to the Ganale Doria river in the
east.2 He left Addis Ababa in June at the head of an army composed of 15,000 troops.
The object of his expedition seems to have been to forestall the British who were
believed to have been advancing northward from their East African protectorate.
Hapte Giorgis marched with his army through Sidamo country reaching his
destination in the far southeast on 31 July 1897. The Borana Oromo were easily
subjected without offering any resistance. After having established a katama on top of
Mount Megga and arranged the administration of the region to his satisfaction, he
returned with the bulk of his army, passing through Konso territories to the south of
Lake Margareta, to Addis Ababa at the beginning of October 1897.3
With the incorporation of the large and rich Sidama kingdom of Kaffa and the
vast country of the Borana Oromo in 1897, the process of the Shawan Amhara
conquest of the Oromo and Sidama inhabited regions of southern Ethiopia was
successfully brought to an end. Further extensions of Shawan domains were continued
through the dispatch of military expeditions to infiltrate, subdue or lay claims to
peripheral regions all arround the already conquered southern highlands. The main
objective has been to create buffer Zones of “effective occupation” on the borders to
protect the safety of the rich, fertile and relatively populous interior regions. These
were intended to serve as valuable bargaining cards in the forth coming negotiations
with the European powers for the delimitation of Ethiopia’s frontiers with their
adjacent protectorates.4
It was to accomplish such objectives that three main military expeditions were
sent during 1897-1898. Their destinations and their whereabouts were kept secret
until April 1898. One of them, led by Ras Makonnen, departed for the Bani Shangul
and adjacent sheikhdoms to the northwest of the Oromo territories of Wallagga.
Another, commanded by Dajach Tessemma Nado, the governor of Illubabour, was

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, note 7 on page 463 by de Coppet.
2
- Ibid., 464 and notes 5, 6.
3
- Ibid., and note 8 citing Montandon, G., Au pays Ghimirra (Paris, 1913), pp. 267-270.
4
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 190.

167
sent to the Sobat (Baro) region in the west. The third, led by Ras Walde Giorgis
marched towards the Lake Rudolf (Turkana) region in the southwest.1
The withdrawal of the Mahdist garrisons and administration from Bani
Shangul and the neighbouring sheikhdoms had created a power vacuum, which
Menilek was only too willing to fill up. In addition, the importance of the region as
the source of gold production and as the centre of commercial exchange between the
Oromo regions of southwestern Ethiopia and the upper Blue Nile regions of the Sudan
rendered its occupation highly attractive. And since the region had not been under
effective Mahdist political authority its occupation was not expected to be considered
a hostile act by Khalifa Άbdullāhi. Therefore, in early December 1897 Ras Makonnen
departed from Addis Ababa at the head of an estimated 80,000 strong army on the
way to the Bani Shangul region. Sometime before February 1898 Makonnen’s army
was joined at Arjo by the Gondare forces under the command of Dajach Demessie
Nasibu the governor of Wallagga. Also joined to his army were the local auxiliary
troops of Dajach Gabra Egziabher (formerly Moroda Bakare) and Dajjach Jote Tulla
the respective rulers of the Leqa Naqamte and the Leqa Qellam Oromo.2 The
combined army then camped at Mendi to the east of the Dabus river from where Ras
Makonnen exchanged messages with the local sheikhs demanding their submission.
Internal conflicts and animosities between the local rulers precluded any common
defensive action against the Shawan invaders. Sheikh Άbd al – Rahman Khōjali the
ruler of Bani Shangul (known also by his war-name of Tor al Gure) refused to submit
and mobilished his forces to fight the invaders. Sheikh Muhammad Wad Mahmud, the
ruler of Khomosha (Gomosha), delayed his answer for a while, but later took sides
with the defiant Tor al Gure in fighting the Shawans. Sheikh Khōjali al-Hasan, the
ruler of Aqoldi (Asosa), readily submitted to Ras Makonnen and served him as a
guide.3
Ras Makonnen’s army then crossed the Dabus river and began a bitter
campaign against the forces of Sheikh Άbd al-Rahman Khōjali for several days. The
defiant adversary was forced to abandon the Bani Shangul hills and escaped together
with Muhammad Wad Mahmud and their followers to the Famaka region. The
country of Tor al Gure was looted and its capital Qebesh was destroyed and burned

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, pp. 471-472.
2
- Triulzi, Op. cit., pp. 175-176.
3
- Ibid., p. 176.

168
down. Sheikh Khōjali al-Hasan’s territories were spared being plundered by the
Shawan army for his submission and cooperation. Finally Makonnen and his army
returned to the capital on 6 May 1898 without achieving the victory that was expected
of the expedition.1
As far as the other border regions of Gedaref, Roseires and Gallabat further to
the north were concerned Emperor Menilek adopted a cautious policy. He refrained
from undertaking their military occupation to avoid complicating his relations with
Khalifa Άbdullāhi. Instead he restricted himself to dispatching Dajach Demessie with
letters addressed to each one of the local rulers. Demessie reached as far as Roseires
in the summer of 1898. Each local ruler was given an Ethiopian flag and was
instructed to hoist it and demand its protection on the advance of an alien military
force. This time Skeikh Άbd al-Rahman Khōjali submitted hoping to regain his
authority over Bani Shangul and set free his people who had been taken prisoners at
the time of Makonnen’s expedition. Afterwards Damessie, accompanied by Skeikh
Άbd al-Rahman, returned to Addis Ababa where they arrived on 7 November 1898.
Άbd al-Rahman was later joined at the capital by the two other rulers Khōjali al-
Hasan and Muhammad Wad Mahmud. The three of them were kept under the
“protection” of Menilek until the negotiations with the British for the May 1902
agreement on the Ethiopian western border with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan had been
completed.2
In March 1898, Dajach Tessemma Nado left Gore, the capital of Illubabour,
with a large force for the west in the direction of the White Nile. He was accompanied
on the expedition by some members of the French Bonchamps mission; the
Frenchman Faivre, The Swiss Potter and the Russian Colonel L. K. Astamanoff. The
force marched first northward then southward subjecting on its way the small
Massongo, Gimira and Sauro negroid, shanqalla, tribes. Being much troubled by
malaria sickness in the marchlands of the White Nile the force returned to Gore in
May. However, the Europeans and a small force of about 800 locally recruited
volunteers led by Fitawrari Haile pushed on until they reached up to just before the
confluence of the White Nile with the Sobat (Baro) river where they raised the
Ethiopian and French flags on 22 May 1898. They withdrew immediately afterwards

1
- Triulzi, Op. cit., pp. 177-178.
2
- Ibid., pp. 178-179.

169
because many of their men and pack animals had died of disease. They could not wait
for meeting with Colonel Jean Baptiste Marchand who arrived six days later.1
Also at the beginning of 1898, Ras Walde Giorgis departed from his base in
newly conquered Kaffa with a small military force on an expedition into the sparsely
inhabited lowland regions to the south. He was accompanied by Captain A. K.
Bulatovich, the secretary of the Russian Legation at Addis Ababa, whose presence on
the expedition was intended to serve as a useful observer in case of an encounter with
an European force. Without meeting any resistance the force subdued the Golda,
Maji, Dokko, Dimmi and other small negroid tribal groups. At Menu Hill area, to the
north of Lake Rudolf Walde Giorgis and his force came across the abandoned camp
of the British Macdonald expedition which had been on its way to the Upper Nile to
fend off the French Marchand mission. On reaching the northern shores of the lake
the force raised the Ethiopian flag on 26 Mach 1898 and returned to its base in Kaffa.2
In June 1899 the Russian adventurer and self-styled “Count” Nicolai S.
Leontieff left Addis Ababa for the south. He had been appointed by Menilek as a
governor, with the rank of dajazmach, of the regions in the far south between the Juba
river in the east to Lakes Rudolf and Stephane in the west. He was accompanied with
his second in command Prince Henri ď Orléans, a few French and Russian
companions, 100 Senegalese personal guards and about 200 Ethiopian troops and
their personal followers. They had in their stores 10,000 rifles and 2 million cartridges
Leontieff succeeded for a time in stabilising and consolidating Ethiopian authority in
the region and extending Menilek’s sovereignty a little to the south. However, lack of
sufficient funds and backing forced him and his companions to withdraw in 1902.
They were replaced by Ethiopian officers and their soldiers to continue their tasks.3
In the meantime British, French and Italian diplomatic representatives at
Addis Ababa and official authorities in the neighbouring protectorates became
apprehensive about the continued Ethiopian expansionism into regions claimed but
were not occupied by their local authorities. They were convinced that the problem

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 472 and note 1 by de Coppet citing Michel, C., Mission de
Bonchamps. Vers Fachoda à la rencontre de la mission Marchand à traversl’’ Ethiopie (Paris, 1900),
pp. 431-461. See also Marcus, Op. cit., p. 187.
2
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, 11, p. 471 and note 6; Bieber, Kaffa, 11, p. 541 See also Marcus, Op.
cit., pp. 186-187.
3
- Leontieff, N. S. “Exploration des provinces equatoriales d’ Abyssinie”, La Géographie, 11, (Paris,
1900), pp. 105-118; Genardiere, G. de la, “Les provinces equatorials D’ Éthiopie,” QDC, IV (Paris,
May 1898), pp. 12-19 See also Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 187-189.

