Wi 1379
Wi 1379
Wi 1379
DISINTERMEDIATION MYSTERY:
A REVIEW AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Research Paper
Abstract
Blockchain technology has been in the interest of IS researchers and practitioners for several years. One
key reason for this curiosity is the possibility to carry out peer-to-peer transactions without a trusted
intermediary. Building upon this capability, many researchers posited that blockchain technology would
remove traditional intermediaries from their market position. This process has been described in
electronic markets literature as Disintermediation. However, other researchers proposed a more distinct
perspective by proposing that blockchain technology will not facilitate Disintermediation in all settings.
Thus, no unified view on this topic exists yet. Our literature review identifies three dominating concepts
in blockchain literature: Extensive Disintermediation, Limited Disintermediation, and Re-
Intermediation. We further highlight in our findings that most of the identified literature does not
consider all market functions as described in the electronic markets literature. Hence, we provide a
structured overview of the field and possibilities for future research.
Keywords: Intermediation, Electronic Markets, Blockchain, Research Agenda; Literature Review.
1 Introduction
Blockchains are at the center of the academic (Chong et al., 2019) and public discourse (Gartner, 2021)
regarding the impact of emerging technologies on society, businesses, and individuals. Since the first
publication on blockchain in 2008 (Nakamoto, 2008), researchers and practitioners have highlighted the
disruptive potential of the technology for business models and industries (Beck et al., 2018). By the
decentralized design of blockchain technology, participants facilitate transactions directly without a
trusted third party. Thus, many blockchain use cases consider the removal of intermediaries as a key
aspect of this technology (Chalmers et al., 2021).
Intermediation is the "[…] bridging of incompatibilities between two (market) sides involved in a
transaction" (Wigand, 2020, p. 39). Building on established definitions, we define intermediaries as third
parties that provide services for market participants through the administration and execution of
transactions (Datta and Chatterjee, 2008; Bhargava et al., 2000; Grover and Teng, 2001). Following the
widely adopted transaction-cost-focused view (Coase, 1937), intermediaries fulfill the role of carrying
out transactions by reducing the cost of the transaction between two sides, compared to a situation
without any intermediary. With the introduction of electronic markets, companies sought the
opportunity to further reduce the cost of transactions by removing intermediaries in the value chain. This
process is called Disintermediation and directly connects two (market) sides (Wigand, 2015).
Subsequently, this process has the potential to disrupt established market structures (Gomber et al.,
2018). Even though the widespread assumption in literature posited that through the evolvement of
electronic markets, the majority of intermediaries would be removed entirely from the value chain
(Malone et al., 1987), many intermediaries found possibilities to reposition themselves in value chains
(e.g., through the provision of value-added services) (Giaglis et al., 2002).
Research on the how, what, and why of intermediation concerning blockchain technology is highly
fragmented. While many researchers over the years posit that Disintermediation is a key characteristic
of blockchain technology (Chalmers et al., 2021; Pereira et al., 2019; Werner et al., 2020), some
researchers take a different view by proposing that organizations might adopt the technology to derive
novel business models for themselves (Chong et al., 2019). Hence, there is no unified understanding of
how intermediaries are affected by blockchain technology and no overview of different research streams
in this field. Addressing this research gap helps companies identify the possible effects of blockchain
technology on their business models, in particular, as well as the impact on market structures. Rossi et
al. (2019) and Lumineau et al. (2021) also highlight the need to further investigate how blockchain
technology will impact institutional intermediaries in their traditional responsibilities within markets
and possible future business strategies. To answer these calls for future research, we aim to provide a
comprehensive overview of how literature conceptualizes intermediation in blockchain systems. We,
therefore, state the following research question:
Which concepts and paths for future research for intermediation within blockchain systems exist?
To answer our research question, we carry out a structured literature review. A review of the state of
literature is highly recommended when investigating how a research field is structured (Webster and
Watson, 2002). By applying a systematic approach that incorporates a defined protocol, we ensure the
accuracy and validity of our findings. We, therefore, adopt the methodological guidelines of Webster
and Watson (2002).
Our findings provide a structured overview of the research field by identifying different research streams
that stem from conceptual as well as real-world studies. We define those research streams into three key
concepts. Afterward, we compare those concepts with literature from electronic markets research to
provide further insights for academia and practice. Lastly, we derive a framework that serves as guidance
for future research by following Alvesson and Sandberg (2011).
