PPL V Agao

3Republic of t{Je ~bilippineg
~upreme Qtourt
;jJllla nila
EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 248049

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
GESMUNDO, C.J.,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,,.
- versus - INTING **
'
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,**
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,
KHO, JR.,** and
SINGH, ** JJ.
EFREN AGAO y ANONUEVO, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant.
O::.tol::er 4, '2[)'22.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
In yet another horrid case of the rape of a child, the Court here takes the
difficult but important opportunity to clarify the anatomically accurate
physical threshold of contact that must distinguish between attempted and
consummated rape in the physical degrees of rape through sexual intercourse.
Although at every turn unenviable, the Court now recognizes that there is
No part.
·• On official business.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 248049
perhaps no other way to reconcile and refine the current jurisprudence on rape
than to peel away the euphemistic shrouds that have been resorted to so far,
and instead inform case law with the exact anatomical situs of the pertinent
body parts referred to in jurisprudence, which, unlike other matters that attend
the crime of rape, are uncolored, self-evident and inarguable in their precision.
Fully aware of the detestable fact that the crime of rape, regardless of
its permutations, is a violence of power and an ordeal of unspeakable trauma,
the Court deems it fit that a clarification is necessary, crucial even, if it is to
ensure that the detestable act of consummated rape by sexual intercourse or
through penile penetration is not passed off as a mere attempt. Far from
minimizing rape as a crime, objectifying women, or reducing the worth of the
female victim, the Court here chooses to draw into the light the true gravity
of rape by penile penetration, which has so far been capable of hiding in the
shadows of unsure semantics.
To ensure that the deserved conviction and the appropriate penalty are
not withheld because of perceived uncertainty, and to guarantee that no victim
of rape ever has to face the tallest task of recounting the assault at the level of
specificity of detail that are both sordid and unnecessary, the Court here
clarifies that in the crime of rape through penile penetration, a particular
physical situs and threshold penile contact draws the line between attempted
rape and consummated rape of a woman or a girl, the proving of which
provides the categorical factual basis for the finding of consummation. In the
same breath, the Court here similarly takes the opportunity to reiterate the
various badges of rape that are appreciable and applicable in the process of
accurately determining the nature of the physical threshold of contact in all
rape cases.
In a manner perhaps as barefaced as it is unprecedented, and in no way

discounting the other physical modes with which the horrid crime of rape can
be conceivably carried out, the Court affirms that to see that the jurisprudential
arc towards the dignity and integrity of women and children is not undone, it
must maintain its ability to take an unflinching look at existing case law and
acknowledge where it can rule with better articulated clarity for the bench, the
bar and the public at large.
The Facts
This appeal 1 arose from two Informations 2 dated October 27, 2014,
which charged accused-appellant Efren Agao y Afionuevo (appellant) with
two counts of statutory rape, under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 and Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Republic Act No.
1
See Notice of Appeal dated February 13, 2019, CA rollo, pp. 126-127.
2
Records, p. 105.
(R.A.) 8353 3 in conjunction withR.A. 7610, 4 docketed as Criminal Case Nos.

1453-V-14 and 1454-V-14 lodged with Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City (RTC). The accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Crim. Case No. 1453-V-14
That sometime in July 2010, in Valenzuela [C]ity, Metro Manila,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the step-father of herein minor victim AAA,5 who was then
10 years old, DOB: (December 6, 1999), by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with said minor victim, against her will and without her
consent, thereby subjecting the said victim to sexual abuse, which debased,
degraded and demeaned her intrinsic [worth] and dignity as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 1454-V-14
That sometime in January 2012, in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the step-father of herein minor victim AAA, who was then
13 years old DOB: (December 6, 1999), by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the said minor victim, against her will and without her
consent, thereby subjecting the said minor to sexual abuse, which debased,
degraded and demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.
CONTRARYTOLAW. 6
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. 7
AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME
AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT No. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, dated September
30, 1997.
4
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAlNST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, dated June 17, 1992.
5
The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise his/her identity as
well as those of his/her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to R.A.
7610, titled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; R.A. 9262, titled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR C!IILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENAL1 !ES THEREF)R, AN;) FOR OTl!SR PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND THEIR CHILDREN" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576,
578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013]. See also Amended Administrative
Circular No. 83-2015, titled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND
POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS
NAMES/PERSONAL C!RCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 20 I 7).
6
Records, p. I 05.
7
Certificate of Arraignment, id. at 31.
During the trial, private complainant AAA recounted the protracted

abuse she was subjected to, and positively identified appellant in open court
as the man who repeatedly raped her. 8
The prosecution's collective evidence showed that AAA was born on

December 6, 1999 to BBB 9 and CCC, 10 her mother and father, respectively.
AAA's parents were not married, 11 and separated when she was still a baby.
AAA added that her mother BBB later on lived with appellant, whom AAA
identified as her stepfather. 12 AAA alleged that she first fell victim to
appellant's abuse sometime in 2009, when she was 10 years old, during an
incident when appellant started touching her private parts while he was
bathing her. 13 AAA thereafter chose not to tell her mother because she was
afraid the latter would not believe her. 14
AAA further testified that appellant first raped her in July 2010, at
around 7:00 in the morning. During her direct examination, she recalled that
while she was sleeping, she woke up to find appellant touching her breasts
and vagina, 15 and later on trying to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA
specifically testified that appellant undressed her and then mounted her. 16 She
said that she both felt and saw appellant's penis hard against her, as the
appellant kept trying 17 to insert it into her vagina, thereafter managing to
introduce the same into the outer fold, also called the labia majora of AAA's
TSN, March I, 2016, pp. 9-12.

9
Supra note 5.
10
Id.
11
TSN, March I, 2016, p. 4.
12
Id. at 5.
13
Id. at 6-8.
14
Id. at 9.
15
The Court notes that while the term "vagina" may have been previously used in some jurisprudential
pronouncements as the global term to refer to the female genitalia, the "vagina" is specifically defined
as "a neuromuscular vault connecting to the cervix of the uterus that unsheathes the penis during sexual
intercourse and allows passage of the newborn infant during birth." [Aikaterini Deliveliotou and George
Creatsas, Anatomy of the Vulva, THE VULVA: ANATOMY, PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY (Eds. Farage,
M. and Maibach, H.) (2006), pp. 5-6.J
16
TSN, March 1, 2016, p. I 0.
17
Records, pp. 6-7; in her SinumpaangSalaysay, AAA recounts:
(Tanong]: Ano naman ang mga sumusunod pang pangyayari noong unang beses ka niyang
gahasain noong July 20 IO?
[Sagot]: Nung natutulog po ako sa may Northville I, Bignay po hinihipuan niya po ako sa
ari [ko po] tapos inaalis [ko po J yung kamay niya tapos po nilalagay niya ulit. Tapos
sinarado niya po yung pinto tapos inumpisahan niya [na poJ akong gahasain.
Hinuhubaran po niya ko pati rin po siya naghuhubad din tapos pumatong nap o
[sic} siya sa akin tapos pinipilit po niyang ipasok yung ari niya sa ari ko pero
lumalaban po ako kaya hindi niya po naipapasok tapos po sinabi [ko po] na ayoko
po tapos magagalit po siya sasabihin niya sa akin na wag na <law po akong lalapit at
ako na rin daw po ang bahala sa pag-aaral ko. Natatakot po ako nung mga oras na yun.
T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung ilang beses pa ulit nangyari yung sinasabi mong
panggagahasa sa iyo ni Efren?
S: Simula nung unang beses niya kong gahasain, mga tatlong beses po sa isang linggo
niya ako gahasain magpapalipas lang siya ng dalawang araw tapos uulitin na
naman po niya yun. Nung lumipat po kami sa Canumay West noong January 2012,
ganun pa rin po ginagawa niya sa akin palagi niyang dinidikit yung ari niya sa ari ko
hindi lang niya naipapasok kasi po lumalaban ako. (Emphasis supplied)
' Decision 5 G.R. No. 248049
vagina. 18 Appellant was allegedly unable to fully penetrate AAA's vagma

because she kept fighting back. 19
18
TSN, March I, 2016, p. l l.
19
Id. at 9-12; in her own words, AAA related before the RTC, thus:
PROSECUTOR: Do you remember around July 20 IO when you were Grade 4, as you were
sleeping something happened between you and Efren?
AAA: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you living at that time?
A: Canuway West.
Q: Before Canuway West, where were you living?
A: Northville I, Bignay.
Q: Will you tell us what happened at that time?
A: When I was sleeping, sir.
Q: Around what time was this?
A: 7am.
Q: As you were sleeping what happened?
A: He touched me on my vagina, sir.
Q: You said you were sleeping, when he was hinihipuan ka, what happened?
A: I felt that there is a ma/ikot na gumagapang sa hita ko.
Q: So, when you say you felt, you woke up?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you wake up, who did you see?
A: Efren Agao, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened?
A: He immediately put his hand on my vagina and suddenly he removed his clothes and
also removed my clothes.
Q: At that time, where was your mother?
A: She is in her place of work.
Q: Other than your mother, you and Efren, who else was living in that house at that time?
A: None, sir.
Q: When that happened did you not shout to get the attention probably of your neighbor?
A: Not anymore, sir, because he told me not to tell anyone about it.
Q: After he undressed himself and you, by the way, who did he [undress] first?
A: Him, sir.
Q: As he was undressing himself, did you not [try] to go out of the house?
COURT: Put on record that the witness is crying.
A: No, sir.
Q: After he undressed you, what did he do?
A: He mounted on me, sir.
Q: After he mounted on top of you, what did he do?
A: He wanted to insert his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q: How did you know that he wanted to do that?
A: He told me, sir.
Q: Did you see his penis?
A: Yes, sir and I also felt it.
Q: Was it hard?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But was he able to fully penetrate your vagina?
A: No, sir.
Q: Using the female doll, at what part of your vagina where his penis was at that
time?
A: Dito po sa may gilna.
Q: Witness pointed to the pelvic area. When you say sa may gitna, you mean sa may
hiwa?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why he wasn't fully inserted his penis?
A: I was fighting, sir.
Q: How?
A: I was kicking him, sir.
Q: How did he react when you kick him?
A: He get angry, sir.
Q: What did he say to you?
A: Wag na daw po ako lalapit sa kanya. Ako na din daw po bahala sa pag-aaral ko.
Q: How did you feel at that time?
A: I was afraid, sir.
Q: Did you bleed?
She further testified that appellant continued to molest her, including

another time in January 2012, when appellant raped her while she was
sleeping. AAA testified that during the latter incident, she woke up to find
appellant touching her breast and then, later, trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. 20 She added that similar to the incident in 2010, appellant was also
unable to fully penetrate her vagina as she also put up a fight. 21
Throughout all this time, despite the repeated assaults, she continued
not to tell anyone, not even her own mother BBB, for fear that BBB would
not believe her, and that she would only be humiliated. On cross-examination,
it was further established that AAA chose not to tell anyone about appellant's
abuse because she was afraid that appellant might harm her and BBB. 22 It was
also shown that up until the beginning of appellant's chronic abuse of AAA,
the latter did not harbor any ill feelings towards appellant. 23
Only after AAA and her mother BBB left appellant in June 2014, or
over two years since the last assault on her took place, did AAA muster the
courage to tell her aunt about the harrowing assaults she repeatedly
experienced at the hands of appellant. 24 Her aunt, in turn, told her friend who
was a police officer. When AAA told her father, CCC about it, the latter
accompanied her to the police station, where she finally lodged a complaint
against appellant. 25
Upon physical and genital examination on AAA by Police Chief