170
could only be solved through the delimitation of the boundaries between their
protectorates and Ethiopia. The first boundary agreement was concluded with France
on 20 March 1897. In exchange for what Léonce Lagarde believed to have been
Menilek’s support for the French aspirations concerning the Upper Nile the agreement
ceded to Ethiopia most of the Somali and Afar inhabited territories in the interior of
their coastal port of Jibute. The result had been the considerable reduction of the size
of the French protectorate which came to be known as French Somaliland.1 After
negotiations with Menilek at Addis Ababa and with Ras Makonnen at Harar the
British envoy Rennel Rodd signed a convention on 4 June 1897 demarcating the
borders of Ethiopia with British Somaliland. It was part of a general agreement, which
was signed with Menilek on 14 May 1897 that included beside the duty-free transit of
all Ethiopian government goods through Zeila, the neutrality of Ethiopia in the war
with the Mahdists in the Sudan and an embargo on the passage of arms and
ammunition to them. According to the convention, the British yielded 13,500 square
miles of Somali inhabited territories to Ethiopian sovereignty that ensured dominant
control of the Jildessa – Zeila route and a favourable position in respect to Berbera.2
After lengthy negotiations an agreement was concluded on 15 May 1902
concerning the demarcation of Ethiopia’s western borders with the Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan. By its terms Ethiopia retained possession of the Bani Shangul region on the
basis of effective occupation whereas the other border regions were ceded to the
Sudan, except the town of Gallabat / Mitemma which was partitioned between the two
countries. The agreement also guaranteed for the Sudan non-interference by Ethiopia
with the waters of Lake Tana and the affluents of the Blue Nile.3 The reluctance of the
British government to spend the money needed to enforce the claims of its
protectorate of British East Ahica (Kenya) to the border regions with Ethiopia allowed
for active Ethiopian southern infiltration to continue unhindered. It was only after the
appointment of Zaphiro in November 1905 as inspector to patrol the border areas and
drive back Ethiopian raiders that an agreement on a frontier line was reached on 7

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 179-180; Sanderson, Op. cit., p. 661.
2
- Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 181-185; Sanderson, Op. cit., pp. 661-662.
3
- Marcus, H. G., “Ethio – British Negotiation Concerning the Western Borders of Ethiopia with
Sudan,” JAH, 111, (1963), pp. 81-94; idem, Op. cit., 189-190; Sanderson, Op. cit., p. 663.

171
December 1906. However, the final draft was agreed upon and signed in December
the next year.1
The Italians, despite their defeat at Adwa, had been allowed to retain their
Eritrean protectorate to the north of the Mareb-Beressa and May – Muni frontier by
the formal Addis Ababa Peace Treaty of 26 October 1896.2 With the conclusion in
1908 of the agreement delimiting Ethiopia’s southeastern borders with Italian
Somaliland the process of establishing the country’s considerably enlarged and
recognised borders was finally completed.3 Thus Ethiopia emerged at the dawn of the
twentieth century as the only Ahican country which had developed as a result of an
internally induced process of territorial expansion through military conquest and had
survived the European colonial conquest as a sovereign and independent state after
defeating by the force of arms an European colonial power.
The politico-military structures of the enlarged Ethiopian empire-state built by
Menilek II depended essentially on the forceful capacity of his Shawan armies.
Hence, the continuity of the country’s unity and the effective control over the recently
conquered peoples have been maintained by the concentration of the decisive sources
of political and military powers at the imperial centre in Addis Ababa. Fears about a
disputed succession and consequent apprehensions about the country’s future
prospects began to surface after the emperor suffered a “stroke” in May 1906. Nearly
all of the European diplomatic representatives at the capital and many other observers
almost unanimously predicted a break down of the Ethiopian state on the death of the
emperor. The three major European powers with direct interest in the region of the
Horn, Britain, France and Italy hurriedly concluded the Tripartite Treaty of 13
December 1906. The purpose has been to forstall the possibility of a conflict arising
between them over their clashing interests in Ethiopia by partitioning the country into
“spheres of influences” between themselves.4

1
- Marcus, H. G., “A History of the Negotiation Concerning the Border Between Ethiopia and British
East Africa, 1897-1914,” in Butler, J. (ed.), Boston University Papers on Africa, 11, African History
(Boston, 1966). pp. 243-254; idem., Op. cit., p. 189.
2
- Marcus, op.cit., pp. 176-177.
3
- Ibid.
4
- Cerulli, Enrico, “Gli avenimenti di Etiopia e la Qestione del Trattato A Tre, 1906,” L’Africa Italiana,
XXXV, fasc., X, (October, 1916), pp. 237-251; Marcus, H.G., “A Preliminary History of the Tripartite
Treaty of December 13, 1906,” JES, 11 (1964), pp. 21-40; Shiferaw Bekele, “Some Notes on the
Genisis and Interpretation of the Tripartite Treaty,” Ibid., XVIII, (November, 1985), pp. 63-79

172
 Happily for Ethiopia, and despite some outward appearances, Menilek’s
empire-state proved to have been a strongly structured and well-administered polity.
No break down of the powers of the state and no deterioration of general security
occurred. In those extraordinary and very difficult circumstances which were set off
by the emperor’s incapacitating illness and ultimate death in 1913 Menilek’s powerful
nobility and military commanders, whose vested interests were closely linked with the
fortunes of Menilek’s state, proved capable of asserting themselves. In spite of
internal intrigues and struggles for power, but backed up by the influential
ecclesiastical leadership of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, they took over the reins
of central political and military authority at the capital. They succeeded in steering the
country to safety through a troubled succession, a deposition of an uncrowned
“minor” emperor and the accession of Empress Zawditu and Tafferi Makonnen, the
future Haile Sellasie I.

173
 CHAPTER VII
THE SHAWAN AMHARA ADMINSTRATION OF THE
CONQUERED OROMO AND SIDAMA REGIONS

By the beginning of 1900 the Shawan Amhara conquest of the largely Oromo
and Sidama inhabited regions of southern Ethiopia had been completed. The conquest
was largely accomplished with the cooperation of the assimilated or Amharised
Tuloma Oromo of Shawa whose destiny became closely bound with the continuation
of Shawan politico-military domination and the hegemony of the Shawan ruling
dynasty. Shawan domination throughout the enlarged Ethiopian state led to the shift
of the centre of political power from its former locations in northern and central
Ethiopia to Shawa further to the south. The provincial ruling dynasty of the
principality of Shawa was transformed into the sovereign imperial dynasty ruling over
the whole of the new greater Ethiopia. The Shawan newly established capital of Addis
Ababa, founded in the mid-1880s, became the permanent political and economic
capital of the enlarged Ethiopian state at near the geographical centre of which it was
located.
Most of the recently incorporated conquered regions in the south were
economically richer and agriculturally more productive than the historic provinces of
the northern and central highlands. The latter had been ruinously affected by warfare,
repeated plundering, famine, human and animal epidemics. The comparatively
slightly affected southern highlands provided opportunities for the settlement of
considerable numbers of immigrants from the impoverished regions of northern and
central Ethiopia. In addition, the financial revenues and military resources obtained
from the conquered southern territories enable the Shawans to extend and consolidate
their rule over the whole of the enlarged Ethiopian state.1
According to traditional ideology and customary laws the relations between
the Shawan conquerors and their non-Amhara largely pagan or Muslim Oromo and

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 190; Sanderson, Op. cit., pp. 655-656.

174
Sidama subjected population were determined by the guidance provided by the Kebra
Nagast and Fetha Nagast, both dating back to the fourteenth and fifteenth century.
The people of the regions whose rulers had willingly submitted peacefully on their
own or after brief negotiations without fighting and accepted their tributary vassal
status were spared the destructive effects of the wars of conquest, the appropriation of
their lands, their subjection to direct Shawan administrative authority through the
occupation of their territories by Shawan armies and officials and their consequences.
These local rulers were usually allowed to retain a large measure of autonomy in
continuing to govern their people as vassals to Shawan royal authority as long as they
remained loyal and regularly delivered the prescribed annual tribute, qurt geber. In
this category were included Abba Jiffar II of Jimma, Moroda and his son and
successor Kumsa of the Leqa Naqamte, and Jote Tullu of the Leqa Qellam in northern
Wallagga. Abba Jiffar had submitted peacefully, regularly paid his rich periodic
tribute and remained loyal to Menilek. In addition, he assisted the Shawans in the
conquest of the neighbouring Sidama states of Janjero (Yamma), Konta, Kullo,
Wallamo (Walayta) and Kaffa. The case of Tona, the former king of Wallamo, who
was reinstated as the ruler of his people under Shawan suzerainty until 1903 after
having been fought and defeated in battle was an exceptional one.1
The other rulers who chose to stand up to the invading Shawan armies and
resist were severely dealt with. Their territories were plundered, many of their people
were killed or enslaved. They were usually deposed after their defeat, and most of
them spent the rest of their lives in enforced captivity or exile. They included the
former rulers of the Gibe kingdoms, with the exception of Abba Jiffar II of Jimma,
and most of the previous monarchs of the Sidama states except for Tona the king of
Wallamo for a short period at least.2
In the early days when the process of conquest was still going on once a
conquered territory was incorporated a governor was appointed by the monarch for its
administration, usually the military commander who was responsible for its conquest.
The appointed governor then posted subordinate officers with a contingent of his own
soldiers in a newly established military camp, katama. Afterwards the rest of the army
continued on its march to other territories. Tribute was collected from the local
subject population in the surrounding neighbourhood to provide enough food supplies

1
- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 104-105, 106.
2
- Ibid., p. 105.