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we provide the theoretical background on blockchain
technology and intermediation theory in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe our research method for
carrying out our structured literature review. Next, Section 4 presents our identified publications as well
as the current state of research. Section 5 discusses our findings from theoretical and managerial
perspectives and presents our research agenda. Finally, we present a conclusion to our research in
Section 6 and outline the limitations.
2 Foundations
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the first blockchain to the public with the cryptocurrency Bitcoin
(Nakamoto, 2008). In the following years, different organizations developed a subset of technologies
that follow the same or similar principles as the Bitcoin blockchain (so-called distributed ledger
technologies). We follow the terminology of blockchain technology which incorporates all technologies
that build on the following principles (Chanson et al., 2019): From a technical perspective, blockchain
technology is a retroactively tamper-resistant distributed ledger. In contrast to centralized ledgers, the
data is stored separately by each participant in the network of connected computers. To ensure the
validity of the data, consensus mechanisms are in place. These mechanisms ensure that all participants
agree on the rightfulness of new data in the ledger before adding it to the network (Andersen and Bogusz,
2019). Thereby, blockchain technology was originally proposed to remove central intermediaries
(Nakamoto, 2008). Building on this idea, various applications that incorporate different technological
requirements have since been proposed (Lumineau et al., 2021). Therefore, developers introduced
various technologies that enhance the technical design of the original Bitcoin blockchain and now
include the support of arbitrary logic (e.g., Ethereum), upgraded privacy features (e.g., Zcash), or
address the specific needs of corporations (e.g., Hyperledger) (Guggenberger et al., 2021a). The most
common classification for blockchain technology builds upon the right to validate new data on the ledger
(permissioned/permissionless) and the possibility to access and write data (public/private) (Beck et al.,
2018). As noted by Bakos et al. (2021), this decision fundamentally influences the degree of
decentralization and, thus, the possibility to remove institutional intermediaries.
Even though blockchain technology has its origin in the peer-to-peer cryptocurrency network Bitcoin,
developers invented applications across industries. The most prominent use cases are supply chain
management, decentralized identity management, logistics, energy, and mobility (Chong et al., 2019).
Many companies started investing in blockchain technology to gain competitive advantages in the
market. Surprisingly, in contrast to the widespread public attention, the number of productive blockchain
use cases remains low (Rossi et al., 2019; Guggenberger et al., 2021b), and the impact on businesses is
not always as disruptive as originally proposed (Fridgen et al., 2021). Further, blockchain technology is
still in an early stage of technological development and maturity. Research and practice still need to
address various challenges to bring the technology to its full potential (Rossi et al., 2019). These
challenges include the scalability and privacy of DLT. However, more recent achievements in the field
of applied cryptography might lower the barriers for productive systems soon (Guggenberger et al.,
2021a).
Due to the technological properties, many researchers suggested that blockchains will disrupt business
models and industries (Gomber et al., 2018). Since blockchain technology enables peer-to-peer
transactions without a central trust-building institution, researchers proposed that blockchain technology
allows for Disintermediation (Chalmers et al., 2021; Pereira et al., 2019; Schlecht et al., 2020). This
assumption builds on the capability to facilitate transactions between two participants without requiring
a central entity that protects all participants against malicious behavior. Even though this perspective
became prominent within the information systems (IS) community, some researchers propose a more
distinct view on the Disintermediation capabilities of blockchain technology (Chong et al., 2019). One
example for the promises of Disintermediation through the distributed facilitation of transactions is
Decentralized Finance (DeFi). DeFi promises to establish a new financial system that does not rely on
banks or insurances and, thus, aims to remove institutional intermediaries from the financial system
(Chen and Bellavitis, 2020).
facilitation of transactions, and institutional infrastructure. Each primary function consists of several
subfunctions, which are depicted in Table 1.
Primary market
Subfunction Influence of electronic markets
function
Determination of
Customization, Aggregation, and Disaggregation
product offerings
Matching buyers and
sellers Searching Reduction of search costs
Legal
Institutional
Increasing relevance of authentication and guarantees
infrastructure
Regulatory
Table 1. Market functions (own depiction, based on Bakos (1998) and Giaglis et al. (2002)).