Inspector Jocelyn P. Cruz (PCI Cruz), it was found that there was no evident
injury at the time of examination. 26 PCI Cruz opined that an erect penis, if it
merely touches the labia, would not cause hymenal laceration. She added that
even if there was penetration, if the same happened sometime in July 2010
and January 2012, it was medically possible that there were injuries and
A: No, sir.
Q: How many times did he do those things to you?
A: Three times in a week, sir.
Q: Whenever he would do that, would he be able to fully penetrate in your vagina?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why not?
A: Because whenever he wanted to insert his penis I would fight him. (Emphasis
supplied)
20
Id. at 13.
z1 Id.
22 Id. at 20.
23
Id. at 22; AAA's testimony reads:
Atty. Alipio: At any rate, before this incident happened, do you have any misunderstanding
or ill feelings against Efren Agao?
AAA: None, sir.
Q: Do you know if Efren Agao will be convicted in this case, he will be imprisoned from
20 to 40 years?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet you still maintain that Efren Agao raped you?
A: Yes, sir.
24 Id. at 14.
25
Id. at 14-15.
26
Records, p. I 0.
lacerations sustained then, but the same may have already healed at the time
of the physical examination. 27
In his defense, appellant denied the allegations levelled against him,

and countered that he never molested AAA, but instead treated her like his
own daughter. 28 He added that the allegations were triggered by CCC who
signified that he wanted to get AAA, and that AAA was only coached by CCC
into spinning false accusations against him. 29 Adding proof that the
accusations were baseless and that AAA did not harbor any ill feelings against
him, appellant testified that AAA even visited him several times during his
detention, until she was taken by the City Social Welfare Development
Office. 30
Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision31 dated March 15, 2017, the RTC found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Statutory Rape, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua for each
count, and ordered him to pay AAA the amount of 1'50,000.00 as moral
damages, 1'50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and 1'25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of decision until full payment. 32
In finding appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC gave

credence to AAA's testimony, and appreciated it as categorical, consistent,
and straightforward. 33 It held that though there was no laceration noted in
AAA's hymen, with appellant's penis only merely touching the labia, the
crime of rape was nevertheless consummated.34 Citing People v. Besmonte, 35
it held that carnal knowledge, as an element of rape, does not require full
penile penetration of the female organ. Instead, consummation occurs once
the penis of the accused, capable of consummating the sexual act, touches
either the labia or the pudendum. 36 It further noted PCI Cruz's testimony to
the effect that lack of injury or laceration on the date of examination does not
rule out laceration at the time of the assault, as the latter could have possibly
healed with the passing oftime. 37
The RTC, however, did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of

the stepdaughter-stepfather relationship between AAA and appellant, finding
instead that although the Informations alleged that appellant was the
stepfather of AAA, the prosecution failed to show proof that appellant was
27 TSN, August 5, 2015, p. 6.

28
TSN, August 24, 2016, p. 4.
29 Id.
30
Id. at 5.
31
Records, pp. l 05-112. Penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones.
32
Id. at 112.
33
Id. at II I.
34
Id. at 110
35 735 Phil. 234 (2014).
36
Id. at 247, Records, p. 109.
37
Records, pp. ll 0-111.
,
legally married to BBB. In addition, it also found that although there was no
dispute that appellant was the common-law spouse of BBB, the information
failed to allege the same. 38 Without appreciating relationship between
appellant and AAA, the RTC found appellant guilty only of Statutory Rape. 39
On appeal 40 to the Court of Appeals (CA), appellant argued that: (1)

there was no consummated act of rape, as the prosecution failed to prove the
same beyond reasonable doubt; (2) AAA's testimony was marked with
incredibility and inconsistency; and (3) the CA erred in its failure to appreciate
the suspiciously belated reporting of the rape incidents. 41 In its response, the
People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that: (1) the
RTC correctly ascribed greater credence to AAA's positive testimony; (2) it
also properly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape; and (3) the award of damages imposed against appellant
should be modified. 42
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision43 dated January 15, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction, but modified the same with respect to the award of damages.
Particularly, the awards of moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary
damages for each count were all increased to P75,000.00, with legal interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of decision until full
satisfaction, in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.44
In affirming appellant's conviction, the CA found that the RTC

correctly gave weight to AAA's testimony and her positive identification of
appellant as the one who raped her. 45 It held that on the matter of ascribing
credibility to the testimony of a witness, the valuations of the RTC are given
utmost respect because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, and its findings may only be disturbed on appeal, upon a showing
that the RTC overlooked material facts which, if considered, would alter its
decision. 46
The CA also noted that AAA did not appear to have been motivated by
any ill will against appellant. 47 It further echoed the RTC's ruling that the
absence of vaginal laceration was immaterial, for neither full penetration of
the vaginal orifice nor the rupture of the hymen was necessary, given that
mere introduction of the male organ to the labia of the victim's genitalia
38
Id. at 11 I.
39
Id. at I 12.
4
°
41
CA rollo, p. 13.
Id. at 40.
42
Id. at 81.
43
Rollo, pp. 3-19. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, with Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court) concurring.
44
Id. at 18-19, citing People v. Jugueta,783 Phil. 806 (2016).
45
Id. at 9-10.
" ld.at13.
'' Id.
already consummates the crime ofrape. 48 The CA also dismissed appellant's

argument that AAA's delay in reporting the incidents of rape cast doubt on
the same, ruling instead that such delay may not be taken against the victim
unless it was shown to have been unreasonable and unexplained. In this case,
given that AAA sufficiently explained that she was only able to report the
assaults after she and her mother left the custody of appellant, the same delay
could not be deemed to have been unreasonable. 49
Finally, the CA found that the RTC correctly convicted appellant of

Simple Rape, without the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship as indicated in the Informations, because
the prosecution failed to adduce any proof that BBB and appellant were
married. 50
On appeal 51 to this Court, appellant manifests 52 that he adopts the issues

he raised in his Brief53 dated November 16, 2017 which was filed before the
CA. The People, for its part, likewise manifests 54 that it affirms its discussion
of the merits of its case in its· own Brief5 5 dated March 22, 2018 with the CA.
Issue
The core issue presented before the Court is whether the CA correctly
affirmed the RTC decision which found appellant guilty of two counts of rape
through sexual intercourse as defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 and
Article 266-B of the RPC as amended by R.A. 8353 in conjunction with R.A.
7610.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
Appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, with the
reviewing tribunal vested with the duty to correct, cite, and appreciate errors
in the appealed judgment, whether assigned or unassigned. 56
In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by the following principles

framed specifically for the review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape,
while easy to make, is difficult to prove and even harder for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) because rape, by its very nature,
involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with the greatest caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
48
Id. at 13-14.
49
Id. at 17.
50
Id. at 17- I 8, citing People v. Manggasirt, 365 Phil. 683 (I 999).
51
Id. at 20-21.
52
Id. at 35-38. Manifestation with Profuse Apology dated November 18, 2019.
53
CA rollo, pp. 34-48.
54
Rollo. pp. 30-34. Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief dated November 6, 2019.
55
CA rol/o, pp. 74-94.
56
People v. De Guzman, 840 Phil. 759, 765 (2018).
,
stand or fall on its own merits and must not be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense; and (4) the complainant's
credibility assumes paramount importance because her testimony, if credible,
is sufficient to support the conviction of the accused. 57
Under the aegis of the foregoing framework, the Court has reviewed
the records of this case and finds no reason to overturn the verdict of guilt
handed down by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, but finds it proper to
modify the finding of two counts of Statutory Rape, the second one being only
Simple Rape.
The Court finds, as correctly discerned by the lower courts, that the
prosecution sufficiently established, through the primary and positive
testimony of the wronged child herself, that appellant gained carnal
knowledge of her, and is therefore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape in the consummated stage.
The Court also holds that the straightforward, candid and consistent
testimony of AAA of the rape sufficiently established that appellant's erect
penis did touch the labia of her vagina which, under prevailing jurisprudence,
falls within the operative definition of consummated rape.
Furthermore, pursuant to the balance that must .be struck between the
fundamental freedoms of the accused and the abused child, and the Court's
affirmation notwithstanding, it nevertheless finds both a need as well as a
suitable jurisprudential platform to clarify the parameters that must attend the
courts' appreciation of the stages of commission of rape in light of prevailing
jurisprudence that has evolved in its definition of what constitutes "the
slightest touch" that consummates the same. The Court here discerns that an
explication is in order given the determined inexactitude in the evolution of
the minimum physical threshold that distinguishes between attempted and
consummated rape.
Admittedly, despite the fact that the act of rape has long been removed
from the realm of private crimes, 58 the Court's practical and doctrinal
imaginations and expressions appear to still be colored by old, discarded
notions of what rape is and is not, made even worse by the social
stigmatization associated with it. As far as jurisprudence goes, as will be
shown in the succeeding tracking of relevant case law, categorical
descriptions of the kind or degree of genital contact that amounts to
consummated rape through penile penetration has been unclear or skirted
around at times, owing, for one, to the sensitive nature of the assault. Thus,
the unmistakably sexual nature of the crime of rape has previously compelled
the Court to sidestep the otherwise unavoidable vulgarity that attends the
crime, and into the use of euphemistic but largely inaccurate descriptions, that
51
People v. Castromero, 345 Phil. 653,662 (1997).
58
Since the passage of R.A. 8353, which expanded the definition of the crime ofrape and re-classified it
as a crime against persons.
have only so far convoluted matters regarding the act of rape that should have
been kept unambiguous and definitive.
For one, diverging cases show that, despite clear testimony of child
victims of repeated attempts and degrees of penetration of an erect penis, the
accused therein were convicted merely of attempted rape precisely because of
the absence of the clear operative definition of penile penetration that qualifies
as consummated rape, especially in cases of younger victims, in view of the
physical natural resistance of their underdeveloped anatomy. For another, as
raised during deliberations, a clarification is overdue given that an error in the
appreciation of the exact anatomical situs of the genital contact amounts to
the justice system's complicity in the improper imposition of penalties.
The apparent avoidance in the straightforwardness or clarity now

presents the Court with the need to reiterate and clarify for the bench and the
bar, the biologically accurate definition of what constitutes the slightest penile
contact which consummates rape through penile penetration. Without
discounting how the instant clarification of anatomical threshold may extend
or apply to rape by sexual assault, the Court's present discussion will be
focused on rape of a woman through penile penetration, and will be three-
tiered: (i) it will begin with a tracing of the evolution of the operative
definition of consummated rape through penile penetration with an illustration
of how cases have diverged, then (ii) elaborate on what slightest genital
contact contemplates with particular reference to the anatomical situs thereof,
and (iii) finally apply said clarified parameters to the instant appeal.
I
Evolution of the Wrong of Rape 59
The origin of the crime of rape as it is now defined traces its source to
the C6digo Penal of 1870, which was introduced in the Philippines in 1887,
and was not superseded until the effectivity of the RPC in 1932, 60 as amended
by R.A. 8353, Section 2, which in tum defines the crime of rape under Article
266-A thereof, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman

under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of

reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or

grave abuse of authority; and
59
David Archard, The Wrong of Rape, THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY (2007), Vol. 57, No. 228, pp.
374-393.
60
Ruben F. Balane, The Spanish roots of Philippine Law, ESTUDIOS DE DEUSTO (2018), Vol. 66, No. 1,
pp.23-31.
d. When the offended party is under twelve