175
for the soldiers at the camp. The local people were also required to provide the
materials and the labour force that were needed for the construction of the
fortifications of the military base. Such outposts were usually located at strategically
selected hilltops or elevated grounds, and were intended to serve as military garrison
and centres of the administration of a conquered province. The governor chose from
among the ranks of his own army the sub-governors who in turn appointed their
regional officials and the latter in their turn selected their assistants. In this way, a
hierarchical administrative system was established in each conquered province in
which each officials was directly responsible to his immediate superior. 1
Later on more katamas were established in each conquered provinces as
increasing numbers of officers and their soldiers together with their families and
retainers came along to settle there. As substantial numbers of royal troops became
available to Menilek he began stationing special units of the royal regiments in each
of the conquered provinces to counterbalance the forces of the provincial governors
and thereby prevent any one of them from building up a significant regional power
base.2 Thus when Dajach Balcha was appointed governor of Sidamo in 1897 to
replace Dajach Lulsagad units from two royal regiments were sent with him. These
consisted of gondare units commanded by Fitawrari Walda Gabrael and others known
as the barud bet, some of whom were organised by Balcha himself before the battle of
Adwa and some others had formerly been soldiers in the army of Ras Gobana.
Balcha’s own soldiers were distinguished by the name of ya-bet ashker (“soldiers of
the household”).3 The commanders of the royal units were directly responsible to
royal authority, but during military campaigns they usually placed themselves under
the command of the governor of the province in which they were stationed.
Otherwise, their independent authority and status were nearly equal to those of the
governor. When a change of governorship was make the royal units remained in the
province until a new governor, his officers and their soldiers were established.4

1
- McClellan, C. W., “Perspectives on the Neftenya – Gabbar System: The Example of Darasa,
Ethiopia,” Africa, XXXIII (Rome, 1978), pp. 427-428.
2
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 106; Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 194-195; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya
– Gabbar System …,” p. 428.
3
- Tsehai Berhaneselassie, “The Life and Career of Dajazmač Balca Aba Nafso ,” JES, IX, 2 (July,
1971), pp. 180-182, 183-184.
4
- Marcus, H. G., “Some Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation in Southern
Ethiopia Arround the Turn of the Century,” in Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di Studi Etiopici;
(Rome, 1974), p. 639; idem., Op. cit., pp. 194-195.

176
 With the arrival of new groups of officers and settler-soldiers, other officials
and their families new establishments such as market places, churches, cemeteries,
schools, courthouses, etc … sprang up. Eventually some of the katamas developed
into permanent urban political and administrative centres from which the Shawans
maintained their politico – military control of their largely Oromo and Sidama subject
population. Based on the accounts of European travellers, Dehérain listed some thirty-
seven katamas that were established throughout the conquered provinces up to 1910.
Obviously, there must have been others, which were not visited by the European
travellers at the time.1
The principal objectives of the administration of each provincial governor had
been to safeguard the continuity and consolidation of Shawan Amhara domination. In
practical terms this meant ensuring the imposition and maintenance of Shawan
political and military authority by keeping the largely Oromo and Sidama subject
population under subjection. At the same time, it allowed for pursuing the systematic
exploitation of the human and material resources of the newly incorporated
provinces.2 Considering the vast areas of the conquered provinces, their distance from
the royal political centre at Addis Ababa, the difficulties of communication and
transportation, the limited resources at the disposal of the provincial governors and
the wide cultural differences between the conquering Shawan Amhara and their
largely Oromo and Sidamo non-Christian pagan or Muslim subjects the Shawans
naturally resorted to the use of local indigenous intermediaries to assist them at the
lower levels of their provincial administrative system. The local employees were
usually selected from among members of the former ruling families for the posts of
balabbats, qoros and their subordinate assistants. In the case of the Oromo inhabited
provinces where the gada institution was still functioning at the time of the conquest
occupants of those posts were often chosen from among the previous members of the
general gada assembly. In other instances, the administrative authorities appointed
whoever they considered to have been useful for their purposes.3

1
- Akalou Wolde-Michael, “Urban Development in Ethiopia (1889-1925): Early Phase,” JES, VI, 1
(January, 1973), pp. 3-5. For details refer to Dehérain, M. H, “Les katamas dans les provinces
méridionales de l’ Abyssinie pendant la régne de l’ Empereur Menilik,” Extract from Bulletin de la
Section de Géographie de l’ Institut de France, (Paris, 1914), pp. 225-241.
2
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 106; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System …,” pp. 428-
429; idem., “State Transformation and Social Reconstruction in Ethiopia: The Allure of the South,”
IJAHS, XVII, (1984), pp. 661-662.
3
- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 106-107; Marcus, Op. cit., p. 195; McClellan, “Perespectives on the
Neftenya-Gabbar System …,” p. 427.

177
 There was nothing “indirect” or especially peculiar about the methods, which
were used by Menilek and his generals in establishing and consolidating their
administration of the newly annexed provinces and their subject population. All
colonial administration or strong rulers in feudal societies had usually because of
necessity used some of the indigenous functionaries as willing and convenient
intermediaries at the lower levels of their rule.1 Their main function was to help in
enforcing the continued subjection of the conquered people while allowing the
colonial authorities to concentrate on the exploitation of the resources of the
conquered regions.
In quasi-feudal Ethiopia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
agricultural production predominated as the main source of livelihood and wealth.
Consequently, the land and the labour of those who cultivated it were the basis of
political and military power. Therefore, the primary concern of the Shawans on the
incorporation of a conquered territory was the appropriation of all its land by the right
of military conquest. This has been justified by claiming that the Shawans were
merely taking back the lands that had formerly belonged to the Amharas before they
lost them to the Oromo in the sixteenth century. The appropriated lands then became
the exclusive property of the royal sovereign who had the absolute jurisdiction to
dispose of them as he wished.2
Quite distinct from the prevailing situation in northern Ethiopia the royal
grants of appropriated lands in the conquered provinces were made on the basis of the
numbers of the tribute and tax-paying peasant cultivators, gabbars, who were settled
on the land and not according to the size of the land itself.3 Though the actual details
of the distribution of the gabbars varied from are conquered province to another the
general objectives and pattern remained the same. The primary aim was to safeguard
the effective collection of tribute and taxation extracted through the exploitation of the
appropriated lands and the labour of the peasants who were settled on them and their
remittance to the central royal treasury. Another aim was to reward, in lieu of salary,
the unpaid governors, officers and their settler – soldiers, other officials and clergy
who served in the administration of the newly incorporated conquered provinces.

1
- Sanderson, Op. cit., p. 664.
2
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 108, n. 6 citing Mahteme Selassie Wolde Maskal, Zikir Neger (Remembrance
of Things) (Addis Ababa, 1950), pp. 112-113.
3
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 113; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System ..,” 429, 434;
Marcus, H. G., “Some Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation …,” p. 636.

178
Other concerns included the maintenance of the royal court, rewarding members of
the royal family, the nobility, ecclesiastical leadership, high ranking state officials and
others in royal favour.1 The result was the imposition of a complicated system of
landholding rights, tribute, taxation and related labour obligations.2 These can only be
briefly outlined below.
The greatest parts of the appropriated lands were reserved for the crown.
Certain portions of them, which were selected for their fertility were usually set aside
for provisioning the various departments of the royal court and were administered by
royally appointed representatives, meslenies. Large gult landholdings were allotted to
the military commanders of the conquering armies and eventual governors of the
conquered provinces, members of the royal family, masafents, the court nobility and
high ranking governing officials, makwannent. The recipients of such land grants
exercised their authority as absentee landholders through their appointed meslenies.
The meslenies were also assigned land holdings on their own, in lieu of salary, as a
reward for their services. Large landholdings were also allotted to the churches that
were founded in the conquered regions to provide for the upkeep of their clergy and
other functionaries on the same basis as the grants that were awarded to the nobility
and high ranking state officials. The only exception was that the land grants to the
churches were irrevocable. Members of the former ruling families were also assigned
land grants, siso, amounting to a maximum of a third of the lands they had before the
conquest.3
All the northern military and civil personnel who served in the provincial
administration of the conquered provinces received no salaries for their services.
Instead, they were supported for their livelihood, together with their families and
retainers, by the agricultural produce and unpaid labour services extracted as tribute
and taxation from the peasants, gabbars, who were settled on the lands that were
granted to them in lieu of salaries. Such state employees and the representatives of the
royal court and nobility, meslenies, were collectively known as naftenyas (literally,

1
- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 109-110.
2
- For the complicated details concerning the various types of Ethiopian land tenure, tribute, taxation
and related labour obligations refer to Mahteme Sellassie Wolde Maskal, “The Land System of
Ethiopia,” EO, 1, (1957), pp. 283-301; and Gebre-Wold Ingida Worq, “Ethiopia’s Traditional System
of Land Tenure and Taxation,” (trans. By Mengesha Gessesse from “Ya Ityopya Maretna Gibir Sim”),
Ibid., IV (1962), pp. 302-339. See also Pankhurst, R., State and Land in Ethiopian History, (HSIU,
Addis Ababa, 1966).
3
- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 110-111.