In the following, we discuss the impact of electronic markets on the function of intermediaries based on
the work of Giaglis et al. (2002). This approach allows us to understand how electronic markets work
and which impact blockchain technology might have on the respective market functions.
The following aspects affect the market function of matching buyers and sellers. Three major
developments influence product offerings in electronic markets: (1) enhanced possibilities regarding
customization of particularly digital products and services, (2) the aggregation and disaggregation of
products to create new product bundles, and (3) the reduction of costs for demand aggregation which
subsequently leads to cheaper products (Giaglis et al., 2002). As electronic markets drastically reduce
searching costs, many researchers expected the searching function to become obsolete as buyers and
sellers interact directly. However, the vast majority of information within (international) electronic
markets cannot be processed by a market participant. This challenge led to the emergence of new roles
for intermediaries to aggregate and consolidate market information. Even though price discovery
mechanisms profit from easier access to information, price discovery in electronic markets does not
substantially differ from analog markets. Still, electronic markets formed new possibilities for
intermediaries to provide formerly non-electronic price discoveries in the electronic market (e.g.,
electronic auctions) (Klein, 1997). Those mechanisms profit from the easier access to information.
Further, the facilitation of transactions is affected through the following influences. As with other
functions, logistics are driven by a reduction of transaction costs. The direct exchange of orders between
buyers and sellers pressures wholesalers but at the same time provides opportunities for specialized
intermediaries like logistic companies. The widespread adoption of electronic systems provides
numerous possibilities to automate payment transactions and, at the same time, reduce costs drastically.
Namely, most previous analog services have been moved by traditional intermediaries to the electronic
market, for example, application processes (Kleider et al., 2021). Nonetheless, also new specialized
intermediaries emerged that provide a whole range of new services to customers (MacCarthy, 2010).
Finally, electronic markets also affect the institutional infrastructures. The provision of trust in electronic
markets, thus, the protection against the leverage of information asymmetries, has attracted various
research (Fuller et al., 2007). Giaglis et al. (2002) posit that trust in electronic markets becomes more
relevant than in analog markets. Henceforth, intermediaries can adopt new roles in the market by
leveraging new technological or institutional safeguards to protect market participants from malicious
behavior (Datta and Chatterjee, 2008). Those safeguards include, for example, refund guarantees like
the PayPal buyer and seller protection. Intermediaries, in most cases, have provided legal or regulatory
boundaries in markets. This function receives even higher importance in electronic markets, where the
relevance of authentication systems and guarantees increases.
Following the assessment of the subfunctions, early research underpinned the hypothesis of a threat of
Disintermediation for traditional intermediaries (Chircu and Kauffman, 1999) as electronic markets
decrease transactions costs (Malone et al., 1987). Disintermediation describes the removal of established
intermediaries from the market process. This scenario can be explained through a decline in transaction
costs to a level where a market clears itself (Giaglis et al., 2002) or the extrusion through the technologies
(Chircu and Kauffman, 1999). Nonetheless, later research proposes two future scenarios, aside from
Disintermediation, on how intermediaries are affected by electronic markets: Re-Intermediation and
Cybermediation. (Sarkar et al., 1998; Chircu and Kauffman, 1999; Giaglis et al., 2002).
Re-Intermediation occurs when an institutional intermediary finds a new position or function in the
market. Examples of such behavior are further market differentiation (e.g., providing value-added
services) or concentrating on a market niche. One example of Re-Intermediation is the e-commerce
retailer Amazon. While Amazon initially took over the retail process for many producers, the cost of
setting up and running individual e-commerce solutions declined over the last years. Thus, many
producers started to set up their own e-commerce while still using Amazon Web Services for their cloud
infrastructure. Electronic markets literature further describes the facilitation of market transactions by
solely electronic intermediaries. Therefore, scholars proposed the term Cybermediation (Giaglis et al.,
2002). These intermediaries account for electronic systems that administer the infrastructure and
intermediation process in electronic markets (e.g., the provision of trust) (Sarkar et al., 1998, 1995).