(12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances

mentioned in paragraph I hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the conceptualization of the wrong of rape,

more specifically the meaning of "carnal knowledge" has been consistently
defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with a woman. 61 Most recently, through R.A. 11648 62 the first
type of rape under Article 266-A was further redefined and broadened as an
act which may be committed "[b]y a person who shall have carnal knowledge
of another person."
The operative definition of carnal knowledge, however, has been

subject to further evolution, with the main vein of contention running along
the different thresholds that are drawn between the stages of its commission.
In other words, although "carnal knowledge" has always been conceptually
clear, the metes and bounds of where or at which physical contact point it
actually legally begins has been the subject of further refinement.
The Court's more nuanced approach to the study and determination of

the stages of the crime of rape began with the case of People v. Orita63 ( Orita),
where the Court first held that taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of its execution, it was deemed that the commission of the frustrated
stage was inconceivable. This was reiterated in the later cases of People v.
Orande64 and People v. Quinanola 65 (Quinanola), where the Court held that
until Congress sees it fit to define the term frustrated rape and penalize it, its
continued usage in the statute book should be considered a persistent lapse in
language.
With only the attempted and consummated stages left possible for the
commission of rape, the series of cases that followed thereafter grappled with
the question of where the line could be drawn between a mere attempt at rape,
on the one hand, or its consummation, on the other. Given that the intrinsic
nature of rape is one fraught with repulsive intimacy and covertness, the
61 See People v. Bon, 444 Phil. 571, 579 (2003); People v. Bormeo. 292-A Phil. 691 (1993); People v.
Mic/at, Jr., 435 Phil. 561 (2002).
62
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER PROTECTION AGAINST RAPE AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND
ABUSE, INCREASING THE AGE FOR DETERMINING THE COMMISSION OF STATUTORY RAPE, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE REVISED PENAL CODE,"
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8353, ALSO KNOWN AS "THE ANTI-RAPE LAW OF 1997," AND REPUBLIC ACT No.
7610, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE,
EXPLOITAT!ON AND DISCRIMINATION ACT," dated March 4, 2022.
63 262 Phil. 963, 977 (I 990).
64 461 Phil.403,419(2003).
65
366 Phil. 390,415 (1999).
Court's efforts to clarify the line between the two stages have so far resulted
in dispositions of borderline cases that are varying and perceptively both
semantically and pragmatically unclear. Contrary to the observation made
during the deliberations, the overdue discussion of the anatomical situs and
threshold of consummated rape by penile penetration does not reverse
progressive doctrine nor does it render invisible the sordid violation of the
dignity of the victim. On the stark contrary, the clarification sheds light on the
obscurity of the language and the tendency with which the Court may have
repulsed from confronting distinctions, and instead makes plain the point of
genital contact which, when crossed, provides the courts with categorical
factual basis to find that the gravest assault on the victim's body, integrity and
dignity has already been consummated, and not merely attempted.
Recalibration of Stages of
Commission: Attempted vs.
Consummated
As early as 1990, the Court has built on its trajectory in refining the acts
which would constitute the stages of the commission of rape by sexual
intercourse through penile penetration in the particular context of sexual abuse
of minors. In Orita, the Court decisively disabused the notion that perfect
penetration and hymenal rupture are necessary for consummation, and
clarified that any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however
slight, is sufficient to warrant conviction, viz.:
xx x In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People

v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21,
1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration
of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the [labia] or
lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559;
People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434)
because not all acts of execution [were] performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into
account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape
and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated
stage in rape can ever be committed. 66 (Italics in the original omitted)
Proceeding from Orita, the efforts of the Court to expound on as well

as further sharpen the operative definition of "touch" as that which
consummates rape followed. In People v. Dela Pena67 (Dela Pena), the Court
fine-tuned the definition of"touch" vis-a-vis consummated rape, provided an
operative context thereto, and ruled that mere touching ofa vagina by a penis
capable of penetration is considered consummated rape. 68 In this case, the
Court held that its earlier decisions, where it considered rape to have been
66
People v. Orita, supra note 63, at 976-977.
67
303 Phil. 595 (1994).
68
Id. at 599.
•
consummated despite the fact that the attacker's penis merely touched the
external portions of the vagina, were within the situational context of "the
presence of the existence of an erectile penis capable of full penetration."69
Here, the Court expounded on the operational context for its ruling that the
mere touching of the penis on the external portions of the vagina is enough,
to wit:
It is likewise settled that the absence of physical findings on medical

examination does not negate a finding that carnal knowledge had actually
occurred. The absence of seminal fluid, spermatozoa, abrasions, lacerations,
hematoma[,] etc., around the genital area or the presence of an intact hymen
does not automatically lead to a conclusion that no act of rape had occurred
or that the act was in fact consensual. In fact, the absence of a medical
certificate is not indispensable in the crime ofrape. However, our decisions
finding a case for rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the
external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence of the existence of an erectile penis capable of full penetration.
The physiologic impossibility of penetration absent an erection - complete
or otherwise - cannot be gainsaid. If, because of the victim's vigilant
attempts at warding off her attacker's sexual advances an accused in a case
of rape is unable to accomplish the act of completely penetrating his
victim's vaginal orifice, a charge for rape under existing jurisprudence can
be sustained anyhow, because full penetration would have been
accomplished if the penis were erect, were it not for the victim's vigilance
or the occurrence of other circumstances which might have frustrated the
accomplishment of complete penetration. That is not the case here. 70
(Emphasis supplied)
Then in the 1997 case of People v. Escober71 (Escober), the Court held
that what is fundamental is that the entrance, or at least the introduction, of
the male organ to the labia of the pudendum, is proved. Still in the same year,
in People v. Castromero 72 (Castromero), the accused's penis merely touched
the minor victim's private parts and did not penetrate - "[a}ng kanyang pag-
aari ay lumapat sa aking pag-aari."73 The Court here nevertheless found that
the rape already reached its consummated stage. Harking back to Dela Pena,
and once more ruling that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a
penis capable of consummating the sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge,
the Court there reasoned thus:
In determining whether the rape was consummated or merely

attempted, we observe that in this case there was no complete or perfect
penetration of the complainant's sex organ. The salient portions of her
testimony are as follows:
Q While he was on top ofyou, what was he doing?

A He tried to insert his penis to my vagina.
Q Wh.en he was trying to insert his private part to your private

part, what happened?
69
Id. at 600.
70
Id. at 599-600.
71
346 Phil. 513. 522 (1997).
72
Supra note 57.
73
Id. at 665.
' Decision 15 G.R. No. 248049
A His penis touched my vagina.
FISCAL CASTILLO:
May I request Your Honor, that the Tagalog word "Ang kanyang
pag-aari ay lumapat sa aking pag-aari".
Q What happened next?

A Because of the movement sideways his penis touched my
private parts.
xxxx
To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the

complainant's private organ is not essential. Even the slightest penetration
by the male organ of the lips of the female organ, or [labia] of the
[pudendum], is sufficient. In People vs. Dela Pena, this Court held that "the
mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating
the sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge." Josephine's testimony that
appellant's organ tonched the opening of her vagina can lead to no
other conclusion than that the appellant's manhood legally invaded,
however slightly, the lips of her private organ. Clearly, rape was
consummated in this case. Because the sexual assault was perpetrated by
force and intimidation, Appellant Castromero is thus guilty of rape pursuant
to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 74 (Emphasis supplied)
In the succeeding case of Quinanola, the Court again echoed Dela

Pena, and reiterated that in light of discerning whether or not carnal
knowledge was had, "mere touching' of the penis consummates the crime. In
this case, the Court further refined the operative definition of the required
genital contact for purposes of finding consummated rape, by outlining that
the genital contact has to be either of the two alternative scenarios: (1) the
penis which merely enters the labia or the lips of the vagina, or (2) the
penis capable of consummation merely touches the external genitalia, viz.:
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal

knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be
ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the
man's penis merely enters the [labia] or lips of the female organ or, as
once so said in a case, by the "mere touching of the external genitalia by
a penis capable of consummating the sexual act." 75 (Emphasis supplied)
Proceeding from the standing doctrine in Quinanola, the Court further

drew distinctions with respect to the genital contact that is contemplated by
the consummated stage of rape, through several 1999 Decisions.
In the case of People v. Oliver76 (Oliver), the Court reiterated that rape
is consummated "when the penis touches the pudendum, however slightly." 77
74
Id. at 664-666.
75
People v. Quiiianola, supra note 65, at 410.
76
362 Phil. 414 (1999).
77
Id. at 424. citing People v. Caballes, 340 Phil. 213, 225 (1997); People v. Andon, 336 Phil. 91, 115
(1997); People v. Magana, 328 Phil. 721, 745 (1996). (Italics supplied)
In the same year, in People v. Alojado,78 the Court described consummated

rape as that which consists of even the slightest penetration. Then, in the En
Banc case of People v. Puertollano 79 (Puertollano), it was iterated that mere
touching, or less than penetration, amounts to consummation, to wit:
The mere touching by the male's organ or instrument of sex of

the [labia] of the [pudendum] of the woman's private parts is sufficient
to consummate rape. As we have said in unnumbered cases, full or deep
penetration of the victim's vagina is not necessary to consummate sexual
intercourse; it is enough that there be even the slightest penetration of the
male organ into the female sex organ. 80 (Emphasis supplied)
Then, in the later oft-cited case of People v. Campuhan 81 (Campuhan),

the Court clarified the standing definition of "touch" in reference to its ruling
in Orita, and elucidated that the minimum genital contact that is required for
a finding of consummated rape must be either ( 1) the penis touching the labia
majora, or (2) the penis sliding into the female organ, thus:
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply

mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush
or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the
mans pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof
that the penis indeed touched the [labias] or slid into the female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to
be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to
be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the
mans pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the [labia majora] or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape.
xxxx
x x x Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered

for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female
organ or touching the mans pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either (labia ofi the
pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape, if not acts oflasciviousness. 82 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Fallowing Campuhan was the case of People v. Ombreso 83 ( Ombreso ),