179
“those who carried a naft,” i.e. a gun). The term was gradually applied to all settlers
from northern Ethiopia who were settled in the conquered provinces. Landholdings
were allotted to their recipients on the basis of the numbers of the subject tribute and
tax – paying peasants, gabbars, who cultivated it and not according to the size of the
land itself. The landholders enjoyed their privileges only temporarily as long as they
continued in the service of the administration. 1 Though the local balabbats and qoros
were similarly awarded landholdings on equal basis as other officials they were not
included within the ranks of the naftenyas.2
The naftenya-Gabbar system which was imposed in most of the conquered
provinces was a transplantation of the patron-client quasi-feudal system which had
been prevalent in northern Ethiopia, more particularly in Shawa, with the exception of
several significant differences. The northern gabbars owned the lands they cultivated;
were usually well-armed and could defend themselves against excessive exactions of
their patrons and plundering by soldiers of armies on marching through their lands;
participated in military campaigns thereby supplementing their income from the land
by war booty and their tribute, taxes and labour obligations were less excessive than
those required from their counterparts in the conquered provinces. The latter lost any
rights of possession which they previously had to the lands they farmed and were
reduced to the status of tenants; the tribute, provisions and taxes they paid as well as
the unpaid labour obligations they were required to provide were onerous. Though
theoretically the additional provisions and the labour services required from them
were limited, the naftenyas in fact got as much as they could from their gabbars.
Again though the gabbars were free to leave the lands they farmed if they wished,
case of gabbars leaving their lands or being evicted from them were very rare. Since
lands without the peasants who cultivated them were useless, the naftenyas were
usually very careful in avoiding the possibilities of their gabbars leaving the lands by
resorting to the balabbats to prevent them from doing so. In addition the gabbars were
not allowed to cary firearms or take part in military expeditions except as servants of
their patrons.3

1
-Ibid., pp. 111-112; Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 191-192; idem., “Some Reflections on the Development of
Government and Taxation …,” p. 636; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System …,”
p. 429; idem., “State Transformation and Social Reconstruction in Ethiopia: The Allure of the South,” I
JAHS, XVII (1984), p. 662.
2- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 115-116; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar System …,” pp.
434-435.
3
- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 112-113, 114.

180
 The conquered regions whose rulers had submitted peacefully without fighting
and subsequently retained some measure of autonomy in governing their own people
as vassals under Shawan royal suzerainty were exempted from the imposition of
direct military occupation and the consequent naftenya-gabbar system. Instead each of
their rulers like Abba Jiffar II of Jimma , Kumsa Moroda (later Dajach Gabra
Egziabher) of the Leqa Naqamte, Dajach Joté Tullu of the Leqa Qellam and Tona the
former king of the Wallamo up to 1903 regularly delivered a fixed amount of annual
tribute to Menilek at the capital.1
While it is difficult to be exact about the details concerning how the naftenya-
gabbar system was actually applied in the conquered provinces as they varied from
one province to another an approximate general pattern can be discerned. Initially
each provincial governor and his immediate subordinates were allotted several
hundreds or even thousands of gabbars each who were settled on the lands given to
them in order to provide tax-free agricultural produce and unpaid labour services for
their personal needs, their households and retainers. A gabbar family was obliged to
deliver to their patron the customary tithe in kind, usually amounting to between a
quarter or a third of the harvest, as tribute, gibr. In addition they paid him a tax of ten
percent of agricultural produce, asrat, which was introduced in 1893. They were also
required to provide their patron with additional supplies in kind and render to him
various unpaid labour services. The additional supplies included measures of honey,
butter, grain, firewood, dry grass and cash gifts of either a sheep or a goat on festive
religious occasions such as New Year, Easter, Christmas and the Feast of the Holy
Cross, weddings or the birth of a child. The labour services involved the followings;
farming on crown land or on the patron’s gult fief, which usually amounted to about a
third of a gabbar’s labour, transporting the harvest to storehouses, construction and
repairing houses and fences, herding livestock, fetching water, grinding grain,
providing food supplies, dergo, for officials passing through the province and acting
as prison guards. There are no exact estimates of how much time it took an individual
gabbar to perform such labour services but it is generally said to have been about one
day’s work in every three days. Moreover, the patron was also entrusted with the

1
- Ibid., pp. 104-105, Marcus, Op. cit., p. 195.

181
dispensation of justice, a function for which he received court fees and fines. In
addition he usually expected and accepted bribes as well.1
Each one of the lower ranking military officers and their settler-soldiers,
naftenyas, was assigned a certain number of gabbars with nearly comparable
obligations according to his rank, the length of his service, the size of his family and
retainers as well as the numbers of the available gabbars in the province where he was
serving. Therefore, the actual numbers of the gabbars allotted to each naftenya and
their obligations appear to have differed from one province to another. During the
governorship of Ras Walde Giorgis in Kaffa, Limmu, Gomma, Konta, Kullo, Gimira,
Maji and Golja an individual naftenya is said to have been allotted a minimum of ten
gabbars, while military officers with the ranks of balambaras (“commander of a
fortress”), qanazmach (“commander of the rightwing”), grazmach (“commander of
the left wing”) were assigned between fifteen and twenty gabbars each.2 In the Darasa
region of northern Sidamo gabbars were allotted to their respective naftenyas in units,
each of which usually consisted of a number of related families or kinship groups
living in the same neighbourhood. The distribution of the gabbars is said to have been
as follows; three hundreds for a shambal (“commander of a garrison”), one hundred
for a meto alaqa (“commander of a hundred soldiers”), fifty for a hamsa alaqa
(“commander of fifty soldiers”) and between fifteen to twenty for an ordinary soldier.
The local balabbats were regarded as junior ranking officers, while the qoros were
considered as ordinary soldiers; and each category was assigned gabbars accordingly.3
In the Darasa region the prescribed annual tribute obligation of each gabbar
unit is reported to have been five Maria Theresa thalers in cash, but it was usually
paid in agricultural produce. The unit also delivered to the naftenya various quantities
of kocho (a product of ensete), grain or cash in thalers or alternatively in local iron
money which consisted of iron bars about half a meter long and bend on one end
weighing about two kilos each. Sometimes, however, an individual gabbar could pay
his own share of the tribute in cash and perform his required labour obligations to his
respective patron separately.4

1
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 114; Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 192-193; idem., “Reflections on the Development of
Government and Taxation …”, p. 637.
2- Marcus, Op.cit., p.192.
3
- McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya – Gabbar System …,” 434-435.
4
- Ibid., pp. 430-432.

182
 The unpaid labour obligations required from a gabbar in Sidamo appear to
have been more of less the same as those expected elsewhere in the other conquered
provinces. The only exception was that in Sidamo a gabbar could avoid undertaking
the required services personally by either paying his patron for an exemption or by
hiring someone else to perform them in his place. All the peasants in a single unit
were obliged to take part in farming on the patron’s land, usually for about two days
labour each week, transporting the harvest to grain stores, constructing and mending
houses and fences, herding livestock, grinding grain, fetching firewood and carrying
the patron’s baggage while on a military campaign or travelling arround as well as
performing whatever was required of them by their patrons. In addition they were
required to provide their patron with a gift of a sheep or a goat on the festive
occasions of the New Year, Easter, Christmas and the Feast of the Holy Cross.1 In
Kambata, each gabbar was obliged to pay his patron four Maria Theresa thalers in
cash annually and provide him with certain quantities of grain, kosho and five donkey
loads of firewood. Moreover, a gabbar was required to shepherd his naftenya’s
livestock, assist in repairing his house and fences and generally undertake whatever
labour services were demanded from him. He was also expected to provide his patron
with a sheep or a goat as a gift on the customary festive religious occasions.2
A gabbar usually remained on the land he cultivated as long as he continued to
pay the prescribed tribute and taxes as well as he performed the required labour
obligations. He could then hand over the land he farmed to his heirs. The landholding
rights, on the other hand, could be transferred from one naftenya to another while the
gabbar remained on the land. Theoratically the client could leave the land if he wished
or he could be evicted form it if he failed to honour his obligations. In such cases, the
vacated land could be offered to another gabbar. In fact, as it has been indicated
earlier, such cases were very unusual.
The multiple exactions imposed on the gabbars were a heavy burden on the
subject peasant population of the conquered provinces and a constant source of
resentment. The relationship between patrons and their clients had always been
characterised by immense fear. The possession of firearms by the northerners which

1
- Marcus, Op.cit., p. 193; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya- Gabbar System …”, pp. 432-434
For further details see also the author’s article “State Transformation and Social Reconstruction …”,
pp. 661-666.
2
- Marcus, Op.cit., p. 193; idem., “Some Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation
…”, p. 637.

183
had been a major determinant factor in the conquest of the country in the first place
remained as a constant threat that contributed in keeping the gabbars in subjection and
in their acceptance of their submissive and subservient status. Moreover, the political
and economic superiority of the northern naftenyas and the wide ethnic and cultural
differences that seperated them from their gabbars also contributed towards
strengthening those fears. The intermediary role of the local balabbats and their
assistants contributed significantly in explaining the realities of the situation and
thereby easing the relations between the two parties.1
Similar to the situation in northern Ethiopia the administrative structure which
was established in the conquered provinces was political and military in nature. The
royally appointed governor was the chief civil administrator in his province and the
military commander of the armed forces that were stationed and eventually settled
there as well. Theoretically, he was under direct royal authority and control, but he
practically enjoyed a large measure of local autonomy. Provincial governors were
frequently transferred from one province to another through the traditional policy of
shum-shir (literally, “appoint – dismiss”) in order to deny any of them the possibility
of building up a regional base of political power. Consequently, most of them usually
used their terms in office to draw the maximum profits for themselves from the
provinces they governed. In attempts to maintain control over them and to curb their
corrupt practices Menilek resorted to encouraging competition between the governors
and their troops on the one hand and the rival independently commanded royal forces
that were stationed in their provinces, gathering intelligence through specially
organised networks and removing uncooperative elements.
The main concerns of each governor were centered on security and taxation.
One of his primary duties was insuring the continuation of Shawan domination
through the control of the subject population and the maintenance of law and order.
Another responsibility was the collection of the annual tribute and taxation levied on
the agricultural produce of the peasants settled on undistributed crown or state lands,
the tolls imposed on transit trade and market dues. After retaining about a third of the
total revenues for himself the governor was required to forward the remaining
proceeds to the central royal treasury at the capital. A governor was also entrusted

1
- McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya – Gabbar System …,” pp. 435-436; idem., “State
Transformation and Social Reconstruction …,,” p. 663.