Chircu and Kauffman (1999) and Giaglis et al. (2002) highlight that no uniform outcome of electronic
market scenarios exists. Instead, each market shows its own consolidation of scenarios between
Disintermediation, Re-Intermediation, and Cybermediation. However, through the evolving
development in digitalization, the boundaries between traditional and electronic markets vanish
(Rahmati et al., 2021). Some scholars even posit that electronic markets create and shape the physical
world (Baskerville et al., 2020). With this digital-first paradigm, the distinction between organizations
acting as analog or electronic intermediaries and the distinction between Cybermediation and other
scenarios becomes obsolete. Subsequently, we refer to the organization that fulfills market functions as
institutional intermediaries, regardless of whether in the physical world or electronic markets.
3 Method
To carry out our literature review, we followed established guidelines. In our approach, we apply the
eight-step procedure as proposed by Okoli (2015). Senior scholars recommend this approach to assess
the current body of knowledge of a research field and gain a holistic insight into the existing literature
(Webster and Watson, 2002). Hence, a literature review fits our research question. By applying a
systematic approach that incorporates a well-defined and structured protocol, we ensure the accuracy
and validity of our findings. We display our procedure in Figure 1.
To get an overview of existing literature that incorporates the topic of Disintermediation, as well as
possible findings regarding Re-Intermediation and cyber-mediation, we focused on the search term
"intermedia* OR disintermedia* OR re-intermedia* OR cyber*media*" as different authors describe
different concepts of intermediation in the context of blockchain or use terms synonymously. To
systematically extract concepts in the scope of blockchain technology from the literature, we have added
the term "DLT OR blockchain OR "distributed ledger*" OR "smart contract*" to the search string. The
Boolean operator AND is used for connecting those terms. According to these considerations, the search
string aims to ensure an extensive but specific number of results. The search string was applied to the
abstract, title, and keywords. Next, we defined the inclusion criterion to English articles. We purposely
did not only search for journal articles or a specific field of science since we did not want to limit our
sample ex-ante.
4 Findings
In the following, we present our descriptive and our qualitative analysis of our final article sample.
While the first identified article was published in 2016, we observe an increase in interest in the topic
over the following years until the year 2019. For the year 2020, we identified fewer articles. Figure 2
provides an overview of all articles sorted by their publication year. While 64 articles were published in
scientific journals, 25 articles were presented in conference proceedings. Thereby, two of the leading
conferences of the Association of Information Systems (AIS), the European Conference on Information
Systems (ECIS), and the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) each provide
four articles for our review. We also find articles in leading journals like the IEEE Access (n=4),
Business & Information Systems Engineering (n=3), MIS Quarterly Executive (n=2), and the Journal of
the AIS (n=2). Thus, although we did not define an ex-ante focus on the IS and computer science domain,
nearly all articles can be classified there.
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Concept # Articles
Al Barghuthi et al. (2018), Ali et al. (2021), Āriņš (2019), Arndt (2019),
Avantaggiato and Gallo (2019), Bailon (2019), Bdiwi et al. (2019),
Beverungen et al. (2021), Boreiko and Vidusso (2019), Casado-Vara and
Corchado (2019), Chalmers et al. (2021), Chang et al. (2019), Dakhli et al.
(2019), de Boissieu et al. (2021), Dilawar et al. (2019), Egelund-Müller et al.
(2017), Esmat et al. (2021), Faizan et al. (2019), Fu (2018), Gomber et al.
(2018), Gong et al. (2021), Gurtu and Johny (2019), Hasan et al. (2019),
Extensive Hassija et al. (2019), Heck et al. (2021), Hoess et al. (2021), Hrga et al.
61 (2020), Jabbarpour et al. (2020), Jaiswal et al. (2019), Khosla et al. (2019),
Disintermediation
Labazova (2019), Larios-Hernández (2017), Lohmer and Lasch (2020),
Madhusudan et al. (2019), Magyar (2017), Makridakis and Christodoulou
(2019), Mengelkamp et al. (2018), Mika and Goudz (2021), Murray (2019),
Nasarre-Aznar (2018), Norta et al. (2018), Notheisen et al. (2017), Nowiński
and Kozma (2017), Pereira et al. (2019), Perscheid et al. (2020), Philipp et al.