involving the rape of a six-year-old girl, the facts of which are similar to the
case at bar. In Ombreso, the allegation that the accused's erect penis "touched
78
364 Phil. 713, 724 (1999), citing People v. Mangalino, 261 Phil. 436 (1990). See also People v.
Echegaray, 327 Phil. 349 (I 996); People v. Faigano, 324 Phil. 212 (1996); People v. Abella, 298-A Phil.
66 I (I 993); People v. Tesimo, 281 Phil. 593 (I 99 I); and People v. Castillo, 274 Phil. 940 (1991 ).
79
367 Phil. 636 (1999).
80
Id. at 645.
81
385 Phil. 912 (2000).
82
Id. at 920-922.
83
423 Phil. 966 (2001).
the upper part of complainant's vaginal opening" was deemed sufficient for a
finding of consummated rape, viz. :
Thus, although there was no full penetration, and therefore no

laceration of the hymen as the examining physician said, accused-
appellant's penis nonetheless touched the upper part of complainant's
vaginal opening. As accused-appellant repeatedly pushed his organ into
complainant's vagina, the latter suffered pain. Unlike in Campuhan,
where this Court found that accused did not attain erection, and his penis
was flaccid, here, accused-appellant's penis, according to the victim, was
erect and, for a long time, accused-appellant tried to make a full penetration.
This was no mere "stroking" or "grazing of the surface of the female organ,"
as this Court described what took place in the Campuhan case. What
happened in this case was a penetration, albeit not a full one because of the
relative smallness of complainant's vagina. Although the victim many
times said "just here" in pointing to the spot in her genitalia which was
touched by accused-appellant's male organ, "just here," as she
demonstrated, meant the "upper part of [her] vaginal opening." It was
therefore consummated rape which accused-appellant committed. 84
(Emphasis supplied)
Following Ombreso, in the case of People v. Comanda 85 (Comanda),

the Court held that the "briefest ofcontacts" or the "mere introduction" of the
penis to the vagina consummates the rape, particularly that the penis reaches
the pudendum or, at the very least, the labia, to wit:
x x x The position of the parties during sexual intercourse is not

material in the crime of rape. For rape to be consummated, the hymen of the
victim need not be penetrated or ruptured. It is enough that the penis
reaches the [pudendum], or, at the very least, the [labia]. The briefest of
contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation or
unconsciousness, even without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be
rape in our jurisprudence. The mere introduction of the penis into the
aperture of the female organ, thereby touching the [labia] of the
[pudendum], already consummates the crime of rape. 86 (Emphasis
supplied)
In March 2001, the Court, in People v. Francisco 87 (Francisco)

attempted to reconcile the two alternative minimum genital contacts by
clarifying that they are one and the same, in that for the penis to even
merely touch the labia majora or the labia minora of the vagina, the penis
would have already attained some level of penetration of the female
organ. The Court here clarified that there must be sufficient proof that the
penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, in the absence of which the crime can
only be either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. In discussing its
compunction to find the rape committed therein in its consummated stage, the
Court turned on the insufficiency of proof:
84
Id. at 987-988.
85
553 Phil. 655 (2007), citing People v. Bascugin, 473 Phil. 100 (2004).
86
Id. at 674-675.
87
406 Phil. 947 (2001).
[T]here must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis

indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched"
by the penis, are by their natural situs beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the
labia majora or the labia minora of the [pudendum] constitutes
consummated rape. "But in the absence of any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ i.e., touching either labia of the pudendum
by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. 88 (Emphasis supplied)
Seven months after Francisco, the Court repeated said ruling in People
v. Mariano 89 (Mariano) and held that the ascertainment of whether the penis
of the accused did enter the labial threshold of the female organ was necessary
in order to find consummation, and failure of the medico-legal report to
support the allegation of completed rape results in reasonable doubt in favor
of the accused. 90
Taking altogether the evolution of the definition of what constitutes the

minimum genital contact that warrants a finding of consummated rape from
the above survey of case law, it appears that the consummation of rape is
founded upon the prosecution's proofthat the erect penis ofthe accused was,
at the very least, introduced to the labia majora of the victim's vagina as a
precursor for vaginal penetration, regardless of whether the penetration, full
or partial, was actually obtained. Up to this point, the minimum genital contact
threshold for consummated rape was quite literally the merest introduction of
the penis to the labia of the vagina.
However, the cases that followed thereafter would vacillate between

"mere touch" on the one hand, and "slightest penetration" on the other, so that
the clear minimum genital contact of the penis touching the labia majora of
the vagina was confounded.
Diverging cases
An even closer look at the case law that followed Mariano on the matter
of borderline rape cases indicates that in the cases where the initial finding of
consummated rape was modified to attempted rape, said modifications
ultimately turned on the prosecution's failure to establish the manner and
nature ofpenile penetration, i.e., that the erect penis of the accused touched
the labia of the pudendum of the victim's vagina as a precursor for vaginal
penetration, as operatively defined in Campuhan.
What the Court here vitally observes, and which is now the focus
of the instant clarification, is that this hesitation to appreciate the
88
Id. at 96 I.
89
420 Phil. 727 (2001).
90
Id. at 741.
presence of the minimal genital contact that is required for

consummation to be found persisted despite clear testimonial indication
that the penis was in fact introduced to the aperture of the vagina in the
manner that was contemplated in the earlier definitive rulings in Orita,
Dela Pena, Escober, Quinanola, Oliver, Campuhan and Castromero. In the
said cases, to recall, the Court already found as consummated rape that
level of genital contact which was described as "[pag]lapat" or the
nudging or pressing upon the vagina by the penis.
As will be shown, the Court, in the succeeding cases, found only

attempted rape even in the face of categorical testimonies to the effect that the
penis of the accused in these cases was introduced to the vagina of the minor
victims in manners or degrees that are semantically similar to the description
of the manner of penile contact appreciated in the case of Castromero,
wherein the Court found for consummated rape. The Court now finds that
the following differing rulings or appreciations of description of genital
contact are more borne out of an unclear and often confounded operative
definition of the threshold of genital contact that is required, than failure
on the part of these minor victims to testify to the same.
First, in the case of People v. Tolentino, 91 despite a clear testimony on

the part of the victim that the accused therein kept "trying to force his sex
organ into" her vagina, the Court there held that there was no sufficient proof
offered to show that the penis touched the labia of the victim's vagina, to wit:
The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get
some more important details that would demonstrate beyond any shadow of
doubt that TOLENTINO's penis reached the [labia] of the [pudendum] or
the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It should have, for instance, asked
whether TOLENTINO's penis was firm and erect or whether
RACHELLE's legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion
that, indeed, TOLENTINO's penis was not flabby and had the capacity to
directly hit the [labia] of the [pudendum] or the lips of RACHELLE's
vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took
place.XX X
x x x In this case, there is no doubt at all that TOLENTINO had

commenced the commission of the crime of rape by (I) directing
RACHELLE to lie down, (2) removing his shorts and hers, and (3) "trying
to force his sex organ into" RACHELLE's sex organ. But there is no
conclusive evidence of the penetration, however slight, of
RACHELLE's sex organ. The penetration was an essential act of
execution to produce the felony. Thus, in the absence of a convincing
evidence thereof, TOLENTINO should be given the benefit of the doubt
and can be convicted of attempted rape only. 92 (Emphasis supplied)
Still, in the 2000 case of People v. Arce, Jr. 93 (Arce) involving the rape
of a nine-year-old girl, the minor victim repeatedly used the word "idinikif'
to describe the position of the erect penis vis-a-vis her genitalia. The Court
91 367 Phil. 755 (1999).
92
Id. at 764-765.
93 417Phil.18(200!).
notes that "idinikit" is semantically similar to the word "lapat" which the
Court appreciated as consummated rape in the earlier case of
Castromero. Despite this, the Court in Arce was unconvinced that the rape
was consummated because the victim's testimony indicated that appellant
therein was not able to insert his penis into her vagina nor did she declare that
there was the slightest penetration.
Similarly, in People v. Dimapilis, 94 the Court also found therein

accused guilty only of attempted rape, mainly ruling that the testimony of the
10-year-old victim was confusing and made conflicting assertions regarding
the entry of the penis into her vagina, despite the fact that on repeated
occasions, as the Court therein recognized, the minor victim narrated that the
accused "forced his organ into hers, " 95 "tried to insert his organ into hers and
she felt it when he pressed it against her private part," 96 and "tried to penetrate
her, albeit unsuccessfully in view of the natural resistance at her opening and
her propitious cry ofpain." 97
Still in the case of People v. Quarre, 98 involving a father accused of

raping his two minor daughters aged 12 and 16, the Court held that the "bare
and true words of the victim," 99 left uncleansed of ambiguous references by a
medico-legal report, left it unpersuaded as to the precise character of the
sexual act alleged therein. 100 In said case, despite the repeated narration of one
of the minor victims that the accused therein kept trying to insert his penis
into her vagina, and despite said minor victim's particular notation of the fact
that in the accused's attempts at penile penetration she felt persistent pain, the
Court there held that the rape was only in the attempted stage. 101
94
397 Phil. 607 (2000).
95
id. at 616.
96
Id. at 617.
97
Id.at6l8.
98
427 Phil. 422 (2002).
99
Id. at 432.
100
Id. The Synopsis of the case states:
The Supreme Court found no evidence beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant consummated the slightest penetration of Marilou's vagina. Consisting of only
the bare and true words of the victim, there being no medico-legal examination report that
would have cleansed her testimony of ambiguous references to the precise character of the
sexual act, the evidence looms with the moral uncertainty that the penis of accused-
appellant ever touched the labia of the pudendum. A perusal of the transcript of the
testimony of Marilou disclosed repeated denials of penile insertion. Considering that there
was neither testimonial nor physical evidence to provide adequate basis for the finding of
consummated rape, the accused should only be properly punished for attempted rape.
101
Id. at 432-433. The testimony of the minor therein read in part:
COURT:
Let's make this clear.
Q: The only thing that your father did to you while he was on top of you was to kiss you
on the different parts of your body, is that the only thing that he did to you?
A: There was, maam, I felt that he was trying to insert his private part into my
private part but I resisted that's why he got angry, maam.
Q: Was he successful in inserting his private part into yours?
A: He tried to insert his private part into my private part and I felt pain, but it did
not enter into my private part, it merely made "dikit," maam.
Q: And despite that length of time you are telling the Court that your father was not
able to penetrate you?
A: No, maam, he was also trying to insert his finger to my private part. I felt pain and I
resisted and I was able to ward off his attempt, maam.
Q: So he was not able to insert his finger into your private part, is that what you mean?
More, in the similar case of People v. Brioso, 102 the Court held that since
there was no other evidence, apart from the victim's testimony, that could
confirm whether there was penetration of the labia, the accused therein could
only be convicted of attempted rape. This, despite the consistent testimony of
the minor victim therein that the accused kept trying to insert his erect penis
into her vagina, albeit unsuccessful, with the cited testimony clearly reading
in part:
Q: You said you were dragged by your stepfather to that bed. When you
were dragged to the bed, what happened next?
A: He forced me to lie down and he removed my shorts and panty.
Q: While doing this, what if anything did you do?