184
with the dispensation of justice in his province for which he received court fees, fines
and in most cases bribes as well.1
During the early years, of the provincial administration each governor or local
vassal ruler personally presented his annual tribute and taxation revenues beside the
occasional personal gifts to Menilek at the capital. For example, on the occasion of
the wedding of the king’s daughter Zawditu to the emperor’s son Ras Area Sellassie
in 1882 Ras Gobana Daci, then the governor of the Macha Oromo regions he had
conquered, presented Menilek with a gift consisting of 1,300 horses, 500 mules and
various quantities of ivory, civet musk and gold.2 In 1885 the tribute brought to
Entotto from Gomma included 50 tusks of ivory, 200 horns filled with civet musk and
an unspecified amount of thalers. In addition Menilek was given a personal gift of ten
small ingots of gold.3 In 1886 Abba Jiffar II, the tributary vassal ruler of Jimma,
brought to the king ivory tusks, bamboo trunks filled with musk, jars full with honey,
shields decorated in silver, lances and various other locally manufactured idems as
tribute.4 In 1893 Dajach Gabra Egzabher, formerly Kumsa Moroda the vassal ruler of
the Leqa Naqamte Oromo of Wallagga, presented Menilek with 500 ounces of gold
and several amounts of grain and ivory.5 At the same time when the annual tax of ten
per cent, asrat, in kind on agricultural produce was introduced an attempt was made to
store the collected proceeds in state grainaries established in the conquered provinces
from which provisions were distributed for the maintenance of the soldiers stationed
there on regular basis.6
The gradual transition from the customary tribute system to regular taxation,
however, was begun after the battle of Adwa. Special officials from the central royal
treasury in Addis Ababa were sent to the provinces to supervise the assessment and
collection of the tribute, taxes and the forwarding of the revenues to the capital. A
special department of the central treasury under the direct supervision of the Minister
of the Pen and with royal approval managed the accounting, auditing and

1
- Markakis, Op.cit., p. 106; Marcus, Op.cit., pp. 194-195; idem., “Some Reflections on the
Development of Government and Taxation …,” p. 639; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya –
Gabbar System …,” pp. 427-428.
2
- Soleillet, Op.cit., p. 97; Darkwah, Op. cit., p. 115.
3
- Audon, Op.cit., p. 147; Darkwah, Op. cit., p. 123.
4
- Borelli, Op. cit., p. 159; Darkwah, Op. cit., p. 123.
5
- Marcus, “Some Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation ..,” p. 636.
6
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 114; Marcus, Op. cit., p. 191.

185
disbursement of the revenues.1 Compared to the other conquered provinces Jimma
Abba Jiffar, the wealthy commercial centre of the southwest, paid the highest tribute
and taxes to the central treasury. In 1904, its ruler reportedly paid 350,000 Maria
Theresa thalers in cash, approximately 50 kilos of gold, 10-20 richly caparisoned
horses, 100-120 mule loads of wooden furniture, 200-500 rugs and a special gift for
Menilek which consisted of gold plates and silver cups.2 At about the same time Ras
Makonnen, the governor of the second richest province of Harar, who was allowed by
a special arrangement with Menilek to retain two thirds of the total tribute and taxes
of his province which were estimated at about 100,000 thalers annually, paid the full
200,000 thalers of import duties paid at Dire Dawa to Menilek at Addis Ababa.3
Ras Wolde Giorgis, the governor of Kaffa, delivered only about 5,000 thalers
annually which was about a third of the total revenues of his province which had been
impoverished by the war of its conquest. Wallamo paid its tribute and taxes in grain,
honey, capes, rugs and small amounts of gold and silver of an estimated annual value
of about 25,000 thalers. Similarly, Wallagga delivered its tribute and taxes in wheat,
tef, honey and gold amounting to the value of between 15,000 to 20,000 thalers
annually. An estimated 10,000 to 15,000 thalers annually in coffee, hides, honey and
small amounts of thalers was paid by Illubabour. Gamo Gofa, Arussi and Baroda paid
about 5,000 thalers each annually. During the early period of the administration
Sidamo paid about 800 thalers only but its annual contribution rose to about 9,000
thalers by the turn of the century.4
The contribution of the conquered provinces to the central treasury amounted
to a total of about 1,351,000 Maria Theresa thalers annually. The highest revenues
extracted from Jimma and Harar were largely derived from taxation on trade.
Revenues from the other provinces were apparently obtained from the tribute and the
asrat tax paid in kind on the annual agricultural harvest. Part of the produce was
stored in provincial grainaries, but most of it was usually sold for cash which was sent
to the central treasury. In addition Menilek obtained substantial other revenues from
monopolizing the gold and ivory trade, the taxes collected on slaves entering and

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., pp. 190-191; idem., “Some Reflection on the Development of Government and
Taxation …,” p. 634
2
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 191; idem., “Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation …,”
pp. 634-635.
3
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 191; idem., “Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation …,”
p. 635.
4
Ibid., p. 635.

186
leaving Shawan markets, participation in commercial transactions and lending money
at high interest rates. In addition he had at his disposal very extensive crown lands and
large herds of lirestock dispersed throughout the conquered provinces.1
The systematic exploitation of the land and human resources of the conquered
provinces through the imposition of the naftenya - gabbar system sustained their
military occupation, the maintenance of their administration, the effective control of
their subject population and the steady flow of the wealth generated from them to the
governing centre at Addis Ababa. The conclusion of the wars of conquest and the
effectiveness of the Pax Shawana removed the need for further military action in most
of the conquered provinces. The governors and most of the naftenyas were allowed to
enjoy relatively comfortable existence being supported by the agricultural produce
and the unpaid labour services of their gabbars and slaves for their livelihood. They
made substantial additional benefits for themselves by using their local clients to clear
and cultivate unoccupied forested and pastoral lands. Moreover, the end of military
campaigning and the near destruction of elephant herds led to the gradual elimination
of the main sources of slave and ivory supplies. The resultant decline in their supplies
and the corresponding inflation in their prices provided a lucrative incentive for the
governors and most of the northern settlers to engage in raiding for slaves, ivory and
cattle in the peripheral regions to supplement their revenues from the land.2
The northern settlers in the conquered provinces constituted a distinct
privileged emigrant minority linked together by relatively common ethnic and cultural
identities and general isolation from their original homelands. Their distinctiveness
was greatly reinforced by their general political association with the governing
authorities and their social and economic pre-eminence. Most of them lived in the
newly founded military and administrative urban centres with minimal social contacts
with the surrounding multitude of subject indigenous population who greatly
outnumbered them. They socialized and interacted with each other, attended their
church religious services and sent their children to church schools to learn to read and
write in Amharic.3

1
- Marcus, Op. cit., p. 191; idem., “Reflections on the Development of Government and Taxation …,”
p. 635.
2
- McClellan, C.W., “Land, Labor and Coffee: The South’s Role in Ethiopia’s Self Reliance, 1889-
1935,” AEH, IX (1980), pp. 70-73; Edward, J.R., “Slavery, the Slave Trade and the Economic
Reorganization of Ethiopia, 1916-1935,” Ibid., XI (1982), pp. 5-6.
3
- Markakis, Op. cit., pp. 134-135; Marcus, Op. cit., p. 194; McClellan,” State Transformaation …,”
pp. 663, 666.

187
 The distant relationships of the northern naftenyas with their gabbars, of
whom they were seperated by wide ethnic and cultural differences, were always
characterized by fear. The possession of superior firearms by the northerners which
was denied to the subject population, that had been a significant factor in their
conquest of the country in the first place was also a constant threat that helped in
keeping the gabbars in continued subjection and their fatalistic acceptance of their
submissive and subservient status.1 The links between the northern patrons and their
subject clients were provided by the balabbats and their assistants. As intermediaries,
they helped in smoothing the relationship between the two parties by explaining the
situation and the demands of the northern patrons in ways and means that the gabbars
could understand and favourably respond to.2
The persistence of the conqueror’s mentality of ethnic and cultural superiority
among the northern administrators and settlers and the authoritarian colonial character
of the administration precluded any possible social interaction with the subject
population. The Orthodox Christian churches which were founded in the urban
centres catered almost exclusively for the spiritual needs of the northern
administrators and settlers, their families and retainers. The church establishment and
clergy practically made no attempts to proselytize among the indigenous subject
population. As a result, therefore, the adherents of the traditional religious beliefs
were more or less left unaffected. On the other hand, Islam succeeded in making
increasing progress largely as a reaction to Christian Shawan Amhara conquest and
domination. Thus neither the state nor the Orthodox Church establishment made any
positive contribution towards assimilating the conquered peoples. Nevertheless, some
degree of limited assimilating occurred. The local balabbats, who were invested with
titles and assigned landholdings and gabbars, developed a vested interest in the
administrative system of the governing authorities. They eventually converted to
Orthodox Christianity, took new Christian names, spoke Amharic language, dressed
in Amharic fashion and became gradually assimilated into the culture of the northern
conquerors. Some assimilation also resulted from the inter-marriages between the

1
- McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya – Gabbar System …,” pp. 435-437.
2
- McClellan, “State Transformation…,” pp. 665-666.