(2019), Queiroz et al. (2019), Rashideh (2020), Rejeb and Rejeb (2020),
Saichua et al. (2019), Salah et al. (2019), Saurabh and Dey (2021), Schlecht et
al. (2020), Schmidt et al. (2019), Soto et al. (2021), Tian et al. (2020), Wang
et al. (2019), Werner et al. (2020), Ying et al. (2018), Zhao and O'Mahony
(2018), Zielinska et al. (2019)
Al-Shaibani et al. (2020), Beck et al. (2018), Cai (2018), Catalini and Gans
(2020), Chong et al. (2019), Frolov (2021), Fridgen et al. (2021), Garcia-
Limited Teruel (2020), Guo and Liang (2016), Hawlitschek et al. (2020), Lacity and
20
Disintermediation van Hoek (2021), Mehrwald et al. (2019), Risius and Spohrer (2017),
Trabucchi et al. (2020), Wang et al. (2021), Weking et al. (2020), Wilkinson
et al. (2020), Yue (2020), Zavolokina et al. (2020), Ziolkowski et al. (2018)
Abbatemarco et al. (2020), Chiu and Shang (2019), Collao and Winship
(2019), Lindman et al. (2017), O’Dair and Owen (2019), Owen and O'Dair
Re-Intermediation 9
(2020), Tönnissen and Teuteberg (2020), Tseng and Shang (2021), Zamani
and Giaglis (2018)
Extensive Disintermediation
We find the concept of Extensive Disintermediation to be the most prominent in our literature review
(n=61). The articles put forward the idea that institutional intermediaries are removed from the markets
or processes through blockchain technology. This idea can either apply to a specific use case
(Beverungen et al., 2021; Notheisen et al., 2017) or a generic attribute of the technology (Labazova,
2019; Chalmers et al., 2021). Among the most present use cases for this concept is supply chain
management, where all authors who focus on this use case (n=9) present the idea that in some way,
blockchain will remove institutional intermediaries from the markets by making their function obsolete
(de Boissieu et al., 2021; Salah et al., 2019). Some even see Extensive Disintermediation as the main
reason for blockchain adoption (Chang et al., 2019) or the advent of a new industry system (Egelund-
Müller et al., 2017). Within this concept group, most articles either use a design science research
approach (n=23) or are purely conceptual (n=15). Qualitative-empirical (n=13) and quantitative-
empirical approaches (n=3) are less represented. This stream of literature builds their argument for
Extensive Disintermediation upon the inherent attributes of blockchain technology: transparency (Heck
et al., 2021), immutability (Murray, 2019), decentralization (Nowiński and Kozma, 2017), security
(Schmidt et al., 2019), and trust (Dilawar et al., 2019). Thereby, this technical perspective barely takes
into account the complex market processes.
Limited Disintermediation
The second-largest group of articles highlights the idea that blockchain technology might have the
possibility to remove institutional intermediaries in certain limited use cases but cannot be attributed to
the characteristic of Disintermediation per se (Catalini and Gans, 2020; Cai, 2018; Fridgen et al., 2021;
Lacity and van Hoek, 2021; Trabucchi et al., 2020; Mehrwald et al., 2019; Ziolkowski et al., 2018).
Mehrwald et al. (2019) posit that blockchain technology can surrogate institutional intermediaries
because the technology can replace institutional coordination mechanisms. However, the authors
highlight that institutions will not be replaced entirely by blockchain technology since blockchain
technology cannot take over functions like matching buyers and sellers. Al-Shaibani et al. (2020) further
add the perspective of institutional infrastructures in the case of a decentralized stock exchange. The
authors highlight that a fully decentralized exchange would not comply with the regulatory boundaries
of the market, and henceforth a blockchain solution cannot disintermediate all functions of an
institutional intermediary. Other research finds several possibilities for institutional intermediaries to
gain a competitive advantage through blockchain technology (Trabucchi et al., 2020). Due to the inter-
organizational character of the technology, institutional intermediaries often collaborate in consortia to
implement solutions that improve processes but do not remove their market position (Wang et al., 2021;
Zavolokina et al., 2020; Guggenberger et al., 2021b).