A: I cried because I could do nothing.
Q: When he removed your garments and you were made to lie on the bed,
what happened next?
A: He also undressed himself and tried to insert his penis to my vagina, but
it did not succeed.
Q: Now, on what part of your body did you feel that his penis touched?
A: My vagina.
Q: So, what happened after that?

A: He dressed up and I also dressed up and went upstairs.
Q: So, how long therefore, was he on top of you?

A: Around five (5) minutes.
Q: While on top of you on that duration as you approximated it, what

if anything did you feel?
A: Painful.
Q: Which is painful?
A: My vagina.
Q: Why is it painful?
A: Because he was trying to insert his penis to my vagina. 103 (Emphasis
supplied)
At this point, the Court notes that although all the aforementioned cases
were decided by mentioning what constitutes "slightest penetration" under the
Dela Pena and Campuhan standard, with the downgrading of the initial
convictions to attempted rape all "on the account of the paucity of evidence
to prove that there had been penile penetration, even of the slightest kind, of
the victim's genitals," all the above cases also failed to appreciate the genital
contact that took place in the manner and circumspection that the Court
appreciated them in the cases of Dela Pena and Campuhan.
A: He was not able to insert his finger into my private part, maam, but I felt pain because
he was forcing his finger into mine.
Q: Does the court understand that he was not able to insert his private part into yours?
A: No, maam, only "dikit." (Emphasis supplied)
102
600 Phil. 530, 542 (2009).
103
Id. at 539-540.
•
22 G.R. No. 248049
Decision
Even more instructive is the Court's observation of an unmistakable

lack of clarity and consistency in the operative definition of the minimum
genital contact which, as we have seen in the jurisprudential arc, has been
more of a subjective moving target than a pinned down exposition. In other
words, the appreciation of the minimum genital contact that
consummates rape, i.e., whether the erect penis of the accused touched
the labia of the pudendum of the victim's vagina as a precursor for vaginal
penetration, has been confounded, with said opacity easily resolvable by
informing jurisprudence of the exact anatomical situs of the pertinent
body parts referred to in settled jurisprudence, which, unlike other
inexact matters that surround a rape testimony, are as inarguable as they
are true.
For while it is tragically true that, as Senior Associate Justice Marvic

M.V.F. Leonen posits, the crime of rape is not suffered in degrees and the
destruction in its wake is utterly complete, 104 the existing provisions in the
RPC and its amendments on rape continue to define that the offense itself, not
its trauma, is committed in stages. On this score, and short of judicially
legislating a new definition of the crime of rape, the Court must choose to
apply itself to ensuring that no obscurity either unduly benefits the accused
(in that the accused is convicted for attempted rape when in fact the crime was
consummated) or unduly burdens the victims with the heartbreaking task of
jumping through hoops of propounded questions in order to try and prove the
genital assault required which jurisprudence itself has not so far made clear.
Far from "licensing" the toxic masculinity that reduces women to mere sexual
objects, 105 the Court pries loose the constricted uncertainty of the semantics,
unravels the clearer parameter, and finds that the safety and dignity of all
persons are worth the disconcerting conversation that must be had, if it is to
dispense with honest justice.
II
Clarifying the parameters for appreciation
of "slightest penetration" in cases of rape by sexual intercourse
through penile penetration
The Court, in its wisdom, has long laid down jurisprudence to the effect
that the level of penetration that is sufficient to appreciate consummation of
rape by penile penetration is established by using a minimum litmus test, i.e.,
mere touching of an erect penis on the labia of the female genitalia. Perhaps
this was done in order to sidestep discourse that ran along the discussions that
seek to demand the degree of particularity (i.e., ask "how deep a penetration
is deep enough") that may only be sharp at the level of legal doctrines, but
insufferably nebulous and unknowable at the level of actual cases.
On this score, the Court recalls that the prevailing fine-tuned operative
definition of the minimum threshold for a finding of consummated rape, from
104
Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leon en, p. I.
10s Id.
the nuanced jurisprudential development that began in Orita all the way to
Mariano is when the prosecution established that the erect penis of the
accused touched the labia of the pudendum of the victim's vagina as a
precursor for penile penetration, regardless of whether the penetration,
full or partial, was actually obtained.
This operative definition, however, as will be demonstrated, calls for a

clarificatory rephrasing, as its physical characterization below proves the
same to be either inconsistent or otherwise problematic and uncertain. For the
avoidance of doubt and for pedagogical purposes, the Court finds it necessary
to herein include a brief descriptive discussion of the parts of the external
female genitalia including a clear indication of the situs of the pertinent parts,
in order to categorially delineate for the bench and the bar which physical
threshold, when crossed, constitutes rape in the consummated stage.
The vulva, or pudendum, is a collective term for the external female

genital parts that are visible in the perinea! area. 106 According to Aikaterini
Deliveliotou and George Creatsas, in their article "Anatomy of the Vulva," 107
the parts of the vulva that are crucial for a clear discussion of the
consummation of rape are as follows:
The vulva consists of the [mons pubis], the [labia majora], the [labia
minora], hymen, the clitoris, the vestibule of the vagina, the urethral orifice,
Skene's glands, Bartholin's glands, and the vestibular bulbs xx x.
The anterior and posterior boundaries of the vulva extend from the
[mons pubis] to the anus, respectively; its lateral boundaries lie at the
106
Aikaterini Deliveliotou and George Creatsas, Anatomy of the Vulva, THE VULVA: ANATOMY,
PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 1.
107
Id. at 1-8. The anatomy of the vulva is illustrated below as follows.
(Id. at 2) As suggested by Associate Justice Singh and for ease of reference of members of the bench
and bar who do not have sufficient medical backgrounds, consider below the illustration of the external
appearance of the female genitalia, with the vulva] cleft appearing as the fleshy external part of the
vagina in the illustrated stages offemale pubic hair development, as it appeared in Miranda A. Farage,
Howard I. Maibach, Aikaterini Deliveliotou and George Creatsas, Changes in the Vulva and Vagina
Throughout Life, THE VULVA: ANATOMY, PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY (Eds. Farage, M. and Maibach,
H.) (2006), p. 32:
1 ' 2 • il a . 141 ' .51

'
..._.,,
y ·r t i.
" ·,/
genitocrural folds. The vulvar epithelium exhibits regional differences in

tissue structure based on embryonic derivation. The skin-bearing [mons
pubis], perineum, and [labia] are derived from the embryonic ectoderm.
Vulvar skin, like skin at other sites, has a keratinized, stratified, squamous
epithelial structure with hair follicles, sebaceous glands, and sweat glands.
The thickness degree of keratinization of vulvar skin decreases
progressively from the [labia majora], over the clitoris, to the [labia
minora]. The vulvar vestibule, derived from the embryonic endoderm, is
nonkeratinized. x x x
[Mons Pubis]
The [mons pubis] (mons Veneris) is the rounded eminence in front of the
pubic symphysis, which is formed by a collection of adipose tissue beneath
the integument. During puberty, it becomes covered with hair up to its
junction with the abdominal wall. The hair pattern, or escutcheon, of most
women is triangular. Genetic and racial differences produce a variety of
normal hair patterns, with approximately one in four women having a
modified escutcheon with a diamond pattern.
[Labia Majora]
The [labia majora] are a pair of prominent longitudinal, cutaneous folds of
fibroadipose tissue that are homologous to the scrotum in the male. The
structures bear epidermal tissue resembling the dartos tunic of the scrotum,
as well as adipose tissue, areolar tissue, blood vessels, nerves, and glands.
The [labia majora] also include the terminal extension of the round
ligament and, occasionally, a peritoneal diverticulum, the canal ofNuck.
The size of the [labia majora] is related to fat content. Each is

approximately 7 to 8 cm in length and 2 to 3 cm in width. The [labia majora]
extend downward and backward from the [mans pubis], thus forming the
lateral boundaries of a fissure or cleft (the pudenda! cleft or rima) into which
the vagina and urethra open. 108
Guided by the foregoing anatomical description, the Court now

reiterates, even as it clarifies, that rape of a female victim by a male
person through penile penetration reaches the consummated stage as
soon as the penis penetrates the cleft of the labia majora, also known as
the vulval or pudendal cleft, 109 or the fleshy outer lip of the vulva, in even
the slightest degree. Simply put, mere introduction, however slight, into the
cleft of the labia majora by a penis that is capable of penetration,
regardless of whether such penile penetration is thereafter fully achieved,
consummates the crime of rape.
Necessarily, the Court must now revisit and clarify the language of the
descriptions in the cases of Dela Pena, Oliver, Puertollano, Campuhan,
Ombreso, Comanda, and Francisco, which have collectively described that
108 Aikaterini Deliveliotou and George Creatsas, Anatomy of the Vulva, THE VULVA: ANATOMY,
PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 2-3.
109
The cleft between the "labia majord' is called the pudendal cleft, or "cleft of Venus," and it contains
and protects the other, more delicate structures of the vulva. These are lined by skin on the outside and
basal layer of cells (stratum malpighiz), a thin granular layer on the insides. (Dr. Anya Manda!, MD,
Vulva Structures, NEWS-MEDICAL.NET, available at <https://www.news-medical.net/healthNulva-
S~ctmes.•""·) ~
the act of rape is considered consummated as soon as the penis touches either
the pudendum or the labia of the victim's vagina.
With careful and decisive reference to the anatomical illustration above,

the Court clarifies that when jurisprudence refers to "mere touching," it is not
sufficient that the penis grazed over the pudendum or the fleshy surface of the
labia majora. Instead, what jurisprudence considers as consummated
rape when it describes a penis touching the vagina is the penis penetrating
the cleft of the labia maiora, however minimum or slight. Similarly, a mere
grazing by the penis of the fleshy portion, not the vulva! cleft of the labia
majora, will also constitute only attempted rape and not consummated rape,
since the same cannot be considered to have achieved the slightest level of
penetration. Stated differently, the Court here elucidates that "mere
touch" of the penis on the labia majora legally contemplates not mere
surface touch or skin contact, but the slightest penetration of the vulva!
or pudenda! cleft, however minimum in degree.
For this seeming nebulous operative definition to remain unclarified,

i.e., for the definition that a penis that touches any part of the female genitalia
is tantamount to consummated rape, would be both a physical and legal
negation of the concept of attempted rape. In other words, if any nature and
degree of touch of a penis of the female genitalia can be considered
consummated rape, then effectively, all sexual assaults involving a penis and
the vulva would only either be acts of lasciviousness or consummated rape,
with no gradation of the attempted stage in between. Since the same cannot
be reasonably presumed to be the legislative intendment with respect to
defining the stages of rape, the Court must clarify and fine-tune, as it now
does, the unveiled, straightforward definition of exactly the threshold genital
contact that constitutes consummated rape.
To be sure, the Court's clarification herein remains faithful to the