188
families of the northern naftenyas and those of the wealthy local balabbats or through
northern settlers having fathered children by indigenous mistresses.1
Attracted by more promising economic incentives increasing numbers of
emigrants from northern Ethiopia continued to move to and settle permanently in the
conquered provinces. Fortunately, for them the decline in the role of slaves and ivory
as the major exportable commodities was slowly replaced by the profitable
agricultural production of coffee in the post 1914 period. At the beginning,
uninhabited forest state lands suitable for coffee production were cleared and
cultivated by naftenyas and their gabbars as squatters. Eventually the state intervened.
Illegal occupants were evicted; the lands were measured and subsequently distributed
as maderia lands in lieu of salaries to new northern settlers. Most of the former local
clients chose to remain on the lands they cultivated as tenants to their new landlords.
In fact they became wage labourers retaining a portion of their coffee production,
usually 60-70 %, in exchange for their labour. Soon afterwards others, being tempted
by the new advantages, moved into the coffee producing regions to join them. Thus,
some type of landlord and tenant wage labour system evolved which in time became
tied to a monetary economy.2
As coffee production steadily developed into the main basis of the agricultural
production in the conquered regions both the settlers and their tenants became
economically dependant on its efficiency and profitability. Thus the northern settlers
began to move away from the established military and administrative urban centres
and congregate into commercially oriented new settlements closer to their coffee
producing lands in the countryside. Thus, for the first time the northern Ethiopian
settlers were brought into closer contacts with their local peasant population. Soon
churches and their Orthodox clergy began to be established in most of the newly
settled locations. Though the churches were originally intended for the service of the
settler communities their positions closer to where the local inhabitants lived provided
more favourable opportunities for possible cultural interaction and social change.
Nevertheless, without positive support and encouragement from the governing

1-
Markakis, Op. cit., p. 136; Marcus, Op. cit., p. 194; idem., “Some Reflections on the Development of
Government …,” p. 638; McClellan, “Perspectives on the Neftenya – Gabbar System …,” p. 436;
idem., “State Transformation …,” pp. 664-665.
2
- McClellan, “Land, Labor And Coffee …,” pp. 71-75; idem., “State Transformation …,” pp. 671-673.

189
authorities and the ecclesiastical leadership the pace and the extent of cultural
interaction was bound to have been limited.1
In most of the newly conquered non-Muslim regions the local tributary vassal
rulers and their families were converted to the official Orthodox Christian religion and
were gradually assimilated into the culture of the Shawan Amhara dominated state. In
their turn they often become increasingly eager to discourage their people from
continued adherence to traditional religious beliefs and practices. Instead, they tended
to promote Christian proselytisation among their people through the establishment of
churches in their regions and the employment of the clergy for them. In this way large
numbers of the Oromo in Wallagga and Illubabor and many of the Sidama in Kaffa
and Wallamo were won over to the Orthodox Christian faith.2
In marked contrast the rapid spread of Islam among the Arussi (Arsi) Oromo
was in a large measure an expression of their rejection of Christianity which happened
to have been the religion of the Shawan Amhara conquerors and the north Ethiopian
and assimilated Tulama settlers. Thus, when the traditional Oromo pilgrimage to the
Abba Muda was banned on Menilek’s order in 1900 large numbers of them embraced
Islam. Their conversion was essentially a protest against Christianity which they
identified with the oppressive Shawan Amhara rule and excessive settler exactions.
As a consequence the traditional Oromo pilgrimage to the Abba Muda was replaced
by the Muslim pilgrimage in February of each year to the tomb of Sheikh Hussein in
Bale.3
The incorporation of large numbers of Muslims with the extended borders of
Ethiopia rendered the adoption of a militant policy of intolerance to Islam and
enforcement of Orthodox Christian conformity certainly impractical and potentially
distructive.4 Christian proselytisation among the predominantly Muslim Oromo
population of the Gibe region was prohibited. Likewise, the establishment of churches
in their territories was not allowed. By 1911, the only church in the whole region was

1
- McClellan, “State Transformation …,” pp. 673-674.
2- Terrefe Woldetsadik, “The Unification of Ethiopia … Wallagga,” pp. 83, 84; Marcus, “Imperialism
and Expansionism …,” pp. 450-451.
3
- Greenfield, Richard and Mohammed Hassen, “Interpretations of Oromo Nationality,” Horn of
Africa, 111, 3, (1980), p. 5; Hajj Gnamo Abbas, “Le rôle du culte de Chaikh Hussein dans l’Islam des
Arsi, Ethiopia,” Islam et Société au Sud du Sahara, V, (1991), pp. 21-42.
4
- Caulk, R.A., “Religion and the State in Nineteenth Century Ethiopia,” JES, X, 1, (January, 1972), pp.
38, 41.

190
intended solely for members of the Shawan garrison that was stationed in Limmu.1 A
similar policy of toleration of Islam was pursued in Harar after its conquest and
occupation. The Muslim faith and the shari’a laws of the Harari people were not
interfered with. Most of the Muslim notables were allowed to retain their posts. The
few churches that were established in Harar were intended to serve the Shawan
administrators and soldiers of the garrison in the town, though one of the churches
was built on the site of a former mosque.2

Most probably it was Menilek’s intention to avoid generating any feelings of

religious resentment and persecution among the conquered Muslim population which,
together with their subjugation, would provoke rebellion. Even so a few sporadic
revolts against Shawan Amhara expansionism broke out among some of the Muslim
subject Oromo people. One of the early revolts was led by Hassan Injamo, Omar
Baxa’s successor as vassal ruler of the small principality of Qabiena, in the late 1870s.
His rebellion, in alliance with a few neighbouring Muslim Oromo and Gurage chiefs,
was put down after several military campaigns led against them by Gobana and Habte
Giyorgis.3 Another rebellion was led by Firrisa, the eldest son of Abba Gubir the last
independent ruler of Gumma, among the Muslim Oromo of the Gibe region in around
1899. It lasted for almost two years until it was ended with the leader’s arrest and
execution.4
A rebellion also broke out in 1909 among the non-Muslim Leqa Qellam
Oromo in Wallagga following the deposition and imprisonment of their local ruler
Joté Tullu and the extension of direct Shawan rule accompanied by the imposition of
the naftenya-gabbar system over their territories. The rebels harassed the Shawan
naftenyas almost continuously until their insurrection was brutally suppressed and
Joté Tullu was released and entrusted once more with the administration of his
territories in 1913. Rebellion was started again for a time towards the end of 1917
when he was finally discharged.5

1
- Cerulli, Enrico, “L’Islam nei règni Galla independenti,” L’Africa Italiana, XXXV, fasc. V-VI (May-
June, 1916), pp. 116-117; Marcus, H.G., “Imperialism and Expansionism …,” p. 450.
2
- Caulk, “The Occupation of Harar …,” pp. 18-19; idem, “Religion and the State …,” p. 38
3
- Cerulli, Enrico, “Folk-Literature …,” pp. 163-165; Trimingham, Op. cit., pp. 183, 203.
4
- Cerulli, Enrico, “Folk-Literatury…,” pp. 45-51; Trimingham, Op. cit., p. 202.
5
- Triulzi, A., “Social Protest and Rebellion in Some Gäbbar Songs From Qelläm, Wallägga,” in
Tubiana, Joseph, ed., Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Session
A: Nice 19-22 December, 1977) (Rotterdam, 1980), pp. 178-179.

191
 The loss of their independence, the appropriation of their lands and their
subjection to oppressive alien Shawan Amhara rule were not the only misfortunes
suffered by the Oromo, Sidama and other conquered peoples. Their countries have
been devastated, their livestock and movable belongings were plundered and most of
their villages have been burnt down. Of particularly grave consequences have been
the huge losses of human lives. Great numbers of people have been killed or were left
dying on battlefields during the military campaigns of conquest. Still equally large
numbers, usually young men, women and children, were carried away into slavery as
war captives, tribute or victims of slave raiding. After the campaigns of conquest were
over slaves continued to be procured through raiding the negroid peoples of the
distant peripheral western and southern borderlands. Most of the slaves were sold,
despite treaties to suppress the slave trade, at the principal eastern markets of Shawa
for foreign export. Considerably large numbers of slaves were also retained within the
country. Menilek was the greatest slave owner who kept several thousands of the
procured slaves for himself. The royal slaves were employed at the royal palace and
its various establishments where most of the young women served in preparing food
and drink for members of the royal court and the great numbers of guests at the royal
banquets and feasts. Many others served as guards, porters, servants or as
metalworkers, brick-layers, carpenters, weavers tanners, potters, etc …. Others
ploughed and harvested crops, shepherded livestock or served as staple-hands in the
royal estates. Many slaves, too, were employed in the households of the nobility, top
state officials, military commanders and leading churchmen as personal retainers,
guards, concubines and domestic servants. Nearly all the provincial governors,
administrators and settlers in the conquered territories were slave owners who usually
employed their slaves as retainers, personal servants and fetchers of water, fodder and
firewood.1
After the campaigns of conquest were over slaves continued to be procured
through raiding the predominantly negroid peoples in the distant peripheral southern
and western bordelands. The extent of slave raiding in these directions was intensified
after 1906 when Menilek’s health began to deteriorate. When provincial governors
and their subordinate military commanders in the conquered provinces were
transferred from one province to another or to the north they usually took with them

1
- Le Roy, Paul. E., “Slavery in the Horn of Africa,” Horn of Africa, 11, 3, (July / September, 1973),
pp. 11-12, 13.