Re-Intermediation
Lastly, the concept of Re-Intermediation extends the perspective of Limited Disintermediation by
proposing scenarios of how institutional intermediaries change their role within markets. Drawing on
interdisciplinary literature, Zamani and Giaglis (2018) suggest that complete Disintermediation is
unlikely to happen in their conceptual paper. The authors propose different scenarios for institutional
intermediaries based on Giaglis et al. (2002). While blockchains theoretically could form an Internet of
Value that operates without any institutional intermediaries, it is more likely that existing intermediaries
find new business models that leverage the advantages of blockchain technology (e.g., banks enhancing
processes through blockchain-backed systems). Through the implementation of blockchain networks,
also new intermediaries might emerge that provide new services in the market (e.g., wallet providers)
that did not exist before. The authors thereby adopt the perspectives of the theory of electronic markets
on intermediaries as proposed by Wigand (2015). Chiu and Shang (2019) further develop this
perspective, and the preliminary results of their case study approach imply that institutional
intermediaries are not removed entirely by blockchain technology but find new roles within the value
chain. Tseng and Shang (2021) expand this perspective by proposing a set of five different outcomes
for institutional intermediaries when adopting blockchain technology from their multiple case study.
Owen and O'Dair (2020) follow the argumentation that blockchain technology is unlikely to completely
remove institutional intermediaries in value chains but rather change their role in creating value for
customers. Their case study in the music industry finds that blockchain technology enables new
possibilities for companies to act as infomediaries in the music industry whereby companies create new
services and thus, find new blockchain-enabled business models (O’Dair and Owen, 2019).
Further examples can also be found in the context of blockchain-enabled fundraising. Companies find
priorly unknown business models by acting as an auditor to verify new coins in the market (Collao and
Winship, 2019). This perspective of evolving business models has also been proposed for law firms
(Abbatemarco et al., 2020), finance (Lindman et al., 2017), and supply chain (Tönnissen and Teuteberg,
2020).
Next, we decided to gather further insights by exploring the scope of our identified concepts. Therefore,
we analyzed each article based on the mentioned functions of an intermediary. To provide a
comprehensive overview, we followed the framework of Bakos (1998). While initially proposed as a
generic framework, it also applies electronic markets (Giaglis et al., 2002). Henceforth we consider it to
analyze our identified blockchain literature. Table 3 presents the identified concepts based on the
analysis of the respective articles and their focus on different market functions.1 The values show the
percentual value of articles from a concept incorporating the perspective of a market subfunction.
Therefore, one article might incorporate the perspective of multiple market subfunctions.
1 The complete overview of the 90 identified articles can be accessed under the following link: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5708484
Extensive Limited
Concept Re-Intermediation
Disintermediation Disintermediation
Primary market
Subfunction n = 61 n = 20 n=9
function
Matching Det. of p. offering 1 of 61 (2%) 12 of 20 (60%) 8 of 9 (89%)
buyers and Searching 1 of 61 (2%) 15 of 20 (75%) 7 of 9 (78%)
sellers Price discovery 2 of 61 (3%) 8 of 20 (40%) 2 of 9 (22%)
Logistics 48 of 61 (79%) 12 of 20 (60%) 7 of 9 (78%)
Facilitation of
Settlement 55 of 61 (90%) 19 of 20 (95%) 8 of 9 (89%)
transactions
Trust 56 of 61 (92%) 19 of 20 (95%) 8 of 9 (89%)
Institutional Legal 0 of 61 (0%) 0 of 20 (0%) 1 of 9 (11%)
infrastructure Regulatory 0 of 61 (0%) 0 of 20 (0%) 1 of 9 (11%)
Table 3. Percentage of articles based on market functions and the proposed concept.
First, we find articles with the concept of Extensive Disintermediation to predominantly only cover one
primary market function. Thereby, the articles following this concept focus on the facilitation of
transactions through logistics, settlement, and trust (Schlecht et al., 2020). This focus can be found
across many different blockchain use cases and applications (Perscheid et al., 2020), e.g., in the energy
(Faizan et al., 2019) or finance industry (Gomber et al., 2018). Since most articles follow a Design
Science Research approach, the focus on these technical attributes is not surprising since they are well
documented in the literature (Rossi et al., 2019). Through the decentralized nature of blockchain
technology and the retroactive immutability of the ledgers, trust-free transactions are enabled (Chanson
et al., 2019). Since the first blockchain application was a peer-to-peer transaction system (Nakamoto,
2008), whereas other market functions are less important, the focus of articles on the facilitation of
transactions is reasonable from a technical perspective. However, we observe that this narrow
perspective leaves out other functions of an intermediary beyond the facilitation of transactions. Only
two articles incorporate mechanisms for price discovery in their research (Jaiswal et al., 2019; Zielinska
et al., 2019). We identified no articles that discuss the perspective of institutional infrastructures in this
context.