original definition as laid down in the earliest recalibration in Orita, where
while the Court disabused the notion that full penetration was required for
rape to be in the consummated stage, it nevertheless qualified that the
"slightest penetration" was nevertheless required, albeit imperfect or slight,
otherwise the rape would be deemed to have been in its attempted stage. I IO So
that while the Court requires the proof of the minimum genital contact as here
clarified, the notion of having to distinguish between depths or extent of
penetration remains out of the question.
In point of fact, in the case of Escober, the Court already articulated

this careful equivocation towards the idea of making further distinctions as to
penetration degrees, to wit:
There are no half measures or even quarter measures nor is

their gravity graduated by the inches of entry. Partial penile
penetration is as serious as full penetration. The rape is deemed
110
People v. Orita, supra note 63, at 976-977.
consummated in either case. In a manner of speaking, bombardment of

the drawbridge is invasion enough even if the troops do not succeed in
entering the castle. 111 (Emphasis supplied)
Given the foregoing, for as long as the prosecutorial evidence is able

to establish that the penis of the accused penetrated the vulval cleft or the
cleft of the labia maiora (i.e., the cleft of the fleshy outer lip of the victim's
vagina), however slight the introduction may be, the commission of rape
already crossed the threshold of the attempted stage and into its
consummation. On the factual appreciation of whether this minimum
threshold genital contact is obtained in an allegation of rape, the same is
rightly left to the trial court's astute assessment from the entirety of the body
of proof presented in each case.
Doubtlessly, the minimum test of erect penile contact preparatory for

consummation is the soundest gauge of differentiating between attempted and
consummated rape because, as illustrated by the present case, this bare
minimum penile contact may be all that can be reasonably wrested from the
testimony of a sexually abused child. On the unenviable task of determining
at which stage the crime of rape was committed, the courts are further
enjoined to be circumspect in their careful appreciation of the language
used to recount the manner, degree of penile contact, especially when the
victim attesting to the same is a minor child.
Appreciation of Stages of
Commission of Rape for
Pre-Puberty Victims
On this score, as recommended by Associate Justice Maria Filomena

D. Singh (Associate Justice Singh), the Court deems it high time, as well, to
further calibrate this genital contact threshold and rule, as it does, that for child
victims in the pre-puberty age, the genital contact threshold for a finding of
consummated rape through penile penetration is deemed already met once the
entirety of the prosecution evidence establishes a clear physical indication
of the inevitability of the minimum genital contact threshold as clarified
here, if it were not for the physical immaturity and underdevelopment of
the minor victim's vagina, which may include repeated touching of the
accused's erect penis on the minor victim's vagina and other indicative acts
of penetration. 112
The Court marks the ages of nine years old and below as the age range
when the "repeated touching" test is to be applied since, according to medical
literature, particularly the mainly referenced Nelson Textbook of Pediatrics, 113
the first sign of puberty in girls occurs between 10 to 11 years old, viz.:
111
People v. Escober, supra note 71, at 522, citing People v. Salinas, 302 Phil. 305 (I 994).
112
Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Singh, p. 1.
113
Kliegman, St. Geme, Blum, Shah. Tasker and Wilson (2020) (21" ed), Elsevier.
(
The age of onset of puberty varies and is more closely correlated

with osseous maturation than with chronological age. In females, the breast
bud (thelarche) is usually the first sign of puberty (10-11 yr), followed by
the appearance of pubic hair (pubarche) 6-12 mo later. The interval to the
onset of menstrual activity (menarche) is usually 2-2.5 yr but be as long as
6 yr. In the United States, at least one sign of puberty is present in
approximately 95% of females by 12 yr of age and in 99% of females by 13
yr ofage. 114
The Court takes judicial notice that in these cases, due to the
underdeveloped genitalia of child victims in the pre-puberty age, an attempt
of the penis to penetrate will already be likely indicative, at the very least, of
the penis' introduction to the vulval cleft of the victim's vagina, with
penetration considered made if it were not for the natural resistance of the
victim's organ due to biological immaturity.
Circumspection required in
appreciating testimonies of
child victims in rape cases
Furthermore, as Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo (Chief Justice

Gesmundo) astutely adds, the Court further reiterates the jurisprudential
guideposts which provide that when the necessary genital contact is not
explicitly described through the testimony of the victim, whether minor or
otherwise, courts can anchor their findings and appreciation of the genital
contact on other aspects that would similarly depict the occurrence and
circumstance of penile penetration. 115 These guideposts which are appreciable
in all rape cases may reasonably find sharper import with respect to cases of
rape involving minor victims, especially in view of the inherent limitations of
the testimony of child witnesses. The courts are, therefore, enjoined to
exercise circumspection in their appreciation, with the use of these
surrounding or attendant circumstances which can aid the courts in their
appreciation of penile penetration: (i) when the victim testifies that she felt
pain in her genitals; 116 (ii) when there is bleeding in the same; 117 (iii) when the
labia minora was observed to be gaping or has redness 118 or otherwise
discolored; 119 (iv) when the hymenal tags are no longer visible; 120 or (v) when
the sex organ of the victim has sustained any other type ofinjury. 121
Once the testimony of the victim and/or the above attendant

circumstances reveal that the threshold genital contact occurred, the courts
have sufficient basis to find for consummation.
u, Id. at 2899.
115
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo, pp. 3-4.
116
People v. Campuhan, supra note 81, at 925-926.
117
See People v. Grande, supra note 64.
118
See People v. De la Pena, 342 Phil 526 (1997).
119
See People v. Lazaro, 319 Phil. 352 (1995).
120
People v. Campuhan, supra note 81, at 926.
121
See People v. Ta/an, 591 Phil. 812 (2008).
For the avoidance of doubt, the Court deems it necessary to remind the
bench and bar of the need for circumspection given that as may be gleaned
from the preceding brief history and the juxtaposition of cases that all involve
minor rape victims, with all evidentiary appreciation turning on the child
witness' testimony, it appears that the Court, in its valuation of child witness'
testimonies in the specific context of rape cases, has repeatedly categorically
ruled that the testimony of the prosecution witness left it unconvinced that the
required degree of penetration did take place so as to consider the crime
committed to have been in its consummated stage. It consistently found the
testimonies of the child victims wanting in the degree of explicitness that
would depict for the Court the very manner and extent of penile contact or
penetration, e.g., that descriptive words and phrases used by child victims to
depict the assault, including "binundul-bundol ang kanyang ari," 122
"poked," 123 and "idinidikit ang art' 124 were not explicit or specific enough to
assess the nature of the penile contact.
The case at bar offers the Court the opportunity to clarify, streamline,
and reconcile the diverging cases, as well as revisit the prevailing principles
with respect to appreciating testimonies of child witnesses in the prosecution
of rape cases, to the extent that the fairness of the trial is gauged not only in
reference to the rights of the accused but also the rights of the minor victims.
For admittedly, although existing rules of procedure already grant a
discernible accommodation in favor of child witnesses, said rules only go into
the manner of facilitating child testimonies in court. The Court now goes a
step further, and lays down the guideline on the level of exactitude that must
color the court's appreciation of the testimony, after it has been obtained from
the child. This need to revisit how the courts appreciate testimonies of child
witnesses in the peculiar context of rape cases is far from a wasteful academic
exercise, or a tinkering of precedents for the sake of it. Far from it, the instant
reexamination rises from both the substantial body of literature in child
development which concedes the many inherent limitations of children in the
schema of .a rape or sexual abuse trial, as well as the appreciable
jurisprudential inconsistency in taking these intrinsic limitations into account.
For another, the Court deems it not only permissible but more so an
imperative that precedents, when brought under the light of an actual case and
exposed with its incongruence, must be reconsidered. Perhaps the Court may
not be faulted in pursuing such a reexamination with circumspection and
compassion, not in the least when its ruling is tethered to the lives of sexually
abused children, and the odds that are stacked against them.
To be sure, the present revisit by the Court does not militate against the
principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. This
principle, although encompassing, does not negate the fact that not all crimes
are alike, and sexual crimes, by their very nature, are rightly approached
122
See People v. Tolentino. supra note 91.
123
See People v. Francisco, supra note 87.
124
See People v. Arce, Jr., supra note 93.
differently, or at the very least, warrant a nuanced one. The nature of sexual
crimes is peculiar principally because the prosecution of sexual crimes rests
heavily, if not solely, on the testimony of the victim. Unlike other crimes
where other pieces of evidence may be available to prove their elements, the
prosecutorial proof in sexual crimes almost singularly rely on the testimony
of the victim. The Court would, therefore, be remiss if it unqualifiedly stops
at resolving all doubts in favor of the accused, without taking into account two
key considerations: (1) the distinctive nature of sexual crimes, and (2) the
inherent limitations of a child when giving testimony in the prosecution of
such crimes.
Nature of child testimonies

in adversarial trials must be
taken into account in the
context of rape
In the prosecution of criminal cases, witness testimonies often prove

pivotal to the establishment of facts. More particularly in rape cases, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused often depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony. Rape is, by nature, generally
unwitnessed, with the victim usually left to testify for herself, and her
testimony considered most vital and received with the utmost care. 125
In the Philippine jurisdiction, the existing guideline that finds closest

relevance to the case at bar is the Rule on Examination of Child Witness 126
(Rule) which governs the examination of child witnesses in all criminal
proceedings and non-criminal proceedings that involve them. 127 This Rule
mainly covers the facilitation of the testifying of minor witnesses, with the
goal of creating a court environment that minimizes the possible trauma on
the child witnesses, and assists in enabling them to deliver the most credible
testimonies possible. 128 Among other adjustments made in the configuration
of a witness examination, this Rule allows for the appointment of a facilitator
to pose questions to the child, 129 the involvement of support persons, 130 the
employment of testimonial aids such as anatomically correct dolls, 131 and
emotional security items. 132 The Rule further modifies the mode of question,
and permits the asking of leading questions, 133 and the narrative form of
testimony. 134
Demonstrably, however, the matter of appreciating testimony already

wrested from the child remains unaddressed by this Rule. Stated differently,
125
People v. Comanda, supra note 85, at 664.
6
" A.M. No. 00-4-07-SC, dated November 21, 2000.
127 RULE ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS, Sec. 1.
128
Id. at Sec. 2.
129
Id. at Sec. 10.
130
Id. at Sec. 11.
131 Id. at Sec. 16.
132
Id. at Sec. 17.
133
Id. at Sec. 20
134
Id. at Sec. 19.
this existing Rule is primarily geared towards facilitating the giving of the
testimony of the child. The Court here, on the other hand, directs the instant
clarification towards judges and justices, with respect to how the testimonies
of child witnesses must be appreciated after they have been given.
Specifically, although this Rule already exists to provide a generic

accommodation for child witnesses, the more nuanced scenario of ascribing
credibility, belief, and the overall valuation of the testimony of child witnesses
in sexual assault cases presents for the Court a whole new context, precisely
because the subject matter requires both levels of specificity on the one hand,
and sensitivity on the other, (e.g., accurate description of penile insertion) that
are reasonably considered strange to the schema of any child. This scenario,
therefore, presents a new, unique barrier to the clarity and articulation of the
child's testimony, such that the present Rule pertaining to child witnesses,
with its broader application, has shown to be insufficiently applicable.
In other words, the jurisprudence and existing Rule on child witness