192
large numbers of slaves for themselves or as suitable gifts for others. When Ras
Wolde Giyorgis, the governor of Kaffa, was transfered to northern Ethiopia in 1910
he took with him a very large number of young men, women and children as slaves.
1
His example was followed by his accompanying military commanders. Menilek’s
designated successor Lij Iyasu conducted several slave-raiding expeditions in the
negroid Ghimirra-Maji southern regions in one of which he returned “with no less
than eight thousand slaves.”2
On the whole the viciousness of the destructive Shawan military
expansionism, the predatory behaviour of Shawan armies raiding enemies for booty
during war times and living off the subject peasants in peace times3, and the generally
oppressive and exploitive nature of their alien rule and their consequences have been
felt everywhere by the majority of the conquered peoples. Their experiences have not
been substantially different, if not possibly worse, than of other African peoples
elsewhere who were subjected to European colonial rule. The Shawan armies of
conquest and occupation had in their possession an almost exclusive monopoly of
imported firearms which they conquered peoples were prevented from having access
to. The unfortunate fate of the helpless tribal warriors who fought them with only
lances and spears was predictable. Even the determined and sustained resistance of
the Arussi Oromo have been suppressed after six years of repeated bloody military
campigns that ended in thousands of them being killed and their country ravaged.
Similarly, the firepower and mobility of the Shawan armies of occupation enabled
troops to be effectively deployed wherever they were needed to control and keep the
conquered peoples under subjection.4
Everywhere the conquered Oromo and Sidama people have shared comparable
experiences of immense abuses and sufferings imposed on them by oppressive
Shawan rule and exploitive Shawan, north Ethiopian and assimilated / Amharised
Tuloma Oromo and Gurage settler communities. A few examples of the manner in
which such experiences have been responded to or described indicate the magnitude
of what the incorporation into the enlarged Ethiopian state has meant to the peoples
concerned. Traditional expectations are said to have been current among the

1
- Caulk, R.A., “Armies As Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia C. 1850-1935,” IJAHS, XI, 3,
(1978), p. 474.
2
- Le Roy, Paul. E., Op. cit., p. 12.
3
- Caulk, “Armies As Predators …,” p. 460, 462-463, 465-474.
4
- Greenfield and Mohammed Hassen, Op. cit., pp. 8-11.

193
conquered Oromo at the beginning of the twentieth century of signs that promised the
near return of the kao (“the time of full rights and happiness.”)1. In 1901 Roba, a
former abba dula (“war-leader”) of the Arussi who still had hopes of his peoples
regaining their independence, was reported saying: “The hour has not come, but it
will come; perhaps our children will see the departure of the oppressor.”2
A few brief contemporary account by European travellers would possibly
illustrate the extent of what some of the conquered people, particularly the Oromo,
had been through under Shawan Amhara rule. In 1896 Donaldson Smith wrote,
“where was the country teeming with lusty war-like people? Certainly no where!
What we found … was only … natives presenting the most abject appearance
imaginable. Only four years ago, they must have been a fine race of men. They loved
to tell us of their former glory, their eyes would light up and they would forget for the
instance their present condition … The Arussi Galla here, as elsewhere, were regarded
as slaves, and were sold in the market as such.”3
Koettlitz, who travelled through southern Ethiopia at the beginning of the
twentieth century, reported that “the Galla here have been comparatively lately
subjected to the Abyssinians. They are a fine-featured, well-formed agricultural and
pastural race who is kept in abject subjection to their conquereors by means of not
allowing them to have firearms. The Abyssinians rob, ill-treat and tax their produce
without mercy and they are evidently in a very unhappy state.”4
The profound resentment felt by the conquered peoples as a consequence of
the appropriation of their lands and the excessive exactions imposed on them under
Shawan Amhara rule have been expressed in a number of popular sayings. “Menilek
gave the land to the Amhara, and other people to the birds,” is a Wallamo saying
meaning that the loss of their lands to the conquering Shawan Amhara has reduced the
conquered people to corps to be eaten by vultures. “An ordinary person is born with

1
- Greenfield and Mohammed Hassen, Op. cit., p. 8.
2
- Marcus, “Imerialism and Expansionism ..,” p. 452; Greenfield and Mohammed Hassen, Op. cit., p. 8
Both refer the original and quotation to Bourg du Bozas, Pierre Marie Robert, Mission scientifique Du
Bourg du Bozas de la mar Rouge a l’ Afrique tropical (Paris, 1906), pp. 122 and 125.
3
- Greenfield and Mohammed Hassen, Op. cit., p. 9 citing Donaldson Smith, “Exploration through
Somaliland to Lake Rudolf,” Geographical Journal, (London, 1896), pp. 123-127.
4
- Greenfield and Mohammed Hassen, Op. cit., p. 9, citing Koettlitz, R., “Journey through southern
Abyssinia to the Shangala or Berta country and the Blue Nile and through the Sudan to Egypt,”
Scottish Geographical Magazine, XVI, (Edinburgh, 1900), p. 488.

194
crossed hands, an Amhara is born with outstretched hands” is a Harari saying. Its
Wallamo equivalent is “The Amhara and the wolf count sheep they have not raised.”1
Even as late as the 1960s the Arussi Oromo reportedly still described their
conquest by the Shawans as the “commencement of an era of miseries, since which
life has not run as God intended it.” Similarly, we are told that the Boran divide their
historical experiences into two periods “before” and “after” their conquest by the
Shawan Amhara, the first was good and the second bad. The Guji also blamed all
their social problems on their conquest and incorporation within the Ethiopian state.2

1
- Markakis, Op. cit., p. 137.
2
- Baxter, P.T.W. “Ethiopia’s Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo,” African Affairs, 77, 308, (July,
1978), p. 291.

195
 Conclusion

The campaigns of Shawan Amhara military conquests conducted during the late
nineteenth century had more than tripled the territorial extent of the historic Orthodox
Christian Ethiopian state and almost doubled the size of its population. Included
within the country’s newly extended and recognized borders were the rich, fertile and
relatively less densely populated southern highland regions inhabited by the Oromo
and Sidama peoples, in addition to the small Gurage and Harari groups. Also added to
the enlarged Ethiopian polity were portions of the adjacent lowland regions inhabited
by the pastoral Somali and Afar in the southeast, the negroid Berta and Nilotic tribal
groups in the southwest and the Gimmira – Maji group in the south.
The successful accomplishment of the conquests was mainly the result of an almost
unmatched military superiority of the Shawan armies over the fighting forces of their
adversaries in both man – power and armament. The numerical strength of the
Shawan armies had been steadily built up during the course of time through the
enlistment within their ranks of new recruits and former soldiers of the defeated
armies. Most of the financial revenues derived through war – booty, particularly in
captured ivory and slaves, the control of the transit flow of the major staples of the
exportable items of commerce such as ivory, civet – musk, gold and above all slaves
in addition to the tribute and taxation extracted from the conquered territories were
spent to pay for the purchase of increasing quantities of imported modern firearms
and ammunition for the armament of the armies. The success of the conquests also
owed much to the lack of interference by outsiders - including the imperial sovereign,
the northern provincial magnates or the European colonial powers – mainly Britain,
Italy and France – who had established their respective protectorates on parts of the
coastal territories of northeastern Africa.
The military preponderance of the Shawan Amhara was also an instrumental factor in
ensuring the effective administrative control they managed to establish over the
conqured territories and the systematic exploitation of their economic and human
resources. It was also a determinant factor in the decisive defeat of the Italian
invading forces at Adwa in 1896. The result had been the survival of the
independence of a considerably enlarged Ethiopian state during the era of the
European scramble and colonial conquest of sub – Saharan Africa. Internally the

196
outcome had been the sustained maintenance and consolidation of the newly
established Shawan Amharan politico – military hegemony and domination over the
emergent greater Ethiopian polity, though the northern Eritrean highlands were ceded
to the Italians in 1896.
In many ways, therefore, the emergence of an enlarged Ethiopia as an independent
modern African state was essentially a survivor of a former indigenous political
paramountcy which had already been expanding as a result of an internally induced
process of military expansion rather than being the outcome of external European
colonial conquest and territorial annexation as the majority of the African modern
states had been. The newly incorporated conquered largely Oromo and Sidama
territories were directly settled and administered by royally appointed governors and
military generals with their settler officers and soldiers functioning as provincial
garrisons and administrators. All Shawan, north Ethiopian, assimilated Oromo and
Gurage settlers, their families and retainers were established in the conquered
territories as land – holding settlers. They were supported for their livelihood by the
agricultural produce and the surplus labour services of the tribute and tax – paying
subject peasants who farmed the lands allotted to them in the lieu of salaries. In most
cases the settlers supplemented their sustenance by the produce and labour of their
own slaves and participation in local trading activities.
The politically and militarily dominant Shawan Amhara conquerors were
distinguishably dissimilar ethnically and culturally from their largely Oromo and
Sidama subject population whom they had forcefully subjected, oppressively and
exploitatively governed. In addition the ruling Shawan Amhara and their conqured
subjects had undergone very distinctively different historical experiences over the
centuries during which they had developed their respective separate socio – political
institutions and identities. In these respects, therefore, it would not be unjustifiable to
agree with the contention that the position of the Shawan Amhara visa – vis their
largely Oromo and Sidamo subject population was not necessarily different from that
of any one of European colonial powers elsewhere in Africa below the Sahara. The
only exception, perhaps, was that they were Africans in origin.
Under direct rule of the Shawan governing authorities and the privilged status of the
settler communities, most of whom were governing officials as well, the subject
largely Oromo and Sidama peoples suffered much oppression and exploitation. The
only exceptions who escaped this fate were the assimilated members of the former

197
ruling families, the balabbats, who became titled officials and landholders whose
interests were closely identified with the continuation of Shawan rule and the
systematic application of its policies. As a consequence the bases were laid for the
resultant division of the society in the newly annexed conquered provinces into two
distinct class formations. On the one hand there were the politically dominant,
economically and socially privileged minorities represented by the landholding
governing officials, settlers and assimilated local notables. On the other hand were the
powerless, oppressively and exploitatively governed majority of landless tribute and
tax – paying subject tenants. The division and dichotomy between the two groups has
been further compounded by the exaggerated belief on the part of the Shawan Amhara
conquerors and the northern Ethiopians in the assumed superiority of their ethnic
origin and culture and the corresponding inferiority of those of their Oromo and
Sidama subjects.