Second, the concepts Limited Disintermediation and Re-Intermediation have a wider focus by
incorporating the functions of matching buyers and sellers and institutional infrastructure. For example,
Catalini and Gans (2020) incorporate those functions in their economist perspective to propose a change
in the role of institutional intermediaries rather than their removal from the market. Those functions are
further displayed in the business model taxonomy of Weking et al. (2020). Tönnissen and Teuteberg
(2020) develop this perspective in their multiple case study in the supply chain sector. Thereby, the
authors find that institutional intermediaries still administer the matching of buyers and sellers, while
blockchains predominantly facilitate transactions between the participants. Following those research
streams could lead to a more distinct discussion over the possibilities of Disintermediation through
blockchain technology. While it is easy to replace institutional intermediaries for the facilitation of
transactions with blockchain technology, it seems more difficult to determine the product offering,
search for new products, set prices, and provide legal and regulatory infrastructures.
5 Discussion
Our article sample demonstrates a strong rise in scholarly interest in the topic of intermediation in the
context of blockchain technology over the years. This is not surprising since, with the rising maturity of
technologies and the respective literature, more theory-driven questions get into the focus of scholars
(Gregor, 2006). Our findings show that most articles dealing with blockchain technology and its impact
Second, we find several possibilities for institutional intermediaries to leverage blockchain technology
to develop their business models. Thereby, companies could use the capabilities of blockchain
technology to automate processes, in particular, the facilitation of transactions. Thus, practitioners
should not just consider the threat of Disintermediation but also the possibilities of blockchain
technology. Here, we propose a more specific perspective not only for incumbents but also for
established corporations. Other authors also support this perspective (Lacity and van Hoek, 2021;
Fridgen et al., 2021; Mattke et al., 2019).
6 Conclusion
Blockchain technology is still at the center of interest in academia and practice. Much of the expectations
regarding the disruptive potential of the technology build upon the capability to facilitate peer-to-peer
transactions without a trust-providing central entity. While many researchers build upon this capability
to foresee the removal of institutional intermediaries in different use cases, our research identifies three
different concepts in the literature. Thereby, we find Extensive Disintermediation to be the most
prominent concept, followed by Limited Disintermediation and Re-Intermediation. Comparing our
identified set of articles with literature about the functions of intermediaries in electronic markets shows
that the concept of Extensive Disintermediation largely focuses on the facilitation of transactions.
Therefore, the key functions of intermediaries are only partly considered. Building upon these findings,
we propose several avenues for future research. While our research provides substantial benefit to
research and practice, we acknowledge several limitations to our results, which we elaborate on in the
following.
First, our findings are limited to our applied search string and the selected databases. We followed a
highly structured approach in our methodology by applying established best practices for literature
reviews (Webster and Watson, 2002). Nonetheless, we might miss studies that provide further insights.
Second, due to the ongoing technological development, our paper only assesses the current body of
knowledge. Future generations of blockchain technology might enable other functions of intermediaries,
thus facilitating the removal of additional intermediaries. Third, the selection of the articles was only
conducted by one author. Even though the selection criteria had been discussed iteratively with all
authors to achieve a high degree of objectivity, the selection process itself is limited to some subjectivity
of the responsible researcher. Finally, selecting the framework to assess the market functions of each
identified concept (Giaglis et al., 2002) limits the breadth of our insights. Other theoretical lenses might
yield further insightful results.
Our overview and assessment of existing intermediation scenarios serves as an important building block
for a more theoretically founded discussion about the impact of blockchain technology on institutional
intermediaries. Thereby, we provide a starting point for researchers to assess the impact of blockchain
technology on real-world applications and continue to develop the research field onward.
Acknowledgment
We gratefully acknowledge the Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Regional Development and
Energy for their support of the project “Fraunhofer Blockchain Center (20-3066-2-6-14)” that made this
paper possible.
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