examination are under-inclusive, and do not squarely consider the needs of
child witnesses in rape cases, because they remain largely unmindful of the
linguistic descriptive ability and limitations of an abused child. The case at
bar presents the Court with the occasion to rethink this demonstrated
predisposition towards this descriptive precision, in order to incorporate into
the equation the intrinsic limitations of a child witness' testimony. The Court
now adds that not only caution but more so circumspection is in order. In
sexual abuse cases involving children, the level of exactness that the preceding
case law seem to be seeking may be too difficult in the case of child victims
as to render its attainment practically impossible.
Illustratively, studies in "The Child Witness: A Training Manual" of

the United Nations Children's Fund suggest that child testimonies are steeply
affected by the courtroom's general adversarial setting, with a tone of hostility
that children are not mature enough to cope with. Especially with respect to
sexual abuse testimonies, such must be considered in light of children's
limited vocabulary knowledge and awareness of the sexual terminologies,
viz.:
Body parts and sexual terminology is the area where it is most obvious that
children have limited vocabulary. However, it is also an area that is of
crucial importance in cases of child sexual abuse. Although we may think
that body part terminology forms part of everyday words, research has
shown that children are not as aware of their body part words as we would
think. And this applies even to non-sexual body parts. Studies have found
that the number of body part words both understood and named increases
· with age, and some words are not fully acquired until after 6, like ankles
and elbows. A child will say that someone touched his leg but will not be
able to be more precise. Is it the thigh, the knee, the shin, the ankle?
Adults should, therefore, not assume body part words are everyday words
and seek clarification. One of the biggest difficulties in obtaining
information about sexual abuse from children is the fact that children, who
are not sexually active, do not understand what sex is. This is further
exacerbated by the fact that children under the age of 6 do not have an
understanding of their sexual anatomy. These children do not know that
they have a separate anus and a vagina. Many children under this age
believe that they use one orifice for both bodily functions.
In the forensic context, children will often in their disclosure use a general
word to describe a body part. It may not be clear what exactly they are
referring to, yet this information is vitally important for the court. 135
There is ample research that has long argued that court involvement
with respect to prosecution of child sexual abuse traumatizes the child
victims. 136 Child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are subjected to varying
limitations, from cognitive maturity to linguistic eloquence. The strength of
the testimonies in borderline cases such as the one at bar is impressed with
their various constraints on account of their age-determined developmental
abilities, vulnerabilities, needs, and other limitations that affect their
capability to comprehend court proceedings and intelligently and precisely
respond to complex questions during examinations. 137
A longitudinal psychological study on children in the courtroom even

surmised that in responding to lawyer's questions on the witness stand, child
witnesses rarely asked for clarification and often attempted to answer
questions which they actually deemed ambiguous or without sense. 138 This
observed reluctance of child witnesses bears squarely upon the probative
weight of their accounts. It is therefore, only consistent with due process for
both the complainant and the accused that, in the prosecution of rape, where
the crucible of proof closes in on the testimony of the victim, the evaluation
and appreciation of the accuracy of the primary testimony should be properly
informed of the limitations of the child thrust at its center.
Child witnesses are also exposed to a hostile and unfamiliar

environment in the form of a courtroom during an adversarial proceeding, so
that the evidence in these types of trials are often "derived not out of truth but
as a result of bullying or coercion." 139 Studies have further shown that the
135
UNICEF, THE CHILD WITNESS: A TRAINING MANUAL, p. 40.
136 Id.
137
Elita Joy G. Pinga and Anna Victoria M. Veloso, The Child Witness and the Law: The Truth (And
Nothing But), PUBLIC POLICY, (July-December 2006) Vol. X, No. 2, pp. 70-71, available at
<https:// cids. up.edu. ph/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/The-Child-Witness-and-the-Law-vo I. I 0-no.2-
July-Dec-2006-4. pdf>.
138
Rachel Zajac, Julien Gross and Harlene Hayne, Asked and Answered: Questioning Children in the
Courtroom, PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW, Vol. 10 Number I 2003, p. 199. The study adds:
Finally, the unique structure of the cross-examination interview may hinder a child's ability
to provide reliable and valid testimony. Contrary to interactions outside the courtroom,
where adults readily provide a framework for children's recollections, children's narratives
in the legal setting are far less supported. During cross-examination, the defence lawyer
asks questions in such a way as to structure and control the information to be recounted.
Structural cues that children rely on, such as those that signal a change in conversation
topic, are seldom present during the cross-examination process. (Citations omitted)
139
Annie Cossins, Cross-Examination in Child Sexual Assault Trials: Evidentiary Safeguard or an
Opporiunity to Confuse?, MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Vol. 33 (2009), p. 75, citing Judy
Cashmore, The Evidence of Children (1995), Crime Prevention Committee, Parliament of Victoria,
intimidating atmosphere of a courtroom causes anxiety in children, and

undermines their capacity to offer accurate testimonial evidence. 140
Another important difficulty that arises when communicating with

young children is not their capacity to recall an event but their insufficient
verbal skills to relate the memory. This becomes even more problematic when
gathering information in a forensic context. 141 The evidentiary odds are often
stacked against children's opportunity to offer the best, clearest, most accurate
testimonial evidence, with a "clear mismatch" between the linguistic
capabilities and the linguistic norm in court, which includes strangely phrased
questions, or questions that are designed to confuse or create the appearance
of inconsistencies, and the like. 142 Children's testimonies are also prone to
improper questioning, which bear directly on their credibility, and often result
in unreliable descriptions of abuse. 143
Finally, the exacting task of eliciting from a child witness the pivotal
pieces of information upon which the prosecution's case stands is further
confounded by the persistent rape myths and stereotypes that are still applied
to a child who cries sexual assault. Stated simply, therefore, to require from
the prosecution a high degree of semantic specificity in the testimony of child
victims, to the point that the gradation of penetration may be ascertained with
persuasiveness, is too tall an order to be met by the child, and therefore
becomes a standard of testimonial proof the achievability of which is more
apparent than it is real. For if the treatment were otherwise, it would be unjust
to appreciate children's testimonies based on criteria set for testimonies of
adults.
To be sure, the courts do not presently require that children should be

able to describe the nature of penetration against them using technical or
scientifically accurate words. Certainly, the courts do not ask of children the
use of technical terms such as labia minora or majora, mans pubis, pudendum
and the like. This would be a nuanced error in the casting of the premise, and
is not what the instant recalibration proceeds from.
Instead, it is acknowledged that although in black letter, the courts

supposedly afford a level ofleniency in favor of children when they testify on
the witness stand, this accommodation seems to be, as far as the oscillating
jurisprudence shows, not wholly and consistently translated to all actual court
cases that call for it. In other words, the Court now no longer insists that it
already affords accommodation in view of children's inherent limitations,
when these accommodations do not consistently reflect themselves on all
child rape cases where the question of threshold between attempted and
Combating Child Sexual Assault: An Integrated Model, Parl Paper No 47 (1995) 191; New South Wales,
Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service, Final Report (1997) vol 5, 1086.
140
John E. Myers, Decade of International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and
Litigation: Steps toward a Child Witness Code, MCGEORGE LAW REVIEW, 28 Pac. L. J. 169 (1996),
available at <https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol28/issl/>.
141
See People v. Francisco, supra note 87.
142
See People v. DimapiUs, supra note 94.
143 Id.
consummated rape is put to the fore. Truly, the courts, short of requiring
children to use technical terms to describe penetration, nevertheless
demonstrably search for more accurate depictions of said penetrations than
the children, in their studied linguistic and cognitive limitations, can ever be
prevailed upon to provide.
Moving forward, therefore, in the specific context of trying cases of

rape, the Court enjoins the courts: (i) to be circumspect in their appreciation
of the entire body of evidence submitted before them, including the
testimonial evidence offered by the minor victims in cases involving them;
(ii) take into full account the jurisprudential guideposts which depict the
nature and degree of genital contact when not explicitly described through the
testimony of the victim, minor or otherwise; and (iii) particularly with respect
to minor victims, give due regard to their inherent linguistic limitations as
witnesses, in order to avoid demanding the highest exacting level of linguistic
accuracy as they have been jurisprudentially demonstrated to have required in
the past.
Instant threshold of genital

contact may be applied by
analogy to acts of rape by
sexual assault
Moreover, as proffered by Chief Justice Gesmundo 144 and as raised

during deliberations, the Court further finds merit in extending the same
threshold of genital contact by analogy to acts of rape by sexual assault as
described in Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, as amended, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
I) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman

under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of

reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or

grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve

(12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances

mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
144
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo, p. 8.
the genital or anal orifice of another person.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Stated differently, the extension of the instant anatomical threshold

applies to rape by sexual assault such that a finding that the accused has
penetrated the vulva! cleft of the victim through the use of any instrument
or object warrants a factual finding of consummated rape by sexual assault.
To be sure, the Court here concedes that the inclusion of the foregoing
anatomical descriptive discussion is as much unprecedented as it is
necessitous, for in determining physical degrees of sexual assault in the crime
of rape by sexual intercourse through penile penetration, there is no other way
to reconcile the evolving and, at times, varying jurisprudence than to
increasingly incorporate into these legal pronouncements the anatomically
accurate and unquestionably specific body parts that these cases in
jurisprudence constantly refer to. As Chief Justice Gesmundo supposes, the
visual and descriptive clarification herein should enable the country's
prosecutors to build and present their cases with sufficient clarity, and for the
courts to appreciate them with the same degree ofunambiguity. 145
Further to the instant clarification, in the converse, the Court also

clarifies that when there is no touching by the penis of the vulva! cleft of the
victim's genitalia in a case of rape through penile penetration, there can be no
finding of consummated · rape but only attempted rape or acts of
lasciviousness, as the case may be, with the distinctions determinable based
on various indications that may reveal either the absence or presence of"intent
to lie" 146 on the part of the accused, 147 which include the presence of an erect
penis. 148
The Court further notes that, perhaps, the inconsistency in the

appreciation of testimonial depiction of the genital contact that already
consummates the rape committed is not a failure of the imagination nor a
deficit in compassion, but simply a lack of certainty as to what the required
genital contact as described in preceding jurisprudence really anatomically
entailed. For one, the Court understands that over and above an explicit
examination of matters that were once relegated to imprecise euphemisms, an
intelligent interrogation of these excruciating details is inescapable if it is to
dispense justice in a manner that is both consistent with the contemplation of
jurisprudential precedents, as well as appreciable in the painful realities of
actual rape cases. ·
Proceeding from this clarification, and to help decrease the trauma

which the rape victims experience during testimonies, those that have been
correctly described during the deliberations as aggravated by the usual
pummeling of probing, pointed and hostile questions from the defense, this
145
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo, p. 8.
146
People v. Banzuela, 723 Phil. 797, 820 (2013).
147
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo, pp. 5-6.
148
See Cmz v. People, 745 Phil. 54, 74 (2014).
clarification of the anatomical threshold in the instant case hopes to spare the
victims, especially the minors, the harrowing task of recounting the smallest,
most profoundly humiliating details of the attack beyond what is needed. With
this clarification, both the prosecution and the courts will have a floor
anatomical threshold, the establishment of which is all that is needed to
factually confirm for the Court the consummation of this kind of rape.
For another, the Court reminds that the crucial import of this
recalibration or clarification is no more evident than in the net resulting
penalties imposable on the convicted accused who, either in the attempted or
the consummated stage, has nevertheless been found by the Court to have
sexually assaulted a minor, at the very least. Namely, the penalty
for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty
of reclusion perpetua for consummated rape of a minor under 12 but not
below seven years of age. Two (2) degrees lower :from reclusion perpetua is
prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty imposable upon an
accused convicted of attempted rape of a minor is prision mayor in its medium
period, while the minimum shall be taken :from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision correccional, the range of which is six (6) months
and one (1) day to six ( 6) years, in any of its periods. 149 In palpable contrast,
a penalty of reclusion perpetua awaits an accused that is convicted of
consummated rape of a minor.
Stated plainly, lest the Court be misunderstood, the unclear definition

has, considering the diverging cases, resulted in instances where the accused
was meted a significantly lighter penalty (i.e., penalty for attempted rape) than
the heavier penalty which the act as committed should have incurred (i.e.,
penalty for consummated rape). It goes without saying, therefore, that the
difference in the lengths of period of incarceration is considerable and, insofar
as borderline cases of attempted vis-a-vis consummated rape of minors are
concerned, appears to be too high a cost to be paid for unclear definitions of
the genital contact that distinguish between the two stages of commission.
Finally, as raised during deliberations, there also appears to be a

distortion in the scale of penalties involving rape, sexual assault and acts of
lasciviousness under the RPC, as amended, vis-a-vis sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) ofR.A. 7610, as amended. Specifically,
the Court notes, upon the juxtaposition of these crimes and their prescribed
penalties, that acts of lasciviousness under the RPC in relation to R.A. 7 610
and lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610 warrant severe punishments of
reclusion temporal in its medium period and reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua, respectively. Comparatively, however,
attempted rape carries a penalty which is two degrees lower than the
prescribed penalty or prision mayor. Stated differently, the crime of attempted
rape effectively carries a lighter penalty when compared to acts of
149
People v. Baluyot, G.R. No. 227422, March 18, 2019 (Unsigned Resolution).
lasciviousness and lascivious conduct. This, despite the reasonable conclusion

that the crime of attempted rape rises from the more detestable criminal intent
to have sexual intercourse with the minor victim against her will.
Thus, and in view of the constitutional limitation on the Court, it

therefore entreats the Legislature to reinterrogate and examine this
inconsistency in the scale of penalties in rape, sexual assault, acts of
lasciviousness, and lascivious conduct, in order that they may most accurately
approximate and reflect the penalty that each crime truly merits.
III
Application of the foregoing parameters
in the present case
Applying this frame of analysis to the instant appeal, the Court finds
that the lower courts correctly found herein appellant guilty of consummated
rape, on both accounts. Demonstrably, AAA's account in open court vividly
described how appellant's penis was hard and erect as he kept trying to
penetrate her vagina as antecedent for full penetration, eventually succeeding
to introduce his erect penis on the vulva! cleft of her vagina, to wit:
Q: After he undressed himself and you, by the way, who did he undressed
first?
A: Hirn, sir.
Q: As he was undressing himself, did you not [try] to go out of the house?
COURT: Put on record that the witness is crying.
A: No, sir.
Q: After he undressed you, what did he do?

A: He mounted on me, sir.
Q: After he mounted on top of you, what did he do?

A: He wanted to insert his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q: How did you know that he wanted to do that?

A: He told me, sir.
Q: Did you see his penis?

A: Yes, sir and I also felt it.
Q: Was it hard?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But was he able to fully penetrate your vagina?

A: No, sir.
Q: Using the female doll, at what part of your vagina where his penis
was at that time?
A: Dito po sa may gitna.
Q: Witness pointed to the pelvic area. When you say sa may gitna, you
mean sa may hiwa?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why he wasn't (sic) fully inserted his penis?

A: I was fighting, sir. 150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the brief excerpt of AAA's testimony, the crucial facts of the

appellant's erect penis and its touching of her vulval cleft (i.e., "sa may gitna,"
"sa may hiwa ") were established categorically and beyond doubt, and
sufficiently established that the minimum penile-vaginal contact between the
penis and the vulval cleft to enable a finding of consummated rape was, in
fact, obtained.
The Court further finds that the CA erred in appreciating both incidents
of rape as statutory. On the contrary, only the rape as charged under Criminal
Case No. 1453-V-14 is statutory in nature, with AAA aged 10 years old at the
time of the rape. On the other hand, the rape as charged under Criminal Case
No. 1454-V-14 is simple rape, with AAA at age 13 at the time of said incident.
Further, appellant's attempts at ousting the positive and unequivocal

testimony of the minor AAA are ofno moment, as minor inconsistencies that
are irrelevant to the elements of the crime charged are not material and will
not sustain an acquittal. 151 Furthermore, jurisprudence is also replete with
pronouncements from this Court that in child sexual abuse cases, the child
victim's disclosure is the most important evidence of sexual abuse, 152 which
in this case is further physically corroborated by medical evidence.
Imputations of concoctions and false testimonies are also of no import

as it is likewise well-entrenched in our jurisdiction that courts are rightly
inclined to lend credence to testimonies of young offended parties in charges
of sexual abuse, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
sheer trauma, scandal, and undue exposure brought on by a public trial, which
the offended minor would reasonably wish to avoid if not for the fact that her
accusations are as inconvenient as they are true. What is decisive in a rape
charge is that the commission of rape by the accused against the complainant
has been sufficiently proven. In this respect, the testimony of AAA, even on
its own, is credible, and sufficiently sustains a conviction. Further, the CA
correctly affirmed the RTC with respect to its non-appreciation of the
qualifying circumstance of the stepdaughter-stepfather relationship between
AAA and appellant, since the marriage between AAA's mother, BBB, and
appellant was only alleged in the Information but not proved.
150
TSN, March 1, 2016, pp. 10-1 I.
151
See People v. Linsie, 722 Phil. 374,384 (2013).
152
Peoplev. Bohol, 415 Phil. 749,761 (2001).
A Final Note
The irreversibility of the crime of rape is not lost on the Court, and the
rape myths that persist, the ambient sexism that color the moral imaginations,
and the stigma that hounds its victims must all be examined under the light,
unvarnished, if society is to meet around the central, shared values of human
dignity and life. The Court must be able to interrogate the darkest corners of
crimes as closely as possible to ask how justice can be truly served in these
spaces, lest it betray a mere artifice of its civilities. Perhaps no truer than in
crimes that are too confronting, the Court must be able to put a human face to
the suffering and refuse to be too offended to call things for what they are. At
the risk of testing its strength under the weight of its decisions, the Court must
remain honest, clear-sighted and unflinching, for to look away is violence.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and ADOPTS

with MODIFICATION the findings of fact of Branch 172, Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated January 15, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09405, and AFFIRMS said
Decision with MODIFICATION, and hereby finds appellant Efren Agao y
Afionuevo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Statutory
Rape in Criminal Case No. 1453-V-14, and one (1) count of Simple Rape in
Criminal Case No. 1454-V-14 through sexual intercourse, for which he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. 153 The
Court further AFFIRMS the award of damages pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.
The letter 154 dated October 23, 2019 of Atty. Julie May Taguiam,
Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau
of Corrections, New Bilibid Prison Reservation, Muntinlupa City, in
compliance with the Resolution 155 dated August 19, 2019, informing the Court
that appellant was received for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison on May
27, 2017 is NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
153
In accordance with the guidelines as laid down in People v. Tu/agan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12,2019,
896 SCRA 307.
154
Rollo, p. 27.
155
Id. at 25-26.
WE CONCUR:
UNDO
~~o Associate Justice
(no part) (on official business)

AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER HENRI JEAN PAUL B. INTING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RODI
SA~UE~N RICA .ROSARIO

Associate Justice As
(on official business)

JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ
Associate Justice
,~"-----
;4,,,,
~ (on official business)
J SE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ ANTONIO T. KHO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(on of,,.ffe.dess but left her vote; see

attac=~a~:;e Concurring Opinion)
MARIA FILOMENA D. SINGH
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
C~KHFIED TRUE COPY

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3Republic of t{Je ~bilippineg

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 248049

EFREN AGAO y ANONUEVO, Promulgated:

In a manner perhaps as barefaced as it is unprecedented, and in no way

(R.A.) 8353 3 in conjunction withR.A. 7610, 4 docketed as Criminal Case Nos.

Crim. Case No. 1453-V-14

That sometime in July 2010, in Valenzuela [C]ity, Metro Manila,

Crim. Case No. 1454-V-14

That sometime in January 2012, in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. 7

During the trial, private complainant AAA recounted the protracted

The prosecution's collective evidence showed that AAA was born on

TSN, March I, 2016, pp. 9-12.

vagina. 18 Appellant was allegedly unable to fully penetrate AAA's vagma

She further testified that appellant continued to molest her, including

Upon physical and genital examination on AAA by Police Chief

In his defense, appellant denied the allegations levelled against him,

Ruling of the RTC

In finding appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC gave

The RTC, however, did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of

27 TSN, August 5, 2015, p. 6.

On appeal 40 to the Court of Appeals (CA), appellant argued that: (1)

In affirming appellant's conviction, the CA found that the RTC

already consummates the crime ofrape. 48 The CA also dismissed appellant's

Finally, the CA found that the RTC correctly convicted appellant of

On appeal 51 to this Court, appellant manifests 52 that he adopts the issues

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by the following principles

The apparent avoidance in the straightforwardness or clarity now

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed - Rape is committed -

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman

a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of

c. By means of fraudulent machination or

d. When the offended party is under twelve

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances

In Philippine jurisprudence, the conceptualization of the wrong of rape,

The operative definition of carnal knowledge, however, has been

The Court's more nuanced approach to the study and determination of

xx x In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People

Proceeding from Orita, the efforts of the Court to expound on as well

It is likewise settled that the absence of physical findings on medical

In determining whether the rape was consummated or merely

Q While he was on top ofyou, what was he doing?

Q Wh.en he was trying to insert his private part to your private

A His penis touched my vagina.

Q What happened next?

To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the

In the succeeding case of Quinanola, the Court again echoed Dela

In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, "carnal

Proceeding from the standing doctrine in Quinanola, the Court further

In the same year, in People v. Alojado,78 the Court described consummated

The mere touching by the male's organ or instrument of sex of

Then, in the later oft-cited case of People v. Campuhan 81 (Campuhan),

x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply

x x x Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered

Fallowing Campuhan was the case of People v. Ombreso 83 ( Ombreso ),

Thus, although there was no full penetration, and therefore no