198
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219
 Appendices

Appendix A: Units of the Shawan Royal Army: Their Commanders and Numerical
Size

Appendix B: Letter of Emperor Yohannes IV to Kaiser Welhelm I, Samara, 14

Yakkatit, 1973 (17 February, 1881) complainin about two Turco – Egyptian
aggression and outlining Ethiopia’s territorial claims.

Appendix C: Letter of Emperor Menilek II to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Addis Ababa, 14

Miyaza 1883 (21 April, 1891); i e Menilek’s circular letter which was addresses to the
European powers outlining Ethiopia’s territorial claims.

Appendix D: Maps.

220
 Appendix A
Units of the Shawan Royal Army: Their Commanders and Numerical Size
According to Pietro Antonelli’s Report, dated
Addis Ababa, 23.11.1887 in ASMAI 36/5-43)

Name of the Unit Name of Title of its Numerical Size of

Commander the Unit
Balamwal Shalaqa Taché 1,000
Zebenga Assalafi Gebru and Haile 1,000
Snaiderage Shalaqa Gabru Gabeiu 2,000
Zammanage Sheika Shalaqa Adeno Goshu 3,000
Faras Zebenga Balambaras Damptu 2,000
Eka Biet Bajerond Atanafe 1,000
Gwada Ato Balcha 1,000
Ciagne Azaj Sinkie 1,000
Mad Biet " " 0,500
Sega Biet Shalaqa Agussio 1,000
Tej Biet Asalafi Gabieu 1,000
Gasciagiage Balambaras Deballo 2,000
Lugamae Balderas Banti 0,500
Baleggi Ato Wald Hanni 1,000
Gondare 20,000
Ghindebel 15,000
Neftenya Turk Basha Dejach Makuria 10,000

Total 64,000

Note:-
Soldiers of the last three units were equipped with firearms. Only the Neftenya were
commanded by the Turk Basha; the Gondare and Ghendebel units had no special commanders,
but were usually placed under the command of the various generals who led the Shawan armies
during the military campaigns of conquest.

Armies of The Provincial Shawan Generals/Governors

And their Numerical Size
(According to Pietro Antonelli’s Report dated,
Addis Ababa, 23.11.1887 in ASMAI 36/5-43)

Names and Titles of Names of Their Provinces Numerical Size of their Armies
Generals/Governors
Ras Gobana Daci (Governor Faras-Tafar, the 30,000
Oromo Gibe region and Wallagga
up to Fadasi; composed for the
most part of cavalry)
Ras Darge Sahle (Govenor of Salale, Arussi and half 15,000
Sellassie of the Ittu Oromo country)
Dajach Mangasha (Governor of Efrata, Ghedem, Tumuga, 8,000
Artuma, Gurage and Jillé Oromo country)

221
Dajach Makuria (Holder of the Turk Basha command 4,000
post, beside the governorship of Gola
province)
Dajach Walde (Governor of Chercher, half of the Ittu 6,000
Gabriel Oromo country, and half the Danakil
(Afar) country up to Mullu)
Dajach Walie (Governor of the provinces of Midda, 3,000
Aiafec and Waramba)
Dajach Tesamma (Governor of Gumma and Sullubor) 6,000
Nado
Dajach Woldie (Governor of Soddo and Gurage) 4,000
Dajach Wolde (Governor of Limmu and Botar) 3,000
Giorgis
Dajach Basha (Governor of Ghera and Kaffa) 4,000
Dajach Haile (Governor of Bacio and Nonno Oromo) 3,000
Mariam

Dajach Ammen (Governor of Ciabo) 2,000

Shawa
Dajach Makonnen (Governor of Metta, Becio, part of 4,000
The Galam and Harar)
Dajach Desta (Governor of Chaliya) 3,000
Dajach Mammuje (Governor of Ghishie) 2,000
Dajach Mashasha (Governor of Derra) 2,000
Worke
Dajach Mashasha (Governor of Ginbibiet and Amoro) 2,000
Sayfu
Fitawrari Waddajo (Governor of Konto and Kullo) 4,000
Fitawrari Zewdie (Governor of Minjar and Dubo Godja) 2,000
Fitawrari Tekla (Governor of the Mecia Oromo) 1,000
Mariam
Fitawrari Ifru (Governor of Lalo Meder 1,000
Qagnazmach Ceno (Governor of Antochia) 1,000
Qagnazmach Hapte (Governor of Warra Gano, much of the 4,000
Mariam provinces of Abbu, Maroqo, Jillé and
Liban, beside being responsible for the
Monarch’s oxen
Total 114,000

*Other small armies mobilised by the king’s agafari,

then the Turk-Basha Zamare, and other unites
formed by junior Shalaqas and Fitawraris held no
provincial governorships, but usually followed the
king with their modest arms and followers during
a military campaign (the “Oa’ Senku”) 3,000
*Other combatants who voluntarily joined the
Shawan armies en-route during a military campaigns (the
“Fanno” 15,000
Total 18,000

222
 Notes:-
(I) The overall total numerical size of all the Shawan
armies (Royal Unites (64,000), armies of provincial
generals /governors (114,000) and other auxiliary units
(18,000) was about 196,000
(ii) Soldiers of the gondare, Ghindebel and neftenya royal units were then under the
command of the various generals who governed the recently conquered territories
to help in keeping the conquered peoples under subjection. In the event of a new
military campaign being launched they could be recalled to participate.
(ii) Their number in the recently conquered territories was about 34,000 men, but their
numbers could be increased by about 50% if the need arose.
(iv) Of all the Shawan forces only bout 50,000 were armed with firearms, and even so
only 12,000 of them were armed with good modern weapons, i.e. repeating rifles;
18,000 were armed with double-barell guns, 2,000 with matchlocks and flintlocks
and the rest with assorted imprecise old models.

The Military Parade Held on 1 March 1903 on the Occasion of Celebrating the
Seventh Anniversary of the Victory of Adwa

On 1 March 1903 Emperor Menilek II reviewed an impressive five to six hours

long military parade held at Janhoy Meda in Addis Ababa on the occasion of
celebrating the seventh anniversary of the victory of Adwa, the teskar
(“memorial”) for fellow countrymen who had fallen at the battlefield and feast of
St. Giorgis as well. Participants in the parade and the weapons that were displayed
by their soldiers, in the order in which they marched, were:-
1- Fitawrari Habte Giorgis (the imperial Fitawrari, and
Governor of Borana, Soddo, Ammeiya, Cabo and Gurage)
with 30,000 rifles
2- Ras Walde Giorgis (the emperor’s first cousin and brother –
In- law; governor of Limmu, Kaffa, Kullo and Konta) with 32,000 "
3- Afa – Negus Nessibu (the governor of Gomma) with 15,000 "
4- Dajach Demesse (the governor of Lega, Wallagga, Amoro,
Gudru and Bani Shanqul) with 30,000 "
5- Dajach Lul Saggad (the governor of Arussi and Bali) with 12,000 "
6- Dajach Abate (the governor of Lemo, Kambata and Chechego
with 20,000 "
7- Dajach Balcha (the governor of Sidamo) with 13,000 "
8- Ras Waldie (the governore of Fadji, Dirma, Jamma and
Derra) with 15,000 "
9- Dajach Mashasha Walde (the governor of Efrata, Gedem,
Queost and Temmuga) with 9,000 "
10- Dajach Wube (the former husband of Woizero Zawditu;
and the governor of Golla) with 9,000 "
11- Azaj Bezzabbeh and Azaj Ze-Amanuel (the respective
administrators of the royal estates of the emperor and the
empress) with 10,000 "
12- Ras Mikael (the governor of Wallo, Warra – Himenu,
Saint, Borana, Ambasal and Aussa) with 70,000 "
13- Ras Tessemma (the governor of Ilubabour and the terr-
itories beyond the Gueb river in the far south west) with 30,000 "

223
14- Dajach Lemma (the younger brother of Ras Walde Giorgis;
and the governor of Gofa and neighbouring negroid
districts with 12,000
The overall total 307,000

SOURCE: Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, Vol, 2, pp. 500-504 and relevant notes.

Notes:-
Apart from the above-mentioned 307,000 riflemen who took part in the
military parade there were 90,000 soldiers of the standing imperial army who were
equipped with repeat-firing rifles as well as at least 100,000 riflemen belonging to the
armies of the six other provincial governors who were absent from the occasion. These
were Ras Makonnen, Ras Wale, Ras Gugsa, Wagshum Gwangul, Ras Bessabbeh and
Ras Mangasha- Atikem; the respective governors of Harar and the adjacent Isa and
Ogaden Somalis, Yejju, Bagemder, Semien, Gojjam and Damot.1 For the most part their
absence was due to the purpose of securing the maintenance of law and order in the
respective provinces beside the need to avoid bringing huge numbers of soldiers to the
capital so soon after the end of the famine and epidemics. Furthermore, the
preoccupation on Ras Makonnen at Harar and his army with fighting the Somali
followers of Sayyid Muhammad ‘Abdallāh Hasan and the need for Wube and his forces
in keeping watch over the disturbed conditions in Tigre province following the
imprisonment of Ras Mangasha Yohannes were other significant considerations.2
After the military parade was ended the 90,000 troops of the standing imperial
army gave a demonstrative display of the use of machine gun, cannon and rifle firing.
All in all the overall total number of the rifles in the possession of Menilek and his
various provincial armies was estimated as at least 600,000 by the beginning of 1903.
They were of diverse types; but mostly repeat – firing Remington, Wetterley, Martini
and Gras models.3

1
- Guèbrè Sellassie, Chronique, II, note 11 on p. 504 by Maurice de Coppet, and pp. 506-5-7.
2
- Ibid., note 2 on p. 507 by de Coppet.
3
- Ibid., p. 505.